theory of suicide-

Indian Political System: Centre-State Relation

Centre- State Relation

Hidayatullah National Law UniversityRaipur, ChhattisgarhSubmitted To: Dr. Avinash Samal.Assistant Professor, Political Science.Submitted By: ABHINAV K SHUKLARoll: 03, Semester- 3.Subject: Political Science (Major)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThanks to the Almighty who gave me the strength to accomplish the project with sheer hard work and honesty. This research venture has been made possible due to the generous co-operation of various persons. To list them all is not practicable, even to repay them in words is beyond the domain of my lexicon.This project wouldnt have been possible without the help of my teacher Dr. Avinash Samal, Faculty of Political science at HNLU, who had always been there at my side whenever I needed some help regarding any information. He has been my mentor in the truest sense of the term. The administration has also been kind enough to let me use their facilities for research work. I thank them for this would be grateful to receive comments and suggestions for further improvement of this project report.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements.................2

Introduction.............4

Research Methodology, Objectives and Scope and Limitations.5 Nature of Centre -State Relations ...6-10

Present sitiuation of the Centre-State Realtions ..11-13

Need for restructuring Centre-State Relations.14-16

Conclusion.............17

References.........................................................................................18

1. INTRODUCTIONStates in India are plagued by recurrent and severe fiscal crisis from the middle of the eighties. Mismanagement of the finances by the State governments is the reason for the crisis, most often highlighted during the current discussions on the issue. The role of the Central government, pivotal under the existing Centre-State financial relationship, is seldom mentioned as a possible reason. It requires reiteration in this context that India is a semi federal polity and the existing constitutional allocation of financial powers between the Centre and the States is heavily skewed in favour of the former. The Indian Constitution places considerable constraints on the States capacity for resource mobilisation while saddling them with enormous expenditure responsibilities. The Constitution of India however envisaged a fiscal transfer mechanism to transfer adequate funds from the Central government to the States, taking into account the disproportion between the financial powers and responsibilities of the two tiers of the government. The Finance Commission to be appointed every five years under Article 280 of the Constitution is the main agency for affecting such transfers. It is a semi-judicial body and is entrusted with the twin responsibilities of apportioning Central Government revenues between the Centre and the States on the one hand and among the individual States on the other.[footnoteRef:2] [2: D.D.Basu, Constitution of India, 21st edition.]

The Indian Constitution is federal in form but tends to be unitary in character. The federal principle gets circumscribed by the dominant powers vested with the Centre in the political, legislative, administrative and financial spheres. Strengthening the federal principle is necessary for meeting the aspirations of the people who are governed through state governments and for strengthening the unity of India. Theunity in diversity requires a federal system which can accommodate the rich diversity and weld the variegated social structure into a strong Union.The Constitution has formally divided the legislative, administrative and financial powers between the Centre and the States.[footnoteRef:3] The legislative powers are distributed in three lists, viz. the Union list, the State list and the Concurrent list. The Union list gives the Centre the authority to act in matters of national importance which include defence, foreign affairs, currency and other areas of strategic importance related with the security of the country. [3: http://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch8.htm]

1.1 OBJECTIVES- The specific objectives of this project being the following: (a) To analyze the nature of Centre- State relations in political and financial matters in regard to the Constitutional Provisions. (b) To evaluate the Present Scenario of Centre- State relations in political and financial matters.(c) To discuss the need of restructuring Centre- State relations in political and financial matters.

1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGYThis research is analytical and descriptive in nature. Secondary sources of information have been used while making this project. Such as, articles from books, journals and the internet.1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONSThis project is based on the Centre-State relations in context of only legislative and political powers conferred by the Constitution of India.

2. NATURE OF CENTRE-STATE RELATIONSa. FINANCIAL RELATIONS2.1.1. Formulation and Implementation of PlansIn the sphere of planning, the balance of decision making process tilted more towards the Centre during the early years of planning. This was probably inevitable as there was lack of adequate experience in the formulation and the implementation of Plan programmes at the State level. No doubt, planning from the grass-roots level has been emphasised from the very beginning, but its implementation has been sporadic and tardy. Even so, the Planning Commission encouraged District Planning Committees (DPCs) and taluk level planning process from the Fourth Plan. Subsequently, a significant step was taken through the enactment of the 73rd and the 74th Amendments to the Constitution in 1993, which conferred a Constitutional status not only on the PRIs and the ULBs but also on the DPCs.[footnoteRef:4] It is now fully realised that the spirit of co-operative federalism should get reflected in the strong encouragement given to participative planning processes. In other words, the Central Government, the State Governments, the PRIs, the ULBs, and the non-Governmental organisations, the voluntary action groups and most of all, the people at the grass-roots have to be involved in the process of formulation and implementation of the Plans. It is realised that the process of democratic decentralisation can have true meaning only when sufficient autonomy and freedom is available to the States as well as to the PRIs and the ULBs in the formulation and the implementation of the Plans. At the same time, autonomy pre-supposes maturity in decision making and responsibility in the use of national resources.[footnoteRef:5] Decentralisation of the process of formulation and implementation should, therefore, ensure accountability. [4: G. Austin, Working of a Democratic Constitution, (1st ed., 1999).] [5: http://polityinindia.wordpress.com/tag/federalism-and-centre-state-relations/]

2.1.2. Share of States in Public Sector Plan Outlay An important area of concern in the sphere of planning is the decreasing share of the States in the overall public sector Plan outlay. The share of the States in the actual public sector expenditure is going down continuously from the Fifth Plan onwards, so much so that while the share of the States was about 50% in the Fifth Plan it came down to almost 37% in the Eighth Plan. Further, the share of the States in terms of total public sector expenditure has been lower than the originally envisaged outlay in successive Five Year Plans since the Sixth Plan. In the Eighth Plan, while the share of the States in the total public sector outlay was envisaged to be 41.46%, in actual realisation it is likely to be of the order of 37 percent. The main reason for the declining share of the States has been the shortfall in the mobilisation of resources by the State Governments. Besides others, the non achievement of the States' envisaged outlays has adverse implications for sectors like Agriculture, Education, Health and other Social and Basic Minimum Services. The States' own resources (SOR) for their Eighth Plan were projected at Rs.1,01,485 crore. As against this, the expected realisation would be only Rs.70,335 crore, i.e., 69.3 percent of the projected SOR. The major shortfall was in respect of the Balance from Current Revenue (BCR) and internal contributions of public enterprises of the States. The BCR was projected at Rs.12,985 crore, while the expected realisation is (-) Rs.2,009 crore only, showing a shortfall of Rs.14,994 crore. An important reason for such a severe shortfall was the failure of many State Governments to raise the budgetary resources through additional revenue raising measures, increase in the non-Plan revenue expenditure on the target group oriented programmes, effect of the adoption of Central Pay scales and Central Dearness Allowances by many State Governments. The financially unviable operations of the State Electricity Boards, the State Road Transport Corporations and other State enterprises in most of the States had an adverse impact on the BCR of the State Governments, as these resulted in higher subsidies and grants to these enterprises, in addition to substantial loss of revenue in terms of interest and dividends, while States were forced to pay interest on their loans. The unwillingness of most of the States to revise the irrigation rates at least to meet the O&M expenditure was another reason for the shortfall in the States own resources. The most worrisome aspect was the increasing number of States providing free electricity to the farmers at a time when the country is facing a severe power shortage.[footnoteRef:6] [6: http://www.jstor.org/stable/]

2.1.3 Transfer of Centrally Sponsored Schemes Another issue which has been cropping up from time to time in the relations between the Centre and the States pertains to the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). The CSS are being implemented right from the beginning of the First Plan. When they were conceived, they were welcomed as they were intended to serve certain specific national goals. One classic example of CSS, which has made a far reaching impact, has been the introduction of HYV seed. This ushered in the Green Revolution in the country. But the number of CSS has grown over the years and they have made deep inroads even into the spheres falling within the domain of the States. There have been efforts from time to time for transferring the CSS to the States along with the corresponding funds, but not to much avail. A review undertaken by the Planning Commission showed that in 1995-96 there were 182 CSS under implementation with the Central funding of the order of Rs.16,000 crore. This level of Central funding is even more than the normal Plan assistance given to the States for the State Plans. In principle, the CSS should be confined to schemes of an inter-State character, matters impinging on national security, selected national priorities where Central supervision is essential for effective implementation and multi-State externally financed projects where the Central coordination is necessary for operational reasons. Except for such schemes, all other schemes should be transferred to the States along with the corresponding funds. A detailed exercise has been done by the Planning Commission to identify the schemes which could be transferred to the States in the light of the above approach. A final decision in the matter would be taken after ascertaining the views of the State Governments/Central Ministries with the approval of the NDC.[footnoteRef:7] [7: http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Visakhapatnam/trends-in-centrestate-relations-discussed/article]

2.1.4 Inter-se Allocation of Plan Assistance Since 1969, the Central assistance for the State Plans has been distributed to the States as per the Gadgil Formula. Some marginal changes have been made in this formula from time to time, but the emphasis has always been on channelising larger Central assistance to the backward States. The formula was last amended in 1991-92. As per the existing formula, after setting apart the funds required for Externally Aided Projects (EAPs) and reasonable amounts for Special Area Programmes, 30% of the balance is earmarked for ten Special Category States. The balance amount is distributed among Non-Special Category States on the basis of following criteria and weightage :

-------------------------------Criteria Weightage-------------------------------Population (1971) - 60%Per Capita Income - 25%Performance Criteria - 7.5%Special Problems - 7.5%------------------------------- During the Plan discussions, various Chief Ministers have asked for a revision of this formula for allocation of Central assistance to the State Plans so as to change both the criteria and the relative weights. While the backward States have argued for higher weightage to be given to backwardness, (equity), the better-off States have argued that they should be rewarded for maintaining financial discipline and achieving better productivity, (efficiency). No formula can satisfy the demands of all the States. The formula for the allocation of Central assistance has to be such that it helps in a balanced regional development on the one hand and encourages financial discipline and better economic performance on the other. The solution to this contentious problem has to be found by a consensus. The views of the State Governments have been sought regarding the revision of the formula. The NDC will have to take a final view on this matter.[footnoteRef:8] [8: http://www.epw.in/special-articles/centre-state-relations-india.html]

2.1.5 Nature of Central AssistanceBesides the issue of inter-se distribution of Central assistance among the States, the nature of Central assistance, that is, the grant-loan component, has also been raised from time to time. The States argue that when 30% of the grant component was introduced in 1969, the revenue component of the States' Plans was around 30 percent. Subsequently, it has gone on increasing, reaching upto 45 percent. They maintain that this justifies the increase in the grant component of Central assistance for State Plans under Gadgil Formula. Further, the States argue that among other reasons, the 70% loan component in the Central assistance for the States Plans has been a major reason for their increasing debt burden. They argue that their debt burden has been increasing so much so that in some cases there is net reverse flow of funds. They have, therefore, been asking for an increase in the proportion of the grant component in the Central assistance. The Special Category States have demanded Central assistance to be given as 100 per cent grant. The Sarkaria Commission had examined this issue and recommended different patterns of loan-grant assistance, depending upon the paying capacity of the States. The Finance Commissions in the past had also looked into the debt position of the States and recommended a scheme for general debt relief for all States, linked to fiscal performance and specific relief for States with high fiscal stress, the Special Category States and the States with debt problems warranting special attention. It has to be recognised that any change in the grant-loan component of the Central assistance has implications for the resource position of the Central Government. The NDC may have to decide on the issue of grant-loan proportion in the Central assistance while considering the question of inter-se distribution of the Central assistance among the States.[footnoteRef:9] [9: http://www.enableall.org/competitive-quest/GK/IndianFederalismCenterStateRelations.html]

b. POLITICAL RELATIONSThere are provisions whereby a State or a part thereof could be brought under the emergency powers of the Union. This can be done even without any constitutional breakdown and has been made possible as per Amendment in Article 352. However, bringing a State under the Presidents rule always triggers several controversies and brings criticism from political experts especially if the dissolved Assembly belonged to some other party than the one ruling at the Centre. [footnoteRef:10] [10: HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, (4th ed., vol. 3, 1996).]

The legislative powers are vested in the Union and the States, but the Union wields dominant power over the States. Article 249 empowers the Rajya Sabha or the Upper House to assume legislative powers and make laws for a two-third majority for a temporary period on any matter in the State List, which it feels necessary or expedient. Article 252 empowers the legislatures of two or more States to authorise the Parliament to make a law on any matter in the State List. Under Article 360, during financial emergency, all financial bills must be sent to the President for his assent, or he may direct the Governor to place the financial bills of the State before him for consideration. Under Article 256, the Constitution provides that the executive power of the States should be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by the Parliament as well as the existing laws.A face-off between the Centre and the States can lead to the use of Article 356 in the State. It empowers the President to dissolve the State legislature on the recommendation of the cabinet, if there is a breakdown of the constitutional machinery at the State level, and proclaim Presidents rule in the State. Such an imposition can lead to the deployment of central forces in the State to maintain law and order.Since the maintenance of law and order is a State subject, the role of the Centre in violating the authority has been questioned. The 42nd Amendment to Article 257 empowered the Union to deploy a central force, for dealing with any grave situation of law and order in any State. It has, however, been clarified that a grave situation of law and order is different from the internal disturbance as envisaged in Article 356.[footnoteRef:11] [11: V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, (11th ed., 2008). ]

3. PRESENT SCENARIO OF THE CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS 3.1 FAILED PLEDGESIt is well known that the constitution of India was framed within about three years of independence, and it made some pledges through the Directive Principles of State Policy --- to secure, among other things, for the people of India the right to an adequate means of livelihood, the right to employment, education and health. These pledges, however, have been grossly under-achieved. The number of the unemployed, according to the latest National Sample Survey data, has soared from 2.65 crore in 1999-2000 by 87 lakh to reach a staggered figure of 3.52 crore in 2004-05. About 30 percent of the population is still below or around the poverty line, one-third of population is illiterate and under-five mortality rate is unfortunately at 85 per 1,000 live births.There was another related, important pledge made in terms of the constitutional provisions. It is known that in the constitution, major responsibilities in the spheres of development expenditure (for instance, on education, health, irrigation, roads, power etc) as well as administrative expenditure (on general administration, law and order etc) were given to the states. But in the distribution of powers of revenue-raising in the same constitution, major sources of revenue (such as income and corporate tax, production excise, customs duties etc) were all given to the centre. It is in view of this imbalance --- the major revenue-raising powers being heavily tilted in favour of the central government and major responsibilities in the sphere of developmental and administrative expenditure given to the states --- that the constitution made an important pledge in its article 280: of setting up a Finance Commission with a periodicity of five years, to recommend a just share of receipts of central taxes as well as a compensating flow of deficit grants to the states. Article 275, then, made the provision of further augmentation of the states revenue through grants for promotion of welfare of the scheduled tribes.However, regarding these pledges about the much-needed decentralisation of financial resources to the states, there has unfortunately been a gross failure over the years at the national level. This failure is not an isolated event. It is connected with the adoption at the national level of a capitalist path of development which required India to be a unified homogeneous market. This path reflected the needs of the big capitalists, allied with landlords, who have always considered democracy and more powers for the states and the people as obstacles to their view of economic growth and political power.3.2 PREVAILING IMBALANCE

The basic problem of imbalance in the financial aspect of centre-state relations, as mentioned above, is actually seen from the following fact. In 2004-05, according to the estimates of expenditure compiled by the Reserve Bank of India, the burden of annual developmental expenditure borne by the states (taken together, Rs 3.62 lakh crore) was more than one and a half times higher than what was borne by the centre (Rs 2.33 lakh crore). These figures relate to the expenditure that the states could made under financial constraints. The really needed developmental expenditure of the states would have been much higher, at least twice this figure. On the other hand, in the sphere of revenue-raising, of the total revenue collected in the country in 2005-06, nearly 62 percent went to the hands of the central government and only 38 percent to all the states taken together.[footnoteRef:12] [12: http://polityinindia.wordpress.com/tag/federalism-and-centre-state-relations/]

Given this greater burden of the states responsibilities of developmental expenditure on the one hand, and more powers of revenue mobilisation at the centre on the other, the pledge has been, as mentioned earlier, for a matching transfer of resources from the centre to the states in terms of devolution of central taxes and grants in terms of article 280 and article 275 of the constitution. In fact, however, the share of net central transfer in terms of devolution of central taxes and grants (net of interest payment by the states on central loans), as a proportion of the centres total revenue receipts, has unfortunately fallen from 32.7 percent in 1990-91 to a very low figure of 29.5 percent in 2004-05, showing a gross failure of the pledge in terms of constitutional provisions to help the states for carrying out the needed developmental activities. Confronted with this situation, it has been worked out by the Left-led state governments (and supported by other states as well) that, given the available data on the need of development expenditure, the state's share of central tax revenue should be at least 50 percent.Moreover, the states have also correctly demanded transfer of at least residuary powers in the constitution, particularly the residuary powers of taxation of services, to the states. But, of late, through a constitutional amendment, the centre has unjustly acquired for itself the entire power of levy of service taxation. Fairness requires that the states may now at least be given the concurrent powers of taxation of all services, albeit at a lower rate than that levied by the centre.It may also be noted that the share of total market borrowing to which the states may be entitled is also dictated by the centre. In the 1950s, shares of market borrowing of the states and the centre in the total governmental market borrowings were in the proportion of 50:50. But this share of market borrowing of the states has now fallen sharply to around 15 percent, with more than 85 percent of the market borrowing being cornered by the centre. Now, consistent with development responsibilities of the states, the share of market borrowing of the states should be steadily increased to 50 percent within a period of five years.

4. NEED FOR RESTRUCTURING CENTRE- STATE RELATIONS

4.1 Misuse of Articles 356 and 355

The repeated misuse by the Centre of the provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution to dismiss State Governments and dissolve State Assemblies has been subverting the federal principle and the rights of the States. The demand to restrict the use of Article 356 only to cases where there is a serious threat to national unity or the secular fabric of the country has been raised from various quarters in successive meetings of the Inter-State Council. In view of the Supreme Court judgment on the S. R. Bommai case[footnoteRef:13], there is an urgent need to build in strong safeguards in Articles 356 and 365 through appropriate amendments of the Constitution. However, no decision has been taken by the Union Government in this regard. There is also a new and alarming proposal for Central deployment of paramilitary forces in the States unilaterally in a situation which the Centre would consider as an internal disturbance. The provenance of Article 355 needs to be clarified. As has been repeatedly stressed by several constituents of the Inter-State Council, the term internal disturbance in Article 355 is related to public order, which is the first entry in the State List. The proposal for Central deployment of paramilitary forces in a State in a situation which the Centre would consider as internal disturbance without the States concurrence is unacceptable. Article 355 should be amended on the lines suggested above for Article 356. Apart from external aggression, only a serious threat to national unity or an assault on the secular principle can be taken cognizance of. [13: M.P.Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (6th ed., 2012).]

4.2 Appointment and Role of Governors

The provision for centrally appointed Governors for the States has remained as an anachronism, which is not in keeping with a federal democratic polity. If the post of Governor has to be retained, then the Governor should be appointed by the President from a list of three eminent persons suggested by the Chief Minister, satisfying the criteria mentioned by the Sarkaria Commission. This has also been repeatedly discussed in the Inter-State Council. None of the major countries of the world with a federal constitution have any provision for a post of the Governor in a State to be appointed by the Centre. There should also be a time limit with regard to Governors assent to Bills passed by the State Assemblies. Moreover, the requirement of an explicit norm debarring Governors from publicly expressing disagreements or differences with the State Government, also need to be debated. There is also a need to review whether Governors should continue to be ex-officio Chancellors of State Universities.

4.3 Central Intrusion into the State List

Not only have the earlier transfer of State subjects, such as education, to the Concurrent List been left unreversed, but further intrusions have also been made into the State List in terms of proliferation of the so-called Centrally Sponsored Schemes. These Central schemes on the State subjects, which contain rigid guidelines imposed by the Centre, besides having implications in the financial sphere, also impair the autonomy of the States and affect their development priorities. There is an urgent need to review the impact of the transfer of legislative items from the State to the Union/Concurrent List. The Union Government has so far ignored the demand of the States to place at least the residuary powers of legislation in the State List. The residuary power of taxation in the sphere of services is being pre-emptorily used by the Union Government to the total exclusion of the States. Despite discussions in the Inter-State Council, the proposal for a Constitutional amendment to set definite time-limits for receiving the assent of Governors or the President in the case of bills passed by the State Assemblies has so far been ignored. Moreover, there is no formal institutional structure that requires mandatory consultation between the Centre and the States in areas of legislation under the Concurrent List. [footnoteRef:14] [14: H.R.Khanna, Legal Classics: Making of Indias Constitution, (2nd ed. 2009).]

4.4 Treaty-making Powers The present Constitutional scheme with regard to treaty making power being exclusively in the domain of the Union Executive needs to be urgently reviewed. The Constitution should be amended to make legislative sanction mandatory for any international treaty. Besides, several international treaties like the WTO agreement have serious implications for the States, especially with respect to State subjects like agriculture. In all such cases, consultation with the States and concurrence of the Inter-State Council must also be made mandatory.

4.5 All-India Services The All India Services are under the exclusive domain of the Centre. Some of the powers can be shared with the States. The State Governments should especially have a greater role in the administration of the Rules and Regulations of All India Services.Several cases of disputes between the union and the state governments regarding the All India Services Officers have been in the news.The recent case was the suspension of the SDM of Greater Noida IAS Durga Shakti Nagpal.This decision of the Akhilesh Yadav led Samajwadi party Govt. was criticized by the Union Govt. When the Union Ministry said the state govt. to take back the suspension of Mrs. Nagpal, then the UP Cheif Minister Akhilesh Yadav went to the extent of saying that The Union Govt. may call all the IAS officers to the centre, we will run the administration with the State Administrative Officers.This became a controversy because IAS Mrs. Nagpal was suspended for the only reason that she ordered to remove an illegally built wall of a Mosque which is no justified reason to suspend the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of a District. Her suspension was taken back after 2-3 months.

5. CONCLUSIONThe Supreme Court has at times upheld the decision of dismissing the State government. In March 1994, the apex court upheld the dismissal of the BJP State Government in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh in 1992 because it considered that the antisecular actions of these States were inconsistent with the secular character of the Constitution. However, a large number of cases of dismissal have been held unconstitutional. For example, the Article was used to impose Presidents Rule in Uttar Pradesh on the recommendation of the Governor Romesh Bhandari-although the Kalyan Singhs BJP government had proved its majority on the floor of the Assembly. The governors action showed that being political appointees, the governors display partisan politics and are unable to take a proper decision under their constitutional responsibilities.The Sarkaria Commission called for a consensus and cooperation between the Centre and the States for the smooth functioning of democracy. It favoured a strong Centre to safeguard the national unity and integrity, but viewed the centralisation of power as dangerous. It recommended that the Article 356 should be used sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases, when all other alternatives fail. The Centre-State relations must be founded on fairness and mutual respect. The responsibility devolves on politicians to rise above the parochial considerations and uphold the true values of democracy.To sum up, the reordering of centre-state relations for more justified devolution of powers to the states is an important pledge intrinsically connected to the fulfilment of other pledges regarding the common peoples greater access to employment, livelihood, education, health care and other amenities. Such decentralisation of powers from the centre to the states, moreover, must not stop at the state headquarters, but go down to the level of village panchayats and urban municipalities in the districts, and through them to the vast majority of people. It is only through the peoples involvement of people, through their struggles, that these two kinds of pledges pledge of employment, livelihood, education and health for the people and pledge for decentralisation of powers can be combined into a unified pledge for realisation. The Independence Day is an occasion for the common working people to take up this unified pledge as a part of their class struggle.

6. REFERENCES

Books: V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, (11th ed., 2008). D.D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, (14th ed., vol. 2, 2009). M.P.Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (6th ed., 2012). G. Austin, Working of a Democratic Constitution, (1st ed., 1999). H.R.Khanna, Legal Classics: Making of Indias Constitution, (2nd ed. 2009). D.D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, (14th ed., vol. 1,2009). HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, (4th ed., vol. 3, 1996).

Websites: www.lawmin.nic.in www.jstor.org www.epw.in www.thehindu.com www.preservearticles.com www.polityinindia.wordpress.com

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