A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs September-October 2000 · 2018. 2. 16. · Field Artillery...

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A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs September-October 2000

September-October 2000 Field Artillery46

DISCLAIMER: Field Artillery—is published bimonthly byHeadquarters, Department of the Army, under the auspices of theUS Army Field Artillery School (Building 758), Fort Sill, OK. The viewsexpressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defenseor its elements. Field Artillery's content doesn't necessarily reflectthe US Army's position and doesn't supersede information in otherofficial Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neitheraffirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsements.

PURPOSE: (as stated in the first Field Artillery Journal in1911): To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowl-edge and furnishing information as to the Field Artillery's progress,development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the otherarms, a common understanding of the power and limitations ofeach; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the differentarms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understand-ing between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all ofwhich objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION: Distribution (free) is to USArmy and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Components FA units:seven copies to corps artillery, division artillery and brigade head-quarters; 13 to battalions; and seven to separate batteries. Inaddition, readiness groups, recruiting commands, state adjutantgenerals, Army and Marine Corps libraries and schools, liaisonofficers and other Department of Defense agencies working with FAor fire support issues or materiel may request a free copy by writingto the Editor (see “Submissions”).

PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: May be obtained through theUS Field Artillery Association, P.O. Box 33027, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0027. Telephone numbers are (580) 355-4677 or FAX (580) 355-8745 (no DSN). Dues are $20.00 per year ($38.00 for two years and$56.00 for three years) to US and APO addresses. All others add$13.00 per subscription year for postage.

SUBMISSIONS: Mail to Editor, Field Artillery, P.O. Box33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Telephone numbers are DSN 639-5121/6806 or commercial (580) 442-5121/6806 or FAX 7773 withDSN or commercial prefixes. Email is [email protected]. Materialis subject to edit by the Field Artillery staff; footnotes andbibliographies may be deleted due to space.

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ADDRESS CHANGES: Field Artillery (ISSN 0899-2525) (USPS 309-010) is published bimonthly. Periodicals postageis paid by the Department of the Army at Lawton, OK 73501 and anadditional mailing post office. POSTMASTER: send address changesto Field Artillery, P.O. Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.

A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs

Redleg Hotline(Organization, Materiel, Doctrine and Training)

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Editor:Patrecia Slayden Hollis

Assistant Editor:Linda L. Ritter

Art Director:Bob T. Coleman

Toney StricklinMajor General, United States ArmyField Artillery School Commandant

Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

September-October 2000 HQDA PB6-00-5

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

INTERVIEW

3 Fixing the Marine ArtilleryAn Interview with General James L. Jones, Commandant of theMarine Corps

ARTICLES: Developing Adaptive Leaders

6 Building Our Intellectual Capital: The Need for Adaptive Leadersin Today’s Army

by Major Steven A. Stebbins, USAR

10 Leadership Development for the IBCTby Lieutenant Colonel William M. Raymond, Jr.

15 Training Adaptive Leaders—Are We Ready?by Dr. Karol G. Ross

20 The Practical Application of Army Valuesby Captain Patrick D. Quinn III

24 Developing the Adaptive Leaderby Colonel Bruce A. Brant

28 Decision Making in the Information Age: Moving Beyond theMDMP

by Major John D. Hall

33 A Day in the Life of a BCT First Sergeantby Major Richard J. Anderson

38 Leading the Radar Section in Battle—What “Right” Looks Likeby Chief Warrant Officer Three Harold A. Thacker, Jr.

ARTICLES: Features

35 Virtual, Live and Simulated Training: Getting Fires Back intothe Fight

by Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Lee

42 Fire Support Training in the CCTTby Lieutenant Colonel Ernest J. Herold III, Major Mickey A. Sanzotta andCaptain Thomas W. Everritt

DEPARTMENTS

1 FROM THE FIREBASE

2 INCOMING

Front Cover: Adaptive leaders in the making—from left to right: SFC Tim Rex, Operations NCO; MAJ MarkHigginbotham, S3; and LTC Pete Baker, Commander of 1-14 FA, 214th FA Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.(Photo by Linda A. Young, Fort Sill TSC)

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army, 0015902

Field Artillery September-October 2000 1

Last October, at the Associationof the United States Army(AUSA) convention in Wash-

ington, DC, the Chief of Staff of theArmy (CSA) outlined his vision for abold and rapid transformation of theArmy. General Eric K. Shinseki’s vi-sion is to create an irreversible momen-tum that will transform us into an Armythat has the responsiveness and domi-nance required to support our nationalstrategy, that can project land combatpower anywhere in the world in a mat-ter of hours and is decisive at any pointon the operational spectrum, in any lo-cation, in any environment. This forcewill be more lethal, more survivableand more sustainable than we are today.It will be a full-spectrum force, capableof battlefield dominance in every typeof engagement from stability and sup-port operations (SASO) to operations ina major theater of war (MTW).

The transformation process will im-pact the entire Army, including every-thing from the personnel system, re-cruiting and leadership development tothe officer and NCO education systems(OES/NCOES). As part of the transfor-mation process, the Field Artillery andFort Sill also will rapidly and dramati-cally change. This is not a conservativeprocess—it’s a bold and ambitiouschange. Ours will be a very differentArmy in the year 2020.

I am enthusiastic about the revolu-tionary improvements and possibilitiesthat the transformation presents. FortSill and the Field Artillery are commit-ted to the Army and to helping the CSAachieve his vision.

Transformation to the ObjectiveForce. The goal of the transformationeffort is to implement an “objectiveforce” design by 2010 to 2012. Theobjective force’s operations and orga-nization are still largely conceptual, andno decision has been made concerningits force design, but its construct will becentered around the future combat sys-tem (FCS) and a product of doctrine,

technical maturationand affordability.

It’s important to notethat doctrine is leadingthe technology. TheArmy knows where itwants to go and how itwants to get there and isdeveloping the tech-nologies required toachieve a specific set ofcapabilities for the ob-jective force.

As milestones on the path that willtake us to the objective force, we willfield two initial and six interim brigadecombat teams (BCTs). Both organiza-tions will be optimized for small-scalecontingencies (SSC) and require aug-mentation to operate in an MTW.

The two initial BCTs will be fielded atFort Lewis, Washington, in FY01 andFY02. 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artil-lery, 2d Infantry Division Artillery, isconverting to the initial force designnow, and 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artil-lery, 25th Infantry Division (Light)Artillery, will convert next year.

Fire support in the BCTs will be ef-fects-based rather than delivery sys-tem-based. A fires and effects coordi-nation cell (FECC) will be in the bri-gade’s headquarters and headquarterscompany. The direct support (DS) FAbattalion commander will serve as theeffects coordinator (ECOORD).

The battalion fire support element(FSE) and fire support teams (FISTs)will be organic to each maneuver bat-talion’s headquarters and headquarterscompany. This configuration will capi-talize on the organizational training andleadership development synergies ofthe transformation.

The DS weapons system for the initialBCTs will be the M198 155-mm towedhowitzer. Although the subsequent sixinterim BCTs have a requirement for aself-propelled interim armored vehicle(IAV) 155-mm howitzer, its afforda-bility is at issue. Our fallback position

will be to use the new towed lightweight155-mm howitzer (LW 155) in the in-terim BCTs.

The success of the initial and interimbrigades will create a bridge for trans-formation to the objective force.

Field Artillery Vision for the Fu-ture. Fire support and the Field Artil-lery are essential elements of the CSA’stransformation vision. Our Field Artil-lery vision remains constant and is en-tirely consistent and supportive of thetransformation process and objectives.The four tenets of the Field Artilleryvision—effects-based fires, organiza-tional transformation, dynamic forcetailoring and munitions centrality—helpfocus our efforts in transformation andallow us to accommodate rapid and re-volutionary change.

The Field Artillery transformation andmodernization strategy is guided by theoverarching tenets of the FA vision.Our strategy facilitates rapidly deploy-ing firepower with higher lethality persystem or munition and leverages mu-nition centrality to achieve requiredbattlefield effects.

Weapon systems currently under de-velopment are fundamental to transfor-mation and the objective force. Cru-sader will support both the legacy andtransformation force and serve as a tech-nology carrier for the future combatsystem. The prototype is currently fir-ing at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona,at ranges in excess of 40 kilometers. Weare on track to reduce Crusader’s weight

The Field Artilleryin Transformation

Gunners of C/1-37 FA of the initial BCT prepare to conduct anout-of-traverse fire mission with their M198 at Fort Lewis.


to 40 tons and are fully funded to field480 systems.

Crusader will support the transforma-tion originally as augmentation to theinterim force and will be a critical com-ponent of the Army’s counterattackcorps composed of modernized and digi-tized divisions equipped with theM1A2SEP (system enhancement pro-gram) tank, M2A3 Bradley infantryfighting vehicle, M270A1 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) and theAH-64D Longbow Apache and RAH-66 Comanche helicopters. Crusaderquite possibly will be in the force until2040 and beyond.

The lightweight 155-mm howitzer is ajoint United States Marine Corps/Armydevelopment effort that also plays acritical role in the transformation pro-cess. It may provide fire support for theinterim BCT. The initial design howit-zer has fired thousands of rounds, and

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Crusader prototype firing in testing at YumaProving Ground in Arizona.

L ieutenant Colonel KennethJ. Lull, formerly of the Colo-rado Army National Guard

(ARNG), came on active duty to takecommand of the 1st Battalion, 17th FieldArtillery, part of the 75th Field ArtilleryBrigade of III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill,Oklahoma, on 27 June. He is the firstARNG officer to take command of anActive Component (AC) FA unit underthe AC-Reserve Component (RC) ex-change program and the fourth FA of-ficer in the program.

The AC-RC exchange program fillsselected command and senior staff po-sitions from the alternate component to

141st Field Artillery, Louisiana ARNG,1996 to 1998, and Colonel Mark A.Graham, AC, commanded the 40th Infan-try Division (Mechanized) Artillery, Cali-fornia ARNG, 1998 to 2000.

share expertise, manage-ment practices and leader-ship and promote theinteroperability of the com-ponents into one seamlessArmy.

On 16 April, LieutenantColonel Gary D. Giebelbecame the third AC FieldArtilleryman in the pro-gram to assume commandof an ARNG unit—the 2d Battalion,157th Field Artillery, part of the 169thFA Brigade, in Longmont, Colorado.Lieutenant Colonel John R. Hennigan,Jr., AC, commanded the 1st Battalion,

First ARNG Officer CommandsAC FA Battalion: AC-RC Exchange

the prototype was delivered in Junewith seven more to follow. Productionbegins in 2002.

The high-mobility artillery rocket sys-tem (HIMARS) also supports the Ar-my’s transformation vision. It enjoysgreat support throughout the Army and,as part of a follow-on force, will aug-ment the initial and interim brigades.

These are exciting times. The Army istransforming into a more responsive,more deployable and more lethal landcombat force. We fully support thistransformation and will transform aswell.

The Field Artillery is and will con-tinue to be an integral part of the com-bined arms force that will prosecuteAmerica’s land campaigns today or inour transformed Army of the near future.

Planning is underway for the next Senior Fire Sup-port Conference at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill,Oklahoma, the week of 23 April 2001. The focus of theconference will be the Army’s Transformation and theFA’s initiatives in support of it.

As in past years, Senior Fire Support Conferenceinvitees include Army corps and Marine expeditionary force(MEF) commanders; Reserve Component (RC) and ActiveComponent (AC) Army and Marine division commanders; FAactive and selected retired general officers; Training andDoctrine Command school commandants; AC and RC Armycorps artillery, FA brigade, division artillery and Marine regi-mental commanders and their command sergeants major

(CSMs); and US Field Artillery Association corporatemembers. FA commanders and their CSMs will checkinto the conference on Sunday. Other participants willcheck in on Tuesday, unless they want to participate inthe golf scramble on Tuesday—they then can check in

on Monday.More details of the conference and the week’s schedule

will be in the November-December Red Book, including aconference email address. Until that time, email questionsabout the conference to Colonel Ted Janosko, Deputy Assis-tant Commandant of the FA School, at [email protected] invitations to the conference will be mailed in January2001.

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Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Editor

General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps

Fixing the Marine ArtilleryShortly after you became Com-mandant of the Marine Corps in

July 1999, you issued a directive toreview the role, mission, organization,doctrine, structure and training of theMarine Corps Field Artillery compre-hensively as one of your priorities. Whythe review, and in general, what werethe artillery’s deficiencies that calledfor the review?

In the past 10 or so years, we havedecreased our fire support sys-

tems too far. We got rid of a lot of ourartillery weapons in the name of effi-ciency, in the name of mobility, and wehinged ourselves to one Field Artillerysystem—the M198 towed 155-mm how-itzer. The M198 is a wonderful artillerypiece, but it’s not very mobile.

At the time, the Marine Corps hadmade a conscious decision to shift toaviation as kind of “a flying artillerysystem.” This placed our ground-basedfires out of balance with the maneuverforces it supported.

As a division commander [2d MarineDivision], I had a difficult time weight-ing the main effort and shaping mybattlespace with ground fires withouttaking artillery away from other units.A division commander can use his fourFA battalions as he sees fit, but he doesnot have enough artillery [one FA bat-talion for each of his three infantryregiments and one FA battalion for hisdivision’s tank battalion and light ar-mored reconnaissance battalion]. I hadto rely on fires from Marine aviation,which is adversely affected by weather;naval surface fire support; or the Army’sMLRS [multiple-launch rocket system],which was not always available.

We have atrophied our Marine groundfires inventory to a dangerous point.We’re out-gunned and out-ranged byjust about everyone. So I am fixing theartillery—bringing robustness back tothe Marine artillery. And since I or-dered the review of the Marine artillery,I’ve decided we need to look at firesupport for the entire MAGTF [Marine

air ground task force] to ensure it has anintegrated, flexible system.

You’ve come up with a plan for atriad of firing platforms to give

the Marine Corps FA more flexibility.What are the three platforms and howwill each contribute to the fight?

The analyses that we’ve con-ducted recommended a review of

our total capabilities with particular em-phasis on the high- and low-end sys-tems. I haven’t made any formal deci-sions on the third leg of the triad ofsystems, but we’re bringing two legs ofthe triad into the inventory. One is theM777, the lightweight 155-mm howit-zer [also called the LW 155] being jointlydeveloped by the Army and MarineCorps. The M777 will have towed artil-lery digitization [TAD].

We’re moving ahead to replace allM198s with the M777, beginning in2003. The M777 will be our direct sup-port [DS] workhorse for the divisions.

The other leg is HIMARS [high-mo-bility artillery rocket system]. We’rereplacing two of the five M198 battal-ions in our Reserve artillery, the 14thMarines, with HIMARS battalions,hopefully, in 2006. As a matter of fact,at a recent conference at Camp Lejeune[North Carolina], a number of Marinegenerals fired HIMARS and were veryimpressed. Eventually, we may wantHIMARS in the active force as well—say a HIMARS battery per division. But,initially, the system will go into the 14thMarines, giving us the added capabilityduring a major theater war.

HIMARS will be our general supportsystem for the commander, giving himthe flexibility to weight the main effort,provide counterfire and shape his bat-tlespace without pulling DS systemsaway from other units. HIMARS is acritical asset to shore up our paucity ofground fire support capabilities.

Now, the final system of the land-based fire support triad is yet to bedetermined. That will be the very light-weight expeditionary fire support sys-tem [EFSS]. We must project credibleforces ashore to secure limited objec-tives and, if it’s in our national interests,hang on to those objectives until ourforces are relieved by more sustainableland-based forces. Such operations re-quire a lot of coordination and a singleintegrated system of lethal and nonle-thal fires developed from air-, ground-and sea-based assets.

Within that expeditionary context, theEFSS’ principal role will be to supportthe air assault elements of the STOM[ship-to-objective maneuver] duringOMFTS [operational maneuver fromthe sea, beginning in the 2015 timeframe] until such time as other indirectfire support assets can be brought tobear on enemy forces. The challengesare to provide all-weather, continuousfire support to match our maneuver andmesh the operations of decentralizedoperations in STOM with the central-ized fire support command and controlsystem.

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INTERVIEW

We’re currently studying the remain-ing fire support deficiencies and deter-mining the requirements for the EFSS.Marines in my generation grew up withthe 105-mm howitzer and shed sinceretears when it was taken away. So, the finalEFSS choice could be a 105 or a mortar orsome other advanced system. If the solu-tion is a mortar, the system will remain aninfantry weapon. The basics of small-unitfire support operations in STOM won’tchange significantly enough to justifytaking the infantry commander’s “hip-pocket artillery” away.

Since 1988, the Marine Corps’artillery has been reduced by ap-

proximately 57 percent. If the MarineCorps adds HIMARS and the very light-weight EFSS to the force, will that re-sult in reductions in 155-mm cannons?If you add new systems and don’t re-duce the number of 155 systems, it willcall for more Marine Field Artillerypersonnel—is that an option?

Although we’re always lookingfor ways to get lighter, I do not

foresee a reduction in the number ofartillery pieces in the active force. The155 howitzer design and family of mu-nitions, both current and future, make ita very capable and flexible system.

The intent behind “fixing fires” is toensure we have the fires to accomplishall our warfighting requirements—in-cluding sea-based, air-based and land-based fires. We have a modernizationplan for sea-based fires when the tech-nology matures for precision guided

and other systems to come on line. Weare adequately invested in aviation-basedfires. But we learned in Kosovo that ifwe’re going to fight in different terrainand different weather conditions, we musthave all-weather, all-the-time fire sup-port. Artillery gives us that capability.

To increase our ground-based fires,we’re looking at several new artillerysystems—such as fire support weap-ons, a ground weapons locating radarand others. But we’re also looking athow we train and organize our fire sup-porters. So, yes, increasing the numberof Field Artillerymen in the MarineCorps is an option.

In fact, I’m bringing back theANGLICO [air ground naval gunfire liai-son company] in its original form. It wasa mistake to get rid of our ANGLICOs.

We have an ongoing project to free upMarines in the Corps by replacing se-lected positions with civilians. In ourmodest reform just this year, we haveidentified almost 2,500 Marines whoare going out into the operating forces.At some point, I may be willing to goforward to the Secretary of Defense torecommend the Marine Corps have amodest increase in strength. We abso-lutely must shore up our operatingforces, and our artillery units are criti-cally deficient.

What changes are you making topersonnel management policies

and training to ensure your future firesupport personnel have the competen-cies you need, including flexibility andadaptability?

The road ahead in the Corps forMarines in combat arms and sup-

porting arms is to work in their MOS[military occupational specialties] aslong as possible. The Marine Corps, notthe individual, must make sure our Ma-rines have the opportunity to progressand become experts in their field. That’sparticularly important in the FA, in thefire support business.

As fire supporters, Marine artillery-men must integrate the MAGTF’s firesfrom all sources. Failure to developprofessional fire supporters could re-sult in disaster.

As far as training is concerned, theArmy will continue to teach Marinesthe art and science of Field Artillery.The Army is the best in the world at it.Our basic schooling develops the Ma-rine expeditionary mindset.

The Army’s interim brigade com-bat teams (BCTs) are being de-

signed to be lighter and more deployableto contingencies but have enough combatpower to make a difference until heavyforces arrive. One could make a case thatthe Marine Corps, with its OMFTS, andthe Army, with its interim BCT transfor-mation, are developing similar combatcapabilities. Do you see the developmentof these concepts as fulfilling comple-mentary roles and missions, and how?

The operational concepts comple-ment each other—a certain

amount of redundancy on the battle-field is necessary. US forces don’t wantto have “just the right amount” of onecapability because, sooner or later, we’llcome up short.

Point Number Two: The battlefieldwill not be crowded with US forces. Ineach major regional contingency, wehave advanced, detailed plans that arefully integrated with the Army’s plans.Today, we know exactly what we’regoing to be doing and where and theArmy knows what it’s going to be do-ing and where in each scenario. Thedifference is the Marines will come inby ships and the Army by strategic lift.

In recent years, there has been apush for greater use of UAVs [un-

manned aerial vehicles], robotics andprecision strike munitions. Is the Ma-rine Corps’ requirement for volume,area and massed fires diminishing?

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L to R: Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps Alford L. McMichael and General Jonesattending the first annual Sergeants Symposium in March 2000.


We need both precision andmassed fires, depending on the

scenario. In conventional warfightingin a major regional contingency, wenow have a shortage in our ability tomass fires and must depend on the Armyfor support.

UAVs and precision fires are and willcontinue to be important, especially inurban terrain. But precise fires requireprecise targeting, and we won’t alwaysknow exactly where every target is. Dif-ferences in terrain, the conditions andthe type of enemy targets call for differenttactics and munitions. We cannot affordto get into an either/or situation.

What message would you like tosend Marine Artillerymen sta-

tioned around the world?

I would like to tell artillerymenthe story of my “coming of age”

in regard to fire support in Vietnam in1968. Perhaps this will help explainwhy one of my priorities is to fix theMarine artillery.

Although I spent most of my 1967-1968 tour with Golf Company, 2d Bat-talion, 3d Marines, I assumed commandof Fox Company for about two weeks in1968. Fox Company was assigned topatrol the Laotian border up near KheSanh.

At the end of the day on 28 May, wepositioned ourselves on a ridge line thatseemed to have good fields of fire andbe defensible. We were within range ofthe North Vietnamese artillery acrossthe Laotian border near a place calledCo Roc. The North Vietnamese gunswere well emplaced in caves—very hardfor artillery or aviation fire support toget at. (Co Roc did the shooting duringthe siege of Khe Sanh.)

In the wee hours of 28 May, Fox Com-pany was assaulted by a North Viet-namese battalion that had just comeacross the border. We were dug in, butit was clear that the sheer numbers ofthe enemy would overcome us.

We had a wonderful artillery spot teamwith us that started calling in artillerydefensive fires and “walking” the firesback toward us. About nine batteries,both at Khe Sanh and with my 2d Bat-talion, 3d Marines, fired in direct sup-port of Fox Company—105s and 155s—virtually nonstop from 0200 until 1000that morning.

INTERVIEW

A Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey prepares to deliver an M777 lightweight 155-mm howitzer.

Usually, the North Vietnamese brokecontact at daylight because they knewhelicopter gunships and Phantom jetswould be on station. But such prospectsdid not dissuade this North Vietnamesebattalion. Daylight came, and the bat-talion started attacking even more ag-gressively. Before it was over, some ofus had to fight the North Vietnameseinside our perimeter.

The majority of our fire support camein with devastating accuracy and ex-traordinarily close—within meters ofus. Artillery and our 81-mm and 60-mm mortars firing nonstop saved theday, essentially decimating a NorthVietnamese battalion. Fox Companyhad very few casualties.

One of the things that helped save uswas that the enemy used green flares tostart the attack, and so we reasoned thatred flares would stop it. We fired redflares from our line, and it broke up theattack. And by the time the North Viet-namese got reorganized and began at-tacking again, we’d adjusted our calls-for-fire to provide a safety net of steelbetween us and them.

The combination of the courage of thecompany and the accuracy and respon-siveness of our organic fire support iswhat allowed Fox Company to walk offthat hill that day—I’m convinced of it.

General James L. Jones became the 32dCommandant of the Marine Corps in July1999. In his previous assignment, he wasthe Military Assistant to the Secretary ofDefense. Also in Washington, DC, he wasthe Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policiesand Operations for Headquarters, MarineCorps, and Director of the ExpeditionaryWarfare Division (N85) in the Office of theChief of Naval Operations. He commandedthe 2d Marine Division, Marine Forces At-lantic, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.While Deputy Director, J-3, of the US Euro-pean Command in Germany, he wasassigned as Chief of Staff of Joint TaskForce Provide Promise for operations inBosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Healso participated in Operation Provide Com-fort in Northern Iraq and Turkey as theCommanding Officer of the 24th MarineExpeditionary Unit out of Camp Lejeune.He commanded the 3d Battalion, 9th Ma-rines in the 1st Marine Division at CampPendleton, California, and five infantry com-panies, including two in Vietnam.

As the Commandant of the MarineCorps, I’m determined to ensure Ma-rines will have the fires they need to“walk off the hill” on any future battle-field.

It’s an exciting time to be a Marineartilleryman.

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I t’s time to raise the bar for leaderdevelopment—today’s leadersmust think faster, deeper and

broader than ever before. Rapid com-munications and transportation, newtechnologies, grueling operations tempo(OPTEMPO), diverse missions and newthreats stretch our leaders’ abilities tothe limit. In a single year, a lieutenantcould deploy to the National Training

project managers, policemen, humani-tarian assistance providers and mediarelations specialists. And the list growsevery year. There is, perhaps, no othervocation with so many potential de-mands. Developing adaptive leaderswho are effective in each situation iscritical to the Army’s success.

The Challenge. Our leader develop-ment programs teach the military deci-sion-making process (MDMP) in a verystructured framework. The structure hasevolved over centuries, propelled bynumerous tactical and technological de-velopments. In the 19th century, theindustrial revolution and the nation-in-arms combined the effects of technol-ogy and the demands of mass armies todrive the need for centralized, efficientdecision-making.

The Prussian general staff system metthis need best, and most modern armiesadopted the Prussian model. It becamethe basic model for staff organizationand military decision making throughthe 20th century. Centralized planningand clearly defined doctrine became

Building OurIntellectual CapitalThe Need for Adaptive Leaders

in Today’s Armyby Major Steven A. Stebbins, USAR

Photos by Linda A. Young, Fort Sill TSC

Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California;field complex new equipment; providemilitary support to civil authorities; andconduct peacekeeping operationsabroad. Each scenario is unique with itsown particular challenges.

How many civilian leadership rolesare there with requirements so broad?Military leaders are expected to be war-riors, diplomats, technicians, teachers,

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common to all modern armies, and theanalytical, objective techniques of mili-tary science overshadowed the intui-tive, subjective nuances of military art.

This system worked well through mostof the 20th century, but now we’re en-tering the post-industrial age. Many callthis new era the Information Age. Itscharacteristics are ever-faster commu-nication and increasingly sophisticatedmeans for managing information. Sincethe essence of war centers on the humanmind in that its objective is for one partyto compel another party to decide tosubmit, the developments of the Infor-mation Age profoundly affect the waywe wage war.

Some experts believe these develop-ments constitute a revolution in mili-tary affairs. Military theorists pronouncethat new technology and the decline ofthe nation state have ended the era ofmassed and sustained land wars. In-stead, future conflicts will be centeredon a wide variety of antagonists andthreats that most militaries previouslyviewed as distractions, at best. Terror-ism, information warfare, peacemakingand peacekeeping are where we shouldfocus our defense efforts, according tosome.

Whether or not these changes are trulyrevolutionary, clearly the world is chang-ing and the demands on leaders areintense. In a complex, fast-moving en-vironment, leaders often won’t havetime to stop and think. Yet, they’ll needto be incredibly thoughtful. In a fasterworld linked by global communications,the decisions of leaders at the lowestlevels can have major significance.Flooded with information, these lead-ers will need the intuition and confi-dence to think without thinking and toact decisively and do the right thing.This is the essence of military art.

But since the death of Clausewitz,most military theorists have focused onmilitary science. Today, professors ofmilitary science (PMS) develop most ofour new lieutenants. Our training pro-grams stress highly structured decision-making processes and countless lists ofprinciples and rules, which is not neces-sarily a bad thing. The techniques ofmilitary science provide practical guide-lines and common intellectual framesof reference. However, to quote now-retired Brigadier General Huba Wassde Czege in a 1984 Military Reviewarticle, “The art of war consists of theartful practice of the science of war.”1

To win on future battlefields, our lead-

ers will need to build on their founda-tion of military science to become deftpractitioners of military art.

To be modern masters of the militaryart, leaders must be highly adaptive.They must be able to adapt their think-ing and behaviors to the wide range ofsituations they’ll face. Doing this suc-cessfully requires several basic compe-tencies: creativity, resourcefulness, ini-tiative and decisiveness; a profoundunderstanding of doctrine and theory;highly developed intuition and concep-tual thinking; the ability to see patternsand identify key information; strongcultural and political sensitivity; sys-tems perspective (ability to see connec-tions between conditions and events);and a tolerance for ambiguity.

Through rigorous study, a broad rangeof experiences and constant reflection,adaptive leaders develop the intellec-tual ability to understand diverse andcomplex situations, cope with a flood ofinformation and establish the clarityand focus to act decisively.

Adaptive Leadership. The first steptoward becoming an adaptive leader isto make a personal commitment. It’s acommitment to curiosity, to being anactive thinker and a student of one’sprofession. Learning how to prepare anFA support plan or fire sup-port execution matrix is nec-essary, of course, but it isn’tsufficient. Beyond master-ing the technical details ofhis functional specialty, theadaptive leader needs abroader knowledge of themilitary art and the world atlarge.

Armies function in the con-text of national and worldevents, and adaptive leadersunderstand this context.They develop a sense for howseemingly unrelated forcesand events interact and howthey can shape their envi-ronment. Developing this“feel” takes time; indeed,since our world is constantlychanging, our leadershipsense is developing con-stantly. Purposeful develop-ment occurs through activeengagement and reflection.Without commitment therecan be no deliberate growth.

Growth can flourish onlyin a supportive environment.As does all truly effective

leadership, adaptive leadership must bebuilt on a foundation of trust. Adaptiveleaders must know they have the trust ofsuperiors and subordinates alike. Oth-erwise, they lack the confidence to thinkcreatively and act decisively.

Lately, we have read a lot about a lackof faith in senior leaders.2 Careerism,micro-management and the zero-defectsmentality, constant criticisms since theVietnam War, seem to be increasinglycommon complaints. Good professionaldevelopment counseling is rare. Underthese conditions, building trust is hard.

What can we do to fix this and createthe right sort of environment for devel-oping adaptive leaders? Above all, de-veloping others must be the top priorityof every leader. We need to recognizethat teaching is at the core of leader-ship.3 Once we accept that at all levels,the fear and insecurity that drives thezero-defects mindset and its micro-man-agement behaviors will dissipate. We’llcome to recognize that developing lead-ers takes time, and that we learn bestthrough our failures.

The change has to start at the very top.Senior leaders must clearly articulatethe new behaviors and skills expectedof all leaders, then model them consis-tently and conspicuously. They must

Adaptive leaders have the intellectual ability to under-stand diverse and complex situations, cope with a floodof information and establish the clarity and focus to actdecisively. L to R: 1SG Mark Walters and SSG Kyle Cunningham, 1-14 FA.


hold subordinates accountable fordeveloping future leaders. It will behard. Attitudes and habits developedover decades don’t change overnight.

Recognizing this, the Army shouldconsider executive coaching for itssenior leaders. An increasingly com-mon civilian practice, executivecoaching involves working with aprofessional coach to prepare a per-sonal development plan and receiveperiodic one-on-one developmentalfeedback. The coach, often a trainedpsychologist, offers a more objec-tive perspective than could someonefrom within the executive’s organi-zation. Their objectivity and profes-sional training often make themhighly effective in coaching seniorleaders. Supported by their coaches,senior leaders then could model ef-fective development practices for therest of the Army.

All leaders need to have a basic setof coaching skills. Regrettably, wedon’t do a very good job of teachingthese skills. As a result, many lead-ers don’t really know how to de-velop other leaders. They have diffi-culty identifying and assessing thebehaviors and cognitive skills associ-ated with specific leader competencies.They aren’t trained in preparing indi-vidual development plans, so thoseplans, while sorely needed, are virtuallynon-existent. We can’t blame the lead-ers; the Army hasn’t trained them in theskills to do the job.

There are several things we could doto close this skill gap. Beginning at ourofficer basic course and NCO primaryleadership development course (PLDC),we can introduce training in leadershipcompetencies and how to identify andassess associated behaviors and think-ing skills. Training in coaching skills,particularly effective listening, wouldbe essential. Role-plays, videotaped andwith rigorous feedback, would becomethe core of this training. Lieutenantsand junior NCOs would leave the FieldArtillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,with a basic understanding of the leaderdevelopment skills they could practicein their assignments. Most importantly,they would understand the level ofcoaching they should expect from theirleaders and commanders.

Advanced course students, both of-ficer and NCO, would revisit the basics,complete with role-plays, then wouldmove into development planning. Theywould learn how to facilitate the pur-

poseful growth of subordinates throughplanned development activities andtimely competency-based feedback. Tofurther their own development, ad-vanced course students could undergo apersonal assessment through a combi-nation of formal testing, simulationsand interviews. They would receivethorough and insightful feedback froma trained professional who would deepentheir self-knowledge, a basic require-ment for any leader.

Using this new self-knowledge toguide their own development, theseleaders would return to the field as moreactive learners and caring coaches. Pre-command course students could un-dergo similar education.

A focus on active listening, deep per-sonal insight and regular coaching wouldbe a big change for most leaders. In amake-it-happen culture with constantpersonnel churn, taking the time neces-sary to nurture and grow thoughtfulleaders is hard. But it must happen.Unless we make the time to coach sub-ordinates and build deeper trust be-tween leaders and led, we won’t havethe environment necessary for develop-ing adaptive leaders.

Trained Intuition. Artillerymen faceunique challenges in developing theintellectual habits of adaptive leaders.

The technical aspects of our craftstress precision, highly structuredplanning and unwavering executionof the plan. These characteristics havebeen essential to indirect fire gun-nery and the complex fire supportplanning processes that have beenthe heart of our training since theFirst World War.

Unfortunately, the attitudes re-quired for technical success can un-dermine the attitudes required ofadaptive leaders. It is only a shortstep from precision to a zero-defectsmentality and micro-management.Strict adherence to structured plan-ning processes easily can lead to alack of creativity and originality. Un-wavering execution of the planteaches none of the flexibility re-quired of adaptive leaders. The intel-lectual challenge for artillerymen isto retain the precision, attention todetail and objectivity required fortechnical excellence, while cultivat-ing the creativity, flexibility and intu-ition essential to adaptive leadership.

That trained intuition is the coreintellectual competency of adaptiveleadership. It is what enables leaders

to think without thinking, to assimilateand act upon large amounts of informa-tion quickly. When intuition is highlydeveloped, it manifests itself in “flow”experiences. We’ve all had these expe-riences. Think of a time when thingswere happening so fast that you didn’thave time to think yet had to decide andact—perhaps during a Combat Train-ing Center (CTC) rotation or while con-ducting an airborne assault. You knewwhat needed to be done and did it,period.

FM 22-100 Army Leadership definesintuition as “direct, immediate insightor understanding of important factorswithout apparent rational thought orinference.” It further states that “theability to assess a situation accuratelyand reliably—a critical tool in theleader’s arsenal—requires instinct andintuition based on experience and learn-ing.”4

The key concept here is trained intu-ition. It’s not just a gut feel; one doesn’tjust wing it. As General Wass de Czegeasserts, “…the art of war demands dis-ciplined intellectual activity.”5

Beginning with the study of core doc-trine and tactics, young leaders developa common framework for how to thinkabout the problems of their profession.Through early experiences, they learn

Trained intuition is the core intellectual competencyof adaptive leadership. It is what enables leaders tothink without thinking, to assimilate and act uponlarge amounts of information quickly.


Major Steven A. Stebbins, US Army Re-serve (USAR), is the Executive Officer forthe 2d Battalion, 274th Regiment (BasicCombat Training), 84th Division (Institu-tional Training), in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin.While on active duty, he served in FieldArtillery units of the 1st Armored Division inGermany, 2d Infantry Division in Korea, 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized) in Germanyand 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg,North Carolina. He commanded B Battery,6th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, part of the1st Armored Division. Major Stebbins holdsa Bachelor of Arts in History from the Uni-versity of Vermont and a Master of Arts inHistory from the University of North Caro-lina at Chapel Hill. In his civilian career, heis a Senior Professional in Human Re-sources as certified by the Society of HumanResource Management.

1. Huba Wass de Czege, “How to Change an Army,” Military Review (Vol. LXIII, No. 3, March1983, reprinted in Military Review, Vol. LXXVII, No. 1 January-February 1997).

2. Gil High, “New Army, New Thinking,” Soldiers (Vol. 55, No. 4, April 2000).

3. Noel Tichy, The Leadership Engine: How Winning Companies Build Leaders at Entry Level(New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 42-44.

4. US Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100 Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do (Washington, DC,August 1999), 2-14.

Endnotes:5. Wass de Czege.

6. Rhett A. Hernandez, “Top Ten Traits for Future Leaders” (Field Artillery, May-June 1999), 11.

7. Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: HarvardUniversity Press, 1994), 244-245.

8. Warren Bennis, An Invented Life: Reflections on Leadership and Change (Reading,Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993), 15.

9. High, 15.

how to apply those concepts in practice.The challenge is to continue that devel-opmental process beyond the narrowrange of tactical problems.

Now the coaching and teaching skillsof mid-level and senior leaders becomesimportant. They must develop the skillsof the Socratic teacher who helps hisstudent discover new insights throughdeliberate and patient questioning. Toquote Colonel Rhett A. Hernandez (“TenTop Traits for Future Leaders,” May—June 1999), leaders must learn to “listenmore and talk less.”6 They must learn tounderstand and appreciate diverse per-sonality types and learning styles sothey can tailor their coaching to theindividual. Recognizing that the paceof day-to-day operations will only in-crease, they must see every event, mis-sion or tasking as a learning opportu-nity and exploit it as such.

In Leadership without Easy Answers,Ronald Heifetz describes the leader’srole as a teacher: “Unlike rote learningsituations in which the answer is sup-plied, though paced, by the teacher,adaptive learning situations demand thatpeople discover, invent, and take re-sponsibility. Leadership is a special sortof educating, in which the teacher raisesproblems, questions, options, interpre-tations, and perspectives, often withoutanswers, gauging all the while when topush through and when to hold stea-dy....The leader as educator has to en-gage the parties in a process of inquirythat accounts for their fear or pain, iflearning is to be produced.”7

The senior leader becomes a mentorwho guides his juniors through learningexperiences, simultaneously develop-ing their intellectual discipline and cre-ativity. Guided by his mentor, the de-veloping leader learns to think morebroadly, deeply and creatively. He learnsto think about thinking and to see andunderstand broad concepts and connec-tions. Rather than becoming a prisonerof doctrine, he uses his solid doctrinalfoundation to inform and guide his cre-ative thinking. Through study, experi-ence, feedback and reflection, he deep-ens his understanding and knowledge.

He becomes a continuous learner whoseintuition develops constantly.

Fortunately, today’s Army alreadyprovides many of the core developmen-tal experiences that leaders require. Wegive leaders responsibility early, rotatethem through a wide range of jobs fre-quently and return them to the school-house regularly. Junior leaders learnthe fundamentals of leadership quickly,which is why they are so marketable inthe corporate sector. Many civilian lead-ers, including renowned leadershipscholar Warren Bennis, credit their mili-tary experience for teaching them thebasics of leading people.8

While our leader development pro-grams are among the best at instillingthe basics, they are less effective atdeveloping leaders with the breadth anddepth required of modern adaptive lead-ers. To address this shortcoming, wemust create an ever-widening range ofexperiences for the developing leader.Increasingly complex simulations, con-temporary case studies and diverse as-signments are only a few possibilities.Some of these initiatives are already inprogress, such as the training programsdescribed in the April 2000 issue ofSoldiers magazine. It describes ArmyExperiment 6 that developed “…adap-tive training programs that stress how tothink.”9 [Also see the article “TrainingAdaptive Leaders—Are We Ready?”by Dr. Karol G. Ross in this edition.]The objective is to create situations thatexpose the developing leader to newchallenges and perspectives, which histrained mentor then can help him toexplore. Both mentor and student be-come partners in learning, increasingthe Army’s intellectual capital together.

This growth of intellectual capitalserves two purposes: it increases theArmy’s effectiveness as a learning or-ganization and increases the individual’seffectiveness as a leader. The two areintertwined. Just as an organization’sresults largely reflect the individualdecisions of its members, an individual’sresults often reflect the culture and col-lective knowledge of the organization.Creating a vigorous culture of engaged,

insightful and mutually supportive ac-tive learning will improve both.

Conclusion. In the end, the Army’scapacity to practice adaptive leadershipis a function of its intellectual capital.We must become a more thoughtfulArmy while retaining our ability to actdecisively. This is the real paradox ofadaptive leadership and the real culturalchallenge for our Army. In an organiza-tion that values doers over thinkers, weneed to think more about thinking so wecan act decisively when there is no timeto think.

This takes leader development to an-other level. It places a premium on theleader’s thinking skills, in addition tohis interpersonal and management skills.Developing adaptive leaders is more aprocess of constant nurturing and less aprocess of completing required coun-seling sessions or hurdling key career“gates.”

The key elements of developing adap-tive leaders are instilling a commitmentto active and continuous learning, train-ing leaders in the art of developingothers and then challenging them withincreasingly complex and diverse learn-ing experiences. The result will be adap-tive leaders whose trained intuitionmakes them nimble practitioners of themilitary art.


On the battlefields of tomorrow,America’s sons and daughtersdemand leaders of character

who are adaptive and use initiativewithin their commanders’ intent to ac-complish the mission. The Initial Bri-gade Combat Team’s (IBCT’s) LeaderDevelopment Program, especially itsquarterly leadership sustainment train-ing, will help develop such adaptive,decisive leaders.

On 12 October 1999, Chief of Staff ofthe Army General Eric K. Shinseki an-nounced his plans to transform the Armyinto an “objective” force that would bemore responsive, deployable, agile, ver-satile, lethal, survivable and sustain-able. Since that announcement, therehas been widespread interest in the ac-tivities going on at Fort Lewis, Wash-ington, where the first two brigadesare converting into “initial” brigades

equipped with medium-weight, lightarmored vehicles and a host of newcapabilities.1 These IBCTs will haveunprecedented lethality, mobility andsurvivability; deploy anywhere in theworld within 96 hours; and be capableof conducting full-spectrum operations.

The new brigade will have uniquecapabilities. (See Figure 1 for the orga-nization of the IBCT.) This IBCT willhave three infantry battalions with com-bined arms companies and one recon-naissance, surveillance target acquisi-tion (RSTA) squadron, significantly in-creasing the number of combat armssoldiers as compared to the number inthe typical light or heavy brigade.

Fire support teams (FISTs) withStriker-like vehicles and operations areorganic to each maneuver company.The IBCT has an unprecedented num-ber of mortars—a total of 66 mortars:60-mm, 81-mm and 120-mm mortars atthe company and battalion levels.

The RSTA squadron is a unique orga-nization with three reconnaissancetroops and a surveillance troop. Thesquadron combines the capabilities ofcavalry scouts and selected military in-

by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Raymond, Jr.


telligence assets, including unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs), sensors andcounterintelligence teams to serve asthe IBCT’s primary source of combatinformation.

A fires and effects coordination cell(FECC) is replacing the fire supportelement (FSE) at the brigade headquar-ters. The FECC will provide brigade

counterfire and deep operations andserve as a focal point for coordinatingand synchronizing both lethal and non-lethal assets in support of the com-mander.

The first IBCT’s FA battalion—the1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (1-37FA), the former direct support battalionfor the 2d Infantry Division based at

Fort Lewis—has three batteries, eachwith four M198 155-mm howitzers(3x4). The battalion also has a targetacquisition platoon with one Q-36 andone Q-37 Firefinder radar and a meteo-rological section.

The brigade support battalion (BSB)will accomplish execution-focused sup-port that’s integrated fully with theIBCT’s concept of operations andscheme of maneuver.

While these capabilities are certainlynew and noteworthy, one of the mostrevolutionary of the IBCT’s initiativesis its Leader Development Program.The program includes the one-time ini-tial leader “conversion” training (a Tac-tical Leaders Course and Senior Lead-ers Course). In addition, the programhas quarterly sustainment training thatincludes NCO educational developmentand nested leadership training withmultiple vignettes from the brigade tothe platoon levels.

This article provides an overview ofthe type of leader the IBCT demandsand describes the key components ofthe IBCT Leadership Development Pro-gram.

• Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)1

• 3 Infantry Battalions with Combined Arms Companies2

• Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Battalion3

• Field Artillery Battalion4

• Brigade Support Battalion (BSB)

• Anti-Tank Company

• Signal Company

• Military Intelligence Company

• Engineer Company

Figure 1: The Initial Brigade Combat Team

1Location of the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC).2Includes 20 mortars per battalion (60-mm, 81-mm and 120-mm).3Includes six 120-mm mortars.4Has 12 M198 howitzers, a target acquisition platoon and a meteorological section.


Overview. The 21st century opera-tional environment our Army confrontsis extremely fluid and demanding. Full-spectrum operations range from stabil-ity and support operations, small-scalecontingencies (SSC) and major theaterof wars. These operations most likelywill occur in complex terrain and urbanenvironments. The increase in the num-ber of unknowns that leaders could facein these environments increases the needfor adaptive leaders. The IBCT opera-tional and organizational concept(O&O) requires unique leadership train-ing to prepare IBCT leaders for full-spectrum operations, precision inter-netted (digital tactical internet) com-bined arms fighting, dispersed and de-centralized operations, and network-centric and leader-centric operations.

The IBCT O&O defines an adaptiveleader as one who “influences peopleby providing purpose, direction andmotivation while operating in a com-plex, dynamic environment of uncer-tainty and ambiguity to accomplish themission and improving the organiza-tion.”2 Figure 2 lists the qualities of anadaptive leader.3

Given the distributive, decentralizedand simultaneous operations an IBCTleader will confront over an expandedbattlespace, the building of highly co-hesive and trusting units is essential.The IBCT also must have leaders whocan make decisions and act within theirhigher commander’s intent.

How do we develop and train that typeof leader? First, the leaders must be theprimary experts and trainers to facili-tate the building of cohesive, trustingunits. Second, leaders must be trainedinitially to execute operations relativeto the IBCT O&O and not based solelyon their former experience as “light” or“heavy” fighters. Third, IBCT leadersmust sustain leader training with a struc-tured, comprehensive unit leader de-

velopment program based on FM 22-100 Army Leadership. This programmust be conducted quarterly to keepleaders within a band of excellence.

Initial Leader Conversion Training.The one-time leader conversion train-ing consisted of the Tactical LeadersCourse and Senior Leaders Course.

Tactical Leaders Course. The pur-pose of this course was to train leaderson how the IBCT fights, focusing on thesquad, platoon and company levels. TheTactical Leaders Course participantswere company and battalion leaders/staffs from across the IBCT—basicallyplatoon sergeants to battalion command-ers. The IBCT conducted five iterationsof the course from May to August.

Each iteration consisted of two phases.The first lasted seven days. Three dayswere devoted to common core classeson the IBCT organization, adaptive lead-ership, operating in an SSC environ-ment and developing training. Every

IBCT tactical leader received the samecore instruction.

During this phase, the tactical leadersreceived a one-hour class on fires andeffects in the IBCT. This class discussedthe FA Vision, specifically the para-digm shift to effects-based fires; thecapabilities and organization of theFECC; fire support assets from the pla-toon to the brigade levels; and the 3x4M198 FA battalion organization andoperations. The class also discussed theintegration of non-lethal effects and in-formation operations into the IBCT’scombined arms operations.

The next three days focused on unit-specific fighting. For example, infantrybattalions conducted infantry training,and the RSTA squadron conducted re-connaissance and surveillance training.In August, 1-37 FA’s tactical leadersspent three days at the Battle Simula-tion Center on Fort Lewis.

Using the joint conflict and tacticalsimulation (JCATS)4 and the Kosovocommon scenario, FA tactical leadersgained a better understanding of how tofight in an SSC that featured complex,urban terrain and distributed operations.During this simulation exercise (SIM-EX), the FA battalion didn’t performnew artillery tasks but had to operate ina significantly different environmentthan in the past.

The seventh day of the Tactical Lead-ers Course was reserved for retrainingas well as after-action reviews (AARs).

Phase II of the Tactical Leaders Coursewill be a weeklong crucible event, “The

The adaptive leader is—• Decisive.• Able to balance the human leadership dimension with technology.• Comfortable with uncertainty (agile and flexible).• Focused and a quick learner.

• One who empowers others and is a decentralized leader who properlyuses “initiative within intent.”

• A good communicator.• Able to build cohesive, trusting teams with candor.

• Effective using the force across the full spectrum of conflict.

Figure 2: Qualities of an Adaptive Leader

The purpose of the Senior Leaders Course was to teach the senior IBCT leaders about theuniqueness of their organization. Participants were the brigade commander and hisbattalion commanders and their respective staffs.


Arrowhead Challenge,” that will occurin 2001. The Arrowhead Challenge willbe a morale and cohesion building, per-formance-oriented event for leaders thatwill be physically and mentally demand-ing and focus on military skills. It alsowill serve as a ceremony to recognizethe transition of leaders to this neworganization.

Senior Leaders Course. The purposeof the Senior Leaders Course was toteach the senior IBCT leaders about theuniqueness of their organization. Par-ticipants were the brigade commanderand his battalion commanders and theirrespective staffs. The course started atFort Lewis on 15 June and finished witha one-week digital capstone exercise atFort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 29 August.

In between these two events, the se-nior leaders spent one week each at FortLee, Virginia, training on BSB opera-tions; Fort Huachuca, Arizona, on mili-tary intelligence; Fort Knox, Kentucky,on RSTA operations; and Fort Benning,Georgia, on infantry operations. At eachpost, the leaders participated in hands-on proponent training that was task,conditions and standards-based. In ad-dition, special physical training events,staff rides and noteworthy guest speak-ers allowed the leaders to build camara-derie among themselves.

Training at Forts Lewis, Benning,Knox and Leavenworth had fires andeffects and combat service support(CSS) concepts integrated into the in-struction and exercises. For example,during the RSTA training at Fort Knox,the senior leaders grappled with how tosupport this unique unit with fires andeffects and CSS.

Leader Sustainment Training. Thequarterly sustainment training will be-gin in the spring of 2001. The two keycomponents of the program are NCOeducational development and nestedleadership training. Each quarter, thefive-day sustainment training will coverindividual and special skills sustain-ment and low-density military occupa-tional specialty (MOS) training, withselected NCOs attending collegecourses. At the same time, team leadersthrough the brigade commander willparticipate in nested leadership training.

NCO Education. This program willprovide civilian education to staff ser-geants (primarily) to enhance their edu-cational development. Fort Lewis isworking with colleges and universitiesin the northwest to provide two three-credit-hour college courses. One course

1. Interpersonal—How to Deal withPeople:

• Understanding Soldiers• Communicating• Supervising• Coaching• Teaching• Counseling• Motivating• Empowering

2. Conceptual—How to Handle Ideas:• Using Sound Judgement• Establishing Intent• Filtering Information• Understanding Systems• Using Ethical, Analytical,

Critical Reasoning3. Technical—How to Employ

Job-Related Abilities:• Knowing Basic Soldier Skills• Maintaining Critical Skills• Resourcing• Predicting Second and

Third Order Events4. Tactical—How to Solve Unit

Combat Problems:• Synchronizing• Orchestrating

Figure 4: Skill Categories and Leader Ac-tions for Nested Leadership TrainingVignettes. These four skills from FM 22-100 Army Leadership form the basis for theskills developed in the leadership vignettes.

will cover the human dimensions ofleadership in combat, focusing on thepractical application of the principlesand concepts of the behavioral sciencesand interpersonal relationships in a com-bat environment.

The second college course will coverthe SSC environment, introducing vari-ous perspectives on global issues andemphasizing the increasingly interde-pendent nature of our world. Case stud-

ies will examine US interventions inPanama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia andKosovo. During quarterly sustainmenttraining, selected NCOs will be excusedfrom other activities to attend thesecourses.

Nested Leadership Sustainment Train-ing. The heart of the leadership sustain-ment program is quarterly nested lead-ership training. The purpose of this train-ing is to develop the leaders’ commonunderstanding of IBCT operations thatincreases their experience levels andforces them to solve problems based onmultiple leadership vignettes.

Figure 3 depicts the nested leadershipmodel. Each of the five days trains a“nest” of leaders from three levels. Forexample, Day 1 is the “brigade nest”consisting of the brigade commanderand his battalion and company com-manders who tackle brigade-level prob-lems posed in four vignettes. Note, forexample, that each company com-mander will participate in training intwo other levels of nests (brigade andbattalion) before he leads his own nestof platoon and squad leaders throughtheir four vignettes.

The fifth day of the nested leadershiptraining is reserved for additional train-ing, as required by the commanders.Leaders will need no external assis-tance to conduct their nested leadershiptraining.

One-hundred and sixty vignettes arebeing developed for this program. Thevignettes will focus on the four leader-ship skills taken from the leadershipframework in FM 22-100: interpersonal,conceptual, technical and tactical (seeFigure 4). For each day of training, twoof the four vignettes will be based ontactical skills related to the IBCT O&Oand use the Kosovo common scenario.The other two vignettes will focus onany of the three remaining leadershipskills with any type of scenario. Semi-nars and discussions, map exercises,

Company Commanders

Platoon Leaders

Squad Leaders

Team Leaders

Figure 3: Nested Leadership Training. Each day has problem-solving vignettes that focusat the highest level listed; the highest level is the title of the “nest.” For example, eachcompany commander will have participated in the Brigade Nest on Day 1 and the BattalionNest on Day 2 before leading his own nest on Day 3.

Day 1

Day 2

Day 3

Day 4

Day 5

Brigade Commander

Battalion Commander

Company Commander

Platoon Leader

Battalion Commanders

Company Commanders

Platoon Leaders

Squad Leaders

As Required by Commanders


Lieutenant Colonel William M. Raymond,Jr., took command of 2d Battalion, 2d FieldArtillery (2-2 FA), 30th Field Artillery Regi-ment in the Training Command at Fort Sill,Oklahoma, in July. For six months beforeassuming command, he was the EffectsBranch Chief in the Brigade CoordinationCell at Fort Lewis, Washington, helping totransform the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artil-lery into an Initial Brigade Combat Team(IBCT) organization and develop the Firesand Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) andthe IBCT’s Leadership Development Train-ing Program for the Training and DoctrineCommand’s (TRADOC’s) Deputy Com-manding General for Transformation. Hisother assignments include serving as theDeputy Chief for Experimentation, TaskForce 2000 at the Field Artillery School,Fort Sill; S3 and Executive Officer for 2-2FA; and Commander of Headquarters andHeadquarters Battery for 6th Battalion, 1stField Artillery in the 1st Armored DivisionArtillery in Germany. He holds a Ph.D. inPolitics from the University of Michigan.

1. The 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, was the first brigade in the Army to transform into oneof the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) and is projected to receive its interim armoredvehicles (IAVs) in March 2001. It will undergo a Combat Training Center rotation in late 2001before achieving its initial operating capability (IOC) in December 2001.2. Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Operational and Organizational (O&O), 31 October1999, Appendix I, 5.3. The qualities listed here were derived from three sources. The first source was the IBCTO&O; Colonel Ricky Lynch’s unpublished report on “Lessons Learned Commanding a DigitalBrigade.” Colonel Lynch is a former brigade commander in the 4th Infantry Division (Mecha-nized) at Fort Hood, Texas, the Army’s first fully digitized division. The third source was theWhite Paper “Preparation of Leaders” by Frederic Brown, January 2000, of the Institute forDefense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia.4. Joint conflict and tactical simulation (JCATS) is a high-resolution combat simulation similarto Janus. It replicates combat forces down to the individual vehicles and personnel. It also can

show aggregate forces in icons for better management in larger exercise scenarios. JCATSplays the terrain in three dimensions (although it still only appears two dimensionally on thecomputer screen), and it accounts for differences in elevation and vegetation to influence thebattle by limiting weapons and visibility to line-of-sight. JCATS has a detailed urban modelingcapability, to include subterranean features with the option of replicating buildings in completedetail. Artillery flight paths can be interdicted by high terrain (in rough approximation) and bybuildings at the terminal end of the flight path. Buildings can be turned into rubble, which allowsmoderately good training on collateral damage and rules of engagement (ROE) issues.5. FM 22-100 Army Leadership (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center,31 August 1999), 2-25.6. See Lieutenant Colonel James M. Dubik’s article “Decentralized Command: TranslatingTheory Into Practice,” Military Review, June 1992, for a more detailed discussion of theconditions for decentralized command.

Endnotes:

videos and terrain exercises withouttroops (TEWT) are drivers for the vi-gnettes.

The nested training approach allowsthe IBCT to develop adaptive thinkingteams. As each nest works through fourvignettes per day, leaders expand theirexperience base as they tackle prob-lems focused at the highest level of thatnest. Furthermore, leaders become pro-ficient in making decisions and takingthe initiative within the commander’sintent and gain a common understand-ing of fighting and leading.

The objective of nested training is tocreate a common approach to analyzingand solving tactical problems that leadsto a variety of acceptable correct “solu-tions” consistent with Army doctrine.The training avoids a validation of rigidthinking that leads to the same solutioneach time.6

Initiative Within Intent. Developingleaders who are comfortable taking theinitiative within the commander’s in-tent is an important component of theLeader Development Program.

A simple example illustrates the typeof leader the IBCT needs. One of theIBCT infantry battalions has the mis-sion to destroy an enemy force on ahilltop located about one to two kilome-ters behind a river. A company com-mander is given the mission of securinga bridge on the river to allow the rest ofthe battalion to cross the river and at-tack and destroy the enemy. Upon ar-riving near the bridge, the companycommander sees an enemy platoonguarding it.

He has two options. One, he can attackthe enemy force at the bridge, thus alert-ing the main force on the hill of hiscompany’s presence but accomplish-ing his mission of securing the bridgefor the rest of the battalion. Two, uponseeing the enemy force at the bridge andunderstanding his higher commander’sintent, he can send soldiers to reconboth flanks of the bridge to find another

fording location; the soldiers would dis-cover a fording location east of thebridge. The company commander thencould secure the fording location andnotify the battalion of the new crossingsite, which would allow the battalion tosurprise the enemy force on the hill anddestroy it. Clearly, the second optionillustrates an IBCT leader who is em-powered, can act within his com-mander’s intent and is comfortable inmaking this type of decision.

The IBCT’s nested leadership train-ing will develop this common under-standing of how to take the initiativewithin intent as the leaders solve vari-ous problems in the vignettes.

Related IBCT Training that Sup-ports Leader Development. Two otherIBCT activities will support the devel-opment of adaptive, decisive leaders:Situational Training Exercises (STXs)and a unique Company CommandersPreparation Program.

Situational Training Exercises. Theplatoon and squad STXs began lastspring. The company STXs will start thisfall. The STXs have realistic lanes thattrain warfighting and leadership skills.

Senior leaders are subject matter ex-perts (SMEs) and serve as observer/controllers (O/Cs) during the conductof the lanes. The leader O/Cs walk thelanes and help their subordinates under-stand their intent. “Fall out one” drills,where a key leader is “killed,” occursregularly and the mission continues.Uncertainty and ambiguity are built intothe lanes, and multiple iterations occurduring each STX. AARs focus on leaderand unit actions.

Company Commanders PreparationProgram. Starting in 2001, this pro-gram will focus on how to support pre-cision internetted combined arms fight-ing and how to run the IBCT company/troop/battery. The course will consist ofindependent modules that include unit-specific training, leadership develop-ment, training management, staff train-

ing, maintenance and administration.Captains will train via a variety ofmeans: self-paced, distance learning,home station and institutional training,the latter including temporary duty(TDY) trips to proponent schools andmobile training teams coming to FortLewis.

Conclusion. The 21st century opera-tional environment and the IBCT O&Oplace exceptional demands on the lead-ers of this new organization. The IBCTis conducting realistic warfighting train-ing to prepare for its brigade certifica-tion exercise at the Joint ReadinessTraining Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk,Louisiana, and initial operating capa-bility (IOC) in December 2001.

The IBCT’s Leadership DevelopmentProgram will ensure the brigade’s lead-ers are adaptive and decisive enough tomaximize the combat power of theirunique organization


The demands to adapt to changingoperations and technology aregrowing at an almost incompre-

hensible rate. Traditional warfightingproficiency must be combined with ad-ditional skills if our Army is to remainthe world’s premier fighting force. Weneed men and women who can think atthe speed of new technology. Even withtalent, it takes years to develop experttactical thinking. Innovative training isneeded to help people develop their think-ing skills earlier and more thoroughly.

A new training methodology for de-veloping adaptive thinking is helpingemerging leaders get ready. This articleaddresses key questions about the newmethodology.

Why Adaptive Thinking? Increasedcognitive demands for situation assess-ment, decision-making and monitoringoutcomes in unusual situations are pro-jected for “information rich,” complex,fast-paced and ambiguous mission set-tings of the 21st century. Individualsare expected to be more multi-func-tional, i.e., to understand and supportthe roles of other staff members and, insome cases, perform tasks previouslydesignated for only one specially trainedstaff member.

Teams are expected to continuouslymaintain a collective, almost tacit aware-ness and understanding of the “big pic-ture,” including many elements not pre-viously tracked by a battalion or bri-gade staff. Advances in informationtechnology, changing operational mis-sions and redesigned, “flattened” orga-nizations all contribute to the new per-formance requirements. The Armyleadership has defined the general skillunderlying the performance requirementsas adaptive thinking. (See Figure 1 onPage 16.)

The genesis of the training methodol-ogy was at the Army Research Labora-tory-Human Research and EngineeringDirectorate Field Unit at the Depth andSimultaneous Attack Battle Lab, FortSill, Oklahoma, and at Fort Leaven-worth, Kansas. The methodology wassuccessfully demonstrated in 1999 atthe Command and General Staff Col-lege (CGSC) in the Training and Doc-trine Command’s (TRADOC’s) ArmyExperiment 6. (For more informationon AE6, see www.armyexperiment.net.)TRADOC’s methodology continues todevelop and expand as part of the InitialBrigade Combat Team’s (IBCT’s) train-ing and other training development ef-forts.

Training Adaptive Leaders

Are We Ready?by Dr. Karol G. Ross

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The history of the 20th century is filled withexamples of the American soldiers’ bravery andinnovation—ordinary soldiers rising to extraor-dinary stature through uncommon valor and the

ability to adapt to the unexpected. Theadaptability of the American soldieris nothing new, but new challengesin the 21st century cause us to askourselves, “Are we ready?”


The work was carried out at the FieldArtillery School at Fort Sill in 1998 toanswer the question “What kind of tech-nology is most suitable for advancedofficer training in the military school-house setting?” We concluded thatmerely importing advanced battlefieldsimulation technology into the class-room setting wouldn’t support the keyrequirement of advanced learning orthe level of training transfer needed foremerging missions.

Written visions of emerging militaryoperations indicated that the trainingrequired more focus on flexible perfor-mance of tactical thinking in responseto circumstances not anticipated by thelearner. The goal of the project becameto further the systematic and early devel-opment of flexibility during an officer’scareer. To meet that goal, we designed theAdvanced Learning Model at Fort Sill.

Advanced Learning Model. Themodel is based on state-of-the-art aca-demic research in high-level cognitivelearning. It supports development ofhigh-level thinking skills in an area ofexpertise where there can be a lot ofambiguity in the decision-making pro-cess—an accurate description of com-mand and battle staff performance.

The model uses an academic instruc-tional approach called constructivism.The goal of constructivism is for stu-dents to practice constructing their indi-vidual models of complex problem situ-ations while immersed in realistic, chal-lenging situations. The instructionalprocess helps the learner identify andframe (structure) a problem and thenexperience how information can func-tion as a tool to solve that problem.

Instruction must include multiple,complex, problem-solving iterations.Use of a rich context allows the studentto see situations from many perspec-tives and struggle with making sense ofsituations by defining problems and ar-riving at workable solutions. The ap-proach is student-centered and placesthe instructor in a facilitation role.

The advanced learner—the target au-dience for this learning model—alreadyhas a great deal of information and atleast some practical procedural skills.The advanced learner is neither a nov-ice nor an expert.

Advanced learning requires a periodof sustained exploration (guided expe-rience) to move through this stage andon to expertise. There is no shortcut toexpert performance. However, to makethe most of the advanced training timeavailable, more structured experiencesand less direct instruction can move thelearner along more effectively.

Those involved in leader and battlestaff training today may ask, “Aren’twe already training that way?” The an-swer is “Yes” and “No.” We have au-thentic learning situations—CombatTraining Centers (CTCs), the BattleCommand Training Program (BCTP)and simulations in the classroom—butthese are usually “high cost” trainingsituations that aren’t structured to ac-commodate failures and explorationthrough multiple iterations needed atthe advanced level of learning. In ad-vanced institutional training or unit stafftraining, we have small group instruc-tion and students or staff working to-gether, but we’re not coaching problemsolving of the nature needed to rein-force how to think adaptively in theoperational setting.

We employ cases and examples ininstitutional learning, but we still relytoo much on abstracted, disjointed caseswith no method to support active prob-lem solving and exploration. Studentsmust confront realistic tasks, not just bepassively exposed to examples. Whilewe expose trainees to expertise in termsof recent operational lessons learned,the exposure to expert models is sterileor incomplete. It lacks direct linkages toexperts practicing in the field to ex-change views and understand the deci-sion processes that unfolded.

The objective of the adaptive thinkingtraining methodology is different than

traditional battle staff training. It’s pro-cess and execution oriented. It allowsthe students to fight a plan and concen-trate and reflect on their thinking pro-cess as they execute the plan.

Next, the role of the coach or mentorto guide the learning process is key.Coaching must be implemented in ad-dition to the traditional after-action re-view (AAR) process.

Also, the nature of the practice in theiterations is different. Students areplaced in increasingly more demandingsituations, growing out of one generalscenario with the insertion of probes orunexpected events until fundamentalsand thinking skills become second na-ture.

Training must include multiple per-spectives on the same situation and ar-ticulation of principles across perspec-tives and experiences to help learnersweave together what they are experi-encing into an expert’s mindset.

In this learning process, people createa mental space where they feel comfort-able with a problem or concept—anequilibrium point—and as they add newperceptions, dis-equilibrium is created.The struggle to get to a new point ofequilibrium or balance is the process ofthe advanced learner making sense ofnew perceptions during the problem-solving process.

Periods of dis-equilibrium are uncom-fortable but should be welcomed as asign of progress, or at least, one shouldbe able to disregard the uncomfortablefeelings and proceed. They are part ofthe “terrain” leading to new discoveriesand the creation of better vantage pointsfor defining and solving problems. It isonly through sustained experience solv-ing meaningful problems and experi-encing results (success and failure) thatan advanced learner can begin to toler-ate ambiguity and gain the perspectivethat is part of expert performance.

Captains and majors in the Army typi-cally have a wealth of knowledge, butthey can’t always apply it well, espe-cially under pressure. The AdvancedLearning Model is directive in the useof multiple, challenging problem-solv-ing iterations with a specific kind ofcoaching to help bring more of ourknowledge into play at the right time.

One of the greatest challenges for in-structors or leaders using this model isto change their role from a provider ofinformation to coach and, often, fellowlearner. Instructors are encouraged notto introduce concepts through direct

Adaptive thinking is—

• Key to the art rather than the science of war.

• The ability to react to unexpected changes during operations.

• Knowing “how” to think in addition to “what” to think.

• The ability to attain a multi-dimensional conceptualization of battlefieldevents and use this understanding to decide and act.

Figure 1: Characterization of Adaptive Thinking by General John N. Abrams, CommandingGeneral of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia


teaching but to use scaffolding at criti-cal times during problem solving tohelp the learners move forward.

The distinction between scaffolding—a coaching technique—and more tradi-tional after-action feedback is critical tothe Advanced Learning Model. Goodfeedback helps the students generalizethe process they used to solve the prob-lem while the mentor guides the feed-back and offers or even demonstratesother possible solutions.

AAR feedback is instructor-led andmay be a formal briefing of a plan by thestudents. The traditional AAR comesafter executing a plan or as a moreinformal review during the learning pro-cess.

In contrast, during scaffolding, theinstructor or leader observes the learn-ers as they perform the task(s) and inter-venes only when the students reach apoint of no progress. This interventioncan take the form of questions, demon-strations, discussion or instructions. Theinstructor only intervenes to the pointwhere the students can begin makingprogress again.

The process starts with the introduc-tion of a situation or a challenge to thestudents. The students define what theybelieve the problem to be (like missionanalysis). They then form a hypothesisabout how to address the problem. Thispart of the learning process is particu-larly important. Here, the instructorbegins to see what the students “cueinto” in the situation and what theyoverlook. This is the first chance to seewhat kind of good and poor assump-tions the students make. Next, the stu-dents build support for their approachand move into testing their solutions,and the instructor continues to watchfor mistaken assumptions, oversightsor even gaps in basic knowledge ortechniques.

Continual assessment is the responsi-bility of both the learner and the instruc-tor. It permeates the entire process.

Current technology is supportive offull-scale staff and unit exercises, butnot of multiple iterations and carefulscaffolding. Likewise, emerging tech-nology supports typical computer-basedtraining that is easy to deliver and couldaccommodate computer-delivered tu-toring but generally doesn’t supportactive problem solving by one or morelearners.

To fill the technology gap, we begandeveloping a PC-based simulation en-vironment for use by individuals or by

“multi-players.” The battle staff train-ing tool, called Advanced CognitiveUnderstanding of Military Environ-ments (ACUMEN), for battalion andbrigade staff officers is still under de-velopment at Fort Sill’s Battle Lab. Thegoal is to make the training tool a usefulpractice environment with little or nolive instructor involvement, when de-sired. The training tool requires con-stant participation by the user and pro-vides coaching in a natural format, suchas questions from simulated co-workers.

As we came to conclusions about thenature of the training needed and begandeveloping the simulated learning en-vironment, we became aware that theArmy leadership had begun to discuss asimilar viewpoint, called “adaptivethinking.” The 1999 Army Experiment6 demonstration of our Advanced Learn-ing Model—”The Adaptive ThinkingExperiment”—at CSGS in a small groupinstruction context was the result. Thisexperiment gave us more insight intothe potential success of the model in aninstructional environment before wecomplete the PC-based tool.

The Adaptive Thinking TrainingMethodology. The purpose of the adap-tive thinking experiment was to de-velop and test a methodology to teachthe leader and battle staff how to antici-pate and leverage change. While thelearning model contained the ingredi-ents to meet that goal, a learning envi-ronment was needed to support it.

The learning model was designed tomaximize the use of technology to ac-

celerate the development of expertise.The CGSC WarLab, containing an im-mersive classroom, a virtual tacticaloperations center (TOC) and simula-tion support, provided a low-overheadtraining context to test the learningmodel.

The WarLab has been described as a“staff COFT” (conduct-of-fire-trainer)type of environment. Unlike any othercurrent technology, the WarLab wasconstructed to host leader and staff re-action courses using a low-overheaddriver consisting of Eagle/ModSAFsimulations with the ability to tie inArmy battle command system (ABCS)tactical systems. Without the necessityof a full brigade exercise and with onlya handful of overhead staff, the leaderand battle staff can execute the kind ofrealistic challenges needed to supportthe learning model.

The concept of deliberate practiceunder research at the Army ResearchInstitute (ARI) was integrated with ourmodel to produce the adaptive thinkingtraining methodology. Deliberate prac-tice is a mode of training common insports. It involves performing whilefocusing on selected elements of form.The elements are compared against anexpert standard and consciously controlledso they conform to the standard. Thebehavior is repeated until it is performedautomatically with improved form.

Typically, there is a focus on weak-nesses as opposed to strengths. Thefinal performance of the response in acorrect form is vital because it is only

To fill the technology gap, we began developing a PC-based simulation environment thatsupports multiple iterations of student problem solving and scaffolding.


through performance that the behaviorbecomes automatic and can be per-formed without conscious effort. Thestudent’s making a mistake and, later,realizing he made a mistake, for ex-ample, during an AAR discussion,doesn’t go far enough. Deliberate prac-tice requires a repetition where the cor-rect behavior is performed.

As we refined the adaptive thinkingtraining methodology, we also inte-grated a set of principles called themesidentified as characteristics of experttactical thinking, which was drawn fromprevious ARI research. (See Figure 2.)The Advanced Learning Model advo-cates the use of themes to support thedevelopment of a web-like understand-ing of commonalties across experiences.Deliberate practice similarly advocatesthe use of principles to focus practicesessions on specific habits of thought.

The behaviors listed in Figure 2 arefamiliar to most soldiers who have stud-ied the art of battle command. Despitethe familiarity of the ideas, the behav-iors are commonly performed poorly ornot at all in realistic situations, espe-cially in times of stress, fatigue anddistracting demands. The commanderencounters a minefield and doesn’t con-sider the enemy’s purpose in emplacingthe minefield (i.e., Where does the en-emy want me to go?) He changes hisaxis of advance and doesn’t considerhow this will affect adjacent friendlyunits. He reacts to an unexpected en-emy threat and doesn’t assess the affectof his actions on accomplishing themission. He forecasts the actions of theenemy regiment he’s facing withoutconsidering what role that regimentplays in the concept of the enemy divi-sion commander. He visualizes themovements of one of his companiesthrough the attack without assessing theprogressive effects of combat on thecompany’s capabilities.

It’s not enough to understand the con-cepts; the learner must perform withenough repetition that his behaviors be-come habitual. Thinking, itself, nevershould become automatic and effort-less, but the structure of how to think onthe battlefield, once it has become ha-bitual, supports clear and accurate think-ing under conditions of pressure.

The adaptive thinking training meth-odology was designed to develop theskills listed in Figure 3. The methodol-ogy was demonstrated with 11 majorsfrom the Advanced Tactics ElectiveCourse A308 at CGSC in 1999 who com-prised the experimental group. The stu-dents participated in exercises with a teamof highly experienced military expertsacting as mentors.

The first part of the instruction con-centrated on creating a multidimensionalunderstanding of the battlefield using amore traditional instructional approach.The second portion was in the form of acapstone exercise. It centered on intensedeliberate practice of cognitive skills inan environment designed in accordancewith the training model.

Student insight into battlefield situa-tions was supported in both parts of theinstruction by the consistent use of thethemes that represent expert perceptionof battlefield situations and by simula-tions to enact and display developingsituations under discussion. Their per-formance was compared with that ofsimilar students in a control group whodidn’t receive the special training butwho completed the existing brigadeadvanced tactics elective course andparticipated in a traditionally structuredcapstone exercise. The team of mentorswas engaged in both the first and sec-ond parts of the adaptive training ex-periment for the experimental grouponly.

Performance measurement, consistingof a structured method for eliciting writ-ten situation assessments from individu-als about a specific battlefield situation,was conducted before and after the firstpart and before and after the second partof the course. The situation assessmentspresented the same general situation onpaper to each individual student. Eachstudent made a brief, written assess-ment by answering a set of questionsabout the situation.

Then a special situation was intro-duced on paper in which some unex-pected event occurred within the origi-nal situation. The students each gavetheir revised written assessment of thesituation by responding to a set of ques-tions about the information they wouldneed and actions they would take then.The assessment was scored by a team ofsubject matter experts (SMEs) using a10-point scale.

Students who completed the adaptivethinking experiment were found to per-

The expert tactical thinker—

• Models a thinking enemy.• Focuses on mission accomplishment and the higher commander’s intent.• Exhibits visualizations that are dynamic, proactive and flexible.• Shows rich contingency thinking.• Considers where the fight fits into the bigger picture of what is happening

or should happen, both from friendly and enemy perspectives.• Considers all elements/systems available to him and his enemy and their

interactions.• Includes considerations of timing.

Figure 2: Themes Characteristic of Expert Tactical Thinking

Adaptive thinking skills are—

• Domain-specific rather than general critical thinking skills.

• Based on effective learning experiences.

• Based on a concept of automaticity that includes not just procedural tasks,but also cognitive tasks, ensuring performance under stress and freeing the mind to work at higher cognitive levels.

• Based on perceptual attunement (tuning in to the cues an expert would seein a situation), which facilitates the cognitive management of complex andrich information.

• Based on the ability to assess a situation in more depth through access tomultiple perspectives.

• Tolerant of the dis-equilibrium associated with the assessment of complexissues.

• Based on the ability to collaborate with others and “feed” off each other’sideas until reaching a workable solution.

Figure 3: Adaptive Thinking Skills


Dr. Karol G. Ross is a Research Psycholo-gist for the US Army Research Laboratoryand the principal investigator for BattleStaff Training research at the Depth andSimultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory, FortSill, Oklahoma. She also serves as the ArmyResearch Laboratory Team Leader for re-search into technology-supported adaptivebattlefield performance. She previouslyserved as a Senior Research Scientist withRaytheon Systems Company, Inc., and asthe Manager of Integrated Training Devel-opment for BDM International. She earnedher Doctorate in Experimental Psychologyfrom the University of Tennessee.

form significantly better at adaptivetactical thinking. Better performancewas found after the second half of thecourse only—the intense practice por-tion. The first half of the adaptive think-ing experiment course, more traditionalin nature, didn’t produce measurablegains in adaptive thinking.

Where Do We Go From Here? Anynew product—a training method, aninformation system or a weapon sys-tem—must continue to be developedand tested after initial promise is shown.In 2000, the methodology was appliedin a newly developed Medium BrigadeCourse at CGSC under the auspices ofthe TRADOC Army transformation pro-gram. The methodology also was usedin the Senior Leaders Course providedto the Initial Brigade Combat Team at

the WarLab at CGSC in August. Thecoaching techniques are being refinedand documented as an Army transfor-mation product, “Leader’s Guide to theAdaptive Thinking Training Method-ology,” which will be disseminated as atraining circular at the Association ofUnited States Army convention in Oc-tober.

Still, the technology gap exists. TheArmy has no “staff COFT” for brigadestaff training. We’re continuing to de-velop the PC-based simulation softwareto support low-cost adaptive tacticalthinking training. However, the Armystill lacks a low-overhead simulationsolution that’s easy to access and oper-ate and integrates with ABCS tacticalequipment or can be embedded in ABCSfor training. Such a simulation solution

would allow us to fully implement thelearning model for the digitized force.

The rumors moved quickly through the bat-talion. The Army had started a program—First Lieutenant (1LT) to Korea—and the

battalion was sending three lieutenants.“Pick me, pick me,” were not the first words I

uttered. In fact, I could not even visualize going toKorea until my battalion fire direction officer (FDO)explained how the program would be a leadershipchallenge and improve my professional develop-ment. Now that I’m finishing my tour in Korea, I mustagree. My year in Korea has been one of education andchallenges.

Lieutenant Missions. Korea is the only theater that usesbattle books. These books are dynamic as they’re constantlychanging. Lieutenants maintain the books; however, it’s the1LT operations officer’s responsibility to ensure they meet allstandards. It has been stressful working with the battle booksbecause the format of the book—transition to war (TTW), unitbasic load (UBL) and initial battle position (IBP)—haschanged.

Redeveloping the book involved many recons and countlesslate nights and weekends. It required 1LT operations officersto educate themselves on the proper way to develop, analyzeand brief the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO)and give proper guidance to other lieutenants in the battery.It’s one thing to develop and brief a plan for training, but ittakes on an entirely new meaning when that’s the plan you andyour men will go to war with.

Maintenance in 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (6-37 FA)is a unique challenge. The battalion commander’s weeklymaintenance program is intense. It goes far beyond the usualidentifying of faults; it also involves true preventive mainte-nance. Soldiers spend many hours finding potential non-mission capable (NMC) faults. A back order status of a part inKorea could mean a delay of weeks; however, the unit may beonly seconds from “the balloon going up.” Lieutenants quickly

learn to command their platoon’s way of thinkingabout maintenance and be proactive.

Beyond the lieutenant’s daily duties, he partici-pates in corps- to division-level exercises that takehim away from his platoon for weeks at a time.Many of the exercises involve US and Koreanforces and require a wide scope of responsibilities.

The lieutenants are officers-in-charge (OICs) of thebattalion’s augmentees to Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL).

They also brief the North Korean artillery attack andtarget selection to the “general of North Korean People’s

Army” (nKPA) during UFL, as well as gather information andco-formulate the G3’s briefing to the Republic of Korea’s(ROK’s) commander. More often than not, 1LTs in Koreafind themselves with more responsibilities than their counter-parts in other theaters.

Learning Commandership. The First Lieutenant to KoreaProgram prepares 1LTs for command. Every decision ortroop-leading procedure in Korea can have a real-worldimpact and affect the readiness of the Army’s most forward-deployed division.

Personnel changes are almost daily; therefore, a lieutenantmust learn to maintain unit cohesion. Team building is anecessary skill. The hardest leadership challenge is operatingwithin Korea’s training restrictions and under the 2d InfantryDivision’s (ID’s) high operational tempo (OPTEMPO). De-spite these restrictions, 6-37 FA maintains mission readiness.

In the 2d ID, lieutenants develop initiative and creativity andsharpen their leadership skills. The division’s standard is to beprepared to decisively engage the enemy at a moment’snotice. That’s not something we boast about—it’s how welive in 6-37 FA. On the Minute—Deep Strike.

1LT Derrick G. Anthony, FAFormer Operations Officer, A/6-37 FA

2d IN Div Arty, Korea


Recent times have seen a surge inthe number of incidents of Armyleaders failing to live up to the

ideals of our Army values. The actionsof these few soldiers have cast shadowsof discredit on the members of the Armywho strive to live in accordance withthe seven Army values—loyalty, duty,respect, selfless service, honor, integ-rity and personal courage.

In response to many of these inci-dents, senior leaders produced and dis-tributed “values cards” and “values dogtags.” In light of these recent failures,there is little wonder these cards weremet with resistance. Upon receiving the“values dog tags” and being informedthat their wear was mandatory, manysoldiers could be heard making com-ments to the effect of, “I don’t need tobe told how to live my life.”

Since the issuance of the values dogtags and values cards, commanders andsenior NCOs at all levels have instituteda series of mandatory training eventsfor each Army value. These periods ofinstruction are little more than PowerPoint slide shows or, at best, some smallgroup discussions on the meaning ofeach of the Army values. The unit’svalues-based training is generally lim-ited to quarterly require-ments. These classes arenot much more than a“check in the block” asa unit is preparing forits quarterly trainingbrief.

Current classes onArmy values focus onunderstanding the defi-nition of each value andits fixed application inconveniently cut-and-dry scenarios. The situ-ations fail to adequatelytrain and prepare juniorleaders to internalize theArmy’s values system.As a result, junior leaders are ill pre-pared to implement values-based deci-sions in the difficult real-world situa-tions of today’s Army.

Not only have we failed to adequatelyprepare junior leaders for real-worldchallenges, we have unintentionallycreated a zero-defects atmospheresurrounding Army values. The use ofclear-cut scenarios, coupled withmeasuring adherence to the sevenArmy values as a part of the officerevaluation report (OER) and NCOevaluation report (NCOER) sys-tems, is damaging the future of ourorganization. This atmospherestrips away the ability of the jun-ior members of our organizationto reflect, learn and grow from the deci-sions they make—right or wrong. We’vecreated an essence of cover-up and de-nial by “ruining careers” if someonegets a “no” on the front-side of his eval-uation report.

This article discusses some real-worldsituations, how junior leaders mightreact to the ethical dilemma before themand the impact of the Army’s unofficialzero-defects mentality.

In the desert of Kuwait, as a part of anOperation Intrinsic Action rotation, anFA battery is attached to a maneuvertask force (TF). You, the reader, are theall-knowing battery commander. Lieu-tenants and senior NCOs of the battery

encounter a series ofmoral and ethical dilem-mas throughout the de-ployment and approachyou for mentoring andguidance. Subsequentto the event, you reflecton the moral dilemma,which illustrates someof the challenges.

Scenario 1: Loyaltyand Friendship. Pla-toon leader First Lieu-tenant (1LT) Brox isconducting his finalplanning and coordina-tion for a platoon-leveltraining exercise to be

conducted along the southern boundaryof the Udairi Impact Area. This is a veryimportant event for him as it is his finalopportunity to train before executing

Paladin Table12—his platoon’s external evalu-ation (EXEVAL). He has a number oftraining objectives he wants to accom-plish during this field training exercise(FTX).

The US Army Central Command-Ku-wait (ARCENT-K) range control stand-ing operating procedure (SOP) requiresthe officer-in-charge (OIC) conduct adown-range sweep of the impact area toensure it’s clear of any Bedouins, no-mads, camel-herders, etc. The TF SOPstates “all down-range sweeps by theOIC will be accompanied by membersof the task force scout platoon.” 1LTBrox links up with the scout platoonleader, 1LT Rash, who happens to behis good friend.

As the two vehicles crest the hill atObservation Post 8, they stop to ob-serve the impact area and plan a route toconduct a thorough sweep of the area.In the distance, 1LT Brox can identify aherd of camels that clearly will interferewith his training. 1LT Brox knows thecorrect procedure to clear the impactarea is to notify the TF tactical opera-tions center (TOC), which then coordi-nates support with Kuwaiti militarypolice (MP) to escort the Bedouins outof the impact area.

He voices his frustration to 1LT Rashabout the inefficiencies of this processthat historically takes two days to com-plete and how this will have a dramaticeffect on his ability to prepare for theEXEVAL. 1LT Rash comments that

Army Valuesby Captain Patrick D. Quinn III

The Practical Application of


1LT Brox should follow him and watchand learn how scouts “take care of busi-ness.”

As the two vehicles approach the herdof camels and the Bedouins, 1LT Rash’svehicle suddenly accelerates into theherd and clearly attempts to run over anumber of the camels. In a panic, theherd begins to rapidly move away from1LT Rash’s vehicle. 1LT Rash pursuesthem, pushing the herd with his vehiclewhile standing through the cupola ofhis high-mobility multipurpose wheeledvehicle (HMMWV) behind his M2 .50cal machine gun, yelling and screamingat the Bedouins. Once the herd hadsufficiently cleared the training area,1LT Rash returns and comments, “Thetraining area is all clear now. You justhave to know how to treat these people.”

Several days later, after returning fromstaff call, you bring your lieutenantsand senior NCOs together. Apparently,the ARCENT-K Chief of Staff heardabout the incident through the liaisonofficer (LNO) to the Kuwaiti MP unit.Since your TF is the only unit presentlyin country, the Chief of Staff relayed theincident to your TF commander andwants him to follow up on the situation.

After the meeting, 1LT Brox ap-proaches you and recounts the details ofwhat happened along with the fact thathe has been struggling with the situa-tion and was unsure about coming for-ward with the information. He remem-bers discussions with you concerningthe Army values and, in particular, istorn between feelings ofloyalty to his peer and theblatant disrespect for citi-zens of this country. He be-lieves he did the right thingby choosing to support hisfriend and fellow soldierover someone with whomhe shares nothing in com-mon. He justifies this deci-sion by stating that thegreater good in this case isdemonstrating loyalty to hispeers.

As you are talking withhim, you ask him to differ-entiate between loyalty andfriendship, feeling that hemay be confusing the two.1LT Brox defines loyaltyas support for an ideal, or-ganization or individuals inthe performance of a dutybased on a promise made oran oath taken. Friendship is

a feeling of dedication to an individualbased on past, shared experiences.

You ask, “Which, then, is more im-portant for you to support—the valuesof the organization of which you are amember or an individual with whomyou associate on a per-sonal basis?”

1LT Brox agrees orga-nizational values repre-sent the greater good;however he’s still con-cerned that reporting hisfriend will get 1LT Rashinto trouble. He asks if itwould be appropriate toconfront his friend one-on-one and attempt todissuade him from fur-ther instances of this be-havior. Since no lawswere broken and no indi-viduals or property dam-aged, you advise himthat a face-to-face confrontation is agood starting point. The scout platoonleader’s reaction to this confrontationwill help your platoon leader determinehis subsequent actions.

Later that night, you sit down andreflect on the day’s events. One of themost difficult decisions an individualhas to make is to whom he owes hisallegiance or loyalty. It’s difficult todistinguish between loyalty and friend-ship. Moreover, it’s especially challeng-ing to confront or turn-in a close friend,particularly when the confrontation

could lead to disciplinary action. Thetwo ideals are very similar in nature.

You are disappointed with the factthat 1LT Brox tolerated an incident asdisrespectful as this. Respect doesn’tapply just to members of your own unit

or family members youencounter on-post. It’s afundamental belief thatall beings are intrinsi-cally valuable, regard-less of ethical, racial orreligious backgrounds.

Why didn’t 1LT Broxcome forward on hisown? Could he havedone something at thetime to prevent or stopthe incident from occur-ring? He obviously feltthere would be conse-quences if this incidentwere to “get out of thebag,” and he was right.

Scenario 2: Taking a Moral Stand.As anyone who has ever been a batteryexecutive officer (XO) can attest, thereis a great number of duties to fill theday. This deployment is no exceptionfor your XO, 1LT Danrich. In additionto the standard duties normally assignedto an XO, 1LT Danrich serves as thebattery’s purchasing agent. A numberof morale, welfare and recreation(MWR) items are purchased routinelyfrom various local establishments. It’s1LT Danrich’s responsibility to pur-chase, pick-up and deliver these sup-

plies to the unit.Since the beginning of the

deployment, 1LT Danrich hashad a number of challenges inperforming this duty. Timeand time again he has failed toget the correct amount of sup-plies delivered at the appro-priate times. As you are talk-ing with some of your fellowcommanders, you inquire asto their status in this area. Not-ing that none of them is expe-riencing any difficulties, youdecide to have a talk withyoung 1LT Danrich.

Later that evening, you call1LT Danrich in to discuss thesituation with him. You bringyour discussion with the othercommanders to his attention.Then he tells you the rest ofthe story. 1LT Danrich statesthat he has, in fact, met with alot of opposition and resis-Private Murphy’s Law by Mark Baker (Courtesy of Mark Baker, Army Times, 24 April 2000)


tance from members of the local com-munity as well as store owners and civiland military authorities because he hasrefused to “grease theirpalms.” Apparently, itis a common and ac-cepted practice in thisculture to tip various in-dividuals you encoun-ter to gain their favorand encourage them toexpedite services. Fail-ure to compensate theseindividuals adequatelyresults in delays, con-fiscation of property,etc. This is an acceptedpractice in this culture,yet it is clearly not ac-ceptable in our culture.

This new informationbrings to light a perspective of whichyou were not previously aware. Whenyou ask why other companies weren’texperiencing the same level of diffi-culty, 1LT Danrich asserts that every-one else is paying off the Kuwaiti offi-cials.

“You can assume what you want to,Sir, but I’ve seen it happen. If you don’tcough up some MREs [meals, ready toeat], a case of bottled water or at least abox of chem lights, then you’ll encoun-ter problems along the way.”

1LT Danrich is adamant about hold-ing to his position. “All my values train-ing thus far tells me there is no grayarea. Once you start down that road andcompromise your values, you never trulyhave them again.”

Stuck between a rock and hard place,you tell him to remain true to his valuesand continue to do thebest he can. Later thatnight you reflect on thislatest situation. The di-lemma seems easy tosolve—do what’s right,legally and morally. Butwhat about the hardshipthis situation is causingthe unit?

For almost two months,the unit has been doingwithout the proper a-mount of MWR supplies.The challenge lies in 1LTDanrich’s attempt to dowhat is right and the ef-fect it is beginning tohave on the unit’s ability to meet itsmission and maintain a high level ofmorale. Where does one draw the line

when what is moral in one culture is notin another? How much of an impact will1LT Danrich’s moral stand have on the

morale of the soldierswhen they realize thateveryone else in the TFis getting their MWRsupplies?

United States’ compa-nies that conduct busi-ness in a variety of dif-ferent countries havelearned that to be suc-cessful in other culturesthey must adapt and con-form to the expectationsand demands of that so-ciety. For example, foodproducts shipped to Ja-pan often don’t clear cus-toms and rot at the port if

port authorities are not compensated.American companies conducting busi-ness in Saudi Arabiahave learned not to dis-cuss business in thepresence of Saudi fe-males. Although wedon’t support thesepractices in our ownculture, we must recog-nize that they are ac-cepted in other cultures.

Is it illegal or immoralto give away someMREs or a few cases ofwater? Although the no-tion of choosing thegreater good supportsholding true to yourown culture’s moral be-liefs, the hardship you are causing your

own soldiers can’t bereconciled. You decideto have 1LT Danrichgive up some suppliesto get the much-neededMWR supplies.

What impact does thisdecision have on you,and how will it affectyour career, as well asthat of 1LT Danrich?You have never faced asituation like this before.Your values training, aswell as the command cli-mate prevalent acrossevery unit you’ve beenassigned to, tells you

there is no margin for error. If you makea decision, it’d better be the right one.That’s easy to do when the issue is

black-and-white, but what about thegray area?

Scenario 3: Combat Trains Com-mand Post. One of the many dutiesyour battery is tasked to perform is toserve on the TF guard force. Secondplatoon is pulling security at the combattrains command post (CP). This detailconsists of a platoon of your personneland equipment manning various guardposts, entry control points, the quick-reaction force, etc.

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jenry, whileon duty as the sergeant of the guard, isconducting an inspection of the troopbilleting and bivouac area as required inhis guard instructions. During this in-spection, he catches Specialist (SPC)Alatts, one of his off-duty guard forcesoldiers, “socializing” with a femalemember of the combat trains CP. SFCJenry, himself a single soldier, under-stands and empathizes with SPC Alatts’

desires and need for arelationship. However,he is well aware that theTF commander has apolicy explicitly forbid-ding intimate contact ina field or bivouac envi-ronment. This is prima-rily a force protection/health-of-the-force is-sue.

The two soldiers werenot “in the act,” but SFCJenry knows that had henot come across themwhen he did, they mostlikely would have been.He asks himself, “What

harm can it do?” His bottom-line mis-sion is the security of the perimeter—the fact that he caught these soldierswho were off duty and not hindering themission is inconsequential to the pur-pose behind his being there.

SPC Alatts is one of his best troopsand is the stabilizer in his 4th Section.He doesn’t want to get this soldierbusted, and he definitely can’t afford toshut down a section. So he orders hissoldier to return to his bivouac area anddoesn’t log the event on his DA Form1594 Daily Staff Journal or DutyOfficer’s Log.

The next evening before assuming hisshift, SFC Jenry reports to you andstates he wants to correct his duty logfrom the previous evening. When youask the nature of the correction, he tellsyou he feels he made a poor decisionand wishes to correct it. Since coming


Captain Patrick D. Quinn III serves with the1st Battalion, 358th Regiment (TrainingSupport) where he provides direct trainingsupport as an Observer/Controller/Trainerfor the 2d Battalion, 146th Field Artillery,81st Separate Mechanized Brigade (En-hanced), Olympia, Washington. Prior as-signments include serving as Commanderof C Battery and as Assistant OperationsOfficer, both with the 2d Battalion, 82d FieldArtillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood,Texas; Task Force Fire Support Officer(FSO), Assistant Brigade FSO, PlatoonLeader, Fire Direction Officer and Com-pany FSO, all while assigned to the 1stBattalion, 41st Field Artillery in the 24thInfantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart,Georgia. Captain Quinn is a graduate of theFA Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He will complete hisMaster of Arts in Organizational Leader-ship from Chapman University in Californiain December.

off duty, he has been trying to reconcilehis actions from the previous evening.He realizes that his failure to completelyand accurately report an incident cre-ated a situation where two wrongs hadoccurred. His failure to properly per-form his duties could result in a break-down in the trust his subordinates andsuperiors have in him.

Later, you reflect on the situation thattranspired. SFC Jenry is an outstandingNCO. Where did his judgment fail him?It seems SFC Jenry tried to delineatebetween the performance of his dutiesas the sergeant of the guard and thepurpose behind his soldiers being at thecombat trains CP.

Duty is the most sublime of all theArmy values. “Special trust and confi-dence” has been reposed in each of us—a trust to carry out the duties we’reassigned. We must not limit the scopeof our duties to that required by regula-tions or orders. Duty is encapsulated inthe premise of consistently doing whatis right.

Your immediate reaction is disappoint-ment that SFC Jenry would have over-looked this incident. Of all the prob-lems you have encountered thus far,this one seems the most cut and dry.

However, the more you think about it,the greater the respectand admiration you havefor SFC Jenry and hisability to come forwardand correct his wrong-doing. This action is thepinnacle of the term“duty.”

In today’s Army whereethical “stutter steps” areas good as a ceremoni-ous end to a career, SFCJenry’s actions speaklouder than words. No-body would have knownabout this incident if hehad not come forward.Who would you ratherhave working for you, SFC Jenry or anindividual who makes a mistake andtakes no action to correct it? SFC Jenryhas duty deeply instilled in him and theintestinal fortitude to admit to making amistake. Others simply may have theappearance of doing the right thing.

Reflections. How do we conduct ef-fective values training for the wide di-versity of ethical, religious and culturalbackgrounds we have in the US Army?Is there one simple answer to everyethical and moral dilemma we might

face? One may think that to focus onupholding the greater good would besufficient.

What, then, of the situa-tion with 1LT Brox and1LT Rash as compared tothat of 1LT Danrich? Inthe first scenario, thegreater good is obviouslyloyalty to the organizationas well as the recognitionof the dignity and worth ofall people. What is thegreater good in the situa-tion with 1LT Danrich?To remain steadfast to theideal of unbreakable in-tegrity would result in hard-ship on the unit. Which isthe greater good and towhom does your loyaltyflow in this situation?

The application of ethics and moralityis as individual as you and I. There arecertain universal truths that can be ex-tracted from the seven Army values. Inthe end, when the chips are down andwe are confronted with our own “real-world” moral dilemmas, we must baseour actions and decisions on our ownanalysis, individual training and expe-riences. The correctness and “live-abil-

ity” of our decisions willbe reflected as we lookin the mirror the nextmorning.

As in any training ex-ercise, a commandermust strive to make thetraining as realistic aspossible within the con-fines of risk manage-ment. For the purposeof “ease of training” wehave created artificial-ity in our values train-ing. This limits our abil-ity to “train as we fight”in terms of Army values.

As with almost any ar-gument, there are exceptions. There arereal-world moral and ethical dilemmasthat are cut and dry. But mixed in thisreality lies confusion, ambiguity andconflict. The proof to this argument ison the front page of Army Times or anyleading news publication. It seems thatalmost every issue has at least one ar-ticle or commentary on a recent scan-dal, accusation, affair or moral incidentin our organization. These incidents aresystemic across all ranks—not just iso-lated to one corps or another.

As I reflect on the values training, I amstruck by the obviousness of a zero-defects mentality we all seem to pos-

sess. Indeed, this men-tality is reflected in ourOERs and NCOERs.To receive anythingless than the highestratings in the area ofvalues and beliefswould be an uncer-emonious end to anindividual’s career.

The emphasis onzero defects has cre-ated an atmosphere inwhich soldiers feelpressure to cover-upfalters and misgivings.What if, at some pointin the past, the leaders

we’ve read about in Army Times hadbeen allowed to make mistakes, admitthem, learn from them and grow asindividuals and leaders without the fearof ending their careers for making onewrong decision? Would they have“made the Army Times”?

Instead of learning how to deny, avoidand cover up a misjudgment because ofa perceived zero-defects atmosphere,our soldiers should be gaining the op-portunity to learn from their mistakesand take the experience forward. If thatwere to happen, the situation the Armyis facing would change greatly.


ir, we have to go—the en-emy tanks are about to breakthrough the perimeter wire!”

the brigade command sergeant major(CSM) said as he rushed into the tacti-cal operations center (TOC).

Sitting on a camp stool in front of theoperations map and surrounded bymulti-colored bubble charts, the bri-gade commander was motionless, seem-ingly mesmerized by the vertical mapin front of him. Over the radios’ blaringcontact reports, they could hear therumble of tracked vehicles. The situa-tion was rapidly changing; decisionshad to be made.

“Sir, we have to leave now!” TheCSM grabbed the commander by thearm and dragged him from the tent justas the tanks broke through the wire,roaring past feeble attempts with smallarms to stop them. The commanderescaped to fight another day.

This scene is observed repeatedly atthe Combat Training Centers (CTCs)when commanders, transfixed by ac-tions to execute their plans, are unableto adjust to rapidly altering events. Theyhave forgotten the maxim General (Re-tired) Richard E. Cavazos often citesduring the Battle Command TrainingProgram (BCTP), “Remember, in anyplan, the enemy gets a vote.” Com-

manders too often focus on the plan, notthe enemy. They are unable to processthe changes the enemy causes to theplan and figure out what they need to doabout them.

If the quote attributed to Helmut vonMoltke (The Elder) that “No plan sur-vives contact with the enemy”1 is true,then the first side to adapt to the changespresented by the enemy clearly retainsthe initiative. The winner will be theleader who continuously adapts tochanging situations, quickly responds toshifting circumstances and proactivelytakes and keeps the initiative, therebydictating the parameters of the action. Isthe Army developing such leaders?

Today more than ever, the Army needsadaptive leaders. A quick survey of thestate of the Army illustrates the need.The Army has one corps upgrading toForce XXI modernization to becomethe first digital corps. Modernizationupgrades are still being tested in lightunits. Multi-composition units that fullyintegrate National Guard and ArmyReserve soldiers into active commandsare being developed. At the same time,soldiers are deploying to Bosnia andKosovo for peacekeeping operationsand to southwest Asia for conventionaldeterrence. Simultaneously, the Armyis working toward the Chief of Staff’s

vision of total transformation of theforce. This vision moves the Army fromthe heavy tank to a rapid deploymentforce based on the tactically mobiledismounted infantryman.

The possible adversaries also havechanged. The days of linear warfaremight never be seen again on a grandscale. Foreign armies watched Opera-tion Desert Storm in the Gulf and learnedthree important lessons. First, don’t letthe US build up its combat power. Sec-ond, stay close to the civilians and en-sure the media reports any collateraldamage. Finally, create a large numberof American casualties to directly at-tack the American center of gravity—the will of its citizens. US forces canexpect a decentralized, noncontiguous,high-tempo battlefield with asymmet-ric threats. The US Army will need tobe ready for combat immediately upondeployment. The next enemy won’t al-low us time to prepare, as Saddam didin Desert Shield.

Kosovo provides a good illustrationof what can be expected. To counter thepinpoint accuracy of Air Force laserguided munitions, Serbian air defensedidn’t turn on radars. And because theradars did not radiate, the Serbs couldn’tbe located and destroyed as effectively.This kept US aircraft at a higher altitude

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because the air defense threat at lowerlevels was still present. Target acquisi-tion, accuracy and battle damage as-sessment were greatly hindered by fly-ing at higher altitudes to minimize casu-alties. CNN broadcast worldwide anycollateral damage or civilian casualties.This impacted the NATO nation alli-ances’ targeting efforts and world opin-ion. The enemy effectively adapted tothe American way of war.

British military historian Sir MichaelHoward wrote, “I am tempted to saythat whatever doctrine the armed forcesare working on now, they have got itwrong. I am also tempted to declare thatit does not matter….What does matteris their ability to get it right quickly,when the moment arrives.”2

Former Chief of Staff of the Army,General Gordon R. Sullivan says, “Aswe, the leaders, deal with tomorrow,our task is not to try to make perfectplans….Our task is to create organiza-tions that are sufficiently flexible andversatile that they can take our imper-fect plans and make them work in ex-ecution.”3

Several elements influence the devel-opment of the adaptive leader: culturalsurroundings and expectations, charac-ter, education, force modernization andtraining.

Culture. The American way of lifegives US soldiers a great advantageover other societies in preparing adap-tive leaders. The vastness of the area, itsvarying geography and weather and themulticultural demographics all aid increating an open mindedness not foundin many other countries. Americans areraised making choices, having optionsand hearing divergent opinions. FewAmericans stay in the same geographiclocation their entire lives. Travelingaround the country or overseas is thenorm.

Technology is part of almost everyhousehold with the constant innova-tions in computers and telecommunica-tions. We all adapt to Bill Gates’ latestsoftware version. The pace of change,always accelerating, molds Americanslike few other cultures.

Many countries place a great value onbeing homogeneous, being part of thecrowd and not upsetting tradition.Americans celebrate individuality, theentrepreneur and the nonconformist.

This culture develops a creative citi-zen from whose intellect and insightinnovative ideas flow. All of this allowsthe citizen to form an attitude and abil-

ity to make a choice rapidly when givenvariables and to change.

Ironically, many Americans stereo-type the military as closed-minded, tra-dition-bound, rigidly disciplined robotswith no ingenuity. Nothing could befurther from reality.

Character. Edgar F. Puryear’s lateststudy on generalship states, “I haveconcluded that there is a pattern to suc-cessful leadership….The most impor-tant of these qualities is character.”4

Character is the filter through which alldecisions are made. The leader mayhave perfect knowledge of what is go-ing on, what needs to take place, hisresources and how to use them, and thestrengths and weaknesses of his forcesand the enemies, but his character influ-ences his decision of what action totake.

What is character? Puryear says it“…cannot be defined; it must be de-scribed.” His description of charactercomes from decades of studying suc-cessful and unsuccessful leaders. Hedescribes the character pattern of thegreatest leaders as “…a selfless desireto serve; to accept the responsibility fordecision making, which Eisenhowersaid is the essence of leadership; to havethe ‘feel’ or ‘sixth sense’ in decisionmaking…to read widely, to serve undersenior officers who selected andmentored them, the reward meaninglonger hours, greater challenges andgreater sacrifices for themselves andfor their families; to be concerned forand considerate of their people; to real-ize that the ability to delegate deter-mined how far they would go; and whenproblems surface, to fix the problem,not the blame.”5

General Matthew B. Ridgway de-scribed character as “…standing for self-discipline, loyalty, readiness to acceptresponsibility and willingness to sacri-fice when necessary and, in my opin-ion, for faith in God.”6

Values are a major part of character.Values are a few words that describewhat’s important. Values build disci-pline. They represent what we want oursoldiers to be. They describe what ournation expects of its soldiers. Finally,and most importantly, they serve ourArmy’s purpose on the battlefield.7

Values help leaders by consciously orsubconsciously allowing them to do theright thing. With values as the founda-tion, the leader’s character is the prismthrough which all other components ofthe decision-making process are forced

to arrive at the leader’s final conclu-sion.

Education. No other military has theextensive school system or emphasizescivilian education as the US Army does.Each stage of progression of the NCOor officer is developed through theschool network. An added bonus to thestructured curriculum in many coursesis the use of electives, allowing studentsto fill the gaps in what they believe isneeded for their own personal growth.

An additional benefit is the attendanceby other services and countries to Armycourses. This opens the student to di-verse opinions, tactics, techniques andcultures. Many courses offer historyand battle staff rides to historical battlesites.

Learning from the past, especially onthe ground where the action took place,increases the basis from which to drawfuture judgments. The purpose of thehistory instruction is not to try to haveleaders make decisions by recreatingthe circumstances of the past, but toopen perspectives on why decisionswere made by leaders in certain condi-tions.

Self-education is a must for all sol-diers. This includes not only learningthe mechanics of the profession, butalso reading studies of history, biogra-phies and leadership that add to themental “hard-drive” from which a leadercan draw to make a decision.

Force Modernization. The Army isconstantly changing. This is an addi-tional factor in the development of theadaptive leader. Ask the typical divi-sion artillery or brigade commander

No other military has the extensive schoolsystem or emphasizes civilian educationas the US Army does.


how many firing data and fire supportcomputer systems he learned, and he’llprobably tell you Field Artillery digitalanalog computer (FADAC), TI-59, tac-tical fire direction system (TACFIRE),light TACFIRE, the variable-formatmessage entry device (VFMED), bat-tery computer system (BCS), backupcomputer system (BUC), maybe theinitial fire support automated system(IFSAS) and advanced Field Artillerytactical data system (AFATDS). Thelist doesn’t include the many versionsof software for each system. Technol-ogy forces adaptation.

Leveraging technology has increasedthe tempo of operations, speed of ma-neuver, precision of firepower and thepace at which information is processed.8

The adaptive leader learns to be part ofthe new technology, using it to increaseproductivity and understanding, tomonitor and influence and to enhancehis ability to lead.9

Training. Doctrine specified in FM25-100 Training the Force and FM 25-101 Training the Force: Battle FocusedTraining works—if followed. Trainingbegins in knowing the basics and beingtechnically and tactically proficient. Theleader’s soldiers must be skilled in theirjobs. Behavioral studies at the CTCsconcluded that individual job or taskcompetence within an organization wasa primary determinant of group effec-tiveness in the organization. The bettertrained the soldiers, the better the unit.10

Most units base training schedules onCTC train-ups and deployments as wellas real-world contingencies. The CTCsprovide the best training in the world,short of actual combat, to teach a leaderhow to adapt to fast-changing situationsand using rapidly depleting resources.

Possibly the best experience gainedfrom the CTCs for the leader is dealingwith friction. Military philosopher Carlvon Clausewitz’s concept is, “Every-thing in war is very simple, but thesimplest thing is difficult. The difficul-ties accumulate and end by producing akind of friction that is inconceivableunless one has experienced war. Fric-tion is the only concept that more or lesscorresponds to the factors that distin-guish real war from war on paper.”11

Anyone who has experienced the CTCsknows what can go wrong, will gowrong. Experiencing friction, the leaderlearns how to adapt to unknown orunplanned problems.

Why Aren’t We Better? In a culturethat embraces transformation and com-mon core values, is the world leader intechnology and has the most sophisti-cated military school system and train-ing built around the CTCs and after-action reviews, why aren’t leaders bet-ter at adapting to changing situations?There is no single answer. What arebelieved to be strengths may actually betransforming leaders into followers whoare unable to rapidly make a decision.What do we need to change to ensurethe Army has adaptive leadership?

Change Our School System. Our cur-riculum development has little struc-ture geared toward the processes needednow, much less two or more years fromnow. An example is the teaching of DAForm 2404 Equipment Inspection andMaintenance Worksheet and DA Form2408-14 Uncorrected Fault Record inthe primary leadership developmentcourse (PLDC). During PLDC, onlytwo hours are devoted to turning a driverinto the first-line leader who makes thecritical call on the unit status report ofwhether or not his vehicle is “FullyMission Capable.” One of the two hoursis spent teaching outdated forms. Thereis no foresight.

The Command and General Staff Col-lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, gradestactics on whether all the elements ofthe order are present, not the plan itself.The process is graded over the useful-ness of the product.

Commenting on the campaign inKosovo and the challenge to old-schoolmilitary thinking, General WesleyClark, former Supreme Allied Com-mander in Europe (SACEUR), said, “Idon’t think the armed forces in ourcountry should assume, as a matter ofstaff college training, that when you gointo one of these operations you’re go-

ing to be given carte blanche—bombanything you want, get the mission done.It’s not pure war.”12 Are the staff col-leges teaching Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti,Panama, Honduras, East Timor or thelinear warfare of the Fulda Gap?

General Clark commented that one ofthe reasons the armed forces had troublewith Kosovo was “…because we’d beento school on Desert Storm. Desert Stormwas an entirely different battlefield. Itwas a battlefield that was clean. It wasclean of civilians, mostly clean of refu-gees, clean of vegetation. It was prettymuch clean of media, too. You have tobe prepared in the future to fight on acluttered battlefield. Where there arecivilians—friendly and not-so-friendlycivilians—where there’s tough vegeta-tion. Where there’s tough weather.”13

In mid- to high-level Army schools,students need courses on how to beopen to change. This is being taught attop-level business schools and corpora-tions to prepare executives to embracethe idea that change happens, to antici-pate it, monitor it, adapt to it quicklyand be ready to change quickly againand again.14 Most Army schools teachwhat to think, not how to think.

Change Our Philosophy of Technol-ogy Dependence. Armies have soughtdominance through technology sinceDavid and the slingshot. But for everynew technology, there always has beena counter. A Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) study of Opera-tions Just Cause in Panama and DesertStorm in the Gulf found “…that battle-field leadership had to do with every-thing but equipment. Once the ability tocommunicate was established, the spe-cific hardware pieces were far less im-portant than what transpired on andthrough the lines.”15

Military analyst and author Ralph Pe-ters observed, “…we have fallen intothe old American trap of seeking tech-nological solutions to human problems,of so immersing ourselves in questionsof form that we overlook fundamentalissues of functions.”16 This is demon-strated in TOCs everyday when an S2tells the commander his computer saysthey have destroyed “x” number of en-emy vehicles but cannot tell him wherethe enemy strength is.

It’s also demonstrated when the op-erations order (OPORD) emailed to asubordinate unit from the higher head-quarters is never received. New tech-nology seems to reduce the fog of warby allowing better analysis of the en-

The adaptive leader learns to be part of thenew technology, using it to increase produc-tivity and understanding, to monitor and in-fluence and to enhance his ability to lead.


emy force, but it raises the friction ofwar by the failures of the systems. Whohasn’t lost a transaction in the StandardInstallation/Division Personnel System(SIDPERS) III?

Ralph Peters may have said it best:“We will face a dangerous temptation toseek purely technological responses tobehavioral challenges, especially giventhe expense of standing forces….Wemust beware of wonder weapons thatoffer no significant advantage in achanging world….We will fight in cit-ies, and this brutal, casualty-prone, dirtykind of combat will negate many of ourtechnological advantages while it strainsour physical and moral resources.”17

Leaders who focus on the technologicalsolution are slow to change to an asym-metrical challenge.

Change the Way We Train Company/Battery Leaders. Another problem be-coming more prevalent throughout theArmy is the limited training time givento the company or battery commander.Every exercise seems to be part of atleast a battalion exercise, and everyevent is evaluated. There is little timefor the commander to experiment in thefield without being graded.

In 1930, Lieutenant Colonel GeorgeC. Marshall invited German CaptainAdolf von Schell, who had more thanfour years of combat experience onseveral different fronts, to lecture at theInfantry School on small unit leader-ship. Marshall later published his lec-tures as Battle Leadership. Von Schellcommented that, “The more freedomallowed a subordinate leader in his train-ing, the better the result will be. Why?Because he is made responsible for re-sults and allowed to achieve them in hisown way….War is governed by theuncertain and the unknown and the leastknown factor of all is the human ele-ment.”18 The small unit leader must begiven ample time to learn in an environ-ment that doesn’t hinder initiative and

Colonel Bruce A. Brant is the InspectorGeneral of Forces Command (FORSCOM)with its headquarters at Fort McPherson,Georgia. In his previous assignment, heserved as Commander of the 214th FieldArtillery Brigade, III Armored Corps Artil-lery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He alsocommanded the Combined Battlefield Co-ordination Detachment (BCD) in Osan,Korea; 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne FieldArtillery Regiment in the 82d Airborne Divi-sion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and afiring battery in the 41st Field Artillery Bri-gade at V Corps in Germany. Other assign-ments include serving as Senior Fire Sup-port Observer/Controller at the JointReadiness Training Center (JRTC), FortPolk, Louisiana, and S3 of the 25th InfantryDivision (Light) Artillery, Schofield Barracks,Hawaii.

allows him to become wellgrounded in the fundamentals.

Change Home-Station Train-ing to Make it More Imagina-tive. To prepare an adaptivemind, units need to train tochaos. Chaos is what leaderswill find on the battlefield.Home-station training, even theexternal evaluation, is too pre-dictable.

Take two different battery ex-ternal evaluations. In one, themultiple-launch rocket system(MLRS) battery commander iscalled to perform missions atFort Sill. He knows where he’sgoing to live fire and has beenthere many times. He knows where hisresupply is going to be and how to getmeteorological messages—just aboutthe entire event is predictable.

Now, take the airborne battery com-mander and his external evaluation. Go-ing into an off-post drop zone as part ofan infantry task force, his troops andequipment are spread out over a dozenaircraft. Some of his equipment willnever arrive. Several of his troops willbe hurt on the jump. He goes out thedoor of the aircraft, in the middle of thenight, not knowing where he will land,where his howitzers will be, where histroops will be, where the enemy is orwhere his observers are. All he knows isthat he has to find a howitzer, a crew, getcommunications with observers, com-pute data and put rounds down range in30 minutes or less. It’s chaos. Withpractice, he can adapt.

Units can plan exercises to includesome elements of friction, which trainsleaders’ judgment, common sense andresolution. Units can take the predict-ability out of exercises and promotetraining to chaos.

It’s possible to transform individualsso that creative, adaptive behavior isembedded in them. Today’s Army leads

the way in developing the leader who isflexible and adaptable. But outdatedcurriculum in our Army schools, overcentralized and predictable training, afear of failure by subordinates, lack oftime and unpredictable training sched-ules all force leaders to become reactiveinstead of visionaries able to adapt towhatever they encounter. We can dobetter.

The small unit leader must be given ample time to learnin an environment that doesn’t hinder initiative andallows him to become well-grounded in the fundamen-tals.

1. Robert D. Heinh, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis: US NavalInstitute, 1985), 239.2. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope is Not a Method (New York: RandomHouse, 1996), 189.3. Ibid.4. Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., American Generalship (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 2000), 338.5. Ibid., 338-339.6. Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, Eds., Military Leadership—In Pursuit ofExcellence (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Third Edition, 1996), 109.7. Colonel Dandridge M. (Mike) Malone, Small Unit Leadership (Novato, California: PresidioPress, 1983), 82-83. This is still the best book published on common sense battery leadership.8. FM 22-100 Army Leadership (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 1999), 7-11.9. Sullivan, 221.10. Robert F. Holz, Jack H. Hiller and Howard H. McFann, Eds., Determinants of Effective UnitPerformance (Alexandria, Virginia: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and SocialSciences, July 1994), 184.

11. Carl von Clausewitz (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Eds.), On War (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984), 119.12. Vince Crawley, “Clark Defends Decisions Made in Kosovo Air War,” Army Times, 26 June2000, 28.13. Ibid.14. Spencer Johnson, Who Moved My Cheese? An Amazing Way to Deal with Change in YourWork and in Your Life (New York: Putnam, 1998).15. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-100-1 Leadership and Com-mand on the Battlefield—Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm (Fort Monroe, Virginia:TRADOC, 1992), viii.16. Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Future (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books,1999), 20.17. Ibid., 14.18. Captain Adolf von Schell, Battle Leadership (Fort Benning, Georgia: The Benning Herald,1933; reprinted by the Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Virginia, 1982), 17-19.

Endnotes:


within the framework of automated C2.Specifically, there has been virtually nodiscussion regarding how to supple-ment the military decision-making pro-cess (MDMP) with other decision-mak-ing tools that will allow us to take ad-vantage of the opportunities that domi-nant battlespace knowledge provides.

This article examines how the MDMPfits within an automated C2 environ-ment, and it introduces one such supple-mental decision-making technique—theRecognition Primed Decision Model—that, if used, will help to maximize thepotential of improved situational aware-ness.

The Nature of the MDMP. The Ar-my’s MDMP is one of a group of deci-sion-making models referred to as “ana-lytical” or “rational choice” models. Ana-lytical models use a series of stages tomove from identification of the prob-lem to the implementation of the best

Since the inception of the Army’sForce XXI modernization pro-gram, the pages of professional

military journals have been full of ar-ticles predicting how information ageweapons and command and control (C2)systems will change the nature of war-fare. “The debate surrounding auto-mated C2 systems and their impact onbattle command has been particularlyintense, with many articles making pre-dictions about how advanced informa-tion technologies will lead toward domi-nant battlespace knowledge.”1

Automated C2 advocates assert thatemerging technologies and the result-ing information dominance will vastlyreduce, if not eliminate, the friction andfog of war, providing the commanderand his subordinates with nearly per-fect situational awareness. Thus, theproponents of automated C2 believe thatemerging technology will “enable com-manders to see and understand the en-tire battlefield, and as a result, win thewar.”2

Whether or not these predictions willcome true is certainly debatable. A num-ber of commentaries on informationage control systems present rational ar-guments against automated C2. Most ofthe articles critical of the concept con-tend that information age technology,although rapidly improving, will re-quire many more years of developmentand experimentation before computerscan meet all the conditions necessary tocontrol modern forces on the battle-field.

Another frequently articulated posi-tion is that automated C2 systems un-

doubtedly will reduce uncertainty onthe battlefield, but they will fall shortof achieving nearly perfect situationalawareness. This group of authors ar-gues that regardless of whether or notwe use automated or manual systems,intuitive skills always will be calledupon to bridge the gap between theinformation provided by the C2 sys-tems and the information required by acommander to make decisions.3 Hence,there’s a perfectly rational argumentthat war planning will continue to relyon the use of assumptions to fill gaps ininformation that is required but un-available.4

Nonetheless, the results of a numberof digitized C2 experiments, such as theadvanced warfighting experiments(AWEs) and Army Experiment 5, havedemonstrated the potential for somesort of automated C2 system. The Armyalmost certainly will rely on computersand digital communications systems toprovide automated C2 of forces in com-bat at some point in the future. We mayfind the situational awareness they pro-vide falls short of perfection in terms oftimeliness, accuracy and completeness,but the likelihood is that, eventually,computers will give commanders anunprecedented ability to see the en-emy, the terrain and themselves.

Ironically, the debates regarding theimpact of automation on C2 have largelyneglected to discuss how to maximizethe opportunities that an improved situ-ational awareness may provide. In par-ticular, the proponents of automated C2

fail to analyze how our current meth-ods of tactical decision making will fit

Moving Beyond the MDMPby Major John D. Hall

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possible solution. Seven steps are usedin the MDMP: receipt of mission, mis-sion analysis, course of action (COA)development, COA analysis, COA com-parison, COA approval and, finally,orders production.

One of the advantages to using ana-lytical models like the MDMP is thatwhen used properly, they result in theselection of the optimum COA. Thethoroughness of analytical models alsomeans that commanders and their staffsare less likely to overlook importantinformation as they approach the mis-sion at hand.

Like other analytical models, theMDMP is exceptionally versatile in thatit’s useful in a variety of situations acrossthe entire spectrum of operations. TheMDMP is also an extremely valuabletool for helping inexperienced com-manders and staffs determine what theyknow and what they don’t know regard-

ing the situation.5 Perhaps most impor-tantly, the correct use of the MDMPusually results in a well-integrated, co-ordinated and synchronized plan ar-ticulated via a detailed operations or-der.

Yet, this excellent model for makingdecisions also has significant disadvan-tages that make it less suitable for deci-sion making in the information age. FM101-5 Staff Organization and Opera-tions readily acknowledges that thegreatest weakness of the MDMP is thatit’s time-consuming.6 Like other ratio-nal decision-making models, the MDMPcan sometimes lead to hyperrationalityor the attempt to apply deductive andquantitative reasoning to situationswhere they don’t apply. The most sig-nificant shortcoming of the MDMP,however, is that the circumstances ofactual combat often prevent command-ers and staffs from formally analyzing a

situation, especially at echelons of bri-gade and below where there are noformal planning staffs available.

An analysis of Combat Training Cen-ter (CTC) rotations illustrates this point.As training units receive new missions,the commanders and staffs use theMDMP in the standard or time-con-strained form as the means of develop-ing their plans. However, once theymove from the planning to the execu-tion phase of the operation, command-ers cannot afford to take the time to usethe MDMP as a means of analyzing thecurrent situation and determining howto best continue the operation. Instead,they rely on their previous experienceand intuition as a means of accomplish-ing the mission.

If the MDMP is less suitable as amodel for execution phase decisionmaking under the current C2 system,then it most definitely will be unsuit-able in an automated C2 situation whererapid decision making is crucial to tak-ing advantage of the greater situationalawareness that computers will provide.While the Army has a great planningsystem in the MDMP, it desperatelyneeds a model for decision making inthe execution phase of operations. Thisis particularly true at the lower echelonsof command, where staffs are less ro-bust, commanders are closer to the fightand the time available and the con-stantly changing situations make ana-lytical decision-making systems inap-propriate.

Fortunately, the Army has sponsoredresearch in this area. The research firmof Klein Associates examined how mili-tary commanders make decisions usingreal-time information in high-pressure,high-stakes, rapidly changing and dan-gerous environments. During a 15-yearperiod, Dr. Klein and his staff con-ducted studies in what he refers to as“naturalistic” environments, analyzingArmy and Navy commanders, fighterpilots, paramedics, fire chiefs and otherprofessionals required to make split-second decisions. The result of thesestudies was the development of a deci-sion-making model Klein calls the “Rec-ognition Primed Decision Model.”7

The Recognition Primed DecisionModel. The advantage of Klein’s modelis that it captures how commanders usetheir previous experiences to help visu-alize an existing situation and then usetheir intuition and visualization skills tochoose an acceptable COA. Klein dis-covered that commanders often recog-


nized a given situation as similar to aprevious experience. These command-ers immediately understood what washappening and were able to devise asuitable COA without comparing mul-tiple options.

Remarkably, Klein found that thesedeliberations often took less than oneminute. He also discovered that on thefew occasions when commanders didexamine multiple options, they nevercompared them against one anotherbased on some sort of rational criteria.Instead, they thought of one option at atime, visualized its execution in theirminds and then either accepted it orrejected it as unsuitable.

If the option was unsuitable, the com-manders examined another option andrepeated the process in their minds untilthey found an acceptable solution.Hence, most successful commanders

tended to evaluate each solution on itsown merits rather than against an alter-native solution.8 The figure shows howKlein’s Recognition Primed DecisionModel can be applied to a purely mili-tary environment.9

Under the guidelines of recognitionprimed decision making, the focus is onthe way commanders assess a givensituation to determine how familiar it israther than on comparing options. Like-wise, COAs are evaluated by the com-manders’ visualizing their executionrather than by formally analyzing orcomparing them. By imagining how theCOA will be executed, commanderscan spot weaknesses in the solution anddevelop ways to work around thoseweaknesses. This often makes the origi-nal COA even better.

Klein also found that commandersusually look for the first workable solu-

tion they can find, not the best option.Most importantly, the RecognitionPrimed Decision Model places the em-phasis on being poised to act in a time-critical situation rather than on waitingfor multiple COAs to be analyzed be-fore taking action.10 Thus, by takingadvantage of the intuition gained fromprevious experiences and the power ofbattlefield visualization, commanderscan make reliable decisions faster thanthey can under the MDMP.

Most experienced leaders have cometo realize this over the years and, intime-critical situations and high-pitchedbattles, have relied on their intuitionand visualization skills to solve com-plex problems quickly. The trouble isthat until Klein developed the Recogni-tion Primed Decision Model, it wasdifficult to articulate just how com-manders were arriving at their deci-sions. In other words, commanders knewthey were making decisions, but theyweren’t sure how they were makingthem.

It took almost 15 years of constantresearch before Klein was able to syn-thesize naturalistic decision making intohis model. The key to decision makingin modern and future battlefield envi-ronments isn’t whether to use the MDMPor the Recognition Primed DecisionModel but recognizing if one model ismore appropriate for a given situationthan another and determining when totransition from one model to the next.The Recognition Primed DecisionModel shows how the power of intu-ition and visualization can help in situ-ations where the MDMP is inappropri-ate.

Intuition as a Combat Multiplier. In-tuition is the process of recognizing asituation without realizing how we doit. Most people tend to think of intuitionas an inborn trait—one that some haveand others don’t. Surprisingly, evidenceindicates that rather than being instinc-tive, intuition grows out of previousexperiences.11 People compile their ex-periences over time to form a sort ofmental database, which in turn allowsthem to examine a situation and deter-mine how it relates to previous events.

A broad base of experience providesthe commander a series of consciousand subconscious patterns regarding themission, the enemy and his own unit’sabilities. Based on these patterns, thecommander formulates clear expectan-cies, and these expectancies drive howhe should react in a given situation.

Experience the situation ina rapidly changing context.

No

Determine whether or not the situation is typical.

Compare the situation toprevious experiences, using—

ExpectedEvents

Mission

RelevantCues

PreviouslyAcceptableSolutions

Evaluate the proposed COA(battlefield visualization).

Modify the COA. Will theCOA work?

Implement the COA.

Yes, but...

Yes

Recognition Primed Decision Model. One alternative for the leader to determine his course of action (COA) during mission execution is to apply this model.

Develop anotherCOA.


When the recognized patterns matchprevious experiences, intuition enablesthe commander to use tactics that havebeen previously successful. When thepatterns don’t match previous experi-ences, intuition gives him the feelingthat something is “not quite right” andleads him to approach the situation us-ing an alternative COA.12

Besides providing facts from memory,experience affects the way command-ers see the situation. Many times, expe-rienced decision makers find themselvesreacting to things that are not happen-ing rather than to things that are. Anexpected pattern doesn’t emerge, andthis causes the commander to reevalu-ate the current situation.

When the intuitive commander sensesa situation as atypical, he tends to pausementally, gather additional informationand try to get a better sense of what isoccurring on the battlefield. Further-more, he’s often unaware of his use ofintuition because he’s not drawing onmemories of specific events but rather alarge set of similar incidences that haveall blended together.”13

Key to decision making in time-criti-cal situations, the process of recogniz-ing patterns and whether or not they aretypical happens so fast that most of usaren’t aware of it. This means that awell-trained commander instantly canrecognize when a new COA is requiredand how much time he has to develop it.

This doesn’t mean that intuition isinfallible, however. Sometimes a com-mander’s intuition will mislead him,causing him to make an incorrect deci-sion. Nevertheless, even these failureshave merit as they are added to the pool ofother experiences and should cause thecommander to choose a different solutionthe next time a similar situation appears.

Fortunately, the Army can train sol-diers to develop that part of intuitionthat involves pattern matching and therecognition of familiar and typical cases.Expanding the base of experiencethrough the use of exercises and com-puter simulations allows current andfuture commanders to develop the abil-ity to size-up situations quickly andaccurately.

The CTCs, for example, are excellentways of gaining such experience. Theseexercises, like other good simulations,let the training unit stop the action,examine the events that occurred andcram many situations together, helpingthe commanders develop a sense oftypicality.14

In the Marine Corps, Lieutenant Gen-eral Paul Van Riper has guided organi-zations, such as the Marine Corps Com-bat Development Command (MCCDC)at Quantico, Virginia, to support intui-tive decision making. The Marines havedeveloped a number of exercises toimprove rapid pattern-matching abili-ties. Analysis of the results of theseexercises indicates the emphasis on pat-tern matching seemed more useful thanformal analysis of alternate options.”15

The Power of Battlefield Visualiza-tion. Battlefield visualization, or whatKlein refers to as “mental simulation,”forms the other key component of rec-ognition primed decision making. Ef-fective battlefield visualization is muchmore than accurate situational aware-ness. It’s the ability to imagine people,equipment and events consciously andthrough a series of imaginary transi-tions and intermediate steps to deter-mine how to arrive at a desired endstate. Once the commander has deter-mined how the situation is similar ordifferent from those he has seen in thepast, he develops a COA to solve theproblem at hand.

A study conducted on behalf of theArmy Research Institute (ARI) foundthat typical mental simulations work tosatisfy three screening criteria. First,the proposed solution must make sensetactically. Second, it must result in suc-cessful mission accomplishment, andthird, it must be complete enough tomove from the current state to the endstate. When a proposed solution meetsthese criteria, then the commander, inhis mind, visualizes the execution of theCOA, step by step, constantly on thelook out for potential shortcomings.16 Ifhe can’t find any shortcomings in thesolution, then the process ends and hedirects the implementation of the solu-tion. If he identifies problems as he isvisualizing its execution, the com-mander can modify the COA to workaround the shortcomings, or he can re-ject the COA outright and devise analternative solution.

Battlefield visualization serves sev-eral functions in decision making. Itallows the leader to preview events asthey might unfold in a future situationand examine a COA in his mind, search-ing for pitfalls to determine whether ornot he should adopt it or look for analternative. Visualizing the battlefieldalso allows us to make sense of the differ-ent, often conflicting queues on the battle-field and explain what is occurring.

Effective battlefield visualization takesa lot of effort. It moves beyond simplylooking at a situation and understand-ing what is happening. It’s a processthat examines the information availableregarding the current situation and at-tempts to deduce why things are hap-pening the way they are and determinehow to move from the current situationto achieve the desired end state.

In reality, battlefield visualization iswhat provides commanders true situ-ational awareness. Without it, the Armywill never realize the potential of itsdevelopmental automated C2 systems.True situational awareness occurs onlywhen a commander has combined hisintuitive skills with the results of hisvisualization.

Disadvantages of the Model. As goodas the model sounds, it isn’t withoutdisadvantages. One of the most impor-tant detractors is it’s a highly individu-alistic process. The Recognition PrimedDecision Model centers on the person-ality and experience of the commander,and therefore, it’s a poor model for de-veloping staffs or trying to build teams.It doesn’t take direct advantage of theexperience of a staff as well as theMDMP does because only the com-mander conducts the mental simula-tion. While the staff isn’t precludedfrom doing a concurrent analysis, clearlyit’s more difficult to get the results ofthat analysis to the commander beforehe makes his decision.

Another disadvantage of the Recogni-tion Primed Decision Model is its de-pendence on the experience of the deci-sion maker. While commanders are typi-cally the most experienced members ofthe organization, the experience theyhave may not be sufficient for the situ-ation at hand.

The Army learned this lesson in theearly 1990s when we sent soldiers whohad trained for years to fight high-in-tensity combat into peacekeeping op-erations in Somalia and Haiti. While thecommanders were certainly highly ex-perienced when it came to warfighting,they didn’t have enough experience instability and support operations for theRecognition Primed Decision Model tobe a suitable decision-making tool.

A third disadvantage is that althoughrecognition primed decision makingoccurs naturally, it’s often difficult forindividuals to articulate how they aremaking their decisions. In fact, it’s ex-actly this phenomenon that defines whatintuition is. This same characteristic


Major John D. Hall is the G3 Planner for the1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Ger-many. He researched automated commandand control to write the monograph “FromHorses to Trucks: Implications for ForceXXI” while at the Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.His article “From Horses to Tractors—Im-plications for Army XXI” (November-December 1999) was an excerpt from thatmonograph. His previous assignments in-clude serving as Deputy Operations Officer,Operations Group A, for the Battle Com-mand Training Program, Fort Leavenworth;Commander of B Battery, 6th Battalion,32d Field Artillery, 212th Field Artillery Bri-gade, part of III Corps Artillery at Fort Sill,Oklahoma; and Battalion Fire DirectionOfficer for 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery inthe 3d Armored Division in the Persian Gulfduring Operations Desert Shield and Storm.Major Hall holds a Master of Military Artsand Science from the School of AdvancedMilitary Studies at Fort Leavenworth.

Endnotes:1. David Alberts, “The Future of Command and Control with DBK,” Dominant BattlespaceKnowledge, Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libiki, eds. (Washington, DC: National DefenseUniversity Press, 1995), 80.2. Arnold Beichman, “Revolution in the Warfare Trenches,” Washington Times (31 January1996), 17.3. John E. Miller and Kurt C. Reitlinger, “Force XXI Battle Command,” Military Review (Vol. 75,No. 4, July-August 1995), 9.4. Huba Wass de Czege and Jacob Biever, “Optimizing Future Battle Command Technolo-gies,” Military Review (Vol. 78, No. 2, March-April 1998), 15.5. Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT University Press, 1998), 29.

6. Field Manual 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: UnitedStates Army Combined Arms Center, 1997), 5-1.7. Klein, 19-20.8. Ibid.9. Ibid., 25.10. Ibid., 30.11. Ibid., 33.12. Ibid., 35.13. Ibid., 34.14. Ibid., 43.15. Ibid., 44.16. Ibid., 58.

also makes it difficult to develop pro-grams that foster the development ofintuitive decision-making skills. Thedifficulty in trying to improve some-one’s ability to do something he doesn’teven realize he’s doing is, obviously, asignificant challenge to overcome.

Choosing the Right Model. Never-theless, the results of studies conductedto date indicate that recognition primeddecision making is a viable alternativeto analytical models, such as the MDMP.This doesn’t mean the model should bea replacement for the MDMP. The keyto decision making in the informationage will be knowing when one mustcompare available options and whenone must forsake comparison in theinterests of time. The MDMP and otherrational choice models are most suit-able when there’s enough time avail-able to compare multiple options, thedecision maker lacks the experienceneeded to make an intuitive decision orwhen there is a need (real or perceived)to justify the decision.

Likewise, there are situations whererecognition primed decision making ismore appropriate. The RecognitionPrimed Decision Model is an excellentmethod to use when time doesn’t makethe comparison of multiple options prac-tical. Also, when the commander has ahigh degree of experience with the cur-rent situation, using the RecognitionPrimed Decision Model can save con-siderable time: the commander alreadyknows how he wants to tackle the prob-lem at hand, so the staff doesn’t wasteprecious time developing alternativeCOAs.

Finally, when the tactical situation ishighly dynamic, the reduced decisiontimeline associated with the Recogni-tion Primed Decision Model allowscommanders to use time to their advan-tage. This is often referred to as “gettinginside the enemy’s decision cycle.”

The real question commanders of thefuture will have to ask is when to switchfrom one decision-making method to

another, and how to ensure the staffknows when the shift will occur. Itcould be when the unit crosses the lineof departure. It could be when the en-emy commander begins his attack, or itcould be after the unit receives a mis-sion that must be executed quickly. Thedecision is up to the commander. Re-gardless, it will be critical that his staffunderstands the circumstances underwhich the commander prefers to useone model over another if the staff is towork most effectively within his de-sired framework.

Conclusion. Klein’s testing of hisRecognition Primed Decision Modeland subsequent testing by outside agen-cies have supported virtually all ofKlein’s theories. Nevertheless, theArmy has been reluctant to adopt rec-ognition primed decision making as analternative to traditional models. Per-haps this is because of the disadvan-tages noted or because of the greaterpreference for the MDMP throughoutthe Army. Regardless, we should ac-cept the fact that the Recognition PrimedDecision Model is a natural method ofmaking decisions and begin taking stepsto develop these already existing, butinstitutionally suppressed capabilitiesin our leaders.

Just how to develop benign talents ofintuitive decision making within theleadership is a greater problem to over-come, and therefore, additional researchis required to determine the right meth-ods of teaching this model. Some re-searchers have suggested using com-puter simulations to help accomplishthis task. Other services, such as theMarine Corps, are experimenting withsituational exercises. Regardless of themethods we choose, the Army will gainconsiderably once we find a way toharness the intuitive decision-makingpower that resides within its leader-ship.

The Army also should begin to inte-grate recognition primed decision mak-ing into its doctrinal manuals. At this

early stage, it may only be mentioned asan acceptable option for commandersto choose from, the means by which itworks and the situations where it’s ap-propriate to use. As the techniques andprocedures for training leaders to usethe model are developed, the discus-sions in manuals can be expanded toprovide more information about themodel and maximizing its use.

Another option available is to developtraining scenarios that support recogni-tion primed decision making, and inte-grate them into existing CTC exercises.The greatest advantage to be gainedfrom this approach is that commanderswill learn when to switch from onemodel to another.

By knowing when to switch from ana-lytical systems to intuitive systems,Army leaders rapidly can adapt to thedynamic situations we expect to en-counter in 21st century military opera-tions.


First Sergeant (1SG) Clement wasborn to be a soldier. Clement is aweathered, no-nonsense, field

soldier, capable leader and 15-monthveteran of Bosnia—one of the first USsoldiers to land in Tuzla in 1995 withthe 1st Armored Division.

For the second time in an 18-year ca-reer, Clement has been assigned to “gar-rison” duty—this time as the seniorenlisted leader of C Battery, 1st Battal-ion, 22d Field Artillery, a basic combattraining (BCT) unit at the FA TrainingCenter (FATC), Fort Sill, Oklahoma.Clement has had to get used to morepaperwork and less direct contact withsoldiers, staying out of the way of thebattery drill sergeants. Crusty 1SGClement also has had to work on polishand poise to be in the spotlight as aunique 1SG—the first female 1SG inthe FATC. She is up to the challenge.

Although Jeannette (Jenny) M. L.Clement is not the first female firstsergeant of an FA unit—that distinctionbelongs to First Sergeant MichelleHartness of Headquarters and Head-quarters Battery (HHB), 101st AirborneDivision (Air Assault) Artillery of FortCampbell, Kentucky—she’s the first inthe FATC and second in the FA. 1SGClement reported to the FATC in June1999, the same month gender-integratedtraining (GIT) started at Fort Sill.

Ironically, June 1999 was not the firsttime Clement had been inside her of-fice. She’s married to retired MasterSergeant Michael Clement, SpecialForces, who in the late 1980s, was adrill sergeant in C Battery. Jenny re-turned to the same unit and building whereher husband had been assigned more thana decade earlier. In addition to the usual14-hour training days, six days a week,1SG Clement is a wife and mother of twosons, Carl, age 7, and Neil, age 5.

Born at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, as thedaughter of an Army aviator, JennyClement had the Army in her bloodfrom the beginning. She enlisted in 1981as a Military Occupational Specialty(MOS) 93F FA Meteorological Crew-member and, after advanced individual

training (AIT) at Fort Sill, was assignedto the 7th Infantry Division (Light) atFort Ord, California. She subsequentlyhas been assigned to various positionsfrom the section to the division artillerylevels in the 101st Airborne Divisionand in Germany. She also served a tourwith the US Army Exhibit Team, whichis a team that travels around the countryto high schools in 18-wheelers to helpArmy recruiters. Her previous assign-ment was as a platoon sergeant in HHBand NCO-in-charge (NCOIC) of the S2shop, both in the 101st Division Artilleryduring her third tour at Fort Campbell.

Jenny spent 15 months in Bosnia dur-ing Operation Joint Endeavor. Shelanded in Tuzla on the first planeload of1st Armored Division personnel to formTask Force Eagle in December 1995.While deployed, she served as a meteo-rological section leader and a memberof the division’s fire coordination ele-ment (FCE).

After spending most of her career intactical units, Clement has had to adjustto life at the FATC. She has had to learnto work through the drill sergeants, hav-ing never been one herself. In BCTunits, the drill sergeants conduct virtu-ally all the training and the cadre servesin supervisory and administrative roles.This, perhaps, has been the toughestpart of the transition as 1SG Clementhas always been a hands-on leader.

While the typical Army duty day islong by civilian standards, for BCTcadre, it’s even longer—starting at 0430and ending between 1800 and 1900hours, Monday through Saturday, withchecks of the battery’s areas on Sun-days. 1SG Clement’s day is no excep-tion. (The drill sergeant’s day startsbefore the soldiers get up at 0430 andgoes until lights out at 2130.) Cadre anddrill sergeants continue at this pace fornine-week stretches until they receive acycle break between classes.

Monday through Saturday, physicaltraining (PT) starts at 0500 and lasts anhour. Six days a week, 1SG Clementparticipates in PT with the soldiers. Herrole is to ensure exercises are being

done correctly, running formation in-tegrity is maintained and stragglers aresupervised. With typically four differ-ent fitness ability groups in a BCT bat-tery running each morning, this task isnot as easy as it might sound, especiallywith the widely varying degrees ofmotivation of the soldiers.

For 1SG Clement, PT is an importantpart of the day. It’s an excellent way toevaluate soldiers and a chance to leadby example. For soldiers who aren’tused to running or doing push-ups, see-ing a 37-year-old woman leading fromthe front can be inspiring. This can paydouble dividends—motivating malesoldiers who don’t want to be outdoneand female soldiers who don’t knowwhat their true abilities are yet.

A BCT first sergeant’s level of in-volvement with the soldiers during thetraining day depends on the type andphase of training. The nine weeks ofBCT have three phases. The first phase,called “Patriot,” introduces soldiers tothe Army and Army values in the class-room. “Gunfighter,” the second phase,focuses on basic rifle marksmanship,other weapons and selected commonskills. The final “Warrior” phase tests thesoldiers by having them apply their newlyacquired skills in a field environment.

During classroom presentations forthe trainees, 1SG Clement focuses onadministrative duties. A battery can haveup to 256 trainees at one time, so theamount of paperwork can be consider-able, especially when the trainees turn-over 100 percent every nine weeks.

At week four, the battery transitions tothe Gunfighter phase and the first ser-geant’s involvement increases dramati-cally. She, the battery commander andexecutive officer supervise all live-firetraining. Soldiers receive 14 periods ofinstruction on basic rifle marksmanshipat the various ranges throughout FortSill. They also receive training on handgrenades, rifle bayonet, hand-to-handcombat and fighting with pugil sticks aspart of the Gunfighter phase. 1SG Clem-ent oversees her soldiers at the Confi-dence Obstacle Course, the CombatConditioning Course and the NBC/maskconfidence chamber—courses that chal-lenge a variety of soldier skills, to in-clude physical fitness, teamwork andpersonal courage. At this point in thetraining, BCT soldiers are beginning tobond and the results of their efforts as ateam are visible.

The final Warrior phase of BCT cul-minates in week eight with a 72-hour

by Major Richard J. Anderson


field training exercise (FTX). Dur-ing the FTX, the soldiers apply alltheir BCT training in a demandingtactical environment. The FTX is thecadre’s chance to be innovative—togo the extra mile to ensure soldiersreceive realistic, stressful, but risk-managed training.

One high point of 1SG Clement’stour to date was when C Battery hostedSecretary of the Army Louis Calderafor a visit in March. Secretary Calderasaw soldiers conducting lane train-ing during an FTX, the battery’s tac-tical operations center (TOC), con-struction of the battery defense andan ambush. While the Secretary re-ceived some information from the bat-tery cadre during the training, the ma-jority of his time was spent being briefedby trainees. This is indicative of 1SGClement’s adventurous spirit—her risk-taking—letting the most inexperiencedsoldiers not only meet the Army’s topofficial, but also be his primary briefers.

After their FTX, the soldiers preparefor their final inspection and gradua-tion. The graduation ceremony is nosmall event in the life of the battery.Invariably, hundreds of relatives cometo visit their soldiers, and graduation is

as much a chance for the battery todisplay the professionalism of the Armyas it is to signify the completion of BCT.After graduation, the 1SG’s adminis-trative load remains high because, inless than two days, all graduates areshipped to their AIT units and hold-overs are processed for recycling orremedial physical fitness training.

Once the soldiers are shipped out, thepace slows for two weeks in a cyclebreak. During that time, the battery con-ducts mandatory training and rehearsesfor the upcoming cycle, and perhaps

Major Richard J. Anderson, until recently,was the Executive Officer of 1st Battalion,22d Field Artillery, part of the Field ArtilleryTraining Center (FATC), Fort Sill, Oklahoma.Currently, he’s the FATC S3. His previousassignments include Foreign Area Officerduties as the Security Assistance Officer inEstonia, Cooperative Threat Reduction inthe Ukraine and Military-to-Military Assis-tance in Belarus. He also has served as aFiring Battery Commander, Battalion FireSupport Officer (FSO) and S1 in the 7thInfantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, Califor-nia, and a Firing Battery Executive Officerand Company FSO with the 1st ArmoredDivision in Germany. He is a graduate of theGeorge C. Marshall Center’s Institute forEurasian Studies and holds a Master ofMilitary Science and Operational Art fromthe Air University, Montgomery, Alabama,and a Master of International Affairs andRussian Studies from Columbia Universityin New York.

most importantly, the cadre takesleave or resumes an eight- to 10-hourworkday. With the arrival of newtrainees, the challenge of turning ci-vilians into soldiers starts again.

1SG Clement realizes the impor-tance of the trainees’ first weeks ofexposure to the Army and the long-term effects on the future of the fight-ing force. She thinks it’s important tohave women in leadership positions inthe initial entry training (IET) envi-ronment. “Having women drill ser-geants and even cadre membershigher up the chain of command atIET is important because womentrainees see them as proof that long-

term career progression for women in theArmy is quite possible,” Clement said.

1SG Clement takes her job very seri-ously. Never having been a first ser-geant, she did her homework and tookthe cue from friend 1SG Bert Vaughanof the 82d Airborne Division at FortBragg, North Carolina. Among otherthings, he told her the 11 expectationsfor a first sergeant, which have servedas her guide. (See the figure.)

As to her future, 1SG Clement sees avariety of possibilities after IET. Ser-geant Major of the Field Artillery is aposition yet to be held by a woman. Butas already seen, 1SG Clement won’t letprecedence—or lack of it—deter her.

Although she never has mentioned theposition as a goal, with her experience,talent and determination, there may beyet another “first” waiting for her in thefuture. She’ll be up to the challenge.

Expectations for a First Sergeant1. Desire and Motivation: The individual wants to be a first sergeant.

2. Integrity: Commanders and soldiers trust the first sergeant and know thatif they need to talk to him/her, they can.

3. Leadership: A strong first sergeant is a good mentor. Soldiers want toemulate the first sergeant who “leads the way.”

4. Dedication to Duty: The first sergeant develops a system to accomplish allmissions. This may mean starting before the duty day begins and continuingafter the duty day ends.

5. Tactical Knowledge: The first sergeant spot-checks positions or maneuvertactics to strengthen an element’s leadership.

6. Counseling and Development: The first sergeant teaches platoon ser-geants how to perform and how to develop their subordinate NCOs.

7. Knowledge of Rules: The first sergeant stays abreast of changes to allregulations, standing operating procedures (SOPs) and unit policies.

8. Ability to Speak: As the company’s senior enlisted advisor, the first sergeantspeaks to the commander on behalf of the soldiers.

9. Standard Setter: The first sergeant leads from the front and sets thestandard—not only in uniform appearance and PT, but also in off-duty conduct.

10. Time Management: The first sergeant develops a schedule and budgetshis/her time to take care of paperwork and meetings in the office andsoldiers and unit operations out of the office.

11. Uniform Code of Military Justice: The first sergeant does what’s right andrecommends appropriate punishment—always.

1SG Bertram F. Vaughan, 2-505th IN82d Abn Div, Fort Bragg, NC


Simulations represent a powerfulresource for training today’sArmy, offering a broad spectrum

of flexible training and mission rehearsaltools available to every leader and unit.Unfortunately, by and large, our simu-lations have been developed to supportmaneuver training and often neglect theaccurate replication of fires and firesupport.

At least in part because of this inabil-ity to accurately replicate the effects offires within the various simulation train-ing environments, a growing number ofmaneuver commanders are questioningthe relevance of artillery to the execu-tion of their missions. In addition, manyartillerymen are losing the skills to ex-ecute complex, integrated fire supportscenarios effectively because they rarelypractice such operations at home station.

The Field Artillery School at Fort Sill,Oklahoma, is moving aggressively toaddress these training environment andsimulation issues. The school has un-dertaken several initiatives to fix thereplication of fires at the Combat Train-ing Centers (CTCs) and in our modelsand simulations. During the next coupleof years, commanders in the field shouldhave the opportunity to see many ofthese initiatives come to closure.

Initiative 1: Training in VirtualEnvironments. Advances in computertechnology have afforded the Army theopportunity to train using virtual real-ity. Simply put, these are environmentsin which the trainees can interact witheach other and with other forces on acomputer-generated, three-dimensionalbattlefield. There are several programsthat make use of this technology, but theprimary one is the close combat tacticaltrainer (CCTT). CCTT is the next gen-

eration beyond the venerable simula-tions networking (SIMNET) technol-ogy familiar to a majority of our groundmaneuver brethren. CCTT provides anexcellent training environment for themaneuver forces but falls short in theareas of fires replication and fire sup-port participation.

CCTT suites are currently located atFort Hood, Texas; Fort Knox, Ken-tucky; and Forts Benning and Stewart,Georgia. During the next three years,CCTT suites are scheduled to be fieldedto Europe; Korea, Fort Carson, Colo-rado; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Lewis,Washington (the latter, tentative).

In assessing effective training lever-age points, the FA School determinedthat CCTT needed to be a focus and, assuch, several projects are underway.

The first is to fix the CCTT replicationof fires. At the moment, artillery hasessentially no effect on the CCTT fight.A direct hit from a 155-mm high-explo-sive projectile causes no casualtiesamong the dismounted infantry, let alonethe armored forces fighting the battle.As a result, maneuver commanders aregradually getting away from using artil-lery correctly in support of their opera-tions. Further, they may have a limitedrespect for artillery as a casualty pro-ducer should they find themselves inthe middle of an actual enemy barrage.

Recommended database and algorith-mic modifications that address howCCTT replicates fires have been and arecontinuing to be developed. Command-ers should begin seeing better attritionand battle damage effects from artil-lery-delivered munitions in their CCTTtraining within the next year. In addi-tion, more specialized munitions, suchas artillery-delivered mines, various

types of smoke and the new senseand destroy armor munition (SAD-ARM), may be added to the selectionof ammunition available to forcesfighting on virtual battlefields.

The second area of concern in-volves the replication of the firesupport structure. Here, also, the

CCTT training environment is defi-cient. A standard suite of CCTT mod-

ules includes 14 M1A1 Abrams tanksand 14 M2A2 Bradley fighting vehiclesbut only one fire support team vehicle(FIST-V). Efforts to provide a secondFIST module to each site have provedcost prohibitive.

The current alternative under devel-opment is to provide a “reconfigurablekit” that allows a standard M2A2 mod-ule to be converted into a Bradley firesupport team vehicle (BFIST) modulecomplete with onboard hand-held ter-minal units (HTUs) and lightweightcomputer units (LCUs).

The goal is to field two full-scalereconfigurable kits to each CCTT site.Maneuver commanders still will haveto decide whether to have FIST partici-pation or a fully manned Bradley com-pany. Although not a perfect solution,it’s a step toward providing the correctfire support structure to support com-bined arms operations.

Another component of this initiativeis to enhance the ability of artillerymento use CCTT for training. The objectiveis to turn the facility over to an FAbattalion and then provide it a realisticbattlefield environment focused ontraining the entire fire support struc-ture. Combat scenarios using theCCTT’s semi-automated forces (SAF)can be generated, and the artillery bat-talion commander then will be able toconduct focused fires and fire supporttraining for his battalion using CCTT.

The goal is to have all nine companyFISTs participating on the virtual battle-field. They would communicate andcoordinate with their battalion fire sup-port elements (FSEs) using voice ordigital systems while the brigade FSEparticipated or assessed the training. Inaddition, the fire direction centers(FDCs) and tactical operations centers(TOCs) could participate, allowing acomprehensive fires and fire supporttraining event.

To facilitate this concept, a standardBradley module would, again, be trans-formed into a BFIST module, using alower-cost, lower-fidelity version of the

Getting Fires Back Into The Fightby Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Lee

Virtual, Liveand SimulatedTraining


reconfigurable kit. In this case, only theturret of the Bradley would be modifiedto include an HTU. Then fires could bedigitally processed by the observingFIST element and passed to either a liveor simulated FSE and (or) TOC. TheTOCs and FSEs would operate usingreal-world command, control, commu-nication, computer and intelligence (C4I)systems (principally, the advanced FieldArtillery tactical data system, orAFATDS) to process fire missions. Thiswould allow the FA battalion to train itsentire fire support and fire delivery struc-ture.

Initiative 2: Training at the CombatTraining Centers. The three dirtCTCs—Fort Irwin, California; FortPolk, Louisiana; and Hohenfels, Ger-many—are recognized as the corner-stones of our collective live training.Training at these sites, coupled withprofessional observer/controller (O/C)capabilities, have paid great dividendsto the readiness of the Army. Unfortu-nately, the replication of fires and ef-fects at the CTCs is generally inaccu-rate. As in CCTT, maneuver command-ers are walking away from these train-ing environments with the impressionthat fires are ineffective.

But, there are solutions. One is torevise the software in the simulated areaweapons effects/multiple integrated la-ser engagement system II (SAWE/MILES II) component of the CTC in-strumentation system (CTC-IS).

Efforts are underway with the Simula-tions, Training and InstrumentationCommand (STRICOM) to coordinatethe development of software fixes thatwould allow better effects of fires to bereplicated at the CTCs and increase thetypes of munitions available. This ini-tiative impacts several of the battlefieldoperating systems and, as a result, has afairly broad base of support.

The CTC-IS software and interface“boxes” located with each vehicle andsoldier need to be upgraded to addressnot only fires replications issues, butalso new vehicles coming into the in-ventory, such as the light or mediumarmored vehicles (LAVs) or (MAVs)for the Initial Brigade Combat Team(IBCT), and new weapon systems, suchas Javelin. The goal is to have the fixesin place to support the rotation of theIBCT at the Joint Readiness TrainingCenter (JRTC) at Fort Polk in Decem-ber 2001.

Initiative 3: Training With Modelsand Simulations. Constructive simu-lations, unlike the virtual CCTT, areconducted on a series of networkedcomputer workstations. These simula-tions model real-world actions or eventsand cause friendly, enemy or neutral/faction forces to interact on a com-puter-generated battlefield.

Because of the expense and environ-mental considerations associated withlarge-scale maneuver exercises, themilitary has turned more extensively tothe use of constructive simulations tech-nology to maintain unit readiness andtrain senior leadership.

As in virtual- and live-training envi-ronments, the replication of fires inmodel simulations is inaccurate andoften teaches poor lessons. Currenttraining models, such as the corps battlesimulation (CBS), the brigade/battal-ion battle simulation (BBS) or high-resolution Janus, need their algorith-mic underpinnings and effects data-bases aggressively reviewed and modi-fied to accurately replicate fires andeffects and the delivery of fires. Thiseffort is underway at the FA School incoordination with the National Simula-tion Center (NSC).

Legacy simulations, such as those al-ready mentioned, will be replaced dur-ing the next two to 10 years by the nextgeneration of training simulations. Prin-ciple among these are the WarfighterSimulation (WARSIM) 2000 and theOne Semi-Automated Force (OneSAF).These two simulation programs are ex-pected to span the military operationaltraining environment from the corps,division and brigade levels in WARSIMdown to brigade and below operations inOneSAF. Brigade-level training servesas the crossover point for the two.

The FA School is an active participantin both the WARSIM and OneSAF de-velopment programs to ensure that er-rors of the past are not duplicated in thefuture. Ultimately, the goal is to havethe Army deliver a training model thataccurately replicates the effects of firesacross the full spectrum of battlefieldenvironments and provides artillerymenthe training resources necessary to de-velop and maintain their skills.

WARSIM 2000 is projected to begininitial fielding in late FY01. The sys-tem’s capabilities will be consistent withthe current CBS model. The simulationwill be enhanced during the next sev-

eral years with a full operational capa-bility projected for about FY05. One-SAF also is expected to be deliveredabout FY05 and fully fielded by FY08.

Initiative 4: Training Digitally. Oneof the most significant challenges todayinvolves the use of digital technologyfor communicating, processing, coor-dinating and, ultimately, delivering fires.This challenge is significant for boththe system operator and the battle stafflong accustomed to analog systems andgrease-pencil charts.

Developing and maintaining digitalstaff proficiency is a critical skill re-quired by current and future battle staffs.It isn’t a skill that’s easily trained, andthe techniques involved are extremelyperishable. As the Army continues itstransition to digital battlefield manage-ment, we must establish the trainingenvironment to support unit proficiencywith digital systems.

Two efforts associated with this initia-tive are underway. The first is to sup-port the National Simulation Center’sprogram for providing the digital battlestaff trainer (DBST) to a broad selec-tion of battle simulation centers through-out the Army. DBST has as its heart FireSimulation (FireSim) XXI.

FireSim XXI is a large-scale, artillery-focused simulation originally developedto support artillery system studies forthe combat developments community.It has been adapted to support digitallybased training using an artillery unit’sorganic C4I and tactical communica-tions systems. Units that have beenfielded this system have indicated itprovides the most realistic and chal-lenging training environment of anysimulation in use today.

The second part of this initiative is toestablish a digitally oriented, seniormentor program—a fires senior ob-server/controller team (SOCT)—towork with and help train active andNational Guard artillery brigade-levelstaffs in digital battle staff operations.This program is similar to the man-euver’s SOCT program currently resi-dent at Fort Knox. The use of experi-enced O/C teams pays tremendous divi-dends at the CTCs and in Battle Com-mand Training Program (BCTP) exer-cises and needs to be expanded to home-station training.

Similar to BCTP, the fires SOCT willprovide exercise planning, executionand senior mentorship to units. By us-



ing DBST as the core simulation, theSOCT will train on the units’ digitalequipment at their home stations. Thegoal is to establish the fires SOCT capa-bility and make it available to unitsstarting in FY01; units will be able torequest SOCT support by calling theFA School’s Chief of Simulations at theDepth and Simultaneous Attack BattleLab, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, at commer-cial (580) 442-3649 or DSN 639-3649.

Other Tools Available. Units can usethe various models and simulationsavailable today to create effective train-ing environments for non-maneuverusers or for non-traditional missions.Commanders and leaders at every levelneed to articulate their creative trainingideas to their simulation center staffsand push them to support the unit’straining goals and objectives. The fol-lowing are some of the leading modelsand programs available and their gen-eral capabilities.

Battlefield Synchronization and Com-bined Arms Training. Janus and thejoint conflict and tactical simulation(JCATS) are high-resolution trainingmodels. This type of simulation repli-cates vehicles and personnel down tothe individual level. The models areextremely effective in supporting battle-field synchronization tasks. They allowthe fire supporter and the maneuvercommander to synchronize fires withthe scheme of maneuver and then ex-ecute the plan in real time, addressingcritical timing issues.

High-resolution simulations oftenserve as staff trainers but are primarilyused for “combat” training. Line-of-sight is taken into account as the com-puter “sees” the terrain in three dimen-sions.

When using the models, the leader-ship of a platoon or company generallywill be in the simulation center lookingat the computer screen to see what hisforces can see. The models have beenused to create effective training envi-ronments in support of high- and low-intensity combat operations, disasterrelief exercises, noncombatant evacua-tion operations (NEO) and military op-erations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).

Command and Staff Training. Com-mand and staff training models, such asCBS or BBS, normally involve the train-ing audience’s being located at a fieldsite and interacting with a response cellat the simulation center. The response

cell replicates multiple subordinate ele-ments and interfaces with the computersystem to execute the orders receivedfrom the field.

As the orders are executed, battlefieldoutcomes are generated and given tothe response cell, which, in turn, pro-vides the battle staffs tactical and logis-tic information to drive the decision-making process.

BCTP is probably the foremost pro-gram of this type, although each corpsand division has a significant simula-tion center capability to support unittraining and mission rehearsals.

Digital Battle Staff Training. FireSimXXI is a superb system for providingdigital staff training. FireSim modelstarget acquisition and counterfire ra-dars, communications, fire mission pro-cessing and the firing of friendly andenemy artillery and mortars down to theindividual system level.

In a simulated event, a counterfireradar acquisition occurs and the appro-priate displays appear to the radar op-erator who actions the acquisition andforwards an appropriate tactical mes-sage to the FDC or counterfire produc-tion cell. Once received, the fire mis-sion is processed and passed to a firingelement where it is executed.

The simulation monitors all of theseevents and, as appropriate, assesses at-trition. If any particular node (radar,FDC, etc.) is not participating in theexercise, FireSim replicates its actionsand generates the appropriate messagetraffic as would normally be seen on theunit’s tactical C4I systems.

This powerful training tool can belinked with JCATS or Janus to providea maneuver fight and allow artillerycommanders to exercise not only coun-terfire capabilities, but also direct sup-port to the close fight.

Finally, the environment can be ex-panded further to include the extendedair defense simulation (EADSIM) thatprovides an air picture, air defense battleand intelligence feeds to the all-sourceanalysis system-remote workstation(ASAS-RWS). When the entire envi-ronment is pulled together, it creates anextremely effective tool for trainingacross the depth of the battlefield.

Conclusion. Inaccurate fires replica-tion in virtual (CCTT), live (CTCs) andconstructive (CBS/BBS) training envi-ronments have resulted, at least in part,in maneuver commanders losing their

appreciation for the value of fires insupport of the scheme of maneuver.Further, because these simulations toolsare not up to the task, artillerymen havebeen unable to train effectively at homestation. The Field Artillery School isinitiating and coordinating fixes to ad-dress these training issues.

Simulations are a powerful tool forcommanders, staffs and leaders at everylevel. They are not the answer to alltraining issues but represent one of thetraining multipliers available. With cre-ativity and adequate lead times, localbattle simulation centers can coordi-nate, plan and execute robust exercisesin support of the training communityand help commanders maintain unitreadiness and effectiveness.

Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Lee is theChief of Simulations for the Field ArtillerySchool and the Depth and SimultaneousAttack Battle Lab, both at Fort Sill, Okla-homa. He previously served as the DeputyDirector of Simulations for the UnitedStates Army in Europe; and Battalion S3for the 3d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery,210th Field Artillery Brigade; OperationsOfficer, also for the 210th Field ArtilleryBrigade; and Fire Support Element Tar-geting Team Chief for I Corps, all at FortLewis, Washington. He served as ProjectDirector for the development of the CorpsBattle Simulation (CBS) at the NationalSimulation Center, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. He was a Battery Commanderand S1 in the 2d Battalion, 11th FieldArtillery, 25th Infantry Division (Light),Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Lieuten-ant Colonel Lee was selected forthe new Functional Area 57 Simu-lations Operations.



Few soldiers will spend a day atthe National Training Center(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California,

as a radar section leader (Field ArtilleryTargeting Technician Warrant Officer131A). Yet, understanding the role andresponsibilities of the radar sectionleader is key to the success of everybrigade combat team (BCT). The AN/TPQ-36 radar section provides the bri-gade unique force protection as well asvaluable intelligence on enemy mortarsand artillery and the locations of high-volume indirect fire.

This article examines the duties andresponsibilities of a radar section leaderas he prepares his radar section for andleads his soldiers in the NTC battle. If hetrains to his duties and responsibilitiesright, he and his section will be preparedto conduct operations in combat.

D-2, 1600. The brigade briefs subordi-nate units on an operations order (OPORD)for a movement-to-contact. The directsupport (DS) FA battalion assistant S3takes a copy of the brigade OPORD to theDS battalion tactical operations center(TOC) to begin mission analysis.

At the TOC, battle staffs from the DSbattalion and the reinforcing battaliongather to jointly conduct mission analy-sis as part of the military decision-mak-ing process (MDMP). The radar sectionleader and the general support (GS) FAbattalion targeting officer begin readingthe OPORD. The radar section leaderfocuses on the information listed in Step 1“Analyzes the mission...” of the figure.

The radar section leader notices theOPORD contains no information on an

specifically for the radar. He then issuesa warning order (WARNO) to his sec-tion, covering the information listed inStep 2 “Issues a WARNO...” of the figure.

Next, he participates in course-of-ac-tion (COA) development, confirmingthe information listed in Step 3 of thefigure. For each action/counteraction ofthe COA during wargaming, the radarsection leader states the information listedin Step 4 of the figure.

The radar section leader then returnsto his section and issues a secondWARNO to update the section on theoutcome of the wargame.

D-1, 0600. After a few hours of sleepand a quick breakfast, the radar sectionleader attends the FA support plan(FASP) briefing with the battery com-manders. The GS FA battalion target-ing officer briefs the radar deploymentorder (RDO). The section leader con-firms his understanding of the plan andthe integration of his radar section intothe schemes of maneuver and fires. Hethen back-briefs the DS or reinforcingbattalion S3 on the key tasks and move-ment of his section.

D-1, 0800. The radar section leaderattends the battalion after-action review(AAR) for the previous battle. He noteskey issues with radar zone refinementand fixes call-for-fire zone (CFFZ) re-finement for the next battle.

After the AAR, the radar section chiefbriefs his soldiers on the upcoming mis-sion using the five paragraph OPORDformat, including the information listedin Step 8 of the figure. He and the radarsection chief begin inspecting the criti-cal pre-combat checks (PCCs) to beaccomplished before the brigade crossesthe line-of-departure (LD).

He then reconnoiters future radar po-sitions to evaluate their technical andtactical suitability for the mission andconfirm routes. The radar section chiefreturns to the DS TOC and updates theS2 and GS battalion targeting officer onthe friendly and enemy situations.

D-1, 1600. During the battalion rockdrill, the radar section leader indicatesthe information listed in Step 11 of thefigure.

D-1, 1800. The radar section leaderbriefs his crew on any changes from therock drill. He then prepares his battleboard, including the updated informa-tion listed in Step 12 of the figure. Thebattery first sergeant (1SG) arrives, andthe section leader coordinates for logis-tics, including the areas in Step 13 of thefigure. The radar section leader eats,

electronic warfare (EW) threat. He co-ordinates with the S2 and submits arequest for information (RFI) to thebrigade S2: “What is the ground-basedEW threat in theater?”

The section leader reads through theOPORD concept of the operation andsubordinate unit tasks for the scheme ofmaneuver. He focuses on what force pro-tection assets are dedicated to the radarsection—Bradley team, military police(MP) squad, infantry squad or engineersurvivability assets. If no protection as-sets are identified in the OPORD, theradar section leader discusses the protec-tion assets with the S3, who adds them tothe RFIs for the brigade S3.

Finally, the radar section leader looksthrough Annex D of the fire supportplan to find the radar position areas andradar zone list. He determines the infor-mation developed by the brigade target-ing officer (another 131A) during theMDMP, as listed in Step 1 of the figure.

As he completes the mission analysis,the radar section leader considers theimplied and specified tasks he mustaccomplish for the mission. For thismission, his specified tasks are to acquirethe enemy regimental artillery group(RAG) and opposing force (OPFOR)mortars. His implied tasks are to coor-dinate the link-up time and location forforce protection and engineer assets andcoordinate with adjacent units for forceprotection and support once the radarsection occupies its position.

The radar section leader attends themission analysis briefing to the com-mander and copies down any guidance

What “Right”Looks Likeby Chief Warrant Officer Three

Harold A. Thacker, Jr.

Leading theRadar Section

in Battle—


rests and prepares his section to move tocollocate with C Battery short of the LD.

While he’s eating, the force protectionarrives at the radar location—two MPteams. The radar section leader briefsthem on the overall situation and getsinformation from the teams, as indi-cated in Step 14 of the figure.

D-1, 1900. The radar section movesout and collocates with C Battery. Dur-ing the movement, the TOC informs theradar section leader the route haschanged. The changes are plotted on the

map and the appropriate waypoints areentered into the global positioning sys-tem (GPS).

While moving through a wire obstaclefrom a previous battle, the senior radaroperator calls to tell the section leaderthe cargo trailer has gotten wire wrappedaround the wheel and axle. The convoystops, and the MPs provide area secu-rity. The radar section leader goes to thedisabled vehicle, assesses the situationand notifies the TOC the section will belate in closing on C Battery’s location.

While the section leader contacts theTOC, the radar section chief directs theremoval of the concertina wire from thedisabled vehicle.

An hour later, the radar section leaderbriefs his soldiers on the dangers ofnight movement and battlefield ob-stacles. The soldiers mount-up and re-sume movement, finally arriving at CBattery and emplacing the radar.

The section then conducts a counterfirebattle drill rehearsal with the reinforc-ing battalion in preparation for the up-

1. Analyzes the mission, by...—Examining the Brigade Operations Order (OPORD) for the:

• Enemy Electronic Warfare (EW)• Enemy Indirect Fire Systems• Enemy’s Most Likely Avenue of Approach (Ground and Air)• Force Protection Assets for the Radar Section• Radar Position Areas• Radar Zone Numbers, Types and Grids (Annex D)• Zone Activation/Deactivation Triggers (Annex D)

— Determining the implied and specified radar section tasks.— Attending the Commander’s Mission Analysis Briefing,

looking for specific guidance for his section.

2. Issues a warning order (WARNO) to the section,including the...

• Proposed Primary and Alternate Radar Positions• Search Azimuths• Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs)• Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs)• Time Line for Key Events

3. Participates in Course-of-Action (COA) Development,confirming...

• Primary and Alternate Radar Positions• Search Azimuth• Cueing Schedule• Radar Zones• Use of Force Protection Assets

4. Participates in Wargaming and, during each action/counteraction, states his section’s...

• Position• Search Azimuth• Cueing Schedule• Active Zones• Need for Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) Assistance

and Other Support

5. Issues second WARNO to the section, updating theinformation in the first WARNO, COA development andthe wargame.

6. Attends the FA support plan (FASP) briefing and confirmshis understanding of the radar deployment order (RDO).

7. Back-briefs the direct support (DS) battalion S3 on keytasks and section movement.

8. Briefs his section using the OPORD format, including...• Map with Current Graphics• FASP• RDO• Operations Overlay

9. Conducts inspections on mission PCCs with thesection chief.

10. Reconnoiters radar positions and routes; back-briefs the S2 and general support (GS) targetingofficer on the friendly and enemy situations.

11. Participates in the FA battalion rock drill, indicatingfor each phase of the plan the...

• Radar Location

• Search Azimuth

• Active Zones

• Cueing Schedule

• Acquisition Flow

• Support Requirements at Critical Events

12. Briefs his section on changes and prepares hisbattle board, including updated...

• Zones Plotted

• Graphics

• Routes

• Ambulance Exchange Points

• Radar Sites

13. Coordinates with the first sergeant for...• Logistics, Personnel and Administration Center

(LOGPAC) Requirements• Rations and Fuel• Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services

(PMCS)

14. Briefs the force protection assets on the...• Primary and Alternate Positions and Routes

• Friendly Scheme of Maneuver

• Enemy Situation

• Need to provide roving security from the front tothe rear of the radar convoy and radar sites.

• Requirement for a list of the protection asset’spersonnel, support requirements and sensitiveitems.

15. Convoys to the battery short of the line-of-departure (LD) and...

— Establishes communications and conductsdigital commo checks from sensor to shooter.

— Conducts a counterfire battle drill rehearsal withthe reinforcing battalion.

— Conducts section stand-to, checks sensitiveitems and performs final PCIs and PCCs.

— March orders to the LD and conducts the finalsafety briefing.

Radar Section Leader’s Steps in Planning and Preparing to Execute His Mission


coming battle. The rehearsal ensuresthere are no technical errors and digitalcommunications work from sensor toshooter. The radar section leader thencan be confident that his communicationswork and that everyone understands theradar zone and refinement plan.

Next, the section follows its sleep planfor 24-hour operations, sleeping inshifts. The radar section leader and chiefmonitor the fire support FM rehearsal atD-1, 2100.

D-Day, 0400. The radar section leaderand crew conduct stand-to, check sensi-tive items and perform final PCCs andpre-combat inspections (PCIs) andmarch order the radar system to the LD.The radar section leader then conductsa safety briefing. The soldiers mounttheir vehicles and are ready to roll.

D-Day, 0600. The radar section movesto the first radar position in the vicinityof the Matterhorn. The key task is tolocate the RAG and OPFOR mortars.The GS battalion targeting officer, withthe S3’s approval, has coordinated withthe division artillery (Div Arty) for AN/TPQ-37 radar coverage during themove, including one critical friendlyzone (CFZ) over Brown Pass.

D-Day, 0635. The section leader di-rects the emplacement of the generatortruck and radar trailer on the reverseslope of an intervisibility line to givesome cover and concealment from di-rect fire and observation. He directs theshelter truck, cargo trailer, recon truckand generator trailer to emplace to the rearof the site using a waddi system for cover.

He then checks the radios in the recon-naissance truck to be sure he can moni-tor the Div Arty counterfire, FA battalion

command and brigade operations and in-telligence (O&I) nets to track the battle.He checks the initialization data, cueingschedule and zones to ensure the radarsystem is ready to observe, and he beginsbattle tracking friendly and OPFOR move-ments, current zones and acquisitions.

Maneuver forces move past his loca-tion, and B Battery occupies a positionclose to the radar site as the lead taskforce approaches Brown Pass. As BBattery fires its missions and begins asurvivability move, OPFOR artilleryfrom the RAG fires. Rounds land 800meters from the radar site. As 54 roundsimpact, the radar section goes into mis-sion-oriented protective posture(MOPP) Level 4 following its indirectfire drill. Unfortunately, the RAG firesdestroy three MP vehicles and woundfour of the nine MPs. The radar sectionleader begins coordinating for casualtyevacuation (CASEVAC) for the wound-ed soldiers while the section membersadminister buddy aid.

Unknown to the radar section leader,an OPFOR division reconnaissanceteam initiated the mission, hoping todestroy the radar, a high-payoff target(HTP). The section leader calls the TOCwith a SALUTE (size, activity, loca-tion, unit, time and equipment) reportand nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC)1 report.

Suspecting the section is under enemyobservation, the section leader requeststhe section be allowed to make a surviv-ability move. Minutes later, he receivesguidance from the TOC to move to thealternate location. Ten minutes later,the radar section pulls into the alternatelocation 1,000 meters away.

As the section chief scans the hilltopfor division and regimental reconnais-sance teams, he spots five OPFOR sol-diers overlooking the radar site. Thesection chief notifies the radar sectionleader of the OPFOR soldiers and sendsa SALUTE report to the TOC.

The radar section leader again requestspermission to move farther northeast.Approval is granted, and the radar sec-tion moves again. The TOC advises theDiv Arty of the contact reports from theQ-36, and the battalion receives Q-37coverage for the move.

D-Day, 0735. The radar systememplaces and is ready to observeOPFOR indirect fires impacting in theBCT’s area of operations (AO). Theradar receives and processes its firstzone violation from a CFFZ and sends itdigitally to the TOC. During the nexthour, the section processes a steadyseries of acquisitions and sends them tothe TOC. The radar section leader andsection chief plot the acquisitions andrefine the CFFZ locations, reporting theRAG position to the battalion S2.

Attached to the OPFOR at the NTC, abattery of California Army National GuardM109 howitzers replicates a battery of2S1s during the battle. The 2S1 batteryfires a mission and makes a survivabilitymove. The 2S1 battery commander thennotices that firemarkers are in his lastposition, replicating 12 rockets from thefriendly force’s reinforcing battalion. Withan acquire-to-fire time of six minutes, thefriendly counterfire mission is ineffec-tive, and the OPFOR artillery continues tofire into the brigade sector with no loss ofcombat power.

Using his stopwatch, the radar sectionleader checks the acquisition process-ing time in the shelter. With a process-ing time of 45 seconds, he looks forways to decrease the time. He directs achange in the radar shelter crew drill,allowing each acquisition to be pro-cessed digitally without waiting foracknowledgement from the S2’s digitaldevice. The operator follows up on thevoice FM net to ensure the S2 sectionreceives the acquisitions.

Again using his stopwatch, the radarsection leader finds his battle drill isaveraging 15 seconds. He’s confidentthe radar operators understand the newprocedure and returns to the recon truckto track the battle.

D-Day, 0800. C Battery occupies aposition near the radar site and shootssmoke missions to screen the lead taskforce’s movement. Meeting the surviv-

Sergeant Delgado, senior radar operator for 3d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, 4th InfantryDivision (Mechanized), inputs a critical friendly zone.


ability criteria, the guns move to a newlocation, leaving the radar vulnerable toOPFOR counterfire. The radar sectionleader expresses concern to the DS TOCand is told to stay in place while the taskforce moves through Brown and DebnamPasses. This is a critical time, and the radarsection needs to provide force protection.

D-Day, 0815. The OPFOR fires a non-persistent (NP) nerve agent with theradar in the downwind hazard. The M8chemical alarm sounds, and the radarsection again goes into MOPP Level 4.The section continues to process a steadyflow of acquisitions from the RAG andOPFOR mortars to the reinforcing TOC.The radar section leader submits theNBC 1 report to the DS TOC and waitsfor the section chief to report the resultsfrom the M256 chemical detection kit.

Fifteen minutes later, the section chiefnotifies the radar section leader that thearea is all clear. The NBC 2 report isgiven to the TOC, and the TOC grantsthe section permission to begin unmask-ing procedures.

Meanwhile, the 2S1 battery from theRAG fires a smoke mission to supportmovement of its AT-5 battery into anambush position. Before the battery canmake a survivability move, 12 rocketsfrom the reinforcing battalion impacton its position, destroying four 2S1s.With an acquire-to-fire time of twominutes and 30 seconds, the friendlyforce counterfire team begins the sys-tematic destruction of the RAG.

D-Day, 0840. While monitoring thebrigade command net, the radar sectionleader learns the task force has securedBrown Pass. This is the trigger to movethe radar section through the pass andemplace to support the BCT as it makescontact with the enemy. The Div Artyauthorizes Q-37 radar coverage for theQ-36 radar’s movement, and the battal-ion targeting officer directs the radarsection leader to move.

As the radar section closes to BrownPass, the section leader encounters anOPFOR family of scatterable mines(FASCAM) minefield. He reports itslocation to the DS TOC and directs thesection chief to move the other twovehicles to a rally point. The radar sec-tion leader conducts an area reconnais-sance and coordinates with engineers inthe pass to use a passage lane; the rest ofthe radar section then is brought forward.The section elements link up and continuetactical movement to the new position.

The radar section leader tracks themovement-to-contact and hears a spot

report that contact has been made fivekilometers to the west. As he plots theinformation on his map and studies thesituation, the section chief tells him theradar has been receiving a steady flowof acquisitions, but most had been plottedoutside the active CFFZ. After plottingthe hostile weapons locations, he directsthe section chief to have the radar opera-tor delete the ineffective CFFZ, input anew CFFZ and report the changes to thebattalion targeting officer and S2.

D-Day, 1000. From his radar operatorat the section’s observation post (OP),the radar section leader receives a spotreport of suspected OPFOR smoke oneto two kilometers east of the section’slocation. While monitoring the FA battal-ion command net, the section leader learnsthat OPFOR elements continue to movewestward along the path of the smoke.

He notifies the TOC of the smoke andOPFOR vehicles movement. He doesnot request to move because adjacentunits are providing adequate force pro-tection. The radar section continues toprocess OPFOR acquisitions from theRAG until the battle culminates at 1145.

D-Day, 1145. The section leader’sday continues at the NTC, even thoughthe battle culminates; the radar sectionreceives continue-the-mission (CTM)instructions. At CTM plus one hour, theradar section conducts an AAR with theNTC’s radar/targeting trainer at the ra-dar site to assess what happened, why ithappened and how to improve for thenext fight. During the AAR, the radarsection leader brings up radar position-ing versus firing battery positioning andthe counterfire risk of being too close tofiring elements. He agrees to fix radarpositioning during the next MDMP.

The radar section chief discusses thehazards of battlefield obstacles and de-termines wire cutters need to be readilyaccessible and the section needs battledrills for self-recovery and obstacle by-passing. He will develop the battle drillsand rehearse them in preparation for thenext battle.

The senior radar operator notes thecrew drill was inconsistent and wants tointegrate the section leader’s changesinto the standing operating procedures(SOP). He will write the new SOP andrehearse the new battle drill at the nextcounterfire rehearsal.

NTC battlefield statistics for the radarsection are 40 acquisitions, 21 zoneviolations and the destruction of 162S1s and six mortars. After the AAR,the radar section leader moves the sec-

tion back to the TOC until it’s time torollout for the next fight.

Conclusion. The battle responsibili-ties of a radar section leader stretchfrom the receipt of the brigade OPORDthrough the end of the battle. The paceof his activities is rapid and relentless.Yet radar section leader is one of themost rewarding positions an FA target-ing technician will ever fill.

Battle at the NTC for the radar sectionleader illustrates the complexity of thesection leader’s duties and responsibili-ties. He must be an integral part of theplanning process, coordinate with vari-ous elements of the combined arms team,make key tactical and technical deci-sions during the battle and provide can-did post-battle assessments.

Like battle at the NTC, home-stationtraining must integrate the radar sectionleader into the MDMP and rehearsals.The training must exercise the coun-terfire system, with the section strivingto meet a two-minute acquire-to-firetime. Force protection assets and chal-lenging battlefield movement and ef-fects also must be integrated into thetraining. Finally, no training is com-plete without an AAR.

If home-station training offers thesechallenges to radar sections, then unitswill be well on their way to destroyingRAGs at the NTC—as well as on anyfuture battlefields.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Harold A.Thacker, Jr., until recently, was a CombatRadar/Targeting Trainer with the Fire Sup-port Division of the Operations Group atthe National Training Center, Fort Irwin,California. He is now a Target AcquisitionInstructor in the Targeting Division of theFire Support and Combined Arms Opera-tions Department of the FA School, FortSill, Oklahoma, his second tour in the divi-sion. In previous assignments, he servedas an FA Intelligence Officer for the 1stInfantry Division (Mechanized) and BrigadeTargeting Officer with the 1st Battalion, 6thField Artillery, 3d Brigade Combat Team,also in the 1st Division in Germany. DuringOperation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, hewas a Radar Section Leader for B Batteryof the 25th Field Artillery (TA), part of the 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery inGermany. Among other courses, CW3Thacker is a graduate of the TargetingProcess Course at Fort Sill; the Joint Fire-power Control Course at Nellis AFB,Nevada; and the Joint Aerospace Com-mand and Control Course at Hurburt Field,Florida.


You might think this was a well-executed fire support battle drillat the National Training Center

(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. How-ever, it’s a fire support exercise con-ducted by soldiers of the 1st Battalion,10th Field Artillery (1-10 FA), part ofthe 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized),at its close combat tactical trainer(CCTT), Fort Benning, Georgia.

The guard unit armory device, full-crew interactive simulation trainer(GUARDFIST) and the training set fireobservation (TSFO) are great devices

to train forward observers (FOs) oncall-for-fire (CFF) procedures. With alittle ingenuity, they can be used totrain additional tasks, such as radioprocedures and processing digitalCFFs. However, GUARDFIST and theTSFO can’t be used as a stimulus formany of the fire support tasks requiredfor combined arms operations.

Fire supporters must be able to plan,rehearse and execute an integrated ob-servation plan from a combat vehicle,track the battle, pass combat intelli-gence between observers and hand the

battle over to subsequent observers. Toaccomplish this type of training, a de-vice must be able to place multipleobservers in an environment that realis-tically simulates their unique point ofview from different positions on thebattlefield. With a little imagination,the CCTT can be used to accomplishthis mission.

This article gives an overview of theCCTT facility, discusses 1-10 FA’s de-sign of and workarounds for a task force-level fire support exercise and outlinesthe lessons learned while planning andexecuting the exercise.

CCTT Overview. The CCTT was de-signed to train a company/team-sizedunit in combined arms operations. Sol-diers conduct operations in combat ve-hicle simulators equipped with videoscreens that simulate realistic viewpointsof drivers, vehicle commanders, gun-ners, observers and dismounted infan-try. Mock-ups of M577 command postcarriers represent the task force (TF)tactical operations center (TOC), themortar section, a direct support (DS)Field Artillery battalion fire directioncenter (FDC), as well as a logisticssupport center.

The CCTT facility can expand to theTF-level by manning up to 27 combatvehicle simulators and controlling therest of the task force from semi-auto-mated force (SAF) positions. There-fore, a TF could man almost two com-panies with combat vehicle simulatorsand simulate a company with SAFforces. Another scenario would place

“Hammer 30, this is COLT [combat observation lasing team] 1. I have20 armored vehicles moving east, vicinity of Grid NK386174. Time is0830. Over.”“This is Hammer 30, roger. Out.”“COLT 3, this is COLT 1. The lead element of the 20 victors is headed

into the eastern Granite Pass, vicinity of Grid NK399195. Over.”“This is COLT 3, roger.” Break. “Hammer 30, this is COLT 3. Fire

KM0015 at-my-command. Over.”“COLT 3, this is Hammer 30. Message to observer, Steel Battalion,

6 DPICM [dual-purpose improved conventional munitions], KM0015.”Break. “KM0015, ready. Over.”“Hammer 30, this is COLT 3. Fire KM0015. Over.”“COLT 3, this is Hammer 30. Fire KM0015. Out.”“Hammer 30, this is COLT 3. End of mission: two APCs [armored

personnel carriers] burning, two tanks damaged.” Break. “Let Battle30 know he has 16 armored vehicles moving east toward Phase LineDan, vicinity Grid NK420212. Time 0905. Over.”

by Lieutenant ColonelErnest J. Herold III,

Major Mickey A. Sanzotta andCaptain Thomas W. Everritt


company commanders and platoon lead-ers in combat vehicle simulators in con-trol of SAF troops. The CCTT simula-tion is very flexible and can arrangemany variations of manned simulatorsand SAF elements.

The CCTT facility has off-the-shelftraining support package exercises thatcan be adapted to meet FA unit trainingobjectives, or the unit can develop itsown exercise. Using an existing train-ing exercise significantly decreasesplanning time but may not meet all theunit’s simulation requirements. Devel-oping a unique scenario requires a lot oftime, effort and coordination with thefacility engineers; however, the endproduct will be an exercise tailored tothe tasks the unit wants to train.

To design an exercise in the CCTT,the unit must produce an operationsorder (OPORD) with overlays, decidewhich simulators will be manned andwhich simulated, determine six-digitgrids for all entities (vehicles, fightingpositions, dismounted positions,minefields, etc.) and establish radio netstructures. The unit also must deter-mine the opposing force (OPFOR)strength, composition, disposition andcourses-of-action (COA). Early and con-tinuous coordination with the CCTT fa-cility is critical to ensure the scenario isfeasible and meets training objectives.

The major CCTT advantages are thatit provides low-cost, excellent trainingin combined arms operations withmanned combat vehicles and the abilityto conduct superb after-action reviews(AARs) in an unequaled AAR facility.Time is the only appreciable expense ofconducting a CCTT exercise; all othercosts are negligible.

Combat simulators are a huge benefitfor the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradleyinfantry fighting vehicle and M981 firesupport team vehicle (FIST-V) crews.Inside the boxy simulation modules,crews operate controls and talk on ve-hicle inter-communications systems thatreplicate the “real McCoy.” For ex-ample, the single-channel ground andairborne radio system (SINCGARS)mock-ups are so realistic that soldiershave to be stopped from attempting tohook-up digital devices to the face-plates, which appear functional.

As crews peer through sights or openedhatches, they are amazed at the simu-lated terrain and combat around them.The AAR facility offers top-notch vi-sual and audio playback of the battle,including radio traffic from a macro-

view down to the a view from a specifictank gunner’s sight.

Another advantage of CCTT is theNTC terrain database. This offers a re-alistic view of the NTC battlefield, en-abling soldiers to gain experience onterrain where the greatest challengesmay occur. The NTC terrain also allowsFOs to conduct observation training atmuch greater distances than on a postwith heavily vegetated terrain.

CCTT Fire Support TF-Level Ex-ercise. After observing maneuver taskforces use the CCTT for training, FortBenning Redlegs decided to design amulti-echelon training exercise for firesupporters. The training objectives wereto exercise the entire fire support sys-tem (including the digital system): plan,rehearse and execute an integrated ob-servation plan; perform battle trackingand hand-over; exercise the sensor-to-shooter link; and familiarize the unitwith the NTC terrain.

We adapted the capabilities of theCCTT and designed a TF-level exercisecapable of training a TF fire supportelement (FSE), company FISTs,COLTs, as well as the brigade FSE. Ourdesign included the DS battalion FDCand the mortar FDC.

One drawback was that only oneFIST-V simulator exists in the facility.To account for the lack of FIST-V simu-lators, we provided quick instruction onthe M1 simulator and placed fire sup-port officers (FSOs) and observers inthese vehicles. This allowed each FSOto observe the battlefield with a capableobservation, maneuver and communi-

cations platform. This option limits thenumber of radios available to the FSOs;however, it is not a significant trainingdistracter.

The CCTT facility’s fire support digi-tal system consists of the advanced FieldArtillery tactical data system (AFATDS)in the DS battalion FDC and TF FSEand forward entry device (FED) sys-tems for observers in the FIST-V andboth dismounted infantry modules. Ourdigital system consists of the initial firesupport automated system (IFSAS) andhand-held terminal units (HTU). Weadapted the CCTT system to ours bywiring our HTUs from the observers inthe simulators to the TF FSE, brigade FSEand DS battalion FDC IFSAS. When aCFF was received, the FA battalionFDC processed it in the CCTT AFATDSto generate virtual fires in the simula-tion that observers see on the ground.

During a future exercise, we plan toremote a SINCGARS radio outside thefacility to communicate with the pla-toon operation centers (POCs) and our155-mm Paladin howitzers in a localtraining area. This will account for com-plete fire mission processing time andfurther train observers in targeting, trig-gers and observation planning.

Lessons Learned. We learned manylessons while planning and executingour fire support exercise in the CCTTfacility. These include the capabilitiesand limitations of the facility and futureconsiderations for fire support exercises.

CCTT Capabilities. Face-to-facecoaching that was possible in CCTT isimpossible on the actual terrain. It would

A CCTT Observer/Controller Station


be great if the FSO or the fire supportNCO could stand on the same piece ofground as their FOs to coach themthrough observation post (OP) selec-tion, target refinement, trigger points,etc. In the CCTT, this is a simple task.Instead of driving 20 kilometers overbroken terrain, the trainer only walks afew feet to a simulator.

Engineer support is well simulated inthe CCTT. The engineer has his ownconsole where he digs fighting posi-tions and tank ditches, emplacesminefields and wires obstacles, etc. Thisallows the engineer to work with ma-neuver commanders and fire supportersto build engagement areas (EAs) thatprotect the force and integrate obstaclesinto the commander’s concept of theoperation.

The CCTT can change direct fire en-gagement ranges and marksmanship. Inour scenario, we reduced the direct fireengagement ranges for the Blue Forcesand OPFOR to two kilometers, whichcompensated for the four-kilometer vi-sual range in the CCTT. This allowedobservers to refine targets and deter-mine trigger points to affect the battlewith indirect fires before the OPFORentered direct fire range.

We also had to adjust the marksman-ship level for simulated forces. Duringtesting of the simulation, we discoveredOPFOR simulated combat systemswould overpower a numerically supe-rior simulated Blue Force for no reason.We were able to adjust the marksman-ship proficiency of both forces “to levelthe playing field” and meet our trainingobjectives.

One of the greatest capabilities of theCCTT is its staff. While planning andexecuting the exercise, the CCTT per-sonnel quickly responded by creatingworkarounds to enhance our training.During planning, the staff found a wayto use the dismounted platoon simula-tor for the COLT to give us all thecapabilities of the module while creat-ing a visual signature of only two sol-diers. During execution, the CCTT staffpromptly converged on challenges tosolve problems and create workarounds.When a solution couldn’t be found,they immediately informed us of theproblem and generated reports to theirhigher headquarters to solve the prob-lem for future operations.

CCTT Limitations. There are manylimitations in CCTT because it was de-signed for training close combat withM1s and M2s, not fire support. The key

is for units to be aware of the limitationsand develop techniques to achieve theirtraining objectives.

The visual limit in a CCTT simulatoris four kilometers. There are severalworkarounds for this problem. In mostinstances, we either placed observerswithin the four kilometer range of whatthey needed to see or adjusted direct fireengagement ranges so observers couldaccomplish essential fire support tasks(EFSTs) before OPFOR vehicles en-tered direct fire range.

We also were able to adjust the OP-FOR’s rate-of-march and interval be-tween forces. By slowing the rate-of-march, we allowed the OPFOR to spendmore time in the EA. In addition, bydecreasing the interval between forceswe still stressed the need for quick andaccurate indirect fires in support of themaneuver forces.

Because simulators aren’t suppliedwith global positioning systems (GPS),track commanders and observers mustuse land navigation skills to determinetheir location and be able to maneuverin the simulation. We helped observersrefine their location by finding theirposition on the CCTT computers, whichare in various locations in the facility.

Because the CCTT only has oneFIST-V, we wanted to place two com-pany FISTs in Bradleys to conduct firesupport operations and familiarize ourFISTs with their future vehicle. How-ever, we discovered the CCTT Bradleysimulator wasn’t equipped with a tar-geting system. Therefore, we opted touse M1s because of their laser range-finder capability.

While SINCGARS mock-ups arenearly identical to their real-world cous-ins, they only operate in single-channel,plain text mode. Operators aren’t ableto load radios and establish frequency-hop communication or wrestle throughcommunications problems associatedwith frequency-hop operations.

However, the CCTT simulation doesplay radio maximum range and terraininterferes with communications. Whilethis feature forces you to work out aplan to keep radio platforms withinrange, the system doesn’t provide re-transmission capability. We overcamethis obstacle by placing key vehicles,such as the TF FSE and DS battalionFDC, in positions where a re-transmis-sion vehicle normally would have gone.

The maximum range for 155-mm ar-tillery is 17 kilometers. This is not aserious limitation for most of the opera-

tions but must be accounted for duringthe planning phase. Also, the unit basicload (UBL) only has four rounds ofDPICM on the gun and ammo carrier.The CCTT simulation fires ammo offthe gun and ammo carrier until the roundtype is exhausted and then places thegun out of action for 30 minutes as itconducts re-supply operations. Adjust-ing the UBL to meet mission require-ments during the planning phase willalleviate this situation.

Another CCTT problem is that thesimulation will lock-up if there’s toomuch activity. Every entity (vehicle,minefield, bullet, building, etc.) in thesimulation uses computer memory.When entities are moving around andshooting at each other, memory usagejumps considerably.

During the planning phase, we ran thesimulation to ensure we were able tomove forces and conduct attacks in ac-cordance with doctrine, standing oper-ating procedures (SOPs) and our spe-cific plans. We discovered we couldreplicate some entities with less memorywith no difference in visual effect to thesoldier in a simulation module.

For instance, we knew from a previ-ous exercise that the large amount ofmemory required for scatterableminefields helped lead to the simula-tion failure. We reduced the amount ofmemory used in our exercise by usingconventional minefields with a lanethrough them in place of a scatterableminefield.

During the simulation, we told theOPFOR commander to drive his recon-naissance through the lane in theminefield. Arrival of the reconnaissanceelement triggered a call from an FO toemplace a family of scatterable mines(FASCAM) minefield. We fired the gridwith DPICM rounds that the observer inthe simulator thought was scatterablemines. When the OPFOR commandersent in his main body formation, weinstructed him to run into the pre-planned conventional minefield. Byusing this technique, we provided qual-ity visual effects for observer trainingand ensured the simulation ran continu-ously during the entire exercise.

CCTT isn’t a perfect system. For ex-ample, going back and forth betweenregular view and binocular view on theFO console of the dismounted stationcrashed the module. Once we identifiedthe problem, the facility engineers gotthe module up and running again in lessthan five minutes.


Lieutenant Colonel Ernest J. Herold III com-mands the 1st Battalion, 10th Field Artillery,(1-10 FA) 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized),at Fort Benning, Georgia. He has served as

Service Battery, 4th Battalion, 41st FieldArtillery, 3d Division at Fort Benning. Hewas a Company FSO for the 1st Battalion,39th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 68th Armorin the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) inGermany. Major Sanzotta holds a Master ofScience in Mathematics from the NavalPost-Graduate School in Monterey, Cali-fornia.

Captain Thomas W. Everritt is the TaskForce Fire Support Officer for 2d Battalion,69th Armor, 3d Division at Fort Benning.Previous assignments include serving asCommander of the 2d Field Artillery De-tachment (Target Acquisition), part of theXVIII Airborne Corps, and Fire Support Of-ficer for C Company, 1st Battalion, 327thInfantry of the 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault), both located at Fort Campbell,Kentucky.

While the CCTT was not developedspecifically as a fire support trainer, itcan be adapted to provide inexpensive,quality training for fire supporters. Wefound that the CCTT dramatically im-proved our ability to provide fires insupport of combined arms operationsand identified tasks needing additionaltraining.

With a little imagination, any FA unitcan use its CCTT to gain similar results.

Deputy Fire Support Coordinator(DFSCOORD) during Operation DesertThunder in Kuwait, as Brigade Fire Sup-port Officer (FSO) for the 2d BrigadeCombat Team and as the Battalion Execu-tive Officer for 1st Battalion, 9th FieldArtillery, all while in the 3d Division. He alsoserved on the staff of the UN Commanderin Haiti and was the Chief of the CombinedArms and Leadership Division at the Infan-try School, Fort Benning. He holds a Masterof Science in Foreign Service fromGeorgetown University in Washington, DC.

Major Mickey A. Sanzotta is the ExecutiveOfficer of 1-10 FA. In his previous assign-ment, he was FSO for the 3d Brigade, 3dInfantry at Fort Benning. He also served asthe Assistant Brigade S3 for the 3d Bri-gade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized),Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Commander of

The Army has seven values by which her soldiers striveto live: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor,Integrity and Personal Courage. This brief piece fea-

tures Medal of Honor (MOH) winner George P. Hays, who, asa first lieutenant with the 10th Field Artillery, 3d InfantryDivision, distinguished himself near Greves Farm in Franceon 14-15 July 1918 during a German attack. The actions ofGeorge Hays epitomize the Army value of Honor.

Lieutenant Hays, while wounded and operating under mostdifficult circumstances, did what was right. As a runner, he re-established lines of communication after his commo equip-ment was destroyed at the beginning of a massive two-dayGerman artillery barrage. He continuously moved back andforth on horseback, responsible for effective fire from hisposition, and rallied two French batteries, directing their fire.He played a major role in stopping the last German offensiveof World War I.

MOH Citation: George Price Hays, Number 34, 1919.“At the very outset of the unprecedented artillery bombard-ment by the enemy, his line of communications was destroyedbeyond repair. Despite the hazard attached to the mission ofrunner, he immediately set out to establish contact with theneighboring post of command and further establish liaisonwith two French batteries, visiting their position so frequentlythat he was mainly responsible for the accurate fire therefrom.While thus engaged, seven horses were shot under him and hewas severely wounded. His activity under most severe firewas an important factor in checking the advancing enemy.”

Hays, The Man. George P. Hays was born 27 September 1892in China. He entered service in Okarche, Oklahoma, in 1917 asa Second Lieutenant, Field Artillery in the Officer Reserve

HONORStrict Conformityto What’s Right

Corps. He came intothe Army at a time ofgreat significance andchange for the FieldArtillery. World WarI was the first large-scale use of indirectfire with the corre-sponding rise of therole of the forwardobserver.

After World WarI, he received hisBachelor of Sci-ence from Okla-homa A&M in 1920. He at-tended the Battery Officers School in1922, the Command and General StaffCollege in 1934 and the Army WarCollege in 1940.

Then in 1940-1941, he commandedthe 99th Field Artillery (Pack) withCaptain William O. Darby as one of hisbattery commanders. Darby later was theorganizer and leader of the World War II Darby’sRangers and noted for his innovative use of the 4.2-inchmortar. He credited Hays with teaching him much about theaggressive use of indirect fire.

Hays went on to command the 10th Mountain Division inItaly during World War II. He also commanded the US Forcesin Austria in 1946 and then the Sixth US Army, 1946-1947.Later, he served as the US Representative to the AlliedMilitary Government Coordinating Committee.

In 1953, Lieutenant General George P. Hays retired from theArmy. He died in September 1979. His other decorationsinclude the Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star with OakLeaf Cluster, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star and Purple Heart.

(Editor: Information for this article was taken from the “Ameri-can Artillery and the Medal of Honor,” Military History Mono-graph 49, by Field Artilleryman David T. Zabecki, USAR.)

A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs September-October 2000 · 2018. 2. 16. · Field Artillery...

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