'a Tedious and Perilous Controversy' - Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926

8/3/2019 'a Tedious and Perilous Controversy' - Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926

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'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926Author(s): Peter J. BeckReviewed work(s):Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Apr., 1981), pp. 256-276Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282832 .

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'A Tediousand PerilousControversy':Britainand the Settlementof the MosulDispute,19181926

Peter J. Beck

The emergence of Kemal's nationalist movementin Turkey resultednot just inthe abolitionof the Sultanatein November 1922 but also in the rejectionof thePeace Treaty of Sevres, which had been signed by the Sultan's government.Kemal's revisionist stand, while reflecting in part the internal revolutionoccurring within Turkey, and especially the principles enunciated in theNational Pact of 1920, was furtherencouraged by military successes againstGreece as well as by divisions between the Allied Powers. The peacenegotiations, which followed the Greco-TurkishWar and began at Lausanne inNovember 1922, proved extremely difficult, as demonstratednot just by theviolent disagreementsover several issues and the fears of a resumptionof warbut also by the breakin the conference from Februaryto April 1923; it was notuntil 24 July 1923 that the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed. In manyrespects, the latter representeda victory for Turkey,whose success in retaininga foothold in Europe and in securing boundariessimilarto those claimedin theNational Pact, was reinforcedduring October 1923 by the proclamationof theTurkish Republic, of which Kemal would be presidentand of which Angorawould become the capital, and by the Allied evacuation of Turkish territoryoccupied duringthe First WorldWar.However, the conclusion of the peace treaty did not remove all points ofdifficulty, since the dispute over the possession of the vilayet of Mosul, orrather over the exact frontier ine between Turkey and Iraq, still remained n astate of deadlock.' The disputants were Turkey, which had held the territoryuntil the First World War, Iraq, a British mandate to whom Mosul had beenassigned by the Treatyof Sevres,and Britain which had occupied Mosul at theclose of 1918 and which represented he interestsof its mandate.In spiteof thefact that Iraq,which was supportedby Britishforces, was in defacto controlofmost of the area in dispute, Turkey refused to relinquish ts claims to territoryspecifiedin the National Pact; the sanctityof the latterin conjunctionwith theneeds of the nationalist revolution and the strong feelings aroused upon thesubject in the Turkish Grand National Assembly meant that Mosul was not amatter for compromise.2The area's oil potential and strategic value furtherencouraged Kemal to press his claims to Mosul, especially as he felt thatTurkey had already won a moral victory over a British government whosesupportfor Greece in the recentwar had provedabortive.The largenumberofKurds residing within the Mosul vilayet introducedan additionalfactor, sincethe success of the Turkish policy of assimilationwithin its existing territorywould be influencedby the fate of the Mosul Kurds.Although the Mosul questionwas basicallyone of whetherthe vilayet shouldbe assignedto eitherIraqor Turkey,the disputetendedto become one between


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 257Britain and Turkey. In fact, it has been alleged that the British government,which was supposed to be acting on behalf of Iraq, was more concerned tochampion British interests in Mosul, especially in respect of oil, even if at thetime governments consciously attempted to deflect such criticisms, such as bydeliberately stating that the dispute was over the Turco-Iraq frontier ratherthan over the control of Mosul.3Consequently,Britishinterests in the disputehave been the subject of much debate, both by contemporaries and byhistorians, and the Mosul problem has become, for instance, a key partof anyanalysis concerning the role of oil in British foreign policy. However, such adiscussion is complicated by the fact that, while the Foreign Office performedthe major role in regardto the diplomatic aspects of the dispute,several othergovernment departments possessed a stake in the matter, and inevitably theyapproachedit from varying viewpoints. This was shown, for example, by thecomplaints of Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretaryfrom 1919 to 1924, aboutdepartmental nterferencewith his policy as well as by the continual differencesof opinion during the years 1923-25 between the Colonial and ForeignOffices. The strategic argument,whichjustifiedthe Britishoccupationof Mosulin 1918 and explained the consequent stress upon the area's value both forimperial communications and for Britain's whole position in the Middle East,meant that the Mosul dispute involved not just the Foreign and ColonialOffices but also the India Office, the War Office and the Admiralty. Inaddition, the developmentof air communicationsbetweenEgypt and India andof the RAF's role in the Middle East during the early 1920s broughtthe AirMinistry into the debate, especially after October 1922 when Churchill, theSecretary of State for Colonies (1921-22), transferred military control inIraq from the War Office to the Air Ministry. The strategic argument centredupon the claim that the controlof Mosul, which was separatedphysically fromTurkey by mountain ranges rising to 4168 metres at Clio Dagi, would not onlyensure Iraq's survival but would also provide a more secure boundary againstTurkey; it was feared that the latter, which was viewed as 'an aggressiveIslamic state', might utilise Mosul as a springboardfor an attack upon Iraqand, in time, upon British nterests n the Persian Gulf.Iraq's acquisition of Mosul would, it was argued, not only improve securitybut would also enable the continued reduction of British commitmentsto Iraq.The significanceof this point derivedfrom the questioningof Britain'spositionthere, especially after the problems associated with the Arab insurrectionof1920; the resulting debate, which was partly reflected in the press 'scuttle'campaign, centred aroundcomplaints about the extent of Britishcommitmentsin Iraq both in terms of finance and of manpower. This reassessment of thesituation resulted in two Anglo-Iraqi agreements during 1922-23, therebytransformingBritain'sposition in Iraq, which was originallybased upon directadministrationand regulatedby the mandateobligationsof ArticleXXII of theCovenant, into more of an alliance relationship; such modifications, whilemeeting Iraqidesires for greater autonomy, would, by making Iraq responsiblefor a larger share of its administration and defence, permit the gradualreduction and eventual withdrawal of British forces from the country. Inaddition, it was envisagedthat Iraq wouldjoin the League of Nations once its


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258 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESpolitical stability had been secured and its frontiersproperly defined. In themeantime, the defence of Iraq would depend mainly upon 'air control', sincethis offeredan economical means of securinga relatively arge area of difficultterrain.4The role of oil in British policy-the so-called 'trail of oil'-is moredebatable, since the denials of such ministers as Bonar Law, Curzon,MacDonald and Austen Chamberlainthat oil influenced their attitudes havebeen challenged by recent studies, which have frequently stressed that theMosul question was basically over British oil interests; it is argued that thetendency of British governments to emphasise strategic, racial and otherconsiderations served merely to camouflage their true motives and to avoidarousing excessive domestic and international criticism.5The debate uponBritish motives, and particularly upon what Curzon referred to as the 'dirtymess of Mosul oil', will undoubtedly continue, especially as differentdepartmentsregardedoil in varying ways; for example,the Boardof Tradeandthe Colonial Office assumed a greater interest in Mosul oil than the ForeignOffice, as demonstrated n theirdisagreementsduring 1924 over the conclusionof a concession agreementbetweenIraq and the Turkish PetroleumCompany,in which Britain, including the government through the Anglo-Persian OilCompany, had a significantstake.6However, it seems reasonable to concludethat, even without oil, the British government would have been reluctant tomake concessions on Mosul; a concern for the strategic integrity of itsmandate, Iraq, and for imperial considerationsencouraged the adoption of anuncompromising attitude, a stand reinforced by the crucial importanceattached to the vilayet by the Iraqi government,as highlightedby the rideronits acquisition accompanying Iraq's somewhat reluctant ratification of theAnglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1924. Nevertheless, oil, which brought in yet anotherdepartment, he Board of Trade, constituted an additional f not decisivefactor,since Turkish control of Mosul would not only deprive Iraq of a resourcevaluable for the country's development but would also, it was claimed,provemore beneficialto American and French oil interests than to those of Britain;there were even fears that, in the long term, Turkey might threaten Britishoilsupplies from the Persian Gulf.7 Whatever the motives determining Britishpolicy towards Mosul, successive governments proved reluctant tocompromise upon its dispositionin spite of the frequentassertionsthat it wasnot a vital British interest. For instance, Curzon 'foundBonar [Law] longingtoclear out of Mosul',while MacDonald statedhis governmentwas merelyactingas the 'custodian for Iraq'; they were followedby Chamberlainwho minuted n1925 that 'Mosul really matters very little to us-we can exist and flourishwithout Irak'.8The inability to secure an Anglo-Turkishsettlementon Mosul at Lausanne,in conjunction with a desire to prevent either a diplomatic rupture or abreakdownof the peace talks, resulted n Article 3 paragraph2 of the TreatyofLausanne, which provided for further bilateral negotiations on this questionafterthe peace conference.In the event, the Mosul problem continued to provea serious international ssue during the next two or three years, exacerbatingnot just Anglo-Turkish relations, as seen in their respective military


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 259preparations in case of war, but also influencing the links between theEuropean powers, and especially between Britain, France and Italy. Inaddition,the dispute affected the developmentof the League of Nations, sincethe Treaty of Lausanne stipulated that, if the direct talks failed to yield anagreementwithin nine months, the matter would be referredto the League;Turkey, although a non-member, would be assured of representationfor thepurposes of this particulardispute. Both disputants agreed that, 'pendingthedecision to be reached on the subject of the frontiers',no military or othermovementswhich mightmodify the territorial tatus quo should occur.However, Article 3 paragraph 2, which merely involved an agreement toshelvethe dispute,was only achievedwithgreatdifficulty n view of the markedAnglo-Turkish differences at Lausanne over both the type and method ofsolution; their failure to agree upon an actual frontierline was parallelledbydisagreements over a suitable mode of pacific settlement n the event of directnegotiations provingabortive.In fact, at times between 1922 to 1926, a resortto war seemed the most likely possibility, while the eventual solution, whichinvolved keeping the League in reserve, does appear somewhat surprisingonaccount both of the relative coolness of the Conservative Government of1922-24 towards the League and of Turkey's non-membershipand distrustof the latter. However, in the end, a reference to a third party, such as theLeague, began to seem, at least to Britain,as the only way out of an impasse;Britishwillingness to eventually submit the dispute to the League derivednotjust from its responsibilitiesfor a League mandate, Iraq, but also from ananxiety to avoid a military solution in an area where Britainwas scaling-downits military commitments. Curzon, who was in any case confident of thestrength of Iraq's claim to Mosul, believed that there might perhaps be agreaterchance of the Kemal government making concessions through a thirdparty ratherthan directly to Britain and Iraq, particularlyas past experiencegave little cause for optimismin respect of bilateralnegotiations. Curzon, whohad gone to Lausanne with the objective of achieving a rapid settlement onBritishterms,had found the Turks frustratingpeople to negotiatewith, and hehad become increasinglyinfuriatedby the failureof Ismet Pasha, his Turkishcounterpart, o bendunderthe pressureof his 'steam-roller actics' as well as byIsmet's tendency to use his deafness to advantage; Curzon lamented that 'Imight as well have appealed to the Sphinx of Egypt, or apostrophised themummy of Tutank-amen(sic.)'.9 Child, a member of the Americandelegationat Lausanne, observed Curzon's frustration,stating that 'it must be a terribleexperiencefor Curzon to turn his splendidflow of beautiful Englishupon thisman, and then find Ismet, with his little quizzical face, wholly untouched'.10Curzon and Ismet commencedconversationson Mosul on 26 November 1922,but such privateexchanges tended to highlight points of differencerather thanto facilitate a settlement,and on 23 January 1923 Curzonbroughtthe questionbefore the Territorial and Military Commission, of which he was president.Although Turkishintransigenceon Mosul was partly ascribedto the needs ofdomestic politics and to Soviet pressure, Curzon complained also about thehigh entertainment allowances paid to the Turkish delegation, whoseuncompromisingattitude was reinforced by their alleged preferencefor 'the


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260 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESfleshpots of Lausanne to the austerities of Angora'."1In addition, Curzonregretted he lack of unity among the Allies, who were already divided over theRuhr problem, since this forced him to fight 'a forlorn and solitary battle' onMosul, and he began to envisage the League as an extra means throughwhichto enlist French and Italian support against Turkey; for example, he claimedthat his speech at the commission on 23 January 1923, duringthe course ofwhich he stressed the need to use the League, had made a good impressionupon 'opinion' at Lausanne, thus ensuring future support.12 In fact, theLeague's role had already been touched upon several times during theconference in connection with such questions as minorities, the Straits,guaranteesof territory,and Turkishmembershipof the League, and in a senseCurzon's proposalfor a League referenceon Mosul arose as much out of theseearlier discussions as out of an appreciation of the value of employing theLeague as an adjunct of British diplomacy. The proposal, which won thesupportof both the Iraqi governmentand the Colonial Office,was given addedemphasis by Curzon'sthreat,whichfollowedinterchangesbetween the ForeignOffice and Drummond, the League's Secretary-General, o submit the Mosuldispute to the League anyway, since, under Article XI of the Covenant, itcould be interpretedas a factor threatening o disturb nternationalrelations.13However, such pressure, which was accompanied by Curzon's threat toleave Lausanne unless a rapid settlement was securedon Mosul and the otherissues in dispute, exerted little impact upon the Turkish delegation; Ismetvoiced his government's opposition to any form of third party intervention,especially as the League was viewed as an instrumentdominatedby the greatpowers. In any case, the only acceptable foundation for arbitrationwas onebased upon Turkish terms. Thus, at the Territorialand Military Commissionon 23 January 1923, Ismet countered with the suggestion of utilising aplebiscite to decide upon the fate of Mosul, although this proposal proved asunwelcome to the Britishgovernmentas the League reference was to Turkey.Although Curzon had not been very impressed by recent European plebiscites,his main argument concerned the device's irrelevance to the Middle East ingeneral, and to Mosul in particular.'4A variety of objections sprang to hismind, for instance, that a plebiscite, by allegedly upholding the principle ofnational self-determination, ignored strategic, economic and geographicalfactors, which he regarded as equally important; in any case, it would bedifficult to precisely delimit, or even to agree upon, the area covered by theplebiscite. Additional problems derived, he claimed, from deciding upon whowould be eligible to vote and upon the type of questions to be asked, while theilliterate and nomadic nature of Mosul's population merely exacerbated theproblem. Curzon also expressed concern about the maintenance of orderduring the plebiscite, since a free vote required the withdrawal of British andTurkish forces from the area if undue pressure was not to be exerted uponvoters. Although Curzon believed that such points constituted a cogent caseagainst the plebiscite scheme, his basic objection arose out of his commitmentto an alternativemode of settling the problem, and towards the end of January1923 he decided that it was time to show Turkeyhis determination o bring thedispute 'within the four corners of the Covenant'.'5 Accordingly, on 25


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 261January 1923, the matterwas referred o the Council, which, afterreceivingaBritish statement delivered by Lord Balfour at its session on 30 January,decided to note the dispute but to suspend action pending further talks atLausanne.16 However, Curzon thought that, by bringing the matter to thenotice of the League and by publicisingthe issues in dispute,he had made hispoint, and on 4 Februaryhe agreedto suspenda Leaguereference or one yearin order to allow the resumption of efforts to reach a direct understanding.Thus, Curzon and Ismet reachedagreementupon Mosulprior to the rupture nthe conference, which resulted from other issues, such as capitulations andeconomic matters.However, Curzon and Ismet had only agreedto postpone adefinitive solution of the frontier dispute, and it was not until June that thedisputants accepted the formula which became Article 3 paragraph2 of thefinal treaty; this allowed nine months for bilateralnegotiations, a periodwhichrepresenteda compromisebetween the six month periodadvocated by Britainand the one year periodfavoured by Turkey."7It is clear that the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, including theacceptance of Article 32, representedno real alteration of the situation onMosul, for Britain and Turkey, who were still only prepared to compromiseupon their own terms, remained as far apart as ever. In reality, at Lausannethey had merely agreed to disagree. In addition, the agreement upon aneventual League reference did not terminate Turkey's campaign for aplebiscite, while the debates in the Grand National Assembly upon theLausanne Treaty tended to stiffen Kemal's resolve on the Mosul question. Itwas also realisedin Turkeythat the postponement of a solution might resultinan internationalsituation more favourableto its seizure of Mosul. Meanwhilein Britain, MacDonald's Labour Government of 1924, like its Conservativepredecessor,possessed littlehope that the negotiations providedfor in Article3paragraph2 would yield a settlement,and such pessimism was soon confirmedboth by the delays in getting the talks started and by the state of deadlockrapidlyreached at the ConstantinopleConferenceduringMay-June 1924; infact, it proved impossible at the latter to even agree upon a draft for a jointreference of the dispute to the League in accordance with the Treaty ofLausanne.18MacDonald, whose interest in Turkey had been stimulatedby avisit there in 1923, was particularly unhappy about the continuedunsatisfactory state of Anglo-Turkish relations, as demonstrated by thebreakdown of the bilateral negotiations.'9 On 6 August 1924, that is, onemonth after the expiry of the nine-month period prescribed by Article 3paragraph2 for directnegotiations, the Britishgovernmentreferred he disputeto the League,which meantthat the interests of the latter now became a furtherconsideration to be taken into account, especially in Britain where nogovernmentcould afford to ignore pro-League opinion.20During September,the League Council, which had even postponed the matter in order to allowTurkey to be representedupon 'a footing of equality',allowed both disputantsto argue their cases at length, although Lord Parmoor, the Britishrepresentative, and Fethi Bey, the President of the Turkish Assembly, weredoing littlemorethan going over old ground,repeatingpreviousargumentsandproposals.2'However, the Council, which was assisted by Branting(Sweden)


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262 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESas the rapporteur,efrained romactuallyenteringnto the substanceof thedisputenviewof thewidegulfseparatinghetwoparties;nstead,heCouncildecided n 30 Septembero createa commission f inquiryn order o advise tupona suitablebasisforarbitration, hichwouldparticularlyeflect heviewsof the peopleof Mosul as derived romon-the-spotnvestigations. helattermethod,whichwas welcomedby the Britishgovernment,nvolvedanimplicitrejectionof the Turkishcase for a plebiscite.The commissionof inquirycomprised hreemembers,who wereintentionallyelected romsmall,andsupposedlympartial,Europeanpowers,and from thosepersonswho couldcontribute rangeof relevant kills to the work; heywere M. de Wirsen,aSwedishdiplomat,CountTeleki,a geographer nd an ex-PrimeMinisterofHungary,and ColonelPaulisof the Belgianarmy.TheCouncilresolution f30 Septemberalso recorded he fact that both parties,by recognisingheCouncilas the arbitrator,ndertookto accept n advance he decisionof theCouncilonthequestion eferredo it'.Althoughboth disputantswere remindedof theirobligationsunder theTreaty of Lausanne to respect the status quo, there was, for example, noattemptn the Councilresolutiono specifymeasures o counter nyincidentswhichmightarise n the disputedareaduring heperiod eadingup to a finalsettlement.However,this omission,althoughregrettedat the time by theForeignOffice,onlybecame ignificantnretrospect, hen, nspiteof previousundertakings,minor frontierclashes occurred; hese clashes, which wereaccompaniedby mutual recriminations,were encouragedboth by thevagueness f thefrontierineon theground ndby thepolicyof bothpartiesotightenup theircontroloverthe areathey interpreteds fallingwithin heirjurisdiction. or instance, herewereseriousclashes n theHakkiyari istrictbetween the Assyrians and the Turkishauthorities,as reflected n thedestruction f Assyrianvillagesand in the flightof AssyriansntoIraq,andduringSeptember,hat is, while the Councilwas still in session,the Britishgovernmentadkepta closeeyeon theill-treatmentf theAssyrians s wellasuponcontinualTurkishencroachmentsnto the areaclaimedby Britain orIraq.22nfact, theAssyrianproblem adrecently ssumed reatermportancein Britishpolicy,sinceit was realised hatthe championingf their nterests,whilehelpingBritainat theLeague,couldalsobe utilised o justify a frontierlinemorefavourableo Iraq.23 ut theTurkish overnment,n spiteof Britishprotests,dated 29 September nd 5 October,and of the use of air poweragainst heir roopmovements,emainednoccupation f territorylaimedbyBritain, ndon 9 October1924thelatterdeliverednultimatumo theTurkishgovernment, nd threatenedo resume fulllibertyof action'unlessTurkishtroopswerewithdrawn ithin48 hours.24Meanwhile,heTurkish overnment,which disputed Britain's version of the status quo and recalled the NationalAssemblyin order to emphasisenationalunity, partiallyoutmanoeuvredBritainby appealing o the Leagueagainst the ultimatum.Althoughsomepeople, ncludingLindsay, he Britishambassadoro Turkey,arguedhat theissue was worth a war with Turkey n orderto teach Kemal a lesson, theBritishgovernmentwas forced to suspendthe ultimatumand decidedto


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'ATEDIOUSAND PERILOUSCONTROVERSY' 263request,underArticleXI of theCovenant, specialCouncil ession n orderodealwith hefrontier lashes.25As a result,a specialsession of the Council was convoked o meet inBrusselson 27 October, and, as anticipated,he basic problemdividingParmoorand Fethi Bey concerned he precisearea whicheach partywasentitled o control.26 Council ub-committee,hichwas chairedby Brantingand also includedGuani(Uruguay)and Leon(Spain),examinedhe matter,and advised the Councilupon a frontier ine on the map-the so-called'BrusselsLine'-which could serveas a temporary emarcationineuntil hecommission's eportwas ready.Thisline,whichwas basedupon headviceofcartographersndtheinterpretationf existingarrangements,endednfacttobe favourableo the British laim,althought was stressed hatit would notprejudice he finalsettlement.On 29 October, he Council, ncludingBritainandTurkey,accepted he 'BrusselsLine'as a temporaryrontier, lthoughtwas advisedby the sub-committeehat such factorsas the remoteness f thefrontier area and the attitude of the Kurds ruled out an on-the-spotdemarcation f the line; both disputants,who agreedto withdrawo theirrespective ides of the 'BrusselsLine'by 15 November,wereauthorisedoexercise ulladministrativeontrolover heirownsectors.In November 1924, the commissionof inquiry,whose task had beenfacilitated y the decisions aken at Brussels,beganwork, and,aftervisitingLondon, Angora and Baghdad, t reachedMosul in January 1925, whenBritishand Turkishassessorswere appointed o help the commissioners.27However, heirreportwas not readyuntilJuly 1925,andsucha delay ed tocriticismsand impatience, specially n Britain,whereconcernhad alreadybeenexpressedaboutthe timetaken n actually ettingup the commission.28AlthoughAustenChamberlain, ho tookover heForeignOfficenNovember1924, decided to wait for the report, t is clear that some of his Cabinetcolleaguesas well as certainsectionswithinboth the Foreignand ColonialOfficeswererather riticalnotjustof thedelaybut also of thecommissionersthemselves.Within heForeignOffice, orexample,both CroweandLindsayexpressedheirdoubts,referring isdainfullyo the'smallnationmentality fLeague representatives'.29hey feared that the commissionerswould beinfluencedess by the meritsof thecase thanby mattersrrelevanto theissuesat stake,such as by respondingo thepressure f the Turkish ssessororby adesire o showthat theLeaguedidnotalwayssupport greatpoweragainstasmallone.Crowe, xpressing traditionalntagonismowardsheimplicationsof the'newdiplomacy', omplainedhat when mportantnterests f theGreatPowersareconcerned, ecisionsarealmost nevitablyeft to subjects f minorPowerswho rarelyhave the courageor experienceo handlesuchquestionswith real skill,judgementand impartiality'. uch assertions,which reflectconcernaboutabdicatingdecisionsupon British nterests o a thirdparty,indicate hat someelements tillpossessedreservations boutsubmittingheMosuldisputeo theLeague.Chamberlain lso found t necessary o curbtheimpatience f Amery, heColonialSecretary,who wasin anycaseunenthusiasticbout heLeagueas a


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264 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

whole, and to refutehis suggestionshat the commissionmightdeliberatelydecideagainstBritain n order o disavowaccusationshattheLeaguewasthetool of thegreatpowers.30 lthoughChamberlainharedAmery'smpatiencewith the delaysin the production f the reportandappreciatedhe ColonialOffice'sanxietyat the effectof thisuponIraq's tability, e refused o interferewith the commission, uch as by raising he matterat the MarchCouncilsession,especiallynthelightof Drummond's dvice o theForeignOffice hatpressurisinghe commission o expedite ts workwouldmerelyresult n tworeports ather han n a unanimous ne.Amery,somewhat eluctantly, greednot to pressthepoint.Further omplaintsmanatedromDobbs,who,as theBritishHighCommissionern Iraq,received he comrnissionn Baghdad; ealso suggestedanother easonfor the delays,whenhe complained boutthecommissioners'excessive drinkinghabits and penchant for the HighCommission'schampagne.31 However,Dobbs' criticisms,while colouredpartly by the commissioners'hreat o his drinkstocks andby theirallegedconsumption f ten dozenbottlesof champagne, erivedundamentallyromhis concernabouttheir mode of procedure, s seenin his complaints bouttheirattempts o secure nformationgainst he existing raqiadministrationand about heapparentnfluence f theTurkish ssessoroverthecommission.Inturn, helatter xpressedoncernabout he constantpolicesupervisionf itsactivitiesand about the imprisonmentf those favourable o Turkey; hecommission venstoppedwork or a fewdays,until he authoritiesnIraqhadgivensatisfactionnthesepoints.However,whenthecommission'seportwasstudiednBritain,manyof thecriticisms dvancednthepastby suchpeopleasAmeryorCroweaboutdelayor biaswereforgotten, incethecommissioners'onclusions learly avouredthe Britishclaim,althoughat the sametime such recommendations erelyconfirmedTurkish doubts about the League's mpartiality.32n ordertodeterminehe fate of Mosul,the commissionattemptedo adopta balancedandscientific pproachhroughheapplicationf a seriesof tests,whichwerebasedupongeographical,thnic,historical, conomicandstrategicactorsaswell as upon what the commissionersnterpreted s the wishes of thepopulation. ts conclusions,which weresupportedby accompanyingmaps,graphsandstatistics, laimed hat,while hegeographicalndethnic estswereindecisive, the other criteria tended to favour Iraq. Perhaps, the keyconsideration,speciallyn the lightof the recentstressupontheprinciple fnational elf-determinationndof theTurkish esire or a plebiscite,oncernedtheallegedwishesof Mosul'spopulation,ven f theseviewswerederived rompersonalmpressionather hanthrougha plebiscite;n fact,the commissionaccepted he Britishargumentegardinghe'insuperableracticaldifficulties'of holdinga plebisciten the disputed one. It was argued hat,'taking heterritory s a whole, hedesires xpressed ythepopulation remore nfavourof Iraq hanof Turkey .. theattitude f most of thepeoplewasinfluenced ythe desire for effective supportunder the mandate,and by economicconsiderations, ather than by any feeling of solidaritywith the ArabKingdom'.Althoughpro-Iraqentiments resomewhat epid, herecan at thesametimebeno doubt hatthe TurkishGovernment'sssertions,o theeffect


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 265thatthemajority f thepeopleof thevilayetof Mosulare ndisputablynxiousto returno Turkey,are incorrect'.Althoughdoubtswereexpressed bout hemannern whichthese 'desires'wereobtained, uchextractsdo illustratehecommission'sattemptto interpret he evidencein as balanceda way aspossible, a pointwhichalso explainswhy the commission,having rejectedpartition, roposed wo alternativeolutions,whichwouldboth be consistentwith ts findings.Thepreferableoursewouldbe the unionof MosulwithIraqon condition hatthelatter emained Britishmandateor25yearsandagreedto respect he wishesof theKurds.In fact,the Kurdishquestion,whichhadbeenrecentlyhighlighted y the Kurdish evolt n Turkey romFebruaryoApril 1925, proved a significantactor, since the Kurds constituted largeproportion f Mosul'spopulation;he Kurds,who were describedby oneobserveras a turbulent ationalgroupingwith a predilectionor shootingatmovingobjects,preferablyuman, houldhavetheirwishesrespected,ven f,as the commissionargued,their sense of national consciousnesswas stillundeveloped.33owever,f theseconditions ouldnotbesatisfied,hedisputedterritory, part romIraq's etention f Diyalah orirrigationurposes,houldbe placedunder hecontrolof Turkey,whichwasadjudgedo be 'morestable'thanIraq.In fact,the exactwordingof this secondrecommendation,hat 'itwouldbemoreadvantageousortheterritoryo remainunderhesovereigntyof Turkey',caused some debate n view of Britishclaims to the area since1918.34TheLeague eport amebefore he BritishCabinet n 7August1925,and, nChamberlain'sbsence,Amery,whoremained nxious o uphold raq'sclaimto Mosul,persuaded is Cabinet olleagues o accepttheconditions ttachedto Iraq'sacquisition f Mosul.35 uch approvalwas facilitatedby Hoare'sreassuranceshat no additional efenceobligationswouldbeinvolved,while twas also pointedout that, by working or stability n Iraq,Britaincouldacceleratenot just the latter'sentry to the League but also the completewithdrawal f British orces fromthe area.Havingacceptedboth the reportand theconditions elating o theMosulaward,heBritish overnment, hichhad alreadyrequestedan earlieropeningto the September ession of theCouncil n orderto allow timefor the consideration f the Mosulproblem,hoped that the way was now clear for a finalsettlement.36n the event,thepositionwas nowcomplicated y theactionof the Turkish overnment, hichnotonly rejectedhereport,whoseassumptionstquestioned, utalsoopposedboththe Council's ightof jurisdiction ndthe claimthatits awardwouldbebinding.However,such assertionswerenot entirelyunexpected,incetheyfollowedon fromvariousTurkish tatementsduring1924-25, whichtended

to qualify its previousundertakingso the Council.When the Councilassembled,Amery, who representedBritainfor this particularquestion,carefully efuted he arguments dvanced n a 'moredramaticandeloquent'manner y theTurkish epresentative,ewfikRushdiBey,whowas,accordingto one observer, flashinghis gold teeth everywhere'; ewfik,who evadedAmery'squestionsaboutthe fate of the Kurds n Mosul f theywereplacedunderTurkish ule,stressed hatthe only solutionwas to reinstateTurkishcontroldefacto over anareawhere ts dejuresovereigntyadneverceased.37


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266 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESWhile the Council reconvened he sub-committee f Three, which hadoriginally een used to fix the 'BrusselsLine'andwasnowheadedby Unden(Sweden)as the rapporteur,n order to advise it upon the commission'srecommendations,he controversyconcerning he status of the Council'sdecision was referred o the PermanentCourt for judgement,n spite ofTurkey'sefusal ither o admit heCourt'surisdictionrto appear eforet.These Anglo-Turkish ifferencesover the reportand the powersof theCouncilwereaccompanied,et again,bymutual omplaintsoncerningheill-treatment f thepopulationf Mosuland breaches f the'BrusselsLine'.38 orexample,Tewfik omplainedf action akenagainsthosewho hadexpressedpreference or Turkeyto the commission,whereasAmery respondedbychargingTurkeywith hecontinued ersecutionf theAssyrians.nfact,on 24SeptemberheCouncil,actingupona proposalmadeby Amery,decidedhatsuchallegations houldbeinvestigated,ndthis resultedntheappointmentfGeneralLaidoner, nEstonian,n order o perform non-the-spotnquiryntothevalidityof thechargesmadeby BritainandTurkeyas wellas to keeptheCouncil nformed f developmentsntheareaadjacent o the 'BrusselsLine'.39However,the Turkishgovernment,which opposed this decision,refusedpermissionor Laidonero travelon theTurkish ideof the line.Thefinalstage of the League'snvolvementn the Mosuldisputeoccurredwith the Councilsessionof December1925,since thisreceivednot onlytherecommendationsf the sub-committee f Three and Laidoner's eportbutalso the opinionof the PermanentCourt.The latter's udgement,hat theCouncil'sdecisionon the frontierwouldbe a bindingarbitral wardandthatsuch a decision,excludinghe votes of thedisputants, ad to be unanimous,cleared he way for a settlement, speciallyafterLaidonerhad delivered isreporto theCouncilon 10December;nfact,Laidoner ad efttwoassistantsin Mosulas a continuingLeaguepresence.40aidoner,whilecomplaininghatTurkey'srefusalto allow him acrossthe 'BrusselsLine'had preventedhefulfilment f all of his functions,advised hatneitherBritainnorTurkeyhadintentionally iolated he 'BrusselsLine';he argued hat suchincidentswereinevitable, ince the line, which was not markedon the ground,did notrepresent natural oundary.However, ertain ectionsof his reportdidserveas an indictment f Turkishadministration,uch as demonstrated y theevidenceof rapeandmassacreat Baijo,where forty menarestated o havebeensuddenlyakenawayfrom heir amilies, hutupina remotebuilding, ndassassinatedncoldbloodby Turkish oldiers,who no doubtwereanxiousnotto be disturbedn theirorgiesby thehusbands ndparents f thewomen heyintendedo outrage.'Suchevidencedid not helpTurkish laimsforterritorywhich includednon-Turks,and contributed o the Council'sunanimousdecision in favour of Iraq, subject to the conditionsspecified in thecommission'seport.4'Although heTurkish overnmentadceased o attendthe Councilafterthe PermanentCourt's udgementhadbeenacceptedon 8December,t did send a note to the League n orderto place on record tsrepudiation f the Council'spowers of arbitration nd its assertionthatTurkish ights n Mosulremainedntact.BothAmeryandChamberlain,hilesatisfied with the outcome of the Council session, were critical of the


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 267diplomatic ntriguesbehindthe scenes at Geneva, and especiallyof thesympathy hown orTurkeyby the smallerpowers;orinstance,Chamberlainsaw no reason o modifyhisearlierview of Unden, herapporteur,s 'a littlemandealingwithbig affairs'.42Naturally, heTurkish overnment as critical f the Councilaward,and tsincreasinglyntransigentttitude, sdemonstratedothbyits absence rom heCouncilandbythe tone of its noteto theLeague, esultednfears hat t mightdefy the League'sdecision,andperhaps,withRussianencouragement,venresort o force. Suchconcernwas reinforced y the factthat,throughoutheperiodin which the League had been involved n the dispute, he Turkishgovernment, hichhadneverbeenenthusiasticbout he use of an institutionfelt to be under he controlof the greatpowers,continually roposeddirectnegotiations in preference o League arbitration.However, neither theMacDonald nor Baldwin governmentsrespondedfavourablyto theseproposals,whichwereusuallymadethrough heTurkishMinistern London;in fact, the appointment f ZekiaiBey to this post in September 924 wasallegedlydesigned o facilitate uch negotiations.43or example,ZekiaiBeyraised the matter upon the occasion of his first meetingwith AustenChamberlainn November1924, but the latter,evenmorethanMacDonald,refused o become nvolved n bilateral egotiations, artlybecause uchtalkswould be interpretedas by-passingthe League, and would, therefore,antagoniseLeague opinionin Britain,and partlybecausethere seemednoreasonto believe n the feasibility f a negotiated ettlement;n addition, heTurkishMinister,whowas described y Tyrrell s 'aslippery entwithwhomwould be sorry to deal',did not really impress he ForeignOfficewithhissincerity."In any case, the type of agreement uggestedby Turkey, hatBritain houldrecogniseTurkish ontrolof Mosul n return orsome quidproquo,such as oil concessions,wouldhave beenheavilycriticised oth at homeandabroad.Thus, during 1924-25 the Turkishattitudeprovedincreasinglyambiv-alent, as seen on the one hand by the proposalsfor directnegotiationsand on the otherhandby thethreat o oppose,possiblyby force,an adverseCouncildecision.As a result, heBritish overnment as forced o considertsresponsen theeventof an Anglo-Turkish ar or of a Turkish efiance f theLeague, especially in the light of reports concerningTurkish troopconcentrationsn the disputedareaand Russianencouragementf Turkishbelligerence.45nitially, uch as at the time of the LausanneConference rduringheearlypartof 1924, hisstudyconcentratedponwhatBritain erselfcould do, althoughonce the League became involvedpossible counter-measureswere widenedto includesanctionsapplied by its members; nparticular,he affairprovidesone of the fullestaccountsof Britishattitudesduring he 1920stowards he natureandfeasibility f Leaguesanctions. nthesestudies,attentionocusseduponairandnavalactionratherhan he moreexpensive rmyoperations.46hestressuponthe RAF for the'immediate nddrasticbombing' f Turkishroopconcentrationsndlinesof-communicationreflectedhedecisionmade n 1922to transfermilitary ontrolnIraq rom heWarOffice o the AirMinistrynviewof thegreater uitabilityf airpoweror


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268 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESdealingwith such areas as the MiddleEast.In any case groundoperationswouldbe difficult ndexpensiven a regionwhere heRAF hadalready rovedits relativevalue,as demonstrated y its employmento counterborder aidsontheTurco-Iraqrontiern 1923and tsbombing fTurkishorces invading'theterritory laimedby Britainn September 924.Aerialbombingwouldbeaccompanied y navalaction,whichwasdesignedo seizeaportion f Turkishterritory s a bargaining ountern theeventof a Turkish ccupation f Iraqiterritory.However,during1924it provedunnecessaryo putsuchplans ntooperation,although he Britishultimatumo Turkey n Octoberbrought hepossibility f actioncloser.Nevertheless,hequestion emained nder onstantreview,especiallyduring he periodfollowing he publication f the Mosulcommission's eport n July 1925 in view of Turkey'sreactionagainst hecommission's ecommendationsndof newsof Turkish roopmovementsntheborderarea.In fact,in October1925Britishntelligence eportedhattheTurkishgovernmenthad, albeit on the pretextof unrest in Kurdistan,concentrated bout13,000 nfantry nd5,000cavalry roopscloseto theIraqifrontierand that reinforcementswere still being sent along the Nisibinrailway.4'The discussionupon the natureof the Britishresponse o Turkishactioncontinued o be conductedwithin he frameworkf thedeterminationo avoida large-scale onfrontation ithTurkey;neitherBonarLaw norMacDonaldwanteda waroverMosul,andevenBaldwin,whowasnotnoted orinvolvinghimself n internationalssues,summonedGregoryrom heForeignOfficeon22 September1925 in orderto indicatehis personalopposition o such an'unpopular' ar.48Theneedto avoidextensivemilitary ommitmentsor thedefenceof Iraqwasrepeated y Baldwin t the Committee f ImperialDefenceon 15October; oth ChurchillndAmeryagreed,althoughhelatterqualifiedhis statementby indicatinghe natureof British reatyobligationso Iraq.49Churchill,whosereservations f the early 1920s were now reinforced y hisTreasury esponsibilities,rgued hatIraq should ight ts own battles; I ampersonally pposed o riskinga singleBritishunit ndefenceof Mesopotamia',since itwouldbemadness o get entangledhere'.Tyrrell,whorepresentedheForeign Office duringChamberlain's bsence at Locarno,agreed,whilestressingthat it was the League'sresponsibilityo recommend anctionsagainstanydefiance f its decisionon Mosul; n addition,Laidoner's resencein theborderarearenderedt desirablehat anyunilateral ndimmediate irand naval action by Britainshouldonly occur in response o a 'flagrant'violationof the frontierby Turkey.The Committeeof ImperialDefence'srecommendations,hatBritish ction orMosulshouldbe limitedn nature ndthat Britainshouldact through he League,were acceptedby the Cabinet,while helatterdecidedhatany mmediate ritish esponse,which houldonlyoccur in the event of whatit specifiedas 'a conspicuousbreach'of the Iraqifrontier,would be justified n terms of counteringTurkishdefianceof theLeague.50Aerialbombingwouldconstitute significantartof such mmediateaction,while heAdmiralty,n spiteof doubtsabouta possibleviolation f theStraitsConvention f 1923,was instructedo prepare lans or theoccupationof Turkishslandsat theentrance f theDardanelles,nd,withairsupport,or


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 269passing hrough he Straits o blockadeConstantinople. uring he nextfewmonths,these plans were furtherrefined,such as to include the possiblemovementof troopsfromIndia,although he Britishgovernmenttillhopedthat force would not be required.Thus,it provedessentialnot to provokeTurkey,and Chamberlain, ho was aware of the latter'scomplaintsaboutBritishnavalandairmovementsn theAegeanSeaduringAugust1925,urgedthe need not to giveTurkeycause for concern.5" owever, he Committee fImperialDefence'sdiscussions angedbeyondthe sphereof militaryaction,sincea sub-committee,hosereportwas notreadyuntilJanuary1926,studiedthe feasibility f employing conomicsanctionsagainstTurkey.52ut,it wasconcluded hat, even if the sanctionswere League-wide,he impositionofeconomicmeasureswould be futile,particularlys Russia,whichwas not amember f theLeagueandhad ustconcluded new treatywithTurkey,waslikely o facilitate nyTurkish fforts o evadea Leagueblockade.Therefore,he natureof the British esponse,which nvolved heuse of airandnavalaction n conjunctionwith heLeague,wasfairlyclear nthecase ofa Turkishresort to force; the situationwas more complex f the Turkishgovernment, hilerefusing o recognise nyLeaguedecisiononMosul,didnotactually fight. Chamberlain,or example,remaineduncertainas to theappropriateourseof actionin such an eventuality, lthoughafterOctober1925 he hoped that the moral pressureof the League,which had beenenhanced y the latter's uccess nhaltingheGreco-Bulgarianonflict,wouldprovesufficient.53s a result, he Leagueremained n integral artof Britishthinkinguponthe Mosuldisputebecauseof the advantageshat a League-basedpolicy appearedo possessto a Britishgovernment, hichwas acutelyawareof the limitations f Britishpowerand of the dangersof an Anglo-Turkishwar. In particular,owards he end of 1925,Chamberlainsed theLeagueas aninstrumento foster heunityof theLocarnoPowers,andthusasa meansof avoidinghedivisionsnthe ranksof theAlliedPowerswhichhadhamperedBritish policy during the LausanneConference.In fact, hisexpectation of the support of the other membersof the League ledChamberlain,ikeAmery, o becomeratherrritated t thewayinwhichsomeof thesmallerpowers,whichhadcontinually een rying o persuadeBritainounderwriteLeaguesanctionson a world-widebasis, such as throughtheGenevaProtocol 1924), dragged heirfeet on the Mosulquestion;are thesanctionsavailable', e asked, onlyif Britain pplies hemforsomeone lse'sprotection '54Likehis predecessors,Chamberlain asanxious o secure heassistance ftheothergreatpowerson accountof hisappreciationotjustof thepotentialmilitary alueof theirsupportbutalso of theimpactof greatpowerunityupontheTurkish overnment;e was alsoconcerned ot to allowtheMosulaffairto disruptheunity forgedrecentlybetween hegreatpowersat Locarnoandduringthe Greco-Bulgarianispute.AlthoughFrenchcommercial nd oilinterestswerehoping o profit romTurkey's cquisition f Mosul, herewereat the sametime a numberof cogentreasonswhichencouragedhe Frenchgovernmento respondavourablyo Chamberlain'sequestsorsupport,uchas in respectof permittingheuseof Syria,a Frenchmandate, s an airbase


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270 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

againstTurkey,and of preventinghe passageof Turkish roopsalongtheNisibinrailway hroughSyria.Briand's greement,whichwas in accordwithan earlierFrenchpledgeonthesubject n 25 November1921,wasencouragedby his desire o maintainAnglo-Frencholidarity, otjust in relation o theGermanproblembut alsoin the MiddleEast,such as in regardo therecentDruzerevolt n Syria July1925);hewasalsoconsciousof thefactthatMosulmightestablish precedentorTurkish laims o AlexandrettandAleppo.Onthewhole,Chamberlaindmitted issatisfactionwithBriand'sesponse,whichincluded he exertionof Frenchpressureupon Unden to restrainhis pro-Turkishendencies, lthough ccasionalproblems tillarose,suchas overtheNisibin railway and over the 'independent'ctivitiesof'Paul-Boncour,heFrenchdelegate,at Genevaduring he Councilsessionof December1925.55Italianhelp was deemedequallydesirable, speciallyn view of its potentialabilityo offerbothnavalandairsupport gainstTurkey,while he ikelihood fsuch cooperationwas facilitatedboth by Italian erritorial mbitions gainstTurkeyand by the continued evelopmentf Anglo-Italianelations ponthefoundationsaiddown by Chamberlain ndMussoliniat Rome in December1924.56For example, n April 1925 the Britishgovernment ad recognisedItalian ightsnIraq,suchas inrespectof participatingn thelatter's conomicdevelopment,while an Anglo-Italian xchangeof notes in December1925,providingor the mutualrecognition f theirrespective oncessionclaims nEthiopia,markeda further tage n theirrelationship;n fact,theexchange fnoteshas resulted n claims,whichareunsupportedy theevidence,hat theEthiopianagreementwas a quidpro quo for Italianhelp overMosul.s Inaddition,Chamberlain'sisitto Rapalloatthe endofDecember1925providednot just a further pportunityo meetMussolinibutalsoserved, orTurkey'sbenefit, sanother utwardmanifestationfAnglo-Italianarmony.58Britishefforts o create a kind of 'TripleEntente'betweenBritain,FranceandItalywereclearlyhelpedby the relative oincidence f interests xistingbetween them in respectof Turkey,althoughrecentevents, such as theLocarnoConference,he Greco-BulgarianisputeandtheEthiopian uestionalso promotedharmony. Is Mosul',Chamberlainsked,'to be allowed odestroywhat has beenaccomplished?'59n fact,therewereevenreportshatStresemann,he GermanForeignMinister,had reprimanded adolny,hisrepresentativen Constantinople,orencouraging urkey o lookforGermansupporton Mosul.60Chamberlain'sontacts with the great powersweresupplementedy the attentionhe paidto the threemembers f theCouncil'ssub-committee,Guani,Leon and Unden;he particularlyoncentrated ponLeon,whowas,in turn, eekingBritish upportnrespectof Spain'sroublesnMoroccoandof its desire or a permanenteatontheLeagueCouncil.6'The cooperation f the greatpowers,which was backedby a threatofmaterialand moral sanctions,undoubtedly ontributed o the decision ofTurkey,albeitreluctantly,o acquiesce n, or rathernot to openlydefy,theCouncil'sdecisionon theTurco-Iraqrontier, lthoughts dislikeof an award,whosevalidity t refused o admit,was highlightedn 17December1925bytheconclusion f a Russo-Turkishreaty,whosesignificanceerivedessfromits contents hanfromthe date and thefact of its signature.n addition,here


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 271was, predictably, strongreactionwithinTurkeyagainstbothBritain ndtheLeague,althoughn the eventsuch oppositionwas nottranslatedntomilitaryactionagainstIraq, partlybecauseof an appreciationf the realitiesof theinternationalituationand partlybecauseof a consciousdiplomatic ffortonthe partof the Britishgovernmento reconcileTurkeyat the same timeasBritainwas fulfillinghe termsof the Councildecision; orexample, nAnglo-Iraqi Treaty,whichwas signedon 13 January1926 and approvedby theLeague n April,extended he term of Britain'smandaten Iraq,although nescape clause provided or the earlyterminationf the mandateupon Iraq'sentryto the League.62 owever,as earlyas 4 December1925, Chamberlain,anticipating urkishhostility o theforthcoming ouncilaward, xaminedhepossibility f offeringKemalsomeface-saving rrangement,hichcould henbecome he basisfor an Anglo-Turkisheconciliation.venBaldwin, uchasinconversation ithZekiaiBey, personally romoteduchanagreement.63Thus, the Baldwin governmentaccepted the need to actively appeaseTurkey,and this attitude acilitated he openingof bilateralnegotiationsnApril 1926 and the eventualconclusionof the Treatyof Angoraon 5 June1926.64Although he latterembodiedTurkishacceptanceboth of theTurco-Iraq frontier ine as 'definiteand inviolable'and of the creationof a jointboundarycommission o trace the line on the ground, he progressof thenegotiations was initially hindered by Turkish demands for territorialadjustmentso the frontier inedecidedupon by the Council.However, heBritish overnment as only preparedo agree o minormodifications,uchasto give Turkeycontrolof the road from Alamun to Ashunta;the mainconcessionsmade o Turkey,whichreviveda proposaldiscussedat Lausannein 1923, comprised n arrangementompensating urkey orany oil found nMosulwitheither10%of the oil royalties or 25 yearsor a compoundumof?0.5 million. nthisway,the oil question,whichsomesee as theroot causeoftheMosuldispute,helped o solvetheproblem f whatsortof treaty houldbeconcludednthe causeofAnglo-Turkisheconciliation.

The Treatyof Angoraof June 1926, rather hanthe LeaguedecisionofDecember1925, effectively erminatedhe Anglo-TurkishonflictoverMosul;thedispute,whichhadoriginatedn 1918,hadprovedboth tedious', s shownbythelengthyandoftenabortive egotiations n the subject, nd perilous', sseen nthepersistentearsofandpreparationsor an Anglo-Turkish aras wellas in Britain'sdescriptionof Turkey as an 'aggressiveIslamic state'.65Nevertheless,he fact that the Anglo-Turkishreatyconfirmedhe Council'sdecisionandthatthedisputehad apparently een settled hrough he Leaguemeant hat the latterreceived reditat the time,especially s the Mosulawardwas made at the same time as the League'ssuccess in the solutionof theGreco-Bulgarianispute.As such,the Mosulaffairconstituted further tagein the evolutionof the peace-keepingole of the League,whiledemonstratingalso the rangeof resourcesat the latter'sdisposal,such as the role of therapporteur,he operationof a commission f inquiry, he interaction f theCouncilwiththe International ourt,as well as the natureandfeasibility fLeaguesanctions.Naturally,hereweredifficulties,uchas thedelays n thecompletion f thecommission'seport, lthoughhesewere o beexpectedna


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272 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESdevelopingnstitution;n fact, certain essons derived romthis disputewereimmediately utinto effectduring heGreco-Bulgarianncident, s seen nthecomposition f the RumboldCommission f Enquiry,whichcomprised ivemembers f whom hreecame romBritain, ranceandItaly.Once the Mosul problemhad been referredto the League, Britishgovernments adbeenconcernedo actthroughheLeague, ndChamberlain,forexample, onstantly ndeavouredo persuadeuchdoubting olleagues sAmeryto acceptthis line of policy;theirdifference f attitude owards heLeague's olereflected ot justpersonal actorsbut alsothe varyingoutlooksof theirrespectivedepartmentsn regard o the internationalituation, inceAmeryplaceda greater mphasisupon mperial onsiderations,ncludingheinterestsof Iraq,than Chamberlain. evertheless,Amery'sratherguardedattitudeowards he Leaguewas modified y hisvisitsto theLeagueCouncil,even if his doubtswere neverentirelydissipated; e returned romGeneva,impressed y the League'svalueas a social andpoliticalgathering,ince'wedanced-even the Congressof Viennacannot have danced more'.66But,behind he fa9adeof a League-basedolicy,the greatpowersperformedhemajorrole, thereby ustifying, o some extent, Turkishcriticisms hat theLeaguehad beenthe 'tool of the imperialistowers'.Although he'imperialist'natureof Britishpolicy is a matterof debate, t is clearthatit suitedBritishgovernments,s in thecase of Mosul, o utilise heLeagueas an instrumentfforeignpolicy; the Leaguewas viewed as an adjunct o Britishdiplomacy,offeringan alternativemeans of settlinga difficultproblem n a mannerfavourableo the Britishpointof view.Suchanattitude,whichemphasisedheLeague'snter-governmentalature, esultedn a policyof using heLeague obail Britainout of a difficult ituationarising rom the failureof bilateralnegotiations s well as to depoliticisehe questionhrough heinterventionf athirdparty.The Leaguealso offereda platformo publicisewhatthe Britishgovernment aw as Turkey'sunreasonablettitude,and thus as a meansofsecuringboth moraland material upport rom othermembers; s Tyrrellminuted, elianceupontheLeagueplacedBritainin a muchstronger ositionto dealwith her [Turkey]hanwe shouldbe in in the eventof the failureofdirectnegotiations'.67ritain'sreluctance o employ force againstTurkeyreinforced his particular onsideration.n addition, t was realised hat apolicy apparentlybased upon the Leaguewould be welcomedby Leagueopinion n Britain,andparticularly y the Leagueof NationsUnion; n fact,the Baldwingovernment,whichhad beencriticised or rejectinghe GenevaProtocolnMarch1925,attemptedo conciliate uchopinionbypointingo itssupportof the League n boththe Mosul andGreco-Bulgarianisputes.Forexample,ChamberlainnformedheLeagueAssembly n September 925that'no greaterproofof the influencewhich the Leaguehas gained ... can beoffered hanbytheactionwhichmyGovernmentastaken nconnectionwiththedifferenceoncerningMosul'.68However,his stressupontheLeague's ole couldnotdisguise hefact that,theCouncildecisionof 16December1925,while ettlinghe fateofMosul,didnot reallysolve the Anglo-Turkishispute.TheTurkish overnment'sefusalto accept he Mosulaward mpliedhatit was merelybiding ts timeuntil he


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'A TEDIOUS AND PERILOUS CONTROVERSY' 273moment seemed appropriate or settlingit to Turkey's satisfaction,such as at atime when Britishforces had been completely withdrawn rom Iraq or when thegreat powers were less united.The state of Anglo-Turkishrelations at the closeof 1925 was, therefore, a potential threat to peace, as well as to the futurestabilityof Iraq, and this illustrates he limitationsof the League's achievement.It was left to direct negotiations outside of the League to secure a morepermanentAnglo-Turkishreconciliation, albeit upon the-basis of the territorialsolution advocated by the League. The Treaty of Angora of 1926, by removingone of the principal stumbling-blocks to improved Anglo-Turkish relations,facilitated their rapprochement, although the latter did not become obviousuntil the early 1930s.69In fact, in 1932, Turkey, like Iraq, even entered theLeague of Nations. The 1926 agreement also promoted the political andeconomic development of Iraq, and especially the exploitation of Mosul oil,which had performeda role in the origins, course and settlement of the Mosuldispute.

NOTES1. S.R. Sonyel,TurkishDiplomacy 918-1923. MustafaKemaland the TurkishNationalistMovement(London, 1975), 195-226; "F", 'Turkish Facts and Fantasies', Foreign Affairs,

III, 1925, 589-603. For the Mosul problem, see: E. Kedourie, England and the MiddleEast. TheDestruction f the OttomanEmpire1914-1921(Hassocks,1978) 133, 175-213(on the historical context); A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1925, i (London,1927), 471-531; V.F. Minorsky, The Mosul Question(Paris, 1926).2. Sonyel, op cit., 187-8, 195, 201, 211-12; R.H. Davison, 'TurkishDiplomacy from Mudrosto Lausanne' in G.A. Craig and F. Gilbert(eds.), TheDiplomats 1919-1939, i, (New York:1965), 172-209.3. Minutes, March 1924, FO.371/10076. E2682/7/65(24). British Foreign Office (FO.),Colonial Office (CO.), Admiralty (ADM.), and Cabinet (Cab.) Papers are located at thePublic Record Office, London; MacDonald, PrimeMinister, 26 March 1924, Hansard, 171,column 1351; MacDonald, 18 June 1924, Cabinet 38(24), Cab.23/48. On Britishpolicy inIraq, see: Report of Cabinet Committee on Iraq, 23 March 1923, CP.167(23), Cab.24/159;Cabinet discussion, 26 April 1923, Cabinet 22(23), Cab.23/45; Minute, Sir J. Shuckburgh,Asst. Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 8 Feb. 1924, CO.730/64. CO.6225; Memo.on InterdepartmentalMeeting, 16 May 1924, CO.730/65. CO.22074; H. Mejcher, 'Iraq'sExternal Relations, 1921-1926', Middle Eastern Studies, 13, 1977, 340 (herafterMejcher/MES).4. E.B. Scovill, 'The RAF and the Desert Frontiers of Iraq, 1919-1930', Aerospace Historian,22, 1975, 84-5; P. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, Ithaca, 1976, 90, 160; N.Henderson, Water underthe Bridges, London 1945, 119-20.5. For example, see: Curzon to Foreign Office, 19 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E830/1/44(23);Minute, Shuckburgh, 14 Feb. 1924, CO.730/65. CO.6364; Macdonald Government'sinstructions for the Constantinople Conference, March 1924, FO.371/10076.E2053/7/65(24); Minutes, November 1924, FO.371/10080. E9561/7/65(24); Chamberlainto Worthington-Evans, 18 Dec. 1924, AC.51/1/237. The Austen Chamberlain Papers(AC.) are at Birmingham University. For assessments of British motives, see: e.g. K.Hoffman, Oelpolitik und angelsdchsicher Imperialismus (Berlin, 1926); H. Mejcher,Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928 (London: 1976), 131-2, 135-8, 165; Sluglett,op.cit.,79-80, 103-4, 110-15;M.Kent,OilandEmpire.BritishPolicyandMesopotamianOil 1900-1920(London:1976), 126-8, 155-7;E.Monroe,Britain'sMomentntheMiddleEast (London: 1963), 103.6. For example, see the debate in 1924 on grantingoil concessions in Mosul with the Foreign


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274 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESOffice opposing the views of the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade: CO.730/65.CO.3719, CO.6364, CO.9955. On Curzon: Curzon to Bonar Law, 13 Jan. 1923,FO.371/9059. E589/1/44(23); Earl of Ronaldshay, TheLife ofLordCurzon,ii (London:1928), 333.7. S. Longrigg, ed, Oil in theMiddleEast(London: 1960), 24, 66-83.8. Ronaldshay, op.cit.,332-3; MacDonald to Henderson, 30 June 1924, FO.371/10078.E5212/7/65(24); Minute, MacDonald, 31 Oct. 1924, FO.371/10080. E9561/7/65(24);Minute, Chamberlain, 2 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6772/32/65(25). Chamberlaininsisted on spelling'Irak'in this manner,and criticised the use of 'Iraq'.9. Curzon to Foreign Office, 23 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E959/1/44(23); Ronaldshay, op.cit.,329, 331. Rumbold, Curzon's debuty at Lausanne, referred to 'uppish Orientals'; M.Gilbert,Sir HoraceRumbold. ortrait fa Diplomat. 869-1941 (London: 1973), 280-98.10. R.W. Child,A DiplomatLooksatEuropeNew York: 1925), 96.11. Curzon to Foreign Office, 13 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9059. E590/l/44(23); Sonyel, op.cit.,185.12. Curzon to Foreign Office, 12 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9059. E587/1/44(23); Curzon to ForeignOffice, 23 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E932 and E959/1/44(23); Curzon to Crowe, 9 Feb.1923, FO.371/9063. E1386/l/44(23); Sonyel, op.cit.,189-90; Henderson,op.cit.,109.13. Shuckburgh to Curzon, 12 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9059. E562/1/44(23); Curzon to ForeignOffice, 19 Jani.1923, FO.371/9060. E830/l/44(23).14. Curzon to Foreign Office, 23 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E959/l/44(23).15. Curzon to Foreign Office, 24 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060. E961/1/44(23); Crowe, PermamentUnder-Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Drummond, 20 Jan. 1923, FO.371/9060.E967/1/44(23).16. LeagueofNations,Official ournal LNOJ.), v, 1923, 20 1-2.17. Curzon to Foreign Office, 5 Feb. 1923, FO.371/9064. E1509/1/44(23); Curzon to ForeignOffice, 4 Feb. 1923, FO.371/9065. E1586/1/44(23); Gilbert,op.cit,289.

18. Cabinet to Rumbold, 21 April 1923, Cabinet 22(23), Appendix, Cab, 23/45; Minute, D.G.Osborne, First Secretary, 8 March 1924, FO.371/10076. E2053/7/65(24).19. MacDonald to Foreign Office, 10 June 1924, FO.371/10078. E5261/7/65(24).20. LNOJ.,v, 1924, 1465.21. LNOJ.,v, 1924, 1291-2, 1318-24, 1337-9, 1358-60, 1670; Britain and Turkey sentmemos. to the League on 14 Aug. and 5 Sept. 1924, LNOJ., v, 1924, 1566-83.22. 29 Sept. 1924, Cabinet 51(24), Cab.23/48.23. Minute, Osborne, 8 March 1924, FO.371/10076. E2053/7/65(24); Memo., 6 May 1924,CO.730/65. CO.22074.24. LNOJ.,v, 1924, 1584-6, 1649-50; Memo., J. Thomas, Secretary of State for Colonies, 14Oct. 1924, CO.730/65. CO.48890.25. Minute, T. Spring Rice, Head of Eastern Dept., 20 Oct. 1924, FO.371/10080.E9241/7/65(24).26. LNOJ.,v, 1924, 1648-54, 1659-62, 1670 (includes a map of the "BrusselsLine").27. In London, the commission sent the Foreign Office a questionnaire: see FO.371/10081.E10538 and E10845/7/65(24).28. See Minutes, Oct. 1924, FO.371/10080. E8949/7/65(24).29. Lindsay to Chamberlain,28 Jan. 1925, FO.371/10823. E516/32/65/25), and see Crowe'sminute, 29 Jan. 1925; Minute, Crowe, 19 Feb. 1925, FO.371/10824. E964/32/65(25).Similar views were expressed in the Colonial Office, e.g. Minute,Shuckburgh,23 May 1925,CO.730/84. CO.23573.30. Amery to Chamberlain, 5 March 1925, FO.371/10824. E1469/32/65(25); Minute,

Chamberlain, 3 April 1925, FO.371/10825. E2093/32/65(25); Chamberlainto Amery, 5June 1925, AC.52/1/33; Amery to Chamberlain,6 June 1925, AC.52/1/34; Chamberlainto Amery, 11 June 1925, FO.800/258; L.S. Amery, My PoliticalLife, ii (London: 1953),308.31. Dobbs to Chamberlain,2 Feb. 1925, FO.371/10824. E1044/32/65(25).32. Report, League doc. no.C400 M147 1925 VII.33. Toynbee, op.cit., 507-11; W.L. Westerman, 'Kurdish Independence and RussianExpansion', ForeignAffairs,24, 1946, 679. The exact number of Kurds in Mosul wasdebatable; Turkey, which put the total at 260,000, disagreed with the British estimate of450,000.


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'A TEDIOUSAND PERILOUSCONTROVERSY' 27534. See, e.g. Sir J. Fischer Williams, 'Sovereignty, Seisin and the League', British YearbookofInternational aw, 1926,26-7.35. 7 August 1925, Cabinet 44(25), Cab.23/50.36. LNOJ., vi, 1925, 892.37. LNOJ., vi, 1925, 1307-37, 1377-82; Major-General A.C. Temperley, The WhisperingGalleryof Europe, London, 1938, 32; Amery, op.cit., 326.38. LNOJ.,vi, 1925,1435-40.39. LNOJ.,vi, 1925, 1404-5, 1583-6.40. BritishMemorial to the PermanentCourt, 21 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6305/32/65(25);the Court'sjudgement, 21 Nov. 1925, Publications of the Permanent Courtof InternationalJustice,Series B, no.12, Collection f AdvisoryOpinions;LNOJ., vii, 1926, 120-9, 145,305-8. On the continuingLeague presence, ibid. 538, 1040-1.41. LNOJ., vii, 1926, 187-93.42. Chamberlainto Ida, his sister, 19 Dec. 1925, AC.5/1/371, Chamberlain to Ivy, his wife, 9,10 and 13 Dec. 1925, AC.6/l/626-8; Temperley, op.cit., 33; Minute, Chamberlain, 18

Sept. 1925, FO.371/10825. E5662/32/65(25); Amery, op.cit., 326.43. Henderson to MacDonald, 20 Aug. 1924, FO.371/10079. E7314/7/65(24); ChamberlaintoWorthington-Evans, 18 Dec. 1924, AC.51/1/237; Chamberlain to Lindsay, 21 Jan. 1925,FO.371/10823. E465/32/65(25); 8 April 1925, Cabinet 20(25), Cab.23/49; ChamberlaintoLindsay, 2 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6589/32/65(25). Drummond was kept informedofsuch approaches.44. Minute, Tyrrell, 19 Nov. 1924, FO.371/10081. E10061/7/65(24). Although MacDonaldopposed 'double negotiations', he was occasionally ambivalent on this point: Minute,MacDonald, 30 Sept. 1924, FO.371/10080. E8436/7/65(24). Minute, MacDonald, 1 Nov.1924, FO.371/10080. E9561/7/65(24).45. Lindsay to Chamberlain,21 Nov. 1925, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939,IA, i, doc.541; Minute, MacDonald, 1 Nov. 1924, FO.371/10081. E10061/7/65(24);CP.450(25), 23 Oct. 1925, Cab.24/175; Memo., G.W. Rendell, First Secretary, 19 Oct.1925, FO.371/10826. E6418/32/65(25); Minute, J.D. Gregory, 2 Oct. 1925.FO.371/10825. E6004/32/65(25).46. Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) meetings 184, 5 May 1924, 185, 19 June 1924,191, 11 Dec. 1924, Cab.2/4; Osborne to Colonial Office, 14 March 1924, CO.730/65.CO.12346; see also Foreign and Colonial Office contacts, Oct. 1924, CO.730/65.CO.50557; Memo., Thomas, 14 Oct. 1924, CO.730/65. CO.48890; Sluglett,op.cit., 115.47. 13 Oct.1925, Cabinet 48(25), Cab.23/51; War Office Memo., 5 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10826.E6172/32/65(25).48. Tyrrell to Chamberlain, 19 Oct. 1925, AC.52/l/770; Minute, Gregory, 22 Sept. 1925,FO.371/10825. E5845/32/65(25).49. C.I.D. meeting 203, 15 Oct. 1925, Cab.2/4; Churchill to Chamberlain, 7 Sept. 1925,AC.52/1/169; Churchill to Baldwin, 7 Sept. 1925, S.B.P.115/112. The Stanley BaldwinPapers (S.B.P.) are at CambridgeUniversity.50. 21 Oct. 1925, Cabinet 49(25), Cab.23/51; CP.528(25), 15 Dec.1925, Cab.24/176. TheAdmiralty drew up the necessary plans; the details (Admiralty case no.1856, Adm. 116.1925 - 50.4, MediterraneanSquadron) have been destroyed, but an outline can be found inIndex 24550.51. Chamberlain to Vice-AdmiralSir R. Keyes, Commander of the MediterraneanSquadron inthe Aegean, 4 Nov. 1925, AC.52/1/541. A similar situation arose early in 1924 when theForeign Office criticised the Colonial Office and Air Ministry plans for manoeuvres inMosul; see CO.730/65. CO.12346.52. C.I.D. Meeting 208, 26 Jan, 1926, Cab.2/4; 17 Feb. 1926, Cabinet 6(26), Cab.23/52.53. J. Barros,TheLeagueof Nationsand theGreatPowers.TheGreek-Bulgarianncident f1925 (London,1970), 120; P.J. Beck,Britainand thePeacekeeping ole of theLeagueofNations, 1924-1929, University of London, Ph.D., Thesis, 1971, 173-214.54. Chamberlain to Ida, 19 Dec. 1925, AC.5/1/371; Chamberlain to Ivy, 13 Dec. 1925,AC.6/1/628; Amery to Baldwin, 9 Dec. 1925, S.B.P.1 15/40; Minute, Chamberlain,2 Nov.1925, FO.371/10826. E6772/32/65(25).55. Lord Crewe, British ambassador in Paris, to Selby, 17 Sept. 1925, FO.371/10825.E5662/32/65(25); Chamberlain to Crewe, 14 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10852.


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276 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIESE6984/357/89(25); 3 Dec. 1925, Cabinet 57(25), 16 Dec. 1925, Cabinet 59(25),Cab.23/5 1; J. Paul-Boncour, Entre Deux Guerres.Souvenirs ur la 111eRepublique,i(Paris: 1945), 174-5.

56. Minute, Chamberlain, 1 Dec. 1925, FO.371/10826. E7369/32/65(25); Chamberlain toGraham, 13 April 1926, FO.800/259. For the debate on Anglo-Italianrelations, see: P.G.Edwards, 'Britain, Fascist Italy and Ethiopia, 1925-28', European tudiesReview, , 1974,359-60.57. On Italian rightsin Iraq, see: CO.730/84. CO.19020.58. P. Edwards, 'The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings' HistoricalJournal, iv, 1971,156-60.59. Minute, Chamberlain, 2 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6772/32/65(25); DocumentsonBritishForeignPolicy1919-1939, IA, i, doc. 566, Tyrrellto Lindsay, 30 Jan, 1926.60. Lindsay to Chamberlain,4 Oct. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6195/32/65(25).61. Chamberlain to Leon, 3 and 11 Nov. 1925, FO.800/258.62. Command aper (Cmd.)2587(26); British parliamentarydebates, 17 Dec. 1925, 21 Dec.1925, Hansard, 189, columns 1624-7, 2076-152; LNOJ.,vii, 1926, 5023. For Iraq'sreaction, see: A. Al-Marayati, A DiplomaticHistoryof Modern raq (New York: 1961),53-4.63. Chamberlain to Lindsay, 4 Dec. 1925, FO.371/10826. E7485/32/65(25); Chamberlain toSalisbury, 4 Nov. 1925, FO.371/10826. E6875/32/65(25); 3 Dec. 1925, Cabinet 57(25),Cab.23/5 1.64. Cmd.2679(26); LNOJ.,vii, 1926, 858-9. Cf. Curzon to Foreign Office, 30 Dec. 1922,FO.371/9058. E2/1/44(23); Minute, Osborne, 1 July 1924, FO.371/10079.E6205/7/65(24).65. Chamberlain's statement to the Imperial Conference, 20 Oct. 1926, Documents n British

ForeignPolicy1919-1939, IA, ii, 943.66. Amery, op.cit.,33 1-2; Amery to Baldwin, 18 Sept. 1926, S.B.P.1 15/120.67. Minute, Tyrrell, 19 Nov. 1924, FO.371/10081. E10061/7/65(24).68. Recordsof the SixthAssembly, 925, 37.69. L. Zhivkova,Anglo-Turkish elations1933-1939, London: 1976), 3.

'a Tedious and Perilous Controversy' - Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926

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Transcript of 'a Tedious and Perilous Controversy' - Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926