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A Study Evaluating if Targeted Training for StartleEffect can Improve Pilot Reactions in HandlingUnexpected Situations in a Flight SimulatorMichael Gillen

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ASTUDYEVALUATINGIFTARGETEDTRAININGFORSTARTLEEFFECTCANIMPROVEPILOTREACTIONSINHANDLINGUNEXPECTEDSITUATIONSINAFLIGHTSIMULATOR

By

MichaelWilliamGillenBachelorofScience,UniversityofNorthDakota,1992MasterofScience,UniversityofNorthDakota,2008

ADissertation

SubmittedtotheGraduateFacultyofthe

UniversityofNorthDakotainpartialfulfillmentoftherequirements

forthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy

GrandForks,NorthDakotaDecember

2016

ii

Copyright2016MichaelWilliamGillen

iv

PERMISSION

Title AStudyEvaluatingifTargetedTrainingforStartleEffectCanImprovePilotReactionsinHandlingUnexpectedSituationsinaFlightSimulator.

Department Aviation

Degree DoctorofPhilosophy

InpresentingthisdissertationinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforagraduatedegreefromtheUniversityofNorthDakota,IagreethatthelibraryofthisUniversityshallmakeitfreelyavailableforinspection.Ifurtheragreethatpermissionforextensivecopyingforscholarlypurposesmaybegrantedbytheprofessorwhosupervisedmydissertationworkor,inhisabsence,bytheChairpersonofthedepartmentortheDeanoftheGraduateSchool.Itisunderstoodthatanycopyingorpublicationorotheruseofthisdissertationorpartthereofforfinancialgainshallnotbeallowedwithoutmywrittenpermission.ItisalsounderstoodthatduerecognitionshallbegiventomeandtotheUniversityofNorthDakotainanyscholarlyusewhichmaybemadeofanymaterialinmythesis.

MichaelW.Gillen

September20,2016

v

TABLEOFCONTENTS

LISTOFFIGURES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………vi

LISTOFTABLES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………………………………………….xi

ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..xii

CHAPTER

I INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………..…1

II LITERATUREREVIEW……………………………………………………………………………..8

III METHODS……………………………………………………………………………………………45

IV RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………………………60

V DISCUSSION……………………………………………………………………………………..….93

APPENDICES………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…106

REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..132

vi

LISTOFFIGURES

Figure Page

1.AutomationBias(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010)..........................................18

2.BehaviorModel(Rasmussen,1983)................................................................27

3.CausesofAccidents(Boeing,2012).................................................................30

4.Flight3407–OneMinutefromImpact–SituationNormal(NTSB,2010)......33

5.Flight3407–30SecondsfromImpact–StickShakerActivation(NTSB,2010)..........................................................................................................33

6.Flight3407-27SecondsfromImpact-RolltotheLeft(NTSB,2010)..............34

7.Flight3407–21SecondsfromImpact-RolltotheRight(NTSB,2010)...........34

8.Flight3407–10SecondsformImpact-FinalRolltotheRightandPitchDown(NTSB,2010).....................................................................................35

9.Parametersfrom2:10:50to2:11:46(BAE,2012)...........................................40

10.EvolutionofAirspeedandPitotIcing(BAE,2012).........................................41

11.AF447FDRData(MM43,2011).....................................................................42

12.OutsideFlying................................................................................................62

13.CivilianversusMilitaryFlying........................................................................63

vii

14.AerobaticTraining.........................................................................................64

15.StartlingEvents..............................................................................................65

16.PitchandPowerSettings...............................................................................67

17.HandFlyingBelow10,000Feet....................................................................68

18.ChairFlying....................................................................................................70

19.RawDataFlying.............................................................................................71

20.SkillsPractice.................................................................................................73

21.AutopilotUsage.............................................................................................75

viii

LISTOFTABLES

Table Page

1.DescriptiveStatisticsBetaGroup....................................................................49

2.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsBetaGroup...............................................50

3.DescriptiveStatisticsLowAltitudeScenarioBetaGroup................................50

4.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsLowAltitudeScenarioLowAltitudeBetaGroup................................................................................................51

5.DescriptiveStatisticsHighAltitude-BetaGroup............................................51

6.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsHighAltitude-BetaGroup.......................52

7.Cohen’sDCalculationBetaGroup...................................................................52

8.HighAltitudeAnalysis......................................................................................55

9.LowAltitudeAnalysis.......................................................................................55

10.EvaluatedFactorsandSeatPositions............................................................56

11.FlyingOutsideofProfessionalJob.................................................................61

12.DidYouFlyintheMilitary?............................................................................63

13.DoYouHaveanyFormalAerobaticTraining.................................................64

ix

14.StartleEvents.................................................................................................65

15.IKnowtheProperPitchandPowerSettings.................................................66

16.HandFlyingBelow10,000Feet.....................................................................68

17.ChairFlyScenariostoHelpDetermineCoursesofAction.............................69

18.ComfortFlyingRawData...............................................................................71

19.OftenPracticeRawDataSkills.......................................................................72

20.AutopilotUsageAbove1000Feet.................................................................74

21.DescriptiveStatisticsHighAltitude................................................................76

22.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsHighAltitude...........................................78

23.DescriptiveStatisticsRegressionHighAltitude.............................................79

24.DescriptivesLowAltitude..............................................................................80

25.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsLowAltitude...........................................81

26.DescriptiveStatisticsLowAltitude................................................................82

27.DescriptiveStatisticsCombined....................................................................84

28.HighandLowAltitudeMeanComparison.....................................................84

29.MeansComparisonwithTraining..................................................................85

30.MeansComparisonNoTraining....................................................................86

x

31.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsCombined...............................................87

32.ANOVAOtherFactors....................................................................................88

33.T-testTrainingversusFAAStandard..............................................................89

34.HandFlyingPreferences..............................................................................100

xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Therearesomanypeoplewhohelpedmealongthisjourneyanditwouldbe

impossibletonamethemall.Iwouldliketoacknowledgeafewspecialpeoplewhom

withouttheirsupportthisworkwouldhaveneverbeencompleted.Iwouldliketo

thankmyfamilyincludingmyparentsforalwayssupportingmeinthiseffort.Their

wordsofencouragementkeptmegoingwhenthecourseworkseemeddaunting.Ialso

wouldlikethankmycommitteewhoalwaysofferedsoundadviceandguidance

developingandwritingthisdissertation.Theirpatienceandwillingnesstooffer

constructivecriticismandsuggestionswereinvaluable.Finally,Iwouldliketo

acknowledgetwoindividualswhosawpotentialinayoungaviatorandgavemesound

adviceandafewbreaksalongtheway.WithheartfeltthanksIacknowledgeCaptain

JimCorley(TWA)andMr.ElmerSchaal.Thesetwoindividualsarenolongerwithus,

however,theiridealsandphilosophyhashelpedcarrymethroughmyacademic

endeavorsandmycareerasaprofessionalaviator.

DEDICATION

Itwouldhavebeennearlyimpossibletotakeonaworkofthismagnitudewithoutthe

lovingsupportofmywifeSonyaGillen.Thisworkisdedicatedtoherforherunfailing

love,guidance,andunderstandingthroughoutthislongendeavor.

xii

ABSTRACT

Recentairlineaccidentspointtoacrew’sfailuretomakecorrectandtimely

decisionsfollowingasuddenandunusualeventthatstartledthecrew.Thisstudy

soughttodetermineiftargetedtrainingcouldaugmentdecisionmakingduringastartle

event.Followingastartleeventcognitivefunctionisimpairedforashortdurationof

time(30-90seconds).Inaviation,criticaldecisionsareoftenrequiredtobemade

duringthisbrief,butcritical,timeframe.

Atotalof40volunteercrews(80individualpilots)weresolicitedfromaglobal

U.S.passengerairline.Crewswerebriefedthattheywouldflyaprofileinthesimulator

butwerenotmadeawareofwhattheprofilewouldentail.Thestudyparticipantswere

askedtocompleteasurveyontheirbackgroundandflyingpreferences.Everyother

crewreceivedtrainingonhowtohandleastartleevent.Thetrainingconsistedofa

briefingandsimulatorpractice.Crewmembers(subjects)wereeitherpresentedalow

altitudeorhighaltitudescenariotoflyinafull-flightsimulator.

Themaneuverscenarioswereanalyzedusingaseriesofone-wayANOVAs,t-

testsandregressionforthemaineffectoftrainingoncrewperformance.Thedata

xiii

indicatedthatthetrainedcrewsflewthemaneuverprofilessignificantlybetterthanthe

untrainedcrewsandsignificantlybetterthantheFederalAviationAdministration(FAA)

AirlineTransportPilot(ATP)standards.Eachscenario’ssubfactorswereanalyzedusing

regressiontoexamineforspecificpredictorsofperformance.Theresultsindicatethat

inthecaseofthehighaltitudeprofile,problemdiagnosiswasasignificantfactor,inthe

lowaltitudeprofile,timemanagementwasalsoasignificantfactor.Thesepredicators

canbeusefulinfurthertargetingtraining.

Thestudy’sfindingssuggestthattargetedtrainingcanhelpcrewsmanagea

startleevent,leadingtoapotentialreductionofinflightlossofcontrolaccidents.The

trainingwasbroadandintendedtocoveranoverallaircrafthandlingapproachrather

thanbeingaircraftspecific.Inclusionofthistypeoftrainingbyairlineshasthepotential

tobetteraidcrewsinhandlingsuddenandunusualevents.

1

CHAPTERI

INTRODUCTION

Emergenciesinaircraftofteninvolvehigh-stressdecision-making,whichmustbe

accomplishedcorrectlyinrealtime,oftenwithlimitedinformation.Crewsareoften

startledattheonsetofsuchevents.Evencorrectdecision-makingattheoutsetofan

emergencymaynotguaranteeasuccessfuloutcome.Unfortunately,incorrectinitial

decisionsatthestartofanemergencyoftenresultindelayedaircraftrecoveryandin

somecasesleadtoanundesiredaircraftstate(UAS).Decisionsinstressful

environmentsareoftenmadewithinformationfrompastexperiences,training,and

patternmatching(Rasmussen,1983).Althougheachemergencyissurroundedby

uniquecircumstances,trainingoverabroadarrayofscenariosandcircumstancesmay

giveflightcrewsenoughbackgroundinformationtomanagethesituationfora

successfuloutcome.

AstudycompletedbyWoodhead(1969)founddecrementsonadecision-making

followingastartleevent.Thackray(1969)alsofoundthatmajorperformance

decrementfollowingastartleeventprobablyoccurswithinthefirstfewseconds.Inthe

officialreportonAirFranceflight447,theBureaud'Enquêtesetd'Analyses(BAE,

2012)stated,“Thestartleeffectplayedamajorroleinthedestabilizationoftheflight

pathandinthetwopilotsunderstandingthesituation.”Startletrainingmaybeakey

2

elementineffectiveemergencyflighttraining.Duringsuchtraining,crewsareexposed

todifferent,complex,andunusualsituationstheywouldnotnormallyencounterunder

normalflightconditions.Thepurposeofthistypeoftrainingistodevelopthepattern

behaviorofsystematicallydealingwithcomplexemergencies.

ProblemStatement

Recentairlineaccidentspointtoarapiddegradationfromcontrolledflight

followinganunusualeventwhentheflightcrewbecomesstartled.Therehasbeenvery

littletrainingamongairlinecrewsonhowtosuccessfullymanageasuddenandoften

stressfuleventthatrequiresquickandaccuratedecision-making(BAE,2012).Accident

datahasindicatedthatwhenanincorrectdecisionismade,thelikelihoodofa

successfuloutcomedecreases(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,2012).Thisstudyseeksto

determineifspecificandtargetedtrainingcanhelpmitigatetheeffectsofflightcrews

beingstartledbyimplementingasetoftechniquesdesignedtohelpstabilizethe

cognitivethoughtprocessandbridgethetimeofcognitivedegradation.

PurposeoftheStudy

Theintentofthismixedmethodsstudyistotestthetheorythatenhanced

specifictrainingcanprovideaneffectivecountermeasuretofillthetemporarycognitive

degradationthatoccursduringastartleevent.Thestudywillusebothsurveyand

observedsimulatorperformancedatatotestthetheory.Ifthehypothesisiscorrect,

specifictrainingcouldbeaddedtoairlinequalificationprogramstobetterequipairline

crewsindealingwithsudden,unusualevents.

3

ResearchDesign

Theresearchisdesignedasamixedmethodsstudyusingquantitativeanalysis

methods.Inthefirstphase,asurveywillbeconductedoftheparticipatingaircarrier

pilots.Thissurveywillbeusedtogaugethepilot'sownperceptionsoftheirflyingskills

duringastartleevent.Theanalysiswillexploreforcommonthreadsofpilotthinking

andreactions.Theresultsofthesurveywillbecomparedandcorrelatedtothedata

fromtheaircraftsimulatorscenariosets.

Thesecondphaseofthestudyinvolvesevaluatingprofessionalairlinepilots

flyingtwodifferentscenariosinanFAAapprovedLevel-Dfullflightsimulator(FFS).The

scenarioswillbeflownbyacrewconsistingofacaptainandfirstofficer,similartowhat

wouldhappeninactuallineoperations.Eachcrewwillbepresentedeitheralowor

highaltitudescenariodependingonthedayoftheweek.Randomlyselectedcrewswill

receivetrainingonhandlingtheaircraftduringastartleevent.Thepilotgroupthatdoes

notreceivethestartletrainingwillbeconsideredthecontrolgroup.Thisgroupwillbe

referredtoastheuntrainedgroupforthepurposesofthisstudy.Thetrainingconsists

ofbothabriefingandsimulatorpractice.Thetrainingbriefingisviaaninperson

discussionontheproperpitch,power,andbank,settingsthatshouldbeflowninan

unusualevent.Thebriefingalsodiscussestimerecognitionespeciallyatlowaltitudes

andfuelstates.Thetrainingcontinueswithsimulatorpracticeusingthetechniques

discussedinthebriefing.Thepracticesessionsarenotthesameastheevaluation

profiles.Eachcrewwillpracticebothalowaltitudeandhighaltitudescenario.

4

Thefirsttestscenarioisalowaltitudeandlowfuelprofile.Timepressureandan

unexpectedmissedapproachcombinetoformthestartleeventandeventevaluation

beginsatthemissedapproach.Thesecondtestscenarioisahighaltitudeprofile.The

profileinducesalossofairdatafollowedbyanenginefirebellthatcausesthestartle

event.Evaluationbeginsatthelossofairdata.Intermsofprocedures,thelossofair

dataisoftenreferredtobyaircraftmanufacturersasMach/AirspeedUnreliable.Data

analysiswillconsistofregression,ANOVA,andpost-hocTukeytests.Theanalysislooks

fordifferencesbetweentrainedanduntrainedgroupswithregressionlookingfor

differenceswithingroupssuchaspreviousexperience.

ResearchQuestions

Theresearchquestionssurroundthecognitivegapthatisperceivedtoexist

duringastartleeventandtowhatextenttrainingcanmitigatethegap.

1. Cantargetedtrainingbesuccessfulinhelpingpilotsmaintainaircraft

controlduringanunusualandsuddenstartleevent?

a. Doesthespatialproximityoftheeventhaveanyeffectonthe

outcome(loworhighaltitude)?

b. Sinceaccidentdataindicatesthataccidentsoccurmorefrequently

withthecaptainflyingandonthefirstdayandfirstlegofatrip,does

thepilotflying,eitherthecaptainorthefirstofficer,haveanyeffect

onthesuccessfuloutcomeoftheevent?

5

2. Isthereanindicationinthepilot’ssurveyanswersthatisapredictorof

beingabletosuccessfullyhandleastartleevent?

Assumptions

Thelistbelowisnotmeanttobeall-encompassingbuttoinformthereaderasto

themajoraspectsinvolvedinthestudy.Thisstudydevelopsfindingsbasedonthe

followingassumptions.

1. Eachparticipantisaqualified,AirlineTransportPilot(ATP)certifiedFARpart

121jettransportpilotemployedbyaU.S.aircarrier.

2. Eachparticipanthasspentatleastoneyearinthespecificseat(Captainor

FirstOfficer)andtypeofaircraft.Itisassumedthatafteroneyearof

experienceonaparticularaircraft,thatthepilotwillbenormalizedtoflying

thatparticularaircraft(theaircraftwillnotbe“new”tothem).

3. Eachpilotiscurrentandqualifiedintherespectiveaircraft.Currentand

qualifiedindicatesthatthepilotcanbescheduledtoflyaregularpassenger

tripatanytime.

4. Eachpilotisconsideredalinepilot.Forthepurposeofthisassumption,line

pilotmeansthateachpilotfliestheirrespectiveairplaneatregularintervals.

Linepilotsinclude;Captains,FirstOfficers,LineCheckAirman,and

Instructors/Evaluators

6

5. Exceptforthegroupthatreceivestraining,thepilotshavenoprior

knowledgeorpracticeofthemaneuverthatistobeflownandisgivenno

opportunitytopracticeitbeforehand.

6. Eachpilotisassumedtoflytothebestoftheirabilityduringthemaneuver.

Limitations

Thestudysoughttomitigatepossiblelimitationsthatcouldskewtheresults.

Althougheachstudyhasasetofuniquelimitations,theresultsofthisstudyshouldbe

consideredinthecontextofthelimitationslistedbelow.

1. Themaneuversetsareflowninasimulatorthatisrealisticinnaturebut

involvessimulationlimitsspecificallythegenerallackofg-forces.

2. Thestudyonlylooksattwomaneuversets.

3. Aircraftemergenciesareoftendynamicandareuniquetoeachsituation.

4. Thestudyonlyobservedprofessionalpilotsflyingtransportcategory

aircraft.

5. Crewsvolunteeredforthisstudywhichmayindicateahigherawarenessof

safety.

6. Crewsweresampleddirectlyaftertheirrecurrenttrainingwhichmay

increasetheirproficiencyabovewhatmightbeexpectedinnormalline

operations.

ExpectedFindings

Thestudyhasfourmajorgroupsofsubjectsthatarebeingcomparedtoaset

standardasdefinedtheFAAandairlinepolicyforsuccessfuloutcomes.Thestudy

7

expectstofindcrewsthatreceivetrainingwillbecomemoreawareandproficienton

howtohandleaninflightemergencywithregardstothefirstfewcriticaldecisions

and/oractions.Theexpectationsarethatthetrainedgroupforbothlowandhigh

altitudescenarioswillshowastatisticallysignificantincreaseinperformancewhen

comparedtothenon-trainedgroups.Inaddition,whencollapsedformaneuverssets,

thetrainedgroupsshouldshowasignificantincreaseinperformancethanthenon-

trainedgroup.Itemssuchaspastexperienceandcurrentoutsideflyingmightbe

reasonablyexpectedtoalsoinfluencesuccess.

8

CHAPTERII

LITERATUREREVIEW

Introduction

Aliteraturereviewwasconductedofpertinentarticlesrelatedtothisstudy.

Althoughtherewerenodirectstudiesonthisparticularproblem,thereweremany

articlesrelatedtodecisionmaking,startleeffect,andtimecriticalactionsrequiredby

flightcrews.Thereviewbeginsbyrelatingadiscussionontrainingofunusualeventsand

whypracticeisimportantforimprovedperformance.Theliteraturereviewthen

discusseswhatstartleeffectisandhowiteffectscognition,decisionmakingandpilot

responses.Thereviewthentakesthetheoreticaldiscussionandrelatesittoactual

aircraftaccidentsusingtheofficialreportsasabackground.Thisliteraturereviewisnot

meanttobeallencompassing,buttogivethereaderabroadoverviewoftheissues

surroundingthisstudy.

TrainingandUnusualEvents

Accidentreportsdescribemanysituationswherepilotsrespondedtoabnormal

eventsinwaysthatwereunexpectedfromthewaythattheyweretrained(Casner,

Geven,&Willliams,2012).Unfortunately,trainingandtestingofprofessionalairline

pilotshavebecomesomewhatroutineandpredictable.Inshort,theflightcrewsknow

whattoexpectastheyseethesamemaneuversateachtrainingevent.

9

InastudybyDr.StephenCasner,(when)pilotswereevaluatedperforming

routinetrainingeventsandunexpected(butsimilar)ones.Pilotresponsestothe

routineeventsshowedlittlevariability.Incontrast,pilotresponsesintheunexpected

maneuversshowedgreatvariabilityfrompilottopilot(Casner,Geven,&Willliams,

2012).Theresultsofthestudyshowedthatmostpilotsgenerallyexperiencethesame

sequenceofabnormalevents,presentedundersimilarcircumstances.Thisisdueto

boththeairlinetrainingenvironmentandtheregulatoryenvironmentassetforthbythe

FAA.Thistrainingcallsintoquestiontheextenttowhichpilotshavetheabilityto

respondtoabnormaleventsinactualoperations(Casner,Geven,&Willliams,2012).

Casner,Geven,andWilliams,suggestedthatsuchtrainingcanleadtoshallowand

memorizedunderstandingsofproblemsituationswhichinturndonotleadtoanability

totransferthistrainingtodifferentencountersinactualoperations(Casner,Geven,&

Willliams,2012).Theendresultofthestudywasthatpilotsstruggletorecognize

unexpectedsituationswiththeresultofconsiderablydelayedresponses(Casner,Geven,

&Willliams,2012).

Itisunlikelythattrainingalonecaneliminatetheelementofsurprisefrom

unexpectedeventsalthoughskillandexperienceareknowntoreducetheoccurrence

and/orseverity(Merk,2009).Furthermore,forunusualevents,pilotswouldbenefit

fromexposurewithouttheuseofautomationtoenablethemtobetterrecognizethe

situationitselfratherthanrespondtoanalert(Wiener,1985).Finally,themost

importantstepintrainingistotrainabnormaleventsoverawidearrayofcircumstances

andoperationparameters(Casner,Geven,&Willliams,2012).

10

Safetymanagementtendstofocusonpreventionoferrorsandfailures.Inmost

failurecases,thereareopportunitiestorecoverfromthefailurethroughthetimelyand

effectiveapplicationofcountermeasures.Theaimofthecountermeasurestoprevent

thenegativeconsequencesofthefailure(Kranse&vanderSchaaf,2001).Inthecaseof

unforeseenfailures,humanoperatorsplayakeyroleintheapplicationofeffective

countermeasures.Researchersgenerallyagreethatthefailurecompensationprocess

hasthreephases:

• PhaseOne:Detectionofthefactthatsomethinghasgonewrong

• PhaseTwo:Explanationorlocalizationofthecauses

• PhaseThree:Correctionoftheproblemthroughplanningandexecution

ofcountermeasures

AstudybyKranse,andvanderSchaaf,(2001)askedthequestion:howdoesthe

failurecompensationprocesswork,andwhatfactorsinfluencetheprocess?Afailure

canbeacombinationoftechnical,organizational,orhumanfactors.Detectionofthe

situationisalwaysthefirstfailurecompensationphasetooccur(Kranse&vander

Schaaf,2001).Afterthedetectionphase,timeoftendictatesthenextstep.The

correctiveactioncanbeperformedimmediately(usuallythecaseinaviation)orona

longertermforsystemicissues.Thestudyexamined50reportedfailuresatachemical

plant.Thefailureswereallreportedviaavoluntarysafetyreportingsystemsimilarto

AviationSafetyActionProgram(ASAP)reportingsystems.Thestudynotedthatinmost

detectionandlocalizationphasesunplannedactions(nottrained)occurred.Inthe

detectionphase,46outof50cases(92%)involvedunplannedactions(Kranse&vander

11

Schaaf,2001).Forfailuresrequiringimmediatelocalization,100%involvedsome

unplannedactions.Suchwasthesameforeventsrequiringimmediatecorrection,

where80%involvedunplannedactions(Kranse&vanderSchaaf,2001).Eveninevents

thatwerenotastimecritical,wherelongertermcorrectionsweresought,77%

experiencedunplannedactions(Kranse&vanderSchaaf,2001).Generally,thetype

andseverityofpotentialconsequenceswerethemostpracticalfactorindecidingwhich

recoverypathstotake.TheKranseandvanderSchaafstudyhasimportantimplications

foranytypeofaviationtraininginasmuchasuntrainedactionswillinvariablytake

placeinarecoveryfromanunusualevent.

PracticeandPerformance

Astudythatwaspublishedin(McKinney&Davis,2003)researchedtheeffectsof

deliberatepracticeoncrisissituations.Withinprofessionaldomains,deliberatepractice

hasbeenpositivelycorrelatedwithimprovedperformance(McKinney&Davis,2003).

Thestudyexaminedthequestion,“dothebenefitsofdeliberatepracticecreatesuperior

performanceifpartofthetaskisunpracticed?”(McKinney&Davis,2003).Researchers

revieweddecision-makingundercrisisconditionsusingatotaldecisioneffectiveness

model.Themodelevaluatedboththeinitialassessmentandtheactionstakenforboth

practicedandunpracticedmaneuvers.Additionalstudieshaveindicatedthatdeliberate

practiceresultsinautomatedpatternmatchingofproblemswithsolutions(Richman,

Gobet,Stazewski,&Simon,1996).Practicedskillsallowforamoreaccuratediagnoses

ofthesituation,andimprovesbothspeedofactionandtheaccuracyofrecall(KleinG.,

1993).Practicemayaidinthecognitiveprocessesthroughenhancementofhigher

12

levelsofsearchingandevaluating.This,inturn,mightenhancetheabilityto

extrapolatebeyondthepresenteddataandmakeuseoflong-termmemoryitemswhich

isricherandmoreorganizedthanshort-termmemory(Ericcsson,1996).

Forthisstudy,whollypracticedmaneuversareonesthatpilotshavedeliberately

practicedeitherinflight,ormorelikely,inthesimulator.Eachofthesemaneuvershad

abestpracticesolution,whichwasreinforcedonaregularbasis.Incontrastapartially

practicedmaneuverwasdefinedasaspecificaircraftmalfunction,occurringwithina

widerflyingscenariothatwasnovelorunique,andamaneuverthatthepilotcouldnot

havepracticed(McKinney&Davis,2003).Thesemaneuverscouldincludeitemssuch

asmultiplesystemfailures,flightcontrolmalfunctions,andunusualfailuremodes.The

dataforthestudywascompiledfrom173U.S.AirForcefighteraircraftmechanical

malfunctionincidents.Ineachcase,themishapwasclassifiedaseitherwhollypracticed

orpartiallypracticed.ThreeindependentpanelsofexperiencedAirForcepilots

reviewedandratedthemishaps.Theactiontakenbythepilotswasratedaseffectiveor

ineffective(McKinney&Davis,2003).Furthermore,athirdgroupofevaluatorswere

askedfurtherdefinewherethefailureoccurredincasesofineffectiveresponses.The

groupsoughttodefineiftheineffectiveresponseswereinthedecision-makingprocess,

orintheselectionofactionprocess.Toevaluatetheresearchquestions,logistic

regressionanalysiswasusedasatoolforpredictinggroupmembershipincaseswhere

dependentvariablesaredichotomous(McKinney&Davis,2003).Intotal83ofthe

eventswerecharacterizedaswhollypracticed,ofwhich68endedwitheffective

decisionsand15withineffectivedecisions(McKinney&Davis,2003).Thestudy

13

concludedthatdeliberatepracticehasapositiveeffectoncrisisdecision-making

performance(McKinney&Davis,2003).Increasedperformancewasnotedforeach

decisionphaseforwhollypracticedmaneuvers.However,thestudyalsofoundthatno

relationshipexistedwherethecrisis-flyingscenariowasunpracticed(McKinney,2003).

Thestudyalsonotedthatdeliberatepracticewithintheflyingdomainwasnotrelated

tooveralldecision-makingperformance(McKinney&Davis,2003).

StartleEffect

Startleeffectisquitedifferentthanstartletraining.Thestartleresponsehas

beenwellresearchedanddocumentedoverthepast60years.Astartleresponse

happenswhenthehumanbrainispresentedwithasituationthatcompletely

overwhelmstheavailablecognitiveresourcesneededtoeffectivelymitigatethe

situation.Ithasbeenwidelyestablishedthroughpsychologicalresearchthatourability

toregulateourownthoughtsandbehaviorsbecomesdiminishedduringanemotional

event(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,2012).Thisdiminishedabilityiscompoundedbythe

reliabilityoftoday’smodernaircraft,whichhascreatedaconditionedexpectationof

normalcyamongstpilots(Martin,Murray,&Bates,2012).Researchhasshownthat

thereareconsiderablecognitiveeffectsoninformationprocessingfollowingastartle

event.Theresultsindicatethatstrongcognitiveanddexterousimpairmentcouldlast

forupto30secondsfollowingastrongstartle(Vlasek,1969;WoodheadM.M.,1959;

WoodheadM.,1969;Thackray&Touchstone,1970).Apilotdescribinganencounter

withsevereturbulencedescribedthesituationas“theconstantaudiblewarningscame

fromfar-off,detachedfromthestruggleinthecockpit”(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,

14

2012).TheBureaud'Enquêtesetd'Analyses(BAE)intheofficialreportonAirFrance

Flight447(AF447)accident,themadethefollowingstatements:

“Thestartleeffectplayedamajorroleinthedestabilizationoftheflight

pathandinthetwopilotsunderstandingthesituation.Initialand

recurrenttrainingasdeliveredtodaydoesnotpromoteandtestthe

capacitytoreacttotheunexpected.Indeed,theexercisesarerepetitive,

wellknowntocrewsanddonotenableskillsinresourcemanagementto

betestedoutsideofthiscontext.

Alloftheeffortinvestedinanticipationandpredeterminationof

proceduralresponsesdoesnotexcludethepossibilityofsituationswitha

‘fundamentalsurprise’forwhichthecurrentsystemdoesnotgenerate

theindispensablecapacitytoreact.”(BAE,2012)

Theresponseofthebrain,andtheconsequentbehaviorisanamalgamation

resultingfrompastexperienceandgeneralexpertise(Isaac,2012).Onceanunusual

situationhasbeendeterminedtoexist,pilotsattempttocomparethesituationwith

pastexperiencesthroughasequenceofpatternmatchinganddecision-making.The

outcomeoftenreliesontheseverityofunusualcircumstanceandemergencytraining.

Inaddition,otherfactorsincludepriorexperienceandtheabilitytoaccepttheactual

factsofthesituation.Discrepanciesbetweenperceptionandtheactualaircraftstate

leadstoabreakdownofapilot’smentalpicture,whichinturncanleadtoalossof

situationalawareness(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,2012).Surprisingeventscanplace

15

thepilotintoaveryhighstateofarousalthatcanrenderthemineffectiveincomplex

decision-makingtasks(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,2012).Thefinalresponseisoftena

stronglydevelopedbehaviorwiththepurpose,inextremecases,ofsurvival.Thereare

examplesinwhichhighlytrainedcrewsdiscardedindicationsfrominstrumentsand

flighttrainingafterastartleevent(Isaac,2012).Thisleadstodisbelievingwhatis

actuallypresentedtothecrewfromtheaircraft’ssystems.Onceanunusualor

emergencysituationispresented,apilotwillgenerallybelimitedintheirresponse.The

responsetendstofallintopatternsapilothasseenbefore,andwillalsobesubjectedto

severaldecision-making,behavioralbiases.Anobjectivethatisnotaddressedin

traditionalflighttrainingisbehavioralmanagementthatpromotesprogressive

functionalityunderconditionsofuncertaintyandfear(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,

2012).

AutomationBiasandComplacency

Automateddecisionaidssupportdecision-makingincomplexenvironments.As

such,automationisassumingincreasingcontrolofcognitiveflighttasks,suchas

calculatingfuel-efficientroutes,navigating,ordetectinganddiagnosingsystem

malfunctionsandabnormalities(Mosier,1998).Thesesystemsaredesignedtosupport

thehumancognitiveprocessingofinformationtocorrectlyassessagivensituationand

torespondappropriately(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010).Automation-induced

complacencyandbiasrepresentcloselylinkedtheoreticalconceptsthatshow

considerableoverlapwithrespecttounderlyingprocesses(Parasuraman&Manzey,

2010).Automationcomplacencycanoccurwhentheautomationcompetesforthe

16

pilot’sattentioninamultipletaskloadenvironment(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010).

Althoughsomewhatdifferentbutinterconnected,automationbiasresultsinmaking

bothomissionandcommissionerrorswhentheautomateddecisionaidsarenot

accurate(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010).Thesetwoissuesaffectbothnoviceand

expertpilotsandcannotgenerallybemitigatedthroughtraining.

Researchstudieshaveindicatedthatautomationdoesnotalwaysenhance

humanactivity.Insomecases,automationcanchangebehaviorpatternsinwaysthat

areunintended,andcannotbeunanticipatedbyautomationdesigners(Parasuraman&

Manzey,2010).Automatedsystemsintoday’smodernaircraftarehighlyaccurateand

reliable.Theendresultisthatpilotscandevelopaprematurecognitivecommitment

regardingtheinformationdisplayedbytheautomationanddisregardotherconflicting

information(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010).Automationbiascanleadtoincorrect

decisionsthatarenotbasedonacompleteanalysisoftheavailableinformationandcan

compromiseperformanceespeciallyinthecaseofautomationfailure.

Automateddecisionaidsaremisusedfortwomainreasons.Thefirstreasonis

thatautomationgeneratedcuesareusuallysalient,andbydesign,drawtheuser’s

attention(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010).Thesecondmajorfactoristhatusershavea

cognitivebiastoassigngreaterrelevancetoautomatedcuesoverothersourcesofdata

(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010).

InastudybyLayton,Smith,andMcCoy(1994),acomparisonofelectronicflight

planningtoolswasexamined.Pilotswhoweregivenhighlyautomatedflightplansspent

17

lesstimeandeffortevaluatingalternateplansthangroupsworkingwithmanually

developedplans.Thisresultwasconsistentwiththecognitive-miserhypothesisof

automationbias(Layton,Smith,&McCoy,1994).Thepilotstendedtoaccepttheplan

generatedbytheautomationevenwhenitproducedlessthanoptimalsolutions.

Anotherstudyonautomationbiassoughttoquantifytheeffectsofautomation

over-relianceinmoderncockpits.Thisstudypointedouttheneedforpilotstobeable

toflytheairplanewhentheautomationdoesnotfunctioncorrectly.Automationbias

referstoomissionandcommissionerrorsresultingfromtheuseofautomatedcuesasa

heuristicreplacementforvigilantinformationseekingandprocessing(Mosier,Skitka,

Heers,&Burdick,1997).Highlyautomatedcockpitstendtochangethewaypilots

performtasksandmakedecisions.Researchershavedocumentedproblemsintheuse

ofadvancedautomatedsystems,includingmodemisunderstanding,failuresto

understandautomatedbehavior,confusionorlackofawarenessconcerningwhat

automatedsystemsaredoing,anddifficultytracingthefunctioningorreasoningprocess

oftheautomatedagent(Billings,1996).Figure1belowdiagramsbothpositiveand

negativefeedbackloopsassociatedwithautomation.Eachlooporpathwaycanleadto

biasonthepartofthepilot.

18

Figure1.AutomationBias(Parasuraman&Manzey,2010)

Pilotsaretrainedanddeveloptheirskillsassessmentthroughtheuseofboth

systemandenvironmentalcues(crosscheckingofinformation).Inmostsituations,

processingisfacilitatedbyinter-correlationsamongcues(Wickens&Flach,1998).In

thecross-checkingenvironment,relatedtooldertechnologyaircraft,pilotsoftenlooked

formanycuesindeterminingifaproblemexisted.Usingtheseskills,pilotsknowand

lookforpatternsorcombinationofcuesthataremostecologicallyvalid,reliable,or

relevantfordiagnosingparticularsituations.Theyareabletoincorporatecontextual

informationtoformulateaworkableactionplanbasedontheirassessmentofthese

cues(Kaempf&Klein,1994).

Whenautomatedaidsareintroduced,thepatternofcueutilizationisdisrupted.

Automatedaidspresentpowerfulandgenerallyhighlyaccuratecues.Thisleadstothe

overallattitudethattheautomatedcuesarenotjustanothercue,butthemost

19

powerfulandimportantcue.Theseautomateddecisionaidssupportthegeneral

humantendency“totraveltheroad”ofleastcognitiveeffort.Peoplewillgenerally

utilizeheuristics(cognitiveshortcuts)toreduceeffortandinformationload.

Forrigidtasksthatdonotrequireflexibledecision-makingautomationcanoften

providethebestsolution(Cummings,2016).Intime-criticalenvironmentsthathave

externalandchangingconstraints,higherlevelsofautomationmaynotbeadvisabledue

totherisksandthecomplexityofthedecisionaidsnotbeingperfectlystable.

(Cummings,2016).Situationawareness,complacency,andskilldegradationarethe

measurablecostsofautomationbias.

BreakdowninCoordination

Errorscanneverbecompletelyeliminatednecessitatingtheneedfordetection,

diagnosis,andrecovery(UnitedAirlines,2016).Eventdrivingtasksanddomainshave

seenalackofresearchinerrordiagnosisandrecovery(Nikolic&Sarter,2007).Astudy

jointlyconductedbytheBoeingCompanyandtheUniversityofMichiganin2007sought

tosomeinsightintoerroranddisturbancemanagementstrategies.Thestudynoted

thatpilotsseldomfollowthecanonicalpathtohandledisturbanceevents(Nikolic&

Sarter,2007).Acanonicalpathcanbeconsideredthemostoptimumsolutionthatis

technicallycorrectindevelopingdiagnosisandrecoveryoptions.Detectionofsuch

eventswereoftenobservedtobedelayedduetopilots’knowledgegapsandtime

criticality,andinmanycases,genericandinefficientrecoverystrategieswereobserved

(Nikolic&Sarter,2007).Inaddition,pilotsoftenreliedonhighlevelsofautomationto

20

managetheconsequencesoftheinducederrors.Thestudynotedthatpilotsoften

attempttodiagnoseautomation-relatedproblemsbeforetheyrespondedtotheactual

disturbancehandling(Nikolic&Sarter,2007),meaningthatpilotstendedtobecome

focusedontheautomationinsteadofflyingtheaircraft.All18pilotcrewsintheBoeing

studystruggledatsomepointwithhandlingevents(actualflying)duringasimulated

flightintheB747.Itwasnotedthatthepilotsinthestudyrarelyattemptedtodiagnose

thesourceofthedisturbance(Nikolic&Sarter,2007).Thestudyfindingsofindicate

thatpoordisturbancemanagementissomewhatrelatedtothedesignofthe

automationinterfaces(Nikolic&Sarter,2007).

CognitiveResources

Asskilllevelsdecline,apilotmustdevotemorecognitiveresourceswhen

situationssuchasemergencies,systemfailures,orotherissuesthatforceapilotinto

manualflying.Inaddition,apilotbeginstolosetheabilitytomentallyprojectwhere

theairplaneisinspacewithregardstoaltitude,airspeed,andconfiguration.Simply

stated,apilot’scognitiveresources(infacteveryhuman)isfinite.

Twobasicparametersaffectperformance:theamountofcognitiveresources

availabletothepilotandthecomplexityofthetaskorsituation.Taskperformance

dependsontherelationbetweenthetwoparameters,cognitiveresourcesavailableand

thecomplexityofthesituation.Aslongastheamountofresourcesconsumedbythe

taskislowerthan,orequalto,theavailableamountofmemory,taskperformancewill

beadequate(Ippel,1987).However,taskperformancewillgraduallydeclinerelativeto

21

thedegreethattasksimposecognitiveloadsthatexceedtheavailableamountof

resources(Ippel,1987).Iftoolittleprocessingresourceisapplied(becauseof

limitationstotheavailabilityofprocessingresources),performancefailureistobe

expected.Asmoreandmoreresourcesareappliedtothetaskthelikelihoodof

successfulperformanceincreases(Norman&Bobrow,1975).

StartleEffectandCognitiveConsequences

Thestartleeffectiscommontoallmammals(Simons,1996).Itconsistsofan

involuntaryreactiontoanunusualstimulus.Thisreflexusuallyhappensquickly

followingthestimulus,generallyinaslittleas14milliseconds(Yeomans&Frankland,

1996).Researchhassuggestedalinkbetweencommonpatternsofthestartlereflex

andtheneuralpathwaysinvolved(Davis,1986;Eaton,1984;Landis&Hunt,1939;Lang,

Bradley,&Cuthbert,1990;LeDouxJ.E.,2000;LeDouxJ.,1996;Whalen&Phelps,2009).

Theseactionsinvolvevarioussensesandmusclesandtheamygdalainthelimbicregion

ofthebrain.Theinitialanalysishappensveryquickly(500milliseconds)andresultsin

anaversivereflexawayfromthestimulus.Thestartlereactionmaylastbetween.3to

1.5seconds,dependingontheseverity(Martin,Murray,&Bates,2012).Anissuearises

whenthethreatpersistsandthestartlereactionbecomesafull-blownstartleor

surprisereaction,otherwiseknownas“flightorfight.”Thisprocesscanleadto

confusionordelaysinprocessing.Whenpeoplearestartledandthethreatpersists,

suchasinalife-threateningaircraftemergency,thenthestartlereflexislikelyto

transitionintoafullstartlereaction,withitsensuingactivationofthesympathetic

nervoussystem(Martin,Murray,&Bates,2012).Asuddenstartlingeventcanhave

22

negativeeffectsonperformance(Martin,Murray,&Bates,2012).Thisisespecially

detrimentalinthecaseofanemergencywerecorrectdecision-makingisimportantto

resolveanissue.AstudyconductedfortheFAA(1969),demonstratedthatastartle

eventnegativelyaffectedperformanceand,alsonotedthatrecoveryofperformance

followingastartleeventappearstobequiterapid(Thackray&Touchstone,1970).

Uponinitialpresentationofthestartlestimulus,maximumdisruptionoccurredduring

thefirstfivesecondsafterthestimulation,withsignificantbutconsiderablyless

disruptionafterthesecond5-secondintervallastingfrom30secondstooneminute

(Thackray&Touchstone,1970).

Vlasak(1969)inhisstudy,investigatedtheeffectsofstartleonacontinuous

task.Thistaskwasmeasuredforaccuracyandconsistency.Testparticipantswere

givenataskofcontinuousmentalsubtraction.Subtractionwasfoundtobesignificantly

impairedfor15seccondsfollowingstimulation(Vlasek,1969).Forthereactiontime

tasks,therewasinsufficientdatagiventodeterminetheprecisedurationof

impairment,althoughbothwereimpairedtemporarilyfollowingstartleevent(Vlasek,

1969).Inasimilarstudy,Woodhead(1969)founddecrementsondecision-making

followingsuddennoisestimulationthatlasted,from17to31seconds.Itwouldappear

fromtheresultsofWoodhead’sstudy,andfromotherswhohaveinvestigated

performancerecoverythatmajorperformancedecrementfollowingstartleprobably

occurswithinthefirstfewseconds(Thackray&Touchstone,1970).Alesserbut

significantdecrementmaylastforperiodsfrom10to30secondsafterstartle.This

underperformancehasbeenshowninsomeaccidentstobeaperiodoftimewhere

23

makingcorrectdecisionswerecriticaltorecovery.Interviewswithstartledpilotsand

qualitativedatainflightsimulatorexperimentssuggestthatthenegativeeffectsof

startleeffectarerealandinsomecasescanbesignificant(Martin,Murray,&Bates,

2012).

Decision-MakingModel

Thereareanumberofdecision-makingmodelsthatattempttoexplainhow

pilotsmakedecisions.Aeronauticaldecision-makingiscomplexandthereisnotalways

aclearlinkbetweenthedecisionsmadeandeventoutcome(Plant&Stanton,2013).

Schematheoryexplainshowpeopleinteractandmakedecisionsusingstoredmental

representations,andformsanintegralpartoftheperceptualcyclemodel(PCM).

Aeronauticaldecision-makingisaformofnaturalisticdecision-making(NDM);(Klein,

Calderwood,&Macgregor,1989)inwhichdecisionmakershavedomainexpertiseand

makedecisionsincontexts,whichareusuallycharacterizedbylimitedtime,goal

conflictsanddynamicconditions(Plant&Stanton,2013).Ahighproportionofpilot

errorsarerelatedtodecisionalerrors(Diehl,1991;Orasanu&Martin,1998;Shappell&

Wiegmann,2009).

Naturalisticdecisionmaking(NDM)iscomplexdueinparttotheweakly

correlatedlinkbetweeneventoutcomeandthedecisionprocess.Outcomescannot

alwaysbeusedasareliablemeanstoquantifyareasonabledecision(Orasanu&Martin,

1998).Theperceptualcyclemodel(Neisser,1976)isbasedupontheideaofareciprocal

andcyclicalrelationshipbetweentheoperatorandtheenvironment(Plant&Stanton,

24

2013).Neisserpresentedtheviewthathumanthoughtiscloselyconnectedwitha

person’sinteractionintheworld,bothinformingtheother(Neisser,1976).

Worldknowledge(schemata)leadstotheanticipationofcertaintypesof

informationorclues.Accuratecueperceptioniscriticaltodecisionmaking.Inmost

operationalenvironments,therearemultiplecuesavailable;however,whenpilots

becomestartled,thereisatendencytoreducethenumberofcuesthataresampled

(Wickens&Flach,1998).Selectivecuesamplingcanleadtoacycleofconfusionthat

furthercomplicatesthesituation(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,2012).Schematacanbe

conceptualizedashavingmental‘slots’thatareusedtostructuretheinformationlinked

tothem.Schematarepresentlinkedneuronsandmemoriesofabstractconcepts.They

aregenerallyformedfromspecificinstancesandallowabstractknowledgetobe

derivedatthetimeofretrievalbysamplingfromdomain-specificinstances(Plant&

Stanton,2013).Schemataareinternalknowledgestructuresthatarebasedonsimilar

experiencesthatcapturethecommonfeaturesofthisexperience(Lieberman,2012).

Theuseofschemataindecision-makingisadvantageous;theyactasnaturalstandard

operatingprocedures(SOPs)todirectdecisionmakerstomakeappropriateresponses

toenvironmentalstimulibasedonpreviouslysuccessfulexperiences(Plant&Stanton,

2013).

Accordingtotheperceptualcyclemodel(PCM),whenanenvironmental

experienceisencountered,relevantexperiences(schemata)areretrievedtohelp

developanappropriateresponse(Plant&Stanton,2013).Thisleadstoseekingout

certaintypesofadditionalinformationinasawayofinterpretingthatinformationusing

25

aformofbottom-upprocessing.Theenvironmentalexperiencecanresultinthe

modificationandupdatingofcognitiveschemataandthus,inturn,influencefurther

interactionwiththeenvironment(Plant&Stanton,2013).

SmithandHancock(1995)havearguedthattheusefulnessofthePCM

explanationliesintheinteractionbetweenoperatorandenvironment,ratherthan

consideringthetwoseparately.Decisionissuesarisewhentheselectedschema(stored

andcatalogedmemories)isinappropriateforthecurrentsituation.Ingeneral,pilots

werefoundtoutilizeanumberofdifferentschemasindetermininganinitialresponse

toasituation.Theuseofschemaaidsperceptionanddecision-making(Plant&Stanton,

2013).Whentheunusualhappens,pilotstendtopaycloserattentiontoinformation

relatedtospecificcuesrelatingtotheunusualsituationinsteadofseekingout

additionalinformationtokeepthe“big-picture”inmind(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,

2012).Alternativescenariointerpretationsareusuallyonlyconsideredwhentheyare

consistentwithpreexistingexpectations(Muthard&Wickens,2002).

MorrisandLeung(2006)foundthatmentalworkloadwasnotsignificantly

increased,whentaskdemandincreasedifpilotscouldreverttopre-existingschemata.

Wheninappropriateschemataareselected,incorrectactionsanddecisionscanfollow.

Over-relianceonpre-existingbutinappropriateschematahavebeenshowntoleadto

fixationoncertaincuesinrelationtoothercues(Stanton,etal.,2010;Plant&Stanton,

2013).

26

Dual-ProcessAccountofDecisionBehavior

Inunfamiliarsituations,whenprovenrulesarenotavailable,behaviormay

becomegoal-controlledusingknowledge-basedreasoning(Rasmussen,1983).Coping

withcomplexityislargelyduetotheavailabilityofalargerepertoireofdifferentmental

representationsoftheenvironmentfromwhichrulescanbegeneratedadhoc

(Rasmussen,1983).Purposefulbehaviorisbasedonapilot’sperceptionofaneventand

isexperientialknowledgeofsimilarsituations.

Humanbehaviorcanbecharacterizedbythreelevelsofconstraintsor

performancelevels.Thelevelsmakeuseofpatternmatchingandaredefinedasskill-

based,rule-basedandknowledge-basedperformance.Skillbasedbehavioris

characterizedbysensor-motorperformanceduringactivitiesfollowingastateof

intentionandgenerallytakeplacewithoutconsciousthought.Theyareusuallysmooth,

automatedandhighlyintegrated(Rasmussen,1983).Thismodeismostlyusedforquick

andaccuratemovements.Thebodyactsasamultivariablecontinuouscontrolsystem

synchronizingmovementswiththebehavioroftheenvironment(Rasmussen,1983).

Whenasked,pilotscannotgenerallydescribetheirthoughtprocessinvolvedinthistype

ofcognition.Theyrefertoitasanautomatic-likeresponse.Thistypeofcognitionis

soughtbytrainingdepartmentsinresponsetotimecriticalaircraftemergenciessuchas

anenginefailureatrotationwhereaquick,automated,andpreciseresponseisneeded.

Attherulebasedlevel,informationistypicallyperceivedassigns,whichserveto

activateormodifypredeterminedactionsormanipulations(Rasmussen,1983).The

27

boundarybetweenskillbasedandrulebasedperformanceisnotalwaysdistinct,and

dependsontheleveloftrainingandattentionoftheindividual(Rasmussen,1983).

Thesesignsareusedtoselectormodifytherulescontrollingthesequencingofskilled

sub-routines,andcannotbeusedforfunctionalreasoningtogeneratenewrules.

Duringunfamiliarsituationsthathavenoknownrulesforcontrol,performance

movestothehighestcognitionlevelthatisknowledgebased(Rasmussen,1983).Inthis

situation,thegoalisformulatedbasedonananalysisoftheenvironment.Thismode

canbecharacterizedbyevaluationofdifferentsolutionsandcanalsoincludetrialand

error.Figure2describesthevariouslevelsofhowRasmussendescribeshisbehavior

model.

Figure2.BehaviorModel(Rasmussen,1983)

Manydecision-processmodelsmarkthefirststepofassessingthesituationby

observinginformationanddatascanning(Salmon,etal.,2008).Thesecondpartofthe

processinvolvesexaminingpossiblesolutionsdependingontheinterpretationofthis

28

assessment.Decisionerrorsoccurwhenthereisalackofconsiderationofimportant

datadisplays.TheperceptualstepbuildsthefoundationallevelofEndsley’sconceptof

situationawareness(Endsley,2006).

CognitionandEmotion

Emotionsareevolvedsituationresponsesthathavemultipleaspects.They

involvesubjectivefeelings,cognition,informationprocessing,expressivebehavior,

motivation,andphysiologicalresponses(Diamond&Aspinwill,2003).Infact,cognition

andemotionareintertwinedconstructs(Hilscher,Breiter,&Kochan,2012).Cognitions

thatpilotshavestoredinmemorymaynotbesufficientforexceptionalevents(Hilscher,

Breiter,&Kochan,2012).Insufficientcognitionschangespilotperceptionandasa

result,placemoreemphasisonhowpilotsperceiveandinterpreteventsbasedontheir

motivationalandbehavioralsignificance(Compton,etal,2003).Pressuressuchas

emotionalpressurescanalterrationalreasoningbyshiftingdecision-makingcriteria

fromsafetyrulestosubjectiveones(Causse,Dehais,Peran,&Pastor,2013).Emotion

andstresscanbiasdecision-makingandcognitivefunctioningparticularlyduring

complextasksthatinvolvehighercognitiveabilities(Causse,Dehais,Peran,&Pastor,

2013).Addingtothisissueisaningrainedconfidenceontheaircraft’sreliability.This

senseofsafetycanleavepilotsunpreparedforsuddenemergencies(Hilscher,Breiter,&

Kochan,2012).

29

InflightLossofControl

Intermsofaircraftaccidents,peopleoftenincorrectlyassociatetakeoffand

landingphasestobetheareawherethehighestriskoccurs.Intotalnumbersof

accidentsandincidents,asdefinedbytheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard(NTSB),

takeoffsandlandingsarethelargestaccidentcategory.However,accordingtoBoeing

(2012),inflightlossofcontrolisthesinglelargestcategoryoffatalitiesoverthepastten

yearsaccountingfor1413fatalitiesfrom18accidents(Boeing,2012).Inflightlossof

controlaccidentshavemorefatalitiesthatbothcontrolledflightintoterrain(CFIT)and

landingaccidents.Manyoftheseinflightlossofcontrolaccidentsweretheresultofan

unusualeventatthebeginningoftheaccidentsequence.Lossofcontrolinflightcan

developrapidlyandsuddenlyfollowinginappropriatedecisionsbytheflightcrew.

Figure11belowshowsthevariousaccidentfatalitiesrankedbycategorywithinflight

lossofcontrolhavingthemost.

30

Figure3.CausesofAccidents(Boeing,2012)

Thenextsectionsofthisliteraturereviewdiscussestwowidelyknownairline

accidentsinwhichinflightlossofcontroloccurredfollowingastartleevent.

AircraftAccidentColgan3407

Asreferencedinthelastparagraph,inflightlossofcontrolrepresentsamajority

ofairlineaccidentfatalities.Manyoftheseincidentshavebeenprecededbyastartle

event.Whenairlinecrewsarepresentedwithasuddenonsetofunusualcircumstances,

theysometimesreactcontrarytowhataregenerallyacceptedcorrectprocedures

(NTSB,2010).

31

OnFebruary12,2009,aColganAirBombardierDHC-8-400(Q400)operatingas

ContinentalConnection3407crashedwhileonapproachtotheBuffaloInternational

Airport.All45passengers,4crewmembers,and1persononthegroundperishedasa

resultofthecrash.Theaircraftimpactedaresidentialareaapproximatelyfivenautical

milesnortheastoftheairportwhileattemptinganinstrumentapproach.Atthetimeof

theaccident,nightvisualmeteorologicalconditions(VMC)prevailedatthetime(NTSB,

2010).

TheMETARfortheairportindicatedthatthewindswerefrom240

degreesat15knotsgustingto27knots.Thevisibilitywas3milesinlight

snowandmistwithafewcloudsat1,100feet,brokencloudsat2,100

feetandovercastcloudsat2,700feet.Thetemperaturewas-1degreeC

withadewpointalsoat-1.PIREPSbothbeforeandaftertheaccident

reportedlighttomoderateicingfrom3,000to14,000feet(NTSB,2010).

TheflighthaddepartedNewarkLibertyInternationalAirportat2118EST(NTSB,

2010)forthe50-minuteflighttoBuffalo.Theflighthadbeenroutineupuntilthattime

withtheexceptionofnon-standardcommunicationduringsterileportionsoftheflight

(below10,000feet).

Whilepreparingfortheapproachat4000feet,thefirstofficeraskedthecaptain

iftheaircraftwasaccumulatingicetowhichherespondedthattherewasiceonhisside

ofthewindshield.Thefirstofficerthenresponded,“lotsofice”andthecaptainagain

commented,“that’sthemostI’veseen–mosticeI’veseenontheleadingedgesina

32

longtime”(NTSB,2010).Airtrafficcontrol(ATC)continuedtomonitorthedescentof

theairplaneto2300feet(MSL)andat2212EST,theflightwasclearedfortheILSto

runway23.Thecrewhadtheautopilotengagedduringthisportionoftheflightandthe

airspeedwas180knots.Approximatelythreemilesfromtheoutermarker,thecaptain

begantoslowtheairplanetowarditsfinalapproachspeedbyreducingenginepower

towardsflightidle.At2216:21EST,thefirstofficerloweredthelandinggearand

selectedflapsto15degreesasrequestedbythecaptain.Theairspeedatthistimewas

145knotsanddecreasing.At2216:27(sixsecondslater)thecockpitvoicerecorder

(CVR)recordedasoundsimilartothestickshakerandtheautopilotdisconnecthorn

thatsoundeduntiltheendoftherecording(NTSB,2010).Theflightdatarecorder(FDR)

thatatthetimerecordedanairspeedof131knots.Within.5secondsoftheautopilot

disengaging,theFDRshowedthatthecontrolcolumnmovedaft(commandingapitch

up).Thepowerleverswerealsoadvancedtoabout75%torque(ameasureofengine

power).TheFDRalsoshowedthatwhilethepowerleverswerebeingadvancedthe

airplanepitchedupandrolledtotheleftapproximately45degreesandthenquickly

rolledtotheright(NTSB,2010).Concurrentwiththeroll,thestickpusheralsoactivated

(itwouldactivatetwomoretimes)attemptingtopushthenoseoftheaircraftdown.At

2216:34thefirstofficerselectedtheflapstozero(uncommentedbythecaptain),

airspeedatthattimewas100knots(NTSB,2010).FDRshowedthattherollangle

reached105degreesrightwingdownbeforetheairplaneagainbeganrollingleft.The

airplanerolledapproximately35degreestotheleftandthenbeganarapidrolltothe

rightreaching100degreesrightwingdown.At2216:50,theFDRindicatedthatthe

33

airplanehadpitched25degreesnosedown(NTSB,2010).Impactwiththegroundwas

at2216:54.Fromtheonsetofthestickshakerwheretheairplanewasstillflyableto

impactwiththegroundwas26seconds.

Figure4.Flight3407–OneMinutefromImpact–SituationNormal(NTSB,2010)

Figure5.Flight3407–30SecondsfromImpact–StickShakerActivation(NTSB,2010)

34

Figure6.Flight3407-27SecondsfromImpact-RolltotheLeft(NTSB,2010)

Figure7.Flight3407–21SecondsfromImpact-RolltotheRight(NTSB,2010)

35

Figure8.Flight3407–10SecondsformImpact-FinalRolltotheRightandPitchDown(NTSB,2010)

TheaccidentwasinvestigatedbytheNationalTransportationSafetyBoard

(NTSB).Anextensivereviewofbothpilot’squalificationswasconductedbytheBoard.

Thecaptainhadexperiencedseveralunsuccessfuleventsduringhisflyingcareer

requiringadditionaltraining,however,otherpilotswhohadflownwithboththecaptain

andfirstofficerdescribedtheirperformanceas“good”(NTSB,2010).

TheNTSBinitsfindingsstatedoneoftheprimarycausesoftheaccidentwasthe

captain’sincorrectactionsinresponsetothestallwarningduringtheapproach(NTSB,

2010).Italsostatedthattheicingontheairplanewouldhaveresultedinminimal

performancedegradation(NTSB,2010).Whenthestickshakeractivated,thecaptain

respondedbyapplyinga37-poundpullforcetothecontrolcolumn,whichresultedina

noseupelevatordeflection.Theangleofattack(AOA)increasedto13degreeswitha

pitchof18degrees.Asaresultofthepowersettingsandthecaptain’sactions,the

36

airspeeddroppedto125knots.Afterthefirststickpusheractivation,thecaptainagain

appliedanoseupforceonthecontrolcolumn(NTSB,2010).Thecaptainappliedtwo

additionalpullforcesofincreasingmagnitudeinresponsetothetwootherstickpusher

activations.TheNTSBcharacterizedthecaptain’sactionsas“abruptandinappropriate”

(NTSB,2010).

AccordingtotheNTSB,thecaptain’sperformancesuggestthathewasstartled

bytheactivationofthestickshakerandrespondedbymakinginappropriatecontrol

inputs(NTSB,2010).TheNTSBfurtherstated:

“Thecaptain’sfailuretomakeastandardcalloutorevenadeclarative

statementassociatedwitharecoveryattemptandhisfailuretosilence

theautopilotdisconnecthorn(whichcontinuedfortheremainderofthe

fightandcouldhavebeensilencedbypushingabuttononthecontrol

wheel)furthersuggestthathewasnotrespondingtothesituationusing

awell-learnedhabitpattern.Thefirstofficerwasnotprovidingguidance

consistentwithanunderstandingofthesituation(NTSB,2010)”.

AscientistattheNASA-AmesResearchforAerospaceHumanFactorsstatedthat

peopleunderstressmightnotrespondappropriatelytoeventsintheirenvironment

(NTSB,2010).Thecaptain’sresponsetothestickshakershouldnothaverequired

cognitiveefforttomakethecorrectinputsorcallouts(NTSB,2010).Inapossible

explanationtothecaptain’sresponse,theNTSBcitedColgan’strainingonicinginwhich

avideoontailplanestallswasshown(NTSB,2010).Therecoverythatthecaptain

37

attemptedwassimilartothatwhichshouldbetakenduringatailplanestall,however,

theaircraftitselfpresentednoevidenceofsuchanevent(NTSB,2010).Itismore

probablethatinreactiontoastartleevent,thecaptainchosetheincorrectcognitive

pathwayforresolutionandwasneverabletocorrectlydiagnosethetrueissuewiththe

airplane.

AircraftAccidentAirFranceFlight447

AirFranceflight447(AF447)alsorepresentsacasewherestartleofthecrew

mayhaveadversuslyaffectedinitialdecisionmakingresultinginalossoftheaircraft

(BAE,2012).AF447wasaregularlyscheduledflightfromRiodeJaneirotoParis.AF447,

anA330,departedRioonJune1st,2009carrying216passengers,threepilots,andnine

flightattendants.RoutingoftheflightwasoverthecentralAtlanticOcean.Theflight

proceedednormallyforthefirsttwohoursandwasflyinglevelat35,000feet.

Approximately2:10:05,theaircraftencounteredfreezingprecipitationwhich

obstructedthepitotprobes(BAE,2012).Thelossofthepitotprobesaffectedthe

autoflightsystemandthecockpitairspeedindications.Thetotaltimefromonsetofthe

pitotissuetoimpactingtheoceanwas4:23.Whentheautoflightsystemdisconnected,

thepilotflying(PF)beganapplyinganoseupcommandonthesidestick.Thecockpit

speedindicationsdroppedfrom275knotsto60knots(typicalofanicingevent).At

2:10:16thepilotnotflying(PNF)stated“we’velostthespeeds”then“alternatelaw

protections”(BAE,2012).ThePFmaderapidandhighamplituderollcontrolinputs

(fromstoptostop).Healsomadeanadditionalnose-upinputthatincreasedthe

38

airplane’spitchattitudeupto11degrees(BAE,2012).Theairplanewasinaclimb

through37,700feetatthispoint.At2:10:36theairspeedontheleftsideofthecockpit

becamevalidastheicemeltedinthepitotprobe.Airspeedatthispointwas223knots

whichrepresentedalossof50knots.ThePFreducedthepitchoftheairplane

momentarilyat2:10:47however,hethenresumedapitch-upbeyond10degreesand

theairplaneagainbegantoclimb.Thispitchcausedtheairplanesstall-warningsystem

totriggerinacontinuousmanner(BAE,2012).

ThePFselectedmaximumthrustontheenginesandmadeadditionalpitchup

inputstowards13degrees.Approximately15secondslatertherightsideairspeed

indicatorbecamevalidandrecordedanairspeedof185knots(BAE,2012).ThePF

continuedtocommandapitchupandtheairplanereachedamaximumaltitudeof

38,800feetandanangleofattack(AOA)of16degrees.At2:11:42thecaptainre-

enteredthecockpitfromarestbreak.Atthattimeallthreeairspeedindicatorswere

displayingvalidairspeeddata.Alsoaroundthistime,theairplanewasdescending

through35,000feetwithanAOAof40degrees,whichresultedinaverticalspeedof-

10,000feetperminute(fpm).Theairplanewasalsoexperiencingrolloscillations

exceeding40degrees(BAE,2012).

Duetotheextremelylowairspeed,thestallwarningceased.ThePF

momentarilyreducedthepitchoftheairplanewhichagaintriggeredthestallwarningas

theplanegainedalittlespeed.Unfortunately,thePFresumedthecommandedpitchup

andtheAOAapproached35degrees.Thelastrecordeddatafortheairplanewasat

2:14:28.Dataindicatesaverticalspeedof-10,912fpmwithanairspeedof107knots.

39

Figure9isagraphicalreproductionoftheflightparametersfromtheflightdata

recorder.Thetimelineforthisdiagramisthefirst50secondsoftheeventwherethe

aircraftgoesfromcontrolledflighttoadescentrateofover10,000feetperminute.

Thechartshowstheaggressivehandlingbythefirstofficerinbothpitchandroll.Italso

showswhentheairspeedinformationbecamevalid.

40

Figure9.Parametersfrom2:10:50to2:11:46(BAE,2012)

Figure10showsthattheairspeedindicationswerenormaljustpriortothe

event.Italsoshowsthattheairspeedindications(forthefirstofficer)mayhavenot

41

beenreliableforaperiodof40seconds.Italsoshowsthatoncetheairspeed

indicationswerevalid,aconstantdecreaseinspeedoccurreduntiltheendoftheevent.

Figure10.EvolutionofAirspeedandPitotIcing(BAE,2012)

Figure11summarizestheeventfromtheonsetofthefrozenpitottubesuntil

impactwiththeocean.Largevariationsinpitchandangleofattackcanbeseen

throughoutmostoftheevent.Theaircraftiscompletelystalledforthelastminuteof

theevent,finallyimpactingtheoceanisanosehighwithalmostnoforwardairspeed

andatarateofdescentof-15,000feetperminute.

42

Figure11.AF447FDRData(MM43,2011)

Initsfindings,theBAEstudied13incidentsrelatedtoicingandunreliable

airspeed.AirFrancehadfoursuchcasesintheirhistorywiththeA330aircraft.TheBAE

determinedthatinlessthanoneminuteaftertheautopilotdisconnected,theairplane

exiteditsflightenvelopefollowinginappropriatepilotinputs(BAE,2012).Theairplane

wentintoasustainedstallassignaledbythestallwarningsystemandstrongairframe

buffet.Eventhoughthestallwarningsoundedfor54seconds,neitherpilotmadeany

referencetothestallwarningortheassociatedbuffet.Thecrewneverappliedthestall

recoverymaneuver.Theincidentstartledthecrewandtheyhaddifficultieshandling

theairplane(BAE,2012).Theexcessivepitchandverticalspeedaddedtotheerroneous

indicationandemergency,caution,andmonitoring(ECAM)messages,whichadded

43

complexityinthediagnosisofthesituation.Thecrewlikelyneverunderstoodthatit

wasasimplelossofairspeeddata(BAE,2012).

Conclusion

Althoughnotintendedtobeallencompassing,thisliteraturereviewseeksto

providethereaderabroadbackgroundonwhichtobasethisstudy.Thereview

discussedstartleeffectandthecurrentunderstandingofitseffectupondecision

making.Emergencies,whereflightcrewsmadetheincorrectinitialdecision,become

progressivelymoredifficulttosuccessfullymanageaspilotsoftenselectivelyfilter

informationtoconfirmtheirinitialdecision.Decisionsevolvefrompastexperiencesand

knowledgewherebitsofsimilarexperiencesarepastedtogetherinthemodel

generationphase.

Decision-makingisacomplexprocessthatresearchersareonlybeginningto

understand.Itisknownthatwhenpilotsarestartledbyasuddenemergencythattheir

decision-makingandsubsequentperformancecanbeadversuslyaffected.Thestartle

effectmayleadtoabreakdownincrewcoordinationandputsadditionalcognitiveload

ontheindividualpilot.Withover-relianceonautomation,crewsmaynotbewell

equippedtohandleasuddeninflightemergencythatrequirestheuseofhandflying

skills.Thestartleeffectmay,insomecases,resultinincorrectmodel

generation/selectionwithincorrectdecisionsand/oractionsbeingappliedtoan

emergencysituation.Boeing(2012)suggeststhatinflightlossofcontrolisthesingle

highestcategoryforairlinefatalities.Startleeffect,cognitiveoverload,andcrew

44

breakdowncanallbeseeninboththeAirFranceandColganaccidents.Inmanycases,

simulatortraininginconjunctionwithdeliberatepracticehasbeendemonstratedto

increasecrewperformance.Deliberatepracticehasbeenwidelyappliedasanindustry

solutiontootherinflightemergenciesandapplyingitstartleeffectmaybeaneffective

waytomitigatesomeofitsinherentrisks.

45

CHAPTERII

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Thisstudywasamixedmethodologystudyfocusingonwhetherstartletraining

couldhelpsuccessfullymitigatethecognitivegapthatexistsduringastartleevent.The

firstpartofthestudywasasurveygiventoeachoftheparticipatingpilots.Thesecond

partofthestudyevaluatedthecrewsastheyflewoneoftheselectedmaneuversets

andwasquantitativeinnature.Thesimulatorpartofthestudywasaquasi-

experimentaldesignwithcrewsthatdidnotreceivestartletrainingservingasthe

controlgroup.Eachparticipatingcrewwasevaluatedeitheraloworhighaltitude

scenariodependingonthedayoftheweek.Randomlyselectedcrewsreceivedtraining

onhandlingtheaircraftduringastartleevent.Thetrainingconsistedofbothabriefing

andsimulatorpractice.Practiceinthesimulatorwasequalforthecrewsinthetrained

grouplastingapproximatelyonehour.Thebriefingconsistedofpersonalinstruction

usingapowerpointpresentationdiscussingtheproperpitch,power,bank,andtime

recognition(seeAppendixB).Thebriefingendedwithamnemonicdevicethatpilots

wereexpectedtouseandverbalizebothinthepracticeeventsandtheevaluation

event.Simulatorpracticeconsistedofastartleeventnotrelatedtotheevaluation

46

profiles.Itwasintendedtohaveequallytrainedanduntrainedcrewstocompare

performancebetweenthegroups.

Thefirsttestscenariowasalowaltitudeandlowfuelprofile.Thescenario

degradeswithasystemfailurethatcausesamissedapproachandaresequencefor

landing.Timepressure,lowfuel,andtheunexpectedmissedapproachcombinetoform

thestartleeventandeventevaluationbeginsatthemissedapproach.

ThecrewflewastandardarrivalprocedureintoNewarkLibertyInternational

Airport(KEWR).Theroutingforthearrivalhadbothlateralandverticalrestrictionsand

wouldbeconsideredaroutineprocedureforapproachingtheairport.Thespecific

arrivalchosenforthisstudywastheDYLINarrival(seeAppendixD).Theweatherat

KEWRcombinedwithtrafficsaturationhascausedholding(attheMETROintersection).

Thisholdingisunexpectedbythecrewresultinginsomewhatofalowfuelsituationthat

addsaninitialstresselementtothescenario.Thecrewisclearedoutofholdingforthe

instrumentapproachtorunway4R(seeAppendixD)withapproximatelyonehourof

fuelremaining.Theexactamountoffueldependsontheaircraftinthescenario(See

AppendixD).Thevectorsandtheinitialpartoftheinstrumentapproachtorunway4R

werenormal.Theweatherwasinstrumentflightrules(IFR)witha500-footovercast

ceilingandavisibilityofonemile.

Whenthecrewselectedthelandinggeardown,aroundapproximately2000feet

ontheapproach,oneofthelandinggearfailstoextend.Itwasexpectedthatthecrew

willexecuteamissedapproachatthispointinordertotryandrectifythelandinggear

47

issue.Thelandinggearmalfunctionisthestartleeventandtimepressureduetolow

fuelservetoaddstresstothecrew.

Thesecondtestscenariowasahighaltitudeprofile.Thecrewwasbriefedthat

theyareonaflightthatterminatesinKEWR,withroutingviatheDYLINarrival.The

flightisat35,000feet(FL350),withadescentplannedviathearrival.Therehavealso

beenreportsoflighticingdescendingintoKEWR.Pilotsareininstrumentconditions

withlightturbulence.Thescenarioinvolveslossoftheaircraft'sairdatasystem,which

disablesmanyoftheauto-flightsystems.Withtheairdataloss,anenginefirewarning

wasintroduced.Theairdatalosswasthestartleeventandtheenginefirewarning

addedadistractorandstresstothecrew.Evaluationbeganatthelossofairdata.The

airdatalossrenderstheaircraft’sspeed,altitude,andverticaltrendunreliablewiththe

sideeffectoftheautoflightsystemautomaticallydisconnecting.Theairdata

interruptionwasofshortdurationandonlyafewsecondselapsedbeforeinstrument

indicationsreturntonormal.Theautoflightdisconnectionforcesthecrewintoahand

flyingsituationandtheenginefirewarningservesasbothadistractionandastartle

event.

Datacollectionconsistedofcrewperformanceasitrelatestoaircraftcontrolfor

eachscenario.Eachscenarioismadeupoffivesub-taskswhichwereevaluatedand

usedtodetermineanoverallscore.Thescoringmethodologywastakendirectlyfrom

participatingairlines’FAAapprovedadvancedqualificationprogram(AQP)evaluation

manual.Eachpilotgroupwascomparedusingaone-wayANOVAagainsttheFAA

proficiencystandardandthencomparedtotheothergroupforsignificance.T-tests

48

wereperformedonthedifferentmaneuversetstodetermineiftheproximityofthe

maneuveraffectsthepilot'sabilitytosuccessfullyflytheaircraft.Ifthestudy

hypothesisiscorrect,theuntrainedcrewsshouldshowasignificantstatisticaldifference

ascomparedtothestandardpilotperformanceasdefinedbytheFAA.Inaddition,

regressionanalysiswasperformedonvariousaspectsofthecollecteddatatogainan

insightastowherethevariabilitylies.

Subjects

ThepopulationforthisstudywereprofessionalpilotsofanFAR121commercial

aircarrier.Furthermore,thestudyfocusedonpilotsofscheduledpassengerairlines.

Flightcrewsfromtheparticipatingairlinewereaskedduringtheirrecurrenttraining

cycleiftheywishedtoparticipateinthisstudy.Theywereselectedbasedontheir

willingnesstovolunteerforthisstudy.Selectionofcrewsgenerallyoccurredduring

theirfinaldayoftrainingwhentherewasoftenextrasimulatortimeavailable.Ifthe

crewvolunteered,theywererequestedtofilloutasurveyontheirexperienceand

perceptionsoftheirflyingabilities,especiallyduringunusualevents.Thecrewswere

informedthattherewasnopersonaldatakeptandnodatalinkinganindividualtotheir

performance.

BetaTesting

Asmallgrouptestwascompletedonapproximately15subjects.Thenatureof

thebetatestwastodetermineanestimatedeffectsizeoftheindependentvariable.

Theeffectsizewasusedtocompleteapoweranalysis.Inaddition,thebetatestgroup

49

wasusedtoestablishthesimulatorparametersforitemssuchasweight,fuel,and

inducedproblems.Thebetatestresultsarereportedhereandnotinthefindings

sectionastheyarenotconsideredpartoftheactualtestdata.IBMSPSSStatistics

(SPSS)wasusedtoanalyzetheoveralltrainingeffectandthenforeachscenario(low

andhigh).Tablesoftheinitialresultsarelistedbelow.Table1liststhebasic

descriptives.Atotalof15crewsparticipatedinthebetatest.

Table1.DescriptiveStatisticsBetaGroup

DependentVariable:OverallscorecollapsedacrosslowandhighaltitudeCrewtrainingprovided

Highorlowaltitudescenario

Mean Std.Deviation N

Yes HighAltitude 4.0000 .00000 5LowAltitude 4.5000 .57735 4Total 4.2222 .44096 9

No HighAltitude 2.3333 .57735 3LowAltitude 2.6667 .57735 3Total 2.5000 .54772 6

Total HighAltitude 3.3750 .91613 8LowAltitude 3.7143 1.11270 7Total 3.5333 .99043 15

Thebetatestfoundthatthetrainingeffectwassignificantwithp=.00whenthelow

andhighaltitudegroups(trainedanduntrained)wherecompared.Theresultsarelisted

intable2.

50

Table2.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsBetaGroup

Table3belowcomparesthetrainedanduntrainedgroupsforonlythelowaltitude

scenario.ThedescriptivestaticsandANOVAresultsareinTables3and4.

Table3.DescriptiveStatisticsLowAltitudeScenarioBetaGroup

DependentVariable:LowAltitudeScenarioCrewtrainingprovided Mean Std.Deviation NYes 4.5000 .57735 4No 2.6667 .57735 3Total 3.7143 1.11270 7

DependentVariable:OverallscorecollapsedacrosslowandhighaltitudeSource TypeIIISum

ofSquaresdf Mean

SquareF Sig. PartialEta

SquaredNoncent.Parameter

ObservedPowerb

CorrectedModel

11.400a 3 3.800 17.914 .000 .830 53.743 1.000

Intercept 163.209 1 163.209 769.414 .000 .986 769.414 1.000Training 10.970 1 10.970 51.716 .000 .825 51.716 1.000HighLow .622 1 .622 2.932 .115 .210 2.932 .346TrainingHighLow

.025 1 .025 .117 .738 .011 .117 .061

Error 2.333 11 .212

Total 201.000 15

CorrectedTotal

13.733 14

a.RSquared=.830(AdjustedRSquared=.784)b.Computedusingalpha=.05

51

Table4.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsLowAltitudeScenarioLowAltitudeBetaGroup

DependentVariable:LowAltitudeScenarioSource TypeIIISum

ofSquaresdf Mean



ObservedPowerb

CorrectedModel

5.762a 1 5.762 17.286 .009 .776 17.286 .908

Intercept 88.048 1 88.048 264.143 .000 .981 264.143 1.000Training 5.762 1 5.762 17.286 .009 .776 17.286 .908Error 1.667 5 .333

Total 104.000 7

CorrectedTotal

7.429 6


Thesamecomparisonwasdoneonthebetagroupforthehighaltitudescenario.The

resultsarelistedinTables5and6.Likethelowaltitudebetagroup,themaineffectof

trainingshowedsignificance.

Table5.DescriptiveStatisticsHighAltitude-BetaGroup

DependentVariable:HighAltitudeScenarioCrewtrainingprovided Mean Std.Deviation NYes 4.0000 .00000 5No 2.3333 .57735 3Total 3.3750 .91613 8

52

Table6.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsHighAltitude-BetaGroup

DependentVariable:HighAltitudeScenarioSource TypeIIISum

ofSquaresdf Mean



ObservedPowerb

CorrectedModel

5.208a 1 5.208 46.875 .000 .887 46.875 1.000

Intercept 75.208 1 75.208 676.875 .000 .991 676.875 1.000Training 5.208 1 5.208 46.875 .000 .887 46.875 1.000Error .667 6 .111

Total 97.000 8

CorrectedTotal

5.875 7


Analysissuggestthatbetween73%and86%ofthevariabilitycanbeaccounted

forduetothetrainingeffect.G-PowerwasthenusedtocalculateaCohen’sDto

estimatethetrainingeffectsize.Thecalculatedeffectsizewas.33whichreflectsa

mediumeffectsize.Thegiveneffectsizewasthenusedtoestimatethenumberof

subjectsneedstoensureanadequatesamplesizewhichwiththecalculatedeffectsize

isbetween17and60crews.

Table7.Cohen’sDCalculationBetaGroup

Scenario LowAltitude HighAltitudeMean 3.167 3.375Std.Deviation 0.916 1.112SampleSize 7.0 8.0Result Cohen'sd=(3.714-3.375)⁄1.018725=0.332769.Cohen'sd=(M2-M1)⁄SDpooledSDpooled=√((SD12+SD22)⁄2)

53

SampleGroups

Theplanwastoevaluate30-60crews.Thisallowedforenoughdatatobe

collectedeveniftheeffectsizeintheratingscaleissmalltomedium

(Cohen’sd=.33/r=.19).Thenumberofpilotswerechoseninordertogaina

statisticallysignificantsampleapproximatingtheskilllevelofthegeneralprofessional

pilotpopulation.Therewerefourmaingroupsforcomparison.Thegroupswere

definedasfollows:

1. LowAltitude–NoTraining(LANT)

2. LowAltitude–Training(LAT)

3. HighAltitude–NoTraining(HANT)

4. HighAltitude–Training(HAT)

Equipment

ThisstudyusedprofessionalairlinepilotsflyingtwodifferentscenariosinanFAA

approvedLevel-Dfullflightsimulator(FFS).SimulatorsthatwereutilizedincludeA320,

B737,B757,B767,B777,B787,andB747.Thescenarioswereflownbyacrewconsisting

ofacaptainandfirstofficer,similartowhatwouldhappeninactuallineoperations.

Thetrainingthatsomeofthecrewsreceivedwasbroad-basedandnotaircraftspecific.

DataCollectionMethods/Procedures

Datacollectionforthisstudyfocusedontwoparts:asurveyandobserved

simulatorperformancedata.Thesurveyconsistedofapproximately10multiple-choice

54

questionsthatwereevaluatedusingaLickertscale.Questionsfocusonsuchitemsas

outsideflying,previousmilitaryand/oraerobaticflying,andgeneralhandflying

attitudes.

ThesimulatorportionofthestudyinvolvedflyingmaneuverprofilesinanFAA

approvedLevel-Dfullflightsimulator.Themaneuversetswereevaluatedbythe

principleinvestigator.Theinvestigatorisaformerinstructorpilotonmultipletransport

categoryjetaircraftwithover11yearsofprofessionalinstructionalexperience.The

maneuverevaluationcriteriaweredevelopedinaccordancewithairlinetraining

proceduresandprotocolsassetforthbytheFAA.Thespecificevaluationcriteriawere

adoptedfromanFAR121passengerAdvancedQualificationProgram(AQP)program

(withpermission),whichwasapprovedbytheFAA.Thecriteriamatchcloselywith

evaluationstandardssetforthbytheFAAintheAirlineTransportPilot(ATP)practical

teststandards(PTS).Thecrewswereevaluatedonthesuccessofthemaneuveras

describedinTables8-10.

55

Table8.HighAltitudeAnalysis

Table9.LowAltitudeAnalysis

Score Criteria

5Thecrewremainedwellwithinstandardsandperformancewasexemplary.Thecrewrecognizedtheissueandhandledpromptlywhilerecognizingthedeterioratingfuelstateoftheaircraft.

4 Thesituationwaswellhandledwiththesafetyoftheflightnotinjepordy.Thecrewwasawareofthetimepressuresandthefuelstateandmitigatedboth.

3 TheflightlandedsafelywithnomajordeviationsforSOPswithatleast30minutesoffuel.

2 Landedtheaircraftinlessthandesirableconditionswithregardstoconfiguration,fuelandtimemanagement.

1Thepilotcommittedmajordeviationsfromstandardsthatwerenotpromptlycorrectedand/orwereunsafe,orwasunabletoperformthemaneuver/taskwithoutassistance.Thepilotcrashedorlostcontroloftheaircraft.

Score Criteria

5Crewperformancewasexcellentinbothaircrafthandlingandproblemdiagnosis.Thecrewhadminimalaltitudeandheadingchanges,recognizedtheissuepromptlyandappliedthecorrectmitigationstrategies.

4 Crewperformancewasgood.Problemwascorrectlydiagnosedwithpitchandrollnotexceeding5deg/50feet.

3 Crewperformancewasaverage.Somedifficultydiagnosingtheproblem.Pitchandrollnotexceeding10deg/100feet.

2Crewperformancewasbelowaverage.Problemsand/orconfusiondiagnosingtheproblemormisdiagnosedoftheproblem.Majordeviationsinpitchandrollmorethan20deg/200feet.

1 Crewperformancewasunacceptable.Thecrewcouldnotdiagnosetheproblemandmisdiagnosedtheproblem.Excessivedeviationsandhandlingoftheaircraft.

56

Table10.EvaluatedFactorsandSeatPositions

HighAltitude LowAltitude

Factors ProblemDiagnosis MissedApproach

Pitch IrregularChecklists

Roll TimeManagement

AltitudeControl FuelManagement

OverallControl ApproachandLanding

OverallScore OverallScore

SeatPosition PilotFlying PilotFlying

PilotMonitoring PilotMonitoring

DataAnalysisandStatisticalModeling

Analysiswasplannedforwithingroupsandbetweengroupscomparisonswith

furtheranalysisofsignificantfactors.Anadditionalanalysiscomparedthetraining

groupsandnon-traininggroupsversustheFAAstandard.Overallfactorandseat

positionscoreswerealsocomparedtotheFAAstandard,whichforthisstudywasa

gradeofthreeasdescribedaboveinthedatacollectionsection.Thestatistical

modelingprogramSPSSwasprimarilyusedtoanalyzethedata.Inaddition,thesurvey

datawascomparedandanalyzedtoseeifanysignificantcorrelationscanbe

determined.ANOVA,linearregression,andpost-t-testsweretheprimarystatistical

modelsused.

57

WithinGroupComparison

Thefirstdatasetforanalysiswerethewithingroupcomparisons.Analysiswas

conductedbetweenLowAltitudeTrainedGroup(LAT)andLowAltitudeNon-Trained

Group(LANT)andtheHighAltitudeTrainedGroup(HAT)andtheHighAltitudeNon-

TrainedGroup(HANT).Thefirstpartoftheanalysisusedtheoverallgradescore(see

Appendix1).Analysislookedforsignificantfindingswithineachgroupusingaone-way

ANOVAwiththealphalevelsetat.05.Comparisonbetweentheoverallgradeandthe

FAAstandardgrade(3)wasalsocompared.Asecondroundofanalysisoccurredforthe

contributingfactorsoftheoverallgrade.Linearregressionwasusedtodeterminewhat

partofthevarianceeachfactor(ifany)aresignificant.Againthealphalevelwas.05.

Finally,aspartofthewithingroupscomparison,theseatposition(captainorfirst

officer)wastestedforsignificanceasacontributortotheoverallgradeusingregression.

BetweenGroupComparison

Thebetween-groupcomparisonwassimilartothewithingroupcomparison

usingthesametestsandtools.ThebetweengroupswasbetweenLATandHAT

followedbyLANTandHANTgroups.Theanalysissoughttodeterminesignificant

findingsofthefinalgrade,usingaone-wayANOVAwithanalphalevelof.05.Aswith

thewithingroupcomparison,linearregressionwasusedtoanalyzeboththe

contributingfactorsandtheseatposition.ComparisontotheFAAstandardwas

conductedinthebetweengroupcomparison.

58

ComparisonversusaKnownStandard

Thefinalsetofcomparisonswasconductedbycollapsingacrossgroups(trained

versusuntrained,andthencomparingagainstaknownsetstandard.Thesetstandard

wasdeterminedbythetolerancessetforthbytheFAAforanAirlineTransportPilot

(ATP)certificate.Thedatacollectionsectionabovedescribesthegradingstandardsas

setbytheFAAandairlinepolicies,whichsincetheyareapprovedarealsopartofthe

FAAstandard.Crewsreceiving,atleast,anoverallgradeof(3)wereconsideredtomeet

theFAAstandard.Anygradebelow(3)wasconsideredbelowstandard.

Thetraininggroups(LATandHAT)andnon-traininggroups(LANTandHANT)

werecollapsedandthencomparedtotheFAAstandardusingaone-wayANOVAwith

analphalevelof.05.Comparisonofthecollapsedgroupswasalsocomparedtothe

surveyresponsesusingthePearsonCorrelationtest.

ProtectionofHumanSubjects

Thecrewsinthisstudywereexposedtounusualbutnotextraordinaryaircraft

failuresinthesimulator.Thesefailuresareregularlypracticedduringinitialand

recurrenttraining.Thecrewsareaccustomedtohavingtheirperformanceevaluated.

Thereisalsoaminimalriskofperforminginfrontofacolleagueiftheperformanceis

substandardeventhoughtheevaluationwillbeasawholecrew.Thisismitigatedby

notidentifyingaparticularpilotwithanindividualperformance.Thevolunteersubjects

werealsoencouragednottoevaluateeachother’scapabilitybasedonthistesting

scenario.Finally,crewswillberequestedtorefrainfromtalkingaboutthetestingwith

59

othercrewsastonotcompromisethetestdata.Therewillbenoidentifiablelink

betweentheperformanceofthecrewandanyindividualcrewmember(aconditionset

bytheparticipatingairlineingrantinguseoftheirsimulators).Individualperformance

willnotbereportedtoanyairlineorentityoutsidetheresearchproject.

Sinceminimalriskswillbeinvolvedinthestudy,thesubjectswillbeinformed

thatthestudywillincludevariousmaneuversthatwillbeflowninthesimulatorand

thatthecrew'sperformancewillbeanalyzed.Therewillbeacheckboxonthesurvey

formindicatingthattheparticipantshavevolunteeredforthestudy.Thespecific

languageisasfollows:“Bycheckingthisbox,IagreethatIhavevolunteeredforthis

studyandhavefeltnounduepressurefromtheairline,theUniversityofNorthDakota,

ortheprincipleinvestigatortoparticipate.Ihavealsobeeninformedthatnodatawill

bekeptlinkinganysimulatorperformancetoaspecificpilot.Datacollectedisforthis

researchprojectonlyandwillnotbereportedtoanyentityorairline.Finalaggregate

resultsmaybeviewedinthepublisheddissertationthatwillbeavailableatthe

UniversityofNorthDakotaChesterFritzLibrary.TheresearcherhasinformedmethatI

willflyaspartofacrewandmayencountersomeunusualsituationsinthesimulator.I

alsounderstandthatIhavetherighttorefuseparticipationorwithdrawfromthestudy

atanypointwithoutachangeinrelationshipwithmyairline,theUniversityofNorth

Dakotaortheresearchteam.”Allparticipantsacknowledgedandsignedthe

participationconsentform.

60

CHAPTERIV

RESULTS

Thisstudyconsistedoftwomainparts,asurveyandaflightevaluation.There

wasdatarecordedinanFAAapprovedLevel-Dflightsimulator,flownbypilotsfora

majorUSbasedpassengerairline.Volunteercrewswereaskedtoflyoneoftwo

differentscenarioprofiles.Randomcrewsreceivedtrainingthatconsistedofabriefing

andsimulatorpractice.Thetrainingsoughttomitigatethenegativecognitiveeffects

followingastartleevent.Thedatamainlyfocusesontheeffectthetraininghadonthe

trainedpilotgroup.Analysisconsistedofbothwithinandbetweenmaingroupswith

regressionanalysisonthecontributingfactorsthatmadeupthemaneuversetscores.

Crewswerepresentedwitheitheralowaltitudeandlowfuelscenarioorahighattitude

scenariowithalossofairdata.Thesurveywasconductedinordertogainaperspective

intohowpilotsatmajorairlinesflytheiraircraft,andhowtheyperceivetheirownflying

skills.

Demographics

FortycrewswhoflewforaU.S.Globalpassengerairlineparticipatedinthe

study.Allofthesubjectswereactivelinepilotsandvolunteers.Thepilotsflewasa

crewconsistingofaCaptainandFirstOfficerandhadflownintheirrespectiveaircraft

61

foratleastoneyear.Crewswerealsodividedbywhichprofiletheyflewandwhether

theyreceivedtrainingandpracticepriortoflyingtheprofilescenario.Eachscenario

(loworhigh)wasflownby20crews.Inaddition,crewswereseparatedbywhattypeof

aircraftthattheyflew.Therewere21wide-bodyaircraftcrews(B747,B787,B777,

B767)and19narrow-bodyaircraftcrews(B737,A320,B757).

SurveyResponses

Thesurveywasdividedintotwodistinctparts:apilot’sexperience,andtheir

perceptionoftheirownskills.Thepilotflying(PF)thescenariowasaskedtocomplete

thesurvey.Thefirstsurveyquestionaskedifthepilotflewoutsideoftheircurrentjob

inanotherprofessionalmannersuchasflightinstructing.Theresultsaredisplayedin

Table11andFigure12

Table11.FlyingOutsideofProfessionalJob

Frequency Percent ValidPercent

CumulativePercent

Valid Yes 6 15.0 15.0 15.0

No 34 85.0 85.0 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

62

Figure12.OutsideFlying

Surveyresponsesindicatedthatonly15%ofthepilotsflewoutsideofthe

currentjob.Outsideflyinggenerallyconsistsoflesssophisticatedaircraftthatrequire

moreroutineflyingskillpractice.Sinceonly15%indicatedthattheyflewoutsideof

theirairlinejob,theresultswerenotconsideredsignificant.

Thenextsurveyquestionaskedwhetherthepilotflewinthemilitary.Ofthe

surveyresponses,32.5%indicatedthattheyhaveflownintheUnitedStatesmilitary.

TheresultsaredisplayedinTable12andFigure13

63

Table12..DidYouFlyintheMilitary?


CumulativePercent

Valid Yes 13 32.5 32.5 32.5

No 27 67.5 67.5 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Figure13.CivilianversusMilitaryFlying

Anecdotalpersonalinterviewswithmilitarypilotssuggestedthatthoseexposed

tomilitaryflyinghaveagreaterexposuretostartleeventsandinsomecaseshave

developedcopingmechanisms.

Thenextsurveyquestionaskedifthepilothadanytypeofformalaerobatic

training.Thistypeoftrainingmayindicatebetterrecognitionofunusualattitudesand

64

leadtoamoreeffectiveresponsetoanunusualevent.Theresultsaredisplayedin

Table13andFigure14.

Table13.DoYouHaveanyFormalAerobaticTraining


CumulativePercent

Valid Yes 23 57.5 57.5 57.5

No 17 42.5 42.5 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Morethan57%ofthepilotsindicatedthattheyhadreceivedsometypeofformal

aerobatictraining.

Figure14.AerobaticTraining

Thefinalsurveyquestionrelatedtopilotexperience,askedwhetherthepilots

hadeverencounteredanunusualeventthattheywoulddescribeas“startling”.This

65

questionwasaskedtogagehowmanypilotshaveexperiencedevents(whileflying)that

caughtthembysurprise.TheresultsaredisplayedinTable14andFigure15.

Table14.StartleEvents


CumulativePercent

Valid Yes 32 80.0 80.0 80.0

No 8 20.0 20.0 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Amajorityofthepilots(80%)indicatedthattheyhadbeenstartledwhileflying,leading

totheconclusionthatstartleissomewhatcommonamongprofessionalfightcrews.

Figure15.StartlingEvents

Thenextsectionofthesurveysoughttogainaperspectiveonhowpilots

generallyflewtheaircraftinnormallineoperations.Thissectionofthesurveyasked

66

thepilotstoratethequestionsbasedonaslidingscaleofagreement(1-5)from

“stronglyagree”to“stronglydisagree”.Thepilotswereaskedtoselecttheiragreement

withthesurveyquestions.Therewasnooptiontoselectresponsesoutsideofthefive

standardones.

Thefirststatementaskedwhetherapilotknowstheproperpitchandpower

settingsforphasesofflightsuchascruiseandapproach.Thisisimportantbecauseif

variousflightinstrumentsarelost,safeflightcanbecontinuedwithjustapitchand

powersetting.Nopilotsdisagreedwiththisstatementwith50%stronglyagreeingthat

theyknewthecorrectpitchandpowersettings.TheresultsaredescribedinTable15

andFigure16.

Table15.IKnowtheProperPitchandPowerSettings


CumulativePercent

Valid StronglyAgree 20 50.0 50.0 50.0

SomewhatAgree

15 37.5 37.5 87.5

Neutral 5 12.5 12.5 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

67

Figure16.PitchandPowerSettings

Whencombinedwith“somewhatagree”,positiveresponsesprovidedbythe

pilotsrecordedat87%.Noneofthepilotsindicatedthattheydisagreedwiththe

statement.Responsesindicatethatamajorityofpilotsbelievethattheyknowthe

correctpitchandpowersettingsforthephaseofflight.

Thenextsurveyquestionaskedifthepilotsoftenhand-flewtheaircraftduring

departureandapproachbelow10,000feet.Thesephasesofflightoftencontainthe

mostcomplexaircraftmaneuvering.Changesinaltitude,speed,andcourseareroutine

inthesephases.Departuresinvolvedchangesinroutingwhileclimbingandconfiguring

theaircraftforhighspeedflight.Arrivalsinvolveasimilarsequenceonlyinreversus

order.TheresultsaredisplayedinTable16andFigure17.

68

Table16.HandFlyingBelow10,000Feet


CumulativePercent


SomewhatAgree

9 22.5 22.5 90.0

SomewhatDisagree

4 10.0 10.0 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Responsestothisquestionwereindicatethat67.5%stronglyagreedwiththis

statementand22.5%somewhatagreed.Only10%ofthepilotsdisagreedwiththe

statement.Therewasnoneutralorstronglydisagreestatements.Thisindicatesthat

mostpilotsarehandflyingtheaircraftbelow10,000feet.

Figure17.HandFlyingBelow10,000Feet

69

Mentalrehearsalofdifferentflightscenarioshasbeenfoundtohelpfulin

shapingpilotresponsestounusualsituations.Atthemajorairlinestudiedforthis

research,pilotsarerequiredtoviewandparticipateinorganized“chairflying”during

therecurrenttrainingcycle.Thenextsurveyquestionaskedwhetherthepilots

extendedthispracticeoutsideoftheirrecurrenttrainingcycle.Theresultsaredisplayed

inTable17andFigure18.

Table17.ChairFlyScenariostoHelpDetermineCoursesofAction


CumulativePercent


SomewhatAgree

17 42.5 42.5 57.5

Neutral 11 27.5 27.5 85.0

SomewhatDisagree

3 7.5 7.5 92.5

StronglyDisagree

3 7.5 7.5 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Thepilotsindicatedthattheysomewhatagreedtothisstatement42%ofthe

time.Thenextlargestgroupwasneutralrepresenting27.5%oftheresponders.

70

Figure18.ChairFlying

Thestatementrecordedresponsesinallcategories.Responsesindicatedthata

57.5%ofthepilotsusethispractice.

Beingabletoflytheairplanewithoutadvancedautomationhasbeenshownasa

keyelementinrecoveringfromanunusualsituation.Whenanaircraftisupset(outside

ofthenormalflightenvelope),theautomationwilloftendisconnect(UnitedAirlines,

2016).Thissurveyquestionaskedifthepilotswerecomfortableflyingtheaircraft

withouttheuseoftheflightdirector,autothrottles,andmapmode.Theresultsare

displayedinTable18andFigure19.

71

Table18.ComfortFlyingRawData


CumulativePercent


SomewhatAgree

15 37.5 37.5 80.0

Neutral 3 7.5 7.5 87.5

SomewhatDisagree

5 12.5 12.5 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Therewerenopilotswhostronglydisagreedwiththisstatement.Pilotsselecting

stronglyagreeandsomewhatagreewere80%oftheresponses.

Figure19.RawDataFlying

72

Theseresponsesindicatethatmostpilotsfeelthattheyarecomfortableflying

theaircraftwithrawdataonly.

Handflyingtheairplaneduringthedayingoodweatheriscommon,however

deliberatepracticeinconditionsotherthandayvisualflightrules(VFR)isimportantin

maintainingflyingskills.Thenextsurveyquestionsaskedpilotsiftheyhandflewin

variousconditions.TheresultsaredisplayedinTable19andFigure20.

Table19.OftenPracticeRawDataSkills


CumulativePercent

Valid StronglyAgree

22 55.0 55.0 55.0

SomewhatAgree

10 25.0 25.0 80.0

Neutral 7 17.5 17.5 97.5

SomewhatDisagree

1 2.5 2.5 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Ofthepilotssurveyed,80%eitherstronglyagreedorsomewhatagreedwiththe

statement.Alargernumberofpilotsindicatedthattheywereneutral17.5%withthis

statementwhencomparedtotheotherquestions.

73

Figure20.SkillsPractice

Theresponsesindicatethatmostofthepilotspracticehandflyingundervarious

conditions.

Thefinalquestionaskedifthepilotsusedtheautopilotforamajorityofthe

flightabove1000feet.Thisquestionisincontrasttothe10,000-footaltitudehand

flyingquestionandsoughttodeterminewhatpercentageofpilotspredominatelyuse

theautopilotforflight.TheresultsaredisplayedinTable20andFigure21.

74

Table20.AutopilotUsageAbove1000Feet


CumulativePercent

Valid 1 2.5 2.5 2.5

StronglyAgree

8 20.0 20.0 22.5

SomewhatAgree

5 12.5 12.5 35.0

Neutral 2 5.0 5.0 40.0

SomewhatDisagree

13 32.5 32.5 72.5

StronglyDisagree

11 27.5 27.5 100.0

Total 40 100.0 100.0

Thisstatementhadthemostvariedresponseswithaslightmajority(56%)ofthe

pilotseitherdisagreeingorstronglydisagreeingwiththestatement.Pilotsagreedwith

thestatement32.5%ofthetime.

75

Figure21.AutopilotUsage

FlightEvaluation-QuantitativeAnalysis

AquantitativeanalysiswascompletedusingSPSSonthehighandlowaltitude

profilesandthesub-factorsthatcomprisedeachprofile.Theprofileswereanalyzed

bothindividuallyandthencollapsedtogetherwiththeindependentvariablebeing

trainingasdescribedintheMethodsSection.Eachofthethreegroups(high,low,and

combined)wereanalyzedusingaone-wayANOVA.Inadditiontodescriptivestatistics,

regressionanalysiswasconductedonthefactorsthatmadeupeachindividualscenario

score.Finally,thecombinedgroupwascomparedtotheFAAstandardsforAirline

TransportPilot(ATP)certification.Theresultsarediscussedbelow.

76

HighAltitude

Crewsflewthehighaltitudescenario20times.Therewerenineuntrainedcrews

and11crewsreceivedthetrainingasdescribedintheMethodsSection.SPSSwasused

tomodelaone-wayANOVAtestingfortheeffectsoftraining(independentvariable)on

theoverallscenarioeventscore.ThedescriptivestatisticsaresummarizedinTable21.

Table21.DescriptiveStatisticsHighAltitude

HighAltitudeScenario

N Mean Std.Deviation

Std.Error

95%ConfidenceIntervalforMean

Min-imum

Max-imum

Between-Compon-entVarianceLower

BoundUpperBound

No 9 2.666 .70711 .23570 2.1231 3.2102 2.00 4.00

Yes 11 3.727 .64667 .19498 3.2928 4.1617 2.00 4.00

Total 20 3.250 .85070 .19022 2.8519 3.6481 2.00 4.00

Mod-el

FixedEffects

.67420 .15076 2.9333 3.5667

RandomEffects

.53252 -3.5163 10.0163 .51653

Theuntrainedcrewshadameanscoreof2.67andastandarddeviationof.70,

whichisslightlybelowthestandardforFAAcertification(ascoreof3),whilethetrained

crewshadameanscoreof3.72andastandarddeviationof.65whichisabovetheFAA

standard.Therewerenocrewsthatreceivedascoreofone(1)indicatinglossofcontrol

oftheaircraft.Therewerealsonoscoresoffive(5)indicatinganearperfectlyflown

scenarioset.

77

ALevene’stestwasconductedonthehighaltitudescenario.Thetestindicates

thattherewasnosignificantdifferenceinthetrainedanduntrainedgroupvariances.

ThetestresultswereF(1,18)=.674,p=.422.SeeAppendixEforadditionaldetailed

statisticaltestresults.

Aone-wayANOVAwasconductedcomparingthetrainedanduntrainedgroups

(seeTable22).Therewasasignificanteffectoftrainingonthehighaltitudescenario

score,F(1,18)=12.25,p=.003.Thetestconfirmstheresearchhypothesisthat

targetedtrainingcanbesuccessfulinhelpingpilotsmaintainaircraftcontrolduringan

unusualandsuddenstartleevent.Inthecaseofthehighaltitudescenario,thenull

hypothesisisrejected.

78

Table22.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsHighAltitude

DependentVariable:HighAltitudeScenario

Source TypeIIISumofSquares

df MeanSquare

F Sig. PartialEtaSquared

Noncent.Parameter

ObservedPowerb

CorrectedModel

5.568a 1 5.568 12.250 .003 .405 12.250 .911

Intercept 202.368 1 202.368 445.210 .000 .961 445.210 1.000

CrewTrng 5.568 1 5.568 12.250 .003 .405 12.250 .911

Error 8.182 18 .455

Total 225.000 20

CorrectedTotal

13.750 19


TheeffectsizewascalculatedfromtheANOVAresultsusingtheformula

R2=SSM/SSTwiththeresultbeingn=.64.ThisrepresentsalargeeffectsizeR2=h2

=5.568/13.750Etah=.64.Theresultindicatesthattheaveragepersoninthe

experimentalgroupwouldscorehigherthan73%ofacontrolgroupthatwasinitially

equivalent(Coe,R.,2002).

RegressionHighAltitude

Regressionanalysiswasconductedonthefactorsthatmadeuptheoverall

scenarioeventscore.Thiswasdonetoexploreanysignificantfactorsleadingtothe

overallscoreandtopinpointpossibleareasoffuturetraining.Thefactorsare

summarizedinthetablebelow.Eachfactorwasevaluated20times.

79

Table23.DescriptiveStatisticsRegressionHighAltitude


HighAltitudeScenario 3.2500 .85070 20

CrewTrainingReceived .5500 .51042 20

Problemdiagnosis 3.6000 1.14248 20

Pitchcontrol 3.5000 1.10024 20

Rollcontrol 3.8500 .81273 20

Altitudecontrol 3.3500 .93330 20

Theregressionanalysiswasconductedintwoblockswithblockonebeingcrew

trainingandblocktwoconsistingofthedescribedfactorsintheprevioustable.The

ANOVAindicatesthatbothmodelssignificantlyimprovetheabilitytopredictthe

outcomevariablecomparedtonotfittingthemodel.Model1hadF(1,18)=12.25,p=

.003andModel2hadF(5,14)=10.02,p=.00.SeeAppendixE.

Theregressioncoefficientswerealsoanalyzedtodeterminewhichfactors(other

thancrewtraininginmodel1)showedsignificance.Significancewasnotedforthe

factorofproblemdiagnosisp=.00.Theotherfactorsdidnotshowsignificance(p>

.05).Collinearityanalysisindicatesthattherearenoexamplesofmulticollinearity(VIF>

10).SeeAppendixE

LowAltitudeScenario

Thelowaltitude,lowfuelscenariowasflownby20crews.Therewere10

trainedand10untrainedcrewsasdescribedinthemethodssection.SPSSwasusedto

80

analyzetheresultsusingaone-wayANOVA.Themeanscoreoftheuntrainedcrews

was2.60withastandarddeviationof.70andthetrainedcrewswas3.70witha

standarddeviationof.82.Aswiththehighaltitudescenario,theuntrainedcrews

performedbelowtheATPstandardsandthetrainedgroupperformedabovethe

standard.Therewerenoscoresofone(1)whichwouldindicatealossofcontrolor

crashoftheaircraft.Therewerescoresoffive(5)indicatingperformancewellabove

theFAAcertificationstandard.ThedescriptivestatisticsaresummarizedintheTable24

below.

Table24.DescriptivesLowAltitude

LowAltitudeScenario

N Mean Std.Deviation

Std.Error

95%ConfidenceIntervalforMean

Mini-mum

Maxi-mum

Between-Compon-entVarianceLower

BoundUpperBound

No 10 2.600 .69921 .22111 2.0998 3.1002 2.00 4.00

Yes 10 3.700 .82327 .26034 3.1111 4.2889 3.00 5.00

Total 20 3.150 .93330 .20869 2.7132 3.5868 2.00 5.00

Mod-el

FixedEffects

.76376 .17078 2.7912 3.5088

RandomEffects

.55000 -3.8384 10.1384 .54667

ALevene’stestwasconductedonthelowaltitudescenario.Thetestindicates

thattherewasnosignificantdifferenceinthetrainedanduntrainedgroupvariances.

ThetestresultswereF(1,18)=.450,p=..511.SeeAppendixE.

81

Aone-wayANOVAwasconductedonthelowaltitudescenariototestthemain

effectofcrewtraining.Therewasasignificanteffectoftrainingonthelowaltitude

scenarioscore,F(1,18)=10.37,p=.005.Thetestconfirmstheresearchhypothesisthat

targetedtrainingbesuccessfulinhelpingpilotsmaintainaircraftcontrolduringan

unusualandsuddenstartleevent.Inthecaseofthelowaltitudescenario,thenull

hypothesisisrejected.TheANOVAresultsaresummarizedinTable25.

Table25.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsLowAltitude

DependentVariable:LowAltitudeScenario


df MeanSquare


Noncent.Parameter

ObservedPowerb

CorrectedModel

6.050a 1 6.050 10.371 .005 .366 10.371 .861

Intercept 198.450 1 198.450 340.200 .000 .950 340.200 1.000

CrewTrng 6.050 1 6.050 10.371 .005 .366 10.371 .861

Error 10.500 18 .583

Total 215.000 20

CorrectedTotal

16.550 19

a.RSquared=.366(AdjustedRSquared=.330)

b.Computedusingalpha=.05


R2=SSM/SSTwiththeresultbeingh=.60.ThisrepresentsalargeeffectsizeR2=h2

=6.05/16.55Etah=.60.Theresultindicatesthattheaveragepersoninthe

82

experimentalgroupwould,asinthehighaltitudescenario,scorehigherthan73%ofa

controlgroupthatwasinitiallyequivalent(Coe,2002).

RegressionLowAltitude

Regressionanalysiswasconductedonthefactorsthatmadeuptheoverall

scenarioeventscore,similartothehighaltitudescenario.Thiswasdonetoexploreany

significantfactorsleadingtotheoverallscoreandtopinpointpossibleareasoffuture

training.Thefactorsaresummarizedinthetablebelow.Eachfactorwasevaluated20

times.SeeTable26.

Table26.DescriptiveStatisticsLowAltitude


LowAltitudeScenario 3.1500 .93330 20

CrewTrainingReceived .5000 .51299 20

Missedapproach 2.8000 1.10501 20

Checklistprocedures 3.1500 .98809 20

TimeManagement 3.1500 1.03999 20

FuelManagement 3.2500 .91047 20

Approachandlanding 3.3000 .92338 20

Theregressionanalysiswasconductedintwoblockswithblockonebeingcrew

trainingandblocktwoconsistingoftheabovedescribedfactors.TheANOVAindicates

thatbothmodelssignificantlyimprovetheabilitytopredicttheoutcomevariable

83

comparedtonotfittingthemodel.Model1hadF(1,18)=10.37,p=.005andModel2

hadF(6,13)=28.13,p=.00.SeeAppendixE.

Theregressioncoefficientswerealsoanalyzedtodeterminewhichfactors(other

thancrewtraininginModel1)showedsignificance.Significancewasnotedforthe

factorofmissedapproachp=.01andtimemanagementp=.00.Theotherfactorsdid

notshowsignificance(p>.05).Collinearityanalysisindicatesthatthereareno

examplesofmulticollinearity(VIF>10).SeeAppendixE.

Eachpredictorhadvarianceloadingontoadifferentdimension.Thisalso

indicatesnoissueswithmulticollinearity.

LowandHighAltitudeCombined

Thefinalsetofanalyseswereconductedbycollapsingtheeffectofcrewtraining

acrossboththelowaltitudeandhighaltitudescenarios.Therewasnoregressiononthe

sub-factorsofthecombinedscoresduetothefactorsalreadybeinganalyzedinthe

individualscenarios.Analysiswasalsoconductedontheeffectsofpilotflying(PF),pilot

monitoring(PM)andthetypeofaircraftinvolved(narrowbodyorwidebody).Further

analysiswasconductedtocompareboththehighaltitudeandlowaltitudescenariovs

theFAAstandardforATPcertificationforboththetrainedanduntrainedgroups.

Atotalof40crews(80individuals)volunteeredforthestudy,ofwhich19didnot

receivestartletrainingand21receivedstartletraining.Themeanfortheuntrained

crewswas2.58withastandarddeviationof.6.Themeanwas3.71withastandard

deviationof.71forthetrainedgroup.Thedeterminationofthescenarioscorewas

84

describedintheMethodsSection.Table27summarizesthegroupmeansandstandard

deviation.

Table27.DescriptiveStatisticsCombined

DependentVariable:LowandHighAltitudeCombined

CrewTrainingReceived Mean Std.Deviation N

No 2.5789 .60698 19

Yes 3.7143 .71714 21

Total 3.1750 .87376 40

Afurtherbreakdownwasanalyzedtodetermineifthereweresignificant

differencesbetweenthehighandlowscenarioswhencomparingtrainedanduntrained

crews.TheresultsaresummarizedinTable28.

Table28.HighandLowAltitudeMeanComparison

CrewTrainingReceived HighAltitudeScenario LowAltitudeScenario

No Mean 2.6667 2.6000N 9.0 10.0Std.Deviation .70711 .69921

Yes Mean 3.7273 3.7000N 11.0 10.0Std.Deviation .64667 .82327

Total Mean 3.2500 3.1500N 20.0 20.0Std.Deviation .85070 .93330

85

At-testwasutilizedtotestforsignificancebetweenthemeanofthetrained

crewsforboththelowandhighaltitudescenarios.Thetestdidnotshowsignificancein

eithercase(p=.89and.91)SeeTable29.

Table29.MeansComparisonwithTraining

TestValue=3.7/3.73

t dfSig.(2-tailed)

MeanDifference

95%ConfidenceIntervaloftheDifference

Lower Upper

HightoLow

.140 10 .892 .02727 -.4072 .4617

LowtoHIgh

-.115 9 .911 -.03000 -.6189 .5589

Theuntrainedgroupswerealsoanalyzedforsignificancebetweenthelowand

highaltitudescenarios.Themeanfortheuntrainedalsodidnotshowanystatistical

significancewithp=.78and.76.SeeTable30.

86

Table30.MeansComparisonNoTraining

TestValue=2.60/2.67

t dfSig.(2-tailed)

MeanDifference

95%ConfidenceIntervaloftheDifferenceLower Upper

HightoLow

.283 8 .784 .06667 -.4769 .6102

LowtoHigh

-.317 9 .759 -.07000 -.5702 .4302

Theresultsofthet-testsindicatethattherewasnosignificantdifference

betweenthetrainedanduntrainedgroupswhenthetrainedanduntrainedgroupsare

combinedacrossscenariosets.Theresearchquestionthatsoughttodetermineifthe

proximityofthescenariohadanyeffectontheoutcomewasanswered.Thedata

indicatesthatthenullhypothesisinthiscaseisretained.

Aswithboththehighandlowaltitudescenario,aLevenetestforequalvariances

wasconducted.ThetestdidnotyieldsignificantresultsF(1,38)=.046,p=.83,

thereforetheassumptionisthatthevariancesareequalacrossthegroups.See

AppendixE.

ThenextstepintheanalysiswasanANOVAcalculatedusingSPSS.TheANOVA

testedforcrewtrainingwhencollapsedacrossbothhighandlowaltitudescenarios.

ThetestrevealedthattheeffectofcrewtrainingwassignificantF(1,38)=28.89,p=.00.

Thismeansthatthetrainedcrewsshowedastatisticallysignificantincreasein

performanceduetotheeffectofcrewtraining.TheresultsaresummarizedinTable31.

87

Table31.TestsofBetween-SubjectsEffectsCombined



df MeanSquare


Noncent.Parameter

ObservedPowerb

CorrectedModel

12.858a 1 12.858 28.881 .000 .432 28.881 .999

Intercept 395.058 1 395.058 887.387 .000 .959 887.387 1.000

CrewTrng 12.858 1 12.858 28.881 .000 .432 28.881 .999

Error 16.917 38 .445

Total 433.000 40

CorrectedTotal

29.775 39

a.RSquared=.432(AdjustedRSquared=.417)

b.Computedusingalpha=.05


R2=SSM/SSTwiththeresultbeingh=.66.ThisrepresentsalargeeffectsizeR2=h2

=12.86/29.78Etah=.66.Thecombinedeffectsizewaslargerthanboththehighand

lowaltitudescenarioeffectsizes.Theresultindicatesthattheaveragepersoninthe

experimentalgroupwouldscorehigherthan73%ofthecontrolgroupthatwasinitially

equivalent(Coe,2002).

Thenexttestmeasuredforsignificantdifferencesinthepilotflying,pilot

monitoring(CaptainorFirstOfficer),andthetypeofaircraft.ANOVAtestingfor

differencesbetweenPF,PMandNB/WByieldednosignificantresults.Theresultsare

summarizedinTable32.

88

Table32.ANOVAOtherFactors

SumofSquares df MeanSquare F Sig.

LowandHighAltitudeCombined

BetweenGroups

12.858 1 12.858 28.881 .000

WithinGroups 16.917 38 .445

Total 29.775 39

CaptainorFirstOfficer

BetweenGroups

.226 1 .226 .877 .355


Total 10.000 39

PilotMonitoring

BetweenGroups

1.684 1 1.684 2.410 .129


Total 26.842 37

NarroworWidebodyacft

BetweenGroups

.095 1 .095 .367 .548


Total 9.975 39

TheANOVAindicatedthatwerenodifferencesinscenarioscoreswitheitherthe

CaptainorFirstOfficerflyingF(1,38)=.88,p=.36.Italsoindicatedthattherewasno

significancetowhichcrewmemberwasthepilotmonitoringF(1,36)=2.4,p=.129.

Finally,thetestindicatednosignificancebetweenaircrafttypeF(1,38)=.37p=.55.

Thistestansweredtheresearchquestionseekingtoexploreifsignificantdifferences

couldbedeterminedwithinthesecategories.Intheabovecases,thehypothesisof

significantdifferencesisrejectedandthenullhypothesisisretained.

89

PerformanceversusFAAStandard

Thenextsegmentoftheanalysiswasconductedusingaseriesoft-teststo

exploredifferencesofcrewperformancefromtheFAAstandardforATPcertification.

Thecrewsforthisstudyhadjustcompletedtheirrecurrenttrainingcyclewherethey

werecertifiedtoFAAstandards.

Thefirstt-testexploredtheFAAstandardofthree(3)totheoverallmean(high

andlowaltitudescenario)oftheuntrainedcrews.TheresultsaresummarizedinTable

33.

Table33.T-testTrainingversusFAAStandard

TestValue=3t df Sig.(2-tailed) Mean

Difference95%ConfidenceIntervaloftheDifferenceLower Upper

NoCrewTraining

-3.024 18 .007 -.42105 -.7136 -.1285

CrewTraining

4.564 20 .000 .71429 .3878 1.0407

Thet-testrevealed,thatinthecaseofnocrewtraining,thatperformancewas

significantlybelowtheFAAcertificationstandards.Themeanscoredifferencewas-.42

thatresultedinasignificanceofp=.01.Thisindicatesthatcrewperformanceduringa

startleeventissignificantlydifferentfromtheFAAstandard.Inthecaseofcrew

training,theresultswerealsosignificantbutinapositivedirectionresultinginamean

scoredifferenceof.71withap=.000.

90

SurveyandPerformanceCorrelations

Thefinalsetofanalysiswasconductedtodetermineifsurveyresponses

correlatedwithcrewperformance.Analysiswasconductedseparatelyforboththe

trainedanduntrainedcrews.Thefirstsetoftestsfortheuntrainedcrewsuseda

Pearson’scorrelationtohighlightsignificantresult.Theresultsaresummarizedin

AppendixE.

Therewerenosignificantsurveyresponsesthatcorrelatedwiththeperformance

oftheuntrainedcrews.Therewere,however,significantcorrelationsbetweentwoof

thesurveystatements.Thestatements“Ioftenhand-flybelow10,000feet”and“I

oftenpracticemyrawdataskills”wassignificantwithp=.02.Thestatement“Iam

comfortableflyingwithrawdata”and“Ioftenpracticemyrawdataskills”’alsoshowed

asignificantcorrelationwithp=.03.Thesequestionsshouldbecorrelatedbecauseone

questiongenerallyproducestheother.

Significantcorrelationswerealsoexploredforthegroupthatreceivedcrew

training.Theresultswereidenticaltotheuntrainedgroupwiththesametwo

statementsshowingsignificantcorrelationsp=.00andp=.01.Theresultsarealso

summarizedinAppendixE.

91

ResultsSummary

Thedatawascollectedandanalyzedintwodistinctparts:thepilotsurvey,and

thecrewsflyingascenariointhesimulator.Thesurveywasdesignedtogainthepilot’s

perspectiveontheirexperiencesandattitudestowardsflying.Theprofilescenariosthat

wereflowninthesimulatorsoughttoproduceastartleeventforthecrewsandthen

recordtheirperformance.

Thesurveydataindicatedthatover80%ofthepilotsreportedthattheyhad

incurredaneventwhileflyingthatsurprisedthem.Inaddition,agoodmixofboth

civilian(67%)andmilitary(33%)pilotsparticipatedinthestudy.Thesurveyquestions

werenotcorrelatedwithcrewperformanceineitherthelowaltitudeorhighaltitude

scenarioandthuswerenotapredictorofcrewperformance.

TheeventscenarioswereallflowninanFAAcertifiedLevel-Dfullflightsimulator

(FFS),withaccuratevisualandvestibularsensoryinput.Inbothscenariotypes,the

crewsthatreceivedtrainingthatconsistedofabriefingandsimulatorpracticeshoweda

significantimprovementinperformancethanthecrewsthatdidnotreceivetraining.

Thisconfirmedthehypothesisthattargetedtrainingonmitigationofstartleeffectcould

increasecrewperformance.Regressionanalysiswasalsoconductedonthefactorsthat

madeupeachcrewperformance.Theanalysissuggeststhatproblemrecognitioninthe

highaltitudescenarioandthemissedapproachinthelowaltitudescenariowere

significantpredictorsofperformanceontheoverallprofile.

92

Crewperformance,collapsedacrossbothscenarios,wasalsomeasuredagainst

theFAAstandardsforATPcertification.Whencrewsreceivedtraining,thedatashowed

asignificantimprovementinperformancevstheFAAstandard.Dataalsoindicatedthat

untrainedcrewsperformedsignificantlyworsethantheFAAstandardwhenpresented

withastartleevent.Thisresultwasunexpected.Therewerenosignificantresults

whenexaminingthepilotflying,pilotmonitoring,oraircrafttypeasitrelatedtocrew

performance,rejectingthehypothesisthatthesefactorswouldbesignificant.There

werealsonosignificantresultsbetweenthelowaltitudeandhighaltitudescenarios

whenlookingatbothtrainedanduntrainedcrews.Thenullhypothesiswasretainedfor

thisresearchquestionrelatedtoeventproximity(loworhighaltitude).

Finally,thesurveyresponseswerecorrelatedwithcrewperformance.There

werenosignificantcorrelationsbetweenperformanceandsurveyresponses.There

were,however,twosignificantcorrelationsthatweresolelyrelatedtothesurvey

questions.

93

CHAPTERV

DISCUSSION

Introduction

Startleeffecthasbeenwelldocumentedforthepast50years.Vlasak(1969)

foundsignificantimpairmentincognitivefunctionforthefirst15secondsfollowinga

startleevent.Otherstudieshaveshownsimilarresults.Unfortunately,itisoftenduring

thisperiodthatcriticalaircrafthandlingdecisionsmustbemade.AccordingtoBoeing

(2012),inflightlossofcontrolistheleadingcauseofairlinefatalities.Recentaccidents

suchasAirAsiaandFlyDubaiindicatetheinflightlossofcontrolcontinuestobea

significantsafetyissueforairlines.Thisstudysoughttodetermineiftargetedtraining

couldimprovesimulatorperformanceofcrewsduringastartleevent.Volunteerairline

pilotsflewtwodifferentstartlescenariosinafullflightsimulator.Thescenarioswere

designedtobesimilartoeventsthathavecausedmajorairlineaccidents.Thevolunteer

groupsweredividedintolowaltitudescenariogroupsandhighaltitudescenariogroups.

Thegroupswerefurtherdividedintotrainedanduntrainedgroups.Dataanalysiswas

conductedonthemaineffectoftrainingwithinandbetweeneachvolunteergroup.

Additionalanalysiswasalsoconductedonthesub-factorsthatmadeupeachscenario

suchaspilotflying,aircrafttype,andmaneuversub-parts.

94

Findings

Thedatashowedthattargetedstartletrainingcouldimprovecrewperformance

whileflyingstartlescenariosinthesimulator.Significancewasfoundforthetrained

crewsinboththelowandhighaltitudescenarioswhencomparedtotheuntrained

crews.Theeffectofthetrainingwasshowntobehigh,predictingthattrainedcrews

wouldperform73%betterthanuntrainedcrews(Coe,2002).Trainedcrewsalso

showedasignificantincreaseinperformancewhencomparedtotheFAAstandardsfor

ATPcertification.Theresultsansweredtheresearchquestionaskingwhethertargeted

trainingcouldincreasecrewperformanceduringastartleeventinthesimulator.

Inthehighaltitudescenario,crewswereexposedtofailuressimilartowhat

occurredintheAirFrance447accidentasdescribedintheliteraturereview(BAE,

2012).Crewsthatreceivedtrainingthatconsistedofabriefingandsimulatorpractice,

onhowtohandlestartleevents.ThisgroupperformedsignificantlybetterthantheFAA

standardandsignificantlybetterthanthecrewsthatflewthesameprofilebutdidnot

receivetraining.

ThelowaltitudescenariowasmodeledaftertheColganaccidentinBuffalo,NY,

andpresentedthecrewswithalowaltitudestartleeventthat,inmostcases,pushed

thecrewsintoamissedapproachinalowfuelsituation.Theresultsweresimilarto

thoseofthehighaltitudeprofileinthattrainedcrewsperformedsignificantlybetter

thantheuntrainedcrews.

95

Unexpectedresultswerefoundinthecrewsthatdidnotreceivethestartle

trainingwhencomparedtotheFAAstandard.Thedataanalysisshowedthatthecrews

performedstatisticallysignificantlybelowthelevelforATPcertificationforatleasta

portionofthetimeduringthemaneuverprofile.Itshouldbenotedthattherewereno

crewswholostcontroloftheaircraftduringtheprofileandthatallcrewseventuallyhad

asuccessfuloutcome.Thisdataexploredtheinitialreactionofthecrewssincethisis

thecriticaldecisionmakingtimeframe.Thecrewsforthisstudyhadjustcompleted

theirannualrecurrenttrainingcyclefortheirrespectiveaircraftunderwhatisknownas

theadvancedqualificationprocess(AQP).InanAQP,TrainingProgram,whenacrew(or

individualpilot)fallsbelowtheFAAstandardtheyreceivetrainingandthenarerequired

toperformtheskillagain.Thisconceptistermed“traintoproficiency.”Crewsinthis

researchstudywereonlypresentedthescenarioonetime.This“firstlook”onlytakesa

snapshotofacrews’performanceintimeandindicateswheretrainingcouldbe

effective.Itisnotmeanttobeextrapolatedtooverallcrewcompetency

Eachmaneuverscenariowasmadeupofseveralsub-factorsorcomponentsthat

comprisedtheoverallscore.Thesefactorswereanalyzedtodeterminetheir

significanceinmakingupthetotalscoreandtouncoverpossibledimensionswhere

trainingshouldbetargeted.Theresultsforthehighaltitudescenarioindicatedthatthe

mostsignificantfactorindeterminingscenariosuccesswas“problemidentification”.

Thiswasconsistentwithpreviousresearchfindingswhichshowedthatwhencrews

makeaninitialwrongdecision,thein-flightissuetendstorapidlydegrade.Thelow

altitudescenariowassomewhatlessclearinsignificantfactors.Timemanagementwas

96

asignificantpredictorofcrewperformance.Themissedapproachwasalsoasignificant

predictorwhichwasunexpected.Ifcrewsperformedthemissedapproachsucessfully,

therestofthescenariogenerallywasgradedbetterthanifthemissedapproachwas

incorrectlyflown.Minimumamountoffuel(45minutes)atstartofthemissed

approachlikelyinfluencedthisresult.

Theresearchalsosoughttodetermineifthepilotflying(CaptainorFirstOfficer)

resultedinsignificantdifferencesinmaneuverperformance.Thestudy’sdata

demonstratedthatcrewperformancewasnotaffectedbywhichpilotwasflying.The

studylookedatthisdimensionsinceinamajorityofairlineaccidents/incidents,the

Captainisthepilotflyinganditisthefirstflightofthetrippairing(United,2016).

Simulatordataalsodidnotuncoveranysignificancebetweenthetypesof

aircraftinpredictingthesuccessofthescenario.Aircraftweregroupedintonarrow

bodyandwidebodycategories.Narrowbodyaircraftpilotshaveagreaterfrequencyof

takeoffsandlandingsthanthosepilotwhoflywide-bodyaircraft.Thisdifferencein

frequencymayaddtonarrowbodyaircraftpilotsflyingproficiencyandincreasethe

successofrespondingtoastartleevent.Inaddition,mostwide-bodyaircraftrely

heavilyonautomationduetothelongdurationoftheirflightspossiblemakingasudden

startleeventmorechallenging.However,pilotswhoflywide-bodyaircraftgenerally

haveamoreexperiencedbackgroundthanpilotswhoflynarrow-bodyaircraftdueto

theairlines’senioritysystem.Theresearchquestiononpracticeandexperiencesought

todetermineifpracticeand/orexperiencecouldinfluencetheoverallmaneuverscore.

Theresearchquestionrelatingtoaircrafttypedidnotshowitaffectedthemaneuver

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scenarioineitherapositiveornegativeway.Therewasnosignificantdifferencein

eitherpilotgroup.

Thepilotsinthisresearchstudywerealsorequestedtocompleteasurveythat

askedquestionsabouttheirbackgroundandflyingpreferences.Thesurveyresponses

werenotlinkedtoanycrewmember’sindividualperformance,butwereanalyzedin

aggregatewithregardtosimulatorperformance.Thepilotflyingthemaneuverscenario

wastheonlycrewmemberaskedtocompletethesurvey.Thiswasdonetokeepthe

surveyresponsesequaltothenumberofcrewsobserved(40)andtocomparethe

responseswiththepilotwhoflewthesimulatorprofile.Thesurveyresponsesindicated

thatthepilotsgenerallyhandflewtheairplanebelow10,000feetandthattheyknew

theproperpitchandpowerforvariousphasesofflight.Furthermore,asignificant

portionofthepilotssurveyedindicatedthattheyhadreceivedformalaerobatic

training.Theresponsesgivendonotnecessarilycorrelatewithsimulatorperformance

whentakenasawhole.Ifthetrainedcrewsweretheonlyonesexamined,thenthe

surveyresponsescorrelatewithpositiveperformance;however,whenuntrainedcrews

wereadded,pilotstendedtooverestimatetheirflyingperformance.

Significance

Thedatarecordedforthisstudyshowedthattargetedtrainingcanhelppilots

bridgethecognitivegapwhenstartled.Crewsperformedequallywellinboththehigh

altitudeandlowaltitudescenario,suggestingthatthetraininghadabroadarrayof

effectiveness.Bothscenariosrecordedasimilarmaineffect:powerofeta=.6

98

suggestedamediumtolargeeffectsize.Thetrainingofferedconsistedofabriefingto

explaintheeffectsofbeingstartledalongwithashortandsimpleproceduretohelp

mitigatethestartleeffectandregain(orkeep)controloftheaircraft.Thestudywasnot

designedtoeliminatethestartleresponsewhichwouldbeverydifficulttoaccomplish,

butsoughttohelpcrewsmanagetheperiodofcognitiveimpairment.Insummarizing

thetraining,themotto“liveforthenext60seconds”wasoftenused.Thisisthetimein

whichthemostcognitiveimpairmentoccurs.Unfortunately,crewsoftenhavetomake

criticaldecisionsinthistimetokeepcontroloftheaircraft.Thedataindicatedthat

trainedcrewsweremoresuccessfulinmanagingtheaircraftfollowingastartleevent

thanthosecrewsthatdidnotreceivetraining.Crewsthatreceivedtrainingflew

significantlybetterthantheFAAstandardsforATPcertification,indicatingapositive

shiftineventhandlingevenversusastandardcrew.

Thetrainingsuggestedinthisstudyhasimplicationsfortheairlineindustryasa

whole.Aspreviouslystated,crewsthatwerenottrainedshowedastatistically

significantdegradationbelowFAAATPstandards.Followingthestartleevent,the

untrainedcrewslapsedoutofATPstandardsasdescribedintheMethodsSectionofthis

study.Allofthecrewswereeventuallyabletosuccessfullyrecoverfromthesimulated

situation,howeveritisthedecisionmakingattheonsetwhichcanprovecriticalto

eventoutcome.Duringthestudytherewerenocrewsputtheaircraftintoanundesired

aircraftstate(UAS).Thissuggeststhatcurrentairlinetrainingmaybeimprovedby

incorporatingstartletraining.Severalpublishedpapersalludetothisideainthatairline

traininghasbecomeroteandroutine;notchallengingcrewswithnewsituationsand

99

scenariosthatexpandflyingknowledgeandexperience(Casner,Geven,&Willliams,

2012).Mostairlineshaveastandardtrainingprofilethatisdeterminedbythe

regulatoryrequirementsoftheFAA.Thistrainingisgenerallythesamefromyearto

yearresultinginrepetitionandexpectedoutcomes.Trainingoutsideofthisset

standardisoftenreferredtoas“proficiencytraining”(UnitedAirlines,2016),andusually

exposesthecrewonlyatpredeterminedcyclesandhasmoretodowithtechnical

failuresandnotcognitiveloading.

Thepilots,throughtheirsurveyresponses,indicatedthattheygenerallyhandfly

theairplanebelow10,000feet.Handflyingbelowthisaltitudeprovidesaboosttoskill

maintenanceduetothefactthatchangesinallphasesofflightoccurfrequently.

Takeoffs,approaches,andlandingsallrequirechangestoaircraftspeed,configuration,

andnavigation(lateralandvertical).Thesemaneuverschallengepilotingskillsandkeep

themsharp(Gillen,2014).Overallpilotingskillsmaybeakeyelementinaircraft

control.Apilotproficientinhandflyingwillrequirelesscognitiveresources(toflythe

airplane)andmaybeabletodevotemorecognitiveprocessestoproblemdetection.

PilotsintheUnitedStatesgenerallyhandflytheaircraftmorethaninotherpartsofthe

world.InapaperpresentedattheLufthansaHumanFactorsConference(Gillen,2014),

pilotsemployedbyairlinesfromvariousglobalcarriersweresurveyedabouttheirhand

flyingpractices.TheresultsaresummarizedinTable34.

100

Table34.HandFlyingPreferences

Company

Description

CompanyPolicy ActualPractice

UnitedStates-

Global

Companypolicystatesthat

theautomationlevelisat

thediscretionofthe

Captain.

Amajorityofpilotshandflythe

aircraftextensivelybelow

10,000feet.

MajorEuropean Handflyingisencouragedto

maintainproficiency

Mostpilotsreporthandflying

below10,000feet.

MiddleEast Companypolicyprohibits

handflyingabove10,000

feet.

Pilotsreportthattheygenerally

engagetheautopilotat1,000

feetondepartureanddisengage

onapproachoncetheaircraftis

fullyconfiguredforlanding.

Asia Companypolicyencourages

handflyingtoincreasepilot

proficiency

CompanyregularlyusesFOQA

dataindisciplinarycasesagainst

pilots.Asaresultpilotsrarely

handflytheaircraft.

SoutheastAsia Companypolicystatesthat

automationisatthe

discretionoftheCaptain

Manualflyingvariedwidely

dependingontheflightcrews.

Lackofflyingskillsbecomemoreapparentwhensystemfailurescausepilotsto

reverttomanualflyingskillstomaneuvertheaircraft.Simplefailurescanleadtoa

cascadeoferrorsandpilotconfusionthatinturncanleadtoanundesiredaircraftstate

(Gillen,2014).Thesesystemfailurescanalsotaxapilot’scognitiveresourceswell

beyondtheirabilitytocopewiththesituation(Gillen,2014).Basedonhandflying

101

preferences,thepilotsinthisstudyshouldbeconsideredthemostproficientandthus

theresultsshouldtrendhigherwhencomparedtopilotswhohandflyless.

CriticalEvaluation

StudiesinvolvingairlinecrewsintheUnitedStatesareoftendifficultto

complete.Airlinesandtheirrespectivepilotunionsarereluctanttohavearesearcher

recordlivedataonacrews’performance.Theonlywaytoobtainpermissionforsucha

studyistohavethedatade-identifiedsothatnoindividualperformancecanbelinked

backtoaspecificpilotorcrew.Assuch,thisresearchwasonlyabletoobserve

volunteercrewsonetimetodeterminetheeffectofthetraining.Trainingresultscould

havebeenmoreconclusiveifarevisitofthetrainedcrewshadtakenplace.

Unfortunately,thiscouldnotoccurasitwouldmaketheindividualpilotsidentified

whichwouldviolatethepermissionletterfromtheparticipatingairline(s).Data

suggeststhatunusedtrainingskillswilldecreaseineffectivenessovertimeandthat

deliberatepracticeisrequired.Itistheopinionoftheresearcherthatifthetraining

presentedinthisstudyisnotpracticed,thentheeffectiveness(ofthetraining)willmost

likelydecreaseovertime.

Anytypeofsimulatortrainingcouldbereasonablyexpectedtoanincreaseinthe

crews’overallscenarioscores.Studysubjectswereaskedtovolunteerimmediately

followingtheirannualrecurrenttrainingcyclewhichincluded8-12hoursofsimulator

training/checking.Allcrewsinvolvedinthestudyreceivedsimulatortrainingand

102

practiceimmediatelyprecedingparticipationinthisstudy.Asaresult,scoresmaybe

skewedhigherthanifcrewsflewthemaneuverswithoutanypreviouspractice.

Resultsinthisstudycouldpossiblybebiasedinapositivedirectionduetothe

voluntarynatureoftheparticipants.Generally,pilotswhovolunteerforthesetypesof

studiesarecomfortableintheirflyingskillsandinterestedinaviationsafety.Pilotswho

havedifficultyintraininggenerallywouldchoosetonotparticipate.Therefore,the

overallresultsmightbeskewedtowardsthehigherendthantheaverageairlinepilot

population.

Implications

Thestartleeffectisnotanewconceptandtheeffectsofbeingstartledarewell

known.Whatisnotwellknownishowtomitigatethestartleeffectinairlinecrews

wherecriticaldecisionmakingmustoftentakeplaceconcurrentwiththetimeof

cognitiveimpairmentfollowingastartleevent.Trainingandpracticehavebeenshown

toincreaseapilot’sresponsetoaircraftcontrolduringaneventthatcatchesacrew

unexpectedly.Targetedtrainingshouldbeproceduralinnatureandseektobecome

skillbase(best)orrulebasedbehavior.Thismethodrequiresaconsistentand

systematicapproachtodealingwithunusualevents.

Tobeeffective,trainingthatisdescribedinthisstudyshouldbeimplementedin

bothinitialandrecurrentpilottraininginadditiontobeingreinforcedinactualline

flying.Thisstudyhasshownthatsignificantpositiveeffectsoftrainingcanberealizedin

aslittletimeas60minutes.

103

Followonstudiesshouldlookattheeffectivenessofthistypeoftrainingover

longerintervals.Thetrainingpresentedinthisstudywasdesignedtobebroadinnature

andcovervariousstatesofcontingenciesasitrelatestoastartleevent.Suchtrainingis

intendedtobeapplicableinageneralwayandisnotintendedtobeaircraftorairline

specific.Itismoreofaphilosophyindealingwithunusualeventsattheinitialdecision

makingpointtohelpbiasasuccessfuloutcome.IntheAirFranceandColganaccidents,

thatweredescribedintheliteraturereview,aircraftcontrolwaslostinthefirst30

secondsfollowingastartleevent.Trainingshouldfocusonthistimeperiodtobemost

effective.Althoughsuddenandunusualeventscannotbepreventedinaviation,a

pilot’sresponsetothem(especiallyattheonset)canbepositivelyinfluencedtoaidina

successfuloutcome.Thereisnotasinglesolutioninairlinetrainingtoeliminatetherisk

ofastartleevent,onlymitigatingfactors,thatwhenpresentedinmultiplelayersserve

toaidcrewsinsuccessfullyhandlingtheevent.

Recommendations

Startletrainingshouldbeaddedtothetrainingprogramsatairlinestomake

crewsawareoftheeffectsonperformanceofbeingstartledandmitigationstrategies

thatcanhelppilotssuccessfullyflytheaircraftimmediatelyfollowingastartleevent.

Startletraining,inordertobeeffective,hastobereinforcedatspecifictrainingintervals

suchasduringeachpilot’sinitialandannualrecurrenttrainingcycle.Positiveresults

wereshowninthisstudywheretrainingconsistedofbothclassroomandsimulator

practicelastingapproximatelyonehour.Trainingshouldfocusonwhathappensfroma

cognitivestandpointandwhatstepspilotsshouldtaketostabilizetheaircraftsothat

104

theycanthendeterminethecourseofactiontosafelyflytheaircraft.Tobeeffective,

thistrainingwillhavetobevariedtopreventhabituation.

RecommendationsforFurtherResearch

Researchintostartletrainingshouldcontinue.Thisresearchshouldattemptto

identifythebesttrainingintervalforstartletrainingtopreventdegradationofstartle

responseskills.Theremaybealinkbetweenhandflyingability,andthegeneralability

tohandleastartleresponse.IncasessuchastheAirFranceandColganaccidents,the

pilotswerefacedwithasuddeneventthatforcedthemintohandflyingtheaircraft.

Pilotswhoarecompetentinhandflyingrequirelesscognitiveresourcestodoso,and

maybeabletodevotemoreresourcestoproblemdefinition.Thiswouldbeagoodarea

forfutureresearchaswell.Onefurtherareaforresearchmaylookatthelinkbetween

oftenpracticedunusualsituationsinthesimulatorandtheirnegativetransferto

unrelatedeventsintheactualaircraft.Duringtraining,mostofthemaneuversare

performedatlowaltitudesandrequireanimmediatepitchupoftheaircraft’snose

(enginefailures,windshear,andmissedapproachesareallexamples).Whilethese

responsesareappropriateforlowaltitudes,theinitialresponsetopitchthenoseup

maynotbeappropriateathighaltitudessuchasseenintheAirFranceaccident.

Conclusion

Thisstudyshowedthattargetedtrainingcanimprovecrewperformanceinthe

simulatorduringastartleevent.Giventhatskillslearnedinthesimulatoraregenerally

welltransferredtoactualoperations,thestudyresultsshouldalsobehighly

105

transferrabletotheactualaircraft.Datashowsthatincreasedstartletrainingcould

significantlyimproveapilot’sreactiontoastartleevent.

Startleeventscontinuetobeamajortriggerresultinginaircraftinflightlossof

control.Althoughnoteveryeventwillresultinalossofaircraftcontrol,trainingcan

helpbridgethecognitivegapthatexistsduringtheinitialsecondsofastartleevent.

Trainingsuchaswhatwaspresentedinthisstudyshouldbeaddedtoairlinetraining

programstoaidcrewstowardsasuccessfuloutcomeofastartleevent.Akeyelement

indealingwithastartleeventofteninvolvesmanualmanipulationoftheaircraft

controls.Pilotswhoareproficientinhandflyingwillhaveanadvantageindealingwith

astartleevent.Training,practice,andhandflyingeachholdanimportantelementin

successfullymitigatingastartleeventandpreventinganinflightlossofcontrol.Further

studiesshouldseektodeterminetheoptimumintegrationofthesethreeelements.It

willtakeapartnershipbetweentheairlines,pilots,andtheregulatorstoimplement

startletraining.Suchtrainingcanbeakeymitigationstrategyinreducingtheleading

causeorairlinefatalities.

106

APPENDICES

AppendixA

Definitions

AC:AdvisoryCircular

ACO:AircraftCertificationOffice

AD:AirworthinessDirective

AEG:AircraftEvaluationGroup

ALPA:AirlinePilotsAssociation

AQP:AdvancedQualificationProgram

ARAC:AviationRulemakingAdvisoryCommittee

ASAP:AviationSafety/AccidentPrevention

ASRS:AviationSafetyReportingSystem

ATA:AirTransportAssociationofAmerica

ATC:AirTrafficControl

ATIS:AutomaticTerminalInformationService

ATP:AirlineTransportPilot

ATS:AirTrafficServices

107

BIS:BasicInstrumentSkills:Theabilitytoflytheaircraftsolelybyreferencetotherawdatawithouttheuseofauto-throttles,flightdirector,ormapmode.

CFIT:ControlledFlightintoTerrain

CMO:CertificateManagementOffice

CRM:CrewResourceManagement

FAA:FederalAviationAdministration

FAR:FederalAviationRegulations

FCOM:FlightCrewOperatingManual

FCU:FlightControlUnit

FMS:FlightManagementSystem

FOEB:FlightOperationsEvaluationBoard

FSB:FlightStandardizationBoard

FSDO:FlightStandardsDistrictOffice

GPS:GlobalPositioningSystem

GPWS:GroundProximityWarningSystem

HF:HumanFactors

ICAO:InternationalCivilAviationOrganization

IFR:InstrumentFlightRules

108

IOE:InitialOperationalExperience

ILS:InstrumentLandingSystem

JAA:JointAviationAuthorities

JAR:JointAviationRequirements

LNAV:LateralNavigation

LOFT:LineOrientedFlightTraining

LOS:LineOperationalSimulations

ModernAircraft/GlassAircraft:Aircraftthathaveadvancedautomationtoinclude:CATIIIcapability,auto-throttles,flightdirector,FMC,andCRTdisplaysinsteadofactualinstruments,theabilitytoLNAVandVNAV

NASA:NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration

NOAA:NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration

NOTAM:NoticetoAirmen

NTSB:NationalTransportationSafetyBoard

PDC:Pre-DepartureClearance

PF:PilotFlying

PFD:PrimaryFlightDisplay

PM:PilotMonitoring

PTS:PracticalTestStandardsDefinedbytheFAAPilotQualification.

109

RNP:RequiredNavigationPerformance

TCAS:TrafficAlertandCollisionAvoidanceSystem

VNAV:VerticalNavigation

VOR:VeryHighFrequencyOmnidirectionalRadioRange

110

AppendixB

BriefingMaterials

ThefollowingareslidesfromaPowerPointpresentation.Thecrewsthat

receivedtrainingwereshowntheseslidesaspartoftheclassroombriefing.

115

AppendixC

GradeSheetsandSurvey

Note:Thegradesheetsandsurveyarepresentedastheywereusedbythe

investigatorduringthedatacollectionprocess.Theyhaveonlybeenformattedtofit

withinthepagemarginsofthispaper.

120

AppendixD

SimulatorSetup

Thissectiondescribesthesimulatorsetupforeachtypeofsimulatorusedinthis

study.EachsimulatorwasanFAAapprovedLevel-Dfullflightsimulator.Thesetupin

eachsimulatorwasdifferent,andtheselectionsrequiredtoachievethefailureswere

alsodifferent.Crewmembersflewthesimulatorfromtheirrespectiveseat(Captainor

FirstOfficer)andwerebriefedtotreatthesimulatorastheywouldanactualflight.

Simulator LowAltitude HighAltitude Notes

A320 4500–Fuel

15NMdoglegtofinal

35,000–cruise

Failall2airdatasources(CaptandFO).

AircraftgoestoALTlawinthehighaltitudescenario

B737 4300–Fuel

15NMdoglegtofinal

35,000–cruise

Fail3airdatasources(Capt,FO,Stby)

B747 19,000Fuel

15NMdoglegtofinal

35,000–cruise

Fail2airdatasources

B757 6000–Fuel

15NMdoglegtofinal

35,000–cruise

Mach/ASunreliable

B777 12000–Fuel

15NMdoglegtofinal

35,000–cruise

Mach/ASunreliable

Enginefire

HighAlt–uselessonplan14A

121

DYLINFourArrivalKEWR(Jeppesen,2016).

122

ILS4RatKEWR(Jeppesen,2016)

123

AppendixE

AdditionalStatisticalTests

LeveneTestofHomogeneityofVariancesHighAltitude

HighAltitudeScenario

LeveneStatistic df1 df2 Sig.

.674 1 18 .422

RegressionANOVAHighAltitudeFactors

Model SumofSquares df MeanSquare F Sig.

1 Regression 5.568 1 5.568 12.250 .003b

Residual 8.182 18 .455

Total 13.750 19

2 Regression 10.748 5 2.150 10.024 .000c

Residual 3.002 14 .214

Total 13.750 19

a. DependentVariable:HighAltitudeScenario

b. Predictors:(Constant),CrewTrainingReceived

c. Predictors:(Constant),CrewTrainingReceived,Problemdiagnosis,Altitudecontrol,Rollcontrol,Pitchcontrol

124

Regressio

nCo

efficients H

ighAltitud

e.

Mod

el

Unstan

dardize

dCo

efficients

Stan

dardize

d

Coefficients

tSig.

95.0%Con

fiden

ceIntervalfo

rB

Correlations

Colline

arity

Statistics

BStd.Error

Beta

LowerBou

nd

Uppe

rBou

nd

Zero-order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

1(Con

stan

t)2.66

7.225

11

.866

.000

2.19

53.13

9

Crew

Training

Received

1.06

1.303

.636

3.50

0.003

.424

1.69

7.636

.636

.636

1.00

01.00

0

2(Con

stan

t).165

.796

.207

.839

-1.542

1.87

1

Crew

Training

Received

.099

.356

.059

.278

.785

-.6

65

.862

.636

.074

.035

.342

2.92

6

Prob

lem

diagno

sis

.440

.124

.591

3.56

1.003

.175

.706

.812

.689

.445

.565

1.76

9

Pitchcontrol

.009

.304

.012

.031

.976

-.6

42

.660

.759

.008

.004

.101

9.88

3

Rollcontrol

.205

.246

.196

.834

.418

-.3

22

.732

.590

.218

.104

.283

3.53

1

Altitud

e

control

.186

.230

.204

.810

.432

-.3

07

.680

.679

.212

.101

.245

4.08

3

125

Colline

arity

DiagnosticsaHighAltitud

e

Mod

elDimen

sion

Eigenvalue

Co

ndition

Inde

xVa

rianceProp

ortio

ns

(Con

stan

t)Crew

Training

Received

Prob

lem

diagno

sis

Pitchcontrol

Rollcontrol

Altitud

econtrol

11

1.74

21.00

0.13

.13

2.258

2.59

6.87

.87

21

5.59

81.00

0.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

2.304

4.29

0.01

.40

.00

.00

.00

.00

3.049

10

.693

.03

.01

.74

.00

.04

.00

4.029

14

.012

.08

.19

.08

.04

.05

.32

5.016

18

.762

.32

.39

.00

.16

.18

.13

6.004

35

.529

.56

.01

.17

.80

.74

.55

a.De

pend

entV

ariable:HighAltitud

eScen

ario

126

Levene'sTestofEqualityofErrorVariancesaLowAltitude

DependentVariable:LowAltitudeScenario

F df1 df2 Sig.

.450 1 18 .511

Teststhenullhypothesisthattheerrorvarianceofthedependentvariableisequal

acrossgroups.

a. Design:Intercept+CrewTraining

ANOVAaLowAltitude

Model SumofSquares df MeanSquare F Sig.

1 Regression 6.050 1 6.050 10.371 .005b

Residual 10.500 18 .583

Total 16.550 19

2 Regression 15.367 6 2.561 28.133 .000c

Residual 1.183 13 .091

Total 16.550 19

a. DependentVariable:LowAltitudeScenario

b. Predictors:(Constant),CrewTrainingReceived

c. Predictors:(Constant),CrewTrainingReceived,Approachandlanding,Time

Management,Checklistprocedures,FuelManagement,Missedapproach

127

RegressionCoefficients

aLowAltitude

Model

UnstandardizedCoefficients

Standardized

Coefficients

tSig.

95.0%ConfidenceIntervalforB

Correlations

CollinearityStatistics

B

Std.Error

Beta

LowerBound

UpperBound

Zero-order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

1

(Constant)

2.600

.242

10.765

.000

2.093

3.107

Crew

Training

Received

1.100

.342

.605

3.220

.005

.382

1.818

.605

.605

.605

1.000

1.000

2

(Constant)

.088

.371

.238

.816

-.714

.891

Crew

Training

Received

.084

.194

.046

.434

.672

-.335

.504

.605

.119

.032

.483

2.070

Missed

approach

.449

.140

.531

3.201

.007

.146

.752

.847

.664

.237

.200

5.008

Checklist

procedures

.137

.115

.145

1.186

.257

-.113

.386

.773

.312

.088

.368

2.718

Tim

eM

agmt

.427

.118

.476

3.610

.003

.172

.683

.735

.708

.268

.316

3.165

FuelMgmt

-.109

.167

-.106

-.652

.526

-.469

.252

.759

-.178

-.048

.208

4.810

Approach

andlanding

.103

.124

.101

.827

.423

-.165

.370

.678

.224

.061

.366

2.736

128

CollinearityDiagnosticsaLowAltitude

Mode

l

Dim

ensionEigenvalueCondition

Index

VarianceProportions

(Constant)Crew

Training

Received

Missed

approach

Checklist

procedures

Tim

e

Management

Fuel

Management

Approach

andlanding

1

1

1.707

1.000

.15

.15

2

.293

2.414

.85

.85

2

1

6.441

1.000

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

2

.367

4.189

.01

.55

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

3

.084

8.783

.01

.01

.11

.00

.14

.01

.06

4

.044

12.141

.10

.02

.03

.36

.05

.07

.01

5

.040

12.622

.35

.23

.06

.18

.10

.01

.03

6

.016

20.048

.15

.08

.31

.00

.12

.10

.86

7

.008

28.124

.38

.11

.48

.46

.58

.81

.04

a.DependentVariable:LowAltitudeScenario

129

Levene'sTestofEqualityofErrorVariancesaCombined


F df1 df2 Sig.

.046 1 38 .831

Teststhenullhypothesisthattheerrorvarianceofthedependentvariableisequal

acrossgroups.

a. Design:Intercept+CrewTraining

130

SurveyCorrelatio

nsNoTraining

Lowand

High

Altitud

eCo

mbine

dIkno

wth

eprop

er

pitchan

dpo

wer

settings.

Hand

flyingbelow

10

,000

feet

Chairflysc

enarios

tohelpde

term

ine

courseso

faction

Comfortflyingra

w

rata

Ofte

npracticeraw

datask

ills

Autopilotu

sage

above10

00fe

et

NoCrew

Training

Pearson

Correlation

1.290

.101

.091

.081

.194

.373

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.228

.681

.712

.742

.425

.128

N

19

19

19

19

19

19

18

Ikno

wth

eprop

erpitchan

dpo

werse

ttings.

Pearson

Correlation

.290

1

.141

.193

.247

.022

.000

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.228

.566

.428

.309

.929

1.00

0N

19

19

19

19

19

19

18

Hand

flying

below10,00

0feet

Pearson

Correlation

.101

.141

1

.218

.411

.534

* -.2

37

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.681

.566

.370

.080

.019

.343

N

19

19

19

19

19

19

18

Chairfly

scen

ariostohe

lp

determ

ine

courseso

faction

Pearson

Correlation

.091

.193

.218

1

.217

.223

.248

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.712

.428

.370

.373

.359

.321

N

19

19

19

19

19

19

18

Comfortflying

rawra

ta

Pearson

Correlation

.081

.247

.411

.217

1

.497

* .154

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.742

.309

.080

.373

.030

.543

N

19

19

19

19

19

19

18

Ofte

npractice

rawdataskills

Pearson

Correlation

.194

.022

.534

* .223

.497

* 1

.279

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.425

.929

.019

.359

.030

.261

N

19

19

19

19

19

19

18

Autopilotu

sage

above10

00fe

et

Pearson

Correlation

.373

.000

-.2

37

.248

.154

.279

1

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.128

1.00

0.343

.321

.543

.261

N

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

*.Correlatio

nissig

nifican

tatthe

0.05level(2-tailed).

131

SurveyCorrelatio

nswith

Training

Lowand

High

Altitud

eCo

mbine

dIkno

wth

eprop

er

pitchan

dpo

wer

settings.

Hand

flyingbelow

10

,000

feet

Chairflysc

enarios

tohelpde

term

ine

courseso

faction

Comfortflyingra

w

rata

Ofte

npracticeraw

datask

ills

Autopilotu

sage

above10

00fe

et

Crew

Training

Pearson

Correlation

1-.1

67

-.042

-.3

06

-.077

.264

-.2

04

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.470

.857

.177

.739

.248

.375

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

21

Ikno

wth

eprop

erpitchan

dpo

werse

ttings.

Pearson

Correlation

-.167

1

.427

-.1

90

.283

.190

-.1

12

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.470

.053

.408

.214

.409

.629

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

21

Hand

flying

below10,00

0feet

Pearson

Correlation

-.042

.427

1

.270

.424

.694

**

.016

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.857

.053

.237

.055

.000

.946

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

21

Chairfly

scen

ariosto

helpdetermine

courseso

factio

n

Pearson

Correlation

-.306

-.1

90

.270

1

-.085

.092

.103

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.177

.408

.237

.713

.691

.656

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

21

Comfortflying

rawra

ta

Pearson

Correlation

-.077

.283

.424

-.0

85

1.537

* .117

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.739

.214

.055

.713

.012

.615

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

21

Ofte

npractice

rawdataskills

Pearson

Correlation

.264

.190

.694

**

.092

.537

* 1

.052

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.248

.409

.000

.691

.012

.824

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

21

Autopilotu

sage

above10

00fe

et

Pearson

Correlation

-.204

-.1

12

.016

.103

.117

.052

1

Sig.(2

-tailed)

.375

.629

.946

.656

.615

.824

N

21

21

21

21

21

21

21

**.C

orrelatio

nissig

nifican

tatthe


*.Correlatio

nissig

nifican

tatthe


132

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