A Problem in the History of Ideas

8/10/2019 A Problem in the History of Ideas

1/11

A Problem in the History of IdeasAuthor(s): Frederick J. TeggartReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1940), pp. 494-503Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707126.

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3/11

A PROBLEM IN THE

HISTORY OF IDEAS 495

political

and social

history. Pareto also

brings changes

in

ideas into

juxtaposition

with

political

phenomena.

Thus

he

observes hat

in

history

a

period of faith will be followedby a

period of

scepticism,

which will

in

turnbe followedby anotherperiod offaith, nd thisby anotherperiod of

scepticism,

nd

so

on

(?2341). He thendeclares that

oscillations n ideas

are

consequencesof social

movements,nd so infersthat

the alternating

periods

of

faith and

scepticismhave

to be correlatedwith other facts

(?2343). His next

step-and it is to be remembered hat

Pareto was a pro-

fessorof economics-is

to say that the oscillationswe are

trying o under-

stand are like

oscillations n the

econommic

ield (?2344).

If now we con-

sider

the formula

in

use by economists-depression

followed by

revival,

revivalby

prosperity,

rosperity y

crisis, risisby

depression

gain,

in con-

tinuous round-it will be recognized hat the patternunderlyingPareto's

argument s that of the

business

cycle.

So, too,

the increasing aware-

ness

of

oscillations n

ideas which

ProfessorLovejoy postulateswould seem

to be

another

expression

of the

extent to which the

imageryof economics

has

imposed tself n

the thought f themoment.

Confidencen

the

graphicrepresentationf

undulations, luctuations,nd

cycles

s

a

definite

hase

of

contemporarymentality.

There will

be many,

therefore,

o

agree

with

Pareto that the

effort

equired

for

an

investigation

of

the

history

f

oscillatory

heories

could

much

more

profitably e devoted

to objective studyof the phenomena hemselves, . . along with a search

for measurable

ndices forthe

phenomena

nd for a

classification f

fluctua-

tions

n

order

of

intensity,

iththe

object,

f

possible,

of

determining

hat

the

major

oscillations

re,

and of

discovering

few of the

very

numerous or-

relationsprevailing

between

oscillations

n

different

henomena (?2330).

The

policy

advocated

by

Pareto

is, then,

hat we should

accept

his

program

and

go

to

work.

The

plan cannot,

however,

e

endorsed

by

the

student

of

intellectualhistory,

or the

special activity

o

which

he is

committed

s

just

that

of

inquiring

nto the

history

f

theories

nd

patterns

of

thought.

He

might

ather

be

expected

to

wonderat the

emphasis

placed,

in

1940,

on

our

awareness

of

oscillations n

thought,

when

Aristotle,

wenty-two

r

three

centuries

go,

had remarked hat

the same

opinions ppear

in

cyclesamong

men

not once

or

twice,

but

infinitely

ften

(Meteorologia

. 339b;

De Caelo

I.

270b;

Metaphysics

XII.

1074b).

And

he

might

e

expected

to

wonder

t

the

current

nterest

n

a

type

of

cyclic

movement or

which

Machiavelli,

at

the

beginning

f

the sixteenth

entury,

rovided

he

pattern

n

his

Florentine

History: States,

he

said,

will

always

be

falling

from

prosperity

o

ad-

versity, nd from dversity heywill ascend again to prosperity. Because

valor

bringspeace, peace idleness,

dleness

disorder,

nd

disorder

ruin;

once

morefromruin

arises

good order,

fromorder

valor,

and from

valor

success

and

glory.

The

phenomenon

f

oscillation,

Professor

Lovejoy

thinks,

s

especially

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4/11

496

FREDERICK

J.

TEGGART

conspicuous

n

political

and social

history;

n

his

opinion

the successionof

absolute

monarchy,

emocracy,

nd

dictatorship

seems

to be the

all-but

universal

patternof the

sequencesof

politico-social

istory,

and

in

confir-

mation of this opinionhe argues that politicalhistory, as Polybius long

since

observed,

.

.

[has

much] the look

of a series

of

periodic recur-

rences. It

would

appear,

therefore,

hat

n

the fieldof

ntellectual

history

the

inquirer

may,

without urther

uestion, ccept

the views of

a political

historian

concerning he

course of

change in

forms of

government

s a

standard

by

which o judge

the

course of change

n

ideas.

Such being

the

case, it

is

essential

to notice

that n

theopinion of

Polybius every

body

or

state

or

actionhas

itsnatural

periods

first f

growth, hen

ofprime, nd

fin-

ally

of

decay (vi. 51.

4), and thatthe

cycle

ofchange n

political

organiza-

tion is the courseappointedby nature in whichconstitutionshange,de-

cline, nd finally

eturn

o thepoint

from

which hey

tarted (vi. 9.

10).

Professor

Lovejoy

mentionsthe

recurrences of

Polybius with ap-

proval,

but

withoutmaking

reference o the

reliance

which that

writer

placed

upon the

conception fthe

life

cycle. It is of

interest,

herefore,

to

notice that

other

writers f

recentyears

who have

accepted

the theory

of

recurrences

have even

been at

pains to disclaim

any

dependence

upon

the

analogy.

To

take

an

example,Dean

Inge,

in

the

Outspoken ssays

pub-

lished in

1922,was

emphatic

n

saying that

this

doctrineof

recurrence s

not

popularto-day; but,

he

continued,

whether

we likeit or

not,no

other

view of

the

macrocosm

s even

tenable (160),

and he

referred o

Goethe,

Nietzsche,

Kierkegaard,

and

Shelley

as

among

those who

adhered to this

belief.

Three

years

ater

(1925), however, e

found

t

necessary,

eemingly

in

response o

critics, o

speakof the

notion hat

civilizations row old

and

die

like

ndividuals

as

untenable, nd

wenton to

say that

there s no

valid

analogy

between

the life of

an

organism nd

that

of

society -yet in

the

same

article he

continued

o

employthe

analogy

in

discussing

the rise

and

fall of nations. Pareto found himself n a similar difficulty. n a par-

ticular

passage

(?2330)

he

gave

it as his

opinion that the

theoriesof

Dr.

Draper

(History

of

the

ntellectual

Development

ofEurope,

1864)

come

very

close to

experimental

ealities.

Draper

had

separated

the

intellec-

tual

progress

f

Europe,

like

that

of

an

individual,

into

five

periods:

the

ages

of

credulity,

nquiry,

aith,reason,

and

decrepitude.

In

a

second

pas-

sage,

after

quoting

Draper's

statement

bout

these

ages,

Pareto

(?2341

note) professed

hat

the

author

clearly

had

an

intuitive

erception

f

one

of

our

wide

oscillations,

but thenwent on to

say

that he

had

let himself

e

led astray by a mistakenanalogy. The fact is, however, hat Draper

was a

physiologist

who,

ater

in

life,

became

interested

n

intellectual

his-

tory;

and

if

he arrived at one

of

Pareto's

major

oscillations,

t

was

through

tracing

analogies,

as

he

himself

ays,

between

the

ife of

ndividuals

and

that of nations. Were Pareto

writingnow,

he

might

with

equal

propriety



5/11

A PROBLEM

IN THE

HISTORY

OF

IDEAS

497

claim

the

conceptions

f

Spengler

and

of

Toynbee

as

intuitive

perceptions

of his

larger

oscillations, ut

he

wouldagain be met

by

the fact

that

n

these

instances

lso the

patterns

ntroduced

had been

derivedfrom

he

biological

analogy. And

in

this

situation

t is worth

mentioning hat,

n

the judg-

ment

of 0. G.

S.

Crawford

Antiquity,

931,p. 6), no

one

except

Spengler

has

brought

the

wave

theoryof

civilization nto

relationwith

the

organic

concept

of

society nd shown

that

the

two are

really

nseparable.

Pareto

assumedthat he

might

dopt the

pattern

which

Draper utilizedin

his

His-

tory nd

yetreject

the

presuppositions pon

whichthe

pattern

was

based.

When,

however,

theory

ormulated

y an

earlier

writer s taken

over

by a

later,

acceptance of

the

conclusions eadhed

carries

with t

of

necessity

n

acceptance

of and

responsibility

or the

antecedent

teps.

The

procedure

bywhicha result s obtained s part and parcel ofthatresult. One cannot

admit the

validity

of

Bury's

contention

Idea of

Progress,

110)

whenhe

speaks of

those

truths

whichwere

originally

stablished

by

false

reason-

ing.

Professor

Lovejoy

approves

ofthe

ideas

of

Polybius

concerning

recur-

rences, but

does

notrefer

to

the

historian'suse

of

analogy.

As

a conse-

quence

he

does

not

find

ccasion

to

comment

pon

the

nsistence f

Polybius

on

the

conception

xpressed

n

the

terms

the

course

appointedby

nature

and

the

natural

periods

of

growth

nd decay.

Now

Polybius

was en-

tirelyfamiliarwiththeidea that each and everyformof lifehas a charac-

teristic life

history,

for then

as now

one

recognized

ctivity f

biological

inquiry was

a

determination

f

the

changes which

a given

organism

passes

through

n

its

development rom ts

primary tage until its

natural

death.

A life

history is the

course which

an

individual

of

a given

species

may

be

expectedto

follow,

f

nothing

nterferes. The

term

life

cycle, as dis-

tinguished

from

life

history,

applies

to the

series of

stages

which the

organism

xhibitsbetween

uccessive

recurrences

f

its

primary

tage.

In-

terest

n

the

way

things

naturally grow

or

develop

was

prominent

n

Greek thought. Thus Thucydides (i. 16) held that in all the different

localitiesof Hellas

the

peoples

would have

had a

similar

development

f

this,

in

certain

ases,

had

not been

nterfered

ith;

he

thought

hat certainof

the

Hellenic

peoples

had

met with obstacles

to their

natural

and

continuous

growth.

The

point of view is

characteristic

f

the

teachingof

Hippocrates.

In

his

judgment

the

first

usiness

of

medical

science

was to

determine

he

course

which diseases

normally

run,

so

that

in

each

particular case

the

physician

might

be

in a

position

to make a

prognosis,

might

be

able

to

tell

what was tobe expected. In his opiniontheaim ofthepractitionerwas to

protect he

patient

against

conditions

r

circumstances

which

might

nter-

fere

withthe

normal

ourse

of

the

disease and of

his

recovery.

The

concep-

tion

of

prognosis

was

adopted

by

Polybius,

as

is

clear,

rom

his remark

hat

he alone

who

has seen

how each

form

naturally

rises

and

develops,

will

be



6/11

498

FREDERICK J. TEGGART

able

to

see

when,

how,

nd where

he

growth, erfection,

hange,

nd

end

of

each

are likely

o

occur again (vi.

4.

12,

tr.

W.

R.

Paton).

Cicero's

way

of

thinking

was not

dissimilar: The

foundation,

he

said,

of that

political

wisdomwhich s the aim of our wholediscourse s an understanding f the

regular

curvingpaththrough

whichgovernments

ravel,

n

order

that,

when

youknowwhat

direction ny

commonwealthends to

take, you may

be

able

to hold it

back or takemeasures

to meet the

change (Republic

ii.

45,

tr.

C.

W.

Keyes).

The

type of

argumentwhich

appears

in

Polybius and

Cicero

was made

use of

by Machiavelli,

and

at no time since the Renaissance has

ceased

to

influence he

thoughtof Western

Europe. It lies back

of the

true

his-

tory of

Locke; the life

of

the

species whichRousseau undertook o write

after laying factsaside ; the natural order ofthings, which, n all the

modern

tatesofEurope, Adam

Smith

thought ad been, in many

respects,

entirely

nverted ;

the hypothetical

historyof a

single people

which

Condorcet

regarded

as

the

golden

mean between

historical

detail

and

philosophical peculation. The

procedure

exemplified

n

these

instances

was still

consciously

mployed

n the

earlier

part

of

the nineteenth

entury.

Comte,

for

example,thought

hat in

dealing

with historical

nformationt

was

necessary, or scientific

urposes, o stripoff rom t

whatever s

pecu-

liar

or irrelevant

n

order to

transfer t

fromthe

concrete o the abstract.

This is obviously he dea expressedbyWilliamWhewell, n his History of

the

Inductive Sciences

(1837):

Natural

History,

when

systematically

treated,

xcludes all that

s

historical,

or

t

classes

objectsby

their

perma-

nent

and

universal

properties

nd

has

nothing

o

do

with

the

narration

of

particular

or casual

facts.

In

the

twentieth

entury

ts

presence

s

evi-

dent

n

the various

theories

f

political

and

cultural

cycles

and

recurrences

which

are the

latest

developments

n the

long

endeavor to enlist

Hippo-

cratic

prognosis

n

the

service

of the

State.

It

will,

then,

be

apparent

that

theoretical,

conjectural, abstract,

or

natural

history,

s it was

spokenof

in the

eighteenth

entury,

was arrivedat

by

abstraction rom

he

actual

chronological

istory

f men

and

countries;and, further, hat ab-

stract

history

s

not

History

as the word

s

to be

understood n the

title of

the Journal.

The search for

natural,

normal, ypical

sequences of change,

whether

scillations,

ndulations,

recurrences,

r

cycles,

s

a

pursuit inap-

plicable to the

Historyof

Ideas.

In

his

Reflections Professor

Lovejoy

introducesoscillations

and re-

currences,

ot

by

way

of

contrast o

History,

ut

as

providing

n

alternative

to the dea ofprogress. Thushe opposes the oscillatory haracterofmuch

of

the

history

f

thought

to

the view

that

what we

chieflywitness n

the

temporal equence

of beliefs

. . . is

the

working

f

an

immanent

dialectic

whereby

deas

are

progressively

larified , nd, again,

he

sets

the idea

that

history

as muchthe

look of a series

of

periodic

recurrences over

against



7/11

A PROBLEM IN

THE

HISTORY OF

IDEAS

499

the notion that

it

moves

continuously

n some

particular

direction.

The

editor

s

notthe first o place

in

opposition

he dea of recurrences

nd

that

of

a single series

of

changes. Aristotle, ndeed,

remarked hat

Empedocles

supposes the course of Nature to returnupon itself,cominground again

periodically o its starting-point; hile

Anaxagoras

makes

t

move

continu-

ously without repeating itself

(Physics

I.

187a,

tr.

P.

H.

Wicksteed).

Among others,JohnStuart Mill,

a

century go,

in

his

Systemof Logic (VI.

x. 3) argued that,

from

he reciprocal

action

of

the circumstances

n

which

men

are

placed

and theireffortso mould

and shape

thesecircumstances

or

themselves,there mustnecessarily

esult

either

cycle

or a

progress ;

one

of

these,

he

thought, must

be

the

type to

which human affairsmust

con-

form.

He went on

to

say that, whileVico conceivedthe

phenomena

of

human societyas going throughperiodically the same series of changes,

later writers-and he has much to

say of Comte-' 'universally adopted the

idea of a trajectory r progress n lieu of an orbitor cycle.

There

were writers

n

Mill's period, however,who found the choice be-

tweenthe dea

of

a

cycleand that

of a

progress

ess

simple

than t

appeared

to

him.

Not

long

after

the publication

of the

Logic Herbert Spencer ex-

pressedthe conviction hat the

current onception f progresswas shifting

and

indefinite, nd set himself,

n

his

essay

on

Progress: its Law

and

Cause

(1857),

to

demonstrate

what

progress

was

in

itself.

The under-

takingwas accordedmore laborate reatmentn hisFirst Principles (1862),

and

thepointto be observed s that n

this ater work ch. 23, ?183) the argu-

ment ed him to the conclusion hatthe entireprocess f things, s displayed

in

the

aggregateof the visible

Universe, s analogous to the entireprocessof

things

s

displayed

n

the smallest

ggregates.

In

the next

paragraph

he

states

his

final

position,

nd this

s

that the

universally

o-existent

orces f

attraction nd

repulsion

. .

produce

.

.

.

alternate ras

of

Evolution

and

Dissolution.

And

thus,

he

continues,

there

is

suggested

he

conception

f

a past duringwhich herehave been successiveEvolutionsanalogousto that

which

s

now

goingon;

and a

future

during

which uccessive ther

uch Evo-

lutionsmay go on -presumably to

infinity.

t

is

certainly

fact

worthy f

notice hat a distinguished dvocate

of

the dea

of

progress hould,

n

the ast

resort, ave foundhimself ommittedo a theory f recurrences. Singularly

enough,

he

position

f Dean

Inge

is also anomalous.

In

his

discussion f

the

idea of

progress,

hiswriter

egan by

making

he

emphatic

tatement

n

favor

of

recurrenceswhichhas already

been

quoted,

nd

proceeded

o

denounce he

idea of progress, s he himself ays, unmercifully. Nevertheless,

n

the

courseof his essay,he came tothepointofsayingthathumanity as notad-

vanced

except by accumulating

knowledge

nd

experience

nd

the instru-

ments

of

living (175) -which

is

just whatadvocatesof theidea take it to

mean.

Moreover, is conclusion, hat

for

individuals, he path of progress

is

always open, renders

appropriate allegiance to the Stoic doctrine of



8/11

500

FREDERICK J.

TEGGART

progressio. It might e added that,whileSpencer was busy

with

his

Prog-

ress: its Law and Cause,

James Martineau

had

occasion

to

declare that

without large acquaintance

with he

history

f deas the

utmost

cuteness

and depth maywaste themselvesn reproducingdoctrineswhichhave run

their

ycle,

nd been

forgot.

The examples given, and they might readily

be

multiplied, suggest

strongly hat the deas

which

Mill regarded

as antithetical

ave

displayed

a

marked endency o appear

in

the same

iterary ontext nd even to maintain

themselves

n

the same mind. It

is not

remarkable, herefore, hat

in

the

published writings

f a

present-day

tatesman he

thought

hat there

is

a

mysterious ycle

n

human events should

crop up in the midst of an ever-

present ppeal to the dea ofprogress.

As

long ago

as the seventeenth

en-

tury,however, ascal, who contributedo the formation f the idea ofprog-

ress in his Preface to a Treatise on

Vacuum, recorded houghts f a dif-

ferent enor

n

his

Pensees: Man's

nature

s

not always to advance; it has

its advances and retreats (?354); Nature

acts by progress, tus et reditus;

it goes

and

returns,

hen advances

further,

hen twice

as much

backwards,

thenmore

forward han

ever,

nd so on

(?355).

In

his note to this

passage

M.

Brunschvieg

efers

o Herbert

Spencer;

he

would,however,

ave

found

a

closer

resemblance

n

the

writings

f

Madame

Blavatsky.

If the difficulty resentedby the

association

n

men's minds of ideas

apparently ncompatible s to be resolved,this end can be attained only

through

ecourse o the

history

f ideas.

Should

one, then,

turn

to

Bury's

history

f

the

dea of

progress,

e would

find hat the

first

tep

n

the formu-

lation

of a

complete

doctrine

of

progress

onsisted

n

a

simple

modifica-

tion of

the

analogy

between

he ife of mankind nd that

of a

single

ndivid-

ual.

Pascal

(in 1647)

had

argued

that not

only

does each

individual man

progress

from

day to day

in

knowledge,

ut

mankind s

a wholeconstantly

progresses

n

proportion

s the

universe

growsolder,

because the same

thing

happens

n

the succession f

men

n

general

s

in

the different

ges of a single

individual man; so the whole succession

of men, throughout he centuries,

should

be

envisaged

as

the

ife of a

single

man

who lives

forever

nd learns

continually (Oeuvres, 1908, I, 139).

Fontenelle

(in 1688)

likewise

util-

ized the analogybetween

the

men of all

ages

and

a

single

man.

This man,

he says,who

has

lived

from

hebeginning

f the

worldup to the present, ad

his

infancy

nd

his

youth,

nd

is

now

in his

prime;

but at

thispoint,Fonte-

nelle

continues,

he

comparison ails,

for

the man

in

question

will

have no

old

age

.

. . he will

be evermore nd more

capable

of those

hings

which

re

suitedtohis prime, in short, he writer hinks, herewill be no end to the

growth nd development

f human

wisdom

Oeuvres,1728, I, 134). It may

be

imagined

hat

n

the

realm

of ideas

great

oaks

do not

from

rifling

corns

grow. Yet

even

today

the author

of

Mysticism

nd

Logic,

in

discoursing f

the

dea

of

progress,

makes

the

endeavorto

recapture

r

possibly

o

modern-



9/11

A

PROBLEM

IN THE

HISTORY OF IDEAS

501

ize this same mode of thought.

An

extra-terrestrial

hilosopher, he

says

(106), who had watched a

single youth up to

the

age of twenty-one

nd

had

never come across any otherhuman being,

might onclude

that t

is the

natureof human beingstogrowcontinually allerand wiser n an indefinite

progress

towards perfection.

The argumentof Fontenelle,

it

may

be

added,

was

introduced s a

weapon

in

a literary

ontroversy,

nd

in

oppo-

sition to views which one

may find correctly,

hough undesignedly,

pre-

sented

n

Santayana

s

Soliloquies.

It appears, then, hat n

the attempt o arrive

at a comprehension fthe

facts of

human experience

differentntelligent ersons

at

the

present

time

represent hange as a

movementn a circle a life cycle ; in a

semicircle,

arc, or trajectory-a life

history ;

in

a series of

undulations

or

waves-

a sequence of life histories ; and in a straight ine. Further, t is nowevi-

dent

that these various ways

of looking at the historicalworld issue from

the

same

source-an analogy

betweenthemovement r motion

perceptible

in

human affairs

nd

the

growth

r

development f

a

living being.

The

theories

of

recurrence

nd

progress

like

have

their

ground

n

the

biological

analogy.

Nevertheless,

he

influence

f

the

theories

has

not

been

the

same,for,

while the one

impliesthat the natural course of

change,

f

not

interferedwith,will lead to

desirable results,

he other calls imperatively

for

action. On the onehand,as has

already

been

pointedout,

an

acceptance

of theconceptof the natural, held byHippocrates and employed n the

eighteenth entury, ound

expression n the

doctrine f laissez faire. Con-

doreet,on

the other hand, an

apostle

of

progress,wanted a science, not

merely

o foresee he

future

progress

of

mankind, ut to direct

and hasten

it.

Comte,too, based his Positive Philosophyon

the idea that from

sci-

ence

comes

prevision,

rom

prevision

omes

action ;

and the

purpose

of

his

newsciencewas the creationof

a new social

system.

In

our own day,John

Dewey

calls for a

foreseeing

nd

contriving

ntelligence

to

direct our

progress, nd puts primary emphasisupon responsibility orintelligence,

for

the

power

which

foresees, lans and constructs

n

advance.

It

is

only

a

step

from

this position to that of another

contemporarywho thinks

humanity must take the management of

things into its own

hands.

Moreover,

he

long way

that the advocates

of

action are

prepared

to

go

is

aptly

llustrated

y

Whitehead's

declaration Adventures f deas, 53)

that

Progress

consists

n

modifying

he

laws

of

nature, and the purpose

of

this dramatic

measure

s

that

the

Republic

on Earth

may

conform

o

that

Society

to

be

discerned

deally by

the divination f Wisdom.

It is time,however, o return to the Reflections which have incited

this

commentary,

nd to

ask

who

is

supposed to be referred o when

the

editor

aysthat we have

become ncreasingly

ware

of

the oscillatory har-

acter of

much

of the

history

f

thought. The

personal pronoun

obviously

does

not

apply to those

confidently ddressed in

the words, Most of us



10/11

502

FREDERICK

J.

TEGGART

accept

the

prosaic

fact

that the

way

to

make

progress

s to

build on what

we

have, and so forth.

It cannot

be

intendedfor

the

present-day

ollowers f

Kant,

Hegel,

and

Marx,

of

Rousseau and

Comte,

f

Charles

Darwin.

It

cer-

tainlydoes notrepresent hosewho stillhave faith n theChristian oncep-

tion of

history.

The

pronoun

must

tand,then,

or some

of

the

intellectual

elements

of a

population which

Pareto

disparaged

(?2344)

rather than

for the

persons

he

grouped

under

the masses

at

large.

The historianof

ideas,

however,will

not

concern

himselfwith

eitherof

these

groups

to the

exclusionof the

other,

hough

he

may

show

a

predilection

or

the recorded

views of the

intellectual

elements.

Hence

the

pronoun,

far from

ndi-

cating

an

increased

unanimity

f

opinion on a matterof

importance,

ctu-

ally directs

attention

o

large classes

of

persons who

remain

unaffected

y

or indifferento the ideas of oscillations, ndulations, nd cycles. If one

were to

hazard

a

parallel

to the

editor's

dea of

increasing

awareness,

it

mightbe

suggested that in

recent

years

popular literature n

the

United

States

gives

evidenceof

striking

ifferences

f

opinion

with

respect

o

inter-

pretations f

human

experience.

The

fact

that

these

differencesf

opinion

are

accentuated

may

be tested

by

a

moment's

reflection

n

the

probable

reception

n

any

group

should one

outspokenly

dvocate the

exact recur-

rence

of social

phenomena,

he

progress

f

mankind

owards

perfection,

he

economic

nterpretation f

anything, r the

view

that

events n

the

world

todayare in accordancewiththe

conscious

designs

of

Divine

Providence.

Earlier

in

these

comments

expressed

the

opinion

that

the

preference

shown

by

the

editor for

the

theory

of

oscillations

would lead

readers and

contributors o

overlook

the

existence

of

other

nterpretations

f

history.

The

remark

was not

ntroduced or

the

purpose

of

leading

up

to

some

alter-

native

view which

might

be

considered

preferable,

but

withthe

intentof

directing

ttention

o the

diversities

f

opinion

manifest n

the

writings f

our

contemporaries. The

remark

was,

in

fact,

nspiredby

the

observation

(recorded imeswithoutnumber n thehistory fscience) that all advances

in

knowledge

ince the

time of

Thales

and

Anaximander

have

been

the

out-

come of

inquiries

set on foot

by

the

perception

f

some

difficulty,

nomaly,

or

inaccuracy

n

accepted

explanations

or

explications

of

phenomena.

It

had

seemed,

ndeed,

when

the

publication of

the

Journal

was

announced,

that those

by

whom t was

instituted

must

have

been

convinced

that

the

present

menacing onfusion f ideas in

the

interpretationf

human

experi-

ence

not

only

called for

investigation,

ut

created

a

situation

in

thought

which,under

adequate

leadership,

held

promise

of

new

critical

and

con-

structive fforts.With thissituationand possibilityn mind, t was cause

for

acute

distress o

find he

editor

counselling

ll

and

sundrythat

the

his-

tory

of

human

thought

reveals

a

perpetual

swinging

of

the

pendulum

between

two not

entirely

unplausible

extreme

positions.

The

motion

may

be

doubted. Three

hundred

nd

twenty

earsago

it

was said

that

wise



11/11

A

PROBLEM IN

THE

HISTORY

OF IDEAS

503

and

serious men

are

wont to

suppose that in

the

revolution f

timeand

of the

ages of

the

world

the sciences

have

theirebbs

and

flows;that

at one

season

they

grow and

flourish, t

anotherwither

nd

decay,yet

in such

sort

thatwhentheyhavereached a certainpointand condition hey an advance

no

further.

But the

statementmade

then in

the Novum

Organumwas

not

given

as advice or

utteredwith

pproval-it was

putforward

o

describe

by far

the

greatest

obstacle

to the

advancement f

knowledge nd to

the

undertaking

f

new

tasks

therein.

The

problem owhich he

titleof

these

comments

efers

s

set

by the

mul-

titude

of

opinions

expressed at

the

presenttime

in

regard to the

meaning

and

significance

f

civilization

nd

culture. The

commentsmade

have

been

designed

to

show

that,

without he

conscioususe of the

history

f

ideas

as a

discipline,we go on generation ftergeneration, ot swingingbetweentwo

extremes,

ut

echoing

confusedly

he

conflicting

iews

which

have

been

accumulated

by

our

predecessors

n

the

course

of

centuries.

University

f

California

Editorial

Note

Professor

Teggart's

nteresting

nd

learned comment

n

a

single

page of

the editor's Reflections

n

the

History

of

Ideas in

Vol.

I,

No. 1,

is

espe-

ciallywelcome s a contribution owards hataim of mutual criticism nd

mutual

aid

which

is

not least

among

the

purposes

of this

journal.

In

further

ursuance of

this aim

the

editor had

proposed

to comment

n

turn,

in this

issue, upon

some of Mr.

Teggart's

observations

with which

he

finds

himself n

incomplete

greement.

To do

so

adequately,

however,

would

result n

devoting oo

much

of the

space

in

a

single number o one

topic, to

the exclusionof other

ontributions;

ublication

of

further

iscussionof

it

is

therefore eferred

o the

next volume. But

one or

two

apparent

miscon-

ceptionsof Mr.

Teggart about the

policy

of the

ournal should be

corrected

without

delay.

The

journal

is not

committed

o

any particular

interpre-

tation

of

historical

phenomena ;

nor does the

editor,

when

suggesting ny

suchinterpretation,speak in an authoritativemanner ; nor are contribu-

tors such

timid

folk

as Mr.

Teggart

seems

to

imagine.

On

the

other

hand,

the

editor

enjoys

(though

Mr.

Teggart

would seem

to

imply

that

he

should

not

enjoy)

the same

freedom f

opinion

as

other

contributors;

nd in the

Reflections,

fter

ndicating

n

thefirst

ection he

general

ims and

hopes

inspiring

he

foundation

f such

a

periodical,

he

proceeded

as

was

expressly

explained)

to

present

opinions

on

certain

currently

controverted

ues-

tions,

for

which

the

writer alone

[was]

responsible.

It is

therefore

difficult

o

understand the cause of

the

apprehensions

which Mr.

Teggart

intimates

n his

first

aragraph; at all

events, e,

and

others,maybe

assured

that theyare groundless-and also that,wherecontroversial uestionsof

interpretationnd

theory

re

concerned,

much

s

likely

to

appear

in

these

pages

to

which

no member f the

Editorial Board should be

presumed

to

subscribe.

ARTHUR

O.

LovEJoY

A Problem in the History of Ideas

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