A. Reboul, L2C2, CNRS, Lyon. Generalized Conversational Implicatures.
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Transcript of A. Reboul, L2C2, CNRS, Lyon. Generalized Conversational Implicatures.
Scalar and contrast set
implicatures: the
Experimental Evidence A. Reboul, L2C2, CNRS, Lyon
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IntroductionGeneralized Conversational Implicatures
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The Gricean account
MeaningIn his well-known 1957 paper, Grice
distinguished between two kinds of meaning:
Natural meaning:
These spots mean measles.
Non-natural meaning (meaningNN):
These three rings on the bus bell mean that the bus is full.
Linguistic communication ressorts to meaningNN.
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A definition of meaningNNGrice proposed the following definition
of meaningNN: “A meantNN something by x” is roughly
equivalent to “A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.” MeaningNN involves a double intention:
A primary intention to produce a specific effect in the hearer;
A secondary intention that the primary intention be satisfied through the hearer’s recognition of the primary intention.
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ImplicaturesGrice also introduced in 1975 the
notion of implicature:Implicatures are accessed by
inference, but they are different from implications by the fact that the inferential processes leading to them are non-demonstrative;
These non-demonstrative inferential processes rest on the cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation.
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Principle of cooperationCooperative principle: Contribute what
is required by the accepted purpose of the conversation.
Maxims:Maxim of Quality: Make your
contribution true; so do not convey what you believe false or unjustified.
Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as required.
Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous; so
avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and order.
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Different types of implicaturesAmong implicatures, Grice
distinguished between:Conventional implicatures:
John is poor, but honnest. CI: Poor people are not honnest.
Conversational implicatures: Anne lives somewhere in Burgundy.
ci: The speaker does not know where exactly Anne lives in Burgundy.
Conversational implicatures, by contrast with conventional implicatures, are cancellable and reinforcable.
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Generalized ciHowever, Grice introduced a further
distinction, among conversational implicatures, between;Generalized Conversational Implicatures:
More conventional (depending on lexical items), but still cancellable and reinforcable: Peter has done some of his exercises.
Gci: Peter has not done all of his exercises.
Particularized Conversational Implicatures: Linked to the context:
Anne lives somewhere in Burgundy. Pci: The speaker does not know where exactly
Anne lives.
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Two accounts of GCIs
Alternative accountsNeo-Gricean accounts (Horn,
Levinson):Maintain the distinction between GCIs
and PCIs;Account for the GCIs by specific
principles complementing the Gricean maxims.
Post-Gricean accounts (Relevance Theory):Deny that there is any difference
between GCIs and PCIs; Account for all conversational
implicatures as based on contextual inferences, constrained by the Relevance Principle.
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Horn’s accountHorn’s account is based on the Q- and
R-principles:
Q-principle: Say as much as you can modulo Quality and R.
“a lower bounding hearer-based guarantee of sufficiency of informative content” (Horn 2004).
R-principle: Say no more than you must, modulo Q.
“an upper-bounding correlate of the law of Least Effort, dictating minimization of form” (Horn 2004).
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A general hypothesis
All Neo-Gricean accounts share a general hypothesis:
Inference is cheap,
articulation expensive…
Levinson 2000.
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Neo-Gricean minimaxMinimax principles are basically
economic principles to the effect that cost should be minimized, while benefit should be maximized.
Neo-Gricean accounts are minimax accounts which contrast speaker and hearer:The Q-principle on the hearer’s side
(maintaining understandability);The R-principle on the speaker’s side
(reducing articulation by triming the linguistic form).
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Two kinds of GCIScalar implicatures:
The Tokyo orchestra played some of Beethoven concerti. GCI: The Tokyo Orchestra did not play all of
Beethoven concerti.
Contrast set implicatures:The flag is white.
GCI: The flag is only white (not white and red, not white and green, etc.).
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Horn insists on the importance of form rather than content in the generation of implicit meaning, notably in his discussion of categorical sentences: A: All/every F is G.E: No F is G. I: Some F is/are G.O: Not every F is G.
Some F is not G.“It is because the basic forms [A/E] are not
only more informative but briefer than their I/O counterparts that the use of the latter will strongly implicate against the former” (Horn, 2004).
Scalars
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Levinson’s default storyAccording to Levinson, both scalar and
contrast set implicatures are lexicalized as default interpretations:In other words, unless the implicature is
explicitly cancelled, it will be the interpretation of the utterance: The Tokyo orchestra played some
Beethoven concerti. Cheap interpretation (implicature): The
Tokyo Orchestra did not play all of Beethoven concerti.
Costly interpretation (logical): The Tokyo Orchestra played some and possibly all Beethoven concerti.
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The Post-Gricean accountRelevance Theory is also a minimax
account, but is only concerned by cost and benefit for the hearer. Relevance is defined as a balance
between interpretive costs and cognitive effects (benefits).
By contrast with Neo-Gricean accounts, Relevance Theory considers that inference and linguistic processing are both costly.
It is linked to the Gricean account not through maxims or principles, but through a double intentional account.
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Relevance CI and II
According to RT, any act of communication is subtended by two intentions:
Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I.
Communicative intention: to make mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator has this informative intention.
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Relevance TheoryThe communicative intention is what puts
the ostensive in “ostensive-inferential communication”.
The fact that communication is ostensive is the justification for the communicative principle of relevance: “Every ostensive stimulus conveys a
presumption of its own optimal relevance”.
The CPR triggers the least-effort heuristic.
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ContextWhereas Neo-Gricean accounts concentrate
on a lexical account for GCIs, Post-Gricean accounts insist that all conversational implicatures are context-dependent.
On the least-effort heuristic account, hypotheses are generated relative to context and are assessed successively, beginning with the more easily accessed ones.
Given that two interpretations are available for any ci, the (easy) “logical” one and the (difficult) “pragmatic” one, the pramatic interpretation will be accessed only if the logical one is unsatisfactory.
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Different inheritances…
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…and different predictionsThe Tokyo orchestra played some
Beethoven concerti.The Neo-Gricean and Post-Gricean
accounts make different predictions: Logical interpretation: The Tokyo Orchestra
played some and possibly all Beethoven concerti. Neo-Gricean accounts: costly; Post-Gricean accounts: cheap.
Pragmatic interpretation: The Tokyo Orchestra did not play all Beethoven concerti. Neo-Gricean accounts: cheap; Post-Gricean accounts: costly.
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Experimental pragmatics
Generalized Conversational Implicatures
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Scalars
Testable predictionsGCI theory Relevance
Theory
literalDefault enrichment + context-sensitive cancellation
Hence slower/later
No enrichment,
Hence faster/earlier
EnrichedDefault
enrichment
Hence faster/earlier
Context-sensitive enrichment
Hence slower/later
Inte
rpre
tati
on o
f sc
ala
r te
rms
27
Varieties of experimental studies
There are been two main types of experimental studies:
Developmental studies;
Time course of comprehension among adults.
28
Developmental studiesA general characteristics of scalar
terms is that, though the stronger term implies the weaker term, the weaker term implicates the negation of the stronger term.
From a developmental point of view, one would expect the easy interpretation to precede the difficult interpretation:GCI theory: pragmatic interpretation
first;RT: logical interpretation first.
Testable predictionsGCI theory Relevance
Theory
literalDefault enrichment + context-sensitive cancellation
Hence later
No enrichment,
Hence earlier
EnrichedDefault
enrichment
Hence earlier
Context-sensitive enrichment
Hence later
Inte
rpre
tati
on o
f sc
ala
r te
rms
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Might – mustChildren were presented with 3 boxes:
Box 1: open with a toy parrot and a toy bear;
Box 2: open with a toy parrot;Box 3: closed.
They are told by a puppet: “A friend of mine gave me this box (box
3) and said: ‘All I know is that whatever is in this box (box 3) looks like what is inside this box (box 1) or what is inside this box (box 2)’”
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Task and resultsThe participants had to say whether
they agreed or not with a further statement.
Noveck 2001
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Some – allParticipants were presented with a
statement and asked whether they agree or disagree.
Noveck 2001
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Summary of developmental evidenceLogical interpretations precede
pragmatic interpretations.
These results have been replicated repeatedly, in other studies, some of which have used different methodologies.
This strongly suggests that the Neo-Gricean account is not correct and that the Post-Gricean account is correct.
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A possible counter-argumentDefault pragmatic interpretations, not
being the literal or lexical interpretation for the scalar terms, have to be learned.
Thus, one should not expect them to be the first to appear: It is normal to find that literal or lexical
interpretations precede default pragmatic interpretations for scalar terms.
Thus the developmental evidence does not contradict the Neo-Gricean account.
35
Comprehension time in adults
GCI theory Relevance Theory
literalDefault enrichment + context-sensitive cancellation
Hence slower
No enrichment,
Hence faster
EnrichedDefault
enrichment
Hence faster
Context-sensitive enrichment
Hence slower
Inte
rpre
tati
on o
f sc
ala
r te
rms
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Bott & Noveck 2004
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Experiment 1The (22) participants were presented with
the same task twice, that is judging whether a sentence is true or false.
They were given two different instructions: First, to treat “some” as some and possibly
all: Logical answer;
Second, to treat “some” as some but not all: Pragmatic answer.
According to N-G, the logical answer should be more costly, leading to more errors and to a slower answer;
According to P-G, the pragmatic answer should be more costly, leading to more errors and to a slower answer.
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Answers true/false
Bott & Noveck 2004
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Reaction time true/false
Bott & Noveck 2004
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Experiment 2Two conditions:
A logical condition: Mary says that the following sentence is true:
“Some elephants are mammals”A pragmatic condition:
Mary says that the following sentence is false: “Some elephants are mammals”
One task (with the same 2 instructions as before): Saying whether one agrees or disagrees with
Mary’s evaluation of the sentence. The correct answer is the same (agree) for both
the logical and the pramatic interpretation.
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Answers Experiment 2
Bott & Noveck 2004
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Reaction time
Bott & Noveck 2004
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Experiment 3Task: making true/false judgments about the
sentences T1-T6, but with no instructions as to the interpretation of some:There is thus no “correct” interpretation.
Results are the measure of pramatic (“false”) as opposed to logical (“true”) answers, as well as reaction times for the two types of answers:40% of participants responded “true” to T1
sentences (logical interpretation);
60% responded false to T1 (pragmatic interpretation).
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RT Experiment 3
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Experiment 4Varying the cognitive resources:
Short condition: 900 ms: Neo-Gricean prediction:
More some and not all answers; Post-Gricean prediction:
More some and possibly all answers;
Long condition: 3 seconds: Neo-Gricean prediction:
More some and possibly all answers; Post-Gricean prediction:
More some and not all answers.
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Results (true)
Bott & Noveck 2004
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Summary of adult resultsLogical interpretations are given more often
than are pragmatic interpretations.
Logical interpretations are assessed more quickly than pragmatic interpretations.
These are robust effects.
Given people more time to answer augments the pourcentage of pragmatic answers.
All of this strongly suggests that the Neo-Gricean account is not correct and that the Post-Gricean account is correct.
48
Contrast sets
The lexical angleScalars do not allow lexical
manipulation, but contrast set implicatures do.
Basically, contrast set implicatures arise when a term belonging to a set (e.g., colors) is used, triggering an implicature that denies the conjunctions of the chosen term and the other terms in the set: The flag is white.
Gci: The flag is only white (not white and red, not white and black, etc.).
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Levison’s default accountLevinson proposes a default account, according
to which the pragmatic interpretation (only X) is a default interpretation triggered by the lexical item (X) itself.
This predicts that if a term is replaced by a pseudo-word, the pragmatic interpretation should not arise.
Thus, a comparison between two sentences, identical apart from the replacement of a contrast set term with a pseudo-word, should show very different results regarding contrast set implicature.
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ComparativesSome sentences semantically impose
strong constraints on their components:
This is the case for comparative sentences: George W. Bush is as/more/less intelligent
than George W. Bush. George W. Bush is as/more/less intelligent
than Barack Obama. The first sentence is nonsensical, while
the second is fine: The things compared must be different.
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Koenig’s sentencesBetter red wine than no white wine.
Better no red wine than no white wine. The question to be answered is:
“What does the speaker prefer, white wine or red wine?”
The answer is the same regardless of whether the speaker said the first or second sentence: “White wine”.
This raises a puzzle: The second negation (in the 2nd sentence)
does not seem to make any difference.
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The solutionThree relevant situations:
Only red wine; Only white wine; Both red and white wine.
Interpretations: No white wine = only red wine No red wine = only white wine Red wine = red and possibly also white wine
Better red wine than no white wine. Better red wine and white wine than only red
wine. Better no red wine than no white wine.
Better only white wine than only red wine.
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Contrast set in Koenig sentencesThe expressions <red wine, white wine>
belong to a contrast set.
According to Levinson, these expressions should trigger the default (pragmatic) interpretations: Only red wine;Only white wine.
Better red wine than no white wine. Better no red wine than no white wine.
The pragmatic interpretation of the 1st sentence yields the nonsensical interpretation: Better only red wine than only red wine.
In other words, the pragmatic interpretation is impossible in Koenig sentences.
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Contrast set terms vs. pseudo-wordsContrast set terms:
Better coffee than no tea.Better no coffee than no tea.
Predictions of Neo-Gricean accounts: the 1st sentence should be more costly to interpret than the 2nd one (default enrichment + context-sensitive cancellation vs. no enrichment).
Predictions of Post-Gricean accounts: no difference (no enrichment).
Pseudo-words: Better pekuva than no luveka.Better no pekuva than no luveka.
Predictions of both : no difference (no enrichment).
56
General predictionsNeo-Gricean accounts:
There should be a significant difference in the results for the regular as opposed to the pseudo-word sentences.
A correct answer should be given significatively less often for the regular sentences than for the pseudo-word sentences.
Post-Gricean accounts:
No significative difference.
57
TaskSubjects (adults) were presented with one of
four sentences in a scenario and asked to indicate what the preference of the speaker of the sentence is: A man arrives very late at a parent-teacher
meeting. Everyone is drinking a hot drink, but there isn’t much left. Someone brings him a cup. He says: Better coffee than no tea. Better no coffee than no tea.
An anthropologist arrives very late at a feast in Papouasy-New Guinea. There is no much left to drink. Someone brings him a gourd. The anthropologist says: Better pekuva than no luveka. Better no pekuva than no luveka.
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Results (%)
Utterances coffee tea Don’t know
Better coffee than no tea 31 63 6
Better no coffee than no tea
0 93 7
Utterances pekuva luveka Don’t know
Better pekuva than no luveka
7 67 26
Better no pekuva than no luveka
6 94 0
Reboul 2004
59
Summary of contrast set resultsThe results are extremely similar
between the regular words condition and the pseudo-word condition.
This verifies the predictions of Post-Gricean accounts;
However, again, it contradicts the predictions of Neo-Gricean accounts.
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Conclusion
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Generalized Conversational Implicatures
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Inheritance
63
Two accounts
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Pragmatic interpretation cost
65
Three experimental paradigms
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Neo-Gricean Prediction
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Post-Gricean Prediction
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Results
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All in all…all the empiric
evidence favors the Post-Gricean account and contradicts all the predictions of the Neo-
Gricean accounts.
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A short reference list… Noveck, I (2001) “When children are more logical than
adults”, Cognition 78/2, 165-188.
Noveck, I. & Bott, L. (2004) “Some utterances are underinformative”, Journal of Memory and Language 51/3, 437-457.
Reboul, A. (2004) “Conversational implicatures”, in Noveck, I. & Sperber, D. (eds) Towards Experimental Pragmatics, Palgrave.
Noveck, I. & Sperber, D. (2007) “The why and how of experimental pragmatics”, in Burton-Roberts, N. (ed.) Advances in Pragmatics, Palgrave.
Noveck, I. & Reboul, A. (2008) “Experimental pragmatics”, TICS 12/11, 425-431.
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http://l2c2.isc.cnrs.fr/en/publications/
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THANKS FORYOUR ATTENTION!