A Victim of Terrorism

Pakistan: A Victim of Terrorism (Volume III) 1

PAKISTAN: A VICTIM OF TERRORISM (VOLUME III)

EDITOR

DR NOOR UL HAQ

ASSISTANT EDITOR MUHAMMAD NAWAZ KHAN

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CONTENT

Preface v 1. Year-wise Summary of Human Losses in Terrorist Acts:

1 January 2001 to 17 January 2011 1 2. Rah-e-Rast Operation by Armed Forces: 26 April 2009– 1

July 2009 1 3. Rah-e-Nijat Operation by Armed Forces: 17 October 2009

Onward 7 4. Casualties Suffered by Armed Forces: 2009-2010 10 5. 2009: Year of Terrorism 11 6. Pakistan Lost $35bn in Three Years in War on Terror 27 7. New Dimensions of Counter-Terrorism 27 8. Suicides Bombing and Dr Tahirul Qadri’s Fatwa 30 9. Lessons from Lahore 31 10. Taliban Increasingly Unpopular in Pakistan 31 11. Taliban Distancing Themselves from al-Qaeda 33 12. 332 Terror Hits Claimed 5,704 Lives Since 9/11 34 13. The Silent Surge 38 14. U.S. Defends Legality of Killing with Drones 41 15. Obama Moves to Delink Terrorism from Islam 43 16. Kohat Killings 45 17. Soft on Militancy 46 18. Get the Militant Leadership 47 19. The Rising Militancy 49 20. Militancy: Realism Needed 50 21. Terror in Lahore 52 22. Terrorism and the Economy 52 23. Search for Soul 55 24. Provinces Back Efforts to Combat Terror 56 25. A Good Anti-terrorism Move 57 26. Terrorism and Religious Identities 60 27. Quelling Terrorism 63 28. Terrorist Attacks 64 29. Quetta Attack 65 30. Lakki Marwat Blast 65 31. Deployment of More Drones Against Pakistan 66 32. The Scourge of Terrorism 67


33. Attacking the Ghazi of Karachi 69 34. Drone Attacks May be Legal, But Are They Moral? 71 35. By Publicly Acknowledging the Price Pakistan Pays

for its Counterterrorism Policy, the U.S. is Helping Untie its Leadership’s Hands 72

36. A Year of Sub-sectarian Massacre 76 37. Swabi Attack 78 38. U.S. Double-dealing 79 39. U.S. Seeks to Expand Drone Operations 80 40. Government Firm in Eliminating Menace of Terrorism:

Prime Minister 81 41. Terror Group Forms Suicidal Gang 81 42. Afghans Involved in Terrorist Activities: Minister of Interior 83 43. Pak-Afghan Joint Declaration: Accord to Knock Out

Militant Sanctuaries 83 44. U.S.-Pakistan Secret Efforts to Defeat al-Qaeda: Petraeus 85 45. National Assembly Body Condemns Drone Attacks 86 46. No Taliban or Quetta Shura in Balochistan: FCIG 86 47. Prime Minister Calls for Joint Strategy to Combat Terrorism 87 48. Drone Attacks in Pakistan 87 49. Pakistan Army’s Contributions in Fight Against Terrorism 103

IPRI Publications 106

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PREFACE Philip J. Crowley, U.S. Asst Secretary of State, told the audience in his daily briefing that “There is no country that has suffered more significantly from terrorism than Pakistan itself”.1 Citing a study, Bruce Riedal of Brookings Institution said “There were 2,113 terrorist attacks in Pakistan last year [2010]. No country in the world even comes close to that. Almost 3000 people died and 6000 were wounded.”2 Soon after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, Pakistan allied itself with the U.S. in the war against terror. The U.S.-led invasion in Afghanistan commenced in 2001. The Talibans were defeated but could not be eliminated. Their resistance transformed into an insurgency and an armed struggle against the foreign forces and their local supporters.

During the past more than three decades (1978-2010), Afghanistan has been in a state of war and Pakistan has had to accommodate millions of refugees entering the country since 1978. In the beginning, their number had risen to about six million but even at present this is not less than 2.5 million. Since Pakistan is supporting the war against the militants/terrorists in Afghanistan, the insurgency in that country has spilled over into Pakistan’s FATA, adjacent to Afghanistan, and the adjoining settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These terrorists are a source of the numerous acts of violence and terrorism that plague the whole country.

The fight against militants/terrorists has so far cost Pakistan 2273 soldiers of the Army killed and 6512 injured, making a total of 8785, besides 21,672 civilians killed. As against them the U.S. and NATO, comprising 43 nations, have suffered only 1582 casualties.

While the terrorist activities are on the rise, the economy is sliding downward, the much-needed foreign investment is not forthcoming and the development of the country is being adversely affected. The cumulative economic impact runs into billions of dollars. Pakistan is likely to continue to suffer as long as there is no peace in Afghanistan.

There is a perception that the tribal insurgency could drag on for an indefinite period. The solution to the problem lies in the age-old system of jirga (assembly of elders) and securing cooperation of all immediate neighbours of Afghanistan (i.e., China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) as well as the U.S., Russia and NATO to resolve the Afghanistan imbroglio.

1 Frontier Post (Peshawar) on line, January 12, 2010. 2 Bruce Riedel introducing his book Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and Future of

Global Jihad in the Brookings Institution, Washington, on January 18, 2011.


The IPRI Factfile includes selected articles appearing in the print media from December 2009 till December 2010, and relevant data depicting terrorist activities causing losses in men and material to the people of Pakistan. January 19, 2011. Noor-ul-Haq


YEAR-WISE SUMMARY OF HUMAN LOSSES IN TERRORIST ACTS IN PAKISTAN

1 JANUARY 2001 TO 17 JANUARY 2011

S.No Year No. of *Incidents

Kil led Injured LEAs Civil ians LEAs Civi l ians

1 2001 110 13 41 72 224 2 2002 56 32 70 110 201 3 2003 88 11 18 46 106 4 2004 159 24 52 152 260 5 2005 113 9 19 32 81 6 2006 1444 267 502 645 982 7 2007 1820 575 1677 1462 20658 2008 1575 541 2248 1434 36659 2009 1946 706 1674 1832 5544

10 2010 2061 502 1453 1383 396511 2011 54 24 16 46 33

Total: 9426 2704 7770 7214 17126

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Crisis Management Cell

RAH-E-RAST OPERATION BY ARMED FORCE 26 APRIL 2009 – 1JULY 2009

A SUMMARY After the complete break down of law and order in the Swat Valley, where followers of Fazal ullah had murdered most of the policemen and had taken over police stations, govt and private buildings, Army was called in aid of civil power to clear the valley of terrorists. Army conducted Swat operation in Swat Valley in Nov 2007 and cleared the valley in five weeks. Than came the elections in Feb 2008 and provincial government decided to have a peace agreement in April 2008. However, the terrorists never honoured the agreement and in the garb of peace agreement kept expanding their influence. They started establishing check posts, kept hitting military convoys, started recruiting young boys of Swat and surrounding areas in different areas in training camps of varying sizes. They resorted to kidnapping of civilians, asking for ransom, anyone opposing was killed brutally and they coerced the population to an extent that they started accepting them as their masters.

Realizing the gravity of the situation government once again ordered Army to launch an operation. This time under the influence of terrorists, the

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civilian population did not cooperate. Moreover during this period the terrorists had reorganized, regrouped, rearmed and had increased their area of influence in other parts of Swat and Malakand. The military operation had become unpopular, with militants entrenched in built up areas. The operation claimed lot of destruction, damage, death and displacement of innocent citizens. At this stage the government desired to hold the operation to avoid further damage and go for reconciliation process through TNSM to give Nizam-e-Adal which was long standing demand of the people. As a result yet another peace agreement with the pledge of enactment of Nizam-e-Adal was signed.

It was soon realized that militants were not interested in Nizam-e-Adal, rather they were using it as a slogan/rhetoric to achieve their nefarious designs. The following statistics of their terrorist activities after the signing of peace agreement clearly shows their lack of sincerity to the Nizam-e-Adal/ peace agreement:-

S/No Incident Remarksa. Kidnapping incident 55 (Individuals abducted

are more than 100) b. Security Forces Personnel

Killed/Wounded 30 (Injured 44)

c. Suicide Attacks 4d. IEDs Attacks 8e. Ambush military convoys 7f. Fire Raids 30g. Schools damaged 2h. Police Stations destroyed 1j. Grid Stations destroyed 1k. Banks Looted 6

Their intentions got crystallized when militants in total negation of

peace agreement moved into Buner and Shangla. The real face of militants got exposed and not only the people of Swat but whole nation gelled together in demanding elimination of terrorists from Malakand Division through a complete comprehensive and decisive operation.

Conduct of Operation

The plan to clear Malakand Division of terrorists was based on the assumption that “Failure is not an Option”. The operation had to be swift, multipronged, effective, comprehensive and all encompassing with an end strategy. The success of this operation lived on two cardinal principles. The support of


public and prevent the escape of terrorists to other areas. The innocent population had to be protected even at the cost of compromising operational necessities and built up areas had to be cleansed and not bombed. With these limitations and objectives the operation was launched on 26 April 2009. Operation Tandar -1

On the request of provincial govt and people of Dir, Frontier Corps launched the operation Tandar-1 in Islampura-Lal Qila Maidan Areas in lower Dir. Intense clashes took place, killing over 100 militants including important militant commander Qari Shahid. Lal Qila was finally secured and thereafter search and cordon operations in adjoining areas continued and to date they are being conducted. Op Tandar –II

Early morning on 29 April heliborne forces of Frontier Corps successfully landed at Daggar and surrounding areas and secured Daggar, the headquarters of Buner District. Meanwhile the ground forces advanced on two axis, Malandri axis and Ambella axis to link up with forces of Daggar. At Ambella pass security forces confronted 13 suicide vehicles, 2 suicide motorcyclists and 4 individual suiciders and a group of 100 militants on mountain top. Finally linkage with troops at Daggar was established. Later by 6th May operation was launched to secure Sultanwas. After an intense engagement for over 9 days Sultanwas was finally secured on 15 May 2009. Later Pir Baba was cleared and and the important Karakar pass which links Buner with Swat was secured on June 13. Finally the forces operating in Buner established link up with forces operating in Swat at Jambil and on 1st July 2009 secured Dewana Baba route leaving Buner with Shangla. During Operation Tander two (Buner) 305 terrorists were killed and 102 apprehended while Security Forces suffered 34 casualties and 127 were wounded. During this operation, following important militant commanders were killed/arrested:-

a. Qadir r/o Kumbar - Killed b. Noor Hameed r/o Kokoi Banda - Killed c. Aftab r/o Dabuna - Killed d. Yousef r/o Dabuna - Killed e. Iftikhar r/o Sharlara - Killed f. Bakht Buland r/o shagai - Killed g. Abu Saeed r/o Buner - Killed h. Misbah ud Din r/o Buner - Killed j. Sultan Khan r/o Drushkhela - Killed k. Ghulam Khaliq r/o Buner - Killed

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l. Salim r/o Ambela - Killed m. Sherzada r/o Ambela - Killed n. Shah Sultan r/o Charbagh - Killed o. Abdullah r/o Hayasarai - Killed p. Hameed r/o Mera Shah - Apprehended q. Miraj r/o Bar Maian - Apprehended r. Mula Khan r/o Khawazakhela - Apprehended

Operation Rah-e-Raast -The Battle of Swat In sync with operation at Buner Security forces launched an operation in Shangla district on 6 May and secured Ramtallai Sar where Security forces discovered 166 dead bodies. At the same time forces secured Chamtaliai and Khwazakhela. Meanwhile terrorists who were targeting security forces from Emrald Mines were targeted where 35 terrorists were killed.

• By 9th May 09, main headquarters of militants in Loe Namal and Matta was completely destroyed on the same day security forces launched an Op at Gulabad and secured Chakdara and pt 2245 and pt 2266 in Loe Sar were also captured. At this stage terrorists were being engaged from four directions i.e West, North, East and South.

• On 12 May 09, in a surprise action Special Services Group landed at the heights surrounding Peochar the headquarters of Fazal Ullah and the main training centre, which was believed to be unreachable and unconquerable. Here security forces came across tough resistance and discovered elaborate training facilities, IEDS and bomb making factories and number of tunnels, 150 feet long and 12 to 15 ft wide. From ridge to ridge security forces cleaned the area after intense engagement at every step and finally secured Peochar valley by 20th June.

• By 14th May 09, security forces after clearing Barikot secured the area upto Bilgram 6 kms short of Mingora.

• By 16 May 09, area from Shangla towards Khawazkela was secured and Biadra Markaz the strong hold of terrorists on Matta Durshkhela road was destroyed.

• By 17 May 09, Op Rah e Rast entered into a new phase. Security forces entered the town of Matta from East and from West were able to secure area between Bilogram to Takhtaband and Kanju. At the same time Mam Dhairi was targeted, killing 15 miscreants. The capture of this strategic location having tunnels and extensive training facilities gave a severe below to the resistance of terrorists in the area.


• By 21 May 09, Banai Baba Ziarat the highest point in the area and a main terrorists training centre was captured after intense battle. The capture of this strategic location having tunnels and extensive training facilities gave a severe blow to the resistance of terrorists in the area.

• On 27 May 09, security forces entered Mingora city and link up operations from different sides commenced. The terrorists trapped from three directions suffered heavily and a number of suicide attempts and IEDs were foiled/destroyed. Parallel to this a strategic bridge of utmost importance Wanai Bridge linking Matta with Peochar was successfully secured.

• On 24 May 09, on report of presence of terrorists at Malam Jabba, a swift operation was launched and cleared in next 36 hours. Malam Jabba located on main line of communication connects Swat Valley with Mansehra was being used as a training centre and logistic base by terrorists. Same day operation from Kanju to secure Kabbal the main stronghold of militants was launched and Fizaghat and Qambar Village were secured.

• By 12 June 09, security forces secured Sakhra Valley, the main route of terrorists moving from Peochar towards Kalam and other areas.

• On 27 May 09, security forces entered Bahrain where they were welcomed by locals with National flags in their hands, it was secured in two days and operations towards Kalam and Gulibagh commenced simultaneously.

• By 31st May 09, Mingora was fully secured. Huge cache of Arms, Ammunition, and Communication equipment were recovered from different areas. Over 150 IEDs were destroyed and a number of terrorists killed and apprehended. After securing Mingora, Security forces turned on Buner axis and secured Najigram, to establish link up with forces operating at Buner.

• On 1st June 09, operation to secure Charbagh was launched alongwith a link up operation to link Kabbal with Sirsanai.

• By 5 June 09, security forces cleared area upto Chakesar Valley and in other areas Cordon and search operation at a fast pace were conducted. At the same time the local Lashkar surrounded 4 villages of terrorists in Upper Dir killing 20 of them.

• By 12 June 09, security forces secured Chuprial after intense engagements. Here a comprehensive training center with a tunnel 150 feet long and 12 feet wide was discovered after eliminating 40 terrorists.

• On 15 June 09, Aligrama was secured and huge cache of arms and ammunition was recovered from the area.

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• By 16 June 09, Peochar valley was fully secured and link up of forces operating in Peochar and Chaprial was established in an area south of Biha valley. During this operation security forces recovered lot of IEDs, Arms, Ammunition big and small tunnels and prepared vehicles for suicide missions and this time Civil Administration became fully functional in Shangla district and IDPs of Kalam started moving back.

• On 24 June 09, the culminating operations to clear Shamozai in the west and Biha Valley in the north commenced. By 26th June Shamozai was fully secured.

• On 30 June 09, the final operation, Op Shah Dheri was launched from two direction from north Samai Killile was secured and from the east forces secured Bhoka and Yakh Tangai Sar.

• By 1st July 09, Shah Dheri was fully secured alongwith vital link up operation in the south with District of Buner.

• By Ist Jul 09, by the grace of Almighty Allah security forces completed the securing of Malakand and Swat over an area of 5373 sq kms, through an intense, courageous and bold operations in an inhospitable environment and against an enemy with no face.

The casualty state below bears ample testimony to the courage/valour and

sacrifice of security forces.

Agency wise details of incidents for the year 2009:- Agency Suicide IED Rkt/SAs Ambush Abduction Phy

Attk Expl

Dir 2 10 11 0 11 0 1 Swat 5 39 144 17 52 3 5 Total 7 49 155 17 63 3 6 Source: official data.

Date Own Cas Terrorists Cas

Shaheed Wounded Killed Wounded / Apprehended

April 2009 1 4 74 0 May 2009 82 246 1152 79 June 2009 61 167 373 144 Total 144 417 1599 223


RAH-E-NIJAT OPERATION BY ARMED FORCE 17 OCTOBER 2009 ONWARD

A SUMMARY

1. To curb the menace of terrorism in South Waziristan Agency, Operation Rah-e-Nijat commenced on 17th October 2009.The Operation was started on three Axes. a. Jandola-Sararogha Axis

(1) Ist Week (a) On Jandola-Sararogha Axis area upto Mandana,

Kund and Tarakai feature was secured by Security Forces on 18th October.

(b) On 19th October Security Forces secured Tor Ghundai feature and Shishamwam. On the same day security forces made an envelopment manoeuvre around town of Kotkai.

(c) On 23rd October Security Forces secured important feature of Shishamwam. This important height is behind Kotkai village thereby seiging Kotkai village from the east. On 24th October Security Forces took complete control of important stronghold of TTP, the town of Kotkai, the native place of terrorists leader Hakim Ullah Mehsud and Qari Hussain. On the same date Shishamwam was also fully secured.

(2) 2nd Week (a) After intense engagements, Security Forces secured the

significant mountain top of Tarkona on 25th October. Security Forces also progressed well on Jandola-Sararogha axis securing important ridges. Moving forward of Kotkai Important Road Y Junction was secured at Kazhakas, the roads leading to Inzar Kalle and Sararogha on 26th October.

(b) On 27th October Security Forces cleared Village Zeriwam and dominating hill features along east and west ridges on main Axis Jandola-Sararogha. The dominating ridges around main road and village Ganra Kas and Konar heights were also secured.

(c) After gaining control of Kotkai, the forces moved towards Sararogha, the Headquarters of Commander Baitullah Mehsud Group. The town fell on 6 November amidst heavy losses suffered by the militant.

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(3) 3rd Week (a) Forces after consolidating their positions in Sararogha

and adjoining areas followed by mopping up operations advanced towards Ahmed Wam which was secured on 13 November. A huge cache of arms and ammunition was recovered.

(b) Torman fell to the troops on 13 November. (c) Forces captured Janata on 17 November and recovered

huge cache of arms and ammunition. It was followed by the fall of Barora Niazi on 23 November and Mir Khoni on 25 November.

(d) To date the most important phase of operation is in good progress. On Jandola-Sararogha Sector the important stronghold of Sararogha has been cleared.

(e) On Shakai-Kaniguram Sector, Karma the stronghold of Uzbeks has been cleared alongwith Kaniguram. On Razmak-Makeen Sector security forces had cleared Makeen.

b. Shakai-Ladha Axis

(1 Ist Week (a) On Shakai-Ladha Axis Boya Narai and Wuzi Sar

were captured on 18th October. (b) Sherwangi was also secured on 19th October. (c) On 20th October Security Forces further consolidated

their positions at Sherwangi. The important heights surrounding Sherwangi were secured and terrorists had vacated their positions leaving behind arms and ammunitions. On 21st October security Forces cleared Khaisura Village linking up with Tiarza Fort. While extending perimeters of security in North of Sherwangi security Forces also secured area of Gurgura Sar.

(d) Security Forces secured Chalwasti village on main Shakai-Kaniguram-Ladha axis on 23rd October.

(2) 2nd Week (a) Security Forces also cleared area along road

Sherwangi-Ladha Axis uptill road track junction. (b) Till 28th of October security forces had achieved

substantial success on all three axes. (c) In anticipation of stiff resistance from militants in

Kaniguram, another strongholds of the militants, the SSG captured all the strategic heights of Karwan


Manza, which overlooks Kaniguram. The capture of these dominating heights resulted in the fall of Kaniguram, Asman Manza on 2 November followed by steadily advances towards Karama, the home town of commander Wali-ur-Rehman, the chief commander of Taliban chapter of South Waziristan.

(3) 3rd Week (a) After consolidating positions in Kaniguram, forces

moved towards Ladha, another important town and home town of militant commander Shamin. The town witnessed fierce fighting and eventually it fell on 17 November, in which the militant suffered heavy casualties and left behind huge cache of arms and ammunition.

(b) The strategically located dry Nullah of Kot Langer Khel was captured on 13 November but forces suffered heavy losses as the militant ambushed the convoy of the security forces with IEDs and small arms. However they responded quickly by killing nearly dozens militants and completely sanitized the area till the heights overlooking Makeen.

(c) The forces captured the strategic located feature of Kund Mela on 1 December and destroyed large numbers of IEDs which were planted on various tracks.

c. Razmak-Makeen Axis (1) Ist Week

(a) On Razmak-Makeen Axis important features and tactical heights were secured on 18th October.

(b) Meanwhile Security Forces consolidated their positions at Razmak and effectively blocked the roads leading from Makeen.

(2) 2nd Week (a) Security Forces also secured Shagha feature and

Sharakai Sar in Nawazkot area. These heights dominate Road Nawazkot-Makeen and area all around.

(b) On 27th October security forces surrounded Nawazkot and dominated the important ridges ahead of Nawazkot. Forces also regained control of old FC Post.

(c) On 29th October after fully securing Sharakai Sar security forces successfully moved forward and secured

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Pakalita and Manza Sar along main axis Razmak-Makeen. Important heights of Dralima and Ahnei Kalle were secured on 30th October.

(d) The forces after overcoming resistance moved towards China which fell on 2 November and thus exposed Makeen.

(3) 3rd Week (a) Nawaz Kot was cleared on 21 November, Marobi

Rogha captured on 24 November, while Makeen Laghad was secured on 30 November and now troops are gradually moving towards Ladha, where the militants have blocked their advances by occupying the ridges overlooking Makeen.

(b) The important stronghold of Kaniguram was surrounded from three directions and forces had made good progress on Jandola-Sararogha Axis along with securing important heights in Nawazkot area on Razmak-Makeen Axes.

Casualty state is as under:

CASUALTY STATE OPERATION RAH-E-NIJAT

Date Own TerroristsShaheed Wounded Killed Injured Arrested Surrendered

October 34 103 322 0 6 0 November 35 69 266 0 19 0 December 1 2 1 0 26 0

Total 70 174 589 0 51 0

Source: Official data.

CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY ARMED FORCE 2009-2010 A SUMMARY

Casualty State: Operation Rah-e-Rast: 27-4-2009 to 24-6-2009

Date Own Terrorists

Shaheed Wounded Killed Injured Arrested SurrenderedTotal 193* 658** 1537 818 1717 0

* Including 14 Officers) ** Including 36 Officers)


Casualty State Operation Rah-e-Nijat: 17-10-2009 to 8-2-2010

Date Own Terrorists Shaheed Wounded Killed Injured Arrested Surrendered

Total 1 11 7 1 210 0

Casualty State: 2001 to 14 January 2011

Dated Army/FCShaheed Wounded

2001 onward 2675 8317

Casualty State-FATA 2009-2010

Date Civilians2009-2010 Shaheed Wounded

2060 4266

Casualty State during Suicide Bombing/Attacks All Over the Country

CiviliansShaheed Wounded

2815 7638 Source: Official Data

2009 – YEAR OF TERRORISM

Pakistan is at war, and this time the war is not at its borders with an enemy country. This war is with its own people and within its own territory. Some call it America’s war whereas the government and the army call it ‘Pakistan’s own war’.

This war has plagued Pakistan's provinces of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], Balochistan, and Punjab with violence between militants and government security forces as well as terrorist activities against innocent civilians. Though, the nature of these violent incidents and terrorist attacks seem similar all over the country, the causes of the conflicts vary in different regions.

In NWFP, the worst hit province in terms of terrorism, Operation Rah-e-Rast against pro-Taliban groups displaced hundreds of thousands of people in April and May 2009. The operation wrapped up on July 7, 2009 with 1,600

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extremists killed and 158 soldiers martyred. During the operation, around 300,000 people of Swat took refuge in camps or with relatives.

Not only displacement, residents of the province also bear the brunt of the terrorist attacks in the country. Around 87 such incidents took place in the province, including suicide attacks, hand grenade attacks, rocket and mortar attacks and blasts with remote control devices. At least 824 people, including 228 security officials of different organizations and grades, were killed in attacks during the year.

Attack on shrine of a 17th century Sufi poet - Rehman Baba - in the Akhund Baba graveyard of Peshawar to discourage ‘shrine culture’ shocked the nation. A letter delivered to the management of the mausoleum three days before the attack had warned against its promotion of ‘shrine culture’.

In Balochistan, Pakistan's largest and poorest province, tribal militants are engaged in a long-running, low-level insurgency to gain greater control of the region's natural resources and political power. Analysts say Afghan Taliban groups are also using Baluchistan as a base. Most of the 37 terrorist acts reported from the province were incidents of sectarian violence. Around 66 people, including 11 security officials, were killed in the terrorist attacks. Those killed include 3 academicians, 1 cardiologist, Balochistan Chief Mines Inspector, Balochistan Education Minister, Vice President of Jamhoori Watan Party, Chairman of Hazara Democratic Party, leader of Fiqah Jafria, and leader of Jammat Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat Noorani.

Some of the militant violence has spilled into other parts of Pakistan, with suicide and armed attacks on troops and the country's main cities.

In Punjab, 315 people were killed in 20 terrorist attacks. Those killed include 62 security officials. The worst terrorist incidents were suicide attacks at Moon Market, Lahore and Paradeline mosque, Rawalpindi. More than 85 people were killed in the two attacks.

Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, didn’t remain safe from the terror wave and 28 people were killed in 10 terrorist attacks. Some of the important incidents include suicide attack at UN World Food Program (WFP) office and suicide attack at International Islamic University, Islamabad.

Violence erupted in Sindh after suicide attack on Ashura procession at M A Jinnah Road, Karachi on December 28... just 3 days before the new year. The province remained relatively safe during the year. At least 53 people were killed in 17 terrorist activities. Majority of these incidents were target killings or shooting incidents, which apparently had sectarian motives behind them.

Following is a time line of major terrorist attacks in all four provinces of the country.


Terrorist Attacks in NWFP

• January 4: A suicide bomber was killed while two people sustained injuries near a check-post in Officers’ Colony in Bannu. The suicide bomber blew himself up in an attempt to target a check-post but could not succeed as the bomb exploded before he could reach his target.

• January 4: Ten persons, including 4 policemen, were killed and 27 others injured in two bomb blasts near the Polytechnic College in Dera Ismail Khan.

• January 17: In the first incident of its kind in Peshawar, religious scholar Pir Hafiz Rafeeullah, who was kidnapped on January 16, was reportedly slaughtered and his decapitated body was found in the Matani area of the capital on the morning of January 17.

• January 20: Four policemen and 4 civilians were injured when a police patrol van was hit by a roadside bomb on Ring Road in the Hazarkhwani area of Peshawar.

• January 23: Two SF personnel were killed in a car suicide attack near Mingora town in the Swat District of NWFP.

• January 26: At least 5 people have been killed and several wounded in a bomb blast in Dera Ismail Khan. The bomb, attached to a bicycle, went off on a busy main road.

• February 3: One man was killed and 18 others injured in a hand grenade attack on a Sunni mosque at Mohallah Joginwala in Dera Ismail Khan district.

• February 5: A suicide attacker detonated an explosive-laden car near a police station in the Mingora town of Swat District, injuring a dozen officers and destroying part of the building.

• February 9: At least 18 FC personnel were injured in amini-truck suicide attack on the Baran Pul check-post of the Frontier Reserve Police (FRP) in the jurisdiction of Bakkakhel police station in Bannu District.

• February 11: Alamzeb Khan, a Member of Provincial Assembly from the ruling Awami National Party (ANP), was killed and 7 others were injured in a remote-controlled bomb blast in Momin Town in Peshawar.

• February 17: Five people were killed and 17 injured in a car bomb blast outside the Hujra (male guest house) of the union council chief in Bazidkhel village of Peshawar.

• February 20: At least 32 persons were killed and 145 others injured when a suicide bomber exploded himself in the funeral procession of a slain employee of the Tehsil Municipal Administration near the busy Shubra Square in Dera Ismail Khan.

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• February 23: A police guard was killed when he flung himself onto a suicide bomber to prevent him from entering a compound in Bannu. The attacker was trying to enter the compound, where judges and senior police officials live and work, when the guard intercepted him. Two other police guards were wounded in the attack.

• March 5: One person was killed and 19 others sustained injuries when a hand-grenade hurled by unidentified miscreants at worshippers exploded in Ameer Hamza mosque in Dera Ismail Khan.

• March 5: Suspected Taliban militants blew an ancient shrine of a 17th century Sufi poet - Rehman Baba - in the Akhund Baba graveyard of Peshawar. A letter delivered three days before the attack to the management of the mausoleum had warned against its promotion of ‘shrine culture’.

• March 7: Eight persons, including five policemen, two Frontier Corps personnel and a civilian, were killed in a remote-controlled car bombing at Mashugagr village in Peshawar. Some villagers also sustained minor injuries.

• March 11: The NWFP Senior Minister and Awami National Party leader Bashir Ahmad Bilour survived an assassination attempt that left six persons, including two suspected suicide attackers, dead in Namak Mandi in Peshawar. Four persons, including a young girl, were wounded in the firing, grenade attack and suicide blast.

• March 18: Five people including three policemen were killed and four injured when over 100 unidentified armed men attacked a police vehicle at the entrance of the University of Malakand at Chakdara in Lower Dir District.

• March 30: Seven persons, including 5 Army soldiers, were killed and 9 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into a military convoy near a filling station on the Bannu-Miranshah Road.

• April 5: Police found bullet-riddled bodies of four local aid workers, including three women, in Shinkiari area of Mansehra District.

• April 15: At least 18 persons, including nine policemen, were killed and five others injured when a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into the Harichand Police Post in Charsadda District.

• April 18: At least 27 SF personnel were killed and 55 others injured in a suicide attack on a security check post in the Doaba area of Hangu District.


• April 26: 12 children were killed after playing with a bomb that resembled a football. The children died after the toy-like-bomb exploded in Lower Dir District.

• May 1: The ISPR spokesman Major General Athar Abbas said two Frontier Corps personnel were killed when a suicide bomber blew up a booby-trapped house in the Buner District.

• May 4: A suicide car bomber killed 4 SF personnel and wounded 8 persons in the outskirts of Peshawar.

• May 5: Seven people, including 2 children and a Frontier Corps soldier, were killed and 48 others sustained injuries when an explosives-laden car rammed into a pick-up near a check-post on the Bara road near Peshawar.

• May 11: At least 10 people died and 27 were injured as a suicide bomber blew up his explosives-laden vehicle near a Frontier Corps check post in the outskirts of Darra Adam Khel.

• May 16: Two handicapped children and 2 of their teachers were among 11 people killed in a car bomb blast at congested City Circular Road, Peshawar. At least 33 people were injured.

• May 16: Six people, including two women and two children, sustained minor injuries when a low-intensity explosive device went off in a busy market in Peshawar.

• May 22: At least 10 people were killed and 65 others were injured when a powerful car bomb exploded near the Tasveer Mahal Cinema hall in the busy Kabuli Chowk area.

• May 28: Three policemen were killed and 9 others injured in a suicide attack on a police vehicle at the Sra Khawra security post on the Kohat road in the jurisdiction of Matani Police station on the outskirts of Peshawar.

• May 28: A policeman and 2 passers-by were killed and 13 people wounded when a suicide attacker exploded an auto-rickshaw near a police checkpoint in Dera Ismail Khan.

• June 5: A suicide bomber killed 49 worshippers, including 12 children, at a mosque in a remote village of the Dir Upper District. Dozens more were injured in the blast just before Friday congregation in the Hayagay Sharqi village.

• June 7: One non-commissioned officer was killed and five others were injured in an attack on security forces' convoy transporting TNSM deputy chief Maulana Alam and spokesman Amir Izaat to Peshawar, the NWFP capital. Both leaders of banned outfits were also killed in the attack.

• June 9: A massive truck suicide attack at the five-star Pearl Continental hotel in Peshawar killed 17 persons and injured 60 others.

16 IPRI Factfile

• June 11: A man was killed and 13 others, including 9 policemen, sustained injuries in a hand grenade-cum-suicide attack on a police party in the Lateefabad area on Ring Road in Peshawar.

• June 11: NWFP Minister for Prisons Mian Nisar Gul Kakakhel was seriously injured and his two guards were killed when his convoy was ambushed by suspected militants in Darra Adam Khel.

• June 12: Five worshippers were killed and 105 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden van into a mosque during the Friday prayers in the Cantonment area of Nowshera. Two soldiers were among the four persons killed on the spot while most of the 105 wounded were reportedly Army personnel.

• June 14: Nine people were killed and over 40 injured when a powerful explosion ripped through a busy market in Dera Ismail Khan.

• June 22: Two policemen were killed and 7 people, including 3 policemen, sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into the Thakot Police check-post in Battagram District.

• June 24: Three policemen, including an officer, were killed when some miscreants fired rockets and mortar shells at the Arbab Tapu check-post in the jurisdiction of Matani Police Station.

• July 2: Two policemen were killed and an equal number of people sustained injuries when Taliban targeted a police vehicle with a remote-controlled device in Peshawar.

• July 9: A Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) employee was killed and three injured when Taliban militants blew up an electricity pylon using a remote-controlled device in Merra Suraizai Payan village on the outskirts of the provincial capital Peshawar.

• July 15: Two people, including an official of the UNHCR, were killed and another injured when suspected Taliban militants attempted to abduct UN officials at the Katcha Ghari Refugee Camp in Nasir Bagh.

• July 15: Two children were injured in a rocket attack. Taliban militants fired three rockets from an unidentified location into the city at about 12:30pm, and one of them hit a house in Sethi Town, injuring a 13-year-old girl and a 15-year-old boy.

• July 20: Suspected militants of the Mangal Bagh group killed four policemen in an ambush on the outskirts of Peshawar.

• August 2: In the southern Mashogagar village, terrorists killed a prayer leader Qari Roohul Amin of Sulemankhel, who had been abducted on June 29, and placed three kilograms of explosives with his body to trigger it with a remote control device in the hope that


policemen would come close to it. Officials of the bomb disposal squad, however, defused the explosives without any damage.

• August 2: Militants shot dead two policemen in Paharipura. A squad of the Paharipura Police Station was ambushed by unknown gunmen in Islamabad town of Peshawar around 2:30 am while patrolling the streets.

• August 10: Militants fired rockets at a paramilitary checkpoint in Peshawar, killing two civilians. The pre-dawn rocket attack targeted a Frontier Corps base in the city's Hayatabad neighborhood.

• August 16: A soldier was killed and three others sustained injuries in a suicide attack near a SFs checkpoint in the Swat District.

• August 17: Seven people were killed and eight others injured when a bomb placed in a vehicle exploded at a filling station in the Shabqadar area in Charsadda.

• August 18: Suspected militants beheaded a man kidnapped from the Matani area on August 12. Kabir Hussain, who had come from the US and was kidnapped on his way from Peshawar airport to his village Dabori in Kohat District.

• August 22: Two persons were killed and three others injured in a suicide blast in Hayatabad area. The blast occurred in sector N-I Phase IV of the area near the Hayatabad Medical Complex (HMC).

• August 23: Three persons were killed and 15 others sustained injuries in a powerful suicide blast close to the house of the slain AI spokesman, Mobin Afridi, in the Momin Town area of Peshawar

• August 30: At least 16 police recruits were killed and 11 others sustained injuries after a suicide bomber detonated explosives strapped to his body at the Mingora Police Station.

• September 4: Suspected militants shot dead two FC troopers in Nasir Bagh suburbs of Peshawar early in the morning while they were patrolling the area.

• September 12: Two policemen were injured in a suicide blast near Doaba Police Station in the Hangu District.

• September 18: At least 33 people were killed and more than 50 injured in a suicide car blast in Kohat District.

• September 26: Two suicide attackers separately rammed their explosives-laden vehicles into a Police station in Bannu and a military-owned commercial bank in Peshawar cantonment area, killing at least 27 people and injuring around another 200.

• September 28: At least four persons, including a prominent anti-Taliban cleric, were killed when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden vehicle into a car at Bannu.

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• October 6: A woman, a minor girl and a boy sustained injuries when a rocket hit a house in Miskeenabad under the jurisdiction of Bhanamari Police Station, Peshawar at around 2 am.

• October 9: At least 56 persons, including a woman and seven children, were killed and 112 others were injured when a suicide attacker detonated his explosives-laden car at the crowded Soekarno Chowk in Khyber Bazaar in Peshawar.

• October 12: At least 47 persons, including 9 security officials, were killed and 45 others were injured in a suicide attack on a military convoy in the Alpuri area of Shangla District, NWFP.

• October 15: At least 11 persons, including 3 policemen, were killed and 22 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into the building of the Saddar Police Station located in the military area of Kohat.

• October 15: An eight-year-old boy, identified as Hamza, was killed and 12 persons, including two policemen, were wounded when a powerful bomb exploded in a three-storey building in the officers’ colony of provincial capital Peshawar.

• October 16: At least 12 persons, including three policemen, were killed and 24 others sustained injuries after a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden vehicle into the CIA’s Special Investigation Unit in Peshawar.

• October 23: At least 15 people were injured in a bombing outside a restaurant in the Hayatabad area. The bomb was planted in a car.

• October 28: A remote-controlled car bomb killed 117 people – including women and children – and injured around 200 others at the Meena Bazaar in Peshawar.

• November 8: At least 18 people, including a local councillor heading an anti-Taliban Lashkar (militia), were killed and 44 others injured when a suicide bomber blew him up in a cattle market at Adezai village, 25 km south of the capital city of Peshawar.

• November 9: Three persons, including a policeman, were killed and 5 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber riding an auto-rickshaw blew himself up at a police barricade on the Ring Road in the Latifabad area of Peshawar.

• November 10: Suicide car bomb blast at Farooq-e-Azam Chowk, Charsadda. Thirty two people were killed and 80 were injured in the incident.

• November 12: Syed Abul Hassan Jaffry, media manager of the Iranian consulate in Peshawar, was shot dead near his home in Gulbarg. Jaffry was going to his office when he was shot at point-blank range as he turned his car towards the Swati Phatak.


• November 13: At least 17 people, including 10 military personnel, were killed and 60 injured when a suicide bomber on an explosive-laden Shehzore truck detonated the explosive material in front of the regional headquarters of the ISI in Peshawar.

• November 13: Twelve people, including 5 security officials, were killed and 26 injured in a suicide attack at a Police Station in the Bannu town of Bannu District.

• November 14: At least 12 persons, including a policeman and a three-year-old child, were killed and another 35 injured when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vehicle at police check post in Pashta Kharra Chowk, Peshawar.

• November 16: Four persons were killed and more than 30 others sustained injuries in a suicide car bombing which targeted the Badhber Police Station on the Kohat Road near Peshawar.

• November 19: At least 20 people, including three policemen, were killed and 50 others injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up at the main gate of the Judicial Complex on Khyber Road in Peshawar.

• November 19: A bomb attack on the police van ripped through the vehicle, killing two policemen on the spot and wounding five civilians on the outskirts of Peshawar.

• November 25: The cleaner of an oil tanker, used for NATO forces in Afghanistan, was killed and its driver injured when unidentified gunmen attacked the vehicle on the Ring Road near Tor Baba.

• November 26: A remote-controlled bomb blast injured three people, including two policemen and a young girl, and destroyed an electricity pylon in Bashirabad area.

• November 30: Two police officials were injured when unidentified armed men attacked their vehicle on the Indus Highway, police said.

• December 1: A leading politician, Shamsher Ali Khan, was reportedly killed when a suicide bomber targeted a guest house where he was present. Another 8 people, including his brother, were injured in this attack.

• December 3: A police official was injured in an explosion at a police check-post in the Ragai area of capital Peshawar.

• December 5: At least four people, including a women, were killed and 12 people were injured in a car bomb explosion at United Plaza, Tehkal Market, University Road, Peshawar.

• December 7: At least 12 people, including 2 policemen, were killed and 50 were injured in a suicide attack outside a court in Peshawar.

• December 22: A suicide bomber blew himself at the gate of the Peshawar Press Club, killing 3 persons including a policeman, and injuring 17 others.

20 IPRI Factfile

• December 24: At least 5 people, including a policeman, were killed and 24 were injured in a suicide attack near State Life Building, Saddar, Mall Road, Peshawar.

Terrorist attack in Balochistan

• January 4: Armed men killed a trooper of the Balochistan Constabulary, identified as Abdul Hakeem, in the Shallkot area of Quetta. The attack appeared to be a targeted killing.

• January 5: Unidentified assailants killed two Shias on Kirani Road, Quetta, despite tight security arrangements due to Muharram.

• January 10: Unidentified men killed a central leader of the Fiqah Jafferia along with his guard in Sibi District.

• January 14: Unidentified assailants killed four policemen, including a DSP in a shootout on Siryab Road. Three of the murdered policemen belonged to Hazara community and were Shia.

• January 26: Hussain Ali Yousafi, chairman of the Hazara Democratic Party, was shot dead by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the southwestern city of Quetta.

• February 2: John Solecki, head of the UN High Commission for Refugees office in Quetta, was kidnapped and his driver was killed after his vehicle was ambushed in Quetta.

• February 2: Unidentified gunmen killed a Shia trader in Quetta in an attack apparently linked to the recent cycle of sectarian killings in the provincial capital.

• February 18: In a suspected sectarian incident, unidentified men killed the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat-Noorani provincial leader Maulana Iftikhar Ahmed Habibi in Quetta.

• February 24: A Shia trader and three of his sons were shot dead in an apparent sectarian attack on Sariab Road, Quetta.

• March 1: In an apparent act of sectarian violence in Quetta, unidentified men murdered a man and his son, both from the Shia sect. The motorcycle borne attackers opened fire on the victims at their shop on Quetta’s Double Road.

• March 2: Six people were killed and 12 others, mostly students, sustained injuries in a suicide attack on a madrassa (seminary) in Kili Karbala in the Pishin District. The Jamaat-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur Rehman faction JUI-F) provincial chief Maulana Muhammad Khan Shirani, the Balochistan Assembly Deputy Speaker Syed Matiullah Agha and provincial ministers belonging to the party were attending a ceremony at the seminary when a 15-year-old boy blew himself up in front of the stage. However, all the JUI-F leadership escaped unhurt.


• March 3: Five Shias were killed in Quetta when unidentified assailants attacked members of a family in the city.

• March 9: Unidentified men on a motorbike killed two Shias in an apparent sectarian attack in Quetta. The victims were shot in their car on Kirani road, on the outskirts of the Balochistan capital.

• April 22: Unidentified militants threw a hand grenade at policemen deployed on the outskirts of Quetta, injuring four policemen and a passerby. Police personnel were on duty in the Hazar Ganji area.

• May 3: Unidentified assailants shot dead two policemen on the Arbab Karam Khan Road.

• May 28: At least five persons, including a woman, were killed when unidentified attackers opened indiscriminate fire on a customer service centre on Kalat Street, Jail Road, Quetta.

• June 22: Three Shias, including a union council chief, were killed in Quetta by unidentified men in a suspected sectarian incident. Unidentified armed men reportedly opened fire on Talib Agha, Union Council 47 chief in Quetta, when he was on his way home along with his driver and security guard.

• June 23: The principal of the Government Commerce College was shot dead by two motorcycle borne assailants in a suspected sectarian incident in Quetta.

• July 23: Haji Mohammad Mohsin, principal of the Government High School in Sariab Mills, was going to school when armed men riding a motorcycle opened fire on him, killing him on the spot.

• July 24:Unidentified assailants shot dead a Professor of the Government Degree College on the Sariab Road.

• July 29: A woman was killed and six persons, including two SF personnel, were injured in a grenade attack on a check-post of the Frontier Corps (FC) in the Sairab Road area.

• June 30: Four people were killed and 11 wounded when a bomber targeted a hotel in Kalat in the first-ever suicide attack in Balochistan. The attack in Kalat District appeared to be aimed at disrupting supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan.

• July 31: Two SF personnel were killed while three others sustained injuries when unidentified miscreants lobbed a hand grenade at a security vehicle on the Spiny Road area.

• August 12: Two persons were killed and six others sustained injuries in a bomb blast and firing incident in the Irrigation Colony area on Sariab Road, Quetta.

• August 17: Cardiologist Dr Abid Iqbal Zaidi was shot dead by unidentified armed men on the Fatima Jinnah Road.

• August 17: A man and his two sons were shot dead by unidentified armed men on Sirki Road.

22 IPRI Factfile

• September 5: Unidentified militants hurled two hand grenades on the City Police Station building, injuring 21 persons including six policemen.

• September 8: Suspected Taliban militants set ablaze eight oil tankers near the Western Bypass, when the tankers were carrying fuel for NATO forces in Afghanistan.

• October 8: Three police officials were injured in a bomb blast at the Spiny Road. The blast took place near a police van which was on a routine patrol on the road.

• October 12: Unidentified armed men killed the Balochistan Chief Mines Inspector on Sariab Road in Quetta. Ashraf Ali was a member of the Shia Hazara community.

• October 13: In another incident of target-killing, the Jamhoori Watan Party Vice-President, Muhammad Aslam Mirza, and his driver were shot dead by unidentified armed men in the Shalkot area.

• October 15: Two persons, including a Frontier Corps trooper, were killed and five others injured in terrorist attacks in Quetta

• October 23: Unidentified gunmen killed an official of the intelligence Bureau (IB), Tanveer Raza, while he was walking on Zargoon Road near the office of the Railways divisional superintendent.

• October 25: Unidentified gunmen killed the Balochistan Education Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan, a member of the Pakistan People’s Party, outside his residence on Thogai Road, while his brother’s father-in-law, Hydayat Jaffar, was injured in the same attack.

• November 7: 13 people, including two children and a trooper, were injured when a hand grenade exploded at a Frontier Corps checkpost near Meezan Chowk.

• November 17: DIG Police (Operations) Shahid Nizam Durrani and his driver were injured in a bomb blast on Spiny Road. Eight persons, mainly policemen, were injured in the blast.

• November 23: Two policemen were shot dead in Quetta in what appeared to be a case of target killing. The policemen, Sardar Muhammad Samalani and Syed Amir Muhammad Khilji, were on routine patrol on Qambrani Road when unidentified assailants opened fire at them, police said.

• December 7: A car bomb blast injured nine persons and damaged several vehicles and shops at the main gate of the Junior Assistant Colony in the Chaman Housing Society, Quetta.

• December 8: The Saryab station house officer and two other policemen were injured in a hand-grenade attack on a police convoy on the Sabzal Road in Quetta of Balochistan.


Terrorist Attacks in Punjab

• February 5: At least 32 persons were killed and 48 others wounded when a suspected suicide bomber blew himself amidst a crowd of Shia worshippers outside a mosque in Dera Ghazi Khan.

• February 7: At least 7 officers were killed in an ambush attack on a checkpoint in Mianwali in Punjab.

• March 3: A convoy carrying Sri Lankan cricketers and officials in two buses was fired upon by 12 gunmen, near the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore. The cricketers were on their way to play the third day of the second Test against the Pakistani cricket team. Six members of the Sri Lankan cricket team were injured. Six Pakistani policemen and two civilians were killed.

• March 16: At least 15 people were killed and 25 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up near a busy bus stand at Pirwadhai in Rawalpindi.

• March 30: Nine people, including 8 police recruits and a civilian, were killed and 93 cadets and civilians were injured when about 10 terrorists attacked the Manawan Police Training School in Lahore with guns and grenades.

• April 05: A suicide bomber blew himself up at the entrance of an Imambargah at Chakwal in Punjab province, killing 24 people, including three children, and injuring 140 others.

• May 27: At least 27 people were killed and 326 were injured in a suicide car bomb blast near offices of the capital city police officer (CCPO) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Lahore. An ISI colonel and 15 police officials were among those killed.

• June 12: Seven persons, including a prominent anti-Taliban cleric Sarfaraz Naeemi, were killed and seven injured when a suicide attacker detonated himself at the Jamia Naeemia madrassa (seminary) in the Garhi Shahu area shortly after Friday prayers.

• July 2: At least 7 people were killed and 36 persons were injured when a young suicide bomber rammed his motorcycle into a bus carrying employees of the Army-run Heavy Mechanical Complex at the Peshawar Road near Chur Chowk in Rawalpindi.

• August 20: Eight people, including 4 policemen, were injured when a bomb exploded close to a police patrol car on the Misryal road in Rawalpindi.

• September 6: Three policemen were shot dead in Hasan Abdal in apparent act of targeted killing.

• October 10: At least 14 people, including six soldiers, five SSG commandos, three hostages, were killed in an attack on Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.

24 IPRI Factfile

• October 15: At least 19 people, including 14 security officials, were killed and 41 others sustained injuries in three separate terror attacks in Lahore. The attacks were carried out at the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) building on the Temple Road, the Manawan Police Training School and the Elite Police Academy on the Bedian Road.

• October 23: Eight persons were killed and 17 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber exploded himself at a police check-post on the GT Road near the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) in Kamra in the Attock District.

• October 24: A Motorway police official was killed when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden car near Lillah Interchange close to Kalar Kahar.

• November 2: At least 35 persons, including two women and children, were killed and 63 others sustained injuries when a suicide bomber blew himself up outside a branch of the National Bank of Pakistan in Rawalpindi.

• December 4: At least 42 people were killed and 77 people were injured in firing and two suicide blasts at Parade Lane Mosque, near the Pakistani army's headquarters in Rawalpindi.

• December 7: Two bomb blasts killed at least 45 people, and injured more than 100 at the crowded Moon Market in Allama Iqbal area of Lahore in Punjab. The two bombs exploded 30 seconds apart at 8:45 PM (PST).

• December 8: A group of three Taliban militants launched a gun, rocket and suicide attack on the office of ISI, killing at least 12 people and injuring 18people in Multan, Punjab.

Terrorist Attacks in Islamabad

• March 23: A policemen was killed and 2 policemen were injured in a suicide bomb blast at the entrance of the headquarters of the Special Branch (SB), an intelligence agency of the Federal Capital Police, in Sitara Market.

• April 04: Eight Frontier Constabulary (FC) personnel were killed, and seven others injured, when a suicide bomber blew himself up at an FC check post on the Margala Road in Islamabad.

• June 6: Two policemen were killed and four others injured in a suicide attack on a Rescue 15 office at Sector G-8 in capital Islamabad.

• September 2: Religious Affairs Minister Hamid Saeed Kazmi was injured in a brazen attack in Islamabad while his driver and a police guard were killed.


• October 5: A suicide bomber targeted the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) office in Islamabad, killing five persons, including a UN diplomat and two women employees. Six other staff members were injured.

• October 20: Two suicide bombers targeted the new campus of the International Islamic University Islamabad in the H-10 sector of Islamabad, killing at least six students and staff members, including two female students, and injuring more than 29 others.

• October 22: A serving Army brigadier, Moinuddin Ahmad, and his driver were gunned down in Islamabad.

• October 27: A military officer, Brigadier Waqar Ahmad, escaped death as two gunmen riding a motorbike attacked his car.

• November 6: Gunmen opened fire on an army brigadier vehicle in Islamabad. Brigadier Sohail and his driver were injured in the incident.

• December 2: An official of the Pakistan Navy foiled a suicide attack on the Naval Headquarters at Zafar Chowk on the Margalla Road in the national capital Islamabad. However, two Navy personnel were killed in the attack, while 13 persons were injured.

Terrorist Attacks in Sindh

• January 20: In a suspected sectarian incident, unidentified gunmen shot dead a shop owner from the Ahmadiyya community outside his house in the Kotri District of Sindh province.

• February 1: An explosion in the Saddar Town of Karachi killed one person and injured two others. One unidentified man - who fidgeted with the bomb planted in a garbage dump, which caused the explosion - died and two others sustained injuries.

• April 15: A 28-year-old sectarian worker-turned-lawyer was shot dead near Hamdard Dawakhana off the arterial M.A. Jinnah Road in Karachi. Mazharul Islam, was a former member of the banned Sunni outfit SSP.

• May 22: Four persons were injured in a cross-fire between two groups after pro-Taliban slogans were found painted on the walls of a church in Surjani Town, Karachi.

• May 24: A senior activist of the banned SSP was shot dead in a target killing. 40-year old Allauddin was the Lines Area Unit in-charge of the banned Sunni outfit, and had earlier worked for the LeJ.

• May 27: Another activist of the banned Sunni outfit SSP was shot dead while his son Sufian was injured by two gunmen near a Tandur in Gulshan-e-Iqbal in the Aziz Bhatti Police limits of Karachi.

26 IPRI Factfile

• June 5: Mir Yaqub Bizenjo, legislator from Balochistan, three of his relatives and a servant were injured after a parcel bomb exploded in his Defence Society house in Karachi.

• July 15: Unidentified men killed the central legal adviser of the outlawed Sunni group, the SSP, Hafiz Ahmed Buksh, in Model Colony in Karachi.

• July 16: Two more activists of the outlawed SSP, including a guard of the group’s central leader Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem, were killed in Karachi. One of them died at a hospital after being injured in the clash a day earlier while another’s body was recovered from Model Colony.

• August 17: Armed men shot dead Allama Ali Sher Hyderi, chief of the banned SSP, along with his associate Imtiaz Phulpoto at Khairpur in the Sindh province.

• September 18: At least three persons sustained bullet injuries during a sectarian clash, which erupted at Iftar time in the precincts of Soldier Bazaar Police Station at Karachi in Sindh. The clash took place between the Shia community and the people belonging to the Deobandi school of thought over the use of loudspeaker during Iftar.

• November 19: Ghulam Muhammad Waezi, a Shia clericm was shot dead in the Orangi Town area of Karachi, within the jurisdiction of Tori Bungash Police Station.

• November 20: In a suspected sectarian incident, the general secretary of the banned Sunni outfit SSP Karachi chapter, Engineer Ilyas Zubair, was shot dead and provincial information secretary, Qari Shafiqur Rehman Alvi, wounded at Teen Hatti under the Jamshed Quarters Police Station jurisdiction in Karachi.

• December 7: The leader of Pasban-e-Aza, a Shia organization was shot dead by unidentified militants in a suspected sectarian attack in the remit of the Brigade Police Station of Karachi. The slain leader was identified as Syed Shahid Hussain.

• December 28: At least 40 people were killed and more than 90 were injured in a suicide attack on Ashura procession at M A Jinnah Road. Enraged people set major commercial centers around the blast scene on fire and burnt dozens of vehicles. Violence erupted across the city.

• December 26: A remote controlled bomb blast injured nearly 26 Shia mourners at Khalifat Chowk in North Nazimabad Town of Karachi.

• December 26: Another bomb blast in Orangi Town in Karachi left 24 people injured. Angry mob had resorted to arsons and anti-


government protests in reaction to the blast.

Samaa TV, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, December 29, 2009, http://www.hrcp-web.org/shownews.asp?id=39

PAKISTAN LOST $35BN IN 3 YEARS IN WAR ON TERROR: HINA RABBANI

Pakistan’s direct and indirect cost in the war on terror has been around $35 billion over the last three years, Minister of State for Economic Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar said on Friday. She expressed these views during a meeting with Giuseppe Vegas, Italian deputy minister for economy and finance, who called on her in Islamabad. She said the public sector development programme allocation for the next financial year might have to be curtailed due to this rising cost of war on terror. She said Pakistan had lost the most in the war, as Pakistani casualties were more than the total number of casualties of all the NATO forces combined. Vegas said his government would encourage Italian businessmen and entrepreneurs to invest in Pakistan to take benefit from its growing market. He also showed interest in initiating various development projects in Gilgit-Baltistan, particularly in the tourism sector.

Daily Times (Lahore), February 20, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\20\story_20-2-

2010_pg7_2

NEW DIMENSIONS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM Pakistan has gone a long way in countering terrorism over the last one year. Its civilian government and the military top brass are in harmony on dealing effectively with the Taliban and other groups that are directly challenging the writ of the Pakistani state.

The army authorities have shown greater determination to deal firmly with Islamic militants despite periodic pressures generated on the security personnel by Islamic parties and orthodox Islamic clerics who question the legitimacy of these operations and accuse the Pakistani civilian and military authorities of fighting against Pakistanis at the behest of the US.

Pakistan’s counter-terrorism security operations, 2009-2010, have four major features. First, the Swat/Malakand operation initiated on April 26, 2009, was the first successful attempt by the Pakistan Army, the Air Force and the paramilitary forces to dislodge the Taliban from a vast territory. The security operation in South Waziristan was launched in mid-October and by the end of December the security forces had knocked the Taliban out of most of South Waziristan. This was a major loss for the TTP that used South Waziristan as its headquarters and provided military training to its fighters as well as to the

28 IPRI Factfile

activists of some militant groups from mainland Pakistan. It had also developed elaborate facilities for training suicide bombers. As the spring season sets in, the Pakistani military will step up its activities to establish its control on the rest of South Waziristan.

Second, the army and its affiliates are now fighting the TTP activists and other militant groups that have created enclaves in other tribal agencies. The focus is on Khyber, Orakzai, Mohmand, Kurram and Bajaur Agencies. There have been pitched battles between the security forces and different militant groups in these Agencies where the militants had established vast underground security networks and training centres and collected weapons. The security forces have made considerable gains but the militant challenge continues to be formidable.

Third, the intelligence agencies have discovered strong linkages between various militant groups in Punjab and the TTP. Invariably, the former acted as facilitators for the suicide bombers in the urban areas and their activists got training in the tribal areas. Pakistan’s security agencies arrested a large number of the activists of the Punjab-based militant groups in order to weaken their linkages with the TTP. This partly disrupted the terrorism chain that linked Punjab with the tribal areas.

Fourth, a major shift has taken place in the disposition of the Pakistan Army and the intelligence agencies towards the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban in January-February 2010. Some of the well known Afghan Taliban leaders and TTP activists have been arrested in different cities, especially from Karachi. According to one source, more than half of the Quetta Shura has been arrested in February-March. The media reported the arrest of Mullah Omar’s son-in-law from Karachi on March 3. This is a major revision of Pakistan’s policy because until recently its security authorities denied any significant presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s tough approach towards the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban is the product of the down-to-earth analysis of the growing Taliban threat by Pakistan’s security authorities and the increased interaction between the top brass of the Pakistan Army and the US military authorities dealing with this region during the last six months. This interaction was backed up by active diplomatic interaction between the two countries.

Until 2009, the army top brass were not fully convinced that they should opt for a full-fledged and sustained security operation against the local Taliban. The civilian authorities were also divided on this. However, the army authorities were alarmed by the ability of the Taliban to control most of Swat and their refusal to moderate their ways even after the NWFP government agreed to implement the Shariah-based judicial system in Swat. The Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) of Sufi Muhammad showed greater defiance and the Taliban began to expand their domain to the adjoining areas. The spectre of the Taliban advancing into


mainland Pakistan emboldened the hard-line Islamic clerics and groups in the cities who began to harass women and others in the name of Islam. Furthermore, several terrorist attacks in Lahore and other cities in February-April of last year created a crisis of credibility for the government.

The fear of losing credibility in the face of the Taliban onslaught led the civilian government and the army to put their foot down vis-à-vis the Taliban and other militant elements. Their counter-terrorism operations strengthened their resolve to dislodge the Taliban because they faced tough resistance from the Taliban and the army and the paramilitary forces lost over 200 personnel in Swat/Malakand and the tribal areas in 2009. They also realised that the Taliban had created a strong military infrastructure with tunnels, weapons storage and training areas in South Waziristan, Bajaur and other tribal areas. The army also discovered some evidence of foreign support to the Pakistani Taliban. Also, the Taliban-backed suicide attacks during October-December of last year, in various cities, especially in Peshawar, convinced the security authorities that the Taliban want chaos and anarchy in Pakistan.

The Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies are now taking action against the Pakistan-based Afghan Taliban because they found out that the Afghan Taliban were helping the Pakistani Taliban in their fight against Pakistan. The military wants to convey a clear message to the Afghan Taliban that if they help those fighting the Pakistan Army, then Pakistan’s security authorities have the capacity to make their life difficult. Further, the Pakistan Army and intelligence authorities want to tell the Afghan Taliban that they cannot be allowed to threaten Pakistan’s interests in the tribal areas and Afghanistan.

These arrests are also meant to help the US because Pakistan wants the current US-led NATO operation to succeed in Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot afford to let the Afghan Taliban capture power in Kabul, although it would like more effective Pashtun representation in the Kabul government, including accommodation of the Taliban that are willing to give up the military option.

Pakistan’s cooperation with the current US policy in Afghanistan is based on the assumption that the US military authorities in the region recognise Pakistan’s security sensitivities about India’s role in Afghanistan and India’s pressure on the eastern border. The other consideration is that the US would contribute to upgrading Pakistan’s capacity to fight the Taliban in the tribal areas. If these understandings persist, Pakistan is expected to continue with the current counter-terrorism policy.

Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, Daily Times (Lahore), March 07, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\03\07\story_7-3-

2010_pg3_2

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SUICIDES BOMBING AND DR TAHIRUL QADRI’S FATWA It is very positive on the part of Maulana Dr Tahirul Qadri for issuing a 600-page fatwa against the suicide bombing, a thing which should have been done much earlier, that too by the Ulema in Pakistan as a whole and by leading scholars of Islam in the Muslim world. It is also encouraging to note Dr Qadri’s announcement on CNN and BBC channels that he would alone fight for the cause if no other Ulema come forward in this direction. One wonders why the Ulema in Pakistan are particularly mum over the suicide blasts across the country. No one speaks against it. No one dares to say that suicide bombing is Haram in Islam, it is against the text of Quran and teachings of the Holy Prophet. The Ulema have in their access the most effective medium of communication – the mosque. They can tell the people, that: (1) Surah Al-Maeda, Ayah No. 32 says: “He who kills a human being (whether Muslim or non-Muslim), he has killed the whole humanity. He who saves one life, it is but equal to saving the whole humanity.” (2) In Surah Al-Nisaa, Ayah 29, it is clearly said that suicide is Haraam: “Don’t kill yourself, there is no doubt that Allah is Merciful to you.” Committing suicide is equal to interfering in the working of Allah. It is as equal to rejecting the blessings of Allah the man is bestowed with. (3) Man is not allowed to kill himself even in the heights of unbearable pains of disease, despondency and any other circumstances. (4) When a Muslim valiant fighter in one of the Ghazwas got unbearable wounds and stabbed himself to death, Hazrat Jundub (RA) heard the Holy Prophet saying: “the man has shut the doors of Jannah in bid to rush to Jannah.” His bravery, his Jehad and all deeds of righteousness which he did in the past all went down the drain because he took the decision of his life and death in his hands. (5) The Holy Prophet used to give instructions to the faithful before going for a Ghazwa, forbidding: “No one will attack the unarmed, the women, the children, the patients, the elders, who offer no resistance, who surrenders, who is given amnesty by anyone from the Muslims.” (6) Surah Al-Baqrah’s Ayah 193 says: “Don’t pick up arms against other than aggressors.” (7) There is famous Hadith of the Prophet (PBUH), which says: “He who kills himself by iron shrapnel, will be beaten by the same iron shrapnel in the Hell.” It is the duty of our Ulema, not to stay calm and speak against the menace of suicide blasts. Luckily, the prestigious Jamia Al-Azhar Egypt’s Mufti-e-Azam Sheikh-ul-Azam Qarat Muhammad Abdul Hameed Al Bashar has come out with the latest fatwa that suicide attacks, in Pakistan, are against the Shariah. He said Muslims are on both sides and there is no reason to fight against each other. He urged the Islamic scholars to preach the teachings of Quran and the Holy Prophet (PBUH). Probably we at the labyrinth of our moral decay that we are not even ready to pay heed to such Fatwas whereas till the early days of last century a fatwa by Mufti Azam of Islam had held the status of decree for all


Muslims of the world. If the masterminds, the Taliban, al-Qaeda men, pro-Taliban militants of tribal areas are true Muslims, they would pay heed to my words. Ulema must come forward in footsteps of Dr Tahirul Qadri and launch a full fledged campaign against suicide bombing as Haram and it has nothing to do with Jannah but they are the merchants of death and hell. Alya Alvi

Editorial, Daily Mail (Islamabad), March, 9, 2010, http://dailymailnews.com/0310/09/Editorial_Column/DMEditorialMail.php

LESSONS FROM LAHORE

As though we were watching a replay of action that has taken place before, terrorists have once more targeted a building belonging to the FIA in Lahore. A very similar attack on a safe house run by the agency and its principal building in the city had taken place almost exactly two years ago in March 2008. What is unfortunate is that few lessons have been learnt from that attack. At that time it was said that all the offices of the security agencies would be moved out of residential areas. This has not happened. The building struck stood in the residential suburb of Model Town. Had it been shifted, some loss of life could have been averted with at least one schoolgirl listed among the 11 persons confirmed so far to have been killed. There are other lessons, too. As they have done before, both in Lahore and other places, the terrorists struck early in the morning – at a time when security was not present anywhere in the vicinity. Despite the fact that the building was an obvious target, there were no pickets around it. What is more, rescue efforts were impeded by the fact that teams had only their bare hands with which to try and shift the massive pile of debris left as the FIA building structure collapsed. One would have thought that by now, with terrorist attacks a not infrequent event, equipment of some kind would have been provided to the rescue workers assigned the task of pulling people out of rubble. …

Editorial, News International (Rawalpindi), March 9, 2010, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=227908

TALIBAN INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR IN PAKISTAN

The Taliban's presence on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is largely unwelcome, but increasingly so in Pakistan, where Gallup surveys show they have lost much of the little appeal they had. Four percent of Pakistanis in a November-December 2009 poll, conducted prior to Pakistan's current push to rout the Taliban within its borders, said the Taliban's presence in some areas of the country has a positive influence, down from 15% in June.

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Gallup most recently polled Pakistanis in the particularly deadly period

after the army's anti-Taliban operations in the South Waziristan tribal area started in October. Retributive militant attacks across Pakistan reportedly have claimed more than 600 Pakistanis' lives since then, which the public's increasingly negative view of the Taliban may reflect.

The Taliban lost support in every region of Pakistan. But nowhere are they more unpopular than in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), ground zero for a full-scale military offensive against the Taliban last May. In November-December 2009, 1% of NWFP residents said the Taliban have a positive influence, down from 11% in June. The percentage saying the Taliban's influence is positive in Baluchistan, which abuts South Waziristan, dropped from 26% to 5%.


On the other side of the border, Afghans agree with Pakistanis that the Taliban have a negative influence. However, Afghans' views have remained relatively unchanged despite the Taliban's threats and violence before the presidential election in August. In both surveys in 2009, roughly 8 in 10 Afghans said the Taliban has a negative influence. …

Julie Ray & Rajesh Srinivasan, Gallup, March 12, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/126602/taliban-increasingly-unpopular-pakistan.aspx

TALIBAN DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM AL QAEDA: EXPERTS

The blasts in Lahore are the last desperate measures of pro-Al Qaeda militants who are now being abandoned by the Taliban, diplomatic sources told Dawn.

The sources also confirmed a Los Angeles Times report, published on Saturday, that the Taliban militants in Fata were now refusing to collaborate with Al Qaeda fighters.

The Taliban were declining to provide shelter or assist in attacks in Afghanistan even in return for payment, the report said.

“Yes, Pakistani intelligence sources also confirm this assessment,” said a senior diplomatic source who did not want to be identified.

“There is a sizeable shift away from Al Qaeda,” he said. “Very few are left who still support Al Qaeda. The vast majority is distancing itself from them.”

The pro-Al Qaeda militants had been weakened so much in the tribal areas that they were shifting their people to other areas inside Pakistan, he said. “In Lahore, they used the Punjabi Taliban to cause Friday’s blasts,” said the diplomatic source.

“These are the leftovers of the pro-Al Qaeda militants and these are last desperate measures.”

The militants, he said, would ultimately be forced to give up fighting or be eradicated. “They have nowhere to go.”

The diplomatic source, like the Los Angeles Times, credited the Pakistani military operations in Fata for this shift in sentiments against Al Qaeda. “Their operations have been very successful,” he said.

The source, however, disagreed with the suggestion that the Haqqani group was still effectively supporting Al Qaeda.

“The Haqqani network is not as effective as the media make it to be. They too have been weakened. The Pakistani military forces are on a winning streak and there’s no exaggeration in it,” he said.

Quoting US military and counter-terrorism officials, the Los Angeles Times reported that the Afghan Taliban began disassociating themselves from

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Al Qaeda because they feared that links to the international terrorist network threatened their long-term survival.

Pakistan’s stepped up military campaign, along with intensified US drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, had made it riskier for the Taliban to harbour Al Qaeda fighters, the report said.

The newspaper speculated that Al Qaeda’s utility to the Taliban could also be ending. “In the past, Al Qaeda was able to offer the Taliban bomb-making experts, experienced fighters and large amounts of cash for operations in Afghanistan in return for haven in Taliban-controlled areas near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border”, but with Al Qaeda’s resources and operational capacity dwindling, it is perhaps too risky for the Taliban to cooperate with them, the report said.

However, the Pakistan-based Haqqani network --- a group active in the Afghan insurgency --- maintained links to Al Qaeda, despite suffering heavy casualties from drone strikes, the report added.

“Al Qaeda fighters are in some cases being excluded from villages and other areas near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border where they once received sanctuary,” US intelligence officials told the Times.

Al Qaeda’s attempts to restore its dwindling presence in Afghanistan were also running into problems, the officials told the paper.

According to the report, Al Qaeda is believed to have fewer than 100 operatives still in Afghanistan.

Last year, the organisation began offering stipend to Afghans who would escort its operatives into the country, but there were indications that many Taliban were refusing this inducement, one US official said.

The Al Qaeda-Taliban rupture has led to a debate within the US government about whether there are ways to exploit any fissures. One idea under consideration is to reduce drone strikes against Taliban factions whose members are shunning contacts with Al Qaeda. “The arrest in recent months of several top Afghan Taliban leaders may also be leading some Taliban to reassess their ties to Al Qaeda in hopes of easing pressure from the Inter-Services Intelligence,” the report said.

Anwar Iqbal, Dawn (Islamabad), March 14, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/front-page/taliban-distancing-themselves-from-al-qaeda-experts-430

332 TERROR HITS CLAIMED 5,704 LIVES SINCE 9/11 The extent to which Pakistan has borne the brunt of the US-led War against Terror can be gauged from the fact that during the last 102 months since the 9/11 episode, the country has averagely been rocked by terrorists every 10th


day during this period, which has witnessed 332 terrorism-related incidents inflicting 5,704 deaths till date.

While 58 terrorism-related incidents have jolted Peshawar (Charsadda and Darra Adamkhel included) since September 11, 2001, the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad have been hit 46 times by terrorists in these last eight and a half years.

A research conducted by The News, using statistics and chronology recorded by the US Department of State, archives of Pakistani newspapers and websites carrying information about global terrorism, has revealed that while the port city of Karachi has been struck 37 times by terrorists during this period under review, Lahore has confronted such happenings on 21 occasions, the same number as the Swat valley.

While Quetta has so far seen blood pouring down its drains 18 times, Dera Ismail Khan has been attacked 16 times by the terrorists during this still ongoing war. The Pakistan Army personnel and installations of country’s armed forces, outside the war zones of Swat, South and North Waziristan etc, have been targeted at least 22 times during this time period under review.

Meanwhile, not fewer than 105 terrorism incidents have taken place since in the war-ridden Bajaur Agency, Kurram Agency, Orakzai Agency, Lower and Upper Dir, Mohmand Agency, South Waziristan and North Waziristan agencies etc.

The NWFP cities mainly hit include Hangu, Kohat, Shangla, Buner, Bannu, Mansehra, Buner, Haripur, Nowshehra, Lakki Marwat and Parachanar etc. Terror has also whacked the calm of Dera Bugti four times.

The residents of Bahawalpur, Sialkot, Hub, Sargodha and Faisalabad found themselves strapped in the grip of fear on two occasions each.

Horror also haunted Multan, Mian Channu, Taxilla, Pishin, Panjgur, Gujranwala, Wah, Dera Ghazi Khan, Kalat, Kamra, Bhakkar, Chakwal, Mianwali, Hassan Abdal and Muzaffarabad etc, at least once each.

During this fright-studded period, high-ranking al-Qaeda officials like Abu Zubaida and Ramzi Binalshibh were arrested by Pakistani officials on March 23, 2002, and September 14, 2002, respectively.

Similarly, on March 1, 2003, Wall Street Journal newsman Daniel Pearl’s killer Khalid Shaikh Muhammed was arrested during CIA-led raids on a suburb of Rawalpindi.

At the time of his capture, Khalid was the third highest ranking official in al-Qaeda and was believed to have supervised the planning for the September 11 attacks on the US.

Khalid Sheikh Muhammed was also linked the USS Cole bombing, an attempt to blow up a civilian airliner with a shoe bomb and the terrorist attack at a synagogue in Tunisia.

Claiming that it has lost around $35 billion since joining the still-continuing War on Terror, Pakistan witnessed only two terror-related incidents

36 IPRI Factfile

in 2001, 14 in 2002, just 8 in 2003, 18 in 2004, 11 in 2005, 16 in 2006, 56 in 2007, 72 in 2008, 130 in 2009 and 29 in the first two-and-a-half months of 2010 till the fling of this report.

The year 2009 of course remained the bloodiest of all with 130 incidents claiming around 1,800 lives, followed by 2008 which saw 1,565 people falling prey to 72 such attacks.

Terror in Pakistan claimed the lives of eminent personalities like the two-time Premier Benazir Bhutto (December 27, 2007), banned Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sihaba chief Maulana Azam Tariq (October 6, 2003), former Interior Minister Lt Gen (R) Moinuddin Haider’s elder brother Ehteshamuddin Haider (December 21, 2000), noted religious scholar Ghulam Murtaza Malik (May 7, 2002), eminent Deobandi scholar and head of Islamic religious school Jamia Binoria, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai (May 30, 2004), leading Shia scholar and Chief of Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, Allama Hassan Turabi (July 14, 2006), Chief of Peshawar City Police Malik Saad (January 27, 2007), former Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam MNA and Wafaqul Madaris Vice Chairman Maulana Hassan Jan (September 15, 2007), Pakistan Army’s top medic Lt Gen Mushtaq Baig (February 25, 2008), former head of Pakistan Army’s Special Services Group Maj Gen (R) Ameer Faisal Alvi (November 19, 2008), Awami National Party Provincial law-maker Alam Zeb Khan (February 11, 2009), leading Sunni Barelwi cleric Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi (June 12, 2009), Punjab-born Balochistan Education Minister Shafiq Ahmed Khan (October 25, 2009), Balochistan’s Deputy Inspector General Nizam Shahid Durrani (November 19, 2009), ANP politician Shamsher Ali Khan (December 1, 2009), former NWFP Education Minister Ghani-ur-Rehman (January 3, 2010), Peshawar’s District Police Officer Iqbal Marwat (February 12, 2010) and Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat’s key leaders Mufti Saeed Jalalpuri (March 11, 2010) and Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem (March 14, 2010).

During this particular period, former President Pervez Musharraf survived three life attempts.

While Musharraf saw death close to him twice in December 2003, he also managed to survive the July 6, 2006, attack aimed at his life.

Then Corps Commander Karachi Lt Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat also narrowly escaped on June 10, 2004, when gunmen opened fire at his convoy in Karachi.

On July 30, 2004, there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Prime Minister-elect Shaukat Aziz, while he was campaigning for a by-election in Attock District.

On August 2, 2004, Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Mohammad Yousaf also managed to deceive death.

On April 28, 2006, the then Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, survived an assassination bid at Charsadda.


On July 17, 2007, another suicide bomber blew himself up outside the venue of the district bar council convention in Islamabad, just be-fore the arrival of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto also escaped unhurt on October 18, 2007, when her convoy was attacked in Karachi upon her return from a long exile, but could not ride her luck the second time she was fatally targeted on December 27, 2007.

On October 30, 2007, a suicide bomber struck a police checkpoint in the high security zone of Rawalpindi, less than a kilometre from President Musharraf’s Camp Office.

The blast also splattered the checkpost outside the residence of then Chief of the General Staff General Tariq Majid.

On November 9, 2007, a suicide bomber detonated explosives at the house of the then Federal Political Affairs Minister Amir Muqam in Peshawar. The minister escaped unhurt though.

On December 21, 2007, a suicide bomber again unsuccessfully targeted former Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao.

On June 9, 2008, controversial Swat cleric and chief of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammadi Maulana Sufi Muhammad survived a remote-controlled bomb.

On October 2, 2008, a suicide attacker targeted the Charsadda house of ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan, who survived the attack.

On October 6, 2008, a suicide attacker targeted a gathering at PML-N legislator Rashid Akbar Nawani’s house in Bhakkar. Nawani luckily survived the attack.

On November 11, 2008, a suicide bomber blew himself up at a packed Qayyum Stadium in Peshawar, minutes after the NWFP Governor Owais Ghani had left the venue and just moments prior to the departure of Senior Provincial Minister Bashir Bilour.

On March 3, 2009, a convoy carrying Sri Lankan cricketers and officials in two buses was fired upon near the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore. Six members of the Sri Lankan cricket team were injured.

On March 11, 2009, senior minister of the NWFP Bashir Bilour survived yet another assassination attempt in Peshawar.

On June 11, 2009, the NWFP Prisons Minister, Mian Nisar Gul Kakakhel, was seriously injured when his convoy was ambushed by suspected militants in Darra Adam Khel.

On September 2, 2009, sitting Religious Affairs Minister Hamid Saeed Kazmi was injured in a brazen attack in Islamabad.

On February 9, 2010, renowned politician Sheikh Rashid Ahmed was attacked by militants in Rawalpindi, though Sheikh Rashid managed to live on

38 IPRI Factfile

by ducking the bullets.

Sabir Shah, The News (Rawalpindi), March 18, 2010, http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=229652

THE SILENT SURGE

Pakistan's Foreign Minister on What His Country is Doing to Combat Militant Islamists

Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Pakistan's foreign minister, runs a balancing act: on one side, Islamists and nationalists; on another, the United States; on a third, India; on a fourth, Afghanistan. Qureshi was in the U.S last week for his country's strategic dialogue with the State Department, where he affirmed his government's willingness to fight the Taliban. Afterward, he stopped by NEWSWEEK's New York office to chat with editors about his military's "silent surge," the back channel with New Delhi, and the sacrifices Pakistan's intelligence agency has made fighting militants. Excerpts: NEWSWEEK: Tell us about this deal between the U.S and Pakistan Qureshi: They were a breakthrough dialogue. We finally succeeded in putting the message across that we have been friends with our allies, and we've had a long relationship that has been cyclical and transactional. What we need to do is convert this relationship into a partnership. I have been hammering on this ever since I became foreign minister, but I think it finally has sunk in.

What do you think caused the breakthrough? First, the recognition of the need of each other. Second, the realization in Pakistan that this menace [of the Taliban] is blocking the progress and the growth of Pakistan. The third factor is that for the first time, the democratically elected government gave the fight to ownership. Even the Army felt that we cannot fight the insurgency unless we have public support. Finally the Obama administration has been engaging more frequently and has been listening. The fact that they nominated a focal point for a constant engagement helped, and so did the fact that we demonstrated our seriousness through actions and sacrifices. Name one nation in the world that has had 31,000 casualties and has arrested, apprehended, and eliminated 17,000 terrorists. Yet the U.S position has always been until now that you need to do more. Is that part of the breakthrough? Not once in this engagement has anyone said to me: "Do more." And for the first time there is the realization in Washington that their delivery has not matched the urgency that is required in the field. What we have succeeded in is converting public opinion and deploying 150,000 troops on the Western


borders. Never in Pakistan's existence and history have we ever deployed these numbers there. … Do you want to see them part of it? That is to the Afghans to decide. For the first time, there is a qualitative change that people are not realizing. It was often said that Pakistani intelligence had an interest in who governs Afghanistan. You have had elections in Afghanistan. Ask the U.N. representative and the EU envoys there, "What was Pakistan's role?" We took a conscious decision of not interfering. Whoever the Afghans elect through the democratic process as their leaders, we will engage and work with them. There has been a change of thinking in Pakistan and a greater realization in Afghanistan that we are destined to be together. We share a border. Afghanistan is landlocked and trade has to go through Pakistan. That is why we are negotiating a new transit trade agreement. This is all new. Some say that the offensive against the Taliban might have been short of going after Taliban leaders who are friendly with Pakistan intelligence. You are misreading that we are differentiating between Pakistani Taliban who are hurting us and Afghan Taliban. I think the distinction that existed is diminishing. If you look at the late operations in South Waziristan, which was considered as the [Pakistan Taliban's] headquarters, the myth was that it had never been occupied by any force and that it was impossible to do it. We have done it. The next question is: "Fine, you have done that but you are not going into North Waziristan where the real bad guys are?" My answer is that we are, but do we have to announce it? It's a tactic again.

Are you sending troops there? We have troops there. But we have to move according to a plan, in line with our resources. The strategy that has worked in Pakistan and that has not worked in Afghanistan is simple: we clear, we hold, once we have held we can only hold with the support of the population. Now we are at a critical phase of maintaining the momentum we have gained, which is build and then transfer authority from military to civilian authority. Aren't those fierce Pashtun mountain warriors that have taken down every empire? Every foreign empire. We are not foreigners. They do not look at us like aliens, but as saviors, because the people living in the tribal belt are sick and tired of the Taliban.

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Do you think there will be visible action in the Northwest Frontier province in the next six months? The allied forces call their surge the military surge. We are doing a silent surge. What is the endgame? Occupy and hold the entire Western region? On the Pakistani side? Obviously. We want to hold, clear, and frankly to amalgamate the tribal bit into the mainstream. But it will have to be done in a phased manner.

Is there a role for American drone strikes in the silent surge? People understand that drone strikes are a precise and superior technology that has taken out some well-known targets. The problem has been the collateral damage. The issue of sovereignty remains. We have used airfire of late and nobody has complained. A missile fired from one of our planes can also target innocents. But when a U.S drone fires and kills, people complain. That is why we have been talking with the administration about transfer of technology. When you give us the ownership, we will face the consequences, as well.

What do you say to those who say that you are taking off the battlefield certain commanders who might be more willing to enter talks and leaving alone those who are more hardline? People can look at it in different ways. You can also look at the positive things. For example, we have this delegation of civilians and military and it is the first time that you have seen such coordination between the civilian and the military leadership of Pakistan. That is a positive thing. But some can say, "Well, the civilians are still not in charge." It is up to you the way you look at it. Do you have a timeline for the silent surge? You can't have a clear timeline. But we are encouraged by the fact that we have performed better than our expectations. How many in the West could have predicted that Pakistani troops would go into Swat and clear the valley in six weeks? Timelines have to be adjusted to ground realities. For many Americans, the low-water mark of the fight was when the Taliban offensive came within 50 miles of Islamabad. Where is the front now? You cannot clearly identify the front. They can operate in small pockets, a group of three or four can slip into a big town and carry out a terrorist activity and run away. Will you call it a front or a hit-and-run operation?


In what sense does the Army have ownership of the fight now that they didn't have before? People's ownership. Initially it was felt that "It is not our war, why are we being sucked into it?" But we said, "This is a war that has a direct impact on Pakistan. Do we want Taliban to succeed in Kabul and target Islamabad with their ideological agenda and try to impose their agenda on us?" We don't. So if we don't, we have to stand up and fight them. Did that change something in poll results? Absolutely. Yesterday, the 22nd of March, in a place called D.i.Khan, which has been a hub of activities of militancy, there was a by-election. A political party which had sympathies and was affiliated with the [coalition of religious parties Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal] was defeated by my party's candidate in free elections. How did President Obama's announcement of the drawdown of the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan affect the way regional actors are behaving now? The initial interpretation was "If they are leaving in July 2011, then just dig in, wait, create no problem, and once they leave come out of the woods." But that interpretation has been dispelled. Why does the perception that the Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to play a double game persist and what is the reality of it? It has changed because ISI has performed significantly against the militants. In the last 18 months, we have lost something like 300 people and had at least 600 injured. Look at how many times their headquarters have been attacked: in Peshawar, Lahore, Multan. If ISI is helping them, why are they being attacked and killed?

Newsweek, March 29, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/235633

U.S. DEFENDS LEGALITY OF KILLING WITH DRONES The Obama administration, facing questions about the legality of its drone program—a key part of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan's Afghan-border region—is pushing back with a legal defense of a program it only tacitly acknowledges.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial Executions and some legal scholars have questioned whether it is legal for the U.S. to target and execute individuals in countries the U.S. isn't at war with. Professor

42 IPRI Factfile

Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame law school has called the drone program "unlawful killing," and says it violates international law.

For the first time, a senior Obama administration official—Harold Koh, the State Department's legal adviser—has publicly articulated the legal basis for targeted killings.

"In this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks," Mr. Koh told an audience of international legal scholars on March 25.

The Central Intelligence Agency has used drones to kill between 400 and 500 suspected militants since January 2009, senior intelligence officials say. The entire program has been expanded notably since Mr. Obama took office. While critics of the program cite collateral civilian deaths, intelligence officials say only about 20 civilians have been killed in that period—a lower estimate than that made by some independent researchers.

National security hawks in the legal community as well as among former Obama and Bush administration officials say they worry the legal scrum could limit the government's ability to track down and kill suspects. The arguments against the program echo the legal challenges that helped overturn U.S. policies on the treatment of terrorism detainees.

Mr. Koh's defense in March won agreement from national security experts such as Ken Anderson, of the Washington College of Law at American University in Washington, who has urged the administration to make a legal case to safeguard what has become an important part of the antiterrorism arsenal.

Mr. Koh's speech was also noteworthy because, before joining the State Department, Mr. Koh, a human-rights lawyer, was an outspoken critic of most of the George W. Bush administration's policies regarding the war on terrorism.Legal criticism of the drone program has continued, however. "A number of controversial questions were left unanswered" by Mr. Koh's speech, says Jonathan Manes, a lawyer on the American Civil Liberties Union's National Security Project. "The speech did not say where the government draws the line between legitimate targets—combatants and those taking part in hostitilities—and civilians, who cannot be targeted. The speech also did not set out any rules on where drones strikes can be used to target and kill individuals," Mr. Manes says.

The ACLU filed a Freedom of Information suit last month in a bid to force the government to divulge details of the classified program.

Brett McGurk, a former National Security Council official in the Bush and Obama administrations currently at the Council on Foreign Relations, says Mr. Koh sidestepped some of the "thorniest issues" surrounding targeted


killing. Mr. McGurk specifically noted questions about "the implications of civilian agencies—the CIA—controlling the kill chain."

The drone program falls into a legal grey area. International Humanitarian Law regulates continuous armed conflict between states, with recognizable combatants—little of which prevails in the U.S. fight against al Qaeda and its allies.

As a civilian agency and a noncombatant under International Humanitarian Law, the CIA isn't governed by the same laws of war that cover U.S. military personnel. The CIA says the program is legal. "Without confirming any specific activity, CIA's counterterrorism operations are lawful and precise," said CIA spokeswoman Marie Harf.

A concern voiced by legal scholars and former and current administration officials is that without an articulated legal basis for the attacks, U.S. officials could in the future be targeted themselves—by crusading judges in other countries who see targeted killings as violations of humanitarian law.

Another potential pitfall: The Obama administration relies on a Bush-era congressional resolution as its main authority to track and kill suspected al Qaeda members. That 2001 resolution authorized the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons" deemed linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks—a justification that dims as time passes.

Relying on that authorization has its limits, warns Mr. Anderson, the American University professor as the fight widens to include individuals who aren't necessarily part of al Qaeda or armed fighters. That roster could include Anwar al Awlaki, a U.S.-born Muslim cleric believed to be hiding in Yemen, where the U.S. has aided counterterrorism efforts.

"One of these days, a future president will face new threats that don't have anything to do" with al Qaeda or the Taliban—and the 2001 congressional authorization won't serve as a legal basis for targeting those threats, Mr. Anderson says.

Keith Johnson & Siobhan Gorman, Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303450704575159864237752180.ht

ml

OBAMA MOVES TO DE-LINK TERRORISM FROM ISLAM

U.S. President Barack Obama has ordered a revision of America’s National Security Strategy with the aim to remove terms that link Islam to terrorism, administration officials said.

The officials said the change would remove terms like “Islamic radicalism” from the National Security Strategy, a document that was created

44 IPRI Factfile

by the previous administration to outline the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war.

The U.S. National Security Strategy outlines major national security concerns and the methods to deal with them. Such documents are prepared periodically by the executive branch of the government for Congress. U.S. media outlets often refer to this document for borrowing terms to use in a report.

The Bush-era document describes the war against terrorists as “the struggle against militant Islamic radicalism … the great ideological conflict of the early years of the 21st century.” The Council on American-Islamic Relations on Thursday welcomed the announcement, saying it was a step in the right direction.

“We welcome this change in language as another step toward respectful and effective outreach to Muslims at home and abroad,” said CAIR National Executive Director Nihad Awad.

He recommended that media professionals and commentators adopt similarly neutral and objective language and avoid “loaded” terminology.

In 2008, the U.S. National Counter-Terrorism Centre produced a document, called “Words that Work and Words that Don’t: A Guide for Counter-Terrorism Communication,” which encouraged government agencies and officials to avoid characterizing Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups as “Islamic” or “Muslim,” as that could “unintentionally legitimise” their tactics.

U.S. Counterterrorism officials said the move to rewrite the security strategy is part of an effort to assure the Muslims that the United States does not link them with terrorism.

Since taking office, President Obama has attempted o seek reconciliation with the Muslim world. During his landmark speech at Cairo University in Egypt in June 2009, Mr Obama said that the U.S. did not have any enmity with the Muslim world.

The document that the Obama administration is consulting for drafting the new strategy — “A Guide for Counter-Terrorism Communication” — urges U.S. officials to “avoid labelling everything ‘Muslim.’ It reinforces the ‘U.S. vs. Islam’ framework that Al Qaeda promotes.” It reminds U.S. officials that “a large percentage of the world’s population subscribes to this religion” and “unintentionally alienating them is not a judicious move.”

Urging officials not to use the word Islam in conjunction with terrorism, the guide notes that, “Although the Al Qaeda network exploits religious sentiments and tries to use religion to justify its actions, we should treat it as an illegitimate political organisation, both terrorist and criminal.”

Instead of calling terror groups Muslim or Islamic, the guide suggests using words like totalitarian, terrorist or violent extremist — “widely understood terms that define our enemies appropriately and simultaneously deny them any level of legitimacy.”


By employing the language the extremists use about themselves, the guide warns, officials can inadvertently help legitimise them in the eyes of Muslims.

“Never use the terms ‘jihadist’ or ‘mujahideen’ … to describe the terrorists,” instructs the guide. “A mujahid, a holy warrior, is a positive characterisation in the context of a just war. In Arabic, jihad means ‘striving in the path of God’ and is used in many contexts beyond warfare. Calling our enemies Jihadis and their movement a global Jihad unintentionally legitimises their actions.”

The guide also bans the use of the word caliphate to describe Al Qaeda’s goal. The term “has positive connotations for Muslims,” says the guide, adding, “The best description of what (Al Qaeda) really want to create is a ‘global totalitarian state.’”

A longer document — “Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims” — says officials should use “terms such as ‘death cult,’ ‘cult-like,’ ‘sectarian cult,’ and ‘violent cultists’ to describe the ideology and methodology of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.” It recommends eschewing the terms Islamist or Islamism — the advocacy of a political system based on Islam – while referring to terrorist groups.

The document urges officials to consider describing Al Qaeda’s ideology as “Takfirism” — the practice of declaring Muslims, who disagree with extremism, apostates who can be killed.

Anwar Iqbal, Dawn (Islamabad), April 9, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/international/obama-moves-to-delink-terrorism-from-islam-940

KOHAT KILLINGS More than 40 people died near Kohat on Saturday when two suicide bombers blew themselves up among a crowd of internally displaced persons queuing up for food rations. Think for a moment about the barbarity of this attack. War-scarred IDPs, many of whom live in makeshift shelters and lead a life of abject deprivation, somehow found themselves on the hit list of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, a banned terrorist organisation which had also claimed responsibility for Friday’s suicide attack on a hospital in Quetta. To maximise casualties, the second bomber waited until a crowd had gathered to help those injured by the first explosion. In Quetta too the suicide bomber struck when the body of a prominent Shia man who was shot dead earlier in the day was brought to a hospital where mourners were present in large numbers. A similar pattern was seen in Karachi in February this year when a bus carrying passengers to a Shia procession was hit first and then another explosion took place in the hospital

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where the wounded were being treated. On Sunday, at least seven civilians were killed in Kohat in another suicide attack which the Tehrik-i-Taliban claimed was aimed at security personnel. Among other things, the recent attacks are further proof of the fact that the Taliban and militants from Punjab share a common cause.

Taking on the army may be seen by some as a fair fight. But the thought of killing refugees, attacking hospitals and exploding bombs in busy bazaars can occur only to those who have lost all touch with humanity. Such tactics also betray the current desperation of the Taliban and their cohorts. They are still a fighting force but the myth of invincibility that once surrounded the militants has dissipated since the armed forces confronted them head-on in May 2009. Since September last year, the Lashkar-i-Islam in Khyber Agency has twice asked the government to strike a peace deal. Hitting soft targets and offers of negotiation are signs of weakness and on no account should the militants be accommodated in any way until they lay down arms.

Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad), April 20, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/editorial/kohat-killings-040

SOFT ON MILITANCY? Monday's suicide bombing in Peshawar’s Qissa Khwani bazaar was an outrageous suicide attack that left some two dozen people dead and many more injured. The victims were mostly Jamaat-i-Islami supporters attending a rally.

It is still not certain whether the target was the JI rally or a police contingent guarding it. Nevertheless, what is clear is the party’s flawed logic, for it failed to utter a single word of condemnation against the bomber, his handlers or even those orchestrating the violence. While the Jamaat leaders reiterated their stance that they considered the U.S. a ‘terrorist state’, they also said that the bombing was the result of government failure, and called upon the provincial government to quit. That was all.

The JI and other rightwing parties, such as the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and the Tehrik-i-Insaf, have every right to oppose the military’s anti-terror operations. In fact, they may be doing so in good faith. But what is bad form and poor politics is their failure to unequivocally condemn the continuing targeting of innocent women, men and children. We are not sure of the JI’s views but its public reaction to every act of carnage makes it sound more and more like an apologist for those perpetrating this senseless violence. Matters have come to this pass in the erstwhile NWFP and the adjoining tribal areas as a consequence of the cowardly Musharraf regime’s duplicitous stance on the militants. The blame must equally fall on the then provincial government of


which JI was a part. It acquiesced in, if not encouraged, the activities of the marauding militants as the latter expanded their influence.

However, we still believe that despite a perceived ideological affinity with the militants, that perhaps forces the JI to keep quiet over terrorist activities of the sort witnessed in Peshawar, the party needs to consider one fact. Notwithstanding its many contradictions and lack of electoral support, the JI still seems to strive for its aims within the ambit of the law and the democratic process i.e. through the ballot box. Therefore, it should not allow itself to be viewed as allied with those who push their agenda by indiscriminately killing innocent Pakistanis.

Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad) April 23, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/editorial/19-soft-on-militancy-240-hh-02

GET THE MILITANT LEADERSHIP In wars, the death of a leader means half the war is won. But, interestingly enough, in the anti-terror war in this region, the leadership is intact despite the use of all air, ground and intelligence resources against them

A latest and somewhat stunning report carried by the British media says the dreaded Waziristan-based Taliban leader Hakeemullah Mehsud is alive. The information is provided by the customary ‘unnamed sources’ in the ‘intelligence apparatus’ of Pakistan. It was the same ‘unnamed intelligence sources’ quoted by all and sundry nearly more than three moths ago confirming the death of Hakeemullah Mehsud in a predator strike carried out by an unmanned U.S. spy plane in mid-January. Before the surfacing of reports about Hakeemullah’s death, questions were raised from time to time, both by the public and in the media, about the whereabouts of another militant leader Fazlullah, the name behind the worst-ever violence and unrest unleashed in Swat over the past more than two years.

The report about Hakeemullah being alive appeared at a time when the government and the security forces are pushing the displaced people from Waziristan, presently living in camps or with relatives and friends in Bannu, DI Khan, Tank or other cities, to return to their areas and help the security forces in the restoration of peace. How can the cowed and crestfallen people of Waziristan, who had tasted the bitter fruits of militancy on their land over the past few years, opt to return to their areas when the top man responsible for their miseries is still alive and may appear at any moment to browbeat the innocent tribesmen all over again?

In wars, the death of a leader means half the war is won. But, interestingly enough, in the anti-terror war in this region, the leadership is

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intact despite the use of all air, ground and intelligence resources against the militant and terrorist outfits since late 2001.

Al Qaeda top leader Osama bin Ladin, believed to be the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and the main force behind the organisation’s operatives, is yet to be declared dead. His second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is still alive and kicking. Leader of the Afghan Taliban and the one-time Amirul Momineen Mullah Muhammad Omar is still alive and issues directions to his fighters and supporters from undisclosed locations. Besides, he is also in touch with his shura members and taking key decisions while some fresh reports suggested that his Taliban had established shadow governments in several Afghan districts and provinces in the backdrop of the U.S. plan to start withdrawal of troops from the country next year.

Coming to the Taliban on the Pakistan side, one can easily assume that Fazlullah of Swat is alive and warning the locals of his return to the valley. Almost all Fazlullah’s key aides are also unscathed with at least four of them in government custody now. Leader of the Taliban in Bajaur, one time deputy leader of TTP, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, is still alive, while the Taliban leader in Mohmand Abdul Wali alias Omar Khalid is also there. In the same token, leaders like Mangal Bagh in Bara and Tariq Afridi in Darra Adam Khel are also alive and kicking.

It is for this reason that the Taliban are gaining strength with each passing month despite the military operations while only common citizens are becoming the fuel of this anti-terror war being waged in the tribal areas and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. To avert the Taliban attacks, the security measures in place in cities, particularly in Islamabad and Peshawar, appear as if the government had gone on the defensive and the Taliban are on the offensive, while in fact, the case should be the opposite.

This can be judged from the recent visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to Peshawar, who inaugurated the construction of 21 schools destroyed by the Taliban in Swat with the help of models of the schools at the fortified Governor’s House. Still, the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are thankful to Zardari for his visit as other leaders, like Nawaz Sharif of PML-N and Shujaat Hussain of PML-Q, never ventured to step in there to show sympathy with the people being devastated by terrorist attacks.

Besides, the governor and chief minister of NWFP are restricted to their official residences while the leadership of the ruling Awami National Party (ANP) has now shifted its centre to Islamabad from Peshawar, fearing terrorist attacks. However, the ANP has a reason for that: its president Asfandyar Wali Khan escaped a suicide attack at his house on October 2, 2009; its provincial president Afrasiab Khattak also escaped a similar attack during a political meeting (February 2008); senior minister Bashir Bilour has so far survived four attempts on his life; ANP’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly member Alamzeb Khan was killed in a bomb attack in Peshawar on February 11, 2009; another


ANP MPA Shamsher Ali Khan was killed in a suicide attack at his house in Swat on December 1, 2009; brother of NWFP Minister for Forests Wajid Ali Khan was shot dead in Mingora the same year while a brother and two nephews of another ANP MPA Waqar Khan were brutally murdered inside their house in Swat before the launch of the final stage of the operation there.

All these incidents, along with many others, happened despite claims of ‘successful action’ against the militants and the victories against them. Judging from the past few years, it seems the situation would remain unchanged unless the top militant leadership is dismantled and effectively removed from the scene.

Daud Khattak, Daily Times (Lahore), May 4, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\05\04\story_4-5-2010_pg3_6

THE RISING MILITANCY

Inspite of operations of all sorts and many initiatives the fact remains that militancy is on the rise and militants are roaming and acting freely all around. The latest incident of kidnapping of 64 persons in Hangu must be an eye opener for those who are claiming that the militants are on the run.

Militants intercepted ten vehicles on Saturday on the boundary of Kurram Agency and Hangu district including two trailers of Tribal Electricity Supply Company heading for Peshawar and took into custody WAPDA officials. One of the trailers of the power company was also set on fire. According to reports, a large number of militants have fled to Kurram and neighbouring regions after the military launched a major operation in South Waziristan in October last year. They are now indulging in acts of kidnapping for ransom and if their demands are not accepted, they kill the hostages. This is a very serious situation as hitherto relatively peaceful areas are becoming the hideouts of the armed criminals and if the situation was not checked, it would deteriorate and go out of control. There is large scale deployment of army, para military forces and police in all the agencies and adjoining settled districts of the NWFP. Despite that level of security if the militants are indulging in kidnappings and killings at will, it is something very alarming which must be looked into. We are of the firm opinion that there is dire need to check the rising militancy in tribal agencies and adjoining districts otherwise the country would be witnessing the repeat of situation in Swat, Malakand and Buner.

Editorial, Pakistan observer (Islamabad), May 17, 2010, http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=31397

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MILITANCY: REALISM NEEDED Military operations are not the solution. This is a multi-pronged issue, which needs a wholesome response. The issue is religious as well as political, strategic, economic and social. Therefore we need to find out a multi-pronged political and reconciliatory process.

The method of suicide bombings, an effective weapon for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban, was transferred to them by Al Qaeda. Previously, the Afghan Taliban considered videos and pictures impermissible, but now they consider it a very important medium to relay their messages. Similarly, the Internet is nowadays also a very effective weapon for the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. This was also introduced by Al Qaeda. As such, Al Qaeda is on the driving seat. Therefore, by ignoring Al Qaeda we can neither think of reconciliation with militants nor solve the issue of militancy.

Tactics and preferences may differ even among members of a single party. To see this fact, we should observe the tactics of Aitzaz Ahsan and Babar Awan of the PPP. The same difference is also evident in the tactics and preferences of Mullah Omar, Hakeemullah Mehsud and Osama bin Laden. Local environments definitely affect the behaviour of all national, political and religious parties. Our political and religious parties support the issue of Kalabagh Dam in Punjab, but lobby against it in Sindh.

And the same differences can also be seen in the activities of Al Qaeda, the TTP and the Afghan Taliban. But not only ideology, the shared concept of jihad and Shariah, they also fight against common enemies. The difference is: Al Qaeda has been interested in taking on the U.S. and its international allies, the Afghan Taliban have restricted their activities to Afghanistan while the majority of TTP members have a declared policy of "Pakistan first." Al Qaeda needs the help of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan and the TTP in Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban and their Pakistani counterparts also needed Al Qaeda.

Persistent instability and disturbance have turned this region into a centre for proxy wars among international and regional powers. State writ is non-existent on both sides of the Durand Line, where proxy wars among secret services are in full swing. It is difficult to tell friend from foe. In this situation, apart from Pakistani agencies, RAW, the CIA, Mossad, and the Iranian and Russian agencies are active in the area. Certainly, some of the militants would be fighting, knowingly or unknowingly, for the objectives of these agencies, but a clear majority of these people consisted of individuals who, under their ideology, are committed to fighting for this chosen cause as they consider it the only way to deliverance.

Inside Al Qaeda and the TTP, extremist elements have now taken over the reins. They consider fighting the U.S., along with its Muslim allies, as an act of faith. They demand that if fighting Soviet allies Babrak Karmal, Dr


Najeebullah and their Muslim Afghan supporters was a jihad, then how come the current fight against U.S. ally Hamid Karzai, and other Muslim leaders, is not holy war? Now the new thinking of first taking on Arab countries and Pakistan before attacking the U.S. is also taking root. Along with this approach, the element of revenge is also becoming visible.

They think the Pakistani state has betrayed them. Previously, they only targeted government employees and army personnel, but now they think that everyone who opposes them is permitted to be killed. And under this very approach, new literature in different languages is being prepared and distributed.

Just like the Afghan Taliban, some of the Pakistani Taliban are intent not on fighting with Pakistan, but the majority of them now accede to the Al Qaeda approach. Apart from the Mehsud group, all jihadi and sectarian militants (the Punjabi Taliban) who had flocked to the tribal areas and are now returning to their hometowns have been infected with the Al Qaeda approach. As compared to the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda has a greater impact on these individuals.

In the beginning, it was claimed that there were no foreigners in the tribal areas. But proved wrong on this count, we took to find new pretences. It was propagated that Baitullah Mehsud was a U.S. agent, but when targeted in U.S. drone attacks we left the field. Now confusion is being created against the TTP and Hakeemullah Mehsud and their threats are called brags. Their capabilities are questioned. But after humiliating Americans by targeting the CIA station in Khost through an Arab suicide bomber, can we afford any underestimation of their capabilities? The suicide bomber's video film with Hakeemuallah Mehsud before setting off on the Khost mission is a clear evidence of close relations between the TTP and Al Qaeda.

In fact, the TTP's strength is the strength of Al Qaeda, and vice versa. The same is also true for Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Therefore, whatever is decided for one of these partners should also be extended to the other one. If power is used against Al Qaeda, we cannot hope for reconciliation with the TTP or the Afghan Taliban. Good wishes for the Afghan Taliban's victory will leave us unable to dismantle the TTP in Pakistan. The policy of reconciliation in one area and a military operation in another, fighting against one group and reconciliation with another is destined to destroy us.

By changing the contours and basic approaches of internal and external policies, we should find an inclusive political solution. Otherwise, we should be ready for dire consequences.

Saleem Safi, News International (Rawalpindi), May 18, 2010, http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=239855

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TERROR IN LAHORE

Yet another attack in Lahore has killed scores of people and left over 100 injured. Poor security has plagued the city for a couple of years now. The same grim questions arise. Why were the attackers able to enter the premises so easily, especially at sites known to be targets? The Ahmadi community was commemorating the death anniversary of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad earlier this week, so surely more security was warranted for houses of prayer. More generally, reports from Lahore suggest that banners denouncing religions other than Islam had appeared in parts of the city recently. This should have in any case put the authorities on a heightened state of alert.

What have the Punjab police done to improve their operation procedures to respond to an attack? Yesterday, angry scenes at the assault sites were reminiscent of previous attacks in Lahore — ordinary, helpless people unable to understand why they the victims were left at the mercy of militants. If television crews can reach the scene of an attack before police reinforcements, what does that say about the administration’s state of preparedness?

There have been wholesale changes, summary dismissals and major reshuffles in most other departments of the Punjab government. But the police seem immune, despite their poor track record. Simply dismissing or suspending officers is obviously not enough, and in any case due process needs to be followed. The real question is: why this lax attitude towards the one department, the police, that is responsible for protecting the lives and property of the citizens of Lahore?

Finally, why is it that nothing ever seems to come of the arrests made, of the gunmen themselves but also their accomplices? Convictions secured in anti-terrorism courts are often overturned on appeal by the superior judiciary. Sometimes it’s the evidence that isn’t collected with care, other times statements are recorded improperly. Surely, the Punjab government — though this isn’t a problem confined to just this province — needs to at least provide some justice and closure to the victims and their families. Anyway you look at it, it’s a wretched picture, past, present and future.

Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad), May 29, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/editorial/21-terror-in-lahore-950-sk-08

TERRORISM & THE ECONOMY The latest incident of attempted terrorism in the United States which has links with Pakistan has administered another blow to our economy. The reference


here of course is to the attempt by Faisal Shahzad, a 30-year-old American citizen of Pakistani origin, who attempted to detonate a bomb in Manhattan’s Times Square.

The bomb did not go off, which is a great relief not only for the United States but also Pakistan. Had it taken its intended toll, the repercussions for Pakistan would have been grim. It would have set back the prospects for an economic recovery by years. Newspapers quoted a senior official of the Clinton administration saying the “the Times Square attempt has reminded Americans that most of the threats to the U.S. homeland come from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.” Fareed Zakaria in a cover story for Newsweek described Pakistan as a terrorist supermarket.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told 60 Minutes, a widely watched TV news programme, that there will be “grim consequences” if damage was done by an attack that had links with Pakistan. There was pressure on President Barack Obama to act before it was too late. There could be a reduction in the quantum of aid flows to the county if a terrorist attack is seen to be connected to Pakistan.

As if to underscore the Pakistani involvement in international terrorism, an Indian court sentenced to death 22-year-old Mohammad Ajmal Kasab, the lone survivor of the deadly assault on Mumbai on Nov 27, 2008. The assault was launched by a group trained by a terrorist organisation in Pakistan. Kasab was earlier found guilty on most of the 86 charges brought against him, including murder and waging war against India. The terrorist had given a statement to the authorities saying he was trained by members of the Lashkar-i-Taiba, a Pakistani group designated as a terrorist organisation by both the United States and the United Nations.

The third reminder of terrorism’s links with Pakistan came when another U.S. resident of Pakistani origin, David Coleman Headley, was taken into custody in Chicago for planning the Mumbai attack, prompting India, according to one analyst, “to repeat that extremists living in the territory of its neighbour are exporting militancy”. This is the link that Ahmed Rashid makes in a recent article contributed to the pages of The Washington Post where he says that North Waziristan, one of the seven tribal agencies located in the area that borders Afghanistan, has become “the hub of so many terrorist groups and so much terrorist plotting and planning that neither the CIA nor the ISI seems to have much clue as to what is going on there…. But Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy, which has been extensively praised by American generals, is now coming apart at the seams — all because of North Waziristan.”

What is the connection between the perception that Pakistan has become the centre of international terrorism and the country’s economic recovery? The most important link is via Pakistan’s dependence on external capital flows for its economic survival. Of the many types of flows Pakistan

54 IPRI Factfile

depends on, at least three would be seriously affected by the growing apprehension that most acts of terrorism — those that have been carried out and those that have been attempted but were thwarted — originate in Pakistan. The suggested links to Pakistan will not help with foreign private flows and continued assistance by the U.S. government. Even remittances sent by Pakistanis living and working in the U.S. could be affected as those sending money become extremely cautious about the possibility of being questioned by the authorities in America. What should Islamabad do to address this issue and to give the signal that it takes very seriously the use of its territory for the launch of any form of terrorist activity on foreign soil? The first thing that needs to be done is to develop a comprehensive strategy aimed at addressing the problem posed by the county’s real and perceived links with acts of terrorism. Statements by senior policymakers — and there have been many of those in recent months — indicating Pakistan’s resolve to deal with the threat of terrorism don’t constitute a strategy. A strategy has to include a number of elements: a precise definition of what constitutes a terrorist attack and what are the punishments meted out if these acts are committed; how the legal and judicial system will work to ensure that those who violate the law of the land will be expeditiously dealt with; and educating the youth about their responsibility towards the state and the citizenry.

Such a strategy should be developed by a group that has a multidisciplinary background: a group that can view the phenomenon of terrorism from many different angles — economic, political, social, religious. It should have the full backing of the political classes who should be called upon to endorse the strategy, once formulated, fully and without reservations. While it is true that Pakistan has anti-terrorism laws on the books and courts to enforce them, they have done little to implement them. Terrorism has not been brought under control.

The other important move by the state is to make it clear that breaking the law of the land will not be tolerated, no matter who commits the crime. Organisations must not be allowed to operate training camps for militant activities, to collect funds for their operations, to run schools that don’t have proper accreditation and to use mosques to propagate outlandish beliefs.

Politicians normally take the path of least resistance and some of these measures may be hard to adopt and implement. But the alternative is the country’s destabilisation and further marginalisation in the global community. Pakistan is very isolated these days; further isolation would do it enormous damage.

Shahid Javed Burki, Dawn (Islamabad), June 1, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/editorial/terrorism-the-economy-160


SEARCH FOR SOUL Perhaps the only faintest ray of hope one can find in the aftermath of the Data Darbar tragedy is the near-universal condemnation of the attack. Major political parties and civil society groups have always been in the forefront when it comes to remonstration against suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism. But the silence in all this of many religio-political parties has often been deafening, so much so that it has led to speculation that they might tacitly approve of such tactics.

This time round, however, it seems that the affront was much too monstrous to stomach for even those who might share certain ideological links with the insurgents whose mission it is to destabilise Pakistan. The Data Darbar massacre has been condemned by people who do not approve of drone attacks or Pakistan’s partnership with the U.S. in the fight against Taliban-inspired militancy. This is significant in a country as conservative as Pakistan, a land where the opinion of the religious right can mentor public thought. When a leading religious figure says that suicide bombings are unacceptable in Islam — without any qualifiers — we might be taking a step in the right direction. Mindsets have to change here and our religious scholars should go even further to stress that no person or community is ‘worthy of death’ simply because their beliefs differ from those who cannot tolerate divergence of opinion.

This may be the time for our religio-political parties to ponder a key point, a defining moment as it were. The insurgents operating under the umbrella of the Taliban — it doesn’t matter if they are Punjabis or from the northwest frontier — are looking to dismantle a belief system. Their target is not just people of liberal bent or the vast majority that abides by the motto of live and let live. Ultimately they wish to unravel the fabric of society and disempower all those who stand by democratic values. And that group includes the religious parties who contest elections and attempt to contribute to social welfare. The battle lines have been drawn and should be unmistakable to anyone with foresight and a grasp of the reality on the ground.

Equally important is the acknowledgment that the enemy lies within. Pointing to ‘hidden hands’ or foreign forces bent on creating havoc in Pakistan may be convenient for officialdom but does not address root causes. Let there be no doubt: the problem is homegrown. Also, let’s move beyond the myth that ‘terrorists have no religion’. If anything, in our context suicide bombers have been brainwashed into believing that they are more devout than the peaceful majority.

Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad), July 4, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/editorial/19-search-for-soul-470-hh-06

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PROVINCES BACK EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERROR Expressing concern over the fresh wave of terrorism in Punjab, a high-level meeting presided over by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and attended by chief ministers of three provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan supported the call for a national conference of all political parties to discuss ways of combating militancy in the country.

The meeting had a one-point agenda -- the law and order situation in the aftermath of Thursday’s attacks on Data Darbar.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Information Minister Iftikhar Hussain attended the meeting in place of the chief minister.

The prime minister accepted a proposal made by PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif on Saturday to convene the conference to hammer out an improved strategy to combat terrorism.

However, no tentative date for the conference was given by Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira who, along with Interior Minister Rehman Malik, briefed newsmen at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat -- the venue of the meeting.

The meeting unanimously decided to stop forthwith activities of leaders of the banned organisations which are accused of having links with terrorist groups operating in Fata.

In reply to a question, the interior minister said he could not give a definite answer as to who was involved in the Data Darbar massacre till the completion of inquiry, but added that every act of terror in Punjab did have a link with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.

Because of a late start by one hour, an expected one-to-one meeting between the prime minister and Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif could not take place as the former had to attend an independence day function at the U.S. embassy.

Mufti Munib-ur-Rahman, chief of Tanzimul Madaris, was specially invited to the meeting. He criticised both the federal and provincial governments for failing to put their act together in dealing with the banned outfits which, according to him, were playing havoc with people’s lives.

According to insiders, Mufti Munib held the interior ministry and the Punjab government responsible for incidents of terrorism. He came down hard on the Punjab law minister for ‘inaction’ against the proscribed organisations.

The meeting, also attended by the AJK prime minister, heads of intelligence and security agencies, provincial chief secretaries and IGs, also decided to introduce a fresh anti-terror law in the coming session of parliament to strengthen the judiciary in dealing with cases of terrorism.


The meeting asked the interior ministry to set up a special cell at the National Anti-Terrorism Authority. It will work as a think-tank and assist the government in pre-empting incidents of terrorism.

The participants agreed to accelerate work on Madressah reforms. The interior minister said that all religious seminaries had signed a

document as a basis for the proposed reforms, which would be launched soon. Mr Malik denied that there was any acrimony between him and the

Punjab chief minister, saying he would meet him in a couple of days to discuss ways and means to pre-empt terror attacks.

The meeting also discussed a recent proposal made by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security for a change in national strategy for combating terrorism and decided to look into its recommendations.

“No military operation is being launched anywhere, including southern Punjab, and whatever action is needed it will be decided by the government of Punjab,” Mr Malik said in reply to a question.

In his opening remarks, the prime minister said that all major political parties, whether in parliament or outside, would be invited to the national conference to work out an improved strategy against terrorists.

He appealed to the nation to unite against forces killing innocent citizens, destroying schools and hospitals and desecrating mosques and shrines.

Mr Gilani directed all security and intelligence agencies to redouble their efforts and share information with each other to defeat terrorists.

Ahmad Hassan, Dawn (Islamabad), July 6, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/front-page/provinces-back-efforts-to-combat-terror-670

A GOOD ANTI-TERRORISM MOVE After the rout of the Taliban by U.S.-led coalition forces, elements of Al-Qaeda found a safe haven in the no-go Fata territory (with the restrictions imposed by the government), and began to operate at will on both sides of the Durand Line. With plenty of cash from the foreigners, with religious sentiments against the occupation of Afghanistan and with the local heritage of spurning laws that are not essentially tribal in nature, Wana became an ideal recruiting ground from among the youth of the area. Poverty-stricken southern Punjab provided an additional source of recruits for the existing cells of disparate religious militants throughout the country.

When Pakistani forces entered Fata in 2004 without proper planning, adequate quantum of men and material, and without training for counter insurgency (COIN) operations, Al-Qaeda—which till then had focused most of its violence on Afghanistan and places elsewhere in the world—had the infrastructure in place to target the Pakistani heartland with a vengeance.

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Notwithstanding the successful COIN operations by the Pakistani army (and the PAF) for the past year, the terrorists continue to have a remarkable capacity for mayhem and murder within Pakistan, and the capability to strike at a place and time of their own choosing.

Well-coordinated terrorist attacks targeting Lahore include “suicide bombings,” like the recent atrocity on the Data Ganj Baksh Darbar seems to have woken up our public representatives from their apathy towards a major problem. Rhetoric alone and chest-beating, and that too without conviction, is pointless, since it won’t save previous human lives. Even more pathetic is the use of the bogey of terrorism for political point-scoring, not only macabre and demeaning but condemnable. Why should anyone use the innocent people killed and injured for political gamesmanship? Whoever incites hatred and ethnic/sectarian violence must be indicted and prosecuted.

Terrorists have no faith and/or ethnicity. They cannot be branded as Punjabi, Pathan, Shia, Sunni, etc. Another hard fact has to be drummed into our ruling elite. To quote my article of Feb 18, 2010, “countering insurgency is far different from countering terrorism. We do not have the capacity or the capability within the civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to counter terrorism.” Use of the army is counterproductive: alienating the population they will lose the goodwill gained through great sacrifice.

The excellent initiative of the government of establishing the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NCTA) lay mostly dormant till the recent Lahore incident. To its credit the government has now “activated” NCTA to cope with the danger. Dedicated and concentrated effort by a well equipped, well-trained and well-led force will be required to destroy the terrorists’ potential to spread harm and grief. This entity should be under the direct control of the NCTA. Using their available capabilities in personnel and training matched with technology, the U.S. (Special Operations Command), the UK (SAS) France (CIGN), etc., have trained and equipped units specialising in handling immediate threats. A Counter-Terrorism Force (CTF) in Pakistan, officered both by the army and the police, must be developed on the pattern of the tremendously successful Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) that has almost eliminated poppy cultivation and drug smuggling. The ANF’s existing structure could be used as the nucleus for the CTF.

The U.S. can help with funds, material and training. My article, “A Pakistan Surge,” of March 25, 2010, noted: “The U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) has an office called SOLIC (Special Operation and Low Intensity Conflict) created in the 1980s. Within SOLIC there is an office called CN (Counter Narcotics), whose funding is authorised directly by Congress. After 9/11, Congress expanded DoD authority to use CN funds for counter-terrorism purposes, justified by the interplay between terrorist and insurgent groups and their fundraising from narcotics trafficking.”


Counterterrorism being the top priority of the nation and a full-time task, the NCTA (and the CTF) should be under a separate federal ministry working in close cooperation with both the ministries of defence and interior. Tariq Pervez, credited with turning the FIA around who has been re-employed as chairman of the NCTA, can possibly craft policy and make assessments if he is not inhibited by lack of cooperation and funds. Till now he was powerless to implement a coordinated strategy. While the proposed NCTA “think tank” is an excellent idea, various agencies presently conduct their own assessments and plan their operations without effectiveness. This uncoordinated “bits and pieces” effort affects security service delivery across a broad spectrum of likely targets: e.g., the diplomatic corps, multinational companies, expatriates and the public in general.

Notwithstanding the fact that law and order is a provincial subject, terrorism is a federal problem. The NCTA must identify the most dangerous threats and likely targets thereof. Among the required capabilities are to: (1) detect people organised in terrorist activity, while simultaneously monitoring their movements; (2) detect the sources of supply of explosive materials: the terrorists have to procure it from somewhere; (3) mobilise the defence capability to recognise and counter specific threats; (4) mobilise adequate and coordinated intelligence capability, utilising both human and electronic intelligence; (5) focus on air, sea, rail and road travel as potential terror targets; and (6) use both electronic and physical means to guard the country’s frontiers, involving monitoring and observation of thousands of miles of our borders.

The NCTA’s risk assessment process should analyse and define: (1) Related risks; (2) risk-related incidents; (3) risk impact; and (4) likelihood of incidents. Next, it should examine the current ability of the security authorities/stakeholders to include: (1) the organisational structures responsible to coordinate and deal with security and security-related incidents; (2) the emergency and other plans and procedures; (3) training standards; and (4) other security measures used by the authorities.

The future state of security alertness must be defined next. Most importantly, the detailed recommendation must include: (1) the specific stakeholder/security authority; (2) rating of current status/quality/ability; (3) recommendations must not be limited to organisational restructuring, manpower needs and training, electronic solutions and the need for specialised equipment; and (4) priorities must be spelt out. With many of our urban areas vulnerable, one city can be selected as a model for a realistic exercise. External sources and expertise must be tapped without further delay.

Those connected directly to the perpetrators and those who indirectly give sustenance must be targeted, including funds ostensibly meant for charity. Besides draining the country of its precious foreign exchange reserves, terrorist funding comes through foreign exchange dealers and “havalas.”. All foreign

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exchange must be processed through scheduled banks to stop the flow. The civilised world still has illusions that it is possible to enforce the rule of law in a totally lawless environment.

No country has a law against cannibals eating citizens because such an act would be unthinkable, but it is time to bring the unthinkable into the statute books. Does International law address killers shooting into hospitals, mosques and society? The punishment for so-called “suicide bombings” and/or abetting such an atrocity should be death. Those who incite ethnic and/or sectarian violence should also receive the death penalty. After years of vacillation our ulema belatedly seem united against this cancerous menace.

Public opinion is mobilised against the threat of terrorism. Rhetoric must now be translated into action.

Ikram Sehgal, News International (Rawalpindi), July 8, 2010, http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=249438

TERRORISM AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES

In the past, most suicide bombers or violent attackers used to come from the tribal areas and the local militant groups acted as their facilitators. Now, local groups have developed skills to undertake such actions on their own

The terrorist attack on the Data Darbar shrine in Lahore on July 1 underlined the growing threat of terrorism in urban centres and exposed the confused state of mind of the political class on terrorism and deficiencies in the capacity of the civilian administration to cope with it.

Two basic problems have made it extremely difficult for official civilian circles, security authorities and the political class to articulate a coherent and effective response to religious extremism and terrorism. Many members of the political class and ordinary Pakistanis are not prepared to admit that religious extremism and militancy are indigenous problems. This does not fit into their idealised notion of religion and a highly polarised worldview tainted by religious orthodoxy that interprets every domestic and foreign development as part of a grand global design to undermine Islam and Muslims.

The Punjab government and the PML-N live in a state of denial. They are not prepared to accept that Punjab has become a sanctuary for Islamic extremist groups and others that want to destabilise the state and society. The Punjab government does not want to acknowledge what most political analysts and the media people know,: that the leaders of banned religious groups freely function in Punjab, organising their loyalists and enjoying open access to the media. Some of them even have access to official circles.

The denial issue is linked to another problem. There is a lot of confusion on what constitutes terrorism and what are its sources. All religious groups, irrespective of their denominational identity and political parties,


condemn terrorist incidents, including suicide bombings. However, most of them are not prepared to condemn a specific group for such activities and they offer excuses and explanations to dilute the charge of terrorism against militant Islamic groups. Some reluctance to condemn them can be attributed to religious-denominational commonalities of some people with hardline Islamic groups. Almost all militant groups using violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, often described as the jihadis, subscribe to Deobandi, Wahabi-Salafi and Ahle-Hadees Islamic traditions. The strict followers of these Islamic traditions often condone their activities or avoid public criticism.

The most common explanations of various terrorist attacks in Lahore over the last six months offer an interesting overview of the failure to accept the reality that the current spate of terrorism is primarily domestic. In the past, most suicide bombers or violent attackers used to come from the tribal areas and the local militant groups acted as their facilitators. Now, local groups have developed skills to undertake such actions on their own.

The well-known explanation of terrorism in Punjab can be summed up as follows:

• A Muslim cannot engage in terrorism targeting ordinary people, places of worship and shrines. One implication of this statement is that such acts must have been conducted by non-Muslims.

• The paid agents of Pakistan’s foreign adversaries, rather than militant Islamic organisations, engage in such activities to destabilise Pakistan.

• Various U.S. agencies working in Pakistan and Afghanistan resort to terrorism or buy off people for terrorism to destabilise Pakistan and thus create a justification for the U.S. and other western countries to take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

• Suicide attacks or bombings are a reaction to Pakistan’s involvement in U.S.-led efforts to eliminate trans-national terrorism, which does not serve Pakistan’s interests.

• These incidents are a reaction to Pakistan’s military action in the tribal areas and U.S. drone attacks.

• If U.S. troops withdraw from Afghanistan and there is no U.S. military activity in Pakistan, terrorism will stop. The Taliban and other militants are not anti-Pakistan; they are fighting against foreign presence in the region.

• PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif condemns terrorism and the loss of life but avoids criticising any particular militant group for terrorism. He attributed the latest attack in Lahore to the policies of General Pervez Musharraf as well as to the foreign

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policy of the current PPP government. He did not elaborate if he was talking about Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S., dating back to the Musharraf days and Pakistan’s active role in the ongoing global effort to control terrorism.

All political analysts agree that Punjab has become the new centre for militant groups. Some of these groups are quite old and well known. There are now new groups that are said to have broken off from existing militant and sectarian groups. Most militant and sectarian groups that were banned are now functioning freely under new names.

The policy of denial faced a challenge from the conglomerate of Barelvi Islamic groups who threatened to launch street agitation if the government did not take action against the group that attacked the Lahore shrine. Various Shia groups support their demands.

The Barelvi groups became active against the militants subscribing to Deobandi and Wahabi Islamic traditions after the assassination of Maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi in June 2009 in Lahore. Later, they found themselves under pressure from various Deobandi groups in Karachi. For the first time this year, the public processions taken out by various organisations to celebrate the birth anniversary of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) were attacked by diehard young Deobandi groups in at least two cities.

This Barelvi activism may impel the Punjab government to take action against hardline and sectarian Islamic groups. However, Barelvi activism is not necessarily a positive development. After all, Barelvi groups also represent religious orthodoxy and they question Pakistan’s current foreign and security policies. They share most of the perspective on terrorism outlined above and want to establish an Islamic order as articulated by them. Until the Barelvi religious interests were not directly hit, they were not publicly critical of Islamic militancy, although they did not participate in it.

If religious extremism and terrorism are to be eliminated, Pakistan’s official and societal circles will have to discard the Islamic orthodoxy discourse on issues and problems. They will have to rise above religious-sectarian or narrow partisan political considerations and articulate the meanings of terrorism in the context of the Pakistani state and its constitution and law.

Terrorism should be articulated as any action, planned or executed, that involves the use or threat of violence in a planned and systematic manner to intimidate the people, killing, kidnapping or injuring them or damaging property. Such acts cannot be condoned or explained away on the basis of any religious or political doctrine or regional and international political development.

Dr Hasan-Askari, Daily Times (Lahore), July 11, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\11\story_11-7-

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QUELLING TERRORISM The Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2010 was tabled in the Senate by Interior Minister Rehman Malik to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The proposed bill aims at tightening the noose around terrorists in view of the terror wave that has gripped the country in recent years. The Ordinance had lapsed last month due to the government’s negligence. Fortunately, our leaders have realised the urgency of the issue and have tabled the bill instead. The amended bill, if passed, will empower the government to detain suspects charged with terrorism to be kept in preventive detention for 90 days and this detention will not be challengeable in any court; anyone possessing an explosive substance could be arrested; illegal FM stations being used for hatemongering would be seized; members of banned terrorist outfits would not be allowed to carry on their activities under some other banner, and not be able to obtain passports or travel abroad; arms licences that had been issued to terror groups would be cancelled; bail would be denied to terror suspects, among other things.

All these are good steps but there are certain lacunae in the proposed bill, which should be looked at by the standing committee that will scrutinise the draft. Under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, Section 3 (MPO-3), a person can be detained for 90 days and the period can be extended at least twice if he/she is suspected of acting in a manner that poses a threat to public safety. How is the new clause of detaining someone for 90 days in the proposed bill different from MPO-3? Do we need two co-existing laws for preventive detention? Another thing that this bill proposes is that the suspect would be produced before an anti-terrorist court in-camera within 24 hours (instead of a magistrate under normal procedures). Also, a confessional statement before a district police officer (DPO) will be admissible as evidence. Can a ‘confessional’ statement be relied upon when we know of the torture culture that prevails in our police set up? The terrorists are most certainly a species apart and not worthy of any mercy, but some innocents can also be roped in on terror charges and left to the tender mercies of our police. Adequate legal safeguards must be provided so that there is no danger of mistreatment of innocents (or even the guilty for that matter). To ensure this, it is necessary that the arrested person should have immediate and continuing access to a defence lawyer. …

Editorial, Daily Times (Lahore), July 29, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\29\story_29-7-

2010_pg3_1

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TERRORIST ATTACKS On this Monday also, the merchants of death were busy as usual. They bombed a mosque-cum-seminary in South Waziristan killing 36 and injuring many more, triggered a landmine killing seven participants of a meeting of tribal elders in Kurram Agency and exploded an improvised explosive device (IED) near Darra Adamkhel taking the life of three members of an anti-Taliban force.

Given the generally inadequate medical facilities available in these places the death toll is likely to rise. That the killing spree should go on uninterrupted even during the holy month of Ramazan, that the perpetrators' hearts should be shorn of any compassion for human life at the time of colossal national tragedy brought about by unprecedented flooding in the country, one fails to comprehend the nature of militancy in Pakistan. Who is killing whom and why the question becomes all the more difficult to answer if you factor in three missile attacks launched by the CIA, almost at the same time, which killed 16, including many women and children.

Among the victims of mosque-cum-seminary in Wana, the principal town of South Waziristan, was Maulana Noor Muhammad, a former member of parliament and a ranking leader of Wazir tribe. But he was better known for his mediatory skills and had had successfully brokered a number of standstill and peace accords between the government and the Taliban. But it was his dislike for the Uzbek inhabitants of the area, whom he wanted to leave the Fata region that had earned him hostility of rival Mehsud leadership. Who sent to him the teenaged suicide-bomber no one has claimed responsibility as yet.

Certainly, the one behind this murderous attack has no respect for the mosque, nor his spirit seems to have mellowed by the sanctity of Ramazan. The responsibility for the explosion in Kurram Agency also remains unclaimed, probably because it was consequent to a dispute over the ownership of a school. However, the Darra Adamkhel bombing has been owned by the Taliban who claimed that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has avenged the killing of two students of a seminary by the victims.

All four attacks tend to tell four different stories with not much common between them excepting the hard reality that the tribal area of Pakistan has become one vast jungle where there is no law except the law of jungle. While the tribals fight for turf, sectarian leaders are out to eliminate rivals, Taliban are at war with the security forces and the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition is busy carrying out person-specific assassinations with missiles fired from unmanned drones.

The tribal region of Pakistan is much more than the so-called safe haven for the Taliban and al Qaeda. Naturally, it has to be targeted not by bullet alone. Before it explodes into something more disastrous it is imperative that


government revisits its policy towards Fata, essentially to consider bringing it into the national mainstream. What to do now, any exercise to this effect has to be different from what has been done so far. A fresh approach is required, cashing in on the inherent sociological strength of the tribal people.

Editorial, Business Recorder (Islamabad), August 25, 2010, http://www.brecorder.com/index.php?id=1095715&currPageNo=1&query=&search

=&term=&supDate=

QUETTA ATTACK It is near impossible to comprehend the level of hatred that rules the minds of people who are terrorising Pakistan today.

They will kill Shias, be they children, women or men, simply because they hate minorities and consider them worthy of death. Ahmadis too are being attacked with increasing frequency by extremists who claim to hold the moral high ground but are seen as terrorists by all right-thinking people. Take Friday’s carnage in Quetta where nearly 60 were killed by a suicide bomber. A procession was taken out to condemn Israeli atrocities and mark Al Quds day, a cause that ought to be common to Muslims of all schools of thought. But it was still fair game for sectarian terrorists because the Shia community has, in the Iranian tradition, always been in the forefront of commemorating this particular occasion. Two days earlier, the streets of Lahore were awash with blood when suicide bombers attacked a Youm-i-Ali congregation. Responsibility in both cases was claimed by groups that like to portray themselves as champions of Islam but have no qualms about massacring practising Muslims in Lahore, Quetta, Karachi and elsewhere. …

Editorial, Dawn (Islamabad) September 5, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-

newspaper/editorial/quetta-attack-590

LAKKI MARWAT BLAST The deadly suicide hit targeting a police station in Lakki Marwat that killed 19 innocent people, including schoolchildren on Monday, following the string of blasts in Lahore and Quetta, shows the degree of freedom with which the terrorists are targeting the citizenry. Besides, a security official’s statement that 500kg of explosives were used in the attack bears testimony to the fact that there is invariably a large supply of illegal explosives and weapons available to lawless elements turned into brainwashed suicide bombers.

Clearly, the law enforcement agencies have been unable to control the scourge. It is a pity that the police department for instance, is still lacking modern equipment like the cell phone tracking system which could come in

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handy in identifying the attacker and pre\empting the attack. Another big failure is their inability to locate the networks behind these barbaric acts and their sources of funding. There, of course, is evidence of RAW’s involvement and even other external forces fishing in our troubled waters, supplying weapons to militant groups, yet the authorities’ lack of action is disgusting. It is doubtful that the bombers creating mayhem in society during the holy month of Ramazan are Muslims. Of late, they have been sneaking into the major cities unarmed, thus easily clearing the security kiosks and posing as common citizens. They do not have to worry about bringing the weapons along. But while there is absolutely no doubt that security forces have to put their house in order, the fact remains that the proxy war we are fighting on behalf of the U.S. is mainly to be blamed for the sorry state of affairs. It is simply nonsensical to assume that the military operation in the tribal areas or for that matter indiscriminate bombing by the drones would not create a backlash. It is high time that the policy of pursuing a negotiated settlement of the conflict was given precedence over use of force.

Editorial, Nation (Islamabad), September 8, 2010, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-

online/Opinions/Editorials/08-Sep-2010/Lakki-Marwat-blast

DEPLOYMENT OF MORE DRONES AGAINST PAKISTAN Reports that the U.S. military is secretly diverting more drones and weaponry from Afghanistan and deploying along Pakistan border are very disturbing and could lead to escalation of tension between the two countries. Already there had been a significant increase in drones attacks in North Waziristan during September, 2010 killing around 120 people.

U.S. newspaper Wall Street Journal quoting unnamed U.S. officials said Washington has classified Pakistan’s tribal belt on the Afghan border as a global headquarters of Al Qaeda. After four consecutive violations of Pakistan’s airspace by NATO helicopters including attack on a check post killing three security personnel have strained Pak-U.S. relations and in retaliation Torkham crossing was closed for NATO supply containers. Though Chamman crossing is still open for supplies to the occupation forces in Afghanistan yet closure of Torkham route will adversely affect the food and military supplies to NATO troops. A joint investigation is under way about the circumstances, which led to the killing of Pakistani security personnel and NATO has apologized over it yet it appears that the coming weeks and months would be very difficult for Pakistan. We should be ready for more drone attacks because President Obama would like to see results for additional deployment of 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan by the middle of next year. Keeping in view the developing situation, it is essential that the political and


military leadership must make it clear to the NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. General Petraeus, the Pentagon and CIA that Pakistan can go to a certain extent to cooperate in the war on terror but would not compromise on its sovereignty. At the same time the Americans must be made to pay compensation for the innocent lives lost in the helicopter and drone attacks as they are doing in Afghanistan. We would also caution that of late the U.S. and its western allies have been talking of possibility of terrorist attacks in Europe from the so-called militant sanctuaries in FATA and might make it a pretext to launch more air strikes across the border. Pakistan has a strong position and the West cannot win the war against terrorism without its cooperation. We must therefore assert strongly and tell them in categorical terms that ground or air violations by the NATO forces would not be tolerated in any case.

Editorial, Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), October 4, 2010, http://www.pakobserver.net/201010/04/detailnews.asp?id=55411

THE SCOURGE OF TERRORISM The fundamental flaw in the contemporary discourse on terrorism is to equate it with Islamic doctrine. This plays into the hands of the likes of Osama bin Laden who justify the slaughter of civilians through distortions of Quran injunctions. In this there is an unmistakable nexus between such extremists and those whose purpose is to demonise Islam

The predominant theme of history is one of conflict and violence. The last hundred years have been particularly blood-drenched. The two world wars of the 20th century resulted in unparalleled devastation. In the near half-century that the Cold War lasted, the number of fatalities almost equalled that of the First World War in which approximately 8,400,000 soldiers alone are said to have died. The Nobel laureates, Heidi and Alvin Toffler, claim, “In the 2,340 weeks that passed between 1945 and 1990, the earth enjoyed a grand total of only three weeks that were truly war-free.”

The contemporary era is no less dominated by the same sordid drama of death and destruction except that the actors have changed. The foremost post-Cold War threat to global peace and security is terrorism from which no nation, big or small, is immune. Although this scourge has neither religion nor culture nor country, it has become commonplace after 9/11 to stigmatise Muslims because, incrementally, the incidents of such violence have been perpetrated mostly, but not exclusively, by a radicalised minority who profess Islam.

Scholars have identified the sense of victimisation coupled with a real or imagined threat perception as the two most important reasons for the recurring acts of terrorist violence and this is not peculiar to Muslims alone. For instance, the Daily Times issue dated February 2, 2006 carried an article by

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Christine Fair and Hussain Haqqani in which the authors stated that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), founded in May 1976 by Vellupillai Prabhakaran, were “the world’s largest group of suicide bombers” whose cadres were “not Muslim, but Hindu” and nearly 40 percent were women. However, the impact of the LTTE was confined only to Sri Lanka and ended with their defeat in May 2009, whereas that of so-called Muslim extremists has been global. This has generated fanciful theories about the inevitability of conflict between Islam and the West.

Harvard professor Samuel P Huntington’s article dated December 24, 2008 examined whether the existing “fault-lines between civilisations” would replace “the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flashpoints for future crisis and bloodshed”. He quoted M J Akbar of India who is of the opinion: “The West’s next confrontation is definitely going to come from the Islamic world. It is the sweep of Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for the new world order would begin.”

Huntington’s essay on this theme, ‘The Clash of Civilisations’, appeared in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs and, according to the journal’s editors, only George K Kennon’s ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ that he published in the 1940s under the pseudonym ‘X’, had generated so much comment. Kennon’s piece inspired debate in Washington’s policy formulation circles and finally resulted in the U.S. Cold War doctrine of containment, whereas Huntington’s article has impacted decisively on post-Cold War world security concerns centred on the threat from terrorism.

The fundamental flaw in the contemporary discourse on terrorism is to equate it with Islamic doctrine. This plays into the hands of the likes of Osama bin Laden who justify the slaughter of civilians through distortions of Quranic injunctions. In this there is an unmistakable nexus between such extremists and those whose purpose is to demonise Islam. According to the Indian writer A G Noorani, there is an “accord in mendacity” between “the leading professional jihadist Osama bin Laden and K S Sudarshan, the supremo of the virulently anti-Muslim body in India, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS).” Both “interpret verses of the Quran in the same sense, perverted to their respective nefarious ends. Sudarshan’s RSS physically attacks the lives and properties of Muslims of India. Bin Laden’s al Qaeda attacks the soul of Islam.”

Extremists such as Osama bin Laden and Sudharshan rely on two unacceptable methods to distort the Quran’s worldview that is founded on peace and harmony. The first is the doctrine of abrogation, which presumes that the earlier verses of the scripture were abrogated by subsequent ones in the 23 years that the process of revelation lasted, and the second is the textual isolation and de-contextualisation of the passages, which inevitably results in the misinterpretation of its fundamental principles.


Abrogation theologians primarily cite the Quranic statement: “Any message which we annul or consign to oblivion, we replace it with a better one...” (Quran, 2:106). What they ignore is that the word ‘message’ (ayah) in this passage relates to the earlier scriptures and this is obvious from the preceding verse that declares that the Jews and the Christians would never accept any scripture subsequent to their own. All that is stated in this verse is that the Quran has superseded the Bible. However, ‘ayah’ is also used in a more restricted sense to denote any of the 6,247 verses of the Quran because they unfailingly contain a message and this is the assumption on which the doctrine of abrogation is based. Implicit in this questionable doctrine is a presumption of Divine fallibility. The implication is that God made His commandments known but then had second thoughts and amended His earlier pronouncements.

Besides exploiting the flawed concept of abrogation, extremists have also extracted individual passages of the Quran to justify suicide bombings and other terrorist acts. For instance, the verses pertaining to the conditional permission to fight only in self-defence are said to have been cancelled by pronouncements such as: “And so, when the sacred months are over, slay those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God wherever you may come upon them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivable place...” (Quran, 9:5).

The killing of “those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God” has been taken out of context to justify violence although the verse pertains to an ongoing war and cannot imply the initiation of hostilities because aggression in any form is prohibited. This passage, which is misconstrued by extremists as authorisation for indiscriminate slaughter, has been described as “the sword verse” although the word ‘sword’ does not appear even once in the Quran. In fact, the very next passage enjoins believers to protect polytheists that have not attacked them and conduct them to a place of safety.

There is need for Muslims to reclaim their religion from a radicalised minority that kill, maim and destroy in the name of Islam. Till they understand and expose the distortions of their scripture, the false ideology of religion-based violence cannot be defeated.

S Iftikhar Murshed, Daily Times (Lahore), October 8, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\10\08\story_8-10-

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ATTACKING THE GHAZI OF KARACHI On Thursday, two suicide bombers killed 10 and injured 70 people at the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi, the patron saint of Karachi. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed responsibility for this horrendous attack. The attack is significant because the Taliban wanted to cause the maximum

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damage, given that it was the busiest day of the week at the shrine. Abdullah Shah Ghazi, a Sufi saint, has been revered as the saviour of Karachi from tropical storms for over a thousand years. This attack by the TTP is not just an attack on his shrine but also his teachings and beliefs.

In the recent past, we have seen a new pattern emerging. The TTP has started attacking shrines of Sufi saints all across the country. The Taliban before this attack have targeted a mosque and shrine in the Khyber Agency’s Landi Kotal tehsil, a Sufi saint’s shrine in Gandhawa in the district of Jhal Magsi, the shrine of Rahman Baba and Mian Umar Baba in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP also initially claimed responsibility for the triple suicide attack on Data Darbar in Lahore but later backtracked and denied involvement. This begs the question: why attack Sufi shrines? Sufism is the single greatest threat to the Taliban and their ideology of violence and coercion. Sufism teaches tolerance and humanism, it is non-dogmatic, accommodative of all sects and religions and non-violent. The Sufis’ message of love transcends the material world and embraces universal brotherhood. In stark contrast, the Taliban use violence as the principal means to their goals and want to impose their strict interpretation of Islam on everyone by force and compulsion. The Taliban consider it un-Islamic to pay homage at Sufi shrines and cite it as shirk (associating partners with God) and bidat (innovation in religion). Knowing their open hostility towards Sufism, one expected the government to have done some homework.

The statement “there was a security lapse” by Sindh Home Minister Dr Zulfiqar Mirza is bewildering. The first suicide bomber struck at the main gate check post, while the second struck at the next check post. The attackers could have wreaked much more havoc had they managed to cross the security check posts. In a way, Dr Mirza is admitting his department’s failure to check the attacks in the first place. Suicide attacks are very difficult to prevent once the attacker is on his way; it is coordinated intelligence and police work that can help pre-empt the threat.

Contrary to popular perception, the large majority of Pakistanis adhere to Sufi beliefs rather than the hardline views espoused by the Taliban. The TTP feels threatened by their dwindling support and have tried to create a sectarian divide time and again. This initially found some success with attacks on religious minorities and places of worship. It was an attack on the shrine of a Sunni saint Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore, whom all major sects of Islam in the subcontinent revere, which ended up uniting the different sects. The shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi is of similar significance to the people of Karachi as is Data Darbar to the people of Lahore. This atrocious attack will, in all probability, once again unite the people of Pakistan against the Taliban


ideology of terror. Editorial, Daily Times (Lahore), October 9, 2010,

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\10\09\story_9-10-2010_pg3_1

DRONE ATTACKS MAY BE LEGAL, BUT ARE THEY MORAL?

Abdul Jabbar, a British citizen from Birmingham, was killed last week in Pakistan by a missile launched from an American drone. If Jabbar was indeed planning a Mumbai-style massacre in a British city, as the intelligence services claim, his death will be a relief. Yet the degree to which it now seems to be acceptable for the U.S. to use drones to kill those it believes to be involved in planning terrorist attacks is alarming. Since the beginning of September alone, President Obama has authorised at least 25 targeted killings.

The total since he came to office is more than 100. These have certainly killed some of the senior operatives of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. They have also killed dozens of people, including a large number of women and children, who were not involved in terrorism. And yet there has been very little protest, certainly compared to the storm of international criticism that greeted the decision to hold suspected terrorists at Guantanamo – a policy that didn’t kill anyone, let alone any innocent women and children.

The silence from human rights groups over the drone attacks is deafening. What has persuaded them that it is acceptable to kill people, including people who are not terrorists, but that it is inhumane to deprive them of a good night’s sleep? There is no doubting the brutal effectiveness of drone attacks, or that they have a lot going for them in terms of risk and reward: they kill the enemy without exposing our forces to any danger. But the targeting is only as good as the information it is based on – and that information is, inevitably, often inaccurate.

Even when the targeted terrorist turns out to be in the building, there are often others with him who are also incinerated. In August 2009, for example, Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, was killed in a drone attack: his wife, his father-in-law, his mother-in-law, a lieutenant, and seven bodyguards also died. No one knows exactly how many innocents have died as a result of drone attacks, but the total almost certainly runs to three figures. It is not easy to square that with President Obama’s insistence that his administration is “living by our values” – unless American values now include the endorsement of indiscriminate killing.

The President has also stressed that America now complies with international law. Remarkably, he seems to be right: the consensus is that drone attacks are indeed legal. The UN produced a report on the topic at the end of May, which concluded that the best way forward is for an international

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conference of states to review the guidelines for setting targets “after a careful review of best practice”.

Best practice? Well, I suppose there is such a thing, even when you are involved in targeted killing. The UN’s Special Rapporteur thinks it involves specifying very clearly, in advance, whom you are going to target, as well as where, when, and why. That is something no country that uses drones will ever do: their success depends on the victims not knowing when or where they will be attacked. The fact that targeted killing has been deemed “legal” seems to have had the effect of making many people, including the President, think that it is morally justified. But that conclusion doesn’t follow. There are plenty of things that are legal, but which you would not be morally justified in doing – just as there are times when you are morally justified in doing things that are illegal.

Perhaps using drones to kill terrorists is a legitimate way of prosecuting the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It may be that the women and children who get killed as a result don’t matter – although I would like to hear someone from the U.S. government, or a human rights organisation, explain exactly why. But we – and the Americans – are deceiving ourselves if we think that something is OK just because international lawyers say it is.

Alasdair Palmer, Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), October 11, 2010, http://www.pakobserver.net/201010/11/detailnews.asp?id=56481

BY PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRICE PAKISTAN PAYS FOR ITS COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, THE U.S. IS HELPING

UNTIE ITS LEADERSHIP’S HANDS

Viewed by the United States and its allies as one of the most dangerous places on earth—and a country that provides a safe haven for leaders of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant movements—it’s little wonder that Pakistan has been garnering so much U.S. attention.

Some of the most serious international terrorist plots in recent years have been traced back to Pakistan, including one revealed just this month involving the training of terrorists in Pakistan to conduct Mumbai-style attacks on civilian targets in Western European cities. Meanwhile, the surprising reach of the Pakistani Taliban became apparent in May when they tried unsuccessfully to use U.S. citizen Faisal Shahzad to detonate a car bomb in New York’s Times Square.

So it’s not surprising that last week saw the third ministerial-level U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue in just seven months, following a March 24 session in Washington and a July 15 session in Islamabad. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Pakistan Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah


Mahmood Qureshi chaired the latest session, which marked among other things a welcome shift in tone and U.S. recognition of Pakistan’s efforts so far.

Since yielding to a U.S. ultimatum in September 2001 to ally itself with Washington against al-Qaeda in return for considerable economic and military aid, the Islamabad government has engaged in a comprehensive campaign against foreign militants on its soil. Yet the combination of the U.S.-led war against the Afghan Taliban (which since 9/11 has re-established its core support operations in Pakistan) and the escalating combat on Pakistani territory have helped give rise to domestically-focused terrorist movements that have been conducting a vicious campaign of suicide bombings throughout Pakistan.

The threat to Pakistan’s stability has been compounded by local insurgencies in the west of the country that have inflicted numerous casualties on the Pakistani army, which remains better suited for fighting a war with India than a counterinsurgency campaign. Meanwhile, the Islamabad government, whether under military or civilian rule, has sought to work out a formal or de facto truce with the insurgents.

But after publicly rebuking the Pakistanis last year for appeasing domestic militants, Obama administration officials have now demonstrated a welcome shift in tone. The clearest evidence is the praise it has given the Pakistani military and its government for engaging in the fight against domestic and violent extremists at the cost of thousands of Pakistanis killed or wounded.

‘One thing that is not often reported enough is that the United States has no stronger partner than Pakistan in fighting the mutual threat we face from extremism,’ Clinton said at a joint news conference with Qureshi. ‘And the cooperation is very deep and very broad.’

This new public line is welcome because it better addresses the widespread Pakistani perception that the growth of Islamist militancy in their country has been due to their leaders’ decision to provide comprehensive support to the US war on terrorism.

But there’s been more to the administration’s Pakistan policy than warm words. As well as the persistent (and sensible) efforts to induce Pakistani authorities to crack down on terrorist plots, the Obama strategy has included a commitment to providing additional economic and security assistance to Pakistan’s civilian government. Last week’s Strategic Dialogue session, for example, saw detailed discussions about how the United States could help develop Pakistan’s energy, water and counterinsurgency capabilities.

At the meeting, Clinton announced that the administration would submit to Congress a Multi-Year Security Assistance Commitment—a security assistance package worth almost $2.5 billion that mostly finances enhancements to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorist capabilities. Combined with the $7.5 billion commitment to civilian projects

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over a similar five-year period in the already approved Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, the total U.S. aid figure now approaches $10 billion.

Of course making these commendable pledges is one thing, but it’s quite another to ensure that they are implemented properly. One problem with the $7.5 civilian aid package is that it has yet to be used to launch specific projects on the ground in Pakistan, while the U.S. Congress also needs to enact the legislation required to establish the U.S.-funded Reconstruction Opportunity Zones and the Enterprise Fund. These multi-year initiatives are essential if Pakistanis are going to see concrete economic benefits for cooperating with the United States and if something is going to be done to help counter perceptions that U.S. aid is skewed in favour of security assistance designed to induce Pakistanis to fight and die for U.S. goals.

But the U.S. should go further to win over a sceptical Pakistani public. By more visibly acknowledging Pakistani losses from the country’s counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, Washington could help avert the kind of public relations setback that occurred a few years ago when some members of Congress complained that the Pakistanis were not ‘earning’ the approximately $1 billion annually in military aid they were receiving each year from the United States.

Of course there’s plenty that Pakistan can do to convince a wary Congress that U.S. taxpayers are getting their money’s worth. One way would be to do more to publicize the costs it has incurred—human and financial—in trying to combat the militant threat. Another would be to stop diverting funds from this programme to enhance its conventional capabilities for a possible war with India.

Overcoming U.S. scepticism won’t be easy, and the task was made all the harder after a cell phone video began circulating on the Internet last month depicting individuals wearing Pakistani military uniforms executing what look to be six bound and blindfolded civilians. When asked about the issue at a joint press conference with Clinton last week, Qureshi reassuringly said ‘that there’ll be zero tolerance against human rights violations’ in the Pakistani military. Still, to bolster support for the proposed military aid package, the administration has indicated that it will suspend U.S. training and equipping programmes for those Pakistani units that violate U.S. laws and regulations, especially the so-called Leahy Amendment, which bans U.S. military assistance to foreign military units that commit major human rights abuses.

But setting aside direct military aid, there are other ways that the United States can help Pakistan boost its internal security. One would be for the administration to pay greater attention to increasing the capacity of Pakistan’s civilian police forces as part of its larger efforts to enhance Pakistan’s civilian government institutions. Not only are police units often more suitable for countering local terrorism threats, but they could also help balance the country’s powerful military and intelligence services, including the Directorate


for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), many of whose leaders are reluctant to break ties with the Afghan Taliban, which the ISI founded in the mid-1990s to serve as a Pakistani proxy in Afghanistan’s civil war.

More broadly, though, Washington needs to take a good look at its regional security strategy. US policymakers should take the recent interruptions in their use of Pakistani territory to supply their forces in Afghanistan as confirmation of the need to reduce their dependence on Islamabad’s support for the war on terror. As well as providing the main route along which NATO receives its non-lethal supplies, Pakistani officials also allow the United States to conduct an air campaign against their own territory. (Indeed, media sources have suggested that the unmanned aerial vehicles that constantly bombard Pakistani territory are actually based in Pakistan and receive much of their targeting intelligence from Pakistani sources).

Not only would diversifying Washington’s regional support base be prudent in and of itself, but relying so heavily on the Pakistani government to actively support US policy like this places Pakistani leaders in the unhelpful position of appearing to be Washington’s regional puppets.

And there’s already some indication that such diversification could work, with the continued improvement in Russia-NATO relations providing a possible window of opportunity to allow these parties to consider expanding the flow of NATO supplies reaching Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and perhaps even through the South Caucasus, an area of special sensitivity to Moscow due to Russian unease about NATO’s ties with Georgia.

Yet there’s another country that also looms over U.S. ties with Pakistan—India.

Last week saw little progress over Pakistan’s requests to receive a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement comparable to that already negotiated by its neighbour and rival. The problem is that the U.S. Congress, which is now subjecting the proliferating number of nuclear cooperation agreements to closer scrutiny, is almost certainly not going to approve such an accord with Pakistan given its inferior proliferation record compared with India.

On the other hand, the Obama administration is aware of Pakistani concerns over the prospect of being granted secondary status compared with India. With this mind, President Barack Obama made sure to tell the Pakistani delegation at the White House that while he wouldn’t go to Pakistan next month when he travels to India, he will visit Pakistan next year and will eagerly greet President Asif Ali Zardari in Washington.

Of course, whatever reassuring gestures Obama makes now won’t overcome decades of U.S.-Pakistan tensions any time soon—Pakistanis have felt misunderstood and mistreated by Washington, which they believe has demonstrated interest in Pakistan only when it needs Islamabad’s help against regional threats.

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U.S. policymakers, for their part, are perplexed by Pakistan’s skewed threat perceptions and apparent insistence in believing India to be a greater danger than Islamist terrorists. Washington believes, with some cause, that Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons deter India from using force against Pakistan, but offers little protection against Islamist suicide bombers.

So although the meeting between Qureshi and Clinton marks another important step in the relationship, the two were also right to talk about a multi-year and even multi-generation programme for rebuilding the bilateral relationship. After all, against a background of decades of mistrust, putting ties on a firmer footing won’t be easy, and it won’t be quick.

Richard Weitz, Diplomat, October 25, 2010, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/10/25/what-us-gets-right-about-pakistan/

A YEAR OF SUB-SECTARIAN MASSACRE On October 29, the Sunni Ittehad Council, led by Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), staged a protest in Karachi and a dozen cities of Punjab against the destruction of tombs and shrines. This multi-city protest was triggered by the latest attack on the shrine of Baba Farid in Pakpattan in Punjab. The protest was ferocious because of earlier pent-up rage on the suicide bombing of Lahore’s Data Darbar shrine when Sunni-Barelvi religious parties united for the first time as a counterforce to the dominance of the Deobandis-Ahle Hadith, traditionally opposed to observances of devotion at the tombs.

October emerged as the most decisive month in so far as the response of the Barelvis graduated from passive protest to the actual creation of a counterforce to Deobandi Islam in South Punjab. The Ahle Sunnat gathering after the Data Darbar bombing in July looked dangerous when it threatened to take action on its own if the government did not move against the terrorists who had put holy shrines at risk. The backbone to this “counterforce” was provided by Sunni Tehrik from Karachi, the only Barelvi outfit in the country which can engage the madrassa-based and more organised Deobandis linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda. The Ahle Sunnat gathered under the flag of Sunni Ittehad Council and came to the notice of a national press more used to highlighting the Deobandis because of their presence in the state-organised jihad in Indian-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Back in July, Barelvi leaders caused a minor political earthquake when they accused Punjab’s PML-N government of courting Sipah-e-Sahaba in South Punjab to safeguard its vote-bank from eroding in the face of the PPP. They demanded the dismissal of Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah because of his much-publicised contacts with the Sipah, long declared a terrorist organisation — the ‘mother’ organisation that has provided human fodder to


the cauldron of the region’s multi-layered violence in the name of Islam presided over by al Qaeda.

The shrines began to be attacked in 2005 when Islamabad’s Shia shrine, Bari Imam, was blown up by suicide bombers sent in from the violently sectarian madrassas of Kohat, using Lal Masjid as its place of muster. Since then, the shrines in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have been systematically attacked with the Taliban routinely owning up to the attacks. Karachi saw a sub-sectarian war between the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Sunni Tehrik, reaching its climax in October when blasts at the great shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi shook the country into some awareness of what was happening. For the first time, the sub-sectarian killing in Karachi is not one-sided; hence the conclusion that a counterforce to the state-supported Deobandi Islam has come about. Had the government listened to the sermons all over Punjab – available on discs – it would have realised that the next massacre was going to be Deobandi-versus-Barelvi on the old issue of “mazar-parasti” (tomb-worship) which forms the fundamental devotional ritual of the more grassroots religion of the people of Pakistan.

In Jhang, where the Sipah-e-Sahaba was born, the prime target were the Shia but there was also a lateral argument with the Barelvis there because of the latter’s tolerance of and friendly interaction with the Shia. The Shia-Barelvi “union” – covert in the case of Shia action – came to the fore in Lahore when the Sunni Ittehad Council announced this month that it would stage a long march from Bari Imam in Islamabad to Data Darbar in Lahore. Pakistan’s relations with Iran nose-dived in the late 1990s because of the exclusive use of anti-Shia Deobandis in the war in Afghanistan where Shia Hazaras were to become their prime target. In Quetta, where the Hazaras have been sheltering from Afghanistan-based violence, sectarian attacks have become routine. This year too, the Hazaras were attacked, but the outreach of the terrorists included Lahore for the first time when Karbala Gamay Shah saw its devotees blown up by a suicide bomber. Sipah-e-Sahaba and its offshoots – the Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi – were once the strategic assets of the state of Pakistan (and if the “solution” in Afghanistan goes wrong for Islamabad in 2011 they could once again be.) But now these “assets” have linked up with al Qaeda and become its ancillary warriors, killing innocent Pakistani citizens and targeting the army to dissuade Pakistan from fighting the war against terrorism and persuading the scared commentator into saying “it is not Pakistan’s war”. The al Qaeda link appeared on the internet on the website of what al Qaeda called Brigade 313 in September 2010, consisting of al Qaeda, Harkatul-Jihad-al-Islami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jandullah (Karachi-based), Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Tehrik-e-Taliban. The leader of Brigade 313 is Ilyas Kashmiri, once Pakistan’s single-most important fighter in Kashmir and suspected of being from the army’s commando brigade, SSG (though this has been denied by ISPR). Anti-Shia violence was once traced by an intelligence

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report to Pakistan’s pursuit of covert jihad. Its use of non-state actors of a certain brand in proxy wars worked two ways: it created multiple centres of power within civil society which could challenge the “monopoly of violence” of the state; and it infected the “handlers” of the warring groups, sending the sectarian virus deep into the corridors of Pakistan’s establishment. The “denigration of the tomb” among the urban classes journeying away from traditional Sufi culture complicates the scene further, in a way preparing Pakistan for a Taliban state.

Al Qaeda went sectarian in 2003 when it sent its first batch of terrorists to Iraq to fight the Americans. Instead of focusing on the invaders, its commander, Abu Musab alZarqawi, took on the Shia majority of Iraq and its patron in the region, Iran. Today in Iraq, “Sunni reconciliation” has failed and the country is expected to tilt once again into sectarian war. This was presaged by the Yom al Quds killing of the Shia in Quetta this month. Typically, al Qaeda, planning to attack the Shia, is persuaded by “local conditions” to kill the Barelvis as well. Can Pakistan change? Darwin is often misquoted on the “survival of the fittest”. He actually said, “species don’t die because they are weak but because they are unable to change.”

Editorial, Express Tribune (Islamabad), November 1, 2010, http://tribune.com.pk/story/70534/a-year-of-sub-sectarian-massacre/

SWABI ATTACK The attack on Shah Mansoor Police Lines in Swabi, though first of its kind in the area, was hardly a surprise. It was always expected that terrorists would not easily let go and re-emerge like all guerrilla movements. With the military in a holding position after conducting military operations in Swat and FATA, the terrorists probe weak points of the security forces and attack whenever they find the security loose. Another tactic is to divert the focus of the attacks to relatively stable areas to draw the attention of the security forces away from active military campaign. Strict security in Islamabad and Peshawar may have prevented terrorists from carrying out an attack there, but it did not prevent them from going after softer targets such as the one in Swabi. Shah Mansoor police compound was fortunate that the four assailants were stopped at the entrance, but the suicide bomber among them detonated his vest and managed to kill two policemen and injuring 12, including seven policemen. One more militant was killed in the exchange of fire between police and terrorists while the rest of two fled. Security at all government offices in Rawalpindi and Islamabad has been enhanced in anticipation of more attacks by terrorists. The Taliban have claimed responsibility for the incident, which, according to their spokesman Azam Tariq, has been carried out in retaliation to the rising drone strikes.


Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has seen scores of focused attacks on the police, military and paramilitary forces apart from random attacks on civilian targets, particularly ANP leadership. The murder of FC Commandant Safwat Ghayyur and the son of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Information Minister Mian Iftikhar and attacks on educational institutions in various parts of the province are all part of the campaign against the state. And this is expected to continue and expand in future unless contained by a well thought-out strategy and preparedness.

As we have argued in this space time and again, the Taliban and their supporters are pitched against the state and only a consistent and prolonged battle against them can hope to ultimately defeat them. This battle is not a test of superior firepower, but a test of nerves and strategy. If conventional military capability were any guarantee of success against guerrilla war, the US would have succeeded long ago in Afghanistan. However, we are engaged in a protracted warfare. We are facing an elusive enemy, which melts away when frontally assaulted but returns when it finds the security forces in holding position. This is borne out by a series of recent attacks in Swat, South Waziristan and other agencies of FATA. The militants moved away to safer areas, where they have active networks of support and returned when the pressure of military operation eased.

The best strategy for the military would be to hand over control to the civil administration as soon as possible after completing the operation and conduct search and strike operations to prevent the possibility of retaliation by the militants. The civilians, too, need to be psychologically prepared for this drawn out battle. Public support and resolve against terrorists is essential to win this war. If the masses are not provided the necessary psychological support, there is a strong likelihood of them crossing over and joining militant ranks to escape their wrath.

Editorial, Daily Times (Lahore), November 3, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\11\03\story_3-11-

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U.S. DOUBLE-DEALING U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has conceded that Pakistan is paying a big price for supporting the U.S. war on terror. Confessing that the U.S. had funded and reared the militant groups during the Soviet-Afghan war, she lamented that now the genie was out of the bottle. After blaming Pakistan for decades for nourishing these elements, this realization has come. Yet this should be seen in isolation to the U.S. foreign policy and the mindset of the U.S. establishment, especially Pentagon. Not a day goes by when the Obama administration is not seen slinging mud on Pakistan for showing leniency to terrorist groups. An important point that she did not mention was the

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aftermath of the Soviet war when Pakistan was totally abandoned by the U.S. and left to fend for itself in the face of influx of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture and the scourge of militancy that continues to plague us to this day. There is no doubt that the U.S. used us as a steppingstone in the 1980s and is following the same policy again. It would be naïve to assume that the Secretary of State is genuinely worried about our plight when she says that we are paying a big price for being the front-line state. The U.S. drones have turned our tribal areas into killing fields, with civilian casualties having created a severe backlash against the country, registering protest in the form of a spate of attacks killing countless innocent citizens. It is a pity that while pursuing a negotiated settlement of the Afghan imbroglio, the U.S. is coercing us to use force in dealing with militant groups even with those who are willing to lay down arms and submit to the writ of the state. The U.S. should know that our armed forces are already stretched too thin to launch new operations. However, much to our chagrin, the do more mantra goes on. There is no disputing the fact that the U.S. hurled us into this maelstrom yet we must accept that we are only suffering the consequences of our error of judgment.

Editorial, Nation (Islamabad), November 15, 2010, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-

online/Opinions/Editorials/15-Nov-2010/US-doubledealing

U.S. SEEKS TO EXPAND DRONE OPERATIONS The U.S. is seeking to expand the areas where American missiles can target Taliban and al Qaeda operatives, reflecting concern that the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan is being undermined by terrorists’ continued ability to take sanctuary across the border, U.S. and Pakistani officials said on Saturday.

The U.S. is increasingly relying on the missile strikes by remote-controlled drones flying over Pakistani territory to find and kill terrorists that have free rein in the lawless areas along the border, where they plan attacks against American and NATO troops in Afghanistan

He would not specify which new areas the American side hoped to target, but an article in The Washington Post identified one as around Quetta where Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Omar is believed to operate.

The drones now operate in designated “boxes” in FATA, the ISI official said. He confirmed that US officials had sought both to enlarge the current boxes and establish new ones outside the tribal zone where senior Taliban and al Qaeda operatives are suspected to be operating.

Expansion: The Washington Post also reported that Pakistan had agreed to more limited measures, including an expanded CIA presence in Quetta,


where the American spy agency would work with the Inter-Services Intelligence to hunt down Taliban leaders.

Senior Pakistani officials expressed resentment over what they described as misplaced U.S. pressure to do more, saying the U.S. had not controlled the Afghan side of the border, is preoccupied by arbitrary military deadlines and had little regard for Pakistan’s internal security problems. “You expect us to open the skies for anything that you can fly,” said a high-ranking Pakistani intelligence official, who described the Quetta request as an affront to Pakistani sovereignty. “In which country can you do that?”

Daily Times (Lahore), November 21, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\11\21\story_21-11-

2010_pg1_1

GOVERNMENT FIRM IN ELIMINATING MENACE OF TERRORISM: PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gillani said that the people of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa have shown determination and commitment combating terrorism and facing natural calamities particularly the recent devastating floods.

The Prime Minister was talking to the Governor Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Owais Ahmed Ghani and Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti at the Governor’s House on Tuesday.

The Prime Minster arrived here, on a day long visit to meet the party workers on the occasion of 43rd anniversary of PPP.

The government, he said, has the firm resolve to eliminate terrorism and extremism and would ensure all possible measures to provide security to the people. …

Dawn (Islamabad), November 30, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/2010/11/30/govt-firm-in-eliminating-menace-of-terrorism-

prime-minister.html

TERROR GROUP FORMS SUICIDAL GANG Karachi - Outlawed terrorist organisation backed by Al-Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has formed a motorbike gang of suicide bombers to hit targets including liberal political forces, rival sects, sensitive installations and high-profile personalities.

Sources privy to the matter informed that agencies had warned some high-profile political figures, clerics and other personalities to avoid the unnecessary movement as terrorists could target them on intersections, narrow lanes and other such places.

82 IPRI Factfile

Meanwhile, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have been put on high alert ahead of upcoming religious month of Muharram-ul-Harram. According to official statistics, around 45,000 religious gatherings (majalis) and over 20,000 processions would be organised citywide within the first ten days of Muharram. Some 30,000 personnel of law enforcement aided by contingents of Pakistan Rangers would remain alert across the provincial metropolis.

According to reports, Interior Ministry has stated that the banned organisation, Lashker-e-Jahngvi (LJ), has formed group that might be involved in snatching vehicles, including police mobiles, government vehicles and ambulances to achieve their goals.

These militants could target any government, political or religious leader or property. It has been also pointed out that the militant group may also comprise young men aged between 18 to 20. It is pertinent to mention here that CID officers have also confirmed the existence of more than 250 sharpshooters in the city and feared that these militants could target the processions, majalis, political and non-political personalities. According to another source, clerics from both the Shia and Sunni sects are on the hit list of these terrorists. Among others the Shia clerics on the hit list include Allama Abbas Kumaili, Hassan Zafar Naqvi, Talib Jauhari, Allama Furqan Haider Abidi, Allama Aftab Haider Jaffery, Maulana Mirza Yousuf, Maulana Qamber Abbas, Maulana Nadir Abbas, Maulana Jaffer Subhani, Maulana Aun Naqvi. Similarly, the Ahl-e-Sunnat clerics including Allama Shah Turabul Haq Qadri, Hakeem Maulana Asghar Dars, Hakeem Maulana Akbar Dars, Hamza Ali Qadri, Kaukab Noorani, and some Sunni Tehrik (ST) members such as Sarwat Ejaz Qadri, Shahid Ghouri, Shakeel Qadri might be the target of terrorists.

On the other hand, secret agencies have also warned with regard to any possible attacks on police officers. Reports reveal that police officers of Crime Investigation Department (CID) might be the target of militants. It is not known exactly how the terrorist elements plan to carry out attacks but the other offices of CID might come under attack. The report reveals that terrorists would attack their offices using explosive laden vehicles. Concerned police officers when contacted reaffirmed warnings of attacks and said that high-ups of police had been informed about the reports of intelligence agencies.

It is pertinent to mention here that a similar warning had been given by same sources earlier to the blast at CID office but concerned department did not take appropriate action to avert the incident.

Mansoor Khan, Nation (Islamabad), December 1, 2010, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-

online/Regional/Karachi/01-Dec-2010/Terror-group-forms-suicidal-gang


AFGHANS INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: REHMAN MALIK

Interior minister says terrorists from Afghanistan have entered Pakistan to carry out terrorist attacks Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik has claimed that illegal migrants from Afghans are involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan.

He said this while talking to reporters at the Jinnah International Airport Karachi on Thursday. “Terrorists from Afghanistan have entered our country to carry out terrorists activities in Pakistan,” he said.

Responding to a query regarding the Balochistan situation, the minister said the government was open to talks with all parties to bring peace in the province. He asked the people of Balochistan to help the government hunt down anti-state elements. “We can go to Quetta, Turbat or Mand for negotiations on meeting their genuine demands, but we will not talk to people indulging in desecration of our national flag,” he said.

Malik warned that the government could use other options to maintain its writ in the affected areas of the country, saying that Baloch people have been given benefits in the ‘Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan’ package.

To a query about disclosures made by WikiLeaks, he declined to comment on the issue, saying that those reports were only leaks and carried no authenticity.

While referring to the law and order situation of Karachi and Sindh, he said that special security steps were being taken for Muharram.

Daily Times (Lahore), December 3, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\12\03\story_3-12-

2010_pg7_32

PAK-AFGHAN JOINT DECLARATION: ACCORD TO KNOCK OUT MILITANT SANCTUARIES

Pakistan and Afghanistan renewed their commitment on Sunday to eliminate militant sanctuaries in their territories, which could have been used for acts of subversion in either country.

A joint declaration issued at the end of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s two-day visit to Kabul said the two countries would again undertake to effectively cooperate, combat and defeat these (terrorist) threats and eliminate their sanctuaries ‘wherever they are’.

The commitment came as a result of fresh Pakistani demand that the Afghan government should end Baloch insurgent infrastructure on its soil and hand over nationalist leaders, including Brahmdagh Bugti, who are believed to have taken refuge there.

84 IPRI Factfile

President Hamid Karzai had pledged on Saturday in his meeting with Prime Minister Gilani to end Balochistan insurgency bases in Afghanistan which, he claimed, could have been operating without his knowledge.

But, he told the delegation that he also expected Pakistan to end Taliban safe havens in Fata that have long been alleged to foment violence in Afghanistan.

The commitment isn’t exactly new, but what’s different this time is the newfound understanding between the two sides that peace and stability in their countries were mutually interdependent.

Reiterating cooperation for collectively fighting terror, President Karzai had said: “We need to work together to end violence that continues to hurt both of us and that we should help each other with full knowledge of reality.”

After the talks, a senior Pakistani delegate told Dawn that there was a realisation on both sides that they were facing same issues from same quarters—in a reference to what President Karzai had earlier described in his media talk as ‘outside plots’ to keep both countries unstable.

“Terrorism and violent extremism and their international support networks are a major threat undermining peace and stability in the region and beyond,” the joint declaration noted.

RECONCILIATION: The declaration showed a change in Pakistan’s policy nuances on the issue of reconciliation, which is thought to be critical to peace in the war-torn country.

Neither public statements by Pakistani leaders nor the joint declaration reflected Pakistan’s desire of helping Afghanistan in making peace with Taliban.

The joint statement said: “Pakistan supports the efforts of the president, government and the people of Afghanistan for peace and national reconciliation, which should naturally be Afghan-owned and Afghan-led efforts.”

Weeks before the Kabul visit, Prime Minister Gilani had in an interview emphasised Pakistan’s indispensability to any settlement in Afghanistan and said: “Nothing can be done without us because we are part of the solution; we are not part of the problem.”

A senior Pakistani diplomat, who was part of the talks, said Islamabad no longer sought a role in peace talks. He went on to acknowledge that Pakistan’s unsaid longing for a reconciliation role was a ‘misplaced desire’.

This acknowledgement stems from an understanding that Islamabad’s offer to help Kabul make peace with Taliban was being misconstrued among the Afghans as an attempt to meddle in their internal affairs.

The reconciliation process has, according to a background briefing, reached a point where it is ready to take off. Contacts with leaders of warring factions have been established and a formal dialogue is about to commence soon.


…

Baqir Sajjad Syed, Dawn (Islamabad), December 6, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/06/pak-afghan-joint-declaration-accord-to-knock-

out-militant-sanctuarie.html US-PAKISTAN SECRET EFFORTS ON TO DEFEAT AL QAEDA:

PETRAEUS

The commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Gen David Petraeus, said on Tuesday that the United States and Pakistan were involved in efforts that would bring considerable pressure on extremists groups operating in Fata but both sides avoided discussing those efforts.

In an interview to ABC News, the general also praised Pakistan for what he called “very impressive counter-insurgency operations”.

But “more clearly needs to be done in the tribal areas of Pakistan to weed out Al Qaeda”, he said, adding that the U.S. would continue to put “considerable pressure” on these areas.

When the interviewer, George Stephanopoulos, suggested that the U.S. military would have to enter those areas if militants hiding there were found involved in an attack on the United States, Gen Petraeus said: “Well, I don’t think it’s productive to get into hypotheticals on all of these different – but certainly there are efforts ongoing that we don’t talk about that do, indeed, put pressure, considerable pressure, on Al Qaeda and some of the other groups that are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”

A U.S. diplomatic cable released last week by the whistle-blowing WikiLeaks site suggested that the U.S. had special operations forces in Fata who, at least twice, had embedded with the Frontier Corps in operations against Al Qaeda militants. Asked if he had the full cooperation of the government, the military, and the intelligence services of Pakistan, Gen Petraeus said he continued to have a “very close relationship with the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, in particular, General Kayani”.

He noted that when he was the head of the U.S. Central Command, he saw Gen Kayani “probably every about 45 or 60 days, at the most”.

Even after moving to Afghanistan, he said, he had continued to see Gen Kayani every 45 days or so. “Either I go there or he comes here.”

Gen Petraeus said that a trilateral relationship between the chiefs of the Afghan military, Pakistani military, and ISAF had led to “more and more progress” in terms of coordinating operations, sharing intelligence across the Durand Line and in other fields.

“Now it’s also important to recognise what Pakistan has done over the course of the last 20 months,” he added. “They’ve carried out very impressive and very costly in terms of casualties – very – very impressive counter-

86 IPRI Factfile

insurgency operations against the Pakistani Taliban, against the Punjabi Taliban, groups that threaten the very existence of Pakistan.”

Dawn (Islamabad), December 8, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/08/us-pakistan-secret-efforts-on-to-defeat-al-qaeda-

petraeus.html

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BODY CONDEMNS DRONE ATTACKS The National Assembly Standing Committee on Human Rights on Friday adopted a resolution expressing grave concerns on ongoing drone attacks on Pakistani soil in sheer violation of the International law resulting in collateral damage of both human and properties loss., asking the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convey serious concerns to United Nations, NATO and other concerned quarters. …

Muhammad Arshad, Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), December 11, 2010, http://www.pakobserver.net/201012/11/detailnews.asp?id=65990

NO TALIBAN OR QUETTA SHURA IN BALOCHISTAN: FCIG

Ubaidullah says those working against Pakistan will not be spared. Balochistan Frontier Corps (FC) Inspector General Maj Gen Ubaidullah Khan said on Saturday that no Taliban or Quetta Shura existed in any part of the province.

Addressing a press conference at the FC Headquarters, he said, “Propaganda was made that Taliban and their Quetta Shura existed in the provincial metropolis so that Balochistan could be destabilised. There is no truth in such allegations as no terrorists are present in the city.” Ubaidullah said that the FC was manning the checkposts along the vast Afghan border and had knowledge about cross-border activities. “I am confident that there is no Taliban leadership in Balochistan,” he said.

Referring to insurgent groups, the FC chief said that problems could not be resolved by picking up guns and taking to hills but by education.

Responding to a query, he said those who were making improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their houses and working against Pakistan would not be spared at any cost nor would FC compromise on this issue. “Without the support of society, law enforcement agencies cannot succeed in maintaining order and peace, thus I have directed all the officers to play their role for bridging the communication gap and remove the misperception regarding FC,” he said.

Ubaidullah held the Afghan refugees responsible for the deteriorating law and order situation throughout the country.


He conceded that law enforcement agencies, including the FC, had failed to properly handle the refugees, thus they had become a serious threat to the security of the country. …

Mohammad Zafar, Daily Times (Lahore), December 12, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\12\12\story_12-12-

2010_pg7_24

GILANI CALLS FOR JOINT STRATEGY TO COMBAT

TERRORISM Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani has underlined the need for having a common strategy by Pakistan, US, Allied Forces and Afghanistan to fight the menace of terrorism.

He hoped for enhanced cooperation between the three sides on defence, security and intelligence matters.

The prime minister was talking to M Michael Morell Deputy Director of CIA who called on him at the PM House on Monday.

The prime minister said that Pakistan would support the Afghan led and Afghan owned reconciliation process in order to bring about peace and stability in that country as and when the reconciliation strategy by Afghan Government is shared with Pakistan.

During the meeting, the outcome of Lisbon Nato Summit with reference to New Exit Strategy of Nato and ISAF forces; the reconciliation and reintegration efforts in Afghanistan; Pakistan’s front line role in campaign against terror and cooperation between Pakistan and US in defence and security areas also came under discussion.

Minister for Interior Rehman Malik, Senator Syeda Sughra Imam, Secretaries Foreign Affairs, Defence and other senior officials were also present in the meeting.

Dawn (Islamabad), December 13, 2010, http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/13/gilani-calls-for-joint-strategy-to-combat-

terrorism.html

DRONE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN

The United States government, led by the Central Intelligence Agency's Special Activities Division, has made a series of attacks on targets in northwest Pakistan since 2004 using drones (unmanned aerial vehicles). Under the George W. Bush administration, these controversial attacks were called a part of the U.S.' "War on Terrorism" and sought to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants who were thought to have found a safe haven in Pakistan.

88 IPRI Factfile

Most of these attacks are on targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border in Northwest Pakistan.

These strikes are mostly carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operated remotely from Creech Air Force Base and have continued under the Presidency of Barack Obama. Generally the UAVs used are MQ-1 Predator and more recently MQ-9 Reaper firing AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The drones have become a weapon of choice for the United States in the fight against al-Qaeda Some media refer to the series of attacks as a "drone war". …

Statistics U.S. Drone Strike Statistics

Year Number of Drone

Strikes Total Killed

(Min) Total Killed

(Max)

2004 1 4 5 2005 2 6 7 2006 2 23 23 2007 4 53 74 2008 34 263 296 2009 53 413 709 2010 109 530 866 Total 204 1,292 1,980

Timeline 2004 – 2007

• June 18, 2004: 5 including Nek Muhammad Wazir killed in a strike near Wana, South Waziristan.

• May 14, 2005: 2 killed including Haitham al-Yemeni in a strike near the Afghan border in North Waziristan.

• November 30, 2005: Al-Qaeda's 3rd in command, Abu Hamza Rabia killed in an attack by CIA drones in Asoray, near Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan along with 4 other militants.

• January 13, 2006: Damadola airstrike kills 18 civilians in Bajaur area but misses Ayman al-Zawahri.

• October 30, 2006 Chenagai airstrike allegedly aimed at Ayman al-Zawahridestroys a madrassa in Bajaur area and kills 70-80 civilians.

• January 16, 2007: Up to 30 Taliban killed in a drone strike in Salamat Keley, Zamazola, South Waziristan.

• April 26, 2007: 4 killed in the village of Saidgi in North Waziristan


• June 19, 2007: 30 killed in the village of Mami Rogha in North Waziristan

• November 2, 2007: 5 killed in an attack on a madrasah in North Waziristan

2008

• January 29, 2008: Abu Laith al-Libi killed in a strike in North Waziristan along with 11 other militants.

• February 27, 2008: 12 people killed in a strike near Kalosha village in South Waziristan.

• March 18, 2008: 16 killed in a strike in South Waziristan • May 14, 2008: 12 including Abu Sulayman Al-Jazairi killed near

village of Damadola, Bajaur. • June 14, 2008: U.S. drones fired three missiles at a potential

hideout of TTP leader Meshud, killing one person. • July 28, 2008: Midhat Mursi and 5 other Al-Qaeda operatives

killed in South Waziristan. • August 12, 2008: Nine killed in four strikes in the area near

Angore Adda in South Waziristan during a meeting of militants. • August 13, 2008: U.S. drone strike on a compound run by

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar killed Taliban commander Abdul Rehman, along with Islam Wazir, three Turkmen, and several Arab fighters. Up to 25 militants were killed in this strike.

• August 20, 2008: U.S. drones fire two missiles that hit a compound in South Waziristan, killing 8 militants.

• August 30, 2008: Missile strike on Al-Qaeda training camp in South Waziristan kills two militants carrying Canadian passports.

• August 31, 2008: U.S. drones destroy a house in Tappi village in Miranshah, killing 6 people and injuring 8 including 1 woman and 1 child.

• September 4, 2008: US drones fired missiles at a house in Char Khel in North Waziristan killing 4 people.

• September 5, 2008: U.S. drones fire three missiles, destroying a house which was potentially hosting Arab foreign fighters, killing at least six.

• September 8, 2008: 23 killed in Daande Darpkhel airstrike, near Miranshah, North Waziristan.

• September 12, 2008: The Miranshah airstrike kills 12 people including three women and two children.

• September 17, 2008: U.S. drone attack in Baghar Cheena region of South Waziristan kills 5 militants including Al Qaeda operative Abu Ubaydah al Tunisi.

90 IPRI Factfile

• September 30, 2008: Six killed in a strike near Mir Ali, North Waziristan.

• October 3, 2008: Two drone attacks hours apart in Datta Khel region of North Waziristan kills 21 militants including 16 foreigners.

• October 9, 2008: U.S. drone strike killed at least 6 militants including 3 Arabs in Tappi village near Miranshah, North Waziristan.

• October 11, 2008: U.S. drone strike at a militant compound in North Waziristan kills 5 people and wounds 2 others.

• October 16, 2008: Senior Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Habib killed in a strike near Taparghai, South Waziristan, along with five other Al Qaeda or Taliban members.

• October 22, 2008: 4 killed in a village near Miranshah by missiles fired from suspected U.S. drone.

• October 26, 2008: 20 killed in a strike in South Waziristan. • October 31, 2008: Two missiles fired by US drones kills 7 in

Wana, South Waziristan. • October 31, 2008: 20 killed including Al-Qaeda operative Abu

Akash and Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim (alias Abu Jihad al-Masri) after 4 missiles hit Waziristan.

• November 7, 2008: U.S. drones fire four missiles, killing up to 14 militants in Kumsham, North Waziristan.

• November 14, 2008: 12 killed in a strike near Miranshah. • November 19, 2008: Abdullah Azam al-Saudi and 4 other

militants are killed in Bannu district. • November 22, 2008: British Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf and

4 others including Abu Zubair al-Masri killed in a strike in North Waziristan.

• November 29, 2008: U.S. drone strike on Miranshah, North Waziristan kills 3 people.

• December 11, 2008: U.S. drone strike in Azam Warzak, South Waziristan, kills 7 militants.

• December 15, 2008: U.S. drone strike in Tapi Tool region near Miram Shah, North Waziristan kills 2.

• December 22, 2008: At least 8 killed in South Waziristan by suspected US drone strike.


2009 January to June

• January 1, 2009: 2 senior al-Qaeda leaders Usama al-Kini and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan killed in a missile strike by U.S. drones.

• January 2, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Ladha, South Waziristan kills 4 people.

• January 23, 2009: In the first attacks since Barack Obama became U.S. president, at least 14 killed in Waziristan in 2 separate attacks by 5 missiles fired from drones.

• February 14, 2009: More than 30 killed when two missiles are launched by drones near town of Makeen in South Waziristan.

• February 16, 2009: Strike in Kurram Valley kills 30, reportedly at a Taliban training camp for fighters preparing to combat coalition forces in Afghanistan.

• March 1, 2009: Strike in Sararogha village in South Waziristan kills 7 people.

• March 7, 2009: Taliban militants shot down one of the two UAVs over a village in South Waziristan.

• March 12, 2009: 24 killed in attack in Berju in Kurram Agency. • March 15, 2009 4 killed in Jani Khel in Bannu district in North-

West Frontier Province. • March 25, 2009: 7 killed in attacks on 2 vehicles by two missiles

in Makin area of South Waziristan at 6:30pm. • March 26, 2009: 4 killed in Essokhel area in North Waziristan. • April 1, 2009: 14 killed in Orakzai Agency tribal area. • April 4, 2009: 13 killed in North Waziristan. • April 8, 2009: 4 killed in attack on a vehicle in Gangi Khel in

South Waziristan. • April 19, 2009: At least 3 killed and 5 injured in an attack in South

Waziristan • April 29, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Kanni Garam village in South

Waziristan kills 6 people. • May 9, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Sararogha in South Waziristan

kills 6 people. • May 12, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Sra Khawra village in South

Waziristan kills 8 people. • May 16, 2009: U.S. drone strike in village of Sarkai Naki in North

Waziristan kills 25 people. • June 14, 2009: U.S. drone strike on a vehicle in South Waziristan

kills 5 people.

92 IPRI Factfile

• June 18, 2009: Two U.S. drone strikes in Shahalam village in South Waziristan kills at least 13 people.

• June 23, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Neej Narai in South Waziristan kills at least 8 people.

• June 23, 2009: Makeen airstrike kills at least 80 but misses Baitullah Mehsud in the town of Makeen, many of which were attending the funerals of people killed in the air strikes earlier in the day.

July to December • July 3, 2009: U.S. Drone kills 17 people and injures a further 27. • July 7, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Zangarha in South Waziristan

kills at least 12 people. • July 8, 2009: U.S. drone strike on a hideout in Karwan Manza

area and on a vehicle convoy in South Waziristan kills at least 50 people.

• July 10, 2009: U.S. drones take out a Taliban communication center killing between 5–8 militants in Painda Khel, South Waziristan.

• July 17, 2009: U.S. drone strike on a house in North Waziristan kills 4 people.

• August 5, 2009: U.S. drone strike in South Waziristan killed 12, including Baitullah Mehsud, his wife, and his wife's parents. The kill was confirmed after weeks of uncertainty over their fate.

• August 11, 2009: U.S. drone strike in Ladda village, South Waziristan, kills 10.

• August 21, 2009: U.S. drone strike on the village of Darpa Kheil, North Waziristan, reportedly targeting Sirajuddin Haqqani kills at least 21 people.

• August 27, 2009: U.S. drone missile strike on the Tapar Ghai area in the Kanigram (Kanigoram) district in South Waziristan kills at 8 people. One of the dead was reportedly Tohir Yo‘ldosh (Tahir Yuldash), leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

• September 8, 2009: U.S. drone fired missiles kill 10 in North Waziristan. The attack may have killed al Qaeda leaders Ilyas Kashmiri and Mustafa al Jaziri as well as three Punjabi militants and two or three local Taliban fighters.

• September 14, 2009: U.S. drone fired missile kills four people in a car 1.5 miles (2.4 km) from Mir Ali in North Waziristan.

• September 24, 2009: U.S. drone fired missile kills up to 12 people in the village of Dande Darpa Khel near Mir Ali.

• September 29, 2009: Two missile attacks take place. In the first, a drone attack reportedly killed six Taliban, including two Uzbek


fighters and Taliban commander Irfan Mehsud, in a compound in Sararogha village, South Waziristan. In the second, a missile killed seven insurgents in a house in Dandey Darpakhel village, North Waziristan.

• September 30, 2009: U.S. drones fire missiles at a Taliban compound and vehicle killing 8 in Novak, North Waziristan.

• October 15, 2009: U.S. drone missile killed at least four people in North Waziristan.

• October 21, 2009: Alleged U.S. drone missile killed two or three alleged militants in Spalaga, North Waziristan in territory controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadur.[105][106] One of those killed was reportedly Abu Ayyub al-Masri (not the same as Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader), an explosives expert for Al Qaeda and a "Tier 1" target of U.S. counterterrorism operations.

• October 24, 2009: Alleged U.S. drone strike killed 27, in Damadolla , inside Bajaur tribal agency. The 27 victims were reportedly a mix of Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives engaged in a planning and strategy meeting. The dead apparently included 11 "foreigners". One of those reported killed was Faqir Mohammed's nephew, Zahid and another was Mohammed's unnamed son-in-law. The meeting was apparently being held to decide on whether to reinforce South Wazaristan against Pakistani forces, which Mohammed advocates, or exploit recent successes in the Nuristan and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan, which Al Qaeda wishes to do.

• November 5, 2009: 2 killed in Miranshah town in North Waziristan.

• November 18, 2009: 4 killed and 5 injured in Shanakhora village of North Waziristan, 12 miles (19 km) south of Miranshah.

• November 20, 2009: 8 killed in the Machikhel area near the town of Mir Ali.

• December 8, 2009: 3 killed in a car near Miranshah in North Waziristan, reportedly including 2 Al Qaeda members. Senior Al qaeda planner Saleh al-Somali, from Somalia, is believed killed in this strike.

• December 9, 2009: Six killed in Tanga, Ladha, South Waziristan, reportedly consisting of four Al Qaeda and two Taliban members.

• December 17, 2009: 17 killed in 2 separate attacks in North Waziristan in an area controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadur. In the first attack, two missiles hit a car near Dosali, killing two. In the second attack, 10 missiles fired by five drones hit two compounds

94 IPRI Factfile

in Ambarshaga, killing 15 people. Unnamed sources stated that seven of the dead were "foreigners."

• December 18, 2009: 3 killed in an attack in Dattakhel region in North Waziristan.

• December 26, 2009: 13 killed in an attack in Saidgai village in North Waziristan.

• December 30, 2009: A suicide bomber killed at least six CIA officers and seriously injured six others at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan, which is used by the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate drone attacks in Pakistan. The Haqqani network claimed responsibility.

• December 31, 2009: Four killed in an attack in Machikhel village in North Waziristan. According to The Frontier Post, senior Taliban leader and strong Haqqani ally Haji Omar Khan, brother of Arif Khan, was killed in the strike along with the son of local tribal leader Karim Khan.

In January 2010, al Qaeda in Pakistan announced that Lashkar al-Zil leader Abdullah Said al Libi was killed in a drone missile strike. Neither al Qaeda nor the US has revealed the date of the attack which killed Libi, but it appears to have taken place in December 2009. 2010January to March

• January 1, 2010: Missile strike on a vehicle near Ghundikala village in North Waziristan kills 3.

• January 3, 2010: 5 people including 3 Arabs killed in an attack on Mosakki village in North Waziristan.

• January 6, 2010: 2 separate missile strikes one hour apart kill approximately 35 people in Sanzalai village, North Waziristan.

• January 8, 2010: Missile strike in Tappi village in North Waziristan killed 5 people. It is alleged that all the militants killed were local and were attached to Taliban Commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur.

• January 9, 2010: 4 killed and three injured when 2 missiles are fired on a compound in village Ismail Khan in North Waziristan, territory of the Haqqani network. Mahmoud Mahdi Zeidan, bodyguard for al Qaeda leader Sayeed al-Masri, was reported killed in either the January 8 or 9 airstrike. Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim who was allegedly involved in hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in 1986 was also reported killed in this strike.

• January 13, 2010: Missile strike in Pasalkot village in a compound formerly used as a religious school in North Waziristan killed 15 people among them 3 militant commanders. The apparent target


of the strike was, Hakimullah Mehsud, who reportedly left the compound before the attack occurred.

• January 15, 2010: Missile strike in Zannini village near Mir Ali in North Waziristan kills up to 15 people, probably including Abdul Basit Usman, an al-Qaeda terrorist.

• January 15, 2010: Second missile strike of the day kills 6 in Bichi village in North Waziristan.

• January 17, 2010: Missile strike in Shaktoi area of South Waziristan kills at least 20 people. The leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud sustained injuries in this attack. It was initially believed he died but it was later learned that he survived.

• January 19, 2010: Two missiles fired at a compound and vehicle in Booya village of Datakhel sub-division, 35 km west of Miranshah, in North Waziristan kills 9 people.

• January 29, 2010: 15 killed when drones fire 3 missiles on a compound belonging to Haqqani network in Muhammad Khel town in North Waziristan.

• February 2, 2010: Up to 8 U.S. drones fired missiles at 4 different villages of North Waziristan killing at least 29 people.

• February 14, 2010: 5 killed in a strike near Mir Ali in North Waziristan.

• February 15, 2010: Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, leader of the Turkistani Islamic Party, is killed by a drone missile strike in North Waziristan.

• February 17, 2010: Three militants killed by a missile strike near Tapi, Miramshah, North Waziristan. One of those killed was reportedly Sheikh Mansoor, a commander in the Lashkar al Zil.

• February 18, 2010: 4 killed in a strike in Northwest Waziristan including Mohammed Haqqani, the brother of Afghan Taliban commander Siraj who leads the Haqqani network. The missiles hit a vehicle belonging to Siraj that Mohammed was riding in, but Siraj was not in the vehicle at the time. Mohammed and Siraj were reportedly attending the funeral of Sheikh Mansoor, who had been killed by a drone strike the day before.

• February 24, 2010: Missiles fired by a U.S. drone killed at least 13 militants at a compound and at a vehicle in the Dargah Mandi area of North Waziristan. Among the dead include Bahadar Mansoor, head of Badar Mansoor group, and Rana Afzal, the man behind the FIA HQ bombing in Lahore. Mohammed Qari Zafar, the head of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the person responsible for the 2002 and 2006 bombing of the U.S. consulate in Karachi was

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thought to be killed in this Drone strike but it was later proved that he survived the attack. He died on June 14, 2010 when he accidentally touched some explosives which set them off killing him in the ensuing explosion in a guesthouse he was staying in North Waziristan.

• March 8, 2010: Three missiles fired by U.S. drone aircraft killed five militants and wounded three in Miranshah. It is alleged that Hussein al-Yemeni (also called Sadam Hussein Al Hussami), an Al Qaeda terrorist who planned the Camp Chapman attack died in this strike.

• March 10, 2010: Missiles fired from drones struck a compound and three vehicles in the village of Mizar Madakhel in North Waziristan. The attack killed at least 12 and as many as 21 militants. Five drones reportedly attacked in two waves. First, four missiles struck and demolished the compound. After local militants cordoned off the area and began recovering bodies, a second volley of missiles struck. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a local Taliban leader and chief of the North Waziristan Shura, may have been killed in the strike.

• March 16, 2010: Eight to ten militants were killed in a U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan's Datakhel area. The militants were reportedly al Qaeda fighters, mainly Afghan, but included two officials from Syria and Egypt.

• March 17, 2010: Two U.S. Drone strikes killed 9 militants. In the first attack, the drones fired four missiles at a vehicle and a militant hide-out in Miranshah, killing six militants. About 50 minutes later, drones fired 3 missiles at a vehicle in Madakhel, killing 3 militants.

• March 21, 2010: U.S. drone fires two missiles in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan killing at least eight people and injuring several others.

• March 23, 2010: U.S. drones fired two missiles on a militant vehicle parked outside a compound in the suburbs of Miranshah in North Waziristan. At least six militants were killed and three others were wounded.

• March 27, 2010: Drone strike in Mir Ali in North Waziristan kills 4 militants.

• March 30, 2010: U.S. drone fired three missiles, destroying a compound owned by Zamir Khan, a local tribesman, and used by militants in the city of Tapi in North Waziristan killing six militants.


April to June • April 12, 2010: 2 missiles fired by a U.S. drone kill 5 in North

Waziristan. • April 14, 2010: U.S. drone strike targeting a vehicle killed up to 4

people and injuring 4 others in Anbarshaga area of North Waziristan. All of the dead and injured were Arab militants.

• April 16, 2010: U.S. drones fired at least 7 missiles which hit two vehicles and a house in the Toolkhel area near Miramshah in North Waziristan killing 6 people and injuring 5 others.

• April 24, 2010: U.S. drones kill 7 militants in North Waziristan in the village of Marsi Khel near Miramshah.

• April 26, 2010: Three missiles from drones strike a compound in the Khushali Toorkhel area, about 25 km east of Miranshah, North Waziristan, killing four or five. A Pakistani security official stated that those killed were militant followers of local rebel commander Haleem Khan. The official added that Khan has ties to regional Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur.

• May 3, 2010: 4 militants are killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan

• May 9, 2010: 10 militants are killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan

• May 11, 2010: At least 24 militants are killed in two separate U.S. drone strikes in which the U.S. fired up to 18 missiles. The first strike occurred when missiles struck cars, homes and tents in the Doga area of North Waziristan killing up to 14 militants. Hours later another pair of missiles hit a compound in the Gorwek area of North Waziristan killing another 10 suspected insurgents, including the brother of a reputed Taliban commander, Maulvi Kalam.

• May 15, 2010: At least 15 killed in Khyber Agency in the first such strike in this area.

• May 21, 2010: US drones fired two missiles on a compound used by Afghan warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur and killed 10 people in Mohammad Khel, North Waziristan. Saeed al-Masri, the current 3rd in command of Al-Qaeda was killed in this strike along with his wife and 3 children. Other dead in this strike include two foreign militants, one of whom was reportedly Filipino. Five women and two children were reported injured.

• May 28, 2010: U.S. drone strike killed 11 militants and wounded three others in the Nazai Narai area of South Waziristan.

• June 10, 2010: U.S. drone strike killed 3 people in North Waziristan.

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• June 11, 2010: U.S. drones fired 6 missiles on a housing compound near Miran Shah at the Afghan-Pakistan border, killing 15 alleged militants.

• June 19, 2010: U.S. drone fired a missile striking a house in Haider Khel village near North Waziristan's Mir Ali town killing 16 militants.[187] Al Qaeda leader Abu Ahmed Tarkash was among the dead.

• June 26, 2010: A U.S. missile strike killed 7 militants in Pakistan's tribal region near the Afghan border. The missile, fired by an unmanned drone, destroyed a house near Mir Ali in North Waziristan. One of the dead men was a foreigner.

• June 27, 2010: A drone strike in North Waziristan killed 5 militants.

• June 29, 2010: U.S. drone fired two missiles hitting a house near in Wana, South Waziristan killing at least 8 militants including Hamza al-Jufi an Egyptian militant belonging to Al Qaeda.

July to September

• July 15, 2010: A drone strike in North Waziristan killed 14 suspected militants in a region under the control of Hafiz Gul Bahadar.

• July 24, 2010: U.S. drones fired two missiles at a militant compound in Nazai Narai area of South Waziristan killing 16 militants.

• July 25, 2010: U.S. drones fired two missiles and hit a double-cabin pickup carrying militants in Shaktoi village in South Waziristan. Taliban sources said 14 militants were killed and two others were injured in the attack. The militants belonged to the Hakimullah Mehsud-led Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

• July 25, 2010: U.S. drones launched their second strike of the day when two missiles hit a house where some militants were having dinner in Landikhel village of Srarogha Tehsil in South Waziristan. Four militants that belonged to TTP were killed and five others sustained injuries.

• July 25, 2010: U.S. drones launched their unprecedented third strike on the same day when they fired two missiles at a house in Taipi village near Miran Shah, the main town in North Waziristan, killing 7 suspected militants.

• August 14, 2010: U.S. drone fired three missiles at a compound in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, killing at least 13 militants including Taliban commander, Amir Moaviya.


• August 21, 2010: A U.S. drone strike near Miran Shah, North Waziristan, kills 6 militants.

• August 23, 2010: Missiles fired from U.S. drones in North Waziristan kill 13 militants and seven civilians. Four women and three children are among the dead.

• August 27, 2010: Missiles fired from U.S. drones in the Kurram Agency hit 2 vehicle killing 5 suspected militants, the first such reported drone strike in the Kurram Agency.

• September 3, 2010: 2 separate drone strikes kill 12–15 suspected militants in North Waziristan.The first strike was near Miramshah, killing six "local" militants according to Dawn. The second strike was near Data Khel, targeting the home of Gul Adam, and killed nine militants. SAMAA TV reported that a local Taliban commander named Inayatullah was reportedly killed in the strike.

• September 4, 2010: U.S. drones struck a compound in Datta Khel village in North Waziristan district killed eight militants including three foreign fighters.

• September 6, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in North Waziristan kills 6 suspected militants.

• September 8, 2010: U.S. drones launch four separate attacks in a space of 24 hours. According to anonymous Pakistani intelligence officials: In the first attack, a house owned by Maulvi Azizullah, a member of the Haqqani network, in Dande Darpa Khel near Miranshah was struck killing at least 6 militants. In the second attack, drones fired missiles striking a car traveling a few miles from the border, killing four people associated with the Haqqani network. In the third attack, another house near the Miranshah area was struck killing another 4 militants. A few hours later U.S. drones launched their fourth attack striking a compound outside Miranshah killing at least 6 militants and wounding 5 others. All told 24 militants have been killed in these 4 strikes.

• September 11, 2010: A U.S. drone strike on the house of Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan kills 5 suspected militants.

• September 13, 2010: A U.S. drone fires two missiles at a house in Shawal, North Waziristan, reportedly killing 13 militants.

• September 14, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills 12 militants in Dargah Mandi near Miran Shah, North Waziristan. The numerous strikes in September are reportedly part of a campaign against the Haqqqni Network. The drone strikes in Pakistan against the network are meant to support concurrent special operations raids against the network's fighters in Afghanistan.

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• September 15, 2010: In an ongoing unprecedented drone offensive, a drone strike kills 4 militants in North Waziristan, including Saifullah Haqqani, first cousin of Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani.

• September 16, 2010: U.S. drones fired missiles at a house in Datakhel area, killing six militants.

• September 19, 2010: U.S. drones fire missiles at a house in Datta Khel, North Waziristan killing 5 militants.

• September 20, 2010: U.S. drones launch two strikes killing a total of 12 militants in North Waziristan, the first volley hit a vehicle in the Datakhel region killing 5, the second hit a house in Miran Shah killing 7. September 21, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills 16 militants in the South-North Waziristan border region, including Taliban commander Mullah Shamsullah.

• September 25, 2010: A U.S. drone fired three missiles hitting a vehicle killing 4 militants in Datta Khel village of North Waziristan. Among the dead was Sheikh Fateh Al Misri, Al-Qaeda's new 3rd in command. Al Misri was planning a major terrorist attack in London, Paris or Berlin by recruiting British Muslims who would then go on a shooting rampage throughout these cities similar to what transpired in Mumbai in November 2008. The plan was thought to be its final stages and the stepped up drone campaign in September was done to disrupt and eliminate the key planners of this terrorist attack.

• September 26, 2010: U.S. drones launch two strikes against militants killing 7. In the first strike, drone fired three missiles at a house in Lwara Mandi village in Datta Khel, killing 3 militants. Minutes later, a drone fired two missiles at a vehicle in the same area, killing 4 militants.

• September 27, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in Miran Shah, North Waziristan, kills 6 militants.

• September 28, 2010: U.S. drone fired missile at a compound Zeba village, west of Wana, South Waziristan killing 4 militants.

October to Present

• October 2, 2010: U.S. drones launch two separate strikes killing 17 militants. In the first attack drones fired two missile at a house in Datta Khel killing 9 militants including 4 foreigners. The dead were members of the Badar Mansur group, which is closely affiliated with Al Qaeda. Four hours later another strike occurred in the same area on a convoy of vehicles and a house killing another 8 militants.


• October 4, 2010: U.S. drones strike a mosque in Mirali, North Waziristan, reportedly killing 8 suspected militants of German nationality.

• October 6, 2010: Two U.S. drone strikes by Miran Shah, North Waziristan, kill a total of 11 militants. October 7, 2010: A U.S. drone strike on a compound in North Waziristan kills 5 militants, included one of the Al Qaeda leaders Atiyah Abd al-Rahman.

• October 8, 2010: U.S. drone strikes by Miran Shah, North Waziristan, kill a total of 6 militants according to an unnamed intelligence officials, who was not authorized to speak to the media.

• October 10, 2010: Drones fire 4 missiles on 2 vehicles and kill at least 8 suspected militants in the Shewa District of North Waziristan.

• October 13, 2010: Drone attacks kill 11 militants in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan.

• October 15, 2010: Two U.S. drone strikes kill 13 suspected militants. The first drone strike killed six suspected militants in North Waziristan's Machi Khel area. Officials said two missiles hit an alleged militant vehicle. Later this day the second drone strike killed 7 suspected militants in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan.

• October 18, 2010: A drone strike in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan kills 6 militants.

• October 27, 2010: Two U.S. drone strikes 12 hours apart killed 7 militants. The first strike was on a house of militant Nasimullah Khan which killed 4 militants. The second strike was on a vehicle in Datta Khel kill which killed 3 militants.

• October 28, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in the Datta Khel area kills 7 militants.

• November 1, 2010: U.S.-operated drones fired four missiles at a house in the Mir Ali District of North Wazaristan, killing five or six suspected militants.

• November 3, 2010: U.S. drones launch three separate attacks killing 13 militants. In the first attack, drones fired two missiles at a vehicle in the Qutab Khel area of Miran Shah killing 5 Uzbek militants. In the second attack, missiles struck a house and a vehicle in Khaso Khel village, near Mir Ali, killing 4 militants. In the third attack, four missiles were fired hitting a vehicle in Pai Khel village in Datta Khel town, killing 4 militants.

• November 7, 2010: Two U.S. drones strikes kill a total 13 or 14 militants in the Miran Shah area of North Waziristan. In the first

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attack, drones struck a house and a vehicle in the town of Ghulam Khan, north of Miran Shah killing 9 militants. The second attack occurred an hour later in which drones stuck several vehicles in the neighboring town of Datta Khel, killing 4 militants.

• November 11, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills 6 suspected militants in North Waziristan.[247] The militants were reportedly Haqqani Network fighters returning from operations in Khost Province, Afghanistan.

• November 13, 2010: A U.S. drone strike kills five people in the village of Ahmad Khel in the Mir Ali area in North Waziristan. A Geo News correspondent reported from the attack site that the deceased seemed to be ordinary citizens, not terrorists.

• November 16, 2010: Four drone-fired missiles hit a house and vehicle in Bangi Dar village of North Waziristan, killing 15 to 20 people, possibly including civilians.

• November 19, 2010: One U.S. drone strike kills 3 suspected militants in the region of North Waziristan.[253]

• November 21, 2010: A U.S. drone strike near Miran Shah, North Waziristan, kills 6 suspected militants.

• November 22, 2010: A U.S. drone strike fired missiles at a car and a motorcycle in North Waziristan killing 5 alleged militants.

• November 26, 2010: A U.S. drone strike fired missiles at a vehicle in North Waziristan killing 4 alleged militants.

• November 28, 2010: U.S. drone missiles strike a vehicle in Hasan Khel village, around 30 kilometers east of Miranshah. Initial reports indicated the strike killed 3 or 4 militants. Local officials, however, later reported that the suspected militants had survived the strike by fleeing the targeted vehicle after the first missile missed.

• December 6, 2010: A U.S. drone strike in Khushali village, North Waziristan, kills 5 people.

• December 9, 2010: At least four suspected militants are killed by a US drone strike on a vehicle in Mir Ali, North Waziristan. …

Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan#Statistics

(accessed December 18, 2010). Pakistan Army Sacrifces Reference

http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-real_story&id=12


PAK ARMY’S CONTRIBUTIONS IN FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

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PAK ARMY’S CONTRIBUTIONS SINCE 9/11

30,457 Casualties (Killed + Injured) Around 10,000 Casualties in 2009 alone 10 Soldiers’ Casualties every Day in 2009 Terrorists arrested/killed 17,742 At Full Stretch and Surge to fight Terrorists


http://www.ispr.gov.pk/from/main.asp?o=t-real_story&id=12 (accessed December 18, 2010).

A Victim of Terrorism

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