A Scientist’s perspective on a BTWC Scientific and Technological ...httpAssets)/54FA2D319B… ·...

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Nancy Connell Professor and Senior Scholar Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security US-National Academies Board on Life Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control A Scientist’s Perspective on a BTWC Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum BWX.MX2 02.08.2019

Transcript of A Scientist’s perspective on a BTWC Scientific and Technological ...httpAssets)/54FA2D319B… ·...

Page 1: A Scientist’s perspective on a BTWC Scientific and Technological ...httpAssets)/54FA2D319B… · Professor and Senior Scholar Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security US-National

Nancy Connell

Professor and Senior Scholar

Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security

US-National Academies

Board on Life Sciences

Committee on International Security and Arms Control

A Scientist’s Perspective on a BTWC Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum

BWX.MX2 02.08.2019

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New technologies and the BWC

Dangers arising from technological advances were understood at the time of the treaty’s negotiation:

“[t]he potential undoubtedly exists for the design and development of infective agents against which no credible defense is possible, through the genetic and chemical manipulation of these agents”.

• Joshua Lederberg, United Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 5 August 1970.

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Article XII of the Convention states that a Conference of States Parties to

the Convention shall be held "to review the operation of the Convention",

"with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the

provisions of the Convention" are being realized, and that "such review

shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments

relevant to the Convention”1

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1The BTWC Review Process of Science and Technology Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.12

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• Advances in science and technology (S&T) continue at

an unprecedented pace, and the convergence of

research and development across the sciences has led

to exciting applications to improve the wellbeing of

human, animal, and plant life and their interactions

with the environment and each other. Despite their

benefits, however, these powerful technologies could

potentially be accidentally or deliberately misused,

presenting risks to global health and security.

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Joint NGO statement to State Parties, MX2, July 31, 2019

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• In the 12 months since the 2018 Meetings of Experts, a wide range of activities sponsored and supported by NGOs and civil society have pursued these issues —in concert with States Parties, the BWC ISU, and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). A number of conferences and related activities have effectively demonstrated the strong leadership role that the BWC community can and should play in analyzing and coordinating the response to the potential risks resulting from scientific advances. The capabilities of civil society are integral in facilitating engagement between States Parties, the scientific community, and the public on these critical issues, providing subject matter expertise on the broad scope of advancing biology and biotechnology, including the prevention of development of biological weapons.

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Joint NGO statement to State Parties, MX2, July 31, 2019

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Thus, the NGO community encourages States Parties to:

• Support the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Board to monitor global developments in S&T. Such an entity would be able to assist in identifying and forecasting S&T advances with potential relevance to the BWC and in facilitating engagement between scientific and technical experts and the diplomatic community to proactively address challenges to the BWC. This board would also be able to assist States Parties in dealing with dual-use challenges by supporting development of a voluntary code of ethical guidelines and the essential supporting programs for active biological security education for scientists. A substantial number of States Parties have proposed this type of advisory body in recent years, and we encourage further proposals and formal dialogue on this critical capability during this ISP.

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Joint NGO statement to State Parties, MX2, July 31, 2019

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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention:Considerations for a science advisory mechanism

• In April 2016, on behalf of the IAP: Global Network of Science Academies, the UK Royal Society, Polish Academy of Sciences and US National Academy of Sciences convened a roundtable on a Science Advisory Process for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

• The report was framed in the following way:

Why, Who, What, How, When, Where…?

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• How could success be measured?

• Several participants highlighted the lack ofinteractivity and the minimal engagement asweaknesses in current arrangements to addressdevelopments in science and technology. Otherparticipants felt that such metrics did not reflectbroader impacts from passive participation.Anecdotal evidence was discussed as to the benefitsof awareness raising and education of passiveparticipation.

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• A science advisory process would be a success if States Parties felt it was useful and assisting them in their work. It was pointed out that such a process would not be the property of individual States Parties but of the membership of the BTWC as a whole, suggesting that the collective satisfaction with a process would be a better measure of success.

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Who?

• There was broad agreement among participants that the

process would need a well-balanced membership

representing diversity in both geography and technical

backgrounds. A list of necessary technical expertise was

felt to be a useful resource for future deliberations on a

science advisory process. It is unlikely any process would

include all the possible expertise it might need to access

and therefore participants stressed the importance of

being able to access external expertise dependent on the

topics being considered. Involving experts from industry

was felt to be important.

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Going to the Regions

• 5 Regional Workshops

• Eastern Europe/FSU – Ukraine, September 2017

• Latin America and the Caribbean – Mexico, April 2018

• MENA – Jordan, July 2018

• SubSaharan Africa – South Africa, July 2018

• South/Southeast Asia – Philippines, November 2018

• BWC staff asked IAP/NAS for assistance with the workshops

• Sent additional scientists/technical experts to take part

• For 4 workshops, commissioned background paper on trends in S&T in the region to facilitate workshop discussions

• Workshop materials being posted on BWC website at https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F5CE37B03894C50EC125809E0057420F?OpenDocument

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Intended results…

• Increased awareness among the scientific community of the BWC and industry, and related issues and increased involvement of the scientific community and national and regional scientific, professional and industrial associations in BWC implementation;

• A broader and deeper understanding of the relevance of scientific and technological issues to the implementation of the BWC among national policymakers and officials;

• Constructive input into the consideration of the standing agenda item on science and technology at BWC meetings, as well as input into consideration by the Eighth Review Conference of ways in which to strengthen reviews of scientific and technological developments relevant to the BWC;

• Increased interaction between the scientific community, academia, research organisations, professional associations, industry and regulatory agencies and policymakers at a national and regional level and enhanced input into reviews of scientific and technological developments relevant to the BWC;

• Promotion of linkages with other multilateral and regional initiatives in the area of science and technology; and

• Increased international cooperation on scientific and technological issues that could support capacity building in developing countries in areas of relevance to the BWC, particularly Articles VII and X, such as detection, diagnosis and prevention of disease outbreaks, vaccines, therapeutics, analytical methods, preparedness and response.

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Ukraine: the conference

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Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan

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S&T developments in the life sciences relevant to the BWC of general concern

• Prof. Connell

BWC relevant S&T developments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia

• Prof. Serhiy Komisarenko

Relevant science advice and review mechanisms (Jean-Pascal Zanders)

Panel discussion on S&T developments: Main challenges and opportunities as seen from a national perspective

• Kyrgystan, Belars, Croatia, Uzbekistan

Engaging with life scientists, biotech-industry and trade agencies

• STCU; Bosnia and Herzagovina

Regulatory frameworks to prevent the misuse of S&T

Regional cooperation and capacity building relating S&T for peaceful purposes

• UNICRI; ISTC)

Discussion: Questions provided for discussion topics (next slide)

Ukraine: the conference

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I. Trends in biotech R&D

Productivity (publications)

Innovation (patent activity)

Number and categories of large, or small and medium sized, enterprises

II. Trends in STI governance

Regulatory issues, codes, implementation

Level of national and regional investments in life sciences S&T;

National and/or regional plans or strategies for biotech

Biotechnology as a driver for economic development or public health

Innovation policy, initiatives

III. Research capacity

Universities as well as private industry and research institutes

Estimated numbers of personnel

Students in undergraduate and graduate life sciences and related fields

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IV. Biosurveillance and Public Health

Facilities

(Relevant) disease reporting and reference centers

Collaborations – local and regional

V. Biosecurity & Biosafety

Training mechanisms

Domestic and regional professional and other organizations

VI. Current scientific collaborations within and across the region

Research institutes

Foundations

Bibliometrics

VII. Conclusions

Gaps, challenges, strengths

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44 participants from 20 countries and international organizations: Argentina, Antigua and Baruda, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago

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Latin America and the Caribbean: the conference

• Ambassador Luis Javier Campuzano

• Director General para la Organización de las Naciones Unidas Secretaríade Relaciones Exteriores, México

• Regulatory frameworks to prevent the misuse of S&T:

• O’Neil Hamilton, CARICOM; Soledad Urruela, OAS

• Biosafety and biosecurity education and awareness-raising

• Luis Alberto Ochoa Carrera, President, AMEXBIO; Adriana Bernacchi, Argentina

• Development and promotion of codes of conduct and professional codes

• Alfonso Regalado, Cuba

• Governance of S&T: Roles of stakeholder communities in academia, industry and civil society

• Ana Sifuentes, iGEM; Dr. Edgar Sevilla-Reyes, National Institute of Respiratory Diseases (INER)

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Latin America and the Caribbean: 5 discussion topics

1. In your country or region, what are some of the major drivers of investments in life sciences S&T in academic or other settings (industry, agriculture, public health)? How are these developments relevant to the BWC?

2. Are you aware of any strategies, plans, or programmes from your government or other sources that promote life sciences S&T with potential implications for biosafety or biosecurity in your country or region? What are some of the key challenges or gaps to successful implementation of these goals?

3. What are some examples of regional and/or international scientific collaborations that are taking place across the region, for example in public health, agriculture/food security, industrial development, etc.?

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Latin America and the Caribbean

4. What are the significant programs in surveillance of infectious diseases affecting human beings and animals in your country or region? How have recent infectious disease outbreaks (e.g., Zika, chikungunya, dengue) affected surveillance efforts and collaborations?

5. Are you aware of any efforts to include information about the BWC, bioterrorism, and/or biological nonproliferation and disarmament in STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) curricula in your country at any stage in the education process?

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MENA

The primary point of contact was Dr. Nisreen Al Hamoud, the Director of the Centre

for Excellence in Biosafety, Biosecurity and Biotechnology at the Royal Scientific

Society (RSS), the national academy of Jordan.

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MENA: the conference

Regulatory frameworks to prevent the misuse of S&T Jawaher Al Khalifa, MFA, Bahrain; Erhan Akcay, TARIM, Turkey

Biosafety and Biosecurity Education and Awareness Raising Dr. Jameela Ali (HamadMedical Corporation, Qatar) &

Samil Darkaoui (ONSSA, Morocco)

HRH Princess Sumaya bint El Hassan, President of the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan

Governance of S&T: Roles of stakeholder communities in academia, industry and civil societyLaila Sbabou (Mohammed V University, Morocco) &Abdulaziz N. Alagaili (King Saudi University, Saudi Arabia)

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MENA

More than 50 people participated in the meeting,

Eight BWC States Parties: Algeria, Iraq, Morocco,

Oman, Qatar, the State of Palestine, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates

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Sub-Saharan Africa

The primary point of contact was Professor Iqbal Parker of the University of Capetown, who is also the chair of the Biosafety and Biosecurity Committee of the Academy of Sciences of South Africa (ASSAF)

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Sub-Saharan Africa: the conference-conclusions

▪ Current biosafety landscape in sub-Saharan African countries is rapidly changing - the AU has recently adopted African biosafety module and 89% African countries have adopted the Cartagena Protocol

▪ Some technical capacity to implement the BWC exists across sub-Saharan Africa, but it is uneven and it could be enhanced through intercontinental and intraregional exchanges and knowledge transfers

▪ Complacency in effective BWC implementation can also be a challenge in sub-Saharan Africa when legislative, policy and regulatory frameworks in place do not include BWC-specific issues

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▪ Biosecurity as a holistic system: poverty and war are the biggest threats to biosecurity. There is a strong link between environmental degradation + war/conflict + poverty + devastating epidemics. Responding in these cases = extremely challenging (Ebola case management)

▪ Support provided by international organisations relies on support by BWC States Parties. Under BWC Article VI, it is States Parties who may provide support

▪ Assistance challenges include a relatively small pool of experts and the obstacles of managing support, logistically and operationally

Sub-Saharan Africa: the conference-conclusions (2)

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Sub-Saharan Africa: the conference-conclusions (3)

▪ Support provided after intentional use under the BWC is triggered differently than with naturally-occurring outbreaks: it’s provided by in Article VII and sanctioned by the UN Security Council

▪ Best prevention is preparation and efforts should be made to capitalize on S&T in these preparations. The BWC should increase capacity to prevent and manage

▪ Continued education and outreach on S&T is imperative in educational curricula, as well as to raise awareness and divulge/diffuse information amongst the general public

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South and Southeast Asia

The primary point of contact for the workshop was Professor Irma Makalinaofrom the University of the Philippines

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• 15 SPs: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Indonesia,

the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the

Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and

Vietnam.

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1. List recent trends in science and technology in academic or industrial

settings? How do they differ among the countries represented in your

group?

2. What are key government programs that promote science and

technology, biosafety or biosecurity in your country or region?

3. What are some examples of regional and/or international scientific

collaborations that are taking place across the region, e.g. public health,

biofuels development, etc.?

4. What are the significant programs in biosurveillance in your country or

region?

5. Is information about the BWC included in STEM (science, technology,

engineering, mathematics) curricula in your country at any stage in their

education?

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Interactive session

• Part one: examining regional activities

• Discuss the modified questions (previous screen)

• Write out activities on sticky notes with country named

• Prepare a short verbal summary of your discussion for the

next session

• Part two: relating our data directly to the articles of the BWC

• Review the twelve articles of the BWC

• Relate your list of activities to the articles by writing the

activity on a sticky note and applying it under the article to

which you think it is relevant

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Article I: Never under any

circumstances to acquire or retain

biological weapons or means to

disseminate

Article II: To destroy or divert to

peaceful purposes biological weapons

and associated resources prior to

joining.

Article III: Not to transfer, or in any way

assist, encourage or induce anyone

else to acquire or retain biological

weapons

Article IV: To take any national

measures necessary to implement the

provisions of the BWC domestically.

Article V: To consult bilaterally and

multilaterally to solve any problems

with the implementation of the BWC.

Article VI: To request the UN Security

Council to investigate alleged breaches of

the BWC and to comply with its subsequent

decisions.

Article VII: To assist States which have been

exposed to a danger as a result of a violation

of the BWC.

Article VII: Honor the Geneva protocol

(1925)

Article IX: Support prohibition of Chemical

Weapons

Article X: To do all of the above in a way

that encourages the peaceful uses of

biological science and technology

Article XI: Review conferences every 5

years

Article XII: unlimited duration; right to

withdraw

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Conclusions: value of the regional S&T workshops

• Increased awareness among the scientific community of the BWC

• Deeper understanding of the relevance of scientific and technological issues

• Constructive input into the consideration of the standing agenda item

• Increased interaction

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Conclusions: value of the regional S&T workshops

• Promotion of linkages – future opportunities for engagement between scientists and tech experts with their gov’t BWC experts

• Increased international cooperation on scientific and technological issues

• Regional focus provided an opportunity to explore variation in S&T issues and trends that may be lost during general discussions in Geneva

• Increased awareness of the importance of Articles VII and X