Able Archer 83 1

Able Archer 83Able Archer 83 was a ten-day NATO command post exercise starting on November 2, 1983 that spanned WesternEurope, centred on the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Headquarters situated at Casteau,north of the Belgian city of Mons. Able Archer exercises simulated a period of conflict escalation, culminating in acoordinated nuclear release.[1] The 1983 exercise incorporated a new, unique format of coded communication, radiosilences, participation by heads of government, and a simulated DEFCON 1 nuclear alert.The realistic nature of the 1983 exercise, coupled with deteriorating relations between the United States and theSoviet Union and the anticipated arrival of Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe, led some members of the SovietPolitburo to believe that Able Archer 83 was a ruse of war, obscuring preparations for a genuine nuclear firststrike.[1] [2] [3] [4] In response, the Soviets readied their nuclear forces and placed air units in East Germany andPoland on alert.[5] [6] This relatively obscure incident is considered by many historians to be the closest the world hascome to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.[7] The threat of nuclear war abruptly ended with theconclusion of the Able Archer 83 exercise on November 11.[8] [9]

Prelude to NATO exercise

Operation RYANThe greatest catalyst to the Able Archer war scare occurred more than two years earlier. In a May 1981closed-session meeting of senior KGB officers and Soviet leaders, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and KGBchairman Yuri Andropov bluntly announced that the United States was preparing a secret nuclear attack on theUSSR. To combat this threat, Andropov announced, the KGB and GRU would begin Operation RYAN. RYAN() was a Russian acronym for "Nuclear Missile Attack" ( ); Operation RYAN wasthe largest, most comprehensive peacetime intelligence-gathering operation in Soviet history. Agents abroad werecharged with monitoring the figures who would decide to launch a nuclear attack, the service and technical personnelwho would implement the attack, and the facilities from which the attack would originate. In all probability, the goalof Operation RYAN was to discover the first intent of a nuclear attack and then prevent it.[10] [11]

The impetus for the implementation of Operation RYAN is still largely unknown. Oleg Gordievsky, thehighest-ranking KGB official ever to defect, suspected that it was born of the increased "Soviet Paranoia" coupledwith "Reaganite Rhetoric". Gordievsky conjectured that Brezhnev and Andropov, who "were very, veryold-fashioned and easily influenced by Communist dogmas", truly believed that an antagonistic Ronald Reaganwould push the nuclear button and relegate the Soviet Union to the literal "ash heap of history".[12] [13] [14] CentralIntelligence Agency historian Benjamin B. Fischer lists several concrete occurrences that likely led to the birth ofRYAN. The first of these was the use of psychological operations (PSYOP) that began soon after President Reagantook office.

Able Archer 83 2

PSYOP

The GIUK gap

Psychological operations by the United States began mid-February1981 and continued intermittently until 1983. These included a seriesof clandestine naval operations that stealthily accessed waters near theGreenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap, and the Barents,Norwegian, Black, and Baltic seas, demonstrating how close NATOships could get to critical Soviet military bases. American bombersalso flew directly towards Soviet airspace, peeling off at the lastmoment, occasionally several times per week. These penetrations weredesigned to test Soviet radar vulnerability as well as demonstrate UScapabilities in a nuclear war.[15] In April, the United States Navyconducted FleetEx '83, the largest fleet exercise held to date in theNorth Pacific.[16] [17]

"It really got to them," recalls Dr. William Schneider,[former] undersecretary of state for military assistance andtechnology, who saw classified "after-action reports" thatindicated U.S. flight activity. "They didn't know what it all meant. A squadron would fly straight atSoviet airspace, and other radars would light up and units would go on alert. Then at the last minute thesquadron would peel off and return home."[15]

Korean Air Lines Flight 007On September 1, 1983 the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 (KAL 007) was shot down over the Sea of Japan nearMoneron Island just west of Sakhalin island over prohibited Soviet airspace. All 269 passengers and crew aboardwere killed, including Larry McDonald, a sitting member of the United States Congress. In conjunction with theextremely secretive PSYOPs against the Soviet Union, the attack brought relations between the two superpowers to anew public low. Illustrating the historically antagonistic relations between the USA and USSR in the early 1980s, theSoviet attack on KAL 007 also lends several insights into Able Archer 83.

Weapons buildupThe Reagan government oversaw the largest peacetime military buildup in the history of the United States. OnMarch 23, 1983, Reagan announced one of the most ambitious and controversial components to this strategy, theStrategic Defense Initiative (labeled "Star Wars" by the media and critics). While Reagan viewed the initiative as asafety net against nuclear war, leaders in the Soviet Union viewed it as a definitive departure from the relativeweapons parity of dtente and an escalation of the arms race into space. Yuri Andropovwho had become GeneralSecretary following Brezhnev's death in November 1982lambasted Reagan for "inventing new plans on how tounleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it".[18]

Able Archer 83 3

The US Pershing II Missile

Despite the enormous Soviet outcry over the "Star Wars" program, theweapons plan that generated the most alarm among the Soviet Union'sleadership during Able Archer 83 was the 1979 NATO approval andplanned deployment of intermediate-range Pershing II missiles inWestern Europe.[19] These missiles, deployed to counter Soviet SS-20intermediate-range missiles on its own western border, represented amajor threat to the Soviets. The Pershing II was capable of destroyingSoviet "hard targets" such as underground missile silos and commandand control bunkers. The missiles could be emplaced and launchedfrom any surveyed site in minutes, and because the guidance systemwas self-correcting, the missile system possessed a genuine "first strikecapability". Furthermore, it was estimated that the missiles (deployedin West Germany) could reach targets in the western Soviet Unionwithin four to six minutes of their launch. These capabilities led Sovietleaders to believe that the only way to survive a Pershing II strike wasto preempt it. This fear of an undetected Pershing II attack, accordingto CIA historian Benjamin B. Fischer, was explicitly linked to themandate of Operation RYAN: to detect a decision by the United Statesto launch a nuclear attack and, it must be believed, to preempt it.[11] [20] [21]

False alarm from the Soviet early missile warning systemOn the night of September 26, 1983, the Soviet orbital missile early warning system (SPRN), code-named Oko,reported a single intercontinental ballistic missile launch from the territory of the United States.[22] LieutenantColonel Stanislav Petrov, who was on duty during the incident, correctly dismissed the warning as a computer errorwhen ground early warning radars did not detect any launches. Part of his reasoning was that the system was newand known to malfunction before; also, a full scale nuclear attack from the United States would involve thousands ofsimultaneous launches, not a single missile. Later, the system reported four more ICBM launches headed to theSoviet Union, but Petrov again dismissed the reports as false. The investigation that followed revealed that thesystem indeed malfunctioned and false alarms were caused by a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude cloudsand the satellites' orbits.

Exercise Able Archer 83Thus, on November 2, 1983, as Soviet intelligence services were attempting to detect the early signs of a nuclearattack, NATO began to simulate one. The exercise, codenamed Able Archer, involved numerous NATO allies andsimulated NATO's Command, Control, and Communications (C) procedures during a nuclear war. Some Sovietleaders, because of the preceding world events and the exercise's particularly realistic nature, believedinaccordance with Soviet military doctrinethat the exercise may have been a cover for an actual attack.[23] [24]

Indeed, a KGB telegram of February 17 described one likely scenario as such:In view of the fact that the measures involved in State Orange [a nuclear attack within 36 hours] have tobe carried out with the utmost secrecy (under the guise of maneuvers, training etc) in the shortestpossible time, without disclosing the content of operational plans, it is highly probable that the battlealarm system may be used to prepare a surprise RYAN [nuclear attack] in peacetime.[25]

The February 17, 1983 KGB Permanent Operational Assignment assigned its agents to monitor several possible indicators of a nuclear attack. These included actions by "A cadre of people associated with preparing and implementing decision about RYAN, and also a group of people, including service and technical personnel... those

Able Archer 83 4

working in the operating services of installations connected with processing and implementing the decision aboutRYAN, and communication staff involved in the operation and interaction of these installations."[26]

Because Able Archer 83 simulated an actual release, it is likely that the service and technical personnel mentioned inthe memo were active in the exercise. More conspicuously, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and WestGerman Chancellor Helmut Kohl participated (though not concurrently) in the nuclear drill. United States PresidentReagan, Vice President George H. W. Bush, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were also intended toparticipate. Robert McFarlane, who had assumed the position of National Security Advisor just two weeks earlier,realized the implications of such participation early in the exercise's planning and rejected it.[27]

Another illusory indicator likely noticed by Soviet analysts was an influx of ciphered communications between theUnited Kingdom and the United States. Soviet intelligence was informed that "so-called nuclear consultations inNATO are probably one of the stages of immediate preparation by the adversary for RYAN".[28] To the Sovietanalysts, this burst of secret communications between the United States and the UK one month before the beginningof Able Archer may have appeared to be this "consultation". In reality, the burst of communication regarded the USinvasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983, which caused a great deal of diplomatic traffic as the sovereign of theisland was Elizabeth II.[29]

A further startling aspect reported by KGB agents regarded the NATO communications used during the exercise.According to the Moscow Centre's February 17, 1983 memo,

It [was] of the highest importance to keep a watch on the functioning of communications networks andsystems since through them information is passed about the adversary's intentions and, above all, abouthis plans to use nuclear weapons and practical implementation of these. In addition, changes in themethod of operating communications systems and the level of manning may in themselves indicate thestate of preparation for RYAN.[30]

Soviet Intelligence appeared to substantiate these suspicions by reporting that NATO was indeed using unique,never-before-seen procedures as well as message formats more sophisticated than previous exercises that possiblyindicated the proximity of nuclear attack.[31]

Finally, during Able Archer 83 NATO forces simulated a move through all alert phases, from DEFCON 5 toDEFCON 1. While these phases were simulated, alarmist KGB agents mistakenly reported them as actual.According to Soviet intelligence, NATO doctrine stated, "Operational readiness No 1 is declared when there areobvious indications of preparation to begin military operations. It is considered that war is inevitable and may start atany moment."[32]

Soviet SS-20 missile

Upon learning that US nuclear activity mirrored its hypothesized firststrike activity, the Moscow Centre sent its residencies a flash telegramon November 8 or 9 (Oleg Gordievsky cannot recall which),incorrectly reporting an alert on American bases and frantically askingfor further information regarding an American first strike. The alertprecisely coincided with the seven- to ten-day period estimatedbetween NATO's preliminary decision and an actual strike.[33] Thiswas the peak of the war scare.

The Soviet Union, believing its only chance of surviving a NATOstrike was to preempt it, readied its nuclear arsenal. The CIA reportedactivity in the Baltic Military District, in Czechoslovakia, and it determined that nuclear capable aircraft in Polandand East Germany were placed "on high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces".[9] [34] Former CIAanalyst Peter Vincent Pry goes further, saying he suspects that the aircraft were merely the tip of the iceberg. Hehypothesizes thatin accordance with Soviet military procedure and historyICBM silos, easily readied anddifficult for the United States to detect, were also prepared for a launch.[35]

Able Archer 83 5

Soviet fears of the attack ended as the Able Archer exercise finished on November 11. Upon learning of the Sovietreaction to Able Archer 83 by way of the double agent Oleg Gordievsky, a British SIS asset, President Reagancommented, "I don't see how they could believe thatbut its something to think about."[36]

Soviet reaction

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet double agentOleg Gordievsky

The double agent Oleg Gordievsky, whose highest rank was KGBresident in London, is the only Soviet source ever to have published anaccount of Able Archer 83. Oleg Kalugin and Yuri Shvets, who wereKGB officers in 1983, have published accounts that acknowledgeOperation RYAN, but they do not mention Able Archer 83.[37]

Gordievsky and other Warsaw Pact intelligence agents were extremelyskeptical about a NATO first strike, perhaps because of their proximityto, and understanding of, the West. Nevertheless, agents were orderedto report their observations, not their analysis, and this critical flaw inthe Soviet intelligence system coined by Gordievsky as the"intelligence cycle" fed the fear of US nuclear aggression.[38]

No Soviet political figure has publicly acknowledged Able Archer 83.Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who at the time was Chief of the mainoperations directorate of the Soviet General Staff, told Cold Warhistorian Don Orbendorfer that he had never heard of Able Archer. Thelack of public Soviet response over Able Archer 83 has led some historians, including Fritz W. Ermarth in his piece,"Observations on the 'War Scare' of 1983 From an Intelligence Perch", to conclude that Able Archer 83 posed noimmediate threat to the United States.[39]

American reactionIn May 1984, CIA Russian specialist Fritz W. Ermarth drafted "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-PoliticalActivities", which concluded: "we believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do notperceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict with the United States."[6] Robert Gates, Deputy Director forIntelligence during Able Archer 83, has published thoughts on the exercise that refute this conclusion:

Information about the peculiar and remarkably skewed frame of mind of the Soviet leaders during thosetimes that has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union makes me think there is a goodchancewith all of the other events in 1983that they really felt a NATO attack was at least possibleand that they took a number of measures to enhance their military readiness short of mobilization. Aftergoing through the experience at the time, then through the postmortems, and now through thedocuments, I don't think the Soviets were crying wolf. They may not have believed a NATO attack wasimminent in November 1983, but they did seem to believe that the situation was very dangerous. AndUS intelligence [SNIE 119-84 and SNIE 111084] had failed to grasp the true extent of theiranxiety.[40]

A still-classified report written by Nina Stewart for the President's Foreign Advisory Board concurs with Gates andrefutes the previous CIA reports, concluding that further analysis shows that the Soviets were, in fact, genuinelyfearful of US aggression.[36]

Some historians, including Beth A. Fischer in her book The Reagan Reversal, pin Able Archer 83 as profoundly affecting President Reagan and his turn from a policy of confrontation towards the Soviet Union to a policy of rapprochement. Most other historians say that Reagan always intended to increase the United States defensive ability and then negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. The thoughts of Reagan and those around him

Able Archer 83 6

provide important insight upon the nuclear scare and its subsequent ripples. On October 10, 1983, just over a monthbefore Able Archer 83, President Reagan viewed a television film about Lawrence, Kansas being destroyed by anuclear attack titled The Day After. In his diary, the president wrote that the film "left me greatly depressed".[41]

Later in October, Reagan attended a Pentagon briefing on nuclear war. During his first two years in office, he hadrefused to take part in such briefings, feeling it irreverent to rehearse a nuclear apocalypse; finally, he consented tothe Pentagon official requests. According to officials present, the briefing "chastened" Reagan. Weinberg said,"[Reagan] had a very deep revulsion to the whole idea of nuclear weapons... These war games brought home toanybody the fantastically horrible events that would surround such a scenario." Reagan described the briefing in hisown words: "A most sobering experience with [Caspar Weinberger] and Gen. Vessey in the Situation room, abriefing on our complete plan in the event of a nuclear attack."[41] [42]

These two glimpses of nuclear war primed Reagan for Able Archer 83, giving him a very specific picture of whatwould occur had the situation further developed. After receiving intelligence reports from sources includingGordievsky, it was clear that the Soviets were unnerved. While officials were concerned with the Soviet panic, theywere hesitant about believing the proximity of a Soviet attack. Secretary of State George P. Shultz thought it"incredible, at least to us" that the Soviets would believe the US would launch a genuine attack.[43] In general,Reagan did not share the secretary's belief that cooler heads would prevail, writing:

"We had many contingency plans for responding to a nuclear attack. But everything would happen sofast that I wondered how much planning or reason could be applied in such a crisis Six minutes todecide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope and decide whether to unleash Armageddon! Howcould anyone apply reason at a time like that?"[44]

According to McFarlane, the president responded with "genuine anxiety" in disbelief that a regular NATO exercisecould have led to an armed attack. To the ailing Politburoled from the deathbed of the terminally ill Andropov, aman with no firsthand knowledge of the United States, and the creator of Operation RYANit seemed "that theUnited States was preparing to launch ... a sudden nuclear attack on the Soviet Union".[13] [45] [46] In his memoirs,Reagan, without specifically mentioning Able Archer 83he states earlier that he cannot mention classifiedinformationwrote of a 1983 realization:

"Three years had taught me something surprising about the Russians:Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps thisshouldn't have surprised me, but it didDuring my first years in Washington, I think many of us in the administration took it for granted that theRussians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike againstthem. But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more Ibegan to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors whomight hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strikeWell, if that was the case, I was even more anxious to get a top Soviet leader in a room alone and try toconvince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union and Russians had nothing to fear from us."[47]

Able Archer 83 7

Notes[1] Benjamin B. Fischer (2007-03-17). "A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare" (https:/ / www. cia. gov/ library/

center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ csi-publications/ books-and-monographs/ a-cold-war-conundrum/ source. htm#HEADING1-12). CentralIntelligence Agency. . Retrieved 2009-01-13.

[2] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 857.[3] Beth Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 123, 131.[4] Pry, War Scare, 379.[5] Oberdorfer, A New Era, 66.[6] SNIE 111084 "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities" Central Intelligence Agency, May 18, 1984.[7] John Lewis Gaddis and John Hashimoto. "COLD WAR Chat: Professor John Lewis Gaddis, Historian" (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ SPECIALS/

cold. war/ guides/ debate/ chats/ gaddis). . Retrieved 2005-12-29.[8] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkovs Instructions, 878.[9] Pry, War Scare, 434.[10] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 746, 86.[11] Fischer, Benjamin B (1997). A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare - Phase II: A New Sense of Urgency. (https:/ / www. cia.

gov/ library/ center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ csi-publications/ books-and-monographs/ a-cold-war-conundrum/ source.htm#HEADING1-08) CIA.

[12] Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum": Appendix A: RYAN and the Decline of the KGB (https:/ / www. cia. gov/ csi/ monograph/ coldwar/source. htm#HEADING1-18).

[13] Testimony of Oleg Gordievsky to Congress.[14] Reagan, Ronald (1982-06-08). "Address to Members of the British Parliament" (http:/ / www. reagan. utexas. edu/ archives/ speeches/ 1982/

60882a. htm). University of Texas archives. .[15] Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The

Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 8, as quoted at Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum" (CIA Centre for the Study of Intelligence, 2007) (https:/ /www. cia. gov/ csi/ monograph/ coldwar/ source. htm#HEADING1-07). Retrieved on 4 January 2008.

[16] Johnson, p. 55[17] Richelson, p. 385[18] Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum: "Star Wars" (https:/ / www. cia. gov/ library/ center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ csi-publications/

books-and-monographs/ a-cold-war-conundrum/ source. htm#HEADING1-11)[19] Although Able Archer 83 simulated the release of Pershing II missiles for the first time, the missiles themselves were not deployed until

November 23 22 days after the exercise completed (Pry, p. 34)[20] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkovs Instructions, 746.[21] White, Andrew (1983). Symbols of War: Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe. London: Merlin Press. pp.259.[22] Schmalz, pp. 2829[23] Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 123.[24] Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum": Able Archer 83 (https:/ / www. cia. gov/ csi/ monograph/ coldwar/ source. htm#HEADING1-13).[25] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 78.[26] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkovs Instructions, 72.[27] Oberdorfer, A New Era, 65.[28] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 76.[29] Walker, Martin (1993). The Cold War: A History. New York: Henry Holt and Company. p.276.[30] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions, 8081.[31] Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 599600.[32] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkovs Instructions, 79.[33] Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 600.[34] Gates, From the Shadows, 271, 272.[35] Pry, War Scare, 44.[36] Oberdorfer, A New Era, 67.[37] Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum": Appendix B: The Gordievsky File (https:/ / www. cia. gov/ csi/ monograph/ coldwar/ source.

htm#HEADING1-19)[38] Andrew and Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkovs Instructions, 69.[39] Ermarth, Fritz W. (November 11, 2003). "Observations on the War Scare of 1983 From an Intelligence Perch" (http:/ / web. archive. org/

web/ 20060724160027/ http:/ / www. isn. ethz. ch/ php/ documents/ collection_17/ texts/ ermarth. pdf) (PDF). Archived from the original(http:/ / www. isn. ethz. ch/ php/ documents/ collection_17/ texts/ ermarth. pdf) on 2006-07-24. . Retrieved 2006-05-21.

[40] Gates, From the Shadows, 273.[41] Reagan, An American Life, 585.[42] Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 1202.[43] Shultz, George P (1993). Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribners Sons. p.464.

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[44] Reagan, An American Life, 257.[45] Nina Stewart, in a report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1990, as cited in Oberdorfer, A New Era, 67.[46] Fischer, Reagan Reversal, 134.[47] Reagan, An American Life, 585, 5889.

Footnotes

References Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg (1992). KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin

to Gorbachev (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=SCIFAQAAIAAJ). Harpercollins. ISBN0-06-016605-3. Andrew, Christopher and Gordievsky, Oleg, eds. (1993). Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on

KGB Foreign Operations, 19751985 (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=6ahujvo6ukwC). Stanford UP.ISBN0-8047-2228-5.

Cimbala, Stephen J. (2001). Russia and armed persuasion (http:/ / books. google. com/books?id=lVj21jB3jnYC& pg=PA64). Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN0-7425-0962-1.

Fischer, Benjamin B (1997). "A Cold War Conundrum" (https:/ / www. cia. gov/ library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ csi-publications/ books-and-monographs/ a-cold-war-conundrum/ source.htm). Center for the Study of Intelligence. Retrieved 2008-01-08.

Fischer, Beth A (2000). The Reagan Reversal Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (http:/ / books. google.com/ books?id=SJnWWTvPYmMC). University of Missouri Press. ISBN0-8262-1287-5.

Gates, Robert M (1996). From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and How They Wonthe Cold War (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=N_hfPrIMYuEC). New York: Simon & Schuster.ISBN1-4165-4336-8.

Johnson, Richard William (1986). Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American Connection (http:/ / books. google.com/ books?id=hyuTAAAAIAAJ). Viking. ISBN0-670-81209-9.

Oberdorfer, Don (1998). From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 19831991(http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=33thz5xQu7UC). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP. ISBN0-8018-5922-0.

Powaski, Ronald E. (2003). Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 19811999(http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=KE-p8w8M3CkC& pg=PA40). Oxford University Press US.ISBN0-19-516098-3.

Pry, Peter Vincent (1999). War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink (http:/ / books. google. com/books?id=WigJ8ZsWE1QC). Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN0-275-96643-7.

Reagan, Ronald (1990). An American Life: The Autobiography. New York: Simon and Schuster.ISBN0-671-69198-8.

Schmalz, Roman (2007). My Life in Stalin's Russia (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=vSvJ2gvD7x8C). TatePublishing. ISBN1-59886-570-6.

Testimony of Oleg Gordievsky to Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee of MilitaryResearch and Development, Hearing on Russian Threat Perceptions and Plans for U.S. Sabotage, 106th cong.,1st sess., 1999-10-26.

Able Archer 83 9

Further reading "Operation RYAN, Able Archer 83, and Miscalculation: The War Scare of 1983" (http:/ / www. wilsoncenter.

org/ index. cfm?topic_id=1409& fuseaction=topics. item& news_id=400459) by Nathan B. Jones. "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities" (http:/ / www. foia. cia. gov/ browse_docs.

asp?doc_no=0000278546), a declassified CIA publication from October 1984 that describes Soviet fears of a USattack.

Did East German Spies Prevent A Nuclear War? (http:/ / www. php. isn. ethz. ch/ collections/ coll_stasi/ mastny.cfm) by Vojtech Mastny.

CNN Cold War - Spotlight: War games (http:/ / www. cnn. com/ SPECIALS/ cold. war/ episodes/ 22/ spotlight/ ) NATO First Strike Doctrine (http:/ / www. wagingpeace. org/ articles/ 1999/ 04/ 21_krieger_abandon-dealert.

htm) The NATO nuclear policy at the time of Able Archer The Straight Dope: Operation Able Archer: Were the United States and the Soviet Union on the brink of nuclear

war? (http:/ / www. straightdope. com/ columns/ 050826. html) Rhodes, Richard (2007). Arsenals of Folly. Knopf (C-SPAN2/BookTV segment (http:/ / www. booktv. org/

program. aspx?ProgramId=8848& SectionName=& PlayMedia=No)) CIA official page on the Able Archer exercise (https:/ / www. cia. gov/ library/

center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ csi-publications/ books-and-monographs/ a-cold-war-conundrum/ source.htm)

1983: The Brink of Apocalypse Channel 4, January 5, 2008 Peter Scoblic, The U.S. versus Them. 2008

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Article Sources and ContributorsAble Archer 83 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=445188207 Contributors: 68Kustom, A little insignificant, ACBest, Ahseaton, Airbuilder7, Airwolf, Alai, Albrozdude,Altenmann, Andonic, Andromeda321, Antandrus, Ashley Pomeroy, Baby Got, Bert Schlossberg, Betacommand, Bhadani, BillyTFried, Biruitorul, Blobglob, Bobblewik, Bobo192, Boleslaw,Bolivian Unicyclist, Bryan Derksen, Bsharkey, Butreaper, Bwithh, Calvados, Canley, CapitalR, CarbonLifeForm, Carlanna, Cassioli, Causa sui, Centrx, CharlotteWebb, Chris Rodgers, Circeus,Cjewell, Coemgenus, Colchicum, Comet Tuttle, CommonsDelinker, CosineKitty, CumbiaDude, D.M.N., Dabomb87, Danbarnesdavies, Dave6, Daytona2, Dcandeto, Ddiggler, Drsayis2, Eleland,Esemono, Eurocopter, Evolauxia, Gaius Cornelius, Garion96, Gbinal, Gimmetrow, Good Olfactory, Gopherbone, GreenReaper, Grizzwald, Ground Zero, Gspr, Hairy Dude, Heathhunnicutt,Hires an editor, Hornandsoccer, IRelayer, Iknowyourider, Inarcadiaego, JDS2005, Jbmurray, Jeff G., Jeffq, Jehochman, JoanneB, John Riemann Soong, John of Reading, JohnnyMrNinja, Jonel,Joseph Solis in Australia, Jsmaye, Justintracy, KBi, Kamalesh9, Kelvinc, Kenshinm4, Kesac, Kirill Lokshin, Kizor, KnightLago, Kozuch, Kumioko, Kungfuadam, Leandrod, Lightmouse,LilHelpa, Longhair, Lusum, Mangojuice, Mark83, Matteric, Maurice Carbonaro, Maury Markowitz, Megapixie, Melchoir, Miserlou, MisfitToys, Mithridates, Mr.tougas, Mrholybrain, Mrzaius,MustaphaMond, Mw1lcr, Natebjones, Neutrality, Octane, Oerjan, Offtherails, Omicronpersei8, Opelio, Owain loft, PBP, Pat Payne, Patrick0Moran, Petri Krohn, Pippilina, Pocketford, Popo leChien, Postlewaight, Prodego, PseudoSudo, Rabenkrahe, Raul654, Redquark, Remurmur, Rettetast, Reywas92, Richard75, Rillian, Rjwilmsi, Rob Burbidge, RobertG, RockMFR, Rollo44,Rwflammang, SOLARISERRIS, SandyGeorgia, SarekOfVulcan, Shimgray, Shiyang, SimonP, Simpsnut14, Slipmesomething, Slogby, Slowking Man, Smiteri, Soarhead77, Socrates2008, Spilla,Squids and Chips, Susan Davis, Tankparksalute, Tariqabjotu, Tec15, Testonetwothree, The Anonymous One, TheLoverofLove, Theroachman, ThoHug, Thom2002, Tim!, Tnkr111, TobyDouglass, TomStar81, Tony1, TransUtopian, Trust Is All You Need, Valeriesherman, Viridae, Vlth44, Wakiped, Weetjesman, Wimt, Woozle, Worldtraveller, XLerate, Xihr, Xiner, Ytcracker,Zarboki, Zquack, 181 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:GIUK gap.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:GIUK_gap.png License: Public Domain Contributors: -File:Pershing II.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Pershing_II.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: U.S. ArmyFile:SS20 irbm.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:SS20_irbm.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Original uploader was ChrisO aten.wikipediaFile:Reagan gordievsky.gif Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Reagan_gordievsky.gif License: Public Domain Contributors: Original uploader was Natebjones aten.wikipedia

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Able Archer 83Prelude to NATO exerciseOperation RYANPSYOPKorean Air Lines Flight 007Weapons buildupFalse alarm from the Soviet early missile warning system

Exercise Able Archer 83Soviet reactionAmerican reactionNotesFootnotesReferencesFurther reading

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