Abid v. Mayor 2012

Republic of the PhilippinesCOURT OF APPEALS

Manila

TWELFTH DIVISION

NELIA L. ABID,Petitioner-Appellee,

-versus-

THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, THE ACTING MUN. TREASURER, THE MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTANT, MUNICIPAL BUDGET OFFICER, EMMA ESPINO AND MARILOU BAGSIT, All of Municipality of Ferrol, Romblon,

Respondents-Appellants.

CA-G.R. SP No. 112361

Members:

LAMPAS PERALTA, F. ChairpersonLOPEZ, M. V., and INTING. S. B., JJ.

Promulgated:

January 31, 2012

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DECISION

LAMPAS PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is respondents-appellants' appeal from the the following Orders in Civil Case No. OD-800 (For Mandamus and Damages) of Branch 82, Regional Trial Court, Odiongan, Romblon:

(1) Order dated September 13, 20071 which denied respondents-appellants' motion to dismiss the petition for mandamus and damages and also ordered the reinstatement of petitioner-appellee as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon, with payment of full back salaries during the period of her preventive suspension from November 5, 1993

1 pp. 7-10, 55-58 and 126-129, Rollo; pp. 73-76, Record

CA-G.R. SP No. 112361 2Abid vs. The Municipality of Ferrol, Romblon, et. al.Decisionx - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

to February 5, 1994, and

(2) Order dated December 17, 20072 which denied respondents-appellants' motion for reconsideration of the Order dated September 13, 2007.

THE ANTECEDENTS

On April 26, 2007, petitioner-appellee Nelia Abid filed with the trial court a Petition3 for Mandamus and Damages against respondents-appellants elective and appointed officers of the Municipality of Ferrol, Romblon, namely: Mayor Jason Fabila, Acting Treasurer Estrella Mao, Accountant Jesalie Mijares, Budget Officer Ramsie Lunasco and Accounting Clerks Emma Espino and Marilou Bagsit, praying for (i) the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding respondents-appellants to reinstate petitioner-appellee as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon; (ii) the payment of petitioner-appellee's back salaries, RATA and other emoluments, allowances and benefits amounting to Php318,970.96; and, (iii) the award of moral and exemplary damages.

Respondents-appellants filed their Answer with Motion to Dismiss,4 praying for the outright dismissal of the petition for want of merit, among others. On August 9, 2007, the trial court heard the oral arguments of the parties with respect to the propriety of petitioner-appellee's reinstatement during the pendency of a criminal action against her.5

In its Order dated September 13, 2007, the trial court summarized its factual findings and the respective positions of the parties as follows:

2 p. 69 and 139, Rollo; p. 99, Record3 pp. 37-44 and 95-102, Rollo; pp. 2-9, Record4 pp. 46-52 and 115-121, Rollo; pp. 54-60, Record5 TSN dated August 9. 2007


That the petitioner was appointed as the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Ferrol, Romblon on November 18, 1984; she was administratively charged of Dishonesty through Malversation of Public Funds on September 3, 1993 and as a consequence thereof, she was preventively suspended for ninety (90) days from November 5, 1993 to February 1994.

After the service of the ninety-(90) day preventive suspension, Thelma Donde the then Municipal Mayor of Ferrol, Romblon refused to reinstate or allow the petitioner to return to her former position as Municipal Treasurer of said municipality.

On July 14, 1999, said petitioner was exonerated on a Decision rendered by the Secretary of Finance, Edgardo Espiritu.

Consequently, a resolution dated June 14, 2001 was issued and the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

It is hereby ordered that she be reinstated to her former position as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon with full back salaries for the period that she was under preventive suspension."

Despite the lapse of the ninety (90) days preventive suspension and the receipt of the Decision of the Department of Finance exonerating her for the administrative charge, said petitioner was prevented, prohibited to perform her duties and functions and refused to conduct the turn-over of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon by the previous and incumbent Municipal Mayor and the acting Treasurer.

Likewise, as a consequence of her exoneration, Civil Service Commission Regional Director Edmundo Dasig, Jr. issued an order for payment of her back salaries and wages including RATA but the respondents who are all responsible for the reinstatement and release of payment of salaries refused.

On February 23, 2007, a formal demand was made upon respondents but they still refused and continuously refused to reinstate and pay her salaries and other allowances up to the filing of said petition.

In its answer with motion to dismiss dated May 18, 2007,


the respondents averred that the petitioner has no cause of action and further claimed that as early as 1995 she has been reinstated in the payroll but not to her former position as Municipal Treasurer by reason of the criminal action that was instituted against her by the Commission on Audit. which is still pending before the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan.

Furthermore, the petitioner has been duly paid by her claims for the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 but the amount of Sixty Thousand pesos Two Hundred Eighty Three and Forty Eight Centavos (P60, 283, 48) was withheld due to the criminal action for Malversation of Public Funds. That the withholding of the subject amount was in consonant with Sec. 37 of P.D. 1445. Said petitioner cannot avail of and is not entitled to be paid and to receive RATA per letter dated February 9, 2001 of Julieta Dela Torre, Regional Director of The Department of Budget and Management Regional Office, Region IV.6

While the trial court denied for lack of merit respondents-appellants' motion to dismiss in its Order dated September 13, 2007, it also ordered respondents-appellants to reinstate petitioner-appellee with payment of full back salaries during her preventive suspension. Thus:

VIEWED FROM THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the respondents are hereby commanded or directed to enforce as part of their ministerial duty to reinstate the petitioner to her former position as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon with full back salaries from November 5, 1993 to February 5, 1994, the period she was under preventive suspension pursuant to the Decision of the Department of Finance on July 14, 1999 which had long became final and executory.

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED for lack ofmerit.

SO ORDERED7

On October 8, 2007, respondents-appellants filed a motion

6 pp. 7-8, 55-56 and 126-127, Rollo; pp. 73-74, Record.7 pp. 10, 58 and 129, Rollo; p. 76, Record.


for reconsideration8 of the Order dated September 13, 2007. In an Order dated December 17, 2007,9 the trial court denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration.

On January 16, 2008, respondents-appellants filed a notice of appeal.10 Petitioner-appellee opposed11 the notice of appeal on the ground that the appropriate mode of questioning the trial court's Order dated September 13, 2007 was by way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.

In an Order dated January 29, 2008,12 the trial court approved the notice of appeal, holding that the trial court's Order dated December 17, 2007 was not an interlocutory order but a final order as it finally resolved the issues raised in respondents-appellants' motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. Thus:

Before this Court is a Notice of Appeal dated January 16, 2008 flied by respondents and its opposition thereto.

The basis of filing the Notice of Appeal was the Court's Order dated December 17, 2007, denying the motion for reconsideration of the Order dated September 13, 2007, which petitioner's counsel considers it as interlocutory in nature, and therefore, is not appealable, the remedy being is by way of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the instant case, the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the Court's order dated September 13, 2007, is not an interlocutory order, but a final Order as the Court had finally resolved the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss and its motion for reconsideration. The respondents' reference in their Notice of Appeal to the Court's Order dated December 17, 2007, denying the motion for reconsideration should also be viewed to refer to the Order of the Court dated September 13, 2007 which was the subject of the motion for reconsideration. In other words, the respondents not only appealed from the final

8 pp. 59-62 and 130-133, Rollo; pp. 67-70, Record9 p. 69 and 139, Rollo; p. 99, Record10 pp. 11-12, 70-71 and 140-141, Rollo; pp. 100-101, Record11 Opposition to the Notice of Appeal, pp. 72-73 and 143-144, Rollo; pp. 102-103, Record12 pp. 13-14, 74 and 145-146, Rollo; pp. 104-105, Record


order of the Court dated December 17, 2007, but it also includes the Court's Order dated September 13, 2007, which appeal was filed on time.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Notice of Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals, Manila.

SO ORDERED.13

On January 31, 2008, petitioner-appellee filed a motion for reconsideration14 of the Order dated January 29, 2008. After a hearing on said motion for reconsideration,15 the trial court issued an Order dated October 26, 200916 denying the same for the following reasons:

Contrary to the stance of the petitioner, the court finds the order dated September 13, 2007 not an interlocutory but a final order. Petitioner is oblivious of the fact that, by careful reading of the September 13, 2007 order, it finally resolves on the merits of the case.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the order dated September 13, 2007 which was filed on time was denied by this court thru order dated December 17, 2007. Hence, the notice of appeal is proper under circumstances to appeal the final order dated September 13, 2007 which was also filed on time.

SO ORDERED.17

The present appeal of respondents-appellants from the Orders dated September 13, 2007 and December 17, 2007 of the trial court raises this issue:

WHETHER OR NOT, A DECISION RENDERED BY THE

13 pp. 13, 74 and 145, Rollo; p. 104, Record14 pp. 75-77 and 147-149, Rollo; pp. 107-109, Record15 TSN dated October 10, 200916 pp. 150-151, Rollo; pp. 173-174, Record17 p. 150, Rollo; p. 173, Record


LOWER COURT, WITHOUT REQUIRING THE PARTIES TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS, IS A VALID DECISION?18

THE ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in resolving the merits of the petition for mandamus with damages in the same Order dated September 13, 2007 which denied the motion to dismiss the petition.

THE COURT'S RULING

Respondents-appellants argues that the trial court's Order dated September 13, 2007 was null and void for violating the rights of the plaintiffs and defendants to be heard, and for want of evidence to support its decision.19 Allegedly, (i) the court, instead of limiting itself to the issues raised earlier in respondents-appellants' motion to dismiss, discussed and argued further, not only to the merits of the case but the whole case itself, without requiring the plaintiff nor the defendant to adduce evidence to support their respective claims and defenses;20 (ii) the trial court did not follow the procedure or steps laid down in the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, nor give the respondents-appellants their day in court, thereby denying their constitutional, procedural and substantial rights to due process;21 and, (iii) there is nothing to support the court's decision as there was no evidence introduced by the plaintiff to support her allegations.22

On the other hand, petitioner-appellee asserts that the present appeal should be denied because (i) respondents-

18 Appeal Memorandum (for the Appellants), p. 29, Rollo19 p. 32, Id.20 p. 31, Id.21 Id.22 Id.


appellants should have filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 6523 since the Order dated September 13, 2007 was merely an interlocutory order; (ii) even granting that the Order is not purely intelocutory, the same should have been questioned by way of certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;24 and, (iii) in any event, the ruling of the trial court was based on documents submitted by the parties and the oral arguments conducted and they have been accorded ample opportunity to be heard.25

The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy of a party aggrieved by the court's denial of a motion to dismiss is (i) to proceed to trial, and (ii) after trial and a decision is rendered, to appeal the decision and assigned as one of the errors the order denying the motion to dismiss. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course.26

Resort to appeal or special civil action for certiorari, unless the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,27 is proscribed because an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order.28 In law, the word "interlocutory" refers to 23 Memorandum for the Appellee, p. 86, Id. 24 p. 88, Id. 25 p. 90, Id. 26 Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 89, February

28, 200127 Heirs of Adolfo Florencio vs. Cabral, 530 SCRA 111, August 14, 200728 Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court

Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from: x x x x

(c) An interlocutory order;


intervening developments between the commencement of a suit and its complete termination; hence, it is a development that does not end the whole controversy. An "interlocutory order" merely rules on an incidental issue and does not terminate or finally dispose of the case; it leaves something to be done before the case is finally decided on the merits.29

In its Order dated September 13, 2007 denying respondents-appellants' motion to dismiss, the trial court also granted petitioner-appellee's main reliefs prayed for in the petition for mandamus, such as her reinstatement as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon and the payment of her full back salaries from November 5, 1993 to February 5, 1994. In fine, the trial court resolved the merits of the case. This is evident from the following ruling of the trial court:

This petition arose from the refusal of former Municipal Mayor of Ferrol, Romblon, Thelma Donde, to implement the Decision of the Secretary of Finance exonerating the herein petitioner from the administrative case and consequently ordering her reinstatement to the former position as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon, with full back salaries for the period that she was under preventive suspension.

The acts and inactions of these respondents from Municipal Mayors, Thelma Donde, Pacifico L. Mayor and the incumbent Mayor Jason FabiIa to implement said decision dated July 14, 1999 and a resolution dated June 14, 2001 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"It is hereby ordered that she be reinstated to her former position as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon with full back salaries for the period that she was under preventive suspension.

For failure to allow or continuous refusal on the part of these respondents to reinstate the petitioner to her former

x x x x.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

29 Marmo vs. Anacay, 606 SCRA 232, November 27, 2009


position as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon after the final orders and decisions of administrative agencies had long become final and executory pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, these respondents or officers have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

It is a well established rule that decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.

Decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the Courts, except when such officers acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, the petitioner had been exonerated since July 14, 1999 and the respondents alleged on their answer that the petitioner as early as in the year 1995 has been reinstated in the payroll but not to her former position as Municipal Treasurer by reason of the criminal action that was instituted against her and those claims were paid of but she is not entitled to be paid of and to receive RATA because said RATA is attached to the performance of duties and responsibilities of the incumbent, which the petitioner is not performing as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon, hence, she shall not be entitled thereto.

The issue regarding the withholding of the amount of Sixty Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Three Forty Eight (P60,283.48) by the respondents was due to the petitioner's criminal case which is still pending before RTC is for the satisfaction of indebtedness to the government pursuant to Sec. 37 of P.D. 1445.

The reinstatement of said petitioner as ordered is final and executory and it became a clear ministerial duty on the part of these respondents to comply with the decision dated July 14, 1999.

The established rule is that a writ of mandamus lies to enforce a ministerial duty or the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust


or station.30

Clearly, the trial court's Order dated September 13, 2007 is not just an interlocutory order but a final order, as nothing more is to be done in the case below. It is basic that an order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the trial court.31

Moreover, the trial court itself, in its Orders dated January 29, 200832 and October 26, 200933 confirmed that its Order dated September 13, 2007 which denied respondents-appellants' motion to dismiss the petition for mandamus and damages was a final order. Hence, respondents-appellants remedy was to file an appeal under Section 2 (a), Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not a special civil action of certiorari.

The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court in resolving the merits of the petition for mandamus not to follow the procedure or steps laid down in the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,34 specifically Sections 5 to 9, Rule 30.35 The Court answers in the negative.

The petition in the case is primarily for mandamus, seeking to reinstate or allow the reinstatement of the petitioner to her position as Municipal Treasurer36 because notwithstanding the clear lapse of the ninety day preventive suspension and the receipt of the decision of the Department of Finance exonerating her from the administrative charge and the favorable ruling of the Civil Service Commission when PETITIONER asked for assistance for the implementation of the Department of Finance ruling, both of which have become final and executory, petitioner was prevented,

30 pp. 8-10, 56-58 and 127-129, Rollo; pp. 74-76, Record31 Sarsaba vs. Vda. De Te, 594 SCRA 410, July 30, 200932 pp. 13-14, 74 and 145-146, Rollo; pp. 104-105, Record33 pp. 150-151, Rollo; pp. 173-174, Record34 p. 31, Rollo35 pp. 29-31, Id.; Rule on Trial36 pp. 44 and 102, Rollo; p. 9, Record


prohibited and refused to conduct the turn-over of the Office of Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon for the petitioner to perform her respective duties and functions by the previous and incumbent Municipal Mayor and the Acting Treasurer.37

Although an action for mandamus is a special civil action, the provisions pertaining to trial under Rule 30, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies suppletorily38 when the issues raised by the parties necessitate the holding of a trial. In petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, a trial court may conduct further proceedings by setting the case for trial after the comment thereon is filed. Section 8, Rule 65 provides:

Sec. 8. Proceedings after comment is filed. After the comment or other pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. If after such hearing or submission of memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.

The court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The oral arguments on August 9, 200739 cannot be 37 pp. 40-41 and 98-99, Rollo; pp. 5-6, Record38 Rule 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

x x x x x x

SEC. 3. Cases governed. These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings.

(a) x x x

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

x x x39 TSN dated August 9. 2007


considered as trial on the merits of the case because the arguments pertained primarily to the issue of whether the pendency of a criminal action barred petitioner-appellee's reinstatement. Notably, no evidence was even presented to prove the pendency of the criminal case.

Accordingly, remand of the case to the trial court for trial is necessary for the following reasons:

Firstly, it must be determined whether petitioner-appellee is entitled to reinstatement and if so entitled, whether she must be reinstated under Department of Finance (DOF) Decision dated July 14, 199940 which ordered the payment of her back salaries during the period that she was under preventive suspension,41 or under CSC Resolution No. 06-0227 dated February 1, 200642 which ruled that she was not entitled to back salaries and other monetary benefits during the period of her preventive suspension.43 Notably, petitioner-appellee was praying for the payment of back salaries and other monetary benefits during the period of her preventive

40 pp. 11-16, Record 41 p. 16, Record

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent is hereby exonerated of the offense charged for lack of susbtantial evidence. Consequently, it is hereby ordered that she be reinstated to her former position as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon with full back salaries for the period that she was under preventive suspension.

Let copies hereof be furnished all parties concerned.

SO ORDERED. 42 pp. 105-114, Rollo; pp. 22-32 and 87-96, Record43 p. 114, Rollo; pp. 32 and 96, Record

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of Pacifico Ll. Mayor, Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Ferrol, Romblon, is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, CSCRO No. IV Decision dated May 16, 2003, reinstating Abid to her former position as Municipal Treasurer of Ferrol, Romblon with payment of back salaries and other monetary benefits, excluding the period of her preventive suspension; the Decision dated July 17, 2003, declaring her entitlement to Representation and Transportation Allowance from the time she was deprived of receiving the same; and the Decision dated September 9, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration of movant Pacifico Ll. Mayor, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.


suspension from November 5, 1993 to February 5, 1994.44

Secondly, trial is necessary to determine factual issues. Petitioner-appellee's claims for back salaries, wages RATA and other emoluments, allowances and benefits x x x with a total of Php 318,970.9645 were controverted by respondent-appellants in their answer.46

Thirdly, petitioner-appellee's prayer for damages calls for

reception of evidence to lay the factual basis therefor.47 The trial court cannot merely rely on petitioner-appellee's bare allegations.

In fine, while the trial court did not err in denying respondents-appellants' motion to dismiss, it gravely erred when it resolved the merits of the case despite the absence of evidence to support the same.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Orders dated September 13, 2007 and December 17, 2007 of the trial court are AFFIRMED insofar as the denial of the motion to dismiss is concerned, but the same are REVERSED insofar as the merits of the case were ruled upon. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED. FERNANDA LAMPAS PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIO V. LOPEZ SOCORRO B. INTINGAssociate Justice Associate Justice44 pp. 42 and 100, Rollo; p. 7, Record45 pp. 44 and 102, Rollo; p. 9, Record46 pp. 48-49 and 117-118, Rollo; pp. 56-57, Record47 Coastal Pacific Trading, Inc. vs. Southern Rolling Mills, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 118692, July 28,

2006


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

FERNANDA LAMPAS PERALTAAssociate Justice

Chairperson, Twelfth Division

Abid v. Mayor 2012

Documents

Transcript of Abid v. Mayor 2012