A. Ratnam and Ors. vs Government of Andhra Pradesh, ... on 7 September, 2001

Andhra High CourtA. Ratnam And Ors. vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh, ... on 7 September, 2001Equivalent citations: 2001 (6) ALT 661Author: V RaoBench: S Sinha, V RaoORDER V.V.S. Rao, J.

INTRODUCTION:

1. All these writ petitions are filed questioning the judgment passed by the A.P. AdministrativeTribunal in various cases including O.A.Nos. 4496 of 2001 and batch dated 24-7-2001. Thisjudgment shall dispose of all the writ petitions.

2. As the facts are almost similar in all the cases, we may take the case as projected in W.P.No. 15469of 2001 which is filed against O.A.No. 4546 of 2001, The said O.A. was filed under Section 19 of theAdministrative Tribunals Act, 1985 by the petitioners herein praying for a declaration that the actionof the respondents in not conducting the entrance test for crash course in the year 1989 as pernotification dated 18-10-1989, and after conducting the same in the year 1995, not permitting theapplicants/petitioners to complete the crash course till April 2000 is illegal, unjust, arbitrary, beingviolative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and also praying for a consequentialdirection to the respondents to consider their cases in District Selection Committee selections 2001('DSC-2001' for brevity) by granting weightage marks and/or alternatively, to conduct a special DSCso far as the applicants are concerned. The Tribunal by the impugned judgment disposed of the OAsincluding O.A.No. 4546 of 2001 in the following terms.

Therefore, in view of the above referred discussion, the applicants who have already availed the onetime benefit that was granted by the Tribunal in O.A.No. 3863/2000 should not be allowed a furtherbenefit for DSC-2001, but we are of the considered view that the applicants who have not availed theone time benefit so far in accordance with the judgment of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 3863/2000dated 21-7-2000 be permitted to undergo the selection process by receiving their applications.However, if they are within the age limit prescribed by the Government or ordered by the APAT forDSC-2001, they are to be allowed as the crash course is conducted by the Government .............TheOAs are disposed of accordingly with the above directions at the admission stage. No costs.

A GLANCE AT PAST LITIGATION:

3. The history of the litigation leading to filing of the O.As. is a chequered one. We may notice thesame in brief. The persons who are qualified in Secondary Grade Basic Teachers Training (SGBT)were eligible for being appointed as teachers in primary schools and upper primary schools. Prior to1969, training was imparted in State-managed Basic Training Institutions. As there was a largesurplus of teachers who are qualified in the SGBT institutions, the Government decided to closedown the same. But in 1975, eleven Teacher Training Institutions (TTIs) were revived with theintake capacity of 150 students. The Government also changed its policy and decided to grantpermission to private managements to establish TTIs. Though there was no permission to some

A. Ratnam And Ors. vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh, ... on 7 September, 2001

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institutions, in one or two cases, the Government permitted students to appear at the Governmentexamination on sympathetic grounds. Encouraged by this, large number of unauthorisedinstitutions came into existence. The Government then issued press notes warning the pubic thatthe candidates seeking admission in unauthorised TTIs are doing so at their own risk. In spite ofthis, the mushroom growth of TTIs did not abate. In the meanwhile, the Legislature enacted A.P.Education Act, 1982 ('the Act' for short). At that stage, unauthorised TTIs filed writ petitionsquestioning the policy in G.O.Ms.No. 169, Education, dated 19-2-1975 whereunder variousconditions were stipulated for granting recognition to TTIs. The writ petitions were disposed ofdirecting the Government to consider the applications of several TTIs. The Government consideredand declined to grant permission. Another set of writ petitions were filed before the Supreme Courtinter alia challenging the orders refusing permission to run the TTIs and also Sections 20 and 21 ofthe Act. The writ petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court in Nageshwaramma v. State ofA.P., .

4. In Nageshwaramma's case, it was also argued that the students of the TTIs were earlier permittedto appear for Government examination and therefore all the students who have undergone trainingfor one year in private un-recognised TTIs may be allowed to appear for the examinationnotwithstanding the fact that permission might not have been accorded to them. This was rejectedby the Supreme Court saying:

We are unable to accede to these requests. These institutions were established and the students wereadmitted into these institutes despite a series of press notes issued by the Government. If by a fiat ofthe Court we direct the Government to permit them to appear at the examination we will practicallybe encouraging and condoning the establishment of unauthorised institutions. It is not appropriatethat the jurisdiction of the Court either under Article 32 of the Constitution or Article 226 should befrittered away for such a purpose. The Teachers trained in Institutes are meant to teach children ofimpressionable age and we cannot let loose on the innocent and unwary children, teachers who havenot received proper and adequate training. True they will be required to pass the examination butthat may not be enough. Training for a certain minimum period in a properly organised andequipped Training Institute is probably essential before a teacher may be duly launched. We have nohesitation in dismissing the writ petitions with costs.

5. Notwithstanding above judgment of the Supreme Court, having regard to the representationsmade to them from all quarters, the Government, so as to mitigate the hardship and suffering of thetrainees from unauthorised TTIs, directed to hold special course in Government TTIs for thosestudents of 1983-84 and 1984-95 batches who had undergone training in private TTIs in all thedistricts. However, such of the candidates had to appear in the entrance examination conducted bythe Government.

For the said purpose, the Government also ordered a screening procedure by District LevelCommittees, Regional Level Committees and State Level Committee to finalise the list of thecandidates at three levels who are eligible for entrance test in Teacher Training Certificate course(TTC). As per the procedure, a special entrance test will be conducted to the candidates who areenlisted by the State Level Committee and the successful candidates in the entrance test are



required to undergo a six months crash course in Government TTIs in accordance with the suitablesyllabus prepared by the Director of School Education. In pursuance of the Government policy ascommunicated in G.O.Ms.No. 170, Education (SEE) Department, dated 9-5-1989, the Director ofSchool Education issued Proceedings being Rc.No. 2965/N1-3/88, dated 7-4-1993 laying downconditions which are to be satisfied to be eligible to appear for the special entrance examination. Asper the condition No. (ii), the candidate seeking admission for the above entrance examinationshould have completed 17 years of age but not over 25 years as on 1st July of the year of joining intothe TTC i.e., 1-7-1983 and 1-7-1984 for 1983-84 and 1984-85 batches respectively.

6. In furtherance of G.O.Ms.No. 170, dated 9-5-1989 as well as the Director's proceedings dated7-4-1993, 7959 candidates were found eligible in the entrance test conducted by the Commissionerfor Government Examinations pursuant to a notification issued on 18-10-1989. As noticed above,there were only eleven or so Government TTIs with an intake capacity of 150 students. Therefore, allthe 7959 candidates could not be sent to TTC crash course at a time. Hence, Government issuedorders in Memo No. 1702/Trg.II/02, dated 29-8-1996 to divide candidates into two (2) batches.Accordingly, 3450 candidates were trained in the first batch of crash course in District Institutes ofEducation and Training (DIETs) in all the 23 districts, which came to be established replacing TTIs.The candidates of the first batch commenced crash course in June 1996 and completed it byDecember 1996 for whom the final examination was conducted in January 1997. Immediately thecourse for second batch of students i.e., 3450 candidates was started in February 1997 and wascompleted by July 1997 in all the regions except Kakinada region. However, the examination for thecandidates of second batch was conducted in October 1997. Insofar as the Kakinada region isconcerned, the admissions were stopped in obedience to the directions of this Court dated 3-2-1997in W.p.m.p.No. 1457 of 1997 in W.P.No. 1253 of 1997 and batch which was filed by some of theprivate TTIs praying this Court to allow their students to appear for interviews scheduled to be heldin February 1997 so as to get admission into the crash course. At this stage, the events took adifferent turn as we presently notice and results of the examination of the first batch of crash coursewere not announced.

7. The vires of G.O.Ms.No. 170, dated 9-5-1989 came to be considered in M. Sanjeeva Reddy v. StateConvenor, CET, 1995, (D.B.). A Division Bench of this Court placing reliance on Nagheswaramma'scase (1 supra), declared the said G.O. ultra vires and that the Government has no such power toissue such orders under the Act and the A.P. Educational Institutions (Admission of Students intoTeachers Training Institutions) Rules, 1986. The judgment was delivered on 14-11-1996 and for thatreason though the first batch and second batch crash course students completed the course inDecember 1996 and July 1997, the results were not announced. The Government then issuedG.O.Ms.No. 258, Education, dated 8-8-1998 amending the Rules issued in G.O.Ms. No. 35,Education, dated 26-2-1990. As per the amendment issued to the Rules, the policy decision videG.O.Ms.No. 170 was given statutory status retrospectively with effect from 9-5-1989, the date onwhich the G.O. was issued. With this, the entrance test, preparation of list of eligible candidates andcrash course in two batches attained legitimacy. The Government also issued G.O.Ms.No. 344,Education, dated 18-9-1998 directing that the results of the candidates who appeared in theexamination in January 1997 (first batch) and October 1997 (second batch) be announced.



8. In yet another round of litigation, before amendment of Rules, W.P.No. 5730 of 1998 and batchwere filed before this Court questioning the inaction on the part of the Government in notannouncing the results of the examination of the candidates who underwent crash course. ADivision Bench of this Court having felt that Sanjeeva Reddy's case (2 supra) requires considerationplaced the matter before a Full Bench. It appears, the DSC 1998 was on the way. Therefore, byinterim order dated 26-3-1998, the Full Bench passed an order in W.P.M.P.No. 9772 of 1998directing authorities to receive the applications of the petitioners therein except those who becameage barred by the date of examination conducted in October 1997 and the Full Bench also furtherdirected that the receipt of the applications shall be subject to the condition that the petitionersshould give the details of their Roll No. or Hall Ticket No. and also append a note to the applicationform stating that they are submitting the application pursuant to the order of the Court passed on26-3-1998.

9. The Full Bench on 1-5-1998 modified the order directing the respondents to allow suchcandidates who passed the special TTC examination held in January and October 1997 for interview,provided they have passed the examination held by District Selection Committees for recruitment ofteachers along with other eligible candidates subject to the condition that the results of selectionshall not be announced pending further orders by Court. In obedience to the interim orders, itappears, most of the petitioners therein were called for interview. Some of the candidates whobecame over aged by 31-10-1997 which is the cut-off date stipulated in the interim order dated26-3-1998, were not called for interview. When the hearing before the Full Bench was in progress,the Government issued G.O.Ms.No. 258, Education, dated 8-8-1998 amending the Rules andtherefore the Full Bench came to a conclusion that the writ petitions became infructuous. However,an argument was raised on behalf of the petitioners herein that the maximum age limit prescribed inemployment notification be relaxed in view of the fact the crash course which ought to have beenstarted much earlier concluded only in 1996 and 1997. The Full Bench declined to give any suchrelief and left it to the discretion of the appointing authorities to extend the benefit of relaxation tothose who are already called for selection and got selected in spite of the fact that they crossed theage limit by 31-10-1997. After the Full Bench disposed of the cases, the Government issued MemoNo. 6238/Trg.III/97-3, dated 16-10-1998 to announce the results and to issue pass certificates tosuccessful candidates and thereafter results of the candidates were announced in October 1998.

10. As noticed above, in Kakinada Region the admissions into second batch of crash course werestopped pursuant to the interim orders passed by this Court in W.p.m.p.No. 1457 of 1997 in W.P.No.1253 of 1997 dated 3-2-1997. It was only after the Full Bench decided the matter that theCommissioner issued orders on 23-12-1998 directing the concerned authorities to allow theremaining candidates of second batch in Kakinada region to take admission into course during theyears 1998-99. Accordingly, 1280 candidates were admitted in the Kakinada region. The course wascommenced on 24-4-1999 and the same was completed on 24-10-1999. The results of theexamination conducted in the first week of April 2000 were also announced.

11. The Government and other authorities issued notification for DSC 2000 on 4-7-2000. As perthis, written examination was held on 17-8-2000. Some of the candidates who completed the crashcourse in Kakinada region filed O.As before the Tribunal. These applications being O.A.NOS. 3863



of 2000 and batch were filed seeking directions to the respondents to receive the applications of thepetitioners for appearing in written examination as a last chance on compassionate grounds; to giveweightage to the applicants in DSC 2000 for the post of Secondary Grade Teacher; and alternativelyto allow the applicants therein to compete to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher in DSC 2000 byfixing the cut-off date as 31-10-1997 for the purpose of maximum age limit and also conduct aseparate/special DSC for the candidates in Kakinada region. The Tribunal by a common judgmentdated 21-7-2000 allowed the OAs directing the respondents to permit the applicants therein toparticipate in the selection process for the post of Secondary Grade Teacher pursuant to thenotification dated 4-7-2000, "as one time chance."

DSC-2001:

12. The notification for recruitment of teachers 2001 (DSC 2001) was issued by the Director ofSchool Education on 14-6-2001 (published in the newspapers on 15-6-2001). As per the notification,applicants for the post of Secondary Grade Teacher must possess the qualification of at leastIntermediate examination conducted by the A.P. Board of Intermediate Education and must possessTeacher Training Certificate issued by the Commissioner for Government Examinations. Theapplicants should have completed the age of 18 years and should have not completed the age of 36years in the case of OCs, 40 years in the case of BCs, 41 years in the case of SC/STs and 45 years inthe case of physically handicapped as on 1-7-2001. All the petitioners herein have crossed themaximum age limit. Therefore they again filed the OAs with the reliefs as noticed supra. All the OAswere disposed of at the admission stage by a common order on 24-7-2001 directing that all thepetitioners who have not availed the one time benefit in accordance with the judgment of theTribunal in O.A.No. 3863 of 2000 and batch, dated 21-7-2000 be permitted to undergo the selectionprocess if they are within the age limit prescribed by the Government or ordered by the Tribunal forDSC 2001. Aggrieved by this order the present writ petitions are filed.

RIVAL CONTENTIONS:

13. In these writ petitions, Sri S. Rama-chandra Rao, learned Senior Counsel made the leadarguments which were supplemented by other learned Counsel. He submits that when theGovernment took twelve years from 1989 to 2000 for completing the crash course for thosecandidates who studied in un-recognised private TTIs, it is the duty of the Government to allow thepetitioners to participate in the selection process duly relaxing the age. He further submits that if theGovernment conducted the entrance test as per the notification all the petitioners herein would havebecome eligible for the DSCs conducted by the Government right from 1994 onwards, but theentrance test was postponed at the behest of the Government more than thrice. Further, theGovernment has taken a policy decision vide G.O.Ms.No. 170 dated 9-5-1989 and the same shouldbe implemented completely and that cannot be left half-through. It is his further submission thatwhile conducting the final examination of TTC the Government has amended the statutory ruleswith retrospective effect from 9-5-1989 by issuing G.O.Ms.No. 258, dated 8-8-1998 and hence theGovernment should not impose restrictions in the DSC selections. Nextly it is contended thatwhether or not the petitioners appeared for selection in DSC 1998 and DSC 2000, they must be heldto be entitled to participate in the selection process applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation.



He would submit that any denial of legitimate expectation would amount to abuse of power violatingArticles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. He would also submit that the first batch as wellas the second batch crash course students were in dilemma as to whether results will be announcedor not which were ultimately announced in October 1998 and therefore even if they are age barred,they should be given a fair opportunity to participate in the selection. The learned Senior Counselhas placed reliance on following judgments in support of his contention viz., Vijoy Kumar v. State ofBihar, 1984(1) SLR 394. R.K. Rama Rao v. State of A.P., . U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. GyanDevi, . The learned Senior Counsel also contends that the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court inW.P.No. 5730 of 1998 requires re-consideration as the same is per incuriam being contrary to theprinciples laid down in Vijoy Kumar's case and Rama Rao's case.

14. The learned Additional Advocate General opposed the writ petitions. He would submit that theimpugned judgment of the Tribunal does not suffer from any error much less grave error apparenton the face of the record requiring judicial review by this Court. He would also submit that theTribunal, in the earlier round of litigation in O.A.No. 3863 of 2000 and batch made it clear that as alast chance all the applicants whose results of crash course examination were announced in October1998 be allowed to participate in the selection in DSC 2000 and the same cannot be a permanentfeature to those candidates who have completed the crash course. He also submits that there is noarbitrariness or illegality in fixing the maximum age limit. He had also drawn our attention to Rule31 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules and submits that the ingredients for exercise ofpower under Rule 31 are absent in the case. When all the petitioners, either they belong to first batchor second batch or the batch of students belonging to Kakinada region, had an opportunity to appearfor 1998 as well as 2000 DSC by virtue of the orders of the Tribunal, they have no legal right toenforce in these writ petitions. He would submit that the doctrine of legitimate expectation does notarise in these cases. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgments inNegeshwaramma's case (1 supra), Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., , State of W.B.v. Niranian Singha, (2001) 2 SCC 326.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:

15. In the factual background, having regard to the rival submissions, the following points arise forconsideration.

(1) Whether the notification for DSC 2001 dated 14-6-2001 insofar as the same prescribes themaximum age limit as 36, 40, 41 and 45 for OC, BC, SC/ST and PH candidates respectively is notarbitrary and unreasonable violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India?;

(2) Whether the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 5730 of 1998 and batch dated25-9-1998 requires any reconsideration having regard to the judgments of the Supreme Court inVijoy Kumar's case and Rama Rao's case (3 and 4 supra) decided by the Supreme Court?;

(3) Whether the impugned judgment of the Tribunal in O.A.Nos. 4596 of 2001 and batch dated24-7-2001 does not suffer from the vice of error apparent on its face requiring judicial review by thisCourt?



In Re Points 1 and 2:

16. We shall deal with points 1 and 2 together. The consideration requires examination of threequestions viz., (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the rule of maximum age limitto the petitioners is arbitrary and unreasonable? (ii) Whether the decision of the Full Bench inW.P.No. 573 of 1998 and batch declining to grant any age relaxation is opposed to any law declaredby the Supreme Court? and (iii) Whether legitimate expectation if any enables the petitioners toappear for DSC 2001 even though they admittedly crossed the maximum age limit prescribed by theRules. We would consider these questions in seriatim.

Question No. (i)

17. The submission made on behalf of the petitioners is that the policy decision in G.O.Ms.No. 170,dated 9-5-1989 cannot be left half-through and all the candidates who have completed the crashcourse programme either in the first batch or second batch or subsequently, are given at least onechance to appear for selection process for appointment to the post of Secondary Grade Teacher andthe Government is bound to implement the policy by giving necessary relaxation to the petitioners.As there was delay on the part of the Government in completing the crash course programme, thepetitioners cannot be blamed for the same. In our considered opinion, the argument ismisconceived.

18. After the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nagheswaramma's case (1 supra), a large number ofrepresentations were made to Government. So as to mitigate the hardship caused to the students bythe private TTIs, the Government came forward with a policy to conduct crash course TTC inGovernment institutions for those students who studied TTC course during 1983-84 and 1984-85 inunrecognised private institutions despite warnings from the Government through the press. Thepolicy decision was to be implemented subject to selection of eligible candidates and also byconducting entrance test. This was presumably because there were limited resources by way ofDIETs., and/or Government TTIs. All the students who were selected in the entrance test could notbe sent at a time for crash course. Therefore, there was some delay. In the meantime, when the firstbatch of 3500 students and second batch of about 3500 students in different regions except inKakinda region completed the course, the Government could not announce the results in view of thechallenge to the G.O.Ms. No. 170, dated 9-5-1989 itself before this Court.

19. A Division Bench of this Court in Sanjeeva Reddy's case (2 supra) declared G.O.Ms. No. 170dated 9-5-1989 ultra vires on 14-11-1996. So as to nullify the judgment of the Division Bench inSanjeeva Rededy's case (2 supra), the Government had taken recourse to amending the AdmissionRules. Accordingly, G.O.Ms.No. 258, dated 8-8-1998, which came into force with retrospective effectfrom 9-5-1989, was issued amending the Rules.

20. After amendment of rules, the results were announced in October 1998. Therefore, about 7000students who completed crash course of TTC examination became eligible only in October 1998. It isnot denied before us that some of them appeared for DSC 1998. Though there was a move to recruitteachers even during 1999 (DSC-1998) the same had to be aborted due to various reasons. When the



Government again started exercise for recruiting teachers during 2000 (DSC 2000) some of thestudents/candidates from Kakinada region whose results could not be announced in October 1998along with the first and second batch students, approached the Tribunal by filing O.A.No. 3863 of2000 and batch. The Tribunal allowed the OAs only insofar as the students of Kakinada region areconcerned though they were age barred. The same was done by reason of "equity, good conscienceand natural justice." The reasons for the same were stated by the Tribunal in the judgment inO.A.No. 3863 of 2000 and batch, dated 21-7-2000 as follows.

The fact remains that the applicants could not get their TTC certificates within the time as there waslitigation in respect of Kakinada region. For it, the applicants cannot be found fault. In fact, whenthe second batch of the candidates were not sent for training, the High Court of A.P. directed theGovernment to send the second batch of candidates also to DIETs., run by the Government to obtaintheir Teacher Training Certificates...... we are fully satisfied that it is a fit matter where therespondents have to be directed to permit the applicants to participate in the selection process forthe post of SGBT Teachers, as the applicants cannot be blamed for getting Teacher TrainingCertificates. In the year 1999............ Earlier two batches of similarly situated candidates were sentfor D.I.E.Ts., for TTC training. As they were sent in earlier two batches, they became eligible andwere allowed to participate in the earlier DSCs and some of them were in fact selected. In their casesalso, the cut off date was relaxed.

21. Thus the students of first and second batches were never allowed to participate in the DSC as amatter of right and it had been only out of compassion having regard to the principles of equity andgood conscience. A reading of G.O.Ms.No. 170, dated 9-5-1989, Memo dated 7-4-1993 issued by theDirector of School Education and G.O.Ms.No. 258, dated 8-8-1998 would show that these deal withonly holding of special course in Government TTIs for the students of 1983-84 and 1984-85 batcheswho had undergone training in unrecognised private TTIs in all the districts of the State. The limitedpurpose of this policy was only to conduct crash course and it no where contemplates that thosestudents who got the benefit of G.O.Ms.No. 170, dated 9-5-1989 and G.O.Ms.No. 258, dated8-8-1998 will also be given any relaxation in the matter of appointment to teachers. We mustremind that under Article 41 of the Constitution, the State shall, within its limits of economiccapacity and development, make effective provisions inter alia for securing the right to work.

22. The right to work is not a fundamental right under the Constitution of India. Therefore, it is notopen for the petitioners to contend that having allowed them to get the teacher training certificatesin Government institutions in the special crash course programme, the Government should alsorelax the qualifications in the matter of appointment of Secondary Grade Teachers in the State. Ifthe submission is accepted, ultimately it amounts to creating a right of employment which does notinhere in the petitioners.

23. The post of Secondary Grade Teacher is Category 2, Class (E) post in A.P. School EducationalSubordinate Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter called as the Special Rules) issued in exercise of thepowers conferred under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. As per Rule 5 of theSpecial Rules read with the relevant entry in annexure, a person to be appointed as Secondary GradeTeacher by direct recruitment must possess the qualifications of Intermediate examination and also



the Teacher Training Certificate issued by the Commissioner for Government Examinations. In theDSC 2001 notification dated 14-6-2001, the maximum age limit is 36 years for OC candidates. It is alittle more in the case of reserved category candidates and the physically handicapped candidates. Itis trite to say that the Constitution ensures equality of opportunity for all persons in the matterrelating to employment or appointment to any office in the State. What is really contended beforethis Court is that the petitioners should be treated as a separate class for the purposes of Article 16and should be given age relaxation whether or not they competed in 1998 and 2000 selections. Arethere any grounds to treat the petitioners as a separate class? Our answer to this question must be inthe negative. By virtue of G.O.Ms.No. 170 dated 9-5-1989 and G.O.Ms.No. 258, dated 8-8-1998, thepetitioners were grouped as a class till they completed TTC course in the Government TTIs, DIETs.The moment they completed the course, in our considered opinion, they are equal with all otheraspiring candidates and there cannot be any discrimination. Indeed, the classification of thepetitioners as a separate class, in our considered opinion, would not satisfy 'the rationality test' and'nexus test'. The object of conducting open selection for recruitment of Secondary Grade Teachers inaccordance with the Special Rules is to provide equal opportunities to all similarly situated personsand to recruit the best available candidates as teachers. Classification of the petitioners whocompleted the crash course TTC examination as separate group would not satisfy the object soughtto be achieved by the Special Rules as well as the Notification.

24. Primary judicial review of action alleging discrimination arises in case of 'under inclusion' aswell as in cases of 'over inclusion'. The "equality before law" is the normal and real constitutionalgoal, but the principle of equality before law and the principle of equal protection of law do notprohibit the State from resorting to classification. As noticed supra, subject to satisfying the'rationality test' and 'nexus test', classification is a permissible device in governance for realizingspecified goals. If a group of people is classified as one category for the purpose of denying or for thepurpose of conferring a benefit the people who are left out can always complain that they have beendiscriminated against. On the other hand, when denying the benefit or the privilege if some peopleare included in the classified group those people may also complain that they have beenunnecessarily included. The approach of the Court in such a situation differs.

25. In Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa, , Section 16(1)(ix) of Orissa Municipalities Act disqualified alegal practitioner from contesting election to a seat in municipality. This provision was upheld byobserving that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification for thepurposes of legislation. The apex Court ruled thus:

The simple answer to this contention is that legislation enacted for the achievement of a particularobject or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for the Legislature to determine what categories itwould embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which wouldstand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not renderlegislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamentalright guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution.

26. A Full Bench of Rajasthan High Court in Shanker Birmiwal v. Union of India, considered thescope of judicial review in the matter of classification which is either 'under inclusive' or over



inclusive'. Justice S.C. Agrawal (as he then was) observed as under:

A classification may suffer from the defect of being under inclusive or being over inclusive. Aclassification is said to be under inclusive when the State benefits or burdens persons in a mannerthat furthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit on other who are similarlysituated. A classification is said to be over inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarlysituated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well. While examining thevalidity of legislation on the touchstone of Article 14 the Courts have drawn a distinction between aclassification which is over inclusive and a classification which is under inclusive. In cases where theclassification is found to be over inclusive the Courts have interfered by striking down the offendingpart so as to exclude persons or groups who ought not to have been included in it. But the Courtshave shown more tolerance towards laws which are challenged on the ground that the classificationis under inclusive for the reason that the Legislature is free to recognize the degrees of harm and itmay confine the benefits or burdens to those classes of cases where the need seems to be clearest.

A distinction has to be drawn between the role of Legislature which "has the affirmativeresponsibility" and the role of the Courts which have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct.

27. In the light of the legal position as noted above, the complaint of crash course candidates even ifit holds water can only be struck down and no mandamus can go to the Government to relax agequalification, which is to be done by the Governor under Rule 31 of the General Rules. We hasten toadd that the so called 'over inclusion' is neither arbitrary nor it offends the doctrine of equality inArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

28. After Nageshwaramma's case (1 supra), the Government in fact went out of the way to mitigatehardship to the petitioners and the Government cannot be faulted for any delay in completing thecrash course for more than 7500 candidates. In any event, in the case of candidates of Kakinadaregion as well as others the Tribunal as well as this Court already allowed the candidates of the crashcourse to participate in the selections in 1998 and 2000 and the same cannot be extended for all thetime. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Nageshwaramma's case (1 supra) supportsour view. Indeed, the Tribunal while allowing the O.A.No. 3863 of 2000 and batch categorically heldthat the students of all batches were already allowed to participate in the earlier selections and thisfinding has not been seriously challenged before us. Therefore, we must hold that there is noarbitrariness and irrationality in fixing the maximum age to be applied uniformly to all and alsothere is no arbitrariness on the part of the Government in not treating the petitioners as a separateclass.

29. It is well settled that "irrationality" is Wednesbury unreasonableness (see Om Kumar v. Union ofIndia. (2001) 2 SCC 386. Even the scrutiny of the case on the basis of the 'Wednesbury' principledoes not lend any support to the petitioners. The action of the Government in fixing the maximumage limit at 36 years etc. is reasonable and the same cannot be held to be arbitrary.

Question No. (ii)



30. The submission of the petitioners is that the judgment of the Full Bench dated 25-9-1998 inW.P.No. 5730 of 1998 and batch is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases ofVijoy Kumar and R.K. Rama Rao (3 and 4 supra) and therefore the same may be ignored. We havealready noticed the circumstances under which the cases came to be referred to the Full Bench.When the Full Bench was hearing the matters, the learned Additional Advocate General stated thatthe rules were being amended to give a fair deal to the petitioners therein whose results could not bedeclared. The matters were adjourned. Then the Government issued G.O.Ms.No. 258, dated8-8-1998 amending the Admission Rules. This, as already observed, in effect amounted to nullifyingthe judgment in Sanjeeva Reddy's case (2 supra) by removing the defect pointed out by the DivisionBench. Be that as it may, the Full Bench categorically stated that all the writ petitions becameinfructuous in view of the amendments. Keeping in view the arguments on behalf of the petitionersfor relaxation of age, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Full Bench thought it fit toprescribe the cut off date as 31-10-1997 instead of 1-7-1997. The benefit of cut off date of 31-10-1997for the purpose of reckoning the maximum age was given only in respect of those candidates whopassed the written examination, interview and got selected. The direction was not given to theGovernment to give the benefit of cutoff date of every body. Further, the same was done by theBench on the concession made by the Additional Advocate General on behalf of the Government. Wefail to understand as to how the directions issued by the Full Bench in a group of writ petitionswhich were categorically held to be infructuous and a direction on the concession made by theGovernment can be contrary to any law. In any event, after going through two cited judgments of theSupreme Court, we are not able to bring ourselves up to accept the submission made by the learnedSenior Counsel.

31. In Vijoy Kumar's case (3 supra), the case involved regularisation of Civil Assistant Surgeons inBihar Health Services who were appointed on ad hoc basis in the year 1976. Those Doctors wereallowed to continue on ad hoc basis for a period of seventeen years. The Government was thereforedirected to regularise the services of those doctors by following the procedure as was done in thecase of other such Doctors. This case is not an authority for the proposition that the Court can issuea mandamus to treat a particular group of people as a separate class and give relaxation in thematter of age.

32. In R.K. Rama Rao's case (4 supra) which arose as a sequel to Venkat Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR1985 SC 729, the Supreme Court having regard to the undertaking given by the Government ofAndhra Pradesh in the latter case directed that those Village Officers who lost their positions byvirtue of the abolition of Village Officers' posts should not be subjected to any maximum age limit. Itwas held:

At the time of hearing before the Supreme Court in Venkat Reddy's case (11 supra), no agequalification had been prescribed. If the undertaking was required to be subject to the maximum agelimit prescribed for direct recruits under the ad hoc Rules, it would practically eliminate all theerstwhile village officers. We do not think that the Government should be allowed to get round theundertaking given at that time by purporting to prescribe the maximum age limit which would havethe effect of eliminating the majority of the erstwhile Village Officers. We have, therefore, no optionto allow the appeals and direct the respondents to absorb as Village Assistants all erstwhile Part



Time Village Officers who have not attained the age of 58 years if they possess the minimumeducational qualifications and are otherwise suitable for appointment, irrespective of their age.

33. Therefore, the judgment of the Full Bench in W.P.No. 5730 of 1998 insofar as the same deniesthe benefit of relaxation except to the extent indicated therein, cannot be said to be contrary to theprinciples either in Vijoy Kumar's case or Rama Rao's case (3 and 4 supra).

Question No. (iii)

34. Legitimate expectation in public law was elucidated by the Supreme Court in Madras City WineMerchants' Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, . It was held that legitimate expectation may arise (a)if there is an express promise given by a pubic authority: or (b) because of the existence of regularpractice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue: (c) such an expectation must bereasonable, and if there is a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by a rule orlegislation no question of legitimate expectation would arise.

35. In Hindustan Development Corporation's case (6 supra), the following principles were affirmed.

For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be same as an anticipation. It is different from a wish, adesire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However, earnestor sincere a wish, a desire, a hope may be and, however, confidently one may look to them to befulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to a assertable expectation and a mere disappointmentdoes not attract legal consequences.

36. In Kanaka Durga Wines v. Govt. of A.P. (F.B.), a Full Bench of this Court after referring to theHalsbury's Laws of England and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Madras City WineMerchants case (12 supra) summarised the ambit of legitimate expectation as under.

Thus, it can be seen that the doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked either where there isan express promise given by a public authority, or where there is existence of regular practice whicha claimant can reasonably expect to continue. The claim for legitimate expectation can be denied byshowing (a) that the expectation itself is unreasonable; or

(b) that the conduct of the person seeking to enforce the claim is such that it disentitles him to theequitable relief of the doctrine; or (c) that the expectations run counter to a public policy; or (d) thatthe policy or the circumstances which gave rise to the expectation have changed; or (e) that theclaim is contrary to the provisions of the statute.

37. A Division Bench of this Court in Osmania University v. R. Madhavi, considered doctrine oflegitimate expectation as under.

A person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, mustsatisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering thesame several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision



taken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest.If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the Courts cannot interfere with adecision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances given rise to the legitimateexpectation, it would primarily be a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the Court issatisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made out then the next question would be whetherfailure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision affecting such legitimate expectation istaken, has resulted in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed.

38. The House of Lords considered the doctrine of legitimate expectation in Council of Civil ServiceUnions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 and Pleasure v. Secretary of State, (1997) 3 AllE.R. 577 (HL). The Supreme Court of India in Navjyothi Co-op. Group Housing Society v. Union ofIndia, , Food Corporation of India v. Kamadhenu Cattle Feed Industries, , Hindustan DevelopmentCorpn. case (6 supra) Madras City Wine Merchants case (12 supra) M.P. Oil Extraction v. State ofM.P., AIR 1998 SC 145 and National Buildings Constitution Corporation v. S. Raghunathan,considered the concept of legitimate expectation. In a recent judgment in Punjab CommunicationsLtd. v. Union of India, , Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) considered all the above judgmentsand held that legitimate expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change of the policyresults in defeating the expectation and such change is irrational and unreasonable.

39. In two judgments delivered by one of us (V.V.S. Rao, J.) in M. Jagan Reddy v. Commr., UppalKalan Municipality, 2000 (1) An.W.R. 298 = 2001 (1) ALD 518 and Laveti Suresh Babu v. Convenor,MCACET-98, , reliance was placed on Punjab Communications case and the principles of legitimateexpectation were summarised as under.

(i) For a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of administrative authority must affect theperson by depriving him of some benefit of advantage, which he had in the past or been permittedby the decision maker, which the person can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue and theperson received assurances from the decision maker that the benefit will not be withdrawn withoutgiving him an opportunity of advancing reasons;

(ii) The procedural aspect of legitimate expectation relates to representation for hearing or otherappropriate procedure;

(iii) Substantive part of the principle is that, representation made for a benefit of substantive nature,will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, it will be continued and notvaried;

(iv) The decision makers permitting to change the policy in pubic interest, cannot be fettered by theapplication of principle of substantive legitimate expectation.

(v) If the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation, the authority should affordthe person an opportunity to make a representation in the matter. From this point of view, thedoctrine imposed a duty to act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant factors relating to suchlegitimate expectation;



(vi) the protection of legitimate expectation do not require the fulfilment of legitimate expectation,where an overriding public interest required otherwise;

(vii) If a person is denied the benefit by virtue of a legislative enactment or change in the statutoryrules, it is always taken that the result of a change in the policy by Legislation, does not give rise tolegitimate expectation;

(viii) The principle of legitimate expectation certainly gives the person sufficient locus standi to seekjudicial review; and

(ix) The substantive legitimate expectation merely permits the Courts to find out if the change ofpolicy resulting in defeating legitimate expectation was irrational or unreasonable.

40. In a recent decision in Niranjan Singha's case (7 supra), the Supreme Court held that thedoctrine of legitimate expectation is only an aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution in dealing withthe citizens in a non-arbitrary manner and thus, by itself, does not give rise to an enforceable right,but in testing the action taken by the Government authority, the same would be relevant.

41. Therefore, when grievance is made that the change of policy is irrational and unreasonable andamounts to abuse of power, legitimate expectation only gives locus standi to the aggrieved toquestion the same on the ground that legitimate expectation is denied without prior notice.Legitimate expectation does not by itself give rise to be enforced in the Court of law in the sense thatonly a limited relief is available to such aggrieved party.

42. We shall now examine the contentions based on legitimate expectation.

(i) Whether there was any promise given by the respondents to the petitioners?

43. No material has been placed before us to show that the Government ever promised either at thetime of issuing G.O.Ms.No. 170, dated 9-5-1989 or at the time of amending the Rules videG.O.Ms.No. 258, dated 8-8-1998 that all the candidates of first and second batch of crash courseTTC examination would be given age relaxation as and when District Selection Committee selectionsfor appointment of teachers take place. Indeed, we have referred to the earlier orders of the Tribunalas well as the stand of the Government to show that every time there was a DSC, the Governmenthas been opposing any relaxation. Even, the Full Bench of this Court in its judgment in W.P.No.5730 of 1998 and batch declined to give any relaxation in the following terms.

It is also pointed out that for the purpose of eligibility for entrance test for crash course, the cut-offdate for the age limit was prescribed as 1-7-1983-84. We do not think that it would be proper todirect the respondents to increase the upper age limit or to give a different cut-off date for thepurpose of making more candidates eligible. Apart from the fact that the petitioners have admittedlyno legal right, the comparison between the cut-off date for entrance test and the one fixed forrecruitment to the posts of Teachers is wholly inappropriate. Moreover, such a direction would alsogive rise to unnecessary complications further delaying the process of recruitment. Any order passed



at this stage to extend the maximum age limit will affect the prospects of appointment of candidateswho are within the age limit and got selected.

44. Further, the history of the litigation starting from Nageshwaramma's case (1 supra) would showthat the endeavour of the Government has been to see that those candidates who completed the TTCcourse during 1983-84 and 1984-85 in unrecognised private educational institutions should get fairdeal insofar as they get a TTC examination certificate only. They were never promised that theywould for all time be allowed to participate in the selection process by duly relaxing the rules.Therefore, on this score there was no legitimate expectation which was denied.

(ii) Was there a regular practice in existence by which the petitioners can reasonably expect thesame to continue?

45. On this test also the petitioners must fail. Either when the litigation was pending whenG.O.Ms.No. 170 dated 9-5-1989 was challenged in Sanjeeva Reddy's case (2 supra) or when thelitigation was pending in W.P.No. 5730 of 1998 and batch or before the Tribunal when O.A.No. 3863of 2000 and batch was pending, there was staunch opposition by the Government. This Court or theTribunal only directed relaxation in the matter of appointment after selection and never there was ageneral practice of giving age relaxation to candidates such as the petitioners. Even before theTribunal in the cases out of which the present writ petitions arise, the Government opposed anyrelaxation to the crash course candidates. Hence, it cannot be said that there was any existence of aregular practice which the petitioners could have reasonably expected to continue. Indeed, they havebeen aware when the notification was issued for DSC 1998, 2000 and 2001 that the petitionersherein were never treated as a special or separate class for the purpose of giving age relaxation. Thepetitioners have not even placed before us any orders passed by the Government under Rule 31 ofthe General Rules which permits the authorities to relax the Rules. The petitioner did not even madeany representation under said Rule.

(iii) Whether expectation of the petitioners is reasonable?

46. It is well settled that if there is a change in policy or in public interest and the position is alteredby a rule or legislation no question of legitimate expectation would arise. Indeed, this principle hasno application in the context of consideration of legitimate expectation. Since 1992 the statutoryrules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution have been very clear and the personto be eligible to be appointed as Secondary Grade Teacher must fulfil all the rules and regulations.Never before there was any special rule enabling the petitioners to claim relaxation of age andtherefore there is no existence of change of policy in this case. Throughout the district selectionsduring various years, the Government has been adhering to the rules and no case is brought beforeus where relaxation is given to any determined class of persons. For these reasons, we reject thesubmission of the petitioners' Counsel that the petitioners have been denied legitimate expectationby abuse of power.

In Re Point No. 3:



47. In pursuance of the power conferred by Clause (1) of Article 323-A of the Constitution of India,the Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ('the Tribunals Act' for brevity). TheTribunals Act, by Section 28 sought to exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except jurisdiction ofSupreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction in relation to all 'conditions ofservice' in the public employment was to be exercised by the Administrative Tribunal constitutedunder Chapter II of the said Act. A seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v.Union of India, laid down that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles. 226/ 227 as well as thatof the Supreme Court under Article 32 cannot be ousted. On that premise, it was held that alldecisions of the Tribunals will be subject to judicial review before the High Court under Article226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the Court within whose territorialjurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. Of late, after the judgment of the Supreme Court inChandra Kumar's case (24 supra), this Court is flooded with almost all decisions of the Tribunalsthat are challenged on untenable and whimsical grounds and this Court is forced to perform the roleof the first appellate Court. What is the scope of judicial review of decisions of the AdministrativeTribunals? It is a pertinent question which we desire to deal in these writ petitions.

48. After the judgment in Chandra Kumar's case (24 supra), the scope and extent of the power of theTribunals constituted under the Tribunals Act has become clear. The Tribunal is vested with powerto adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislation and rules is questioned as well as to decidethe disputes involving interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Alldisputes in relation to conditions of service are within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals.The only areas where the Tribunal is held to be not competent to decide the question are regardingthe vires of their parent statute in which cases alone High Court may be approached directly.Therefore, it is clear that like all the statutory Tribunals, the service Tribunals exercise their widepowers in deciding service law disputes by exercising judicial power. As held by the Supreme Courtin Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 386, Sambha Murthy v. Union of India, , andChandrakumar's case (24 supra) due to adoption of theory of alternative institutional mechanismthe Tribunals are vested with the power of judicial review in service matters. Hence, there cannot beany doubt that High Court under Articles 226/227 exercises power of judicial review of decision injudicial review by the Tribunal. These facts must be kept in mind while we decide the scope ofjudicial review of decisions rendered by service Tribunals.

49. The difference between "appeal" and "review" is well established. An appeal is continuation ofthe original proceedings and is concerned with the merits of the case and requires examination ofthe correctness of the findings of both fact and law. Judicial review, on the other hand is concernedwith the validity of the order than the merits of the case. In Chief Constable of the North WalesPolice v. Evans, 1982 (1)WLR 1155 it was held that "judicial review is not an appeal from a decisionbut a review of the manner in which the decision was made and that the judicial review is concernednot with the decision but with the correctness of the decision making process. In R. Entry v. EntryClearance Officer, Bombay ex.p.Amin, 1983 (2) AC 818, the House of Lords observed that judicialreview is entirely different from an ordinary appeal and that it is concerned not with the merits of adecision but with the manner in which the decision was made. These principles have been quotedwith approval in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, .



50. Further, on the premise that any error of law materially affects the decision making process, ithas been held that only error of law apparent on the face of the record is amenable to judicial reviewunder Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution. When a decision of the Tribunal is challenged before thisCourt, this Court can issue any writ, declaration or direction. A writ of certiorari may be issued if theTribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction properly or exceeds jurisdiction vested in it. A writ ofmandamus may also be sought against the decision of the Tribunal if the Tribunal after adjudicationdeclines to exercise proper discretion in discharging its functions. Equally a declaration can besought when the Tribunal though exercised jurisdiction within its limits in accordance with thesettled principles of law, but arrives at a finding which might be perverse on the face of it. (SeeJudicial Review: Law & Procedure by Richard Gordon; Sweet & Maxwell 1996).

51. It is also equally settled that a Court of judicial review would not ordinarily interfere with thefinding of facts however grave they may be. This Court is only concerned with grave error of lawwhich is apparent on the face of record. The error of law for instance may arise when a Tribunalwrongfully rejects admissible evidence or considers inadmissible evidence and records a finding.However, as observed by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v.Radhakrishnan, , "it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describeadequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on theface of the record and the same must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and uponthe nature and scope of the legal provisions which is alleged to have been misconstrued orcontravened." The principles of judicial review of decisions of the Tribunals noticed hereinabovewere accepted by the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob's case (30 supra). It is apposite to excerpt thefollowing passage which is educative:

The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari underArticle 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf isno longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committedby inferior Courts or Tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts orTribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. Awrit can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunalacts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to beheard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the disputeis opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue awrit of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as anappellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Courtor Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writproceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded bythe Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, theTribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneouslyadmitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.

52. The decision in Syed Yakoob's case (30 supra) was also followed in Jagdish Prasad v. AngooriDevi, . In view of the binding authorities, the law is well settled that-



(i) The High Court is not an appellate authority over the decision of the Administrative Tribunals;

(ii) While exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot be oblivious to theconceptual difference between appeal and review;

(hi) The petition for a judicial review would lie only on grounds of grave errors of law apparent onthe face of the record and not on the ground of error of fact, however grave it may appear;

(iv) When the Tribunal renders a decision after determining the facts, no application for judicialreview could be maintainable only on the ground that the Tribunal committed an error of fact,however grave it may appear, unless it is shown that such a finding of the Tribunal is based on noevidence and the error of fact itself can be regarded as error of law in the sense that admissibleevidence was rejected and inadmissible evidence was relied on;

(v) The orders passed by the Tribunal by exercising discretion which judicially vests in it cannot beinterfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegalin the sense the Tribunal did not follow an earlier decision of the Tribunal or binding authority ofthe High Court or the Supreme Court with reference to finding of facts and law;

(vi) When the Tribunal disposes of the original application by applying the binding precedents of theHigh Court as well as the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has committed anyerror of law apparent on the face of the record; in such cases the limited review before the HighCourt would be whether the binding principle has been appropriately applied or not; the Tribunal'sdecision which is rendered in ignorance of the statutory law including subordinate legislation as wellas the law laid down by the Supreme Court must be held to suffer an error apparent on the face ofthe record and requires judicial review;

(vii) Whether or not an error is error of law apparent on the face of the record must always dependupon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of legal provisionwhich is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened;

(viii) The three parameters of judicial review of administrative action -illegality, irrationality andprocedural impropriety with necessary changes are equally applicable to cases of judicial review ofthe Tribunal's decision; and

(ix) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of HighCourt under Article 227; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on High Court is limited to seeingthat Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasionmiscarriage of justice.

53. Applying the above principles, we have examined the impugned judgment of the Tribunal inthese cases. We are not able to persuade ourselves that the impugned judgment suffers from anyerror apparent on the face of the record. Indeed, the submissions made before us are not even raisedand/or even if they were raised, not even pressed before the Tribunal. Having regard to the



importance of the matter, we have heard elaborate arguments in this Court. We must hold that theTribunal, as noticed above, has correctly applied principles of equity in rejecting the prayer of thepetitioners for relaxation. Even applying Wednesbury unreasonableness, it cannot be said that theTribunal has committed grave error which requires judicial review by this Court.

54. In the light of our findings on the issues which fell for consideration, we must hold that the writpetitions are devoid of any merit. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed without any orderas to costs.




A. Ratnam and Ors. vs Government of Andhra Pradesh, ... on 7 September, 2001

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