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China’s Hegemony in
Cambodia
To what extent can the Sino-Cambodian
A dissertation submitted to the School of Government and
International Affairs
Z0967012Supervisor: Claire Sutherland
Word Count: 9982
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 Offensive Realism
2.2 Offensive Realism and the Rise of China
2.3 Critiques of Offensive Realism
2.4 The Sino-Cambodian Relationship and Offensive Realism
3. Soft-Power
3.1 Culture
4. China’s Military Influence in Cambodia
4.1 Sino-Cambodian Military Relations
4.2 US out, China in
4.3 Japan as a Balancer
5. The Alignment of Foreign Policy
5.1 The South China Sea5.1.1 Cambodia as a proxy in ASEAN
5.2 The One China Policy
6. Resources
6.1 Energy Security
6.2 Food Security
7. Conclusion
Bibliography
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AMM
ASEAN
BoP
CCP
IR
OCP
OR
PRC
PLA
RCAF
RGC
SCS
SEA
US
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Balance of power
Chinese Communist Party
International Relations
One China Policy
Offensive Realism
People's Republic of China
People’s Liberation Army
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
Royal Government of Cambodia
South China Sea
Southeast Asia
The United States of America
Abbreviations
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1.Introduction
Since China’s open-door policy began in 1979, kick-starting the country’s
impressive economic growth, International Relations (IR) scholars have debated
whether China’s rise would be peaceful (Yan, 2001) or if the disruption it caused to
the status-quo would lead to conflict (Mearsheimer, 2001). Offensive Realism (OR)
sits in the latter camp; it sees the structure of the international system as creating
a world of perpetual security competition which forces states to pursue power in
order to reduce insecurity. Therefore, offensive realists expect China to seek
maximum power which can only be obtained from hegemony.
2018 marks the sixtieth anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and
Cambodia, however, the close friendship seen today began in 1997. After Hun Sen
ousted his co-Prime Minister, Prince Ranariddh, in a bloody coup, China did not
adhere to the international condemnation and impose sanctions – a repeated
occurrence in the next two decades – instead, it recognised Hun Sen’s legitimacy
and donated $6 million in aid (Chon, 1999). This marked a turning-point in the Sino-
Cambodian relationship and so began the patron-client relationship this
dissertation will analyse. Chinese aid to Cambodia has been increasing year on
year, the Kingdom supports Beijing politically in return for economic assistance
without the conditions of western aid. Cambodia has undoubtedly become China’s
most reliable ally in SEA, and the great influence China holds here is akin to
hegemony.
This dissertation will analyse the Sino-Cambodian relationship in the context
of OR. It argues that China is following the path of OR, to a large extent, on a
scaled-down form in Cambodia. OR is usually observed through a regional or global
lens but the study of its application on the state-level allows the complexities of
China’s power acquisition to be analysed. This analysis also presents evidence from
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the Sino-Cambodian relationship of China’s hegemonic ambitions elsewhere in
Southeast Asia (SEA), supporting the original offensive realist view of regional
hegemony. Thus, the central argument that China possesses offensive realist
intentions speaks to the ‘China’s rise’ debate in IR on the side that China will not
rise peacefully.
The evidence presented here of OR taking place on the state-level lends
support to the predictive power of the theory and the way states are expected to
behave towards a China pursuing hegemony. Policy-makers should prepare for the
possibility of intense-security competition between the United States (US) and
China, and a concurrent US-led balancing coalition in SEA, checking Beijing
(Mearsheimer, 2014:392). Moreover, understanding how China employs OR in
Cambodia offers insight into how China plans to proliferate its hegemony
throughout SEA, which will have foreign policy implications for these nations.
First, the theory of OR, as according to John J. Mearsheimer, will be
summarised and critically assessed to provide a framework for the empirical
analysis. OR is then evaluated in the context of the Sino-Cambodian relationship,
initially in terms of China’s soft-power in Cambodia (Chapter 3), which shows how
China uses cultural tools to maximise its power. Chapter 4 examines the military
relations between the two countries within the context of OR, in particular it
demonstrates how the increasingly close relationship is pushing America out of
Cambodia. It also illustrates American buck-passing, a feature of OR, whereby
Japan acts as the main check on China’s military power in Cambodia whilst the US
remains on the side-lines. Chapter 5 examines how Cambodia acts as an extension
of Chinese foreign policy, and how this is moving China closer to a position where it
could bid for hegemony. Specifically, Cambodia’s role as a proxy for China in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the South China Sea (SCS)
and the One China Policy (OCP) will be assessed. Lastly, Chapter 6 looks at China’s
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energy and food needs to argue that the Sino-Cambodian relationship is increasing
China’s power through resource security. These chapters work together to reveal
how China is behaving as a good offensive realist in Cambodia and supports OR by
showing that China is preparing to become a potential regional hegemon.
Observing OR through this narrower lens offers insight into how China might make
a future bid for hegemony in SEA and what shape this would take.
2.Theoretical Framework
Over the past forty years, China has experienced remarkable economic growth and
made extraordinary gains in power. Whilst it has become fact that China is ‘rising’,
there remains much debate amongst IR scholars about what exactly China’s
intentions are with regard to other states and the international system as a whole.
This dissertation is specifically concerned with whether China will attempt to
pursue hegemony but does not intend to scrutinise if a hegemonic bid would be
successful or not. On the one hand, Waltz and other defensive realists cite the
balance of power (BoP) as reason that China would not pursue hegemony: states
would ally together to balance against China which would compromise its security
and prove self-defeating (Waltz, 1979:126). On the other hand, the argument with
which this dissertation is concerned, sees China as wanting to dominate the
international system to maximise its security. First proposed by Mearsheimer in
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), OR asserts that the best way for China
to survive under international anarchy is to achieve regional hegemony.
2.1 Offensive Realism
Rather than using human nature to explain the actions of states like classical
realists, OR is a structural theory, seeing the structure of the international system
as the driving force behind state behaviour. In its simplest form, OR reasons that
the anarchical structure of the international system means states are never fully
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secure unless they are hegemon, thus, great-powers will strive to achieve
hegemony when opportunity-cost is low. OR is based on five bedrock assumptions:
1. The international system is anarchic as opposed to hierarchic; states are the
key actors and there is no ultimate arbiter in the system.
2. All states have offensive military capabilities with the ability to hurt one
another.
3. States can never be certain about other states’ intentions; states will always
be suspicious of each other.
4. Survival is the primary goal of great-powers and dominates all states’
motives.
5. Great-powers are rational actors.
(Mearsheimer, 2001:30-32)
Owing to these assumptions, Mearsheimer (2001:29) argues that great-
powers are constantly competing and searching for ways to gain power over their
rivals, with the final goal being hegemony. He defines a hegemon as ‘a state that is
so powerful that it dominates all the other states… [and] is the only great-power in
the system’ (Mearsheimer, 2001:40). His interpretation starts to digress from the
standard definition when he applies the concept in a narrower sense, to specific
geographical areas. Mearsheimer (2001:44) maintains that the ‘stopping power of
water’ – the world’s oceans – limits the power projection ambitions of states,
rendering global hegemony unachievable. Moreover, the world is a heterogeneous
mix of cultures, beliefs and political ideas, creating obstacles for great-powers
trying to extend their influence; it is unlikely any state today is naïve enough to
believe they could achieve all-out global hegemony. Therefore, the best outcome
for a great-power in our anarchic and unpredictable world is to become a regional
hegemon.
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However, a hegemon still needs to be the only great-power in the system, so
a country bidding for regional hegemony has the additional aim of preventing other
great-powers from becoming regional hegemons elsewhere. OR views a great-
power’s ideal situation as when they are ‘the only regional hegemon in the world’
(Mearsheimer, 2001:42). For the past 120 years, the US has held this enviable
position; it dominates the Western Hemisphere and currently there is no other
hegemon. Moreover, it has successfully acted as an off-shore balancer and stopped
aspiring hegemons, such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Imperial Japan,
from being victorious (Mearsheimer, 2001:41).
Recently, China has emerged as a potential threat to the US’ sole regional
hegemonic status, increasingly making moves to try and dominate Asia and push
America out – much like the US did with European powers in the Western
hemisphere in the nineteenth century (Mearsheimer, 2006a:162). Currently, the US
plays a preponderant role in the politics, economics and security of Asia. It must
maintain this strong presence and influence to keep the region in check and ensure
China does not become a rival great-power which could meddle in its own regional
affairs. In accordance with OR, the US has tried to offset China’s rise in the region
with various balancing and engagement strategies; as long as the US is able to
uphold the existing BoP, whereby it is the most powerful state, by definition, China
cannot become regional hegemon (Godwin, 2004:83). The US has behaved in line
with OR in the past and remains determined to endure as the only regional
hegemon. OR sees no room in the international system for two regional hegemons,
for they will only be fully secure as the world’s single most powerful state.
Consequently, Mearsheimer affirms that China cannot rise peacefully.
2.2 Offensive Realism and the Rise of China
Mearsheimer (2014:368) believes that should China continue its remarkable
economic growth, it will act in accordance with OR. That is, in order to maximise
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power, China will attempt to dominate Asia and make a bid for regional hegemony.
Mearsheimer (2010:389) believes that China will attempt to dominate the Asia-
Pacific, however, this discussion will predominantly consider ‘region’ to mean SEA.
With Japan to the east, Russia to the north and India to the west, China, acting as a
rational actor, would attempt to dominate SEA first.
Mearsheimer (2014:375) claims that regional hegemony offers China the
best chance of settling ongoing territorial disputes in its favour. Contested
sovereignty in the SCS, as well as China’s longstanding claim that Taiwan is a
breakaway province to be reunified with China, will be more easily resolved when
there is an outright dominant power in the region with coercive ability. Moreover,
regional hegemony would give China control of vital sea lanes in Asia needed for
transporting natural resources, most crucially oil, from Africa and the Persian Gulf
(Mearsheimer, 2014:379). Therefore, regional supremacy would help China to fully
maximise its security by allowing it to expand its territory and secure resource
access, both of which increase China’s power relative to other great-powers.
When discussing China’s hegemonic desires, it must be clarified that there is
no expectation of Beijing trying to ‘conquer’ Asia in the same way the British
pursued hegemony in the nineteenth century. Rather, Chinese hegemony would
take the shape of a Sinic-Monroe Doctrine formed through the creation of ‘a zone of
super-ordinate influence’ in the region (Kelly, 2014).1 Mearsheimer outlines how
China would attempt this. First, China will seek to maximise the power-gap with its
powerful neighbours, by increasing its economic might so that no other power has
the wherewithal to challenge it (Mearsheimer, 2014:370). Second, China will
attempt to push America out of the region, particularly in terms of maritime
presence (Mearsheimer, 2014:374). China can be expected to build military and
1 Much like US President Monroe’s 1823 Doctrine warned that European meddling in the western hemisphere would be considered dangerous to the peace and safety of the US (Dent, 1999:3), China is beginning to make it clear that American ‘assistance’ in the Asia-Pacific is unwelcome. 8
naval forces capable of accessing strategic areas of the world and deterring US
interference in Beijing (Mearsheimer, 2014:368). As well as decreasing US influence
in the region, these ambitious goals would weaken Japan militarily as it became
more isolated, serving to maximise the power-gap (Mearsheimer, 2014:374). Third,
China will pursue strategic interests outside of Asia; China might interfere in South
and Central America so as to ‘cause Washington trouble in its own backyard’ to
limit the US’ ability to interfere with Beijing’s prospects of regional hegemony
(Mearsheimer, 2014:377). Kelly cites three further additions to this list which China
may pursue: the establishment of a renminbi currency bloc in parts of Asia, a
regional trading area and the alignment of Asian states’ foreign policy to China’s
(Kelly, 2014).
Such conditions may sound farfetched, accordingly Mearsheimer concedes
that China is not currently in a positon to pursue such ambitious goals and make a
bid for hegemony: ‘Contemporary China… is constrained by the global [BoP], which
is clearly stacked in America’s favour’ (Mearsheimer, 2014:362). He qualifies that,
in line with OR, a potential hegemon’s security is kept as the number one priority
and motivator. As rational actors, great-powers will only consider offensive action
when an opportunity arises in which the benefits outweigh the risks (Mearsheimer,
2014:21). Therefore, OR with regards to China is a predictive theory. Nevertheless,
OR has not been without its critics and various IR scholars take issue with
Mearsheimer’s pessimistic view of future world politics.
2.3 Critiques of Offensive Realism
OR derives from the Realist school, hence, other IR schools of thought hold the
same criticisms as with any realist theory. For instance, Liberalism maintains that
Realists downplay the role of international institutions and that, especially in the
current globalised world, economic interdependence ties countries together,
creating strong incentives for peace (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010:117). Accordingly,
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this mutual prosperity indicates that China’s rise will be peaceful. However,
Mearsheimer (2014:408) sees this post-Cold War view of a cooperative and
community-based world order as intolerably optimistic, arguing that security
considerations trump economic ones. He argues that war can sometimes bring
economic and strategic benefits ‘greater than the prosperity lost from damaged
interdependence’, citing the abundance of resources in the SCS as a potential
flashpoint for Chinese military action (Mearsheimer, 2014:409). There are also
criticisms of OR from within the Realist school itself. All types of realism hold the
same core beliefs – statism, survival and self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2014:101) –
but disagree over the order of importance in which these rank.
Kirshner (2010) argues from a classical realist perspective and condemns
Mearsheimer for presenting dangerous policy prescriptions for the US over China.
Instead, he accepts that classical realists are enormously apprehensive about the
rise of China, but that Mearsheimer’s over-reliance on structural variables ignores
how state behaviour is shaped by domestic politics, ideology and lessons learned
from history (Kirshner, 2010:57). However, when taking history and politics into
account, there is support for China following OR. Since Mao Zedong established the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has made every effort to overcome
its ‘century of humiliation’, a period characterised by numerous defeats – notably
the Opium Wars – and foreign occupations such as the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria. Since then, China has learned not to let stronger powers determine its
fate. For example, Mao was intent on developing China to the industrial and
scientific levels of the great-powers – the infamous Great Leap Forward had the
primary objective of overtaking Britain in less than fifteen years (Dikkoter, 2010:56)
– this demonstrates China’s ambitions for superiority and disrupting the Western-
dominated international system. More recently, similar ambitions were shown with
the financial opening of the country and the ‘Go Out’ strategy, making China a
major outgoing foreign direct investment and aid lending country (Wang, 2016). 10
This clear desire for economic power, as well as the focus on expanding and
modernising the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),2 are conducive to Mearsheimer’s
theory showing that China is not simply preserving the existing BoP.
Defensive Realism is another variant of structural realism and shares many
of the same basic assumptions as OR. However, the final goal of hegemony
distinguishes Mearsheimer’s theory from that of defensive realists who instead
argue that the BoP means states wish to maintain their position in the system and
maximise security rather than power (Waltz, 1979:126). With security in mind,
states are motivated to maintain the status quo in order to prevent the possibility
of dangerous balancing coalitions, therefore, states’ survival can be secured
without the power acquired from hegemony (Snyder, 2002:152). Both theories
concur that a state’s primary goal is security, yet, they diverge over how this is
achieved and it is here I believe Mearsheimer’s realism to be superior: is any state,
other than the hegemon, ever fully secure under the anarchical international
system? In order to maximise security, states must maximise their share of world
power (Mearsheimer, 2001:410) and this can be seen in the Sino-Cambodian case.
2.4 The Sino-Cambodian Relationship and Offensive
Realism
In the following chapters, China’s actions in Cambodia and the patron-client
relationship between the two countries will be considered within the theoretical
framework of OR. This will be assessed in two ways. Firstly, although OR as outlined
by Mearsheimer is a supra-state theory, this analysis considers the applicability of
the general theory of OR on a state, rather than a regional-level. It will examine the
extent to which China is acting in Cambodia how Mearsheimer would predict it to
act as a hegemon in SEA. Secondly, it looks at how far China’s actions in Cambodia
suggest it is preparing to make a bid for regional hegemony in the future – through
2 Between 2007 and 2016, China has seen the biggest growth in military expenditure, increasing 118% (Fleurant et al., 2017:2)11
grooming Cambodia to help it reach a position where a hegemonic bid would be
propitious. Empirical examples demonstrate that China is using its hegemony in
Cambodia to acquire more power; in this sense, China’s power acquisition is
exponential.
Before examining the empirical evidence, it is useful to understand why a
Chinese bid for hegemony was rational in Cambodia and not, at least for the time
being, in other parts of SEA. Described as a ‘thin piece of ham between two fat
slices of bread’ (Economist, 2017), Cambodia is sandwiched in between Thailand
and Vietnam, much larger countries in terms of population and wealth. Therefore,
Cambodia was susceptible to the Chinese charm offensive, seeing China as a
counterweight to its neighbours. Pragmatically, Cambodia was in a fragile state
economically in 1997 with its population and political stability still suffering from
the brutal years of Pol Pot’s rule, prompting the Chinese to see it as fertile ground
for power acquisition. The next chapter will assess how China is exhibiting
behaviour in line with Mearsheimer’s theory in Cambodia in terms of soft-power.
3.Soft-Power
This chapter explores how China is successfully using soft-power in Cambodia to
increase its own power as per OR. There are many definitions and uses of the term.
For the purpose of the following discussion soft-power will be defined as the ability
‘to obtain the outcomes one wants by attraction and persuasion rather than
coercion or payment’ (Nye, 2008:94). Nye (2008:96), the coiner of the original 12
concept, cites three channels of effective soft-power: culture, political values and
foreign policies. In Cambodia, China’s main source of soft-power is culture. The
issue of foreign policy will be discussed in Chapter 5 because Cambodia’s
alignment with China over international issues is not necessarily due to their
perceived legitimacy or moral authority, as would be espoused from soft-power, but
through economic incentives (‘carrots’).
Mearsheimer makes no mention of soft-power in The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, however, the Sino-Cambodian case exemplifies how soft-power can be
used effectively by a great-power for its hegemonic desires. If soft-power leads to
the outcome a state wants, and that outcome according to OR is hegemony, then
states should be expected to utilise such means. Mearsheimer’s focus on power
accumulation through the size of a state’s military (Chapter 4), a form of hard-
power, contradicts the assumption of state’s rationality. If China were to use
military might to gain hegemony in Cambodia, there is a high risk of a
counteracting balancing coalition forming against it – this would damage China’s
economy and diminish its power – and these consequences would be magnified if
attempting this on a regional scale. Alternatively, the use of soft-power has won
influence in Cambodia without these risks, so when thinking rationally, China is
more likely to use such tactics.
Moreover, OR posits that all states fear each other due to the absence of a
central authority in the international system and uncertainty about others’
intentions. This fear varies across time and space; the more power a state has, the
more fear it generates among its rivals which acts as a ‘motivating force’ and
intensifies security competition (Mearsheimer, 2001:32). Such conditions explain
why official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) speeches have repeatedly referred to
China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and rebutted claims that China seeks hegemony (Glaser &
Medeiros, 2007:294): reducing the perceived threat of China will reduce the chance
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of states coming together to balance against it. In the 1990s, Beijing realised
displays of hard-power – the seizure of reefs in the SCS and missile tests in the
Taiwan Strait – increased fear amongst Asian nations about China’s regional
intentions (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007:293). Since then, although hard-power
remains, there has been a noticeable shift to exertions of soft-power, which are not
overtly threatening. This can be seen in the transfer of Chinese culture to
Cambodia.
3.1 Culture
China’s cultural soft-power, like investment and aid, has the power to influence and
persuade but, beyond that, the integration of Chinese culture has the ability to
entice and attract (Nye, 2008:95). In 2007, Chinese President Hu affirmed that he
would ‘enhance the influence of Chinese culture worldwide’ (China Daily, 2007);
this can be seen in Cambodia in terms of education, food, media and beliefs (Heng,
2012:75). Cambodian Chinese-language schools funded by the PRC – which makes
them cheaper and less corrupt than standard schools – are heavily over-subscribed
(Reddick & Co, 2017). This, along with the ostentatious Confucius Institute in
Phnom-Penh, shows how Mandarin education has been spreading throughout the
country. Moreover, Kurlantzick (2007:69-70) identifies a ‘feeder system’ in
Cambodia where children who excel in these schools are invited to study in the
PRC, fully immersing them in the Chinese culture, which they bring back to their
homeland. The US has unintentionally facilitated the success of this tactic by
tightening student visa policies (Kurlantzick, 2006:3), adding to the declining US
influence in Cambodia. Additionally, Chinese New Year has become more
prominent, with up to 80% of Cambodians celebrating it (Heng, 2012:78),
evidencing their shared belief systems.
This cultural transfer, along with the close ties between the respective ruling
parties, has established a strong Chinese presence in Cambodia. However, contrary
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to proponents of the ‘peaceful rise’ camp, such as Xin and Worm (2011) who see
Chinese soft-power as symbolic of a ‘genuine desire for peace’, Chinese soft-power
in Cambodia is motivated by strategic self-interest and demonstrates a desire to
maximise power. For example, Confucius Institutes, both inside and outside of
Cambodia, manipulate the way China is presented to their students by restricting
what can be taught, for instance, about Taiwan and Tibet. This has led to
complaints that the Institutes are Trojan Horses for Chinese influence and culture
(Paradise, 2009:662). Moreover, the proliferation of Mandarin education in
Cambodia is a double-edged sword for increasing Chinese power: as well as
spreading culture, a Mandarin speaking workforce will encourage more Chinese
investment, further deepening bilateral ties and increasing the Chinese diaspora in
Cambodia. Therefore, China has effectively used cultural soft-power to increase its
attractiveness, which, in turn, has facilitated its ability to pursue hegemony in
Cambodia.
Mearsheimer dismisses culture, asserting that structural realists ‘ignore
cultural differences among states’ (Mearsheimer, 2006b:72). However, the Sino-
Cambodian case shows how it can be used to support the theory of OR. Shared
culture creates a deep-seated connection between the patron and client state and
in this way is a longer-term strategy than financial investment or well-timed
‘donations’ used to charm the changeable political elite. Soft-power targets the
masses and, if done right, can permeate everyday life; even seemingly small
things, like changing from using spoons to chopsticks (Chan, 2013), increases
China’s influence and thus its power in Cambodia. Mearsheimer (2001:10)
concedes that his version of OR simplifies reality by ‘emphasizing certain factors
while ignoring others’, yet, in the China-Cambodia case soft-power has been a tool
used to increase Chinese power hence should be considered when evaluating China
as a potential regional hegemon.
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One reason cultural soft-power has been so effective in Cambodia is a result
of the country’s history, a reality also disregarded by Mearsheimer. After the four
years of the Khmer Rouge rule from 1975 to 1979, Cambodia’s cultural heritage
was near obliterated, offering China a ‘golden opportunity’ to introduce Chinese
traditions and values into the rebuilding of Khmer society (Burgos & Ear,
2013:107). Therefore, China was able to follow the path of OR through soft-power
means in Cambodia due to country specificities. These tactics might not enjoy the
same success in other SEA countries with a more established national identity, so,
more in line with Mearsheimer’s OR, China would use coercive tactics such as
military intimidation. Overall, cultural soft-power efforts in Cambodia have been an
effective means of gaining power for China, and supports OR on the state-level.
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4. China’s Military Influence in Cambodia
Over the past two decades, Chinese military assistance towards the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) has increased significantly manifesting in the
form of financial aid, professional military education and joint operational events
(Becker, 2017). Boosting Cambodia’s military capability gives China a strong ally in
the region who supports its foreign policy stance on contentious issues such as the
SCS and OCP (Chapter 5). Furthermore, in line with OR, China’s investment in the
RCAF is part of the larger aim of pushing the US out of Cambodia and also
demonstrates America’s buck-passing of the China threat to Japan.
China regards Cambodia in much the same way the US does Latin America:
as its ‘backyard’. The US provides military assistance to nearly every Latin
American country, delivering weapons, holding joint training exercises and working
together on domestic issues such as drug cartels (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017:6). This
mirrors China’s strategic interests in Cambodia, showing how China is copying the
current regional hegemon in fortifying its neighbours militarily. Lastly, the
tightening military relationship has benefits for China in potential conflict: a strong
Cambodia can act as buffer to US-led containment along its southern flank (Ciocari,
2014:256) and provide access to tactical ports and airfields, increasing China’s
security. In this way, China’s military interests in Cambodia are the means to the
end of maximising the PRC’s power.
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4.1 Sino-Cambodian Military Relations
The PLA has played an important role in developing the close Sino-Cambodian
relationship. The tightening military ties have been extremely visible, seen through
the millions of dollars’ worth of donated arms deliveries and large bilateral military
exercises, which appear to be growing year on year. To illustrate, in 2012, China
accounted for just over 20% of Cambodian arms imports, a year later, this had
increased to nearly 60% (Sipri, n.d). Although many of the specifies of such
dealings are not known, China is making a significant financial and human
investment into the RCAF. A notable military donation came in the form of the
Infantry Institute which is one display of the considerable military education China
provides Cambodia, with China paying for both the ongoing expansion and a
portion of the operating costs (Belford & Thul, 2015). Furthermore, Cambodian
military cadets enrolled at the school must spend six months in a PLA academy in
China (Belford & Thul, 2015). This demonstrates China’s linkage of military
investment to the spreading of its cultural influence (Chapter 3) which is especially
strategic when moulding future Cambodian military leaders.
A great-power bidding for hegemony would be expected to build strong
armed forces capable of accessing strategic areas of the world. Cambodia holds a
geopolitically strategic position in SEA, especially due to its coastal border with the
Gulf of Thailand, an important trade area with access to the SCS. China’s interests
are evident through its investment in the Port of Sihanoukville, situated on the
coast of the Gulf, which has been transformed into a ‘Chinatown’ of sorts (Thul &
Tostevin, 2017). If threats were to arise in the region, China has secured access to
a ‘sea-accessible location from which to launch a response’ and with fourteen
Chinese donated naval ships docked in Sihanoukville, threats can quickly be
quashed (Burgos & Ear, 2010:620). Moreover, Cambodian airfields could ‘make up
for China's lack of in-flight refuelling capacity for warplanes providing maritime air
cover’ (Marks, 2000:100). Therefore, China’s military assistance in Cambodia is 18
largely done with its own security interests in mind. Mearsheimer (2001:83) asserts
that ‘power in international politics is largely a product of the military forces that a
state possesses’, so China’s control over the RCAF increases its relative power. As a
regional hegemon, China would exert influence in the most strategically important
areas of SEA and military diplomacy has effectively achieved this in Cambodia.
4.2 US out, China in
This section will establish how China’s tightening defence relationship with
Cambodia is meeting the narrative of OR by pushing the US out of Cambodia. As an
aspiring hegemon, China is intent on removing the US military from SEA which
clashes with American desires to maintain influence and prevent a potential
hegemon from being successful. Therefore, when applying OR on a state-level, we
should expect to see the US and China bidding for military influence in Cambodia.
The US and Cambodian military have had a tumultuous relationship. Unlike
the Chinese, all US aid and assistance to Cambodia is conditional, coming with
‘strings attached’. On numerous occasions throughout Hun Sen’s premiership, the
US has stopped aid on account of human rights abuses and undemocratic policies.
After the 1997 coup, where an estimated 100 Cambodians were killed, the US
imposed a ban on bilateral aid to Cambodia, which was not lifted until ten years
later (Lum, 2007:8). More recently, in February 2018, the US government
announced it would be suspending military assistance programmes due to
Cambodian ‘setbacks in democracy’ (Whitehouse.gov, 2018). Such policies have
often worked in China’s favour by creating a larger vacuum for military influence.
This was demonstrated in 2010 when Washington ceased a donation of 200 army
trucks to Cambodia after Phonm-Penh deported asylum-seeking Uighurs back to
China, who then stepped in with a similar delivery of vehicles along with 50,000
military uniforms (Phorn, 2014). This calls into question the effectiveness of future
US military sanctions in Cambodia and shows how China’s ‘no-strings attached’
19
defence aid is successfully diminishing US influence whilst consequently
augmenting Cambodia’s dependence on China.
Where the variables are the US and China, Cambodia’s foreign military
relations appear to be inversely proportional – that is, as Cambodia increases its
military relationship with China, it decreases its military ties with the US.
Significantly, in 2017, Cambodia announced it would be stopping its joint military
exercises with the US, citing the need to focus on ‘more pressing matters’
(Sokhean, 2017). Yet, the international community did not find this excuse very
convincing and there was speculation as to whether Cambodia loosened its ties
with the US per China’s request; Beijing likely holds great clout as Cambodia’s
largest donor of military aid (Sokhean, 2017). Notably, just a few weeks before this
announcement, Cambodia held its first joint military drill, Golden Dragon, with
China. Golden Dragon simulated disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, very
similar to the cancelled US exercise (Paviour, 2016). Cambodia’s pivot away from
the US was reaffirmed in April 2017 when the Royal Government of Cambodia
(RGC) announced it was terminating the work of a US Naval unit, which included
twenty planned projects such as the building of schools and hospitals (Hunt, 2017).
Whether influenced by China or not, this move by Phnom-Penh demonstrates how
committed Cambodia is to removing US influence, even in humanitarian form.
Weakening US-Cambodia military ties are part of a more general pivot away
from Washington and towards Beijing. Many of the trends in Sino-US competition in
Cambodia transcend military influence, extending to economic assistance and
diplomatic relations which fit into the wider context of China’s bid for hegemony in
Cambodia. For example, the annual US-Cambodia military exercise was about more
than humanitarian training, it established a common ground between the two
countries and nurtured a personal relationship (Parameswaran, 2017). A similar
theme can be seen as China presses for the use of renminbi in bilateral trade with
20
Cambodia (Reuters, 2018) and encourages the tourism sector to accept the
Chinese currency where currently the US dollar is used (Thul, 2016). Therefore, the
above evidence represents an eroding of US-Cambodian relations on a larger scale,
which, according to OR, is conducive to China’s hegemonic intentions.
Following offensive realist logic, the US should be trying to decrease China’s
sizable standing in Cambodia. This was evident in President Obama’s pivot to Asia,
an attempt to rebalance American foreign policy from the Middle East to Asia. For
example, in a visit to Cambodia in 2010, Secretary of State Clinton urged the
country to avoid becoming ‘too dependent’ on China (Pomfret, 2010). However, the
US has another option other than directly balancing China in Cambodia, and that is
to buck-pass the threat to another great-power.
4.3 Japan as a Balancer
Mearsheimer (2001:141) writes that a regional hegemon prefers to prevent rivals in
other areas from gaining hegemony by ‘stand[ing] aside and allow[ing] the local
great-powers to check the threat’. This is known as ‘buck-passing’ and can be seen
in the way the US relies on Japan to balance China in Cambodia. This transfer of
responsibility to Japan is less costly for the US than balancing a far-off potential
hegemon like China and since Japan does not want a superpower on its doorstep,
limiting China’s military influence in SEA is strategically beneficial to itself as well.
Cambodia’s defence relationship with Japan has remained strong despite
China’s growing influence in Cambodia, with the two states upgrading their
bilateral relations to a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2013 (Chanborey, 2016). This
shows that Japan has thus far been an effective ‘buck-catcher’. Japan’s presence in
Cambodia would be difficult for China to replace as Japan-Cambodia relations have
been resilient since 1991 and, unlike the US, there are not decades of distrust
between the two countries. Tokyo continues to support Phnom-Penh amid
international criticism, exhibited through the donation of 10,000 ballot boxes for 21
the upcoming election, despite the US and European Union deeming it illegitimate
(Thul, 2018). Japan is motivated to maintain influence in Cambodia due to the
security-dilemma: as China’s security increases, Japan’s decreases. In that case,
owing to their geographical proximity, there is more at stake for Japan if China’s
sphere of influence continues to grow. Tokyo realises that if it were to pull aid from
Cambodia, China will take the opportunity to fill the gap, just as it has done with
the US. Therefore, through the lens of OR, Tokyo’s ongoing ties with Cambodia can
be seen as a move to guarantee Japan’s survival.
Likely, Cambodia is aware of its reputation as a client state of China and in
an effort to prove its neutrality it will continue to uphold military ties with other
powers in the region. However, Japan’s pacifist constitution means that, at the
moment, it cannot offer Cambodia the same military relationship it enjoys with
China. This casts doubt over Japan’s future as a buck-catcher. If Japan were unable
to contain China, OR dictates that the US would step into balance against it in
Cambodia (Mearsheimer, 2014:141). However, the US, as ‘leader of the free world’,
has a duty to condemn the autocratic practices occurring in Cambodia; as the only
regional hegemon in the world with the strongest military, it would be less
concerned about losing influence in a small state in a faraway region. Thus, here
lies an issue with the scaling down of OR to the state-level: it also scales down the
threat of potential hegemon’s actions than if occurring on a regional-level. If China
were acting in the same way in the whole of the SEA region, the US would be more
likely to intervene, for it would present a more serious threat to the BoP.
Overall, the tightening Sino-Cambodian defence relationship fits the
narrative of OR on the state-level by showing how Beijing is using its hegemony to
push Washington out of Cambodia. As US presence decreases, Cambodia becomes
increasingly dependent on China, offering Beijing more leverage to bend Cambodia
to its will (Chapter 5). Furthermore, as succinctly put by Becker (2017)
22
‘understanding the ways in which China has developed its military relationship with
Cambodia can shed light on how the PLA is pursuing military engagement
elsewhere in [SEA]’. Therefore, a similar push against the US should be expected as
the PLA increases its influence in other areas of the region and pursues a Sinic-
Monroe Doctrine.
5.The Alignment of Foreign Policy
This chapter evaluates how China uses its dominant role in Cambodia to gather
support for foreign policy objectives, especially in its two most important territorial
disputes, the SCS and OCP. The more support a foreign policy objective has, the
more chance there is of a favourable outcome which will produce gains in power.
Cambodia has shown clear signs of following Chinese foreign policy, most notably
in its role as ASEAN Chair in 2012 and in its refusal to recognise the government of
Taiwan. Such examples support the notion that China is hegemon in Cambodia with
Cambodia acting as an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy. Mearsheimer
(2014:375) predicted that China would use the power it gained from hegemony to
help settle territorial disputes. Cambodia’s endorsement of the aforementioned
policies demonstrates this already occurring on a state-level.
23
5.1 The South China Sea
OR can be seen in the Sino-Cambodian relationship in the issue of the SCS through
the accusations that Cambodia is acting as a Chinese puppet in ASEAN over the
maritime dispute. Control of the SCS is essential for any future Chinese bid for
hegemony; Mearsheimer (2001:87) writes that ‘a navy need not control all of the
sea all of the time, but it must be able to control the strategically important parts…
and deny the enemy the ability to do likewise’. Power over the sea would help to
expel the US Navy from the area, pushing them beyond the ‘first island chain’
(Mearsheimer, 2014:374) and increasing pressure on Taiwan (section 5.2).
The SCS is a vital trade route: the waters see one-third of global maritime
trade, amounting to $5 trillion, pass through them each year (Beech, 2016). Even
more significant is the natural resource potential of the sea, a factor which makes
the area especially important for China (Chapter 6). The sea boasts ten percent of
the world’s fisheries (Beech, 2016), responsible for feeding the seafood diet of most
Asians, and, though largely underexplored, is estimated to contain 11 billion barrels
of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (EIA, 2013). Winning control of the
SCS would make the regional environment more conducive to a Chinese bid for
hegemony. Therefore, as well as demonstrating Chinese hegemony in Cambodia,
Cambodia’s alignment with China in the SCS dispute illustrates how Cambodia is
important for China’s future hegemonic designs.
5.1.1Cambodia as a proxy in ASEAN
Four of the six claimants to the SCS are members of ASEAN, therefore, the
organisation has inevitably experienced the spill-over of their national interests.
ASEAN has a unique way of managing member-states’ competing interests. The
practice of musyawarah (consultation) and muafakat (consensus) are part of the
‘ASEAN way’ whereby the organisation strives for unanimous decision-making
(Caballero-Anthony, 2005:72). Through its relationship with Cambodia, China uses
24
muafakat against ASEAN to abet its ambitions in the SCS. Two notable instances
demonstrated this: the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 2012 and 2016. Under
Cambodian-chairmanship, the 2012 AMM saw ASEAN break with tradition when, for
the first time in forty-five years, the Ministers failed to agree on a joint-
communique. The Cambodian Minister, Hor Namhong, rejected the drafted
statement, arguing that it reflected the bilateral disputes of Vietnam and the
Philippines with China and thus had no place in the communique (Bower, 2012).
This echoes China’s repeated assertion that it wishes to deal with the SCS issue on
a one-on-one basis and not have it brought up in multilateral discussions; although
not directly coming out in support of its territorial claims, Cambodia firmly upholds
China’s foreign policy of non-interference. Moreover, press reports that Hor
Namhong was consulting with Chinese officials over the drafted statement (Bower,
2012) add to the accusation that Cambodia was acting under Chinese will. Two
months later, China pledged over $500 million in loans and grants to Cambodia,
thanking Cambodia for its help in maintaining a good relationship with ASEAN
(Reuters, 2012), this suggests such loans acted as the ‘carrot’ for Phnom Penh’s
resilient stance.
Similarly, 2016 saw Cambodia block any mention of The Hague ruling of the
same year that ruled China’s historic claims to the SCS had no legal footing.
Cambodia’s objections led to the release of a watered-down statement which
simply expressed that ASEAN remained ‘seriously concerned’ over ongoing
developments in the SCS (ASEAN, 2016:29), but did not mention China by name.
Two weeks before the AMM, China had given Cambodia $600 million in aid
(Khemara, 2016), once again showing how China bought influence over the ASEAN
agenda via Cambodia.
A weakened ASEAN is favourable to China’s hegemonic bidding; it would shift
the BoP in Asia, creating a vacuum for China to gain more power and move the
25
international environment closer to one where a bid for hegemony would be
rational. The aforementioned AMM episodes have called the relevance and
longevity of the regional body into question as the very principle of consensus
decision-making, which ASEAN prides itself on, was ineffectual. Beijing’s patron-
client relationship with Cambodia enabled it to use ‘divide and rule tactics’ to foster
mutual distrust in the grouping and proved that its decision-making mechanisms
can be exploited (Thu, 2018:10).
Without a unified ASEAN position on the SCS, China can prevent an anti-
China security coalition from forming (Marks, 2000:99) because each member of
ASEAN is weaker as an individual state, save Singapore. In the last few years, China
has been increasing its bilateral ties with its two main rivals in the SCS, Vietnam
and the Philippines, which appear to have successfully softened ASEAN’s stance on
the issue (Pertiwi, 2017). For example, after accepting significant funding from
China, the Philippines have all but abandoned their issues over the SCS with
President Duterte announcing a ‘separation’ from the US both economically and
militarily in 2016 (Ide, 2016). This suggests that China’s success at puppeting
Cambodia in ASEAN has resulted in effective bilateral talks. With claimant states
more vulnerable without the formal backing of ASEAN, for the time being, China
has been able to negotiate favourable outcomes over the SCS. Moreover, on a
multilateral level, China and ASEAN have stated their intent to develop a SCS code
of conduct which critics see as a tactical move from China to buy time to
consolidate its maritime power (Morales & Pomfret, 2017).
Similar tactics of one-on-one diplomatic talks have been employed with the
countries in the Mekong River regional dispute. The Mekong has the potential to
become another flashpoint between ASEAN and China: China’s dam building
upstream in the river is creating problems, such as drought and salinization, for
countries downstream who rely on the river for food and irrigation. Although
26
Cambodia is one of the countries affected, Hun Sen’s support has effectively been
bought after China promised funding for a new expressway and airport (Vannak,
2018). Ultimately, China has been using Cambodia to create internal disunity within
ASEAN which has diminished the body’s power and increased its own, supporting
the offensive realist view of China as a power-maximiser.
5.2 The One China Policy
The OCP is a core Chinese policy, supported by Cambodia, which sees Taiwan as a
breakaway province that belongs to China. Regaining Taiwan would increase
China’s power and security due to its strategic value; positioned at the edge of the
SCS, unification would allow China to be more assertive in its maritime dominance.
Much like the disputed territory in the SCS, China is using its hegemony in
Cambodia to increase support for the OCP. If China were regional hegemon, it
would increase pressure on Taiwan through its ability to control other countries’
foreign policy, this can be seen in Cambodia, supporting OR on the state-level. This
would further China’s aim to isolate Taiwan internationally (Roy, 2013:200).
Cambodia’s acceptance of the OCP is not unique; China now makes the
cutting of formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan a standard for any country it develops
close relations with (Li, 2017). However, the RGC has more robustly supported the
policy in comparison to other countries. For example, Hun Sen banned the
Taiwanese flag from Cambodia on account of respecting Chinese sovereignty.
Similarly, Cambodia has repeatedly blocked any official Taiwanese presence in the
country, such as the establishment of a trade office in Phnom Penh which would
boost Taiwanese investment (Soumy, 2017). This commitment to the OCP is a
result of the strong patronage China commands over Cambodia; it indicates
adverse consequences for Taiwan if China is able to proliferate its dominance in
SEA. Moreover, if Taiwan were to declare independence, China’s 2005 anti-
secession law states that China would use military force in response (Roy,
27
2013:199). For reasons outlined in Chapter 4, Cambodia could be called upon to
assist the PLA, demonstrating the country’s strategic importance for China’s power
maximisation.
Regardless of the absence of diplomatic relations, Cambodia continues to
welcome bilateral trade with Taiwan: $744 million in 2015 (Soumy, 2017).
Therefore, the economic interdependence critique of OR has some validity here and
suggests limits to China’s predominance in Cambodia. If Beijing were to ask Phnom-
Penh to cease economic ties with Taiwan, the RGC would expect them to fill the
gap in their $678 million leather, tobacco and machinery imports from Taiwan
(Taiwan Trade Mission, 2016). As well as this being an economic feat for China, this
would truly put Cambodia’s commitment to the OCP to the test; it is not a certainty
that Cambodia would meet such a monumental request. This demonstrates a
limitation to OR’s application on the state-level which would likely be replicated on
the regional-level considering Taiwan’s significant trade with other SEA countries.
The economic isolation of Taiwan, although effective for reunification, is unlikely
given Taiwan’s increasing investment in the region.
That said, Mearsheimer (2014:377) states that ‘coercion or the actual use of
force is the only plausible way China is going to regain Taiwan’. Military force is a
much surer way of reunification and if China acquires more loyal allies like
Cambodia, this is a probable option. China’s war games in the Taiwan Strait in April
2018 (Ramzy, 2018) were a reminder that the PLA’s strength is growing and
indicate that China will only intensify its dedication to the OCP.
Overall, OR can be seen in China’s ability to coerce Cambodia into aligning
with its foreign policy. China’s determination to dominate the maritime component
of SEA and secure lost territory exposes its drive for power acquisition. This
analysis has highlighted China’s intentions for future regional hegemony: Beijing
continues to manipulate ASEAN in order to bypass the repercussions of its actions
28
in the SCS. Overcoming the issue with other claimants removes a significant
obstacle to the expansion of China’s sphere of influence in SEA. Moreover,
Cambodia’s stringent support of the OCP demonstrates how effective China can be
as a hegemon in dictating another country’s foreign policy. This strategy moves the
regional environment in SEA nearer to one where China could make a bid for
regional hegemony. The next chapter examines how China is using its hegemony in
Cambodia in a similar way to meet its resource needs.
6.Resources
Burgos and Ear (2013:3) claim that ‘China’s hunger for massive amounts of energy
is driving policy in Beijing’, this can be seen through its relationship with Cambodia.
29
A state’s energy supply-chain system underpins the continuity of a country’s
society, economy and military (Leung, 2014). OR sees resource security as one of
China’s highest priorities because, in order for a hegemonic bid to be plausible,
China must continue its substantial economic growth and it cannot do this without
natural resources. Moreover, the legitimacy of the CCP regime rests on its ability to
bring wealth and prosperity to its people. With a rapidly expanding middle class
and a population growing by 0.62% per year, China must secure the resources
needed to meet their demands for products and services (Burgos & Ear, 2010:621).
As history has shown, the emergence of an unhappy middle class can bring about
revolution, something the CCP wants to avoid at all costs. Aside from this economic
motive, resources are finite and this fact decreases every state’s security.
Therefore, as the foundation of OR is that great-powers are first and foremost
concerned about survival, states must have secure access to resources in order to
survive and hegemony is the best way to do so.
Only once a state has maximised power within the confines of its borders
can it effectively project power elsewhere in the region and consolidation of this
domestic power comes through the means of financial prosperity, as shown by the
US in the second-half of the 19th century (Mearsheimer, 2001:244). Energy
resources are needed to sustain China’s manufacturing-based economy and food
resources must be secured to feed the workforce behind it. For these reasons,
China is increasingly anxious about its growing import dependency on faraway
places which are politically unstable, such as sub-Saharan Africa, so has begun to
look for ways to secure resources closer to home. Furthermore, relying on imports
for vital supplies is risky for a potential hegemon as global commodity markets can
be unpredictable. This is currently demonstrated by recurring reports of a budding
trade war between the US and China since President Trump took office.
30
More so, Mearsheimer (2001:143) stresses the link between relative wealth
and military strength. The military forces a state possess make for the most
effective form of power since ‘economic might is the foundation of military might’
(Mearsheimer, 2001:143). This explains why China is so concerned with securing
resources. ‘Abundant wealth and a large population are prerequisites for building
formidable military forces’ (Mearsheimer, 2001:56), thus, with demographics on
side, China must strengthen its economy.
Therefore, a secure supply of energy and food helps a state maximise its
power and subsequently its security within a region; with assured resource supplies
in place, China would be in a better position to bid for regional hegemony. The
tightening Sino-Cambodian relationship is conducive to these natural resource
needs: Cambodia has underexplored oil and gas reserves and only 30% of its land
was cultivated as of 2011 (Siphat, 2015:200). Chinese influence in Cambodia offers
China the opportunity to exploit these resources for its own regional hegemonic
ends.
6.1 Energy Security
China’s hegemony in Cambodia assists it in securing much needed inexpensive
energy sources, specifically oil and hydropower. China’s energy needs have
primarily been met by coal which can be found in abundance within China (Dong et
al., 2017:215). However, the burning of coal brings greater pollution than natural
gas or oil, therefore, China has been looking elsewhere for resources. Cambodia is
a realm of opportunity when it comes to natural resources, although widely
unexplored, there are estimates that just one licensed exploration area in
Cambodia holds 400-700 million barrels of oil and 3 trillion feet of gas (Allwright et
al., 2015:4). Consuming 11 million barrels of oil daily (Slav, 2017), it is no wonder
China has been investing heavily in the Cambodian resource sector, as illustrated
by its $620 million contract in 2016 to build Cambodia’s first oil refinery (Reuters,
31
2016). Future oil endeavours in Cambodia should occur with relative ease given
that ‘the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority, which administers oil contracts,
is under the direct control of a prime minister and deputy prime minister all too
happy to sing China’s praises’ (Burgos & Ear, 2010:622-623). This demonstrates
how following OR on the state-level has had positive economic consequences for
China and lends impetus to pursuing regional hegemony.
Currently, China imports around half of its oil from the Middle East and one-
fifth from Africa (OEC, 2016), two politically volatile regions which bring financial
and security risks. The kidnapping and murder of five Chinese oil workers in Sudan
in 2008 is an extreme example of such risks. Although a dated example, this shows
why China would rather get its resources from a less unpredictable supply. China
has invested heavily in the RGC and, despite accusations that the Chinese have
contributed to the butchery of democracy in Cambodia, Hun Sen is set to win the
upcoming election, safeguarding his power for another five years and making the
political climate there relatively stable. Although Cambodia cannot fully replace oil
from China’s current suppliers, it does offer potential in a world of limited
resources, increasing China’s relative power and consequently the possibility of a
bid for regional hegemony.
Cambodia’s strategic positioning also meets China’s hunger for resources. As
previously stated, hegemony in Cambodia provides access to the Gulf of Thailand
which is believed to contain oil and gas reserves (Ciorciari, 2014:258) and through
which the SCS can be reached which has great resource potential. Also accessible
is the Malacca Strait, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it sees sixteen million
barrels of oil pass through it daily – much of that heading for China (EIA, 2017). Any
disruption, be that piracy or a possible US naval blockade in the Malacca Strait,
threatens China’s energy security (Hamzah, 2017). Therefore, reliable access to the
32
waterway offers China greater security and is one explanation for its investment in
the port of Sihanoukville.
Moreover, China’s commitment to building hydropower plants in Cambodia
suggests they are fortifying their energy security with renewable sources. In the
future, Cambodia hopes to export electricity generated from hydropower to
neighbouring countries (Nordensvard et al., 2017:11) and China’s investment in
Cambodian dam-building will put them at the front of the queue. Therefore, China’s
hegemony in Cambodia provides it with promising access to potential natural
resources and with a more secure way to access resources in general.
6.2 Food Security
Rapid urbanisation since 1978 and environmental degradation has reduced
available arable land – China lost 6.2% of its farmland between 1997 and 2008
(Bloomberg News, 2017) – thus jeopardising food security in China. With nearly 1.4
billion mouths to feed, China’s increasing dependency on food imports makes the
power vulnerable to boom-bust cycles of ‘high food prices… and policy-induced
supply shocks’ (Burgos & Ear, 2010:630). However, China’s hegemony has allowed
it to make Cambodia ‘the site of [its] agricultural outsourcing’ (Siphat, 2015:200)
and exploit its abundant farmland. For example, Chinese investors receive cheap
access to Cambodian cropland, at only three percent of the price in China, on
account of the countries’ close relationship (Jingjing, 2016). Moreover, in 2015 one-
quarter of China’s aid to Cambodia went to the agricultural sector (Grimsditch,
2017:42) demonstrating their commitment to securing food resources closer to
home. Hence, the Sino-Cambodian relationship strengthens China’s food security
and subsequently its economic security.
The empirical evidence examined here supports OR in the Sino-Cambodian
relationship over the liberalist argument of economic interdependence. As has been
shown, China’s quest for resources is centred around limiting its dependence on 33
unreliable sources. China can enhance its security by increasing its ‘capabilities
and control over the external environment’ (Layne, 1993:11); hegemony is the
safest way to accomplish this. As China becomes more powerful, it will become less
dependent. As written by Roy (1994:159) over twenty years ago: ‘Today's weak
China has to suffer the vulnerabilities of interdependence, but tomorrow's strong
China will not’. China’s expanding sphere of influence is increasingly moving it
towards the China of tomorrow. The Cambodian case acts as an example of how
hegemony can successfully maximise resource access in a specific area which
provides incentives for China to expand its sphere of influence to secure more
resources. Ultimately, the Sino-Cambodian relationship is beneficial for a future
Chinese hegemonic bid as the improved access to and availability of resources for
export increases China’s power capabilities. It also demonstrates how China would
exploit the resources of SEA if it were a regional hegemon.
34
7.Conclusion
This dissertation has shown that the Sino-Cambodian relationship follows the path
of OR to a large extent. China’s use of soft-power in Cambodia demonstrates how it
uses cultural transfer to minimise the fear of its encroaching presence in Cambodia.
Through the spreading of their language and customs, China successfully created a
favourable environment for investment and for maintaining a close political
relationship. This desire to glorify Chinese culture lends support to OR as it has
been proven to be an effective means of gaining power, and therefore security in
an insecure world. OR can be seen through China’s determination to push the US
out of Cambodia militarily, which fits into the wider narrative of China wanting to
remove the US from the SEA region as a whole. Furthermore, the US is buck-
passing the burden of China’s influence in Cambodia to Japan, who in turn is acting
in accordance with OR by balancing China’s presence through aid donations and
political support. Cambodia’s foreign policy alignment with China demonstrates the
RGC’s devotion to the PRC, even at the expense of regional and international
criticism. This analysis also showed the strategic importance of China’s influence in
Cambodia by way of its membership in ASEAN and its stringent support for the
OCP, both of which assist China’s expansionist desires for regional hegemony.
Lastly, OR was shown in the Sino-Cambodian relationship through China’s
resources needs. The link between resource security and China’s economic power
35
is indivisible; economic power translates into military might and increases the
chances of a power’s survival. Therefore, OR explains China’s voracious appetite
for food and energy resources in Cambodia and further demonstrates Cambodia’s
strategic importance as a route to the Gulf of Thailand and the Malacca Strait.
This research lends support to the current scholarship predicting China’s
‘unpeaceful’ rise. As well as demonstrating China’s offensive realist actions, China’s
intentions to expand its sphere of influence have been highlighted. Mearsheimer
(2014:361) states ‘we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in
world politics’; understanding how China has achieved hegemony in Cambodia on
the state-level provides a basic ‘roadmap’ for how China will act in other SEA
countries. Indeed, there are already signs of China replicating its Cambodia
strategy in the rest of the region, especially in Laos and the Philippines (p. 23). As
China derives more power from its hegemony in Cambodia, it can utilise this in the
rest of the region, as in the case of ASEAN and the SCS.
This is not to say that China’s hegemonic successes will be replicated in the
rest of SEA as the US and other great-powers in the Asia-Pacific, as well as Russia,
will go to great lengths to prevent this. Inasmuch, identifying China as a revisionist
power has implications for policy. Determined to remain the sole regional
hegemon, America will try to weaken China in similar ways it did the Soviet Union
during the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 2010:390). Consequently, the world should
prepare for intense security competition between the US and China.
Overall, the Sino-Cambodian case makes for an effective display of OR. China
is acting as a ‘good’ offensive realist in Cambodia as it is attempting to push the
current regional hegemon, the US, out of the country whilst expanding its influence
through soft-power and coercion. China’s actions in Cambodia are made with
underlying intentions of power acquisition, be that donating military equipment or
offering scholarships to students attending Chinese schools, the PRC always has its
36
own survival in mind. Therefore, the theory of OR seems best fit to describe China’s
relationship with Cambodia.
OR follows that to guarantee survival, China will attempt to become regional
hegemon. Hegemony does not happen overnight – in the US’s case it took 115
years – and China’s behaviour in Cambodia suggests that it is taking a piecemeal
approach to hegemony, exercising patience until the international environment is
conducive to one where a hegemonic bid would be rational and profitable for power
procurement. This would be a severe challenge to American primacy and trigger
heightened great-power competition. Thus, China’s offensive realist ambitions
present a threat to the international order as we know it and should not be ignored.
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