A Watershed Moment in Venezuela - Teodoro Petkoff (July 2008)

8/14/2019 A Watershed Moment in Venezuela - Teodoro Petkoff (July 2008)

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A n d

e a n

Workin Paper

A Watershed Moment in Venezuela Teodoro Petkoff

December 2, 2007

Conceding Defeat

A review of the conditions in Venezuela hasto begin with an examination of the eventsof December 2, 2007, the day a narrow 51percent majority rejected President HugoChvezs proposed constitutional reformpackage.

Through nine years and numerous electionsand referenda, it was the first time Chvez was defeated at the polls. Late that night, astension edged closer to the breaking point,the president surprised both supporters andadversaries by conceding defeat. True to hisstyle, he downplayed the opposition win andreiterated his famous but somewhat trite por ahora (for now) declaration. Just as in 1992,after he realized that his coup attempt had

failed, por ahora meant that he saw the set-back as temporary and that he would fight toachieve his original goal eventually.

Two days later, his temper got the betterof him. Incensed at a news report claimingthat the decision to concede defeat had beenforced on him by military leaders, Chvez burst into a news conference called by thedefense minister to refute the rumor andproceeded to unleash a barrage of vulgar

abuse against the opposition and the authorof the news story. His ego wounded, Chvez thus undid his initial moderate statement.Conceding defeat had paid political divi-

July 2008

dends both at home and abroad, portrayinghim as an even-handed democratic leader,but his venting undid much of the impact of his initial reaction.

The question raised in the press is relevant.Did the military actually force him to acceptdefeat? I, for one, do not think so. There isno one in the current high command with

the independenceor courage, for that mat-terto encourage Chvez to concede defeat.Military pressure, if any, is more likely tohave pushed in the opposite direction. Inmy view, the decision was his and his alone,because, among other reasons, his style of leadership has made him a solitary ruler whosurrounds himself mostly with timid andsubservient advisors.

Once again, Chvez showed himself a wily

politician with formidable tactical instincts.His cost-benefit analysis of the circum-stances led him to the only politically sensible conclusion: concede defeat to avoidcivil strife. Vote counts had been leaked tothe press, and large segments of the opposi-tion and general population stood ready totake to the streets if Chvez had announced victory. He could not be sure how soldiers would react. Nor could he accurately gaugethe effect of the public admonition made to

the armed forces by his former defense min-ister and retired general, Ral Baduel: defendthe institutions and the will of the people.

December 2, 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Local and Regional Elections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Nationalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Bolivarian Curriculum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The International Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Its the Economy, Stupid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14C o n c l u s i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

Table of Contents

(continued on page 3)


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Pullquote. F o r e w o r d

The Inter-American Dialogue is delighted to publish this paper by Teodoro Petkoff, ethe Venezuelan daily TalCual , former minister of economic planning, and one of the regionleading public intellectuals. Petkoff dissects the causes and explores the political imptions of the Venezuelan voters rejection of Hugo Chvezs constitutional reform refeDecember of 2007. He also sets the stage for local and regional elections in Novemb

views Chvezs agenda for the rest of his second term. This working paper is the seventeenth in a special series focused on the Andean counSouth America. The Dialogues aim is to stimulate a broad and well-informed publicon the complex issues facing key analysts and decision makers concerned with ColoVenezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. We seek to offer diagnoses of the current situaas policy prescriptions to deal more effectively with deep-seated problems.

The series is a byproduct of a working group project launched by the Dialogue in 200Andean working group is comprised of select and diverse analysts and policymakersAndean region, other Latin American countries, Europe, Canada and the United State

the working paper series itself, the group was launched with a particular focus on theconflict but then naturally expanded to encompass all of the Andean countries.

The working group essentially serves as a brain trust or core group of advisors for on the Andean region, a top priority for the organization. The goal of the group is notessarily to reach agreements or produce consensus documents. Rather, it is to generatinterpretations of multiple Andean challenges, in order to shape thought and encourastructive responses.

To date, the papers have dealt with a wide range of topics, including the Colombian cdrug trafficking, civil-military relations, human security and the political stalemate in We hope this paper will contribute to a deeper understanding of a critical situation in sphere. Petkoffs perspective does not necessarily reflect the views of the working grInter-American Dialogue.

We are pleased to recognize the assistance provided by the Ford Foundation for our wAndean region and for the production of this report.

Michael ShifterVice President for Policy

2 A Wa sh d M m i V z a


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He also must have realized that a failure toaccept the referendum result would be seen asfraud and significantly damage his standingabroad. Chvez knew that no Latin Americangovernment would condone a power graband that attempting vote manipulation wouldleave him looking like a tin-pot dictator.Conceding defeat, on the other hand, mighthelp show he was a democrat and dispel someof the misgivings and suspicions about him.

Although there was only one reasonablecourse of action, Chvez still took severalhours to settle on it. His ultimate choice, of course, was perfectly consistent for a man who had twice before opted to surrenderrather than fight. As irascible and impulsiveas Chvez can be, he does keep his cool intimes of crisis, especially if his own future isat stake. Although fellow soldiers who con-trolled leading garrisons during Chvezs1992 coup wanted to stay the course, Chvez understood that their failure in Caracas andthe return of President Carlos Andrs Prez spelled defeat and that surrender was theonly way to save his movement and live tofight another day. History proved him right.During the coup of 2002, Vice President JosVicente Rangel advised Chvez to make astand in Miraflores Palace. But Chvez, whohad communicated by telephone with eachof the garrisons (as both he and Rangel toldme in separate interviews), knew that hehad no support outside of General Baduelselite paratroopersa small island of sup-port surrounded by a sea of mutinous troops.

He again chose to surrender, cognizant thathis political power would remain intact aslong as he stayed alive. History again provedhim right, even faster than he could haveimagined.

Chvez understood on the night of December 2 that he had much more to gainby admitting defeat. And this he did, only to

see his verbal excesses betray him two dayslater. That said, exactly what did happen onDecember 2? Was it just another electoralepisodein a democracy, you win some and you lose someor did something more sig-nificant take place?Charismatic Leadership

What happened was indeed momentous,going well beyond the referendum vote andoffering insights into Chvezs model of lead-ership. Max Weber characterized leadershipmodels like the one employed by Chvez ascharismatic, as opposed to institutional.Regardless of the personal qualities of the

leader, institutional leadership is based onand exercised through a network of politi-cal parties and public powers in a complex setof interactions between leader and follower.Charismatic leadership, on the other hand,is based on a direct link between the leaderand a significant segment of the population, what Weber called the charismatic commu-nity. Such leadership arrangements generally emerge when societies face profound eco-nomic and social crises compounded by a

systemic political collapse. Some nations havefilled the vacuum by following an alluringleader who is soon idealized and sanctified.

The emotional and political bond betweenleader and follower is always an importantfactor in the exercise of power, but somecharismatic leaders have also built or usedinstitutional intermediaries to buttress theirpower. Chvez, on the other hand, is a char-ismatic leader who has seriously weakened

the institutional fabric of his country, with-out replacing it with effective alternatives.In the long term, this makes his leadershipmore vulnerable than that of charismaticleaders who have constructed a strong state.An example of the latter is Fidel Castro, thetype of charismatic leader that comes alongonly once every century. Castro, with helpfrom the Soviet Union and from his brother

(continued from page 1)

As irascible andimpulsive as Chvezcan be, he does keephis cool in times of

crisis, especially if

his own future is

at stake.


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A Wa sh d M m i V z a44

Ralrightly identified by Jorge Domnguez as the great organizer of the armed forces andthe Communist Party, the Cuban states mostefficient organizationsbuilt a strong totali-tarian state that complements and enhances

his personal power.Charismatic leadership, of course, could notexist if the public did not see the leader asa miracle worker, capable of resolving any problem or overcoming any obstacle. Whenconfidence falters, the charismatic leader is introuble. In Webers own words:

If confirmation (of charismaticpower) is long in coming, if the

leader possessed of charismatic graceseems to have been abandoned by his God or his magic or heroic pow-ers, if success is denied for a longtime, and above all,if his government fails to bring prosperity to those he rules, then his charismatic authority is in danger of vanishing.1

Not only has the wellspring of Chvezspower begun to run dry, power brokers such

as business leaders, unions, professional asso-ciations, the Catholic Church, and especially the armed forces are beginning to take notice. They may disagree with the president, butthey still obey and respect him because they understand his hold on the masses. But if thisrelationship begins to show fault lines, theseelites, whose cultural seismographs are very sensitive, will take notice. If Chvez ceases tobe useful to their interests, new divisions may appear and further weaken his hold on power.

The events of December 2 showed that thecharismatic powers of Hugo Chvez havebegun to wane. While calling the referendumrejection the beginning of the endasThe Economist didis wishful thinking, there isno doubt that his power is receding and that

1 Economy and Society, 1992. Webers own emphasis.

December 2 was the turning point. Chvez won the 2006 presidential election with 64percent, about seven million votes. He lostthe referendum, which he had turned into aplebiscite on his rule, with just 49 percent o

the vote. In other words, in the course of on year he lost 14 to 15 percent of his own voters. About three million abstained rather th vote against him, while hundreds of thou-sands said no, giving the opposition theedge needed to win. Keeping Chvez fromsliding even further is his checkbook, whicgives him significant room for maneuver ahome and abroad. In Venezuela, charismaand money can make for an unstoppablecombination.

A Skeptical Constituency

Seen from another perspective, the events oDecember 2 underscored what the closureof the Radio Caracas Television (RCTV)channel in May 2007 had suggested. At thetime, surveys showed that over 80 percentof the population was opposed to the mea-sure. It was the first time since the coup of April 2002 that so many had categorically

refused to back Chvez. While not ready to break with him, his followers still madeplain their opposition to a clear abuse of power that put an end to Venezuelas most watched entertainment source. It was clearthat his constituency was not as unquestioning or loyal as Chvez had thought. Whenthe referendum rolled around, Chvezs traditional voter base grabbed the chance toexpress its growing skepticism to the leade The more they understood the gist of his prposal, the less they liked it. The request fornearly absolute powers (unlimited re-electiocurtailment of governor and municipal pre-rogatives, partisan armed forces, veto overmilitary promotions, subordination of theCentral Bank, redefinition of private propereconomic statism, etc.) was denied by demcratic-minded Venezuelans.

When theconstitutional reformreferendum rolled

around, Chvezstraditional voter

base grabbed the

chance to express its

growing skepticism to

the leader.


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In addition, Chvezs links to Cuba had thusfar flown under the radar of mostchavistas (Chvez supporters), but the proposal showedthem in a whole new light. Although mostpeople appreciate the work Cuban doctors do

in Venezuela, polls show that the same is nottrue for the Cuban political and economicmodel. At some point, the proposed reformhad started to resemble a power grab in theFidel Castro mold, which raised red flagsamong somechavistavoters.

Interestingly, the two issues that met with themost resistance were control over the CentralBank and unlimited re-election, which hadover 60 percent disapproval, well above the

referendum average. While the administra-tion of the Central Bank might seem like atechnical question of interest only to experts,a second look reveals that many voters feltthat the government wanted to controlmoney that rightly belonged to the people.In addition, strong disapproval of unlimitedre-election shows that some government sup-porters are beginning to show signs of fatigueafter nine years under Chvez.

The Opposition The (relatively) organized oppositionprimarily political parties and socialmovementsis undergoing an encourag-ing process of renewal. The recent history of Venezuelan opposition is divided into threequalitatively different stages that merit review.

Stage One: 19992003

The first stage runs from Hugo ChvezsFebruary 1999 inauguration through the endof the oil strike in February 2003. Duringthis stage, the opposition was led by power-ful elites: business executives, media tycoons,military conspirators, and the strange bed-fellows of Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) labor union members and

the Federation of Chambers of Commerceand Production (Fedecamaras) industry asso-ciation. After Chvezs electoral victory of December 1998, political parties were allbut destroyed. Weakened, discredited, and

barely surviving, Democratic Action (AD)and Venezuelas Social Christian Democratparty (COPEI), the two groupings that hadrun Venezuela for half a century, played asecondary role behind the powerful elite.Democratic Coordination, created in mid-2002 to rally political parties and socialorganizations, languished for months, over-shadowed by the de facto leadership. Duringthis time, the opposition had a distinct right- wing bias (which greatly helped Chvez divide the country into rich and poor) and aseditious strategy that overtly sought a mili-tary takeover. Progressive sectors had little say in the way events unfolded, much less in lead-ing them. The hardline opposition definedthe Chvez government as a totalitarian dic-tatorship. Since all options are legitimateagainst such a regime, the definition servedas the pretext for a coup. The opposition wasable to co-opt vast segments of the middleclass and even some sectors of the workingclass, including organized labor, who took tothe streets in unprecedented numbers.

Three coups were attempted. The first took place on April 11, 2002, after conspiratorshijacked a massive rally and turned it intoa pitched battle with Chvez supporters. Inthe ensuing mayhem, conspirators from thearmed forces removed Chvez from powerfor two days, following a series of episodesthat seemed closer to magic realism than toconventional politics. The botched coup which went down in history as thecarmonazo after Pedro Carmona, the hapless figure they named as presidentand the resulting omi-nous specter of massive reprisals paved the way for Chvezs triumphant return.

The (relatively)

organized oppositionis undergoing an

encouraging process

of renewal.


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In the aftermath, a contrite and ostensibly conciliatory Chvez agreed to reinstate firedmanagers at the state oil company PDVSAand named Al Rodrguez as PDVSAchairman (with approval from reinstated

managers). He also pledged to stop wearingarmy fatigues, appointed a dialogue com-mission, and convened the Federal Council.Although Chvez was clearly on the ropesafter his brief ouster, opposition leaders weretoo politically obtuse to take advantage. They merely reiterated the illegitimacy of his gov-ernment and went back to plotting the nextcoup attempt.

The next overthrow effort came on October

10, 2002, as the military conspirators fromApril appealed to the armed forces to oustChvez, based on their reading of Article350 in the Constitution, which delegiti-mizes governments that violate human rights.Since Chvez had previously filled key com-mand positions with loyal officers, the callfell on deaf ears. Faced with failure, the mili-tary conspirators barricaded themselves inAltamira Square and stayed there for overa year. Chvez wisely chose not to go afterthese subversive elements, a decision thathelped him polish his democratic credentials,especially abroad. These events deepenedthe oppositions isolation and went a long way toward earning it a poor internationalreputation.

The third attempt to remove Chvez by force was the oil strike from December 2002 toFebruary 2003. While the opposition hadassumed that no Venezuelan governmentcould survive an oil strike for more than threedays, Chvez was able to withstand it for 62days, all without interference from the armedforces. PDVSA workers allowed themselvesto be manipulated by reckless coup plottersinto a senseless conflict that ended in catas-trophe. In its aftermath, the government firedsome 20,000 PDVSA workers and trans-

Although Chvezwas clearly on the ropesafter his brief ouster,

opposition leaders were

too politically obtuse to

take advantage.

ferred full control of the company into itsown hands. The first stage in the recent his-tory of the Venezuelan opposition ended inFebruary 2003.2

Stage Two: 20032006 The second stage began as the oil strikeground to an end. When the powerful elitesleft to lick their wounds, parties took on agreater role. Democratic Coordination, untithen pushed to the sidelines by coup advo-cates, came into its own. Its call for a recallreferendum became the implicit launch of democratic strategy, disturbed only occasioally by coup advocates. The strategy took fhold after the formidable success of the refendum, which overcame every hurdle throwin its path by the government, whose abso-lute control of the National Electoral Counhelped delay the recall vote by a full year.Chvez used this time to launch his mis-sions, social programs (with an enormouselectoral impact) involving massive finan-cial transfers and food distribution, primaryhealth care, and educational services. The rerendum was at last held in August 2004. B

the resounding success achieved in gettingfour million Venezuelansnearly 45 perceof the electorateto vote against Chvez wsquandered by the oppositions unfoundedcharges of fraud, which turned a political vtory into defeat. The vote-rigging accusatio

2On a personal note, as a member of the democratic left who was forced to take a position on a daily basis in my role asnewspaper editor, I wish to note the ordeal I lived through inthose years. As a government opponent who was completelyagainst the right-wing conspirators, I was a harsh critic of boand publicly called for a democratic opposition strategy. On

the night of April 12, 2002, I went on national television todenounce the coup in the strongest terms possible. In the dayleading up to the coup attempt of October 10, 2002, I wroteseveral editorials categorically opposing a military solution the crisis. While other dailies gave copious front-cover coveto the coup attempt,TalCual headlined Golpe No (No Coup)in large type. I repeatedly called for an end to the Altamirastandoff and harshly criticized democratic leaders who paradthrough the square to have their picture taken with the muti-nous soldiers. When the call for a national strike was made iDecember 2002, I publicly opposed it in the paper. I relate th just for the record, lest readers think Im an armchair genera with 20-20 hindsight.


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also prompted calls for a boycott in October2004, which allowed Chvez to coast to vic-tory in 21 of 23 governorship campaignsand nearly 300 of 335 mayoralty races. InDecember 2005,chavistaswon practically all

of the municipal councils, and then, for goodmeasure, the entire National Assembly.3

Stage Three: 2006Present

The third stage runs from January 2006 tothe present. In early 2006, Manuel Rosalesand Julio Borges, the leaders of the small par-ties A New Era (UNT) and Justice First(PJ), respectively, and I launched a demo-cratic strategy whose immediate goal was tofield a single, unified candidate in the presi-dential elections of December 2006. By June,the initiative had crystallized in the candi-dacy of Manuel Rosales, the governor of themost important state in Venezuela: Zulia.Although it met with skepticism and ridiculeby abstentionist sectors at first, the campaignquickly began to gain traction, especially among the underprivileged. Boycott advo-cates gradually lost ground until practically all opposition forces came over to support

Rosales. On election day, over four millionVenezuelans, slightly over 40 percent of theelectorate, most of whom had stayed away from the polls after the recall referendum,made a grand comeback to the political sceneand voted for Rosales.

In what later became an event with crucialpolitical consequences, Manuel Rosales gra-ciously conceded defeat on election night.For the first time in Chvezs reign, rather

than harping on the tired old song aboutfraud and illegitimacy, the opposition sim-ply acknowledged the obvious: Chvez had won fairly. Although disparaged by a small

3Once again, I feel compelled to recall my rejection of thisopposition stance at the time, which was noted in many TalCual editorials and summarized in the last chapter of my 2005 book Dos Izquierdas. About fraud allegations and my view as to how a Chvez referendum victory could not be challenged on thosegrounds, this chapter may prove useful.

but noisy mob of opposition extremists, thisgesture succeeded in establishing a basis tomove forward with a democratic strategy. While Chvez barely acknowledged the ges-ture and did nothing to meet it halfway, this

in no way precluded consolidation of thenew policy. Needless to say, as long as roomstill exists for free political action, democraticparticipation is the only viable way to con-front authoritarian, autocratic, and militaristicregimes. Ironically enough, someone who saw this with utmost clarity was Ch Guevarahimself, whose now-forgotten tract on guer-rilla warfare warned that armed struggle hadno place in countries where room for demo-cratic action still existed. (Of course, Guevarahimself would forget his own assertion duringthe revolutionary fervor of the 1960s).

The presidential elections had two significantresults. First, A New Era and Justice Firstbecame strong political parties with broadnational appeal. Before that, the former hadexisted only in Zulia and the latter in just fourmunicipalities. Each party obtained morethan a million votes from across Venezuela, which provided a basis to build a nation- wide structure. Their sustained efforts in thisrespect have built an organizational capacity that, while still weak, does extend throughoutthe country. In the public mind, these par-ties are slowly taking the place of DemocraticAction and COPEI, the once-dominant par-ties that ruled the country for half a century. This political emergence is rebutting the oncepotent no volvern (they will not come back)slogan thechavistaschanted to warn againstthe return of the parties Venezuelans kickedout of power in 1998 in favor of Chvez.

In December 2007, as Chvez embarked onhis misguided constitutional reform package,he proclaimed that the first step would beto create a unified party of the revolution.He was stunned to be rebuffed by three of the four groups in thechavistaalliance. As a

For the first timein Chvezs reign, rathethan harping on the

tired old song aboutfraud and illegitimacy,

in 2006 the opposition

simply acknowledged

the obvious: Chvez

had won fairly.


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result, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela(PSUV) is being cobbled together from themembership of the former Fifth RepublicMovement (MVR) and little else. In spite of Chvezs abuse and threats, Fatherland for

All (PPT) and the Communist Party (PCV)both refused to join, forcing him to proposereviving the Patriotic Pole, thechavistacoali-tion of 1999-2000, as an umbrella for thePSUV, PPT, and PCV. Of course, it shouldcome as no surprise that so far this coali-tion only exists in the Presidents rhetoric.As heirs to a democratic and pluralistic tra-dition, PODEMOS (Democratic and SocialPower)achavistafaction that stayed behind when the Movement Toward Socialism(MAS) party walked out of the governmentcoalition in 2001also balked at the pro-posed creation of a single party. As a result,PODEMOS has become the unofficial oppo-sition in the National Assembly, although inan effort not to break with thechavistacon-stituency it keeps a safe distance from the restof the opposition. PODEMOS has provideda welcome boost to center-left oppositionforces like A New Era, the single-largestopposition party and similarly moderate left-ist group.

The opposition renewal process has also beenbolstered by high-profile defections fromthe Chvez camp, notably General Baduel.In addition to his previous positions as min-ister of defense, army chief, commandingofficer of the Maracay garrison (the largestin Venezuela), and commanding officer of the paratrooper battalion, Baduel was untilrecently a Hero of the Revolution, awardedfor his prominent role in returning Chvez topower in 2002. His new role is illustrated by the fact that the recent weeklong commem-oration of the sixth anniversary of the 2002coup was almost entirely devoted to heap-ing abuse on Baduel and rewriting him out of the official history. (Interestingly, Marisabel

Rodrguez, Hugo Chvezs ex-wife, joinedBaduel in opposing the constitutional reforpackage.) The recent acrimonious denunciation of so-called institutionalist military officers by the defense minister seems to su

gest that a number of members of the armeforces, who identify with General Baduel,may be staging a passive resistance to presidential efforts to bring ideology and partisapolitics into the military.

Another key component of the oppositionrenewal process is the re-emergence of thestudent movement. Although Venezuelanstudents have a long-standing tradition of activism, under Chvez they had all but

passed from the scene, probably due to thecrisis facing the left, who are the traditionastudent movement organizers. For the pastnine years, students were nowhere to be sein the Venezuelan social or political arenas. Yet, out of nowhere and obviously as moreof a social than a partisan phenomenon,hundreds of thousands of college and highschool students flooded the streets to protethe closure of RCTV in May 2007. Thesemiddle-class youths, just 12 or 13 years old when Chvez took power, were incensed atthe blatantly arbitrary decision and mobi-lized against it in a completely spontaneou way. The combative, creative presence of young peopleready to spring to actionat a moments notice and steadfast in theirallegiance to democratic procedurewas a welcome breath of fresh air for Venezuelanpolitics. The opposition seems to have learits lesson, as parties no longer seem bent onhijacking the student movement, and the stdent movement no longer thinks of itself asan appendage attached to them. If this con-tinues, and there is no reason to doubt it wiVenezuela can continue to count on a qualitatively different opposition than that of theperiod from 1999 to 2005.

A number of members of the armedforces, who identify

with General Baduel,

may be staging a

passive resistance to

presidential efforts

to bring ideology and

partisan politics into

the military.


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99

Local and Regional Elections

The next electoral confrontation willtake place on November 23, 2008, whenVenezuelan voters will elect 23 state gover-nors and legislatures, the mayor and municipalcouncil of Caracas, and 335 town mayors.

For the opposition, this window of oppor-tunity is extraordinarily important. Absentfrom all state institutions since the secondhalf of 2004 and with a weak street pres-ence (save for the formally apolitical studentmovements), the opposition stands to reclaimfrom six to nine governorships and about100 municipal governments. They governedeight states prior to the collapse of 2004 and2005 but lost all but two. The opposition wasreduced from running some 100 municipalgovernments to less than 50, none of themin large, key cities. In addition, the opposi-tion lost every municipal council and was shutout of the National Assembly, all thanks totheabstentionitisthat infected political partiesand their constituencies.

Returning to power in state and local institu-

tions would be a major achievement in itself,but as it turns out, races in most large statesand Caracas are also ripe for opposition vic-tories. Wins in these key votes would redraw the countrys political and territorial mapand more than offsetchavistagains in otherstates and municipalities. For the opposition,it would secure a degree of institutional legiti-macy it currently lacks and give it a decisivepresence in places where crucial political deci-sions are made.

Of course, the opposition must remain united,as it has been since the 2006 presidential elec-tions. A January agreement, ratified severaltimes since, commits the opposition to field-ing a single candidate for each post. Althoughnot a simple undertaking, candidate selectionshould wrap up in time to register a consensuschoice for each post in the November vote.

Hugo Chvez, for his part, has been vocalabout the importance of these elections to hisoverall plans but is not proclaiming victory prematurely. This time he acknowledges thathe faces a tough challenge. Chvez appears

fully conscious of the sea change that anopposition win in key regions would bringand is consequently leveraging every weaponin his rhetorical arsenal. He has gone as faras warning about war if the opposition wins in Caracas and the neighboring state of Miranda. In his usual manipulative manner,he is repeating that an opposition win wouldstart a war because presumably he wouldbe next, ousted by the opposition, in other words. As usual, the government is expectedto use its monetary and logistical resources toits advantage. The opposition also faces thechallenge of fielding observers at every poll-ing station, as the presidents language leavesroom for attempts to manipulate results. Theopposition must also be careful not to give into its tendency to underestimate Chvez andconsider a victory all but assured.

Thechavistas, for their part, are having seri-ous difficulty selecting candidates. Extensivereiteration of the PSUVs democratic cre-dentials notwithstanding, the candidates willultimately be appointed by Hugo Chvez himself. He does not want a repeat of sur-prises like those he faced during electionsfor the PSUV leadership, when his favor-ites were placed on the slate in an order hehad not anticipated, leaving several out of thefinal lineup. In some states, infighting amongChvez supporters is fierce enough to leavethe impression that they belong to entirely different sides. This fragmentation is a con-sequence of a lack of a unifying doctrine, forthe PSUV andchavismoin general, capableof keeping their component parts together. The absence of a common set of principlesallows personal interests to be placed aheadof the collective good and for feuding sidesto jockey for power or fight over the spoils.

Chvez appearsfully conscious of thesea change that an

opposition win in key

regions during the

2008 local elections

would bring and is

consequently leveragin

every weapon in his

rhetorical arsenal.


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As opposed to Cuba, where Fidel adoptedMarxism-Leninism as the official party ideol-ogy, the driving force in Venezuela is Chvezsspeeches, which are not exactly a paragon of theoretical sophistication.

A singularly important topic has emergedin the run-up to these local and regionalelections: electoral disqualification. TheVenezuelan comptroller general has barredsome 400 individuals, including a number of strong opposition candidates, from runningfor or being named to political office. Thebasis for the ban is an administrative regu-lation, Article 105 of the ComptrollershipLaw, that is ironically similar to a law passed

by elements of the current opposition beforeChvez came to power. The clause allowsthe comptroller to disqualify public officialsdirectly, without any previous judgment ortrial, if they are accused or even just suspectedof administrative irregularities.

The controversy arises from the fact thatArticle 42 of the Venezuelan Constitutionclearly establishes that, The exercise of citizenship or any political rights can be sus-pended only by final judicial decision in thecases provided by law. As is apparent fromthe text, the power to disqualify candidatesis technically permitted by law but not con-stitutional. The unilateral declarations of thecomptroller have allowed thechavistasto ridthemselves of potential political rivals with-out due process or a definitive legal judgment. The decision has given rise not only to a legaldebate but also to a growing public protestagainst the disqualifications.

In reality, disqualification applies toappointed, not elected, officials. It is a stop-gap measure to permit the removal of thosesuspected of rule breaking, though only aftera verdict has been rendered at trial. Until afinal judgment has been made, any disquali-fied officials retain all rights, including the

right to be elected. While this interpreta-tion of the constitution seems obvious, thegovernment continues to insist that the dis-qualifications are valid. In the hands of acomptroller beholden to the presidents wil

the power to disqualify candidates poses a and potential threat to democratic rule.

In spite of the unconstitutional disqualifi-cations, the local and regional elections onNovember 23 may well mark another wateshed moment in the troubled history of Chvezs rule.

Nationalizations

Despite his constitutional reform defeat,Chvez has been busy pushing ahead withsome of the key goals of the referendum. Hneo-totalitarian scheme remains alive and hcan be expected to do everything possible tenact, by decree or legislation, anything thadoes not require explicit constitutional sup-port. His autocratic and militaristic brandof state-controlled capitalism seeks to placpowerful instruments of social control in hhandseven if Venezuelan history shows tstatism can have devastating economic effe While Venezuela has indeed had a traditionof statist economic policy under democratiregimes, an autocratic and militaristic ruleris a different story. This is particularly dan-gerous because state companies and theirthousands of workers can be effective mecnisms of social control.

In May 2007, Chvez nationalized CanTV,a telephone company owned by U.S.-basedVerizon and Spains Telefnica, as well asElectricidad de Caracas, a power utility ownby U.S.-based AES. He also announced plato nationalize the Siderrgica del Orinoco(Sidor) steelworks, controlled by a consor-tium headed by Argentinas Techint, as wellas cement plants owned by Cemex of MexiLafarge of France, and Holcim of Switzerlathat produce all of the cement used in

The unilateraldeclarations of the comptroller

disqualifying opposition

candidates haveallowed the chavistas

to rid themselves of

potential political

rivals without due

process or a definitive

legal judgment.


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1111

Venezuela. In 2007, the government simply bought the companies lock, stock, and bar-rel at market prices, and it proposes to do thesame with Sidor and the cement companies. These postmodern, trouble-free national-

izations are characteristic of a state awash inpetrodollars but devoid of the romantic auraof bygone socialism.

The explicit reason for these measures isfamiliar: the state needs to control cer-tain areas of the economy it deems strategic.However, in the case of Sidor, which canhardly be considered strategic, the ratio-nale has more to do with electoral expediency.Nationalization was a sudden decision

prompted by a bitter labor conflict, a Gordianknot Chvez decided to cut by simply buy-ing the company. Polls show dwindlingsupport for Chvez in Bolvar statehometo the steel plant and other heavy industry facilities and thus of strategic importance tothe governmentand the nationalizationdecision was an effort to stop the electoralhemorrhaging in this region. Seen from the vantage point of the progressive weakeningof the presidents standing, the Sidor nation-alization is a case of offense being the bestdefense. That labor unions and most com-pany employees rejoiced at the announcementcame as no surprise: the current statist drivehas rekindled an old, conditioned reflex inthe labor force. Before privatization in 1997,Sidor needed 20,000 workers to produce lessthan three million tons of steel a year. As theemployer, the state eagerly agreed to unreal-istic collective agreement terms knowing thenational purse would make up for any redink. After privatization, the payroll was cut to6,000 and Sidor started producing five mil-lion tons of steel a year.4

4 It must be said that an obtuse Sidor management totally mis-handled the labor dispute, trusting perhaps in the links betweenits Argentine owners and Nstor and Cristina Kirchner, whohave ties to Chvez.

In the case of the cement plants, however, thereason for nationalization is less apparent. InVenezuela, the cement industry has alwaysbeen in private hands. But after the foreigncompanies mentioned above entered the

scene, Chvez baselessly placed the blame forsetbacks in his housing program on a cementshortage caused by excessive exports.

In brief, the inevitable conclusion is that thisis not just another episode in Venezuelas longtradition of statism. It is a qualitatively differ-ent project, in whose context state-controlledcapitalism is yet another lever for social con-trol. This is not merely about control of strategic areas of the economy, it is about

controlling all industry, strategic or not. Theintent is to turn the state into a ubiquitouspresence in all economically significant areas,place key economic hubs under governmentcontrol, subject the private sector to a battery of regulations, and significantly restrict mar-ket mechanisms. Should the nationalizationof Sidor and the cement companies cometo pass, the state would be in control of theoil, electricity, steel, aluminum, and cementindustries, not to mention iron and bauxitemining. It still remains to be seen how farstatism will reach under Hugo Chvez.

The flip side is that in Venezuela, accustomedas it has been for more than a half century tostrong state involvement in the economy, ordi-nary citizens are justifiably convinced thatstate companies are by definition inefficientand corrupt. The exception is those workersin state company unions, a veritable working-class aristocracy that has directly benefitedfrom greedy, wasteful management. There isno reason to believe that companies nation-alized under the current government willbecome models of efficiency and integrity quite the opposite. In fact, CanTV is

In Venezuela,accustomed as it hasbeen for more than a

half century to strong

state involvement inthe economy, ordinary

citizens are justifiably

convinced that state

companies are by

definition inefficient

and corrupt.


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already showing signs of financial decline.Earnings are down, and they ended the lastquarter heavily in debt. Costs are up signifi-cantly, mostly because of a bloated payrollthat has grown in the time-honored tradition

of using public companies as employmentagencies for party affiliates. Incredible as itmay seem after such a short time, the qual-ity of service is also sliding. Electricidad deCaracas, for its part, has recently been used asconduit for a highly corrupt issuance of securi-ties. There was no reason to expect otherwise.

The nationalization issue reveals a pragmaticstreak in ordinary Venezuelans. Will the his-tory of public company inefficiency and graft

repeat itself? We expect so. How will thecountry evaluate the growth of statism? We will probably not respond positively, which islargely why the country is still far from reach-ing Orwellian depths of political and socialcontrol. On the contrary, nationalizationsmay end up boomeranging back on the gov-ernment, whose poor management skills areevident in how PDVSA is run.

The Bolivarian Curriculum

Chvez is also pushing his authoritarian goalsin other areas. The proposed introductionof a so-called Bolivarian Curriculum anattempt to reform the primary and second-ary school curriculum drasticallysparkedmuch debate. Two issues are especially seri-ous: the inexplicably reduced emphasis on coresubjects such as math, physics, and chemistry in favor of a heavy focus on history and socialsciences, with a strong militaristic bent. The

history taught in the proposed curriculum hasbeen rewritten based on Hugo Chvezs pecu-liar reading of it, including ascribing himself a greater historical role than even the revolu-tionary hero Simn Bolvar. This is a crudeattempt at forcing ideology into schools, with-out the appropriate theoretical equipment.Venezuela is neither Cuba nor the former

Soviet Union, with their Marxist-Leninistprayer books. But what is particularly inter-esting is the reaction to Chvezs trial ballo The concerns raised by teachers, educationexperts, political parties, and citizen groups

quickly threatened to turn the idea intoanother fiasco. This is not the first time thatChvez broached the highly charged education issue. Indeed, back in 1999 his proposato introduce political commissioners in theeducation system met with countrywide condemnation. This time, the solid argumentsfielded by the opposition as well as the dowright mediocrity and conceptual vacuity of the proposal produced by the EducationMinistry portended a very discouraging outcome. Chvez, always the shrewd politicalanimal, understood that such a debate in anelection year could be highly counterprodutive and therefore announced that he was inno hurry. He said that Venezuelans could takall this year and next to debate the curriculum, after which he would call a referendum(an absurdity, since referenda are not intendto consider such matters). While the debaterages on, implementation seems neitherimminent nor likely.

The International Stage

The months since the referendum have beenmarked by intense political wrangling. Whithe erratic measures adopted by the oftenbungling Chvez have done little to improvhis image at home or abroad, they speak voumes of his tenacious intent to move forwa with his 21st century socialism. Equally tenacious, to be sure, are as his opponentsefforts to stop him. On the internationalscene, Chvezs influence has been shrink-ing. Among the European left, there is littleif any, tolerance of him. In Latin America, tdifference between his agenda and those ofPresidents Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, TabaVsquez and Michelle Bachelet is quite evident. In fact, until the Colombia-Ecuador

The concernsraised by teachers,education experts,

political parties, andcitizen groups quickly

threatened to turn

the new Bolivarian

Curriculum into

another fiasco.


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1313

border incident on March 1 of this year, evenEcuadors Rafael Correa had been movingslowly but noticeably away from this incon- venient fellow traveler. Chvezs only alliesare in the phantom organization known as

the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas(ALBA), comprised of Nicaragua, Bolivia,Cuba, and most recently, Dominica. Relationsbetween Cuba and Venezuela merit specialattention. Though previously based on thebond between Chvez and Fidel, the lattersmarginalization and Ral Castros circumspec-tion have returned bilateral relations to a moreconventional mold. While no one thinks thatCuba is about to reduce or even cut off ties toVenezuela, its deafening silence in the face of the Venezuelan governments recent interna-tional stumbles speaks volumes. Most likely,the Cuban agenda, especially vis--vis theUnited States, is not entirely compatible withthe strident anti-imperialist rhetoric in whichChvez often indulges. The immediate futurein Cuba is sure to bring surprises that willhave an impact on relations with Venezuela.

Chvezs mediation in the Colombian con-flict ended in a blunder unworthy of a manof his political acumen. Had he not allowedhis ego and propensity for media antics toget the better of him, he could have secureda major diplomatic and political victory, sub-stantially improving his international image.But this was not to be. After securing therelease of several FARC hostages, Chvez gave his Colombia policy an unexpected spinby advocating recognition of the FARC asa belligerent force. To Uribe, this was anunexpected yet welcome gift. His popular-ity at home reached new heights while theinternational communityunsurprisingly unsympathetic towards the FARCdismissed the Venezuelan presidents absurdproposal out of hand. Save for Nicaragua, noLatin American government even consideredthe suggestion. Cuba and Bolivia kept silent

and Ecuador rejected it flat out. Oil money isnot quite all-powerful, after all.

Shortly after, Chvez adopted an outra-geously bellicose tone to meddle needlessly

in the border incident following Colombiasairstrike on a FARC camp in Ecuador. Heordered the military to mobilize to the border with Colombia, a stunt few Venezuelans took seriously and which revealed the Venezuelanarmys serious operational shortcomings.

With Colombia, Chvez tried to play the nationalist card. After the events of December 2, he is doing everything he can tocontain the persistent thinning of the ranks of

his supporters. Samuel Johnson had it right when he said that patriotism is the last ref-uge of a scoundrel, and Chvez, wrappinghimself in the flag, is no exception. But if hemeant to unite the country around him inorder to stand up to the imperialist menace, with Colombia an expedient scapegoat, hisplan fell through. The rather surreal conclu-sion of the affair at the Rio Group summit inSanto Domingo, Dominican Republic shortly after the airstrike made the whole sorry epi-sode seem even more preposterous. While his enormous financial reserves stillgive Chvez room for maneuver on theinternational stage, any influence is quickly waning. While not isolated, he is certainly not the regional leader that his own self-perception and the inept assessment of theState Department in the early days of theBush presidency led him to think he would be.

However, there is one aspect of PresidentChvezs foreign policy that cannot be dis-counted. Outside of Rmulo Betancourt,Chvez is the first Venezuelan president tomake oil a potent instrument of foreign pol-icy. He has done so boldly and with a clearsense of geopolitics. Behind his oil policy isclearly a political agenda, but that is no dif-

While hisenormous financialreserves still give

Chvez room for

maneuver on the

international stage,

any influence is

quickly waning.


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ferent from any other country that flexes itseconomic muscle to further its interests. TheU.S. government, whose diplomatic and eco-nomic might are inextricably linked, has little justification for reproaching Chvez about his

use of oil as a foreign policy instrument.A dispassionate examination revealsPetroCaribe is an appropriate response to theneeds of its Caribbean and Central Americanbeneficiaries, even if it also happens to meetChvezs strictly personal goals. Selling oil atfavorable termshalf at market price payable within 90 days and the remainder payable in25 years at 1 or 2 percent interestto poorcountries crushed under exorbitant world

prices should be a lesson to oil-producingcountries. The hypocritical United States, inparticular, could buy oil from its private com-panies and practically give it away to CentralAmerica and the Caribbean at a cost of lessthan one billionth of gross domestic product(GDP). Of course, nothing could be moreunthinkable in a country whose foreign pol-icy is built on the principle of trade, notaid. Oil agreements between Venezuelaand Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina sharethe same principles: preferential prices andeasy terms intended to strengthen Chvezsclaim to continental leadership. That thisalso secured the votes of Caribbean coun-tries in the Organization of American Statesand improved relations with other coun-tries is what foreign policy is all about, asMachiavelli would say. In my view, no post-Chvez government, especially if progressive,should set those agreements aside. Like theMediterranean for the Romans, after all, theCaribbean ismare nostrum.

In short, in a continent where clashes withthe United States are a fact of life, Chvezsdiscourse resonates strongly with sectorsof the far left and not so strongly with themainstream, democratic left. Faced with theimperialist policies and arrogance of Bush

and the neoconservatives, Chvezs discouarouses sympathy in ordinary Latin Americcitizenseven if his belligerent and excessrhetoric ultimately ruin the effect.

Its the Economy, Stupid The centrality of politics in Venezuelan cuture is unquestionable. The political arena the stage where the leading contradictionsfacing the country are displayed. As Enge would say, however, the economy always the last word.

Chvezs success at home and abroad woulbe hard to explain without sky-high oil pricand the resulting revenues rolling into hiscoffers. Venezuelas foreign reserves stand some $60 billion. At current prices, oil salein 2008 should bring in an additional $70 blion. In a country of 27 million, this much wealth makes the government more thancomfortable. This is not the place to go intothe long-term effects of Dutch disease andincreased dependence on oil. Suffice it tosay that oil revenues will continue to proviHugo Chvez with a substantial financialcushion, at least in the short and mediumterm. The current account surplus is vastenough to offset easily the capital accountdeficit, but this deficit reflects an uncontrollable capital flight. In an oil-based economythis can lead to vulnerabilities. In spite of exchange controls, Venezuelans with suffi-cient wealth still invest in hard currency. In2007, the government held the line on thecurrent account deficit by going into debt. Aa result, the foreign debt now hovers aroun

$40 billion, which translates into additionamedium- and long-term vulnerabilities.

Oil revenues have caused a formidableincrease in public spending, the engine of growth since 2003. Public spending, historically 20 to 22 percent of GDP, has grown toabout 35 percent. The economy, which grewat Chinese rates through 2007, has been

PetroCaribe is anappropriate responseto the needs of its

Caribbean and Central

American beneficiaries,

even if it also happens

o meet Chvezs strictly

personal goals.


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1515

driven by expansion of aggregate demand,especially private consumption. While all sec-tors of the economy have grownprivateconstruction saw a dramatic boom in 2006,for examplemanufacturing grew the least.

Growth is skewed toward the non-tradablesector and import growth has been morethan $40 billion a year over the past two years, exacerbating a significant loss of diver-sity in the productive system. Chvez bragsabout his endogenous economy (a rehash-ing of the Economic Commission for LatinAmerica and the Caribbean import substitu-tion model of the 1950s and 1960s), but thereis no economy, endogenous or not, capable of withstanding the crushing weight of such a volume of imports, whose most visible result isan obscene degree of consumerism.

An economy based on expanding demandand meeting it with increased imports ratherthan production will decline in the long run. The economy grew 8 percent in 2007, downfrom 10 percent in 2006, and estimates for2008 point to no more than 6 percent growth.Public and especially private investmentare at near-bottom rates, which, to put it inMarxian terms, precludes the reproduction of capital on an extended scale.

The expansion of public spending and liquid-ity, coupled with an overvalued currency dueto exchange controls, is driving inflation. In2007, the inflation rate reached 22.5 percent,far and away the continents highest. Inflationfrom January through March 2008 standsat 8.2 percent, more than triple the 2.6 per-cent posted a year before. Annualized (March2007-March 2008) inflation is a whopping29 percent, which is projected to reach 30percent by December. While finance min-isters have tried to downplay its effects, thatinflation is strongly and negatively affectingthe poor is one of the chief sources of grow-ing skepticism amongchavistas.

The government has adopted a number of measures to deal with inflation, includingreducing liquidity and reconciling the officialand informal exchange rates. Yet inflation hasnot subsided. Inflation can hardly be expected

to yield given that a return to previous liquid-ity levels is highly likelypublic spendingcontinues to grow in this election year andnew sectors of the economy are switchingto the informal exchange rate, thus recreat-ing the de facto dual rate. In addition, the vast amount of food imported to supply dis-count markets and offset the shortages causedby price controls at a time when world foodprices are skyrocketing is also driving infla-tion. In other words, the economy and thecountry are set to continue enduring thehardships associated with high inflation. Foodshortages have never reached catastrophicproportionsas they did in Cuba, for exam-pleand are easing with massive imports.Nevertheless, all of this suggests an economicpolicy that is untenable over the medium andlong term.

The Chvez regime has indulged in social-ist experiments that have proven nothingshort of pathetic. Cooperatives are dead,doomed by amateurism, improvisation, poormember training, lack of technical support,and Chvezs own neglect after he discov-ered that cooperatives are, after all, justanother form of capitalism. Social pro-duction companies fared no better andco-management experiments only suc-ceeded in discrediting the concept. Agrarianreform in a country where large landedestates are of marginal economic and socialsignificance has not advanced beyond a few haphazard land expropriations. In addition,the state, not farmers, keeps the income, which all but seals the fate of the experiment.

Other than resorting to the tried-and-trueformulas of statism and populism, Chvezs

While financeministers have triedto downplay its effects,

that inflation is stronglyand negatively affecting

the poor is one of

the chief sources of

growing skepticism

among chavistas .


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so-called Bolivarian Revolution has failedto bring about any real, progressive reformof social structures. Its achievements stop ata few social programs whose earnest goalsare mired in corruption, wastefulness, and

political discrimination, all without creatingpermanent employment.

Conclusion

A few general definitions might help capturethechavistaphenomenon. Is it a revolutionary regime? No. In spite of Chvezs loud rheto-ric, the historical examples of revolution bearno resemblance to what is now underway inVenezuela.

Is it a classic Latin American dictatorship?No. Although the regime imposes severe con-straints on a full exercise of democratic rights,the country still limps along within a formally democratic institutional framework. Yes, theregime is autocratic, no real separation of powers exists, militarism is a key trait, andthe president is authoritarian. Still, we can-not label it a dictatorship in the strictest senseof the word. While some speak of a post-modern dictatorship, I confess ignorance asto what that may mean. A dictatorship is a

dictatorship, as Venezuelans who lived undstrongmen Juan Vicente Gmez and MarcoPrez Jimnez know all too well. A regimethat allows political parties, elections, civilsociety, a union movement, free speech, and

holds no more than a dozen political prisoners is no dictatorship.

Chvezs Venezuela is a Bonapartist demoracy of sorts, a one-of-a-kind dictatorshipHe aims to make the armed forces the insttutional base of his power. Chvez is alsocreating a new bourgeoisie based on corrution and preferential dealings with the statHe has created a hypertrophic governmentbureaucracy with over two million public

servants, led by anomenklaturaperfectly aware that its power depends directly onthe presidents power. This structure restson the still considerable support of a massmovement used as foot soldiers, while the vast network of intermediaries establishedthese past few years grows increasingly pe verted by clientelism and direct dependenon presidential whims. That ischavismo. Heis a leader obeyed and even loved by somebut Chvez is nevertheless decidedly on adownward slope.

Although theChvez regime imposessevere constraints

on a full exercise of democratic rights,

the country still limps

along within a formally

democratic institutional

framework.


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Working Paper Series

For other testimonies and articles on the Andean Region please visit the Dialogues web site:www.thedialogue.org.

Inter-American Dialogue Publications on Colombia and the Andean Region

Task Force Report

Toward Greater Peace and Security inColombia: Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy.

The Report of an Independent Task ForceSponsored by the Council on ForeignRelations and the Inter-American Dialogue.Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft,Co-Chairs. October 2000.

Published Testimony

Colombias Security Predicament andOpportunities for Peace: Guidelines for U.S

Policy, by Michael Shifter. September 199

Bolivias Long and Winding Road, by

George Gray Molina. July 2008.Ending the Conflict with the FARC: Time for a New Course, by AntonioNavarro Wolff. January 2007.

Petropolitics in Latin America: A Review of Energy Policy and Regional Relations,by Genaro Arriagada. December 2006.

A New Uribe? lvaro Uribes Second-TermChallenges, by Rodrigo Pardo. November2006.The Military and Politics in the AndeanRegion, by Carlos Basombro Iglesias.April 2006.

Towards Greater Human Security andPeace in Colombia, by Michael Shifter. July 2005.

The Colombian Conflict and the Risk of aRegional Human Rights and HumanitarianCrisis, by Csar Montfar. July 2005.

Europe and the Colombian Conflict,by Sabine Kurtenbach. June 2005.

State, Drug Policy, and Democracy in the

Andes, by Eduardo A. Gamarra. June 200Turning Point in Colombia? A RapporteurReport of the Colombia Working Group,by Vinay Jawahar. June 2004.

lvaro Uribe: Dissident, by FernandoCepeda Ulloa. August 2003.

A New Approach: lvaro UribesDemocratic Security Project, by Eduardo Pizarro Leongmez. July 2003.

Doing Something in Colombia,by Eduardo Posada Carb. August 2002.

The Prospects for Peace in Colombia:Lessons from Recent Experience,by Rafael Pardo Rueda. July 2002.

Colombia: Negotiate, But What?by Joaqun Villalobos. June 2002.

Reflections on the Colombian Conflict:A Rapporteurs Report of the Colombia Working Group, by Daniel Mack andVictoria Wigodzky. June 2002.


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Carla A. Hills, Co-Chair, United States

Ricardo Lagos, Co-Chair, ChilePeter D. Bell, Co-Vice Chair, United States

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L. Enrique Garca, BoliviaDonna J. Hrinak, United States

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I nter -A merIcAn D IAlogue

A Watershed Moment in Venezuela - Teodoro Petkoff (July 2008)

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Transcript of A Watershed Moment in Venezuela - Teodoro Petkoff (July 2008)