A Pattern for Joint Operations World War II Close Air Support --North Africa

8/7/2019 A Pattern for Joint Operations World War II Close Air Support --North Africa

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Historical Analysis Series

A PATTERN FOR JOINT OPERATIONS:WORLD WAR I1 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, NORTH AFRICA

Daniel R. Mortensen

Office of Air Force History andU.S. Army Center of Military History

Washington, D.C.


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Library of CongressCatalogingin-PublicationDataMortensen, Daniel R.

A pattern for joint operations.(Historical analysis series)1. World War, 1939-1945--Campaigns--Af rica, North.2. World War, 1939-1945--Aerial operations, American.3. Unified operations (Military science) I. Title.

11. Series.~766.82.~ 6 31987 940.5423 87-19335

CMH Pub 93-7

First Printing 1987

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,US.Government PrintiwW~ceWashington,DC 20402


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FOREWORDT h i s s t u d y i n t h e H i s t o r i c a l A n al y si s S e r i e s e x a mi n e s a s u b j e c t of i m p o r t a n c e

no t on ly to t h e A r m y b u t also to t h e A i r F o r c e : t h e o r i g in a n d d ev e l o p me n t ofA m e r i c a n close a i r su ppor t doc t r ine and p ra c t i c e i n World War 11. Th e idea fo r t h es tudy re su l t ed f r o m a r ev i ew of t h e M e mo r a n d u m of U n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n t h eA r m y a n d A i r F o r c e c h i e f s of staff, concluded on 22 May 1984, and of t h ei n i t ia t i v e s t h a t e m e r g e d f r o m t h a t h i s to r i c d o c u me n t, p a r t i c u la r l y I n i t ia t i v e 24 ,which rea f f i rm ed t h e Ai r Force ' s mi ss ion to prov ide close a i r s u p p o r t to t h e A rm y .T h e p r o j e c t h a s b e e n a c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t b e t w e e n t h e U.S. A r my C e n t e r ofMili tary History and the U.S.A.F. O f f i c e of A i r F o r c e H i s t o r y ; a n A i r F o r c eh i s to r i an was a ss igned to w r i t e t h e s t u d y u n d e r t h e s u p e rv i si o n of t h e C e n t e r ofMil i ta ry Hi s to ry . Th e re su l t i ng work , u l t im a te ly t h e bes t j udgment of t h e a u t ho rbased on h i s to r i ca l ev idence , is t i t l ed A P a t t e rn fo r Jo in t Ope ra tions : World War I1Close A i r S u p p o r t, N o r t h A f r i ca . T h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n is o n t h e N o r t h A f r i c a nc a mp a i g n b e c a u s e t h a t w a s t h e f i r s t ma j o r l a r ge - u n it test of A me r i c a n g r o u n da rm ies i n World War 11, and in t ha t campa ign th e bas i c sys t em of close a i r s u p p o r tfo r A me r i can g round and a i r fo r ces i n World War I1 was f i r s t worked ou t .

Close a i r s u p p o r t d o c t r i n e b o t h t h e n a n d n ow is c r i t i c a l to t h e s e rv i ce s . A st h i s st u d y d e mo n s t r a t e s , t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t h a d b e e n c o n c e iv e d a n d p r a c t i c e d p r i o rto t h e f i r s t A m e r i c a n b a t t l e s of World War I1 f e l l apa r t i n t he mud and fog ofT u ni si a. B o t h a i r a n d g r o u n d c o mm a n d e r s i n 1 9 4 1 r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e c e s s i t y of c losec o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e staffsand fo r ces i n j o in t and combined fo rces. Wha t t he yh ad to l e a r n i n 1 9 4 2 w a s t h e d e g r e e to which close a i r s u p p o rt d o c t r in e te s t e d t h a tc o o p e r a t i o n a n d re q u i r e d a l t e ra t i o n . T h e s t r u g g l e of g r o u n d a n d a i r l e a d e r s tod e f i n e a n d c o n s t r u c t a c o mma n d a n d c o n t r o l s y s t e m, a n d u l t i ma t e l y to a l l o c a t e a n dc o mmi t p r e c i o u s a i r r e s o u r c e s to requis i te ground missions, has as many l e ssonst o d a y as it d id mo r e t h a n f o r t y y e a r s a go .

p r e p a r e f o r c o m b a t.W e b e l i e v e t h i s s t u d y me r i t s c a r e f u l r e a d i n g b y all t h o s e w h o mu s t p l a n a n d

RICH AR D H. KOHNChie fOffice of A i r F o r c e H i s t o ryWILLIAM A. STOFFTBri gad ier Gen eral , U.S. Ar myChief of Mil i ta ry History

Washington, D.C.1 A u g u s t 1987iii


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THE AUTHORD a n i e l R. Mortensen , a h i s t o r i a n w i t h t h e O f f i c e of A i r F o r c e H i s t o r y ,

rec e iv ed h i s B.A. and M.A. in h i s to ry f ro m th e Un ive rs ity o f C a l i fo r n ia , R ive rs ide ,a n d a d o c t o r a t e i n 1976 f r om th e Un ive rs i ty o f Sou the rn Ca l i f o rn ia (USC). Het a u g h t a t s e v e r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n s o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a , i n c l ud i n g U S C, P e p p er d i n e,a n d L o y o l a , a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y a c o u r s e i n a v i a t i o n t e c h n o l og y at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o fMaryland, College P a r k . B e f o r e c o m i n g t o Washing ton in 1981, h e se r ved as d e p u t yc o m m a n d h i st o r i a n of t h e A i r F o r c e C o m m u n i c a t i o n s C o m m a n d at Scott A i r F o r c eBase , I ll ino is . He spe c ia l i ze s in th e h i s to ry of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a v i a t i o nt e c h n o l o gy , a n d t a c t i c a l a v i a ti o n , a n d h e has g i v e n p a p e r s o n al l t h e s e t o p i c s . In1986 h e w a s t e m p o r a r i l y a s s ig n ed to t h e U.S. Arm y Cen te r o f Mi l i t a ry H is to ry , tow r i t e t h i s s t ud y . C u r r e n t l y , h e is c o m p l e t i n g a h i s to ry o f Wor ld War I1 tacticala v i a t i o n f o r t he O f f i c e o f A i r Force History .

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PREFACE

In 1984 i nc r e a s i ng c onc e r n a bou t j o i n t s e r v i c e ope r a t i ons oc c a s i one d t heC h i e f s of Staff of t h e U n it e d States A i r F o r c e a nd A r my to i nve s t i ga t e i n t e r s e r v i c ecoopera t ion . On 22 May Gen era ls Cha rle s A. Gab riel and Joh n A. W ickham, Jr.,s ig n ed a n a g r e e m e n t to i mpr ove t he ba t t l e f i e l d c oope r a t i on be t w e e n t h e A ir Forceand Army. Th e agr eem ent recommended th ir ty-one top ics, o r areas, c a l l ed t h e "31Init iat ives," for fur the r inves t iga t ion . In turn , Army and Ai r Force h i s tor i ansa g r ee d t h a t a s tudy of t h e o r i g in s of modern close a i r s uppor t p r a c t i c e s c ou l d he l ps he d l i gh t on one pa r t i c u l a r i n i t ia t i ve , na me l y, c u r r e n t close a i r suppor t p rac t i ces .A f t e r a pre l iminary inves t iga t ion of resea rc h resources , th e conc ept for th i smanuscr ip t was redef ined as a s tudy of doc t r i na l f o r ma t i on a nd close a i r s uppor tp r a c t i c e s du r i ng t he i mpor t a n t e a r l y pha s e s of World War 11. Archiva l recordsi nd i c a t e d t h a t g r ound a nd a i r l e a de r s ha d a n a b i d ing c onc e r n a bou t t h e n a t u r e a n dp r a c t i c e of close a i r suppor t in modern combined battle ope r a t i ons , a nd t he ycompi led a long and r i ch record . Thi s s tudy combine s resea r ch mate r i a l s , inc ludings ome ne w l y d i sc ove re d doc um e n t s f r om bo t h A r my a nd A i r F o r c e a r c h ive s , a nd itr e f l e c t s as w e l l t he c ombi ne d know l e dge a nd e f f o r t of both Arrny and Ai r Forcehistorians.

The s tory of event s in Washington and Nor th Afr i ca be tween 1939 and mid-1943, when the Al l i e s de fea ted Axis forces in Tuni s i a , has cur ren t s ign i f i cance .The in te rp lay of staff p l ann ing a nd a t t e m p t s to de f i ne doc t r i ne , t h e o r ga n i z at i on oft r a in ing and field ope r a t ions , a nd a d j us t m e n t s to t h e d e m a n ds of technology shouldbe ins t ruct ive . Gene ra l s George C. Marshall , Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H.Arnold, George S. Pat t on, J r., Om ar N. Bradley, Ca rl Spaa tz , and oth er air a n dground l eader s were v i t a lly concerned wi th th e cohes iveness of t he i r c ombi ne dforces-- that is, t h e s ha r e d unde rs t and i ng a mong t h e l e a de r s i n Wa sh ing ton a nd t h ec o m m a n d e r s at t he a t e r a nd t a s k f o r c e le vel s. A no t her a s pe c t t h a t rnay be ofi n t e r e s t to A r my s t ude n t s of close a i r s uppor t is t h e t e s t i n g of Wa r D e pa r t me n tdoc t r i ne i n t he muddy t e r r a i n of Tunis ia , under the cons t ra in t s of "the fog ofba t t l e, " t h a t typ i f i ed th e Al l ied expe r ience in Nor th Afri ca . Ai r For ce l eaders mayalso f ind , at t h e v e r y least, s o m e v a l u e i n t h e s t r u g g l e to define corrirnand andc o n t r o l s y s t e m s o r i n t h e a t t i t u d e s of ground personnel , e spec ia l ly th e l a t t e r ' s n eedto unde r s t and t h e c o r nni i tr ne n t of air-to-ground tasks.

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I t is a l t o g e t h e r f i t ti n g t h a t t h i s s tu d y of jo in t a i r-ground ope ra t io ns in WorldWar I1 shou ld r ecogn ize th e ea r ly s uppo r t of t h o s e A r my a n d A i r F o r c e p e o p l e w h ofound a h i s to r i ca l ana lys i s to b e i m p o r ta n t . A r m y Col. David Coope r and Ai rFo rc e L t . Co l . Edward Land of t h e J o i n t A s s e s s me n t a n d I n i t i a t i v e O f f i c e ; C o l .Ken Kisse l l of t h e C h i ef of Staff, USAF, Staff Group; Lt . Col. R o b e r t F r a n k a n dDr. Alexander S. Cochran, Jr . , of th e U.S. Ar my Cen te r of Mil i ta ry History; andMr. H er m an Wolk an d Col. F r e d S h i n e r of t h e Office of Air Forc e Hi s to ry- -each int h e i r o w n w a y o f f e r e d e n c o u r a g e me n t f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t of c l o s e a i rs u p p o r t a n d to t h e i de a of a c ross - se rv i ce r e sea rch p ro j ec t .

L i b r a r i a n s a n d a r c h i v i s t at th e U.S. Ar my Cen te r of Mil i t a ry Hi s to ry and att h e O f f i c e of A i r F o r c e H i s to r y w e r e p a r t i c u la r l y h e lp fu l. A t t h e C e n t e r ofMil i ta ry History Miss Hannah Zeidl ik , Ms. Barbara Wil l iams, and Ms. Geraldine K.J u d k i n s d u g o u t h i s t o r i c a l d o c u me n t s a n d r e c o r d s a n d f o u n d b o o ks r e l at i n g to t h esu bje ct. Mr. William C. H e i md a h l a n d M. Sgt . Roge r A. Je rn iga n at t h e O f f i ce ofA i r F o r c e H i s t o r y o f f e r e d a d v i c e a n d u n e n d i n g e f f o r t to t h e s e a r c h f o r ma t e r ia l s .Fina l ly , Mr. Hugh Howard, Mrs. Pa t r ic ia Tugwel l , and Mrs. Velma Jones at t h ePen tagon L ib ra ry and a rch iv i s t s Mr . Edward J. Re es e, Mr. W ilber t B. M ahoney, andMs. T e r e sa H a m m e t at t he Modern Mi l i t a ry Branch of t h e N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s an dR e c o r d s A d m i n i s t r a ti o n p r ov i de d v a l u a b le r e s e a r c h a s s i s t a n c e i n my s e a r c h f o rpe r t in ent World War I1 records . Spe cia l than ks is d u e to t h e s e c o m p e t e n t l i b ra r i an sa n d a r c h i v i s t s f o r t h e i r c o n t i n u e d p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e to demanding h i s to r i ans asmysel f .

A l l t h o s e w h o r e a d a n d r e r e a d d r a f t s of t h e ma n u s cr i p t d e s e r v e mo r er e c o g n i t i o n t h a n g i v e n in t h e s e f e w l i n es of cred i t . Much than ks wi l l rem ain in myhea r t . Neve r the l e ss , my apprec i a t ion ex t en ds to ma n y c o l l e a g u e s at t h e C e n t er ofMili tary History: Dr. Dav id F. Trask ; L t . Col. Rober t F rank ; Dr . Alexande r S.Cochran , J r . ;Maj. Bru ce P i rn i e ; Dr. Edga r F. Raine s , Jr .; L t . Col. David Campbel l ;Maj. L a w r e n c e M. Greenbe rg ; Maj. F r a n c i s T. Juli a , Jr .; an d Dr. Pa ul J. Scheips ,w h o k e p t m e h o n e st w i t h t h e A r m y v ie w p o in t a n d c o r r e c t e d by g r am m a r . A t t h eO f f i c e of A i r F o r c e H i s t o r y i mp o r t a n t r e a d e r s a n d a d v i s e r s in c lu d e d Co l. F r e dShine r, Mr. H er m an Wolk, Dr. B. Fr ank lin Cooling, Dr. G eo rge Watson, an d Dr.Wa y ne T h o mps o n. T h e y a l l e x p e n d ed g r e a t e n e r g y a n d t i m e i n t h e i r c r i t i q u e s of

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th e manuscr ip t . Addi t iona l advic e was cont inua l ly sought f rom Dr , F red Beck , Dr.Walton Moody, Lt. Co l . Vanc e Mitche l l , an d Maj. John Kre i s , whose knowledgeablem i nds he l pe d e xpa nd m y unde r s t a nd i ng of t h e v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d e v e n t s of WorldWar I1 Washington and Nor th Af r ica .

The ind iv idua ls involved in the pr epara t ion of th i s s tudy for publ ica t ion a l sode s e r ve s pe c i a l m e n t i on. A t the Ai r Force th ey inc lude : Dr. F red Beck , Mrs. A nneE. Andarcia , Ms. Vanessa Al len , Mr. David Chenow eth , Ms. Laura L. Hutchinson,and Mr . Ray Del Vil lar . Mr. John W. Elsberg; Mr.Ar t hu r S. Ha r dym a n ; Ms. Linda M. C a j ka who p r e pa r e d t h e c ha r t s , m a ps ,i l lus t r a t ions , and the cover ; Mr . Rober t J. Anz e l m o , m y e d i t o r ; a nd l a s t bu t r e a l l yf i r s t, m y p r o j e c t e d i t o r , Ms. J o a n n e M. Brignolo.

A t t he Ar m y t he y i nc l ude :

As e xpe c t e d , t h i s w r i t e r t a ke s f u l l re s pons ib i li t y f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i ons ,om i s si ons, a nd e r r o r s of fact.Washington, D.C.1 Augus t 1987 DANIEL R. MORTENSEN

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CONTENTS

P a g eP R OL OGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I. ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE, AND WEAPONS FOR CLOSE AIR S UP PO RT . . 6T h e I n t e r w a r Y e a r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Inc reas ing Inf luence of the Air Arm, 1938-1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9R e qu i r e m e n t s f o r He m i s pher e De f e ns e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Req ui r e men ts for War With the Axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Doc t r i ne f o r W a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Airc ra f t : Enabl ing th e Execut ion of Close Ai r Suppor t - . 24

11. N O R T H A F R I C A N C L O S E A I R S U P P O R T O P E R A T I O N S - * - * * 47World War I1 Ope r a t i ons a nd Nor th A f r i c a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Planning Close Ai r Suppor t f o r Nor th Af r ica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Opera t ions : TORC H Landings and the Of fens ive Aga ins t Tunis ia . . 56Opera t ions : Reorg aniza t io n and the Second Tunis ian Of fens ive . . . . . . . 6 2Opera t ions : Kasse r ine and a New Look a t Close Ai r Suppor t . - 7 0C l os e A i r S uppo r t Af t e r Ka s s e r i ne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3

E P I L O G U E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4

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MAPSNo. P a g e1. N o r t h A f r i c a a n d t h e Medi te r r anean , 1942-1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

543. Fi r s t Ac t ion in Tunisia , 16-23 November 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584. Co mp ara t i ve Dis tan ces of All ied and Axis Ai r f ields , De cem ber 1942 . . . . . 605. Am e r i c a n B a t t l e f i e l d i n S ou t he r n T un i si a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

-2. TOR CH Landings in Nor th wes t Af r ica , 8 Nove m be r 1942 . . . . . . . . . .

CHARTS1. C ha nne l s of T a c t i c a l C o n t r o l of C o m b a t Av i a t i on i n T yp i fi e dA ir S u p p o rt C o m m a n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 12. Al l ied Comm and Re la t ionsh ips in Nor th Af r ica and theMedi te r r anean , March 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4

ILLUSTRATIONS1. Cu r t i s s A-18s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292. Do ug las A-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293. Douglas B-18s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 04. M art in A-22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 . Nor th rop A-17. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 16. No rth Ame ric an B-25 "Mitchell1' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 27. M art in B-26 "Mau rader". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328. Doug l as 0 - 4 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 39. N o r t h A m e r i c a n 0 - 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3410. C u r t i s s 0 - 5 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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No..1 1.Taylorcraft 0 - 5 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12.St inson 0 - 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 3.Ryan 0 - 5 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14.Lockheed P-38 Lightning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15.Bell P-39 Airacobra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16.Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17.North American A-36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18.Douglas A-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19.Curtiss A-25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P a g e35363637373 83 83939

20.Curtiss C-46 Commando . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4021.Douglas C-47 Goo ney Birdt1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4022.Air Superiority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802 3.Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12 4 . C l o s e A i r S u p p o r t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Unless otherwise indicated. a l l i l lustrat ions are from U.S. Air Force f i l es.

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PROLOGUE

During World War I1 (1939-45), as t oda y , c l o s e a i r s uppo r t ha d a s pe c i a lno t o r i e t y a m ong t he m a ny t a c t i c a l a v i a t i on m i ss ions. An i nve st i ga t ion of e v e n t sa nd i s s ue s s i gn i f ic a n t to close a i r s uppo r t s houl d i l l u s t r a t e it s i m por t a nc e i n m ode rnw a r f a r e , as well as i t s c o m p l e x n a t u r e t h a t c a u s e d g r e a t c o m m a n d p r o b le m s d u r in gba t t l e f i e l d ope r a t i ons . Close a i r s uppo r t wa s a f f e c t e d by r a p i d l y c ha ng i ng wor l de v e n t s as t h e na t ion ' s m i l i t a r y f oc us s h i f t e d f r om a p e a c e t i m e to prewar s ta tus - - apos i t ion of c a u t i ous de f e ns i ve ne s s t ha t i nvo l ve d p r e pa r i ng fo r a he m i s phe r edefense -- and then , in De cem ber 1941, f r om a p r e w a r to wa r t im e s ta tus - - a pos i t ionof total o f f en s i v e n e ss i n E u r op e a n d t h e F a r E a s t , O t h e r f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h ei m po r t a nc e a nd e f f e c t i ve ne s s of c l o s e a i r s uppo r t i nc l ude d the a c c e l e r a t i n ginc idence of m obi l i t y , m e c ha n i z a t i on , a nd f i r e powe r i n m i l i t a r y ope r a t i onsc onc e p t s ; the p e r f o r m a n c e of i m pr ove d a i r c r a f t ; a nd t h e de c i s ions to m a k e g r e a t e ru se of a i r r e s ou r c e s i n ba t t l e . Close a i r s u p p o rt i ss ue s t h a t c a p t u r e d t h e g r e a t e s ta t t e n t i o n of t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t staff a nd f i e l d c om m a nde r s we r e u s ua l l yc onc e r ne d w i t h i de n t i f y i ng a i r c r a f t a nd pe r s onne l r e s ou r c e s , a nd t he i r s ubs e que n ta l l o c at i o n a n d c o n tr o l. T h e l a t t e r w a s e sp e c i a ll y i m p o r t a n t i n t e r m s of t a r g e t a n dmiss ion se lec t ion . Most a i r f o r c e l e a d e r s f e l t t h a t a i r r e s o u r c e s c o u l d c o n t r i b u t em o r e if used to a t t a c k e n e m y a i r c r a f t a n d g r ou n d t a r g e t s a w a y f r o m t h e h e a v il yde f e nde d ba t t l e f i e l d . Most f i e l d c o m m a n d e r s w a n t e d c o n t r o l of a i r f i re p o w e r sot h a t t h e y c o u ld m a s s f o r c e s f o r t h e g ro u n d b a t t l e ; t h e y w a n t e d c l o s e s u pp o r ta v i a t i on r e s ou r c e s , pa r t i c u l a r l y obs e r va t i on a nd de f e ns i ve f i gh t e r a i r c r a f t , to b ec ons i de re d o r ga n i c to t h e b a t t l e f ie l d a n d to be c om m a nde d by f i e l d c om m a nde r s .W hi l e c l o s e a i r s uppo r t p r oduc e d a nd s ym bo l i z e d a s t ru g g l e b e t w e en t h e a i r a n dg r ound a r m s of t h e A r m y , t h e s e n i o r l e a d e r s s o u g h t to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h ed i v i s i ve ne s s by f o s t e r i ng t he i de a t ha t s ubo r d i na t e c om m a nde r s m us t e nc ou r a gec ons ens us, cohe s i on , a nd c oope r a t ion . T h e r e we r e c ha l l e nge s enough j u s t l e a r n ingto c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e A l l i e s o n t h e u l t i m a t e d e f e a t of a d e t e r m i n e d e n e m y .B r a nc he s of t h e A r m y s h ou l d w o r k t o w a r d a n e f f e c t i v e c o m m a n d f ro n t . T h ep r o b l e m s a n d c o m p r o m i s e s t h a t f o l l o w e d i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s s t o r y of c l o s e a i rsupp or t dur ing Wor ld War I1 h a s a ve r y m ode r n f l a vo r a nd r e l e va nc e.

In t h e l a t e 1930s c l o s e a i r s uppo r t wa s m e s he d i n t o a ge ne r a l c a t e go r y known

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i n t h e p r e w a r d o c t ri n a l m a n u a l s as "av ia t ion in suppor t of ground forces."" T a c t i c a la v i a t i on , t he n , i nc l uded a l l t he s p e c i a l t i e s t ha t , e v e n t oda y , s uppo r t t he g r oundforces . Tasks inc luded t roo p t r an spo r t , a i r supply , long-d i stance r eco nna is sance ,de f e nd i ng a ga i n s t e ne m y a i r c r a f t ( e spe c ia l ly by m a i n t a i n i ng a i r s upe r io r i t y ), a nddis rup t ion of e ne m y s upp l y a nd c om m un i c a t i ons , as we l l as t h e t a c t i c a l t a s k sassociated wi t h c l o s e a i r s uppo rt . T he l a t t e r i nc l ude d ba t t l e f i e l d ob s e r va t i on a ndl ia i son , de fense of t h e b a t t l e f i e ld a n d f r ie n d ly t e r r i t o r y f r o m e n e m y a i r c r a f t , a n dbom bi ng a nd s t r a f i ng of e n e m y f o r c e s a n d w e a po n s in t h e i m m e d i a t e v i ci n it y ofba t t l e f ie ld opera t ions . Wi th a c ha nge i n t he m i l i t a r y m i s s i on to fit Weste rnHe m i s phe r e de f e ns e p r i o r i t i e s by 1939, a n d w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of f a s t e r a n db i gg e r a i r c r a f t , t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t m o d i fi e d t h e c o n c e p t s fo r e m p l o y m e n t oftactical a v i a t ion . C l o s e a i r s uppo rt , i n pa r t i c u l a r , wa s de va l ue d i n doc t r i na ls t a t e m e n t s .

A f t e r S e p t e m b e r 1939, as wa r e ns ue d i n W e s t e r n E u rope , t h e g r ound a r m s oft h e A r m y s a w a g r e a t e r n e e d f o r a l l k in d s of air s uppo r t a nd , in thus subsequent lys t r e s s e d t he i r de s i r e f o r c l o s e a i r s uppo r t . This happened at a t i m e w h e n t h e a i ra r m t h ink i ng a nd a v i a t i on t e c hno logy s ugge s te d t ha t a i r c r a f t ope r a t i ons o v e r t h em o d e r n b a t t l e f i e ld w ou ld n o t b e e f f e c t i v e o r p r a c ti c a l. A i r c r a f t w e r e toovulnerab le to e n e m y a n t i a i r c r a f t f i r e a n d co u ld n o t b e easily r e p l a ce d . C l o s e a i rs u p p o r t b e c a m e e v e n m o r e m a r k e d as a pa r t i c u l a r l y d i s t i nc t i ve , t r oub l e som e , a ndc om pl e x i ss ue. E ve n w i t h a dva nc i ng t e c hno l ogy , des i gn i ng s uppo r t a i r c r a f t p r ovedd i f f i c u l t . D i s a g r e e m e n t and de ba t e a bou t doc t r i ne i nc r e a s e d ; c ons e que n t l y ,

T he p r e wa r a nd e a r l y w a r m a nua l s d i d no t u s e t h e t e r m " c l o s e a i r s uppo rt." SeeAi r C or ps F i e l d M a nua l 1-5, E m p l o y m e n t of Avia t ion of t h e A r m y , 15 Apr i l 1940,whi c h s ugge s t e d s uppo r t a v i a t i on is poorl y s u i t e d f o r d i r e c t a t t a c ks . " The hos t il er e a r a r e a is t h e n o r m a l z o ne of a c t i o n of s uppo r t a v i a t ion . .. .)I W a r De pa r t m e n tTra in ing Ci r cu la r , The Army Ai r Force - -Bas ic Doc t r ine , 24 J u l y 1941, de c l a r e dt h a t o p e r a t i o n s "in close c o - ope r a t i on w i t h t he o t he r a r m s of t he m ob i l e Ar m y"w e r e s e c o n d a ry to i n t e r d i c t i on a nd a i r s up e r i o r i t y m i s si ons a ga i n s t i nva d e r s of t h eW e s t e r n He m i s phe r e ; a nd W a r De pa r t m e n t B a s i c F i e l d M a nua l 31-35,Avia t ion inS u p p o r t of t h e G r o u n d F o r c e s , 9 Apr i l 1942, discussed l l immedia te ' l and l lmored i s t a n t " t a r ge t s . R e po r t s f r om a i r - g r ound tests he ld as e a r l y as J a n u a r y 1941s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e a i r m e n a n d g r o u n d f o r c e l e a d e r s b o t h u n d e r s t o o d t h e m o d e r nl i m i t s a nd c a pa b i l i t i e s of c l o s e suppo r t a v i a t ion . T he y a r gue d a m on g t he m s e l ve so v e r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of a War D e p a r t m e n t d i r e c t i v e t h a t c a l le d f o r c o m p r o m is ea nd c oo pe r a t i on i n m ode r n i z i ng ai r -g r ound doc t r i ne .

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d e v e l o p me n t of o p e r a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s s t a l l e d i n lo n g d e b a t e s t h a t c o u l d n o t b es a t i s fi e d i n t h e ma n y f i e l d e x e r c i s e s h e l d to test t he deba ted doc t r ina l i deas . Al lt h e w h i l e a i r l e a d e r s g a i n e d a g r e a t e r say a b o u t a v i a t i o n ma t t e r s , b o t h thosedea l ing wi th suppor t of g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s a n d t h o s e c o n n e c t e d to s t r a t e g i c a i rwar fa re ope ra t ions . Wh a t e v e r t h e A r my A i r F o r c e s mi s s io n , its r i s ing inf luenceand g rowing independence cha l l enged t h e cohes ion of c o mma n d a n d p o i n t e d to t h en e e d f o r a n e w c o n s e n su s a mo n g c o e q u a l a i r a n d g r ou n d c o mp o n e n t c o mm a n d e r s .

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CHAPTER IOrganization, Doctrine, and Weapons for CloseAir SupportThe Interwar Years

In t h e i n t e r w a r y e a r s (1919-38) t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r my A i r C o r p s c o ns i d er e dg e n e r a l a i r s u p p o r t of g r o u n d f o r c e s a pr ime miss ion func t ion . Ai r suppor t av i a t ionu n d e r w e n t d r a ma t i c c h a n g e s i n t h e s e y e a r s as a i r me n a n d o t h e r mi l i t a r y a n dc iv i l i an th inke r s o f fe red new ideas on the app l i ca t ion of a i r p o w e r to warfa re .S t u d e n t s a n d f a c u l t y , t h i n k in g a b o u t a i r d o c t r i n e a t t h e A i r C o r p s T a c t i c a l S c ho o l,M a xw e ll F i e ld , A l a b a ma , r e p r e s e n t e d t h e a i r a r m 's g r e a t e s t e f f o r t to p r o j e c tav i a t ion in to mode rn war fa re . Because of t h e i r c o n c e r n w i t h a i r s u p p o r t , t h escho la r s a t M a x w e l l o u t l i n e d b a t t l e f i e l d t a c t i c s t h a t c o mb i n e d a i r c r a f t , t a n k s ,t rucks , and mobi l e f i e ld a r t i l l e ry . By 1935 t h e c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t facet of a i rs u p p o r t b e c a me d i f f u s e d i n a broade r , mul t i purpose concep tua l i za t ion of a i rs u p p o r t f o r t h e g r ou n d , o n e t h a t i n c l u d e d in t e r d i ct i o n a n d a i r d e f e n s e r o le s. T h eMaxwel l scho la r s began po in t ing to s o me r e v o lu t io n a r y c h a n g e s i n c o n t r o l of a i rsuppor t av ia t ion : a i rm en cen t r a l l y con t ro l l i ng a i r assets i n suppor t of t he g round ;t h e a i r c o mm a n d e r n o t n e c e s s a ri l y a u x i l ia r y to t h e g r o u n d f o r c e c o mma n d e r ; a n dt h e a i r f o r c e as a f u l l c o m b a t a r m , c o o r d i n a t e w it h t h e A r my. With t h e r is e ofd e a d ly a n t i a i r c r a f t f i r e , a i r me n b e g a n to d i scoun t t he i r ab i l i t y to prov ide c lose a i rsuppor t . 1

New miss ion po ten t i a l s fo r av i a t ion , e spec i a l ly coas t a l de fense and long-range bombing t a sks , p romised fu r the r absorp t ion of a i r suppor t r e sources . Qu i t eof t en Ai r Co rps i deas , e spec i a l ly t hose dea l ing wi th independen t s t r a t eg i c mi ssions ,r a n c o u n t e r to c o n c e p t s d e v e l o p ed a t t h e A r my C o mm a n d a n d G e n e r a l S t a ff S c ho o la t F or t Leaven wor th , Kansas , and the Arm y War Co l l ege , t hen in Wash ing ton . Onei d e a e x p lo r e d by t h e a i r m e n a t Maxwell and c re d i t ed to Wil l iam Mitchel l was tha tbombers a lone cou ld s top a n a v a l f o r c e . A n o t h e r , a t t r i b u t e d to t h e f a me d I t al ia np r o p h e t of t h e a i r G i u l io D o u h e t , s u g g e s t ed t h a t f l e e t s of bombers , air power a lone ,could force a n e n e m y n a t i on to su r rende r . *

A s w i t h a i r a r m o f f i c e r s , t h e g r o u n d o f f i c e r s t h o u g h t a b o u t t h e n e wmechan iza t ion of war . Vigorous deb a te occur red be twee n a i r and g round o f f i ce r s ,one t ime in pub l i c , as in the Billy Mitchell case. Occas iona l ly t he d i scuss ions u g g e s t e d to o t h e r b r a nc h e s of t h e A r m y t h a t t h e A i r C o r p s w a s r e l u ct a n t a b o u t a i r

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s u p p o r t in g e n e r a l , n ot c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t a l o n e . For t h e most p a r t , g r o u n d l e a d e r sf i r m l y h e l d to t h e t r a d it io n a l c o n c e p t t h a t a g r o un d a r m y w a s n e c e s s a r y to d e f e a ta n e n em y force a n d c a p t u r e t e r r i t o r y ; t h e a i r a r m w a s p r im a r i ly a n a u x il ia r y f o r c eto f u r t h e r t h e g r o u n d f o r c e m is si on . T h r o u g h t h e m i d - t h i r t i e s g r o un d o f f i c e r s ,h a v i n g t h e a d v a n t a g e of t e n u r e , h e ld t h e l e a d e r s h i p m a n t l e i n t h e G e n e r a l Staff a n di n t h e f i e l d . A l t h o u g h some of t h e s e g r o un d staff officers u n d e r s t o o d t h e c h a n g e si n a v i a t i o n a n d a l t h o u g h s o m e a i r d o c t r i n e t h a t A i r C o r p s l e a d e r s r e g a r d e d asp r o g r e s s i v e was p u b l i sh ed , g ro u n d -o r i en t ed sen s ib i l i t i e s co n t ro l l ed t h e p u b l i ca t i o nof W ar D e p a r t m e n t d o c tr i n e. G e n e r a ll y , c o m b a t a r m s s c h o o ls c h o s e n o t to i n c l u d ee v e n t h e m o s t e l e m e n t a r y n e w a i r p o w e r t h i n ki n g in t h e i r c u r ri c u lu m , f o r e s ta l l in gt h e e d u c a t i o n of g r o u n d o f f i c e r s at a t i m e w h e n a i r f o r c e r o l e s w e r e g a i n i n gi m p o r t a n c e i n m i l i t a r y f o r c e s w o r ld w i d e. B y t h e m i d - t h i rt i e s l e a d e r s of t h e A r m yG e n e r a l S t a f f , i n t e n t o n p r e p a r i n g a n a r m y f o r q u i c k m o b i l i z a t i o n i n case ofi n v a s io n , g a v e t h e A i r C o r p s r e s p o n s ib i l it y to o r g a n i z e a c o m b a t r e a d y a i r f o r c e . In1 9 3 5 t h e A i r C o r p s o r g a n i z e d t h e G e n e r a l H e a d q u a r t e r s (G HQ ) A i r F o r c e to c a r r yout t h e fu n c t io n .3

In t h e m i n d s of some g r o u n d o f f i c e r s , g i v i n g a i r m e n g r e a t e r c o m m a n d a n dc o n t r o l a u t h o r i t y f o r a l o n g s t r i k e o r b o m b in g f o r c e o n ly s h a r pe n e d t h e i r d e s i r e toc o n t r o l a l l a i r fu n c t io n s . B u t t h e f o r m a t i o n of G H Q A i r F o r c e d i d n o t i n c l u d ei n d e p en d e n c e c o m p a r a b l e to t h a t of t h e R o y a l A i r Force. G H Q A i r Force w a ss u b o r d i n a t e to t h e A r m y c h i e f of staff, o r h i s f ie l d c o m m a n d e r i n case of o v e r s e a sa ~ t i v i t y . ~A n e w t r a i n i n g r e g u l a t i o n , T R 4 40 -1 5, E m p l o y m e n t of t h e A i r F o r c e s oft h e A r m y , 15 O c t o b e r 1 9 3 5, c o d i f i e d t h e n e w A i r C o r p s m i ss io n , b u t a ls o s h o w edh o w a c o m p r o m i s e h a d b e e n w o rk e d o u t b e t w e e n e x t r e m e a i r a n d g r o u n d v i e w s o na i r a r m o p e r a t i o n a l in d e p e n d e n ce . If t h e ai r forces m i g h t c o n d u c t a i r o p e r a t i o n s i na n i n d e p e n d e n t m a n n e r a g a i n s t a n i n v ad i ng f o r c e b e f o r e g r o u n d a r m i e s m a d ec o n t a c t , T R 4 40 -1 5 r e a f f i r m e d A r m y d o c t r i n e t h a t " a ir f o r c e s f u r t h e r t h e m i s si o nof t h e t e r r i t o ri a l o r t a c t i c a l c o m m a n d e r to w h i c h t h e y a r e a s s i g n e d o r a t ta ch ed ." 5

More i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s ta n d i n g t h e c h a n g in g c o n c e p t of c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t ,p u b l i c a t i o n of T R 4 4 0 -1 5 r e p r e s e n t e d c l e a r c o n c e s s io n s to t h e a i r d o c t r i n ed e v e l op e d o v e r t h e y e a r s at t h e A i r C o r p s T a c t i c a l S ch oo l. E m p l o y m e n t p r i n c i p l e sd i s cu s s e d i n t h e m a n u a l i nc lu d ed : e m p h a s i s o n o f fe n s i v e a c t i o n , n e e d f o r c e n t r a lc o o r d i n a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , c o n s t a n t a n d p r i m a r y a t t e n t i o n to d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e

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e n e m y ' s air force, p r i o r i t y f o r p r e p a r a t i o n of a i r forces t h a t w o u ld u su a ll y p r e c e d eg r o u n d forces i n t o b a t t l e , a n d e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t a i r forces would be c o n c e n t r a t e da g a i n s t a p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e "n o t d i s p e r s e d or d i s s i p a t e d i n m i n o r o r s e c o n d a r yo p e r at ions>l6

So t h a t t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e a i r f o r c e s w o u l d n o t b e f r i t t e r e d a w a y , t h er e g u l a t i o n c o n t a i n e d a c o r o l l a r y p r i n c i p l e , l o n g p r o m o t e d b y t h e a i r f o r c e s ,c a u t i o n i n g a g a i n s t o p e r a t i o n s o v e r t h e b a t tl e f ie l d . E n e m y t r o o p s wo ul d b e s e c u r e l yf o r t i fi e d a n d p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t e n e m y a i r w i th e f f e c t i v e a n t i a i r c r a f t guns. G r o u n ds u p p o r t o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d be c o n d u c t e d r a t h e r i n a n a i r d e f e n s e m o d e , p r o t e c t i n gt r o o p s a g a i n s t e n e m y a i r c r a f t . A i r o p e r a t i o n s could i n t e r d i c t c o n c e n t r a t i o n o fe n e m y f o r c e s , a t t a c k c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d a m m u n i t i o n du m p s, a n d h a r a s s t h ee n e r n y ' s r e t r e a t . A p r i m a r y c o n c e r n o f t h e g r o un d c o m m a n d e r s , t o h a v e b o m b i n gf o r c e s a v a i l a b l e to a t t a c k a d u g - i n e n e m y or a n e n e m y a r t i l l e ry p i e c e , w a s n o ta d d r e ss e d . E v e n o b s e r v at i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e i m m e d i a t e b a t t l e a r e a s w e r e n o ts t i p u l a te d i n t h e r e g u l a t io n . T h a t c o m m a n d e r s i n t h e f i e l d wo uld h a v e to i n t e r p r e tt h e r e g u la t io n s w a s c l e a r l y i n te n d e d . T h e A i r C o r p s 1 u n o f f i c i a l d o c t r i n e h a d n o tw o n f u l l a c c e p t a n c e ; b u t , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e W a r D e p a r t m e n t h a d o p e n e d t h ed00r.7

In t h e l a t e t h i r t i e s t h e s u b j e c t of c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t c o n t in u e d to b e s e c o n d a ryto m o r e i m p o r t a n t p r o b l em s of n a t i o n a l w a r p la nn in g . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e a t t e n t i o ng i v e n to t h e r i s e of A d ol f H i t l er 's p o w e r i n G e r m a n y a n d t h e close a s s o c i a t i o na m o n g G e r m a n y , It a ly , a n d J a p a n i n 1938 p o i n t e d d o c t r i n a l t h i n k i n g t o w a r d s ad i f f e r e n t d e f e n s e c o n c e r n . W ar p l a n n e r s f e a r e d t h a t a n u n f ri e nd l y f o r e i g n p o w e rw o ul d u s e C a n a d a o r a S o u t h A m e r i c a n n a t io n as a j u m p i n g b o a r d t o a n i n v as i on oft h e U n i t e d States. T h e a i r a r m b e g a n to c o n c e n t r a t e o f f e n s i v e p l a n n i n g foro p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t su c h a n e n e m y f o r c e i n t h e W e s t e rn H e m i s ph e r e . T h e A i r C o r p sT a c t i c a l S c h o ol i n s t r u c t i o n i n c r e a s i n g l y e m p h a s i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f l o n g - ra n g eb o m b e r s , i n d e p e n d e n t s t r i k e f o r c e s , a n d i n d u s t r i a l t a r g e t i n g .

A i r p l a n n e r s w o r r ie d a b o u t c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t a i r c r a f t , a n d d i r e c t e d t h e i rc o n c e r n t o w a r d s f i nd in g a n a i r c r a f t t h a t w ou ld b e c o m p a t i b l e w i th m o d e r nE u r o p e a n w a r p r a c t i c e s . T h e m a i n e x p e r i m e n t a l a t t e n t i o n w a s gi ve n to b i g g e r a n df a s t e r " at t a c k " t y pe s . N e w m o d e l s w ou ld c a r r y m o r e m u n i ti o n s a n d h a v e g r e a t e rs p e e d a n d d e f e n s i v e a r m a m e n t . Th i s k in d of a i r c r a f t m e a n t o b s o l e s c e n c e of t h e

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t r ad i t iona l c lo se suppo r t r o le - -f ly ing low and s low to f i nd p re c i s e t a r ge t s , yet s t i l la vo id i ng e ne m y guns. In t he ne w ope r a t i ona l pa r a m e t e r s , t he l a t e s t a t t a c k a i r c r a f twould no t be ab le to h i t t he p r e c i s e t a r g e t s u s ua l ly a s s oc i a t e d w i t h c l o s e s uppo r ta v i a ti on . T he A i r C o r ps c ou l d f i nd no s a t i s f a c t o r y a i rp l a ne t ype to pr ov i de t ha tc lo s e- in s e r v i c e de s i r e d by t he i n f a n t r y c o m m a nde r on t he ba t t l e f ie l d .8

Increasing Influence of the Air Arm, 1938-1942In November 1938, concerned about Hi t l e r ' s bu l ly ing of major European

na t i ons at Munich t o ga i n t h e S ude t e nl a nd f o r Ge r m a ny , a nd t he e xpa ns i on a ndqua l i t y of E ur ope a n a i r f o r c e s , P r e s i de n t F r a nk l i n D . R oos e ve l t ope ne d w i de t hedoo r to a n Ar m y a v i a t i on re vo lu t ion . W ha t e ve r t h e v i e ws of t he W a r De pa r t m e n t ,t he p r e s i de n t wa n t e d to c om pl y w i t h E ng l i s h a nd F r e nc h r e que s t s f o r Am e r i c a na i r c r a f t , a nd h e t hough t by e xpa nd i ng t he A i r C o r ps t h e a i r c r a f t i ndus tr y wou ldp r oduc e m or e f o r e ve r yone . On t h e f o u r t e e n t h h e c a l l e d a group of h i s m i l i t a ryl e a d e r s t o th e Whi te House. Gen era l s Mal in Cra ig , Army ch ie f of staff, Ge or ge C.Marsha l l, dep uty ch ie f of staff, a nd He n r y H. Arnold , ch ie f of t he A i r C o r ps , we r ea m on g t hos e sum m one d. T he p r e si de n t s a i d he wa n t e d a n a pp r op r i a t e f o r c e f o rp r o t e c t i on of t he W e s t e r n He m i s phe r e a ga i n s t t he m e na c i ng i n t e n t i ons of Ge r m a nya nd It a ly . He wa n t e d t he Ar m y Ai r C o r ps , m ode rn i z e d w i t h t he l a t e s t c om ba ta i r c r a f t , to be t ha t f o rc e .9

If t he r e w a s e v e r a n e ve n t t h a t c ha nge d W orld W ar I1 c l o s e a i r s uppo r t , t h i swas it. C ongr e s s de ba t e d t h e a v i a t ion i s s ue f o r a f e w m on t hs , a nd t he n i n e a r l y1939 i t g a v e t h e A i r C o r p s t h e f i r s t i n a series of ve ry la rge budge t inc r eases . Thep r e s i de n t i a l a nd c ong r e ss i ona l a t t e n t i o n he l pe d i n f l a t e A i r C o r ps p r e s t i ge , g i v ing i ts p e c ia l ra n k a m o n g t h e A r m y c o m b a t a r m s . T h e n ew s t a t u s p o in t ed to pr os pe c t i veindependence f rom a subord ina te pos i t ion in a f i e l d a r m y , a nd f o s t e r e d a v i e w t h a ta i r-ground ope ra t io ns would have to be t hough t of i n t e r m s of j o i n t c om m a ndr e la t io n s. A t t h e v e r y l e a s t, t h e n ew i n f lu e n c e g a v e t h e A i r C o r p s g r e a t e r l e v e r a g eto a r g u e its view of g round suppo r t av ia t ion as wel l as o t he r m i l i t a r y a v i a t i onfunc t ions . 10

T h e case f o r t h e a i r a r m d i d no t de ve l op w i t hou t c oun t e r a r gum e n t s . F o r one ,t h e War De pa r t m e n t c onv inc e d C ongr e s s to i nc r e a s e s pe nd i ng f o r a l l m i l i t a r yforces . In 1939 C ongr e s s a pp r op r i a t e d l a r ge s um s f o r Ar m y e xpa ns i on a nd

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m ode r n i z a t i on , as we l l as f o r a v i a t i on . S e c ond l y , w i t h t he ons e t of World War I1 inS e p t e m b e r the gr ound f o r c e l e a de r s , i m pr e s se d by t h e e x t e ns i ve u s e o f a i r c r a f t i nt h e wa r f a r e , i nc r e a s i ng l y de s i r e d m or e a i r c r a f t as t h e y upda t e d g r ound wa r f a r eplans . When th e pa r t playe d by the d i ve bom be r s i n t he s t unn i ng Ge r m a n Ar m yv i c t o r i e s wa s pub l ic i z ed , t h e gr ound a r m s r a i s e d t he i r de m a nd f o r air s uppo r t a nds pe c i a l i z e d a i r c r a f t f o r c l o s e a i r s uppo r t . D i ve rg i ng v i e wpo i n t s , s t r ong lye xp r e s s e d , c a l l e d f o r c onc e s s i on a nd a c c om m oda t i on . 11

Ge n e r a l M a r sha ll 's l e a de r s h i p d i d no t a n t a gon i z e the a i r o f f i c e r s, as did someof his ch ie f of staff pr e de c e ss o r s . F r om t h e a i r m e n 's po in t of view, M ar sha ll was at r u e l e a d e r of a m ode r n a i r- g round t e a m . He s t ood ou t as a p r o m o t e r ofc om pr om i s e a nd c oope r a t i on i n t h i s t i m e of r a p id c ha nge i n g r ound a nd a i rre la t ionships . H e he l pe d i n s t i tu t i ona l i z e s om e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the Ge ne r a l S t a f fso tha t de ba t e s we r e no t a l wa ys pub l i c i z e d as i n t e r b r a n c h s t rugg l es . S om e i s s ue sha d i n t e r b r a nc h p r opone n t s a nd opponen t s : g r ound as wel l as a i r o f f i c e r s w h ow a n t e d g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n g i v en t o c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t v e rs u s t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s w h oa c c e p t e d e m p h a s i s o n i n t e r d i c t i o n ; o r a d v o c a t e s f o r c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l v e r s u st h o s e w h o w a n t e d a i r assets c on t r o l l e d a t a l owe r c om m a nd l eve l.

M a r s ha l l unde r s t ood m or e a bou t a v i a t i on t ha n m os t g r ound ge ne r a l s . O v e rt h e y e a rs h e h a d b e e n a s t u d e n t of ai r power . In 1938, w h e n h e f i r s t a r r i v e d i nWashington, he a c c om pa n i e d Ma j . Ge n . F r a nk M. Andr e ws , t he n c om m a nde r of t h eGHQ Ai r F o r c e ( t he ope r a t i ona l c om m a nd of t he A i r C o r ps ) on a t o u r ofc on t i n e n t a l a i r f a c i li t i e s. As de pu t y c h i e f of staff, in 1939, h e a n d C h ie f of t h e A i rC or ps Ar no l d , t oge t he r , " wor ke d ou t the d e t a i l s of a n e n t i r e a i r p l a n f o r the WarDepar tment . "l* When he as sum ed chief of staff d u t i e s i n S e p t e m b e r 1939,M a r s ha l l ga ve pos i t i ons on t h e Ar m y G e ne r a l S t a f f to l a r g e n u m b e r s of a i r o f f ic e r s .As we ll r e s pe c t e d as h e w a s, t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of Andr e ws as a s s i s t a n t c h i e f of stafff o r ope r a t i ons (G-3), t h en l a t e r as c o m m a n d e r of t h e P a n a m a D e f e n s e C o m m a n d ,t u r n e d heads a m o n g o l d A r m y l ea d e rs . A n d r ew s b e c a m e t h e f i r s t a i r o f f i c e r tohold the pos i t ions normal ly g iven to ground of f ice r s . Mar sha l l ma de i t a po i n t t oa ppo i n t staff o f f i c e r s a n d f i e l d c o m m a n d e r s w h o k n e w a b o u t t h e c h a n g e s i n a i rwar f a r e .13

Working ha rd to r e c onc i l e t he d i f f e r e nc e s be t we e n a i r a nd g r ound o f f i c e r s ,M a r s ha l l t o o k t h e p o si ti o n t h a t t h e a i r f o r c e s n e e d ed to o p e r a t e w i th a l a r g e d e g r e e

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of a u t onom y . He va l i da t e d t he func t i ona l d i s t i nc t i ve ne s s of a n d g a v e g r e a tindependence to t he a i r f o r c e s whe n he a pp rove d a n A i r S t a ff f o r Arnol d. In 1940a nd 1941 he a nd Ar no l d s aw eye-to-eye on th e long-argued i s sue of independencef o r a i r fo r c e s . W hile m a ny a i r a dvoc a t e s , in a nd ou t of t he m i l i t a r y , u r ge di nde pe nde nce a l ong t he R oya l A i r F o r c e m ode l, M a r s ha l l a nd Ar no ld a g r e e d t h a te x i s t i ng wa r c ond i t i ons p r e ve n t e d s uc h a r ad ica l r eorganiza t ion . S t i l l , wi th ther a pi d g r owt h o f t he Ar m y , t he s e l e a de r s unde r s tood t h e ne e d to r e ly ons ubo r d i na t e s , a nd t he y ga ve t h e staff of f i c e r s l o t s of r e i n a nd f i e l d c om m a nde r si nc r e a s e d a u t onom y- supple mentary p r e r oga t i ve s of c o m m and--e specially inope r a t i ona l m a t t e r s . Ar no ld ke p t h i s wor d, no t a dvoc a t i ng a n i nde pe nde n to r ga n i z a t i on f o r t h e a i r f o r c e s wh il e wa r c on ti nue d . I t wa s on ly na t u r a l f o r h i m ,howe ve r , to wor k c ons i s t e n t l y f o r g r e a t e r i n f l ue nc e of t he a i r a r m . T e c hn i c al l y ,Ar no l d ha d no c om m a nd a u t ho r i t y ove r f i e l d ope r a t i ons , bu t f ound e noughf lex ib i l i ty in t h e w a r t i m e A r m y G e n e r a l S t a f f a n d f i e l d c o m m a n d s to affect a i ropera t io ns a round the wor ld . The r is ing s toc k of a v i a t i on ga ve h i m , a nd o t he r a i rl e a de r s , m or e say i n t he de ve l opm e n t of a i r -ground doc t r ine . lQ

Requirements for Hemisphere DefenseT he Ge r m a n a t t a c k on P o la nd in S e p t e m be r 1939 v i t a l i z e d m i l i t a r y t h ink i ng

a bou t a i r wa r f a r e a nd pa r t i c u l a r l y s ha r pe ne d i n t e r e s t i n suppo r t a v i a ti on . T he W arD e p a r t m e n t s e n t o f f i c e r s of a l l g r a d e s a n d b r a n c h e s to Europe to o b s e r ve e v e n t sa nd s end ba c k r e po rt s . C on c u r r e n t w i t h e ve n t s i n Po l a nd , Ha r r y H. Woodring, thes e c r e t a r y of wa r , na m e d Ar no l d to f o r m a board of of f i c e r s , r e p r e s e n t i ng t heva r i ous Ar m y b r a nc he s, a n d to r e p o r t on t h e p r o j e c t e d e m p l o y m e n t of a n a i r f o rc e .O n 1 S e p t e m be r t he body p r oduc e d t he A i r B oa r d R e po r t . S ho r t ly t he r e a f t e r ,Mar sha l l a sked for a ne w s t a t e m e n t of a i r doc t r i ne ba s ed on t h i s r e po r t. W hen i twas publ ished the fol lowing spr ing, the Air Corps F ie ld l l i lanual (FM) 1-5,E m p l o y m e n t of Avia t ion of t h e Ar m y , wa s e s s e n t i a ll y , l ike t he A i r B oa rd R e p o r t , ac om pr om i s e doc um e n t . I t r e f e r r e d to major Ai r Corp s princ ip les , such as t h e n e edf o r a i r s u p e r i o r i t y a n d c e n t r a l i z e d c om m a nd . T he t r a d i t i ona l p r i nc ip l e of a i rw a r f a r e as an of f e ns i ve we a pon w a s no t e m p ha s i z e d be c a us e wa r p l a nn i ng wa s s t i l lg e a r e d to the l ike l ihood of a Weste rn Hemisphere de fense . The func t ion of

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r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d l i a is o n a i r u n i t s c o n t i n u e d to b e t h a t of s u p p o r ti n g t h e g r o un df o r c e s , a n d t h e a i r u n i ts r e t a i n e d t h e i r p e r ma n e n t a s s i g n m e n t u n de r g r o u nd forcec o mma n d s . T h e ma n u a l a ls o i d e n t i f ie d t h e ma j o r a i r m i s s io n s f o r c o m b a t o rweapons-car ry ing a i r c ra f t unde r t he CH Q Ai r Force . Along wi th l ong- rangeo f f e n s i v e s t r i k e s , a i r d e f e n s e a g a i n s t e n e my a i r f o r c e s , a n d mi s c e l l a n e o u s p a t r o la n d e s c o r t f u n c t i o n s , t h e ma n u a l l i s t e d a i r s u p p o r t t a s k s of d e e p i n t e r d i c t i o n a n d" a ir o p e r a t i o n s i n i mme d i a t e s u p p o r t of ground forces."l5

The g round b ranches ' v i ews were a l so inc luded in FM 1-5. T h e a i r f o r c e swere c l ea r ly d iv ided by spec i a l i zed func t ion , i nc lud ing spec i a l ly i den t i f i ed suppor tun i t s , to p r e v e n t t h e C H Q A i r F o r c e f r o m o v e rl o ok i ng g r o u nd s u p p o r t m i s si o ns asseem ed poss ib le wi th l ong- range bom bardm ent s t r i ke t a sk s be ing a ss igned h ighp r i o ri t y . T h e g ro u n d o f f i c e r s d id n o t w a n t a i r u n i t s b e i n g d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e C H QA i r F o r c e a t t h e l a s t m i n u t e . R a t h e r , t h e y w a n t e d a s u p p o r t a v i a t i o n f o r c eiden t i f i ed as a t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s w e a po n , g e n e r a ll y t a s k e d by t h e h i g h e r t h e a t e rcomm ander . Because in t h e Wes te rn Hemisphe re de fense war p lann ing g rounda c t i o n w a s l e s s p r o b a b l e , t h e g r o u n d f o r c e s a c c e p t e d f o r mi n g a s m a l l c a d r e a i rs u p p o r t f o r c e . T h i s s u p p o r t f o r c e w o uld b e f o r me d i n t o (la nuc leus of av ia t ione s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t of ground t roops and des igna ted fo r r ap idexpans ion to m e e t w a r r e q u i r e me n t s . In p e a c e t i me t h i s a v i a t i o n w i ll s e r v e as as ma l l , i mme d i a t e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r c e f o r u s e i n mi n o r e me r g e n c i e s a n d as al a b o r a t o r y f o r the c o n t i n u o u s d e v e l o p me n t of m e t h o d s f o r its employment.'116

T h e A i r C o r p s a l s o g a in e d e x p o s u r e f o r its v iews in t h i s 1940 f ie ld manual .FM 1-5 i nc luded su rp r i s ing ly modern a i r suppor t concep t s , some of which would bes h e l v ed w h en t h e f o r c e s o r g a n i z ed f o r t h e f i r s t test of b a t t l e in N o r t h A f r i c a. F o re x a mp l e , a " two-ha tt ed" con cep t was employed to e x p l a i n t h e a i r l e a d e r ' ss i mu l t a n e o u s c o mma n d of a i r u n i t s a n d s e r v i c e to the ground com man der . "As ac o m m a n d e r , h e c o m m a n d s a l l A i r C o r p s t ro o ps . . . .As a staff o f f i c e r , h e is t h ei m m e d i a t e a s s i s t a n t to t h e ( g r o u n d ) c o mma n d e r a n d a d v i s e r of h i s staff o n a l lav i a t ion ma tt er s. " Th e man ua l r ecogn ized th e weakness of a v i a t i o n i n a t t a c k i n gba t t l e f ron t enem y t roops. "Suppor t av i a t ion is n o t e mp l o y e d a g a i n s t o b j e c t i v e swhich can be e f fec t ive ly engaged by ava i l ab l e g round weapons ..., [ and] av i a t ioni s po or ly s u i te d f o r d i r e c t a t t a c k s ag a i n st s m a l l d e t a c h m e n t s o r t r o o p s w h ic h a r e

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we l l e n t r e nc he d or disposed." The manua l sugges ted th a t th e maximume f f e c t i v e n e s s of s uppo r t a v i a t i on "is secured th rough cen t r a l i z ed contro l. " Fur the r ,"combined opera t ions of a i r a nd g r ound f o r c e s m us t be c l o s e l y c oo r d i na t e d by t hec o m m a n d e r of t he c om bi ne d f o r c e a nd a l l ope r a t i ons c onduc t e d i n a c c o r da nc e w i t ha well-def ined plan." Then , recog nizing t h e c ons t r a i n t of l i m i t e d a i r r e s ou r c e s , t hem a n u a l s t a t e d t h a t o p e r a t i o n s i n i m m e d i a t e s u p p o r t of g ro u nd f o r c e s a r e c o n d u c t eddu r i ng t he c r i t i c a l pha s e s of c o m b a t a n d p r i or to a nd a t th e conclus ion of bat t le . I 'l7

Requirements for War With the AxisEnunc ia t ing pr inc ip les of c lose a i r suppor t in Apr i l 1940 d id no t a ddr es s t h ec om pl e x de t a i l s a nd p r ob l e m s of jo in t a i r -ground coopera t ion . The success of

Germany ' s combined a rms- - f i r s t in Poland , then in Wes te rn Europe dur ing thespr ing of 1940--encouraged C ong ress to s uppo r t f u r t he r a i r f o r c e e xpa ns i on a ndr e o r ga n i z a t i on a nd a r e e va l ua t i on of t a c t i c a l doc tr i ne . A f o r c e i n be ing ne ede dm or e s pe c i f i c p r oc e du r e s f o r j o i n t ope r a t i ons t ha n we r e ou t l i ne d i n FM 1-5.M a r s ha l l d i r e c t e d Andr e ws a nd h i s G -3 staff to s t udy t he is s ue a ne w. In S e p t e m be rAndrews i s sued a m e m or a ndum t ha t l i s t e d f i ve k i nds of a i r s uppo r t f o r g r oundf o r c es : c l o s e a i r s uppo rt , a i r de f e ns e of f r ie nd l y f o r c e s a nd i n s t al l a ti ons , r e a r a r e aa t t a c k , pa r a t r oop s uppo r t, a nd r e c onnai s s anc e se r v i c es . Andr e ws r e c om m e nde djoint a i r -ground tests to e v a l u a t e t h e c o n c e p t s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e f i r s t t w o , w h i c hr e qu i re d t h e g r e a t e s t e f f o r t i n c o o rd i n at i on . A f t e r a s t r ugg l e ove r t i m i ng ofexerc i ses , Mar sha l l d i r ec ted L t . Gen . Les ley J. McNair , ch ie f of staff of GHQ (ac om m a nde r ' s he a d qua r t e r s f o r a l l f i e l d f o r c es ) , to c o n d u c t a s e r i e s of exerc i ses .

F r om 1941 to 1944, as c o m m a n d e r of C H Q a nd Ar m y Gr ound F o r c e s , M c Na i rwas r espons ib le , wi th Arnold , f o r jo in t deve lopm ent of a i r s uppo r t , t a c t i c a l t r a i n i nga nd doc t r ine . M c Na i r o r ga n i z e d e xe r c i s e s t h a t b rough t t oge t he r va r ious a i r a ndg r ound un i t s to e xpe r i m e n t w i t h t i m i ng a nd i nnova t ive t e a m c om bi na t ions . M or et h a n o t h e r A r m y t r a i n i n g or ope r a t i ons o f f i c e r s , he p r om o t e d t e a m w or k a ndc oope r a ti on . M or e t ha n m os t , he pa t i e n t l y s u f f e r e d t h rough t he c on t i nu ingt e e t h i ng p r ob l e m s ge ne r a t e d by t he j o in i ng t oge t he r of t h e d i f f e r e n t c o m b a t a r m s .He c r i t i c i z e d s e l f- s er v ing a t t i t ud e s f r om t he a i r a nd gr ound b r a nc he s. He wa se s pe c i a l l y d i s t u rbe d by t h e a i r f o r c e t e nde nc y t owa r ds i nde pe ndenc e . He

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r e p u d i a t e d t h e v i ew of some a i r o f f i c e r s t h a t t h e a i r a r m c o u l d win a w ar by i t s e l f ,t he re by jus t i fy ing independence . He a l so opposed d ivi s ion com ma nde rs whod e ma n d e d c o n t r o l of t h e i r o w n a i r r e s o u r c e s , a n d h e r e l e n t l e s s l y e n d o r s e d t h euni ty-of - command p r inc ip l e . I 8

M a r s ha ll a l s o a d v o c a t e d c o n s i s t e n t ly the e l e m e n t a r y A r m y c o n c e p t t h a t u n i tyof c o m m a n d w a s p a ra m o u n t f o r success i n ba t t l e . Lessons of war sugges t ed to himt h e n e e d f o r a u n if ie d c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e . H e r e m a r k e d t h a t t h e G e r m a n v i c t o r ie si n P o l a n d a n d t h e L o w C o u n t r i e s w e r e f o u n d e d o n " c r e a t i o n of a s ingle h ighm i l it a r y c o m m a n d f o r a l l f o r c e s , w h e t h er of t h e l a n d , sea o r t h e a ir . ... In factt h e k e y to t h e mi l i t a r y s u c c e s s of G e r m a n y i n t h e p r e s e n t w a r h a s n o t b e e n t h eo p e r a t i o n of t h e a i r f o r c e s o n a n i n d e p e nd e n t b a si s b u t r a t h e r the subord ina t ion ofa i r p o w e r to t h e s u p r em e c o m m a n d of t h e a r m e d f o r c es . ...'#I9

A r no ld b e l i e v ed t h a t s t r a t e g i c b o m b a r d me n t s h o u ld b e a pr imary ing red ien t i nt h e b a t t l e w i t h t h e A x i s p o w e r s , b u t h e too espoused un i ty of c o mma n d , a l t h o u g hp e r h a p s n e v e r w i t h t h e f e r v o r of a p o t e n t i al f i e l d o r t h e a t e r c o m m a n d e r , s u ch asMcNai r and Marsha l l , and ce r t a in ly wi th a d i f fe ren t de f in i t i on of c e n t r a l i z e dc o m m a n d i n t h e s e p a r a t e a r m s. A r no ld m a d e p e rs i s te n t e f f o r t s t o satisfy groundf o r c e c o m p l a i n t s a n d s o l v e a i r s u p p o r t pr o b le ms . A s w i th M a r s h al l a n d o t h e rc o mm a n d i n g o ff i c e r s , h e h a d m a n y e s s e n t i a l t a s k s to p e r f o r m, a n d c l o s e a i r s u p p o r tw a s o n l y o n e of the a i r facets t h a t c r o s s e d h i s d e sk . O n e e x a m p l e of h i s c o n c e r no c c u r r e d i n 1 9 41 , w h e n t h e A r my A i r F o r c e s w a s c r e a t e d to g i v e t h e a i r f o r c e sg r e a t e r a u t o n o my . A g a i n s t t h e a d v i c e of staff members , Arno ld des igna ted , fo rt h e f i r s t t i m e i n a i r a r m h i s to r y , a f o r m a l a d v o c a t e f o r a i r su p p o r t. C o l . Wi llia m E.L y nd b e c a m e t h e f i r s t h e ad of t h e A i r S u p p o r t S e c t i o n of t h e A i r F o r c e C o m b a tC o mm a n d ( s u c c e ss o r to t h e G H Q A ir F o r c e i n J u n e 194 1). H e c o u l d f o c u s a t t e n t i o nt o w a r d s t h e a ir - gr o u nd t e a m w h e n mo s t n e e d e d , j u s t as t h e r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s f o rw a r a n d e mp h a s i s i n a i r m a t t e r s t u r n e d t o w a r d s s t r a t e g i c a i r w arfa re.* OWith the d r a m a t i c f o r c e e x p a n s i o n in 1 9 41 a n d r e o r g a n i z a ti o n s n e c e s s a r y toi mp r o v e c o mma n d a n d c o n t r o l , A r n o l d i d e n t i f i e d a d i s t i n c t o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r a i rs u p p o r t. In t h e n e w o r g a n i z a t io n t h e A r my A i r F o r c e s c o p i e d the Bri t i sh idea ofn u mb e r e d a i r f o r c e s " o n a T h e a t e r of Opera t ions pr inc iple ," to provide higher-e c h e l o n le a d e rs h i p . T h e s e a i r f o r c e s w o u ld co n t a i n s p e c i f ic t y p e s of c o m m a n d s ,s u c h as b o mb e r c o m ma n d s a n d f i g h t e r c o mma n d s . T h e c o mm a n d o r g a n i z a t io n

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r e f l e c t e d t h e h o p e t h a t p l a c i n g a i r c r a f t t y p e s t o g e t h e r w ou ld s i m p l if y t ra i n in g ,m a i n t e n a n c e , a n d l o g i s ti c s .

T h e n e w o r g a n i z a t i o n i n c l u d e d " a i r s u p p o r t c o m m a n d s " to " s e c ur e t h e c l o s e s tt y p e of c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e gr o u n d f o rc e s. "2 1 I n i ti a ll y , t h e a i r s u p p o r t c o m m a n d sw e r e f il l e d o n ly w i t h a i r u n i t s p r o v i di n g b a t t l e f i e l d o b s e r v a t i o n s e r v i c e s . L a t e r ,i n 1 9 4 2 , f i g h t e r s , d i v e b o m b e r s , a n d m e d i u m a n d l i g h t b o m b e r s w e r e p l a c e d u n d e rt h e a i r s u p p o r t c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e t o im p r o v e a i r s u p p o r t c a p a bi l it y . A t G H QM c N a i r a c c e p t e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s of f l e x i b i li t y a n d m a s s i n g of f o r c e s , w h i c h t h e a i rf o r c e s s t r e ss e d ; b u t , w i th t h e e m e r g e n c e of m e c h a n i z e d w a r f a r e , h e w o r r ie d a b o u ts p e c i a li z a t io n i n t h e a i r a n d g r ou n d a r m s . H e f e l t t h a t t h e i n c l u s i o n of d i f f e r e n tt y p e s of a i r c r a f t , as wel l as t h e v a r i a b l e u n i t c o m b i n a t i o n s , a d d e d to c o m m a n dconfusion.22 F o r a n u m b e r o f m o n t h s M c N a i r w a s u n h ap p y w i t h f o r m a t i o n of t h ea i r s u p p o r t c o m m a n d s , w h i c h h e d e c l a r e d w a s "o ne m o r e s t e p i n t h e s e p a r at i o n oft h e a i r f r o m t h e r e s t of th e Army.l l23

L t . G e n . D. C. E m m o n s , c o m m a n d e r of A i r F o r c e C o m b a t C o m m a n d , f e l to t h e r w i s e . H e e n v i s i o n e d a n a i r -g r o u n d s e c t i o n of a p r op o s ed a i r s u p p o r t c o m m a n dh e a d q u a r t e r s b e i n g p h y s i c a l l y l o c a t e d w i t h M c N a i r at GHQ. In add i t ion , h ep r o p o s ed t h a t c o o p e r a t i o n w o u ld b e e n h a n c e d b y l o c a t i n g s u b o r d i n a t e a i r s u p p o r tc o m m a n d s "at a i r d r o m e s n e a r e s t to t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e forces w i t h w h i c h t h e ywi ll work."24 Fu r th e r s tud y by th e Ge ne r a l Staff a n d t h e A i r C o u n c i l * c o n f i r m e dt h a t t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , w i t h its staff a n d c o m m a n d , w a s s u i t ab l e t o o v e r c o m e t h er e s e r v a t i o n s of t h e g r o u n d f o r c e s . M c N a i r a n d a i r staff o f f i c e r s a l s o a g re e d t h a ta i r s u p p o r t s e r v i c e e n t a i l e d m o r e t h a n j u s t a i r s u p p o r t c o m m a n d o p e r a t i o n s a n dt h a t " all c l a s s e s of c o m b a t a v i a t i o n of t h e A r m y A i r F o r c e s m u s t b e t r a i n e d a n di n d o c t r in a t e d i n p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e A i r F o r c e m i s s i o n, a n d i n s u p p o r t of t h e g r ou n da n d n a v a l forces."25 T h e d i r e c t i v e t h a t a p p ro v e d t h e a i r s u p p o r t c o m m a n d s s t a t e dt h a t n o t o n ly w o u ld a l l a i r c r a f t t y p e s a n d u n i t s "b e t r a i n e d a n d u s e d i n t h e s u p p o r t

F o r m e d i n M a r c h 1 9 4 1 a l o n g w i t h t h e A r m y A i r F o r c e s , t h e c o un c iI 1 s f u n c t i o n w a sto r e v i e w a n d c o o r d i n a t e m a j o r a v i a t i o n p r o j e c t s , I t c o n s i s t e d of t h e a s s i s t a n ts e c r e t a r y of w a r f o r a i r , t h e c h i e f of A r m y A i r F o r c e s , t h e c h i e f of t h e War P l a n sDivis ion of t h e G e n e r a l Staff, t h e c h ie f of t h e A i r C o rp s , t h e c o m m a n d i n g generalof t h e A i r F o r c e C o m b a t C o m m a n d , a n d o t h e r s as a p p o i n t e d b y t h e s e c r e t a r y ofwar .

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of gr ound f o r c e s" bu t t h a t un i t s o rga n i c to t he a i r s uppo r t c om m a nds wou l d no t" c ons t i t u t e t he s o l e a i r s uppo r t of t h e ground operations."z6

While the W a r De pa r t m e n t e xpe c t e d t he r e o r ga n i z a t i on of t he Ar m y Ai rF o r c e s to improve a ir -ground co opera t io n , ev en ts po in ted to a r educed po ten t ia lf o r t h e c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t facet of a i r suppor t. In th e f a l l of 1941 t h e WarDe pa r t m e n t t r a n s f e r r e d s om e a v i a t i on obs e r va t i on a nd l i a i s on un i t s a nd t he i rf unc t i ons to t h e o p e r a t io n a l c o n t r o l of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y c om m a nds . On l y p r oc u r e m e n ta n d m a j o r m a i n t e n a n c e of t he s e un i t s we r e ke p t unde r Ar m y Ai r F o r c e sresponsibi l i ty . Not on ly wou l d t he A r m y Ai r F o r c e s be l e s s invo lve d in t he c l o s e a i rs u p p o r t a s p e c t by t r a n s f e r of obs e r va t i on un i t s to a r t i l l e r y , bu t r e po r t s f r omE ur ope e nc ou r a ge d t he Ar m y Ai r F o r c e s to begin a l loca t ing fast f i gh t e r s a ndbom be r s to obs e r va t i on un i t s tha t t he y s t i l l c on t r ol l e d . T he f a s t e r a i r c r a f ts ugge s t e d l e s s c a pa b i l i t y f o r c ove r i ng t he s m a ll -s c al e , i nd iv i dua l iz e d t a r ge tas s ignm ents r eques ted by the ground command er s .

Or ga n i z a t i on of t he t he a t e r - e c he l on a i r f o rc e s- -t he T we l f t h A i r F o r c e as a nexample - -and the i r wide va r i e ty of a i r mis s ions pr esen ted a probabi l i ty of r educedc l o s e a i r s uppo r t c a pa b il i t y. A l l t ype s of c o m b a t c o m m a n d s a n d a l l m a jo r c o m b a tt y p e s of a i r c r a f t we r e i nc l ude d i n these num be r e d a i r f o r c e s. How t he i nc r e a s e di m p o r t a n c e of t he t he a t e r e c he l on d i m i n is he d p ro s pe c t s f o r c l o s e a i r s uppo r t c a n bei l lus t r a ted by M ar shal l% a i r po l icy s ta te me nt in 1941. In his l is t of "BasicP r i nc i p l e s of E m p l o y m e n t of t h e A i r C o m p o n e n t of t h e A r m y i n t h e O r d e r of T he i rP r i o ri t y " c l o s e a i r s uppo r t r anke d f i f t h i n p r i o r it y ou t of seven po te n t ia l mis sions.In te rd ic t ion of e n e m y a r m i e s a n d a i r f o r c e s , a i r s u p e ri o ri ty , a n d a t t a c k o n e n e m ys h ipp i ng ha d h i ghe r p r i o r i t i e s t ha n " c l o s e c oope r a t i on w i t h o t he r a r m s of the mobi lea r m y . . . .1127 While Mar sha l l ' s s t a tement was made wi th r e f e r ence to Weste rnHe m i s phe r e de f e ns e t h ink i ng , t he t u r n to European war p lanning did no t necessa r i lys ignify a c ha ng e i n t he f a l l i ng p r i o ri t y of c l o s e air support.28

B a t t l e f i e l d c om m a nde r s f a c e d a s i t ua t i on whe r e t he i r s uppo r ti ng a i rr e s ou r c e s we r e c on t r o l l e d a t a h i ghe r -e c hel on c om m a nd t h a t ha d d i f f e r e n tpr ior i t i e s. Co nt ro l o f mo s t a i r un i t s in a t h e a t e r w a s p ro j e c te d as t h e d o m a i n oft he t he a t e r c om m a nde r s . T h i s i nc l ude d t ra n s po r t s f o r d r opp i ng pa r a t r oope r s a nds upp li es ; obs e r va t i on a i r c r a f t to pr ov i de t he a t e r obs e r va t i on , r e c onna i s s a nc e , a nd

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l i a i s o n ; a n d t h e c o mb a t b o mb e r s a n d f i g h t e r s to a t t a c k e n e m y a v i a t i o n , t r o o pc e n t e r s , a n d c o mmu n i c a t i o n c h o k e p o i n t s , as well as e n e my t r o o p s o n t h ei m m e d i a t e f r o n t of t h e g r o un d f o rc e s . T h i s l e f t on ly t h e a i r s u p p o r t c o mm a n d s , ofunce r t a in cons t i t u t i on in 1941-42 , to b e c o n t r o ll e d b y b a t t l e f i e l d c 0 mm a n d e r s .~ 9

A i r a n d g r o u n d l e a d e r s w e r e u n e a s y at t h i s d iv i s ion o f a i r fo rce r e sources .F o r e x a mp l e , t h e a s s i s t a n t a i r c h i e f of staff for p lans , Br ig . Gen. Orvi l Anderson,s p o k e f o r s e v e r a l l e a d i n g a i r me n w h o f e l t t h a t a n y d i v i s i o n of t h e l i m i t e d a n dv a l u ed a i r r e s o u r c e s w e a k e n e d t h e mi l i t a r y p r in c ip l e of ma s s e mp l o y me n t . G r o u ndc o mma n d e r s i n t r a i n i n g a r g u e d f o r l a r g e r r e l a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u rc e s f o r t h ea i r suppo r t comm ands . Now--and th roughou t t he war --Army f i e ld com man ders andstaff o f f i c e r s , i n t r a in i n g a n d c o m b a t , c o mp l a i ne d t h a t t h e A r my A i r F o r c e s f a i l e dto p r o vi d e a d e q u a t e s u p p o r t a i r c r a ft . 3 0

T e s t i n g of t h e s e c o n c e p t s d u r in g t h e s e r i e s of War D e p a r t me n t ma n e u v e r s i n1941 w a s h u r t b y a s h o r t f a l l of a i r c r a f t a n d t r a i n e d sq u ad r on s . T h e ma n e u v e rp l a n n er s , a ir -g r o un d c o o r d i n a t o r s , a n d t r o o p c o mm a n d e r s w e r e f r u s t r a t e d w h e n t h eA r my A i r F o r c e s d id n o t p r o vi d e a d e q u a t e n u mb e r s of a i r c r a f t f o r p r a c t i c al t e s t in gof a i r s u p p o r t co o r d i na t io n . M c N a i r a l s o n o t e d t h a t t h e g r o un d f o r c e s f a i l e d toemploy th e l imi t ed number of ava i l ab l e a i r c r a f t r ea l i s t ica l ly . Arno ld exp la inedt h a t d i v e r t i n g s q u a d r o n s f r o m t r a i n i n g to t he maneuve rs would se r ious ly de l ayt ra in ing schedu le s . Ground fo r ce p l anne r s were n o t consc ious of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t sof a yea r- long t r a in ing p rogram, j us t fo r bas i c p i lo t i n s t ruc t ion . Marsha l l s i dedwi th Arno ld bu t o rde red h im to c o mp r o mi s e a n d s t r i p s o me a i r c r a f t a n d p e r s o n n e lf r o m t r a i n in g s q ua d ro n s . T h e e x e r c i s e s b e c a me m o r e c o mp l e x t h ro u g h the s u m m e ran d fall, b u t u l t i ma t e l y n o o n e was sa t i s f i ed wi th t h e a r t i f i c i a l i t y of a i r c r a f te mp l o y me n t , e v e n i n t h e i mp o r t a n t L o u i s i a n a a n d C a r o l i n a ma n e u v e r s i n l a t e1941.3l

A s e x e r c i s e d i r e c t o r , M c N a i r no w a p p r e c i a t e d t h e n e c e s s it y f o r t h e a i r a n dg r o u n d f o r c e s to emphas i ze bas i c i ns t ruc t ions wi th in t he i r r e spec t ive b ranches i nt h e m o n t h s a h ea d . H e a c c e p t e d the i d e a that p i l o t s h a d t o l e a r n to f l y a n d s h o o tbe fo re t r a in ing wi th t h e g round troops . In Decem ber 1941 he an d Arno ld p roposeda n o t h e r s e r i e s of ma n e u v e r s f o r 1 9 4 2 to exe r c i se t h e j o in t ai r -g round re l a t i onsh ip .T h e d e c l a r a ti o n of w a r a b r u p t l y c u r t a i l e d t h e s e p l a n s, as wel l as ma n y o t h e r p l a n sf o r a smo oth bu i ldup of fo rces .

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Ai r s uppo r t c om m a nd s t r uc t u r e a nd c onc e p t s f o r c l o s e a i r s uppo r t we r ese r ious ly d i s rup ted th roughout 1942.32 Arnold no ted in mid-February th a t c lose a i rs uppo r t un i t s " a r e s t i l l wa l lowi ng a round l ook i ng f o r s om e one who t a ke s a n i n t e r e s tin the m and in the ir act ivit ies."33 Even as l a t e as S e p t e m b e r , whe n l a r ge num be r sof f o r c e s w e r e c o m m i t t e d to c o m b a t , M aj . Ge n . J a c ob L. De ve r s, c om m a nde r ofarmo red fo rces , to ld Arnold th a t the r e was no a i r-ground suppo r t t ra in ing : "We a r es imply pu t te r ing . Can not someth in g be done abo ut it ?"34

By la te 1942 , as ope r a t i ons c a p t u r e d m or e f i r m l y t he a t t e n t i on o f a i r a ndground staff p l a nne r s a nd f i e l d c om m a nde r s , a num be r of p r o b l e m s a f f e c t e d t h equa l it y a nd qua n t i t y of a i r s uppo rt . R oos e ve l t s howed h i s s uppo r t of the Al l i es byc a l l i ng f o r p r oduc t i on of l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of Am e r i c a n a i r c r a f t , t h e r e byc ons t r i c t i ng t he f l ow of a i r p l a ne s a va i l a b l e to a i r f o r c e commands . With warde c l a r e d , a i r un i t s we r e hu r ri e d l y c onc e n t r a t e d a nd r e a rr a nge d. Ope r a t i ona lne c e s s i t ie s de c i m a t e d a i r s uppo r t a nd a i r c oope r a t i on de m ons t ra t i on un i ts . F o re xa m pl e , t he Ar m y Ai r F o r c e s d i s ba nde d t h e T hi rd A i r S uppo r t C om m a nd to he l pf i l l t h e n e e d s of t he ne wly fo r m e d E i gh th A ir F o r c e to be based in England. T heAr m y Ai r F o r c e s e l i m i na t e d t he F i f t h A i r S uppo r t C om m a nd a nd r e de s i gna t e d i tth e Nin th Ai r Forc e in Apr i l 1942 . The War Dep ar tm ent r emoved two of t h e f o u ra i r s uppo r t c om m a nds f r om t r a i n i ng a nd pu t t he m i n t o c oa s t a l pa t r o l d u t i e s to he l pc om ba t t he Ge r m a n s ubm a r i ne o f fe ns i ve a ga i n s t t he E a s t a nd Gu lf Coasts.

Marshal l , responding to or ga n i z a t i ona l i na de qua c i e s r e ve a l e d by t h e t i m e ofP e a r l Ha r bo r , r e o r ga n i z e d t he G e ne r a l Staff in March 1942. Gen era l Hea dqu ar te r sbe c a m e Ar m y Gr ound F o r c e s , a nd bo t h t he Ar m y Gr ound F o r c e s a nd Ar m y Ai rF o r c e s ga i ne d g r e a t e r i nde pe nde nc e of a c t i on . T he r e o r ga n i z at i on a l s o r a i s e d thel e ve l of susp ic ion be twee n air a nd g r ound o f f ic e r s. Gr ound o f f i c e r s kne w t ha t t hea i r f o r ce of f ic e r s eyed jea lous ly th e Br i t ish mode l fo r ai r -ground suppor t . In theR o y a l A i r F o r c e t h e a i r u n i t s w e r e n o t a t t a c h e d to gr ound c om m a nde r s at a n yl e ve l . T he a i r c om m a nde r m a d e t h e dec i s ions on u se of a i r s uppo r t r e s ou r c e s.

A i r a nd g r ound l e a de r s we r e a l s o at odds ove r t he a i r f o r c e i n s i s t e nc e ont r a i n i ng bom be r un i t s i n s t r a t e g i c a nd i n t e r d i c t i on bom bi ng t e c hn i que s be f o r et r a i n i ng t he m to s uppo r t the ground forces . As a r e su l t , t h e A r m y A i r F o r c e s t h e nde c l a r e d t ha t w i t h t i m e r unn i ng s ho r t , f i gh t e r a nd m e d i um bom be r p i l o t s wou ld no tr e c e i ve a r m y s uppo r t t ra i ni ng . T he g r ound a r m s c om m a nds w e r e a l s o su s p ic i ous of


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t h e n a me c h a n g e s g iv e n t o a i r u n i t s d es i g n a t e d to provide c lose a i r su ppor t (ground-a i r suppor t comm and , g round suppor t comm and , a i r suppo r t command) . In t u rn ,s o me g r o un d c o mm a n d e r s a sk e d f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n of a ded ica t ed g round suppor t a i rf o r c e , f e a r i n g t h a t s u p p o r t w o u l d n o t c o me a n y o t h e r w a y . In spi te of t h e i r f e l tn e e d s , t h i s r e q u e s t s u g g e s t e d a l a ck o f apprec i a t i on fo r the comp lex i t i e s of a i ro p e r at i on s . I t a l s o w e n t in t h e face of a pr inc iple he ld by some of t h e staff inWash ing ton tha t mode rn g round fo rce un i t s shou ld be more f l ex ib l e and l e ssencu mb ered wi th r e spons ib i li t i es , such as ma n a g in g a i r u n i t 0 p e r a t i o n s .~ 5

T h e a i r f o r c e s mo d i f i e d t h e t y p e s of a i r c r a f t a s s i g n e d a i r s u p p o r t u n i t sseve ra l t ime s in 1942 , add ing l i gh t bombers and then d ive bombers , med iumbombers and f igh te r s , g iv ing the g r o u n d c o mma n d e r p o t e n t i a l access to b e t t e rg r o u n d a t t a c k r e s o u r c e s . Bu t t he p rob lem of g iv ing g round t roops r ea l i s t i c a i rs u p p o r t t r a i n in g c o n t i n u e d t hr o u g h t h e r e ma i n d e r of 1942. In r ea l i t y , t h e re s implyw e r e n o t e n o u g h b a s e s , a i r c r a f t , o r t i me as the deman ds of war ove r rodee x p e c t a t i o n s of prope r t r ain ing . Even the a i r r ep re s en ta t iv es a t t he g rowingn u mb e r of ground fo rce schoo l s and t r a in ing fac i l i t i e s compla ined abou t poor a i rsuppor t t r a in ing exe rc i se s because o f a de f i c i ency in a i r c ra f t numbers .

McNa i r showed an apprec i a t i on of t h i s d i l e mma , a c c e p t i n g the s h o r t a g eprob lem wi th a i r c ra f t and p i lo t s. Arnold ag ree d th a t "p r io r it y com mi tm ent s ,spec i a l d ive r s ions , and re s t r i c t ed f low of a i r c r a f t to A r my A i r F o r c e s h a v epreven ted [ the] fu l l e s t de s i r ab l e a l l oca t ion of com ba t av i a t ion fo r .. .Ground-AirSuppor t t r a in in g~1 36 Som ewha t op t imi s t i ca l ly , Arnold and McNai r sawi mp r o v e me n t s f o r 1 94 3, b u t A me r i c a n f o r c e s w e r e c o mm i t t e d w i t h o u t realistic a i r -g round t r a in ing dur ing the confused bu i ldup subsequen t to t he i nvas ion of Nor thAfrica.37

Many chang es in Arm y av ia t ion be tw een mid-1940 and mid-1942 a f f ec t edc lose a i r suppor t . Most impor t an t was acqu i s i t i on of a s t r a t e g i c mi s si o n t o b o mb ap o t e n t ia l e n e my ' s w a r -ma k in g i n d u st r y t h a t e n c o u r a g e d g r e a t e r c o n t r o l of a i rr e sources by a i rmen . A r eo rgan iza t ion of air u n i t s i n t o air f o r c e s s i mi l a r toE u r o p e a n a i r f o r c e mo d e l s n o t o n l y p r e c i p i t a t e d g r e a t e r c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l b ya i rmen bu t a l so d iv ided a t t en t ion o r ig ina l ly g iven to c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t a n d o t h e rg round suppor t ma t t e r s . The a i rmen co mpen sa t ed by o rgan iz ing bo th spec i a l a i rs u p p o r t c o mma n d s to conso l ida t e un i t s p rov id ing c lose a i r suppor t fo r the ground

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f o r c e s a nd by f o r m i ng a h e a d q u a r t e r s staff office de d i c a t e d to a i r s uppo r t a ndr e l a t i ons be t we e n a i r a nd g r ound a r m s . Ai r and ground leader s d i scussed themeshing of f o r c e s i n a po t e n t i a l E u r ope a n wa r s c e na r i o a nd t h e W ar De pa r t m e n the l d e xe r c i s e s to test new theor ies . With t im e a t a premium in 1942 , subsequent tothe bu i ldup of f o r c e s f o r ope r a t i ons , t he W ar D e pa r t m e n t c ou ld no t i n s i s t onrea l i s t i c a i r -ground t r a in in g eve n i f the r e was a g r e a t n e e d f o r b e t t e runde r st a nd ing be t we e n a i r a nd g r ound f o r c e s.

Doctrine fo r WarIn spi te of l i m i t a t ions , p l a nne r s a nd c om m a nde r s u s ed t he 1941 m a ne uve r s asthe bas i s , a long wi th obse rver s ' r epor t s f rom Europe , f o r a f i na l doc t r i na l

s t a t e m e n t o n a i r s u p p o r t p r io r t o c o m m i t t i n g l a r g e n u m b e r s of Amer ican groundf o r c e s to c om ba t . As w i t h FM 1-5 in t h e prev ious year , t h e ne w W a r De pa r t m e n tmanua l , FM 31-35, Avia t ion in Suppor t of Ground Forces , publ ished 9 Apri l 1942,w a s a jo in t e f f or t , p roduced by ground and a i r r epresen ta t iv es . By co nt r a s t ,howe ve r , t he y we r e m or e c onc e r ne d w it h the or ga n i z a t i on t ha n w i t h t he t e c hn i que sof a i r s uppo r t. T he y o f f e r e d no p l a ns f o r ba t t l e f i e l d ope r a t i ons a nd no p ri o r it y f o rta rge t s o r mis sions. F ina l ly , t h e y equivo ca ted abo ut c lose a i r suppor t: "Airs u p p o rt t a r g e t s o n t h e i m m e d i a t e f r o n t o r f l a n k s of s uppo r t e d un i t s a r e ge ne r a l l yt r a n s i t o r y t a r g e t s of opportunity." In t h i s i n s t a nc e t he y r e c om m e nde d t h e divebom be r as t he p r ope r a i r c r a f t t ype f o r c l o s e a i r s uppo r t , a l t hough t he a i r l e a de r sha d c l e a r l y s t a t e d t ha t t he d i ve bom be r wou l d be i ne f f e c t i ve i n c l o s e a i r s uppo r twhe r e t he e ne m y ha d good de f e nse s . T he m a nua l s ugge s t e d t ha t de e p i n t e r d ic t i onta r ge t s were th e a i rman ' s choice.38

Ne i t he r we r e t he m a nua l wr i t e r s c l e a r a bou t t he s e ns i t i ve a s pe c t s of t h ec om m a nd r e l a t i ons h i p i n j o i n t ope r a t i ons ( C ha r t 1). I n one a s pe c t t he y we r ere la t ive ly s t r a igh t forward : He- - tha t is, th e a i r suppo r t commander --was l lhab i tua l lyattached t o o r suppor t s a n a rm y in th e thea te r. " Wearing t h e c o m m a n d h a t , h e h a dd i r e c t c o n t r o l of a l l a i r c r a f t un i t s , c a r r y i ng ou t t he ge ne r a l t a s k ing o r de r s f r om a na r m y or t a s k f o r c e c om m a nde r . W e a ri ng t h e staff h a t , h e s e r v ed as t h e a r m y staffa i r suppor t spec ia l i s t , g iv ing advice and sugges t ions to t he g r ound a r m o f f i c e r sa b o u t e m p l o y m e n t of a i r c r a f t i n t he g r ound ope r at i ons. A t bo t h l eve l s, c om m a nd

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Chart 1- Channels of Tactical Control of Combat Aviation in TypifiedAir Support Command

Army

Air Air Air1 Div -Support 2 Divs- Support 3 Divs-SupportParties ControlPartiesI IU

Normal ground force command--- Air support control----- Direct control- Coordination31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, 9 Apr 42 , p.4.

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A Pattern for Joint Operations World War II Close Air Support --North Africa

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