Abram Trosky, Integrative Summary of War, Torture, And Terror

8/2/2019 Abram Trosky, Integrative Summary of War, Torture, And Terror

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Integrative Summary for Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism

Abram Trosky

War, terrorism, and torture can each be thought of as forms of political violence

violence used as a means to achieve some group endbut with different conceptions of

what that end permits. In contrast to the indiscriminate or symbolic violence of terror,

war has traditionally been between national militaries on delimited fields of battle. In

theory, the violence that characterizes modern military warfare is similarly bounded,

tactical, and directed. However, insufficient international regulation of weapons-as-aid

from developed into developing countries and recirculation of Cold War munitions

stockpiles on the black market have contributed to a dangerous decentralization of force.

Asymmetric conflicts involving militias and other non-state actors in Afghanistan to

Colombia, and the Congo can often be bloodier and more protracted than conventional

warfare, with higher levels of civilian displacement and death.

Despite the periodic romanticization of both kinds of warfare, survivors tell horror

stories of wanton pain, suffering, and death that belie the awful, inertial power of

organized violence. These tales testify to how easily the line between the supposedly

instrumental violence of war, and more callous killing of terror is blurred in wars fog.

Repeated failures in the tactical use of torturethe supposedly controlled application of

physical or psychological force to individualsgive similar testimony of the difficulty in

domesticating violence. While no one celebrates cruelty, cultures of all kinds manage

to recreate conditions in which sanctioned group violence spirals into something more

sadistic.


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2INTEGRATIVE SUMMARY DEFINITIONS

However paradoxically, the fact that statespersons regularly euphemize violence

to morally justify its use demonstrates the power that public opinion carries: cynical

leaders still feel required to speak the language of legitimacy when presenting the case

for war. The recurrence of common themes in these appeals indicates the persistence of

some shared morality regarding violence, even in a postmodern age (Walzer, 2006, p.

xxi). Although torture is relatively morally unambiguous, wars of words are still being

fought over whether there are authentic justifications for war and terror; hence the

importance of this chapter cataloguing definitions of these concepts from around the

world. First, we present integrative definitions of each.

War

The moral and legal status ofstates use of force has long been debated in the

context of political expediency: when, if ever, do political endsthe projected good of

some privileged majority or minorityjustify war and its attendant risks? Are there times

when leaders are permitted to trade the life of a few to save many? Soldiers are unique in

that their oath of enlistment places their lives in the absolute service of these decision-

makers as the primary currency of such cost/benefit analyses. But how to identify the

institutions and rationales that demand these risks unnecessarily, hiding underlying

atavistic motives in the resort to war? Machiavelli thought that the unquestioning

allegiance of citizen-soldiers, where countrymen would fight for ideas, not merely

survival, was the principal virtue of a republic. Lenin thought that this was the nations

main liability. Kant proposed that with the rise of republics, warmongering would be self-


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regulated. Citizens everywhere would resist hostilities, which interrupted commerce, and

protest the increased taxes needed to fund standing armies.

All three scenarios suggest governmental pressure to convince national

populations of the necessity of sacrifice is a constant (though not always disingenuous).

Because national motives are nearly always mixed and even democratic states non-

unitary actors, an example of a just war seems as elusive or irrelevant as a Platonic Form.

This elusiveness leads most respondents to our Personal and Institutional Rights to

Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to one of two conclusions regarding war:

general condemnation and the pacifistic hope of its elimination on the one hand; on the

other, the realist recognition that the permanence of wars threat is strong reason to

eliminate sentimental moral considerations in the struggle for survival.

In the absence of a pure case, this polarization may be an example of the perfect

becoming enemy to the good in the relationship of public opinion to international

ethics. However, neither historys sordid chronicling of one war after another, nor wars

projected persistence obviate the question ofhow humans should fight, to which precise

definitions of proscribed tactics, such as torture and terror, remain extremely relevant.

Terrorism

Because government officials are prone not only to national aggrandizement, but

self-aggrandizement as well, citizens opposing antidemocratic leaders also grapple with

questions regarding the morality of violence. Although the state is defined by its

monopoly on violence (Weber, 2004, 29) (or more precisely, on the legitimate use of

force), the law recognizes certain justified uses of lethal force by individuals and nations


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against each other, most commonly in self-defense. There is longstanding debate in

political theory over the threshold of injustice that warrants forceful resistance

(McMahan, 2005). Does a threat need to be existential to be intolerable? Does the

immorality of a law or government ever justify the use of violence against it?

Thatpeople can resist is the premise of civil disobedience, and is relatively

uncontroversial; how they resist is crucial in answering these questions. If laws

systematically deprive a group of the very rights upon which that laws authority is based

(life, liberty, property), that group might be justified in foregoing attempts at peaceful

resistance and use targeted force against the system of law itself (Locke, 1980, vii). As

activist and author ofDisobedience and Democracy Howard Zinn (2001) points out, such

a focused act of violence may not be lawful, but it still can be just.

Terrorism is defined by the use of tactics that cross this line. Its object is not

limited to the system itself, but extends to citizens, who are seen as complicit in injustice

by virtue of their silent consent. They are seen as guilty of inaction. However, the morally

relativistic refrain, one groups terrorist is anothers freedom fighter misses the fact that

terrorism is not merely a label that groups in power use to smear their opponents; it has a

real-world referentthe callous killing of noncombatantsof which either side may be

guilty. No causenot freedom nor the end of war itselfcan morally justify the

intentional sacrifice of innocents against their will; this much is self-evident (Etzioni,

2010). Without some universal standard like the respect for human rights that now

animates international law, justice devolves to the right of the stronger.

Recognition of a common legal, if not moral, framework raises another timely

question about the norms of domestic and international politics and the relationship of


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war to terror: If a citizens movement resists an oppressive government justly (that is,

without resorting to terror), but revolutionary conditions deteriorate, thereby threatening

civil war or state failure, do neighboring countries and/or other members of the

international community have a right or duty to intervene? The opinion of the United

Nations on this issue has evolved over the last decade, positing (2001, 2005) and

reaffirming (2006, 2009) a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that justifies multilateral

intervention in four extreme cases: genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity,

and war crimes (United Nations, 2005). In these cases, it could be said that the offending

government is itself guilty of terrorism against its own people, who are justified in

defending themselves as others are in coming to their aid.

However, R2P exhausts neither the possible definitions of state terror, nor the

possible justifications for intervention. Between headings on Use of force under the

Charter and Peacekeeping, the same document that formalizes R2P features a separate

section strongly condemning terrorism. Naming it as one of the most serious threats to

international peace and security, the UN affirms as part of its mission,

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to takeeffective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to

the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches

of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformitywith the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or

settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a

breach of the peace (UN, 2005)

Central among these principles is respect for that venerable cornerstone of international

law, national sovereignty. This clause serves as a warning to intervening nations,

especially those doing so unilaterally and with lethal force, that they too can easily

present a threat to peace.


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Although human rights activists rightly bemoan the euphemization of

unintentional but foreseeable civilian deaths incurred during wartime operations as

collateral damage, these do not represent war crimes. However, if soldiers of the

invading nation incur avoidable/nonessential civilian casualties, even under the pretense

of aiding oppressed others, the legal distinction between them and the aggressors against

whom they are ostensibly fighting begins to break down. When such deaths are

systematic, repeated, and reckless, the intervening nation may also be guilty of state

terror, or aggression, the supreme international crime (Jackson, 1949).

Fighting terror is not an exemption from the prohibition against terror. The

violation of national sovereignty is, under certain circumstances, legally and morally

permissible; the violation of international humanitarian law is not. In the terminology of

the just war tradition, legitimacy in permission to go to war (jus ad bellum) does not

provide blanket immunity for illegitimacy in its execution (jus in bello).

This distinction is captured in the following paragraph from the 2005 UN World

Summit under the heading Terrorism:

We recognize that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be conductedin conformity with international law, including the Charter and relevant

international conventions and protocols. States must ensure that any measures

taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law,

in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law(UN, 2005).

Although this document does not mention torture, a resolution by the UN Security

Council the next year, Reaffirms also its condemnation in the strongest terms of all acts

of violence or abuses committed against civilians in situations of armed conflict in

violation of applicable international obligations with respect in particular to (i) torture

and other prohibited treatment (UN, 2006).


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This UN resolution on state violence provides an opportunity to elaborate on

international humanitarian law prohibiting torture in the context of two recent

international conflictsthe U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The opening of

these two fronts in the so-called War on Terror, and the debate over the definition of

torture and its use in these conflicts, were relatively recent when our team administered

the PAIRTAPS, and were therefore referenced frequently in qualitative responses.

Torture

If terrorism is characterized by the death of innocents, can torture, which normally

inflicts harm short of death on suspects presumed to be guilty, be considered a terror

tactic? Torture inflicted by suspected terrorists and authoritarian dictatorships conforms

to historical uses of pain to elicit confessions (Murphy, 2012). It is also used punitively to

inflict mutilations or disfigurement that deter dissent and inspire fear in the populace, as

in the notorious South American disappearances, Robert Mugabes systematic

intimidation campaign during the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe (Godwin, 2011), or the

Assad regimes atrocities against captured protestors in Syria. These varieties of torture

are obvious transgressions; even if a captive is guilty of the capital offense of treason,

making an example of them to would-be rebels by protracting this process through

torture transgresses criminal and moral law by treating an individual as a means rather

than an end in themselves (Kant, 1993, 36).

By this reasoning, governments condoning the use of torture may be guilty of

state terror, if not a crime against humanity, but as with the prosecution of other

atrocities, it is unclear how far up the chain of command guilt reaches (Crawford, 2007).


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The world lost a chance to locate responsibility in the case of the U.S. governments use

of enhanced, severe, or aggressive interrogation techniques against two Al Qaeda

operatives when, in 2005, the chief of the CIAs National Clandestine Service destroyed

hundreds of hours of videotaped interrogations (Gorman & Evans, 2009). This step was

supposedly taken as a precaution to protect lower-level officers who were just following

orders, but may as likely have been to protect the identities of higher-level visitors who

were giving the orders (Engelhardt, 2007).

Could blame extend all the way to a citizenry that tolerates or even advocates

their governments use of torture to keep them safe? An affirmative answer borders

dangerously on the terrorists rationale for random acts of violence against the public for

the sake of political expediency. Several PAIRTAPS respondents diddefend the use of

torture, provided it yielded information that contributed to saving lives. However,

torturing a suspect to find and defuse a ticking bomb is largely the stuff of fiction; the

connection and calculus between lives saved and lives damaged through advanced

interrogation techniques is far more tenuous in their common application of general

intelligence gathering.

Mathew Alexander, the lead interrogator responsible for gathering intelligence

used to track down Al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, eschewed

harsh interrogation techniques, calling them a euphemism for abuse, if not torture

(Alexander, 2011). He estimates that the incentive-based, cooperative strategies his team

used had an 80% success rate, but laments that these milder techniques were not widely

adopted by old school interrogators (Gross & Miller, 2011). A recently declassified

U.S. government document (Declassified document 000353, 2002, p. 2) corroborates his


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methodological choice, noting The application of extreme physical and/or psychological

duress (torture) has some serious operational deficits, most notably, the potential to result

in unreliable information.

The document goes on:

This is not to say that the manipulation of the subject's environment in an effort

to dislocate their expectations and induce emotional responses is not effective. Onthe contrary, systematic manipulation of the subject's environment is likely to

result in a subject that can be exploited for intelligence information and other

national strategic concerns. (Declassified document 000353, 2002, p. 2)

Manipulation of the subjects environment is troublingly vague, conceivably justifying

unethical privations that are elsewhere classed as psychological torture. This class

includes the severe emotional abuse of no-touch torturethe sleep, exercise, and

communication deprivation characteristic of solitary confinement. Despite its mention in

the declassified document, the U.S. government continues to deny this or any other use of

torture, calling the conditions in single occupancy cells standard forLevel One military

prisons such as the Marine Corps Brig at Quantico, or the Guantanamo Bay detention

facility. Hostile interrogations, including those of U.S. citizens, have also taken place off

American soil, during extraordinary renditions to secret prisons (so-called black sites),

and, notoriously, at the U.S. prison at Abu Ghraib.

Under former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, enhanced

interrogation techniques previously limited to Army Special Access Programs were

extended to common soldiers andnational guardsmen and women. The cornerstone of

enhancement in this theatre was tailored to what were seen as the specific

vulnerabilities of Arabic males: coercive force coupled with sexual humiliation. This

atmosphere of permissiveness vis--vis racial discrimination and religious bigotry led to


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widespread abuse. The ghastly images leaked from Abu Ghraib confirmed what

psychologists have known for some time: official authorization and/or belief in the

sanctity of ones cause facilitates the dehumanization of victims (Milgram, 1974;

Zimbardo, 1991; Bandura, 1999).

Even if they had not resulted in death and maiming of subjects, these acts would

normally have been prohibited by international humanitarian lawunder the third and

fifth articles of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948)and the UN Convention

Against Torture (1984). Whereas the official line has been to dismiss abuses like those at

Abu Ghraib as aberrationsthe depraved acts of a few, deviant individualspsychiatrist

and historian R.J. Lifton (2004) has argued that war regularly produces conditions

favorable to criminal violations, with wars of counterinsurgency particularly prone to

such atrocity-producing situations.

Torture, Terrorism, and War in the context of International Humanitarian Law

Wars of aggression are prosecutable under the 1928 Kellogg Briand Pact (The

General Treaty for the Renunciation of War), which was used as the basis for the

crimes against peace prosecuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as under article

two of the United Nations Charter. Wars of defense, by contrast, are protected under the

UN Charters article 51 (1945), which states, Nothing in the present Charter shall impair

the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against

a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary

to maintain international peace and security. In practice, because nations retain the

prerogative to determine what constitutes their vital interests and to define threats to that


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interest, the legality of defensive war has provided a loophole for preemptive, even

preventative war-making invoked, for instance, in the Iraq and Vietnam Wars (McMahan,

2005). Critics of these wars argue that their prolonged timetables and high civilian

casualties make them functionally indistinct from wars of aggression (Burke, 2004).

In neither of these conflicts, nor the one in Afghanistan, has war officially been

declared, each having the characteristics of counter-insurgency rather than a series of

battles against a national foe that could be decisively defeated. The U.S. has portrayed the

violations of national sovereignty in Afghanistan and Iraq as multilateral decisions in an

attempt to legitimate them. Despite UN Security Council backing being named as a sine

qua non by a majority of Americans polled for the invasion of Iraq (Benedetto, 2003),

only the coalition effort in Afghanistan had this designation. Failure on this front in Iraq

runs afoul of just war principles such as reasonable chance of success and

authorization by legitimate authority. Revelations since the invasion point to the

violation of the more fundamental just war criteria ofjust cause and last resort

(Wilson, 2003; McMahan, 2005).

Afghanistan and Iraq are seen as fronts in the War on Terror waged by the U.S.

military and intelligence apparatuses, the prosecution of which raises questions in

international humanitarian law. The Bush administrations unilateral declaration that

suspected members of international terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda would be

considered illegal combatants attempted to void their protection under the Geneva

Conventions. However, low-intensity counter-insurgency warfare is covered under

international humanitarian law (IHL): The third and fourth articles of the Third Geneva

Convention of 1929, relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, deal expressly with


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armed conflict notof an international character, mentioning torture among its

prohibitions several times, as well as outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,

humiliating and degrading treatment, for all category of belligerent: crew-members or

laborers, correspondents or contractors, paramilitary or militia, sick or wounded

(International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949). The Fourth Convention, relative to

the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, outlaws terrorist tactics such as

hostage-taking, mutilation, and murder (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949).

Even though civilians and captured soldiers are accorded similar rights under

these articles, the viability of IHL depends on an active distinction between these groups

on the part of all involved: soldiers cannot hide among civilians and civilians cannot

behave like soldiers. Members of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party

to the conflict and operating in oroutside their own territory, even if this territory is

occupied are also covered by the Conventions, provided they meet four conditions: (a)

that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having

a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d)

that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war

(International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949). Decentralized and covert, terrorist

tactics purposefully conform to none of these. However, under the same body of law,

apprehended and detained terror suspects are afforded the protection against mutilation

and murder that they deprived of their victims.

Conclusions


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Even when respondents do not expressly invoke international law or ethics, their

definitions of war, torture, and terror are drawn from one of three basic conceptions

regarding the permissibility of political violence: 1) these acts and activities are

unqualifiedly immoral and therefore impermissible (the position of the pacifist), 2)

qualifiedly moral and permissible (the middle territory that the just war tradition is meant

to navigate), or 3) amoral (the position of the foreign policy realist). In the last case, an

acts permissibility is unrelated to its putative morality, and is only related to its legality

insofar as it is enforceablea largelypost hoc consideration in anarchic international

relations. Because the validity of desperate means depends on the specific conditions

under which they are deployed, as in the second and third cases, neither international law

nor absolutist moral law seem adaptable enough to be useful.

As undesirable as it is, war seems to admit of exception. War may be hell, but it

nonetheless continues to strike citizens of disparate dispositions as occasionally

necessary, albeit for different reasons. As De Mercurio et alpoint out in their chapter,

competing conceptions of what constitutes vital national security interests range from

stopping an immanent threat, to finding dragons to slay. Because of the short leap from

the genuine attempt to promote global justice to governments confusing their good

intention for just cause, national interests must be kept in check through citizens

vigilance and participation. The findings presented in this book imply that once

statespersons convince themselves of their nations stake in a particular conflict, public

opinion is dangerously malleable. This is especially true when members of the media

cease to be vigilant. Peacetime, therefore, ought not be considered merely the period

between inevitable wars, but the time in which populaces steel themselves against


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spurious official rationales for conflict, building bridges between themselves and the

potential other.

Misleading as the War on Terror is in naming an abstraction as a belligerent,

the psychology and sociology behind the resort to terror, often by affluent and educated

individuals, is a pressing area of further study. While many individuals intuitions about

political rights align with the consensus in international ethics, addressing the twin

scourges of aggressive war and terrorism requires continuing public education or re-

education regarding its particular moral and legal requirements. These intuitions can be

overpowered by socialization into either the debilitating cultural relativism that has

become prevalent in higher education, or the jingoistic ethnocentrism or militant

nationalism that often characterizes populist appeals to the less well-educated. Without

authentic deliberation about just reconciliation of difference, these forces threaten to

undermine both the conviction behind international resolutions like the Responsibility to

Protect, and the skepticism necessary to keep individual governments in check, in and out

of wartime.

By demanding national governments adhere to the standards set out in the UN

Charter, conform to international humanitarian law, and accept the jurisdiction of the

International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, citizens take collective

responsibility for shaping the vaunted opinion of[hu]mankind (Walzer, 2006). Voting

is too slow a mechanism to elicit such accountability; these entities and ideas must

permeate political discourse about foreign affairs and electoral platforms, as well as

dinnertime and work conversations. Informed opinion includes knowing, rather than

guessing, what others around the world think. Thus, public opinion presented through


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survey data like those that appear in this chapter, is highly relevant in progressing debate

over the normative status of political violence. It is only through the negotiation of a

more precise understanding of concepts like torture and terror, in their colloquial, legal,

and historical uses, that we can clarify and refine the standards by which humanity

defines humanity.

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Abram Trosky, Integrative Summary of War, Torture, And Terror

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