A Smaller, More Lethal Force

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A Smaller, More Lethal Force:Operational Art By An Outnumbered Army

A Monographby

Major James E. ZanolArmor

DTIC

School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasSecond Term 90-91

A poe fo Public Release; Distribution is ni te

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This monograph looks at operational art practisedby an outnumbered force. Specifically, the researchquestion is: How have outnumbered armies designed ande'xecuted successful campaigns? Simply stated, thisstudy looks at how outnumbered forces achieve ENDSthrough WAYS with limized MEANS.

The criteria used to analyze campaigns of anoutnumbered force come from the Clausewitzian theory ofwar. The concepts used are center of gravity, decisivepoints, attack and defense, and simultaneous andsequential operations. These concepts are discussed inorder for the reader to better understand theirinfluence on campaign design.

The Israeli Army campaigns of 1967 and 1973 serve-1 hitLorlL-l examples. Both cases illustrate a forcethat fought outnumbered and won. These two campaignsprovide a contrast in campaign planning. Israel won inboth wars, although the sphere of her victoriesdiffered.

This paper concludes that an outnumbered force canwin a ,4ar against a larger enemy. Nevertheless, thisforce needs excellence in all facets of war, fromstrategic guidance to tactical execution. The smallforce must also recognize the elements of operationalart in campaign design, thus ensuring effective use ofthe limited means available.

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major James E. Zanol

Title of Monograph: A SMALLER, MORE LETHAL FORCE:OPERATIONAL ART BY AN OUTNUMBERED ARMY.

Approved by:

-------- Monograph DirectorF- r in T

Dire tor, School ofJam s R. McDonough, CL Advanced Military

Studies

A---- Director, GraduatePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Program

Accepted this __day of --- 1991AccesioT or- ...NTISuTC T,Uaiio.. :,

ByDi-t ib cc

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ABSTRACTA SMALLER, MORE LETHAL FORCE: OPERATIONAL ART BY ANOUTNUMBERED ARMY by MAJ James E. Zanol, USA, 50 pages.

This monograph looks at operational art practisedby an outnumbered force. Specifically, the researchquestion is: How have outnumbered armies designed andexecuted successful campaigns? Simply stated, thisstudy looks at how outnumbered forces achieve ENDSthrough WAYS with limited MEANS.

The criteria used to analyze campaigns of anoutnumbered force come from the Clausewitzian theory ofwar. The concepts used are center of gravity, decisivepoints, attack and defense, and simultaneous andsequential operations. These concepts are discussed inorder for the reader to better understand theirinfluence on campaign design.

The Israeli Army campaigns of 1967 and 1973 serveas historical examples. Both cases illustrate a forcethat fought outnumbered and won. These two campaignsprovide a contrast in campaign planning. Israel won inboth wars, although the sphere of her victoriesdiffered.

This paper concludes that an outnumbered force canwin a war against a larger enemy. Nevertheless, thisforce needs excellence in all facets of war, fromstrategic guidance to tactical execution. The smallforce must also recognize the elements of operationalart in campaign design, thus ensuring effective use ofthe limited means available.


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TABLE O= CONTENTS

Introduction 1Criteria 4Israel 1967 12War of Atonement 1973 22Conclusion 32Endnotes -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 37Bi bl iography-------------------------------- 40Appendix A -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 42Appendix B-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 4Appendix C -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 48


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I. INTRODUCTIONSince 1976 the United States Army has believed that

it can fight outnumbered and win. That year Field Manual

100-5, Operations, advanced fighting outnumbered in thedefense as its basic premise.' While later versions ofthis key warfighting manual restored the balance betweenoffense and defense, fighting outnumbered remained alikely condition of war.- Further, emerging doctrineassumed that U.S. forces would fight a nonlinear battlewith an enemy force of comparable size or larger.'Clearly from the development of its doctrine, the UnitedStates Army believed it could fight and beat a largerarmy.

This monograph looks at operational art as executedby an outnumbered force. Specifically, the researchquestion is: How have outnumbered armies designed andexecuted successful campaigns? Fighting outnumbered andwinning is a high risk venture which requires nearflawless use of the principles of operationalart to succeed. Operational art as described incontemporary U.S. Army doctrine can offer help in theserious challenge faced by a small force opposing anumerically superior one.

Three questions from FM 100-5 describe the designof campaigns. 4 Changed slightly from their originalform, these questions form the subordinate researchquestions used to develop evidence. First, what


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military condition must an outnumbered force produce inthe theater of war or operations to achieve thestrategic goal? Next, what sequence of action is mostlikely to produce that condition? Finally, how shouldan outnumbered force apply limited resources toaccomplish that sequence of action? Simply, thismonograph looks at how outnumbered forces achieve ENDSthrough WAYS with limited MEANS. The answers to thesequestions form the evidence for this monograph.

This study follows an organization of theory,history, and synthesis. The criteria uses concepts ofthe theory of war to analyze evidence including centerof gravity, decisive points, attack or defense, andsimultaneous and sequential operations.

The Israeli Army campaigns of 1967 and 1977 serveas historical examples. While both cases show a forcethat fought outnumbered and prevailed, each provides acontrast in campaign planning. It is, however, not theintent to describe these campaigns in detail beyond thatrequired to support the analysis. But before drawinggeneral conclusions from these examples, the context ofIsrael's wars needs review.

Israel's wars occurred within the context ofrestricted geography, time, and international pressures.First, Israel enjoyed advantages peculiar to thegeography of the Middle East. In general terms, Israelfought over a limited area that compressed the spheres

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of strategy, operations, and tactics. This wasespLecially the case for the Golan Heights. Second,Israel needed to fight a short war. Sne did not havethe population to field a larger force or fight aprotracted conflict with heavy casualties. Israel'sArab opponents, on the other hand, had an extensivepopulation and therefore the potential for large forcesthat could sustain greater losses. Finally, Israelfought knowing that superpower interests in the regionwould contain the conflict. It is clear that Israelicommanders understood how to conduct campaigns underthese restrictions. It As also clear that theyunderstood ope-ational art as we define it. That doesnot mean their Arab adversaries did not understandoperations.

Operational art is just as important to a large

force as it is a smaller one. A numerically superiorforce that fails to employ concepts of campaign designcan lose. Any conclusions drawn on the importance ofgood campaign design also applies to a large force.However, it is imperative that the outnumbered forcehave superior operational planning to offset the adverseforce ratio.

The important operational lessons for anoutnumbered force derived from this study are outlinedin the conclusion. As an adjunct, this monograph alsoreviews the value of theory in campaign planning.

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Nevertheless, before the historical narrative, thetheory of war concepts used as criteria requirediscussion.

II. CRITERIATheory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to

learn about war from books.... It is meant to educate themind of the future commander, or, more accurately, toguide him in his self-education, not to accompany him tothe battlefield....

Clausewitz4 On WarUsing the above quote to start a discussion of

criteria is appropriate. Four concepts of the theory ofwar make up the analytic criteria: center of gravity,decisive points, the relationship of attack and defense,and simultaneous and sequential operations. Carl vonClausewitz discussed these concepts in his brilliant butunfinished book, On War. Though his book is over 150years old, Clausewitz's work still has powerfulrelevance today. Using his concepts as a guideshould reveal how an outnumbered force wins bybalancing ends, ways, and limited means. Whilethese theoretical concepts inte-act in war, oneplays a key role -- the center of gravity.

Clausewitz wrote that war plans must focus on theenemy's center of gravity. The first reference to the

center of gravity is the battle. The second and mostuseful reference to center of gravity is theconcentrated power of armies. In developing his thoughts

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on war, specifically the role of the engagement,Clausewitz introduced the theory of the center ofgra,/ity.

To develop a theory of war, Clausewitz began byreducing war to its simplest parts. In Clausewitz'sview, fighting is the essence of war. Therefore, thebattle fought by the maiii fcrr 7 is the center of gravityof the war. Further, both sides of a war commit thelargest concentration of their strength to this battle.As such, this battle of decision becomes theprovisional center of gravity of the campaign.6, AsClausewitz's describes the main battle as the center ofgravity, another element is always present -- the massof the opponent's army.

The main body of the enemy armed +orce is thesecond way Clausewitz described center o+ gravity. And

as nis theory developed, his definition of center ofgravity became more refined. Clausewitz states:

A center of gravity is always found where the massis concr-itrated most decisively. It presents the mosteffective target for a blow: furthermore, the heaviestblow is that struck by the center of gravity .... It istherefore a major act of strategic judgment todistinguish these centers of gravity... and to identifytheir spheres of effectiveness.

Clausewitz narrows his definition of centerof gravity in his chapter on war plans. For example,in campaign planning, one must consider thecharacteristics of the opposing armies. Thesecharacteristics will reveal a center of gravity, the

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hub of all power and movement, on wh.ch everythingdIpends. O This center of gravity then becomes theioca p . at of the campaign.

A useful summary of Clausewitz's center of gravityconcept is:

At the operational level we create a center ofgravity when we concentrate our subordinate maneuverformations. This creates a concentration of potentialcombat power. 'The center of gravity definition in FM 100-5 is alsouseful: a source of strength or balance. Destroying

the enemy's center of gravity thus produces the greatestresults and likelihood of success. Losing this source,the enemy's entire force begins to come apart,producing a cascading deterioration in cohesion andeffective.ess. 10

Therefore, the outnumbered force must make thismajor strategic judgment of correctly identifying checenter of gravity when developing its campaign plan.The outnumbered force must then concentrate its limitedresources against this center of gravity. Correctlyidentified, the next step is deciding how to attack thecenter of gravitv.

The decisive point offers a way to get at theenemy's center of gravity. While Clausewitz understoodthe relationship between the center of gravity and thedecisive point, he did not formally define the latter.However, he did offer that relative superiority of

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strength must concentrate at the decisive point. This istrue even when an absolute superiority of strength isimpossible. I

While still not defining a decisive point,Clausewitz stated that choosing the correct decisivepoint helps achieve relative superiority. Picking thispoint during the planning process comes from theresolution needed to sacrifice nonessentials for thesake of essentials.'*'- Another theorist of Clausewitz'sera provided a better definition of decisive points.

The Swiss theorist Baron Henri Jomini defineddecisive points more fully in geometric and geographicterms. He stated that three factors determine adecisive point: features of the ground, relation oflocal features to the strategic aim, and positionsoccupied by the respective forces. ' Of the many pointsJomini named, the decisive strategic point is mostimportant. In fact, a decisive strategic point canpotentially have a marked influence on battle orcampaign results.'4 Said another way, a decisive pointprovides a force with a marked advantage over itsopponent. Therefore, holding this point willtheoretically decide the outcome of the action. Thedecisive point also forces a decision on the commanderwho must decide to either seize or defend this decisivepoint. He also must decide how much force he will usein keeping or capturing this point.'

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As Clausewitz points out, the correctidentification of the decisive point offers theoutnumbered fnrce a degree of relative superiority.

Armed with the knowledge of the decisive point, theoutnumbered force then masses its strength against it.In doing so, it causes the most destruction anddislocation of the enemy's center of gravity. As withthe center of gravity, the outnumbered force must alsoselect the correct decisive point on the first try.Therefore, application of force at the correct decisivepoint enables the outnumbered force to destroy the enemyat a rate that ensures the collapse of his center ofgravity. Nevertheless, the outnumbered force must alsoselect the form of war that best helps this process.

Attack or defense are the two forms of waravailable in operational design. Clausewitz developshis argument around the proposition of theinterdependence of these forms. Where two ideas, likeattack and defense, are the logical antithesis of eachother, then one form implies the other. 1 6 Thisrelationship is clear in Clausewitz's description of thedefense. He calls it not a simple shield, but a shieldmade up of well directed blows. 17 However, Clausewitzsees a difference in strength between attack anddefense.

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By its nature, defense is theoretically thestronger form of war. Clausewitz makes this assertionbased on three factors. In the engagement, the defenseenjoys the advantages of surprise, terrain, andconcentric attack.' Further, fighting forms the basisof defense, whereas the nature of attack is possession.Therefore defense is the stronger form since it is basedon fighting, the essence of war. 1 Then to make up forits size, the outnumbered force should defend tocapitalize on the inherent advantages of this form ofwar. Regardless of the inherent strength of thedefense, the object of the war also influences the formof war used.

While defense is the stronger form, it has anegative object as its principal aim. Clausewitzcharacterized this negative object in his concept of the

defense as awaiting and parrying the blow. Therefore,one should defend only as long as forced to bycircumstances. When there is enough strength to attack,one must pursue a positive object. To Clausewitz,remaining in a defensive posture contradicts the veryidea of war. 20 Therefore, in order to prove decisive,transition to the attack must eventually occur.

Although the attack pursues a positive object, italways stays closely tied to the defense. InClausewitz's theory, strategic attack is thus aconstant alternation and combination of attack and

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defense. 2 1 Clausewitz also warns that if a successfuldefense can imperceptibly turn into an attack, thereverse is also true.2 2 Looking at the relationship ofattack and defense, the outnumbered force must use thestrength of combining forms. Using a combination ofattack and defense, therefore, implies the use of forceover time.

The outnumbered force must now decide on thesimultaneous or sequential use of means. Clausewitztalks at length about the simultaneous use of force atthe strategic/operational level. In his judgment,large forces used simultaneously provide a greaterchance of success. Further, simultaneous use offorces inherently brings a decision earlier in acampaign, a critical fact for the outnumbered force.Therefore, all parts of the army must act since even

the least appropriate task will occupy some of theenemy's forces and reduce his overall strength.... ,*However, Clausewitz cautions that simultaneous use offorce is not the only course.

When war consists of a lengthy interaction ofmutually destructive forces, successive or sequentialuse of force is also possible.2 O Nevertheless, theoutnumbered force may have another alternative -- acombination of both means. Combining simultaneous andsequential use of force can create favorable conditionsfor the tactical battle.

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These concepts -- center of C-avity, decisivepoint, attack and defense, simultaneous and sequentialoperations -- form the criteria for this analysis of twosuccessful campaigns fought by an outnumbered force.These theoretical concepts are important to any army,but to the outnumbered forc understanding them iscritical.

In summary, faced with fighting a war with limitedmeans, the outnumbered force must act correctly orsuffer defeat. Selecting the correct center of gravityand decisive point is absolutely critical. Further, thecampaign plan must include the form of war used, attackor defense, and the simultaneous and sequential use offorce over time.

The Israeli Army fought two successful wars whileoutnumbered. The campaigns of the Arab-Israeli Wars of1967 and 1973 provide interesting contrasts in the useof the theoretical concepts described above. While bothcampaigns succeeded, the level of success varied.Nevertheless, analyses of both campaigns provideimportant lessons for successful warfighting by anoutnumbered force.

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III. Israel 1967.Where the weaker side is forced to fight against

odds, its lack of numbers must be made up by the innertension and vigor that are inspired by danger.

Clausewitz, On WarStrategic Context

After nearly ten years of uneasy peace betweenIsrael and her Arab neighbors, war broke out in thesummer of 1967. During the summer of 1966, Palestinianguerrillas had launched repeated attacks on Israel frombases in Jordan. In November 1966, Israel struck back,conducting raids on suspected guerrilla bases. Sixmonths later, Syria again ,cnducted heavy artilleryattacks on Israeli villages. Israel responded with airstrikes bombing guerrilla bases and shooting down si

A Smaller, More Lethal Force

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