A SUMMARY OF FACTS COMPARING THE BELIEFS OF MUSLIMS VS. THOSE OF IBN TAYMIYYAH AND THE...

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A SUMMARY OF FACTS

COMPARING THE BELIEFSOF MUSLIMS VS. THOSE OF

IBN TAYMIYYAH AND THE

PHILOSOPHERS’August 29, 2011Posted by Sheikh Abu Adamhttp://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/

A QUICK LOOK AT THE RESULTS OBTAINED MUSLIM sayings

versus those of thephilosophers

Ibn Taymiyyah’ssayings versusthose of thephilosophers

Number of

disagreements

13 6

Number of agreements

1 5

Number of similarities

0 3

Total number of beliefs compared

14 14

% of agreements 7% 36%% of similarsayings

0% 21%

% of similarsayings or

7% 57%

http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2011/08/29/a-summary-of-facts-comparing-the-beliefs-of-muslims-vs-those-of-ibn-taymiyyah-and-the-philosophers/





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agreements

FALSE PROPAGANDA & ACCUSATIONSA common accusation of the wahabis and other anthropomorphists

throughout history, is that the mainstream scholars of Islam, theSunnis, the Asħˆariyys and Maaturiidiyys, took their beliefs from theAristotelian philosophers. For someone with insight into the scienceof belief, this is obviously ridiculous, as they are bitter enemies, butthose who do not have this insight might be affected by such fearmongering.

FACT 1In reality, however, the reason why Sunni scholars engaged deeplyinto arguments based on pure reasoning, was to refute the beliefsof the philosophers. Accordingly, they studied their concepts andterminology, and then showed how the Aristotelian arguments werewrong using the terminology of philosophy.

FACT 2On the other hand, Ibn Taymiyyah also studied Aristotelian arguments,particularly as presented by the Spanish philosopher Ibn Rusħd (thegrandson). His purpose, however, was quite different. What he wantedwas to find arguments against the Sunnis that could be used to defend

and support his anthropomorphist belief that Aļļaah is somethingwith a size, in a location, that moves and goes through changes.During this process he even adopted some beliefs that are identical orequivalent to those of the Aristotelians.He was however a rhetorician of proportions, knowing how to soundconvincing to the naïve, without actually saying much at all. He rarelydefines his terms or clarifies exactly what the point of disagreementis. He sidetracks a lot and makes long and useless discussions arguingabout terminology, “if you by this word this, then I say that,” evenwhen he knows very well that this is not what his opponent means.

He also hides his own views by arguing through quoting others, or bysaying, “it could be said to that…” or the like. That is why you find himextremely long winded and incredibly vague. It is because he beatsaround the bush so much, that many scholars never discovered himand caught him red handed with his anthropomorphist agenda.

ANALYSIS OF COMPARISON OF MUSLIM & IBN TAYMIYYAH



BELIEFS VS PHILOSOPHERSThe below table outlines some of the fundamental principles of belief that are disputed between the philosophers, the Sunnis and IbnTaymiyyah, to see who resembles one another more. Be forewarnedthat the Wahabis will try to skew the results below by making two of the principle issues into many issues.The first principle issue is that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. not somethingin a direction that can be pointed at. It is based on this principle thatthey denied that any of the words ascribing meanings to Aļļaah inthe Qur’aan and the Sunnah, such as nazala, jaa’, istawa, wajh, yad,âynayn, janb, qadam, ‘işbiˆ, and yamiin, can be understood in termsof movement, shape, parts, limbs or the like. So it becomes accordingto them, nazala (descend by movement), jaa’ (came by movement),

istawa (become settled), wajh (face), yad (forelimb), âyn (organ of sight), janb (side), qadam (foot), ‘işaabiˆ (fingers), and yamiin (righthand side), etc. In contrast, the ‘Asħâriyys will either simply narratesuch words, when apparently ascribed to Aļļaah, without assigningany meaning, but denying a bodily meaning, or they will look at whatthe Arabic language allows of meanings, and choose one meaningthat befits the Creator. For example, jaa’ becomes “His orders came,” and “istawa” becomes “controls”, and wajh becomes “what is done forHis sake”, and so on. This is not denial of attributes, as the followersof Ibn Taymiyyah claim, it is a denial of limbs, and this comes back

to one principle belief , namely that Aļļaah is not a body, i.e. notsomething with size or shape or borders. Since Ibn Taymiyyah believesthat Aļļaah is a body, he interprets any word that can be understoodin a bodily manner as having a bodily meaning, whereas Muslimsinterpret such words in ways that do not involve bodily attributes.There are therefore many differences on interpretation that in realitycome back to one single principle.The second principle issue is the Muslim principle belief that Aļļaah isnot something that events happen in, not something that changes,in contrast with the opposite belief of Ibn Taymiyyah. This is anotherprinciple belief with many sub questions in the same manner as thefirst principle issue. For example, ghađab will be interpreted by IbnTaymiyyah as emotional change, whereas Muslims will understand itas Aļļaah willing punishment, without Him changing or being in time.That being said, here are the details of the analysis:

The belief of the The belief of the The belief of Ibn



philosophers Sunnis(Asħˆariyys,Maaturiidiyys andnoble Ĥanbaliyys)

Taymiyyah

1. Most of thephilosophersbelieved that theworld is eternal.They believedthat matter iseternal and thatthere are oneor more eternal

bodies (somethingwith size) (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 13).(Adħ-Dħakħiirah isa book written bya Turkish scholarto judge betweenAl-Ghazaaliyy andthe philosophers,as ordered by

Muĥammad Al-Faatiĥ)

Nothing is eternalother than Aļļaah,and He is not a body.Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy said:{He is now asHe always was,eternally with Hisattributes, beforeHis creation came

into being.} Theexistence of a bodywithout a beginningis impossible,because it needs acreator to specify itsshape. Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyysaid {in brackets}:{The six directions}up, down, front,

back, left and right{do not contain Him}because that wouldmake Him {like allcreated things}

He believed thatAļļaah is an eternalbody (i.e. limitedin all 6 directions– a 3 dimensionalshape) and thatthere have alwaysbeen other bodieswith Him, coming

into existence,one after anothereternally without abeginning.[1]Accordingly, thereis one eternal body,while other bodiesare eternal in kind inhis view.

Similarity tophilosophers

Disagree Identical (inmeaning, but not in naming; he callsthe eternal body

Aļļaah, while the philosophers do not.)

2. The philosopherssaid that theworld (anythingother than Aļļaah)

It is rationallypossible for theworld to cease toexist completely.

Ibn Taymiyyah saidit is not rationallypossible that therebe no creation

http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/TerjeDropBox/Dropbox/Sunnis,%20Ibn%20Taymiyyah%20&%20Philosophers%20-%20An%20introductory%20comparison%20(1).docx#_ftn1




cannot ceaseto exist (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 65). Inother words, it is a

must to them thatother than Aļļaahexists.

We only know that itwill continue by thescriptures that tell usabout resurrection

and eternal life inParadise or torture inHell.

(something otherthan Aļļaah),because Aļļaah mustalways create.[2]

This is becausehis actions are notbeginningless andendless accordingto Ibn Taymiyyah,but happen one afteranother.[3] In otherwords, it is a must tohim that other thanAļļaah exists.


Disagree Identical inmeaning, but not innaming.

3. The philosophersdo not accept tosay that Aļļaah haschoice in whetherto create or not

(Adħ-Dħakħiirah,71).

The Sunnis say thatAļļaah has a Will, andthat it is impossiblethat Aļļaah shouldneed/ be compelled

to create.

Ibn Taymiyyah saidthat Aļļaah mustalways create, asmentioned. He saidAļļaah has a choice in

what to create, butnot whether to createor not.[4]


Disagree Identical

4. The philosopherscannot prove thatthe world needsa creator basedon their premises.This is becausethey claimed thatmatter, and whatthey call “the firstmind”, and some

The Sunnis said thatall other than Aļļaahneed to be created byHim, and that He isnot of created kind,such as bodies, soHe does not need acreator.Aţ-Ţaĥaawiyy said{in brackets}: {The

Ibn Taymiyyahcannot prove thatthe world needs acreator based onhis premises. This isbecause he said thatAļļaah himself is in aplace and has 6 limits(i.e. 3 dimensional)and yet is not created









other parts of theworld, are eternal.(Adħ-Dħakħiirah,87)

six directions} up,down, front, back,left and right {do notcontain Him} because

that would makeHim {like all createdthings}

(see footnote 1). Heis therefore unableto establish thatthings with 6 limits

need a creator, i.e.all the world as weknow it. After all, if such a complex bodycan exist without acreator, then whatabout simpler ones?


Disagree Identical

5. The philosopherssaid that it is onlypossible for Aļļaahto create onesingle thing, andHe cannot createa body. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 99).

Aļļaah has the powerto create infinitelymany creationsappearing over time.

Aļļaah has the powerto create infinitelymany creationsappearing over time.


Disagree Disagree

6. The philosophersrefused toascribe to Aļļaahattributes thataffirm meaningsto Aļļaah Himself,and are not merenegations. That is,knowledge, power,life, will, hearing,seeing, and speech.Even when theyuse these words,they intend by

Sunnis said thatAļļaah is attributedwith knowledge,power, life, will,hearing, seeing andspeech that are notmerely negationsof their opposites.They said that theseare eternal andunchanging attributesthat are not in timeand affirm meaningsthat are eternally

He said that Aļļaahis attributed withknowledge, power,life, will, hearing,seeing and speechthat are not merelynegations of theiropposites. He said,however, that thesechange over time.



them the negationof some meaning.(Adħ-Dħakħiirah,106).

true of Aļļaah,and are not merenegations of flaws.


Disagree Disagree

7. The philosophersagreed to saythat the creatoris not a body, norlike a body, andHe is not in time,place, direction,or existing insomething else.That is, to ascribeattributes to Aļļaahthat negate whatdoes not befit Him.They also agreedto ascribe to Himmeanings related

to creating, such asproviding, creating,controlling etc.(Adħ-Dħakħiirah,106)

Although there aredifferences regardingthe details of thisissue, Sunnis saidthat Aļļaah is not intime or in place, ordirection. The basesfor this is theQuranic, “He doesnot resembleanything”, which isunderstood literally,and any otherscripture isunderstood in light of it. The reason for

this is that thereality of theCreator’s existencemust be complete inperfection, andcreated existence isneed in each andevery sense,because it needs acreator. Since Aļļaah

is not created, Hecannot resemblecreated things. Thisis shown by theQuranicrhetorical, “Is the

Ibn Taymiyyahbelieved that thecreator is a bodylocated abovecreation,[5] withcreated events in it,such asmovement.[6]Hisbasis for this istaking all scripturesascribing a meaningto Aļļaah accordingto the customarymeanings; themeanings that applyto creation. He then

interprets theQuranic, “He doesnot resembleanything” accordingly. Heunderstands this non-resemblance tomean different fromcreation the waycreated things differ

from one another, soHe is bigger in sizethan anything else,stronger, etc.Accordingly, heinterpreted words







One that Creates likewhat does notcreate?”

ascribed to Aļļaah inthe scriptures asmeaning physicalattributes and

change, such aslimbs, place,movement,emotions, and so on.


Identical Disagree

8. The philosophersdenied that Aļļaahknows particulars.(Adħ-Dħakħiirah,172).

Aļļaah knowseverything with aneternal knowledgethat does not change.

He said that Aļļaahknows everything,but that it changesover time in termsof particulars asthe future becomespast.[7]


Disagree Similar (becausethis means hebelieved that

Aļļaah’s knowledge isbounded by time. )

9. The philosophersdiscussed whetherthe universe itself,as a total body, hasa self that speaksand moves by will.(Adħ-Dħakħiirah,179).

The Sunnis said thereis no way of knowingsuch a thing withoutrevelation fromAļļaah.

I haven’t seen IbnTaymiyyah mentionthis, so we’ll give himthe benefit of thedoubt.


Disagree Disagree

10. Thephilosophers saidthat normal causeactually influences

The Sunnis said thatthe hit to the floorand the breaking of the glass are two

Ibn Taymiyyah isvery vague on thisissue. However,it appears that





in reality its effect,i.e. the causesbetween createdthings, such as

glass hits floor– glass breaks isa matter of realinfluence. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 219).

different creations of Aļļaah, thus the hithas no real influence,only apparently and

according to thenormal correlationthat Aļļaah hascreated betweenthings, such as:heat (one creation)– burn (anothercreation),hit (one creation)– break (another

creation), jump off cliff (onecreation) – fall down(another creation),etc.

he is close to themuˆtazilite view,namely that thingsdo have actual

intrinsic influenceon each other, butthat this is createdin them, and theyuse it by Aļļaah’spermission.[8] This ishalf way to the belief of the philosophers,who believed thatsuch influence is not

created. For example,it could be then,according to him heat(one creation) – burn(a creation broughtinto existence byheat.)


Disagree Similar

11. TheAristoteliansbelieved thatbodies do notcontain indivisibleelements that arenot divisible in themind’s eye.

The Asħˆariyysagreed that if bodiesare divided, onewould eventuallyreach an elementthat is not divisible.Not by force, andnot even in themind’s eye could it

be divided. This isbecause if one saide.g. that a stone isinfinitely divisible intoinfinite quantities,then this would

Ibn Taymiyyahagreed with theAristotelians andcriticized theAsħˆariyys fortheir claim thatall bodies mustconsist of indivisibleparticles.[10]This is

because he believedAļļaah to be a body,and did not want tosay openly that thisbody is divisible.He did however say







necessitate that thestone has infinitequantity, which wouldmean that its size

is infinite, and thisis clearly not thecase.[9]

that it is shrinkable,as seen in thequote in last quotedparagraph of this

article.


Disagree Identical

12. The Platonicphilosophersbelieved that thehuman soul isbeginningless.Aristoteleansdisagreed. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 248).

It is impossible thatother than Aļļaahcould exist without abeginning.

Since Ibn Taymiyyahallows for createdkinds to be eternal,he would say thatthe human soulas a kind could bebeginningless, evenif he did not say thisabout the soul inparticular.

Similarity tophilosophers:

Disagree Similar

13. Thephilosophersdenied bodilyresurrection, aswell as Hell andParadise, andsaid that whatthe prophets saidregarding thisare all figures of speech. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 261).

Since the apparentmeaning of thescriptures is thatthere will be bodilyresurrection and Hellor Paradise for them,we must accept this.There is no reliableevidence contrary tothis. The philosophersreasoned that thenon-existent cannotre-exist, because itwill be somethingelse. The answer isthat it was possible

Ibn Taymiyyah hasno dispute withSunnis on this matter– as far as I know.


http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2009/09/12/ibn-taymiyyah-denies-tajsiim/








in existence inthe first place, soone cannot say itbecomes impossible

in existence afterthat.


Disagree Disagree

14. Thephilosophersdeveloped theiropinions ontheology withoutsupport fromrevelation. (Adħ-Dħakħiirah, 270).

The primary basesfor religiousknowledge are theQur’aan andĥadiitħ.[11] As forthe mind, its role isto conceptualize and

judge in terms of true and false. It isthe tool by which thescriptures can beunderstood throughsound deductivereasoning, and

avoidingcontradictory ideas.It is not in itself atool for knowingfacts of religion.However, theknowledge thatAļļaah exists, hasWill, Power andKnowledge can be

achieved withoutscripture, becausecreation definitelyneeds a creator.Likewise, the mindalone can reach the

Ibn Taymiyyahclaims to stick tothe scriptures morethan anyone, butdue to his blindnesshe ended upunderstanding themin a contradictorymanner,[12] and ina way that ruins thepremises for provingthat Aļļaah exists byobserving creation.For details see the

PDF article:Rational QuranicIslam vs WahabismSee also:For children: “Howcan we know that allother religions thanIslam are incorrectwhen there are somany?”



http://sunnianswers.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/rational-quranic-islam-vs-wahabism.pdf


http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2009/10/31/for-children-how-can-we-know-that-all-other-religions-than-islam-are-incorrect-when-there-are-so-many/

























































sayings oragreements

[1] Ibn Taymiyyah said:

“This middle saying among the three sayings of Al-Qaađii Abuu Yaˆlaais the one that agrees with what Aĥmad says and others among the

imaams. He [i.e. Aĥmad ibn Ĥanbal – and this is a lie, Aĥmad believedwhat Muslims believe, but that is another matter (Trans.)] has stated, “ Aļļaah is in a particular direction, and He is not spread out in all directions. Rather, He is outside the world, distinct from His creation,separate from it, and He is not in every direction.” This is what Aĥmad, may Aļļaah have mercy upon him, meant when hesaid,

“He has a limit that only He knows.” If Aĥmad had meant the direction towards the Ârsħ (Throne) only,then this would be known to Aļļaah’s slaves, because they know that

Aļļaah’s limit from this direction is the Ârsħ, so we know then thatthe limit they do not know is unqualified, and is not specified for thedirection of the ârsħ.” (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/438)Accordingly, Ibn Taymiyyah’s saying was that Aļļaah has one limitwhich is known, and that is the Ârsħ, and that the other directionsare also limited, but these are unknown to us. This is understood fromhis support to the expression “He is not spread out in all directions”.This is made even clearer in his statement:

“That something existing should not be increasing, or decreasing, orneither increasing nor decreasing, and yet exist and not have a size –this is impossible.” (Bayaan Talbiis Al-Jahmiyyah, 1/601)In other words, he is of the opinion that everything that exists,including the Creator, must have a size. According to Ibn Taymiyyahthen, Aļļaah has a size limited by 6 limits.

http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/TerjeDropBox/Dropbox/Sunnis,%20Ibn%20Taymiyyah%20&%20Philosophers%20-%20An%20introductory%20comparison%20(1).docx#_ftnref1




He is also of the opinion that creation as a kind has always existedwithout a beginning, because he believes that Aļļaah’s creatinghappens in time. Therefore, he argues, Aļļaah has always been doingone act after another (i.e. creating) without a beginning. He says:

“It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, andnot having something done in particular, so there is no eternal objectin the world, and He is not a complete cause for anything in the world,but He has in beginningless eternity always been a complete cause forsomething, one after another…” ( Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97) Since nothingexists in his belief, except what has a size, we can understand that hebelieves bodies to be eternal in kind, even if each individual body has

a beginning, except the Creator’s.[2] He says:

“It is a necessity of Aļļaah’s self to act, but not an act in particular, andnot having something done in particular,…” ( Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/97)[3] Ibn Taymiyyah said:

“It has become clear that nothing can come into existence except froman actor that does something one after another.” ( Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/141) He also said:

“An act is impossible except bit by bit.” ( Aş-Şafadiyyah, 2/141)[4] See footnote 2.[5] See footnote #1[6] Ibn Taymiyyah said :

In the above statement, Ibn Taymiyyah addresses his opponent, whohas stated that movement must have a beginning, so it cannot be anattribute of perfection. Ibn Taymiyyah responds to this: “Beginning













for its kind or each distinct movement? The first is impossible, but thesecond is accepted as true.” (Dar’ Taˆaaruđ A-ˆAql wa-n-Naql , 4/160)In other words, it is not impossible that there are infinitely manymovements in the past in Ibn Taymiyyah’s view, and it can be anattribute of Aļļaah, since it is an attribute of perfection in his view. Thisis based on his belief that Aļļaah is a body, because a body that cannotmove is “stuck” and it is better to be able to move than to be stuck.Sunnis believe that Aļļaah is not a body, so the attributes of beingable to move or being stuck do not apply to Him. Note that movementis not an attribute of perfection, because movement happens due tothe need to move, although being stuck is even worse, as it signifiesinability to do what one needs to to do. Both movement and beingstuck are thus attributes of imperfection.Ibn Taymiyyah also said:

“So this is not correct except according to what they innovated bytheir saying “Aļļaah does not move and things do not come intoexistence in Him,” by which they denied that He settled on the throneafter being unsettled and that He comes on the Day of Judgment and

other things that Aļļaah described Himself with in the Qur’aan andĥadiitħ.” ( Al-Fataawaa Al-Kubraa, 5/128)He also said:

It has become clear that other than the necessary in existence caninfluence the necessary in existence (the necessary in existence, i.e.Allaah(.This shows that Ibn Taymiyyah considered Aļļaah to have bodilyattributes based on his understanding of the scripture texts. Heunderstood them according to the customary meanings that are true of creation.[7] Ibn Taymiyyah said regarding Aļļaah’s attribute of knowledge:





“This attribute is beginningless, since it is impossible that He beattributed with it as some particular time (and not others). However,one should not delve deeply on this and end up saying what thekalaam scholars say: “Verily He knows the event when it happens with a beginningless knowledge,” for this implies that the knowledge of something previously non-existing during both its existence and non-existence one single knowledge. This is irrational, because knowledgefollows what exists.” He says this, because He believes Aļļaah to must be in time,since He believes He is a body (see footnote1,) and that Aļļaah’sbeginninglessness is a beginningless series of moments. See oneof Ibn Taymiyyah’s follower’s argument for this with a rebuttal

here:Aļļaah is not in time.[8] Ibn Taymiyyah plays word games on this issue, so it is hard tocatch what he is actually saying. However, the following phrase of hisis telling. Because he rejects the idea that created things have realinfluence, as the Sunnis say, and then states:

He says: If Aļļaah created causes, and created through them otherthings, and controlled the matters of the skies and the earth, then thiswould be more complete in ability than creating something by itself,without creating another power, other than it, by which He creates it.In other words, He is saying that the power of creating can be putin causes, and other created things. This means that he believesthat Aļļaah could have partners in creating, which is another shirk toadd to the list of the other ones he commits. This belief is identicalto that of the Muˆtazilah. This is not perfection, as he claims, butin contradiction to it, because it is among the perfect attributes of Aļļaah that His Power is not merely a possibility, but an uncreated

eternal necessary attribute. Aļļaah’s attribute of Power is necessary inexistence, and therefore not amendable. Had it been amendable, orshareable, then this would mean that it was not necessary in the firstplace, and it would have needed a creator, like anything that is subjectto specification and change. Actually, Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument isidentical to Christian arguments like this one. A related topic regardingomnipotence is also presented here.

http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2009/05/23/allaah-is-not-in-time/


http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2008/06/15/q-a-christians-say-that-muslims-limit-the-creator/

http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2009/03/22/382/

http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2009/03/22/382/

http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2008/06/15/q-a-christians-say-that-muslims-limit-the-creator/













[9] See also this article.[10] Ibn Taymiyyah said:

“Some of the authors in Kalaam science make the affirmative belief in the indivisible particle of bodies the saying of the Muslims, andclaim that denying it is the saying of the non-Muslims. This is becausethey don’t know anything about the sayings of the Muslims exceptwhat they found in the books of their shaykħs, the people of kalaamscience, the innovation in religion that the Salaf and the Imams spokeagainst.” (Minhaaj As-Sunnah An-Nabawiyyah, 138)[11] Scholarly ijmaaˆ consensus and Islamic legal analogy (qiyaas)

are also proofs, of course, but these are established as proofs byQur’aan and ĥadiitħ.[12] This article addresses this problem: The ‘Simple’ Wahabi Belief II:Contradiction versus narration


http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2008/05/19/the-indivisible-element/




http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2009/02/09/the-simple-wahabi-belief-ii-contradiction-versus-narration/





















http://sunnianswers.wordpress.com/2008/05/19/the-indivisible-element/


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