Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–2559

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Energy Policy

0301-42

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A participatory approach to sustainable energy strategy developmentin a carbon-intensive jurisdiction: The case of Nova Scotia

Michelle Adams a,n, David Wheeler b, Genna Woolston a

a School for Resource and Environmental Studies, Dalhousie University, 6100 University Avenue, Suite 5010, Halifax, NS, Canada B3H 3J5b Plymouth Business School, University of Plymouth, Cookworthy Building, Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 14 July 2010

Accepted 4 February 2011Available online 1 March 2011

Keywords:

Sustainable energy policy

Stakeholder engagement

Participatory approach

15/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. A

016/j.enpol.2011.02.022

esponding author. Tel.: +1 902 494 4588; fax

ail address: adamsm@dal.ca (M. Adams).

a b s t r a c t

The need for governments to reduce the exposure of energy consumers to future increases in fossil fuel

prices places urgent pressure on policy-makers to deliver fundamental transformations in energy

strategies, particularly in jurisdictions with high dependency on fossil fuel sources (Dorian et al., 2006).

This transformation is unlikely without a high level of stakeholder engagement in the policy

development process. This paper describes two policy development processes recently undertaken in

Nova Scotia in which the inclusion of stakeholder views was central to the approach. The first deli-

vered a new institutional framework for electricity energy efficiency involving the inception of an

independent performance-based administrator. The second required the delivery of a strategy to

significantly increase renewable energy generation in the Province. It involved recommendations for

changes in institutional arrangements, financial incentives and technological options. This process was

followed by new commitments to renewable energy developments, new infrastructure for the

importation of hydro-electricity, and the announcement of FITs for ocean energy. In both cases,

recommendations were made by an independent academic institution, and the Government responded

directly to a majority of recommendations. The paper concludes with a discussion of lessons learned

and the implications for future energy policy making in carbon-intensive jurisdictions.

& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In the 1990s renewable energy policy was largely motivatedby environmental considerations (Lipp, 2007). Today, energysecurity, which first showed up as a policy driver in the 1970s(Lipp, 2007) seems to have once again emerged as an additionalimportant factor (Chatham House, 2010). Particularly where ajurisdiction’s energy resource base is dependent on imported,non-renewable fuels, the sense of urgency to promote indigenousrenewable energy has increased (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006;Lipp, 2007). The number and diversity of stakeholders who areinterested in pursuing alternatives to fossil fuel energy generation– or who are impacted by the adoption of related strategies suchas energy efficiency or renewable energy development – can bedaunting for policy-makers to address. And yet public pressure formeaningful responses to climate change and the need for govern-ments to reduce the exposure of energy consumers to potentiallyvery significant rises in future fossil fuel prices puts urgentpressure on policy-makers in fossil fuel dependent jurisdictions

ll rights reserved.

: +1 902 494 3827.

to deliver radical transformation in energy strategies in theshortest time possible (Dorian et al., 2006).

However, fundamental transformation is unlikely to occur in theabsence of a high level of stakeholder engagement in the policydevelopment process (Dorian et al., 2006; Ricci et al., 2010). In thispaper we describe two public policy development processes under-taken in Nova Scotia in 2008 and 2009 in which the inclusion ofstakeholder views and aspirations were central to the approach. Thefirst process was the delivery of a new institutional framework forelectricity energy efficiency involving the inception of an indepen-dent performance-based administrator. The second process wasmore complex and required the delivery of a strategy to significantlyincrease the level of renewable energy generation in the Province.The intention was to develop recommendations for changes ininstitutional arrangements, financial incentives and technologicaloptions that arose directly out of the input of all relevant stake-holders. Thus, the Government could respond directly to theconcerns and input of stakeholders, embedding this contributioninto the policy development process. In both cases recommenda-tions were synthesized and delivered by an independent academicinstitution and in both cases the Government received andresponded directly to a majority of policy recommendations. Thepaper concludes with a discussion of what was learned from theseprocesses and the implications for future energy policy making in

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–2559 2551

carbon-intensive jurisdictions that face significant transformationalchallenges.

2. Emerging approaches to policy development—theimportance of independence and accountability

As energy prices rise and the importance of successful imple-mentation of energy conservation and renewable energy strategiesincreases, the need for accountability and transparency in policy-making will be paramount (Ricci et al., 2010). Stakeholders willinsist that the policies are reflective of the broader public interestand that any institution involved in the delivery of such strategieswill need to demonstrate the validity and objectivity of their role.

The increasing complexity of contemporary energy policyissues, which combine economic, ecological, cultural, politicaland technical dimensions, invokes the needs for expanded ana-lyses of policy implications (Vigar and Healey, 2002; Holmes andScoones, 2000; Munda, 2004). There is a growing recognition thatincluding broader interests in the policy development process isessential for effective outcomes (De Marchi and Ravetz, 2001;Vigar and Healey, 2002). Stirling (2008) goes further to suggestthat accountability is enhanced when stakeholder can recognizetheir contributions embodied within the outcome as well as theprocess, rather than their involvement simply being a requiredelement of a deliberative process. Specific to achieving successwithin a renewable energy agenda, it has been suggested that toovercome the fossil fuel dependencies that some believe influencecurrent political, economic and technical assumptions – and arethereby built into the current energy markets – entirely newpolicy measures will be required which build on these emergingrealities (Mendonc-a et al., 2009).

It has been argued that where broader stakeholder interestsare sidelined, it is likely that sustainable energy markets willremain largely centralized, inefficient, increasingly costly andexclusive (Mendonc-a et al., 2009; Mitchell and Woodman,2010). This phenomenon is argued to be counterproductive whenthe aim is meaningful penetration of renewables (Juhl, 2010).Therefore, new measures must include new actors, as it is theirinput that could provide balance to the historical vested intereststhat have been seen to influence energy policy development untilnow. In the past, policy development has typically developedsubject to political factors and the needs and views of thesepowerful interest groups, often those groups that stood to benefitmost from the status quo of ongoing fossil fuel dependence(Van Rooijen and van Wees, 2006; Zoellner et al., 2008). Thus,as policy makers design strategies to meet sustainable energygoals, they are faced with growing pressure to ensure thatdecisions are taken with transparency and accountability thatsatisfies diverse constituencies (Rayner, 2010). As Zoellner et al.(2008) noted, if people feel left out of the planning process anddecision making, they will be more likely to oppose the processoutcome. Mitchell and Woodman (2010), for example, found thatheightened concern about the level of effectiveness and appro-priateness of renewable energy policies in the UK resulted in alack of trust about the policy development process. Such situa-tions could have implications for policy makers to generatesupport around decisions that require buy-in at a societal levelto be successful.

In should also be noted that stakeholder participation andaccountability is often very important for the successful develop-ment of renewable energy industries—particularly in jurisdictionswhere it is key to secure long-term stakeholder (particularlycommunity) support (Lipp, 2007). Successful jurisdictions, for exam-ple those in continental Europe (Meyer, 2003; Gan et al., 2007; Lipp,2007), have sought to ensure that such energy strategies were

developed with maximum stakeholder engagement and minimalpolitical uncertainty and interference. Recent research conducted inOntario revealed that one of the most important factors influencingthe unsuccessful development of renewable energy technology andthe associated skill capacities was the instability of the policy andfiscal environment (Holburn, 2009).

Clearly, the ‘rules of the game’ in policy making for sustainableenergy strategies are changing (Van Rooijen and van Wees, 2006).However, it is important to note that participatory methods are notan alternative to scientific expertise and more technical assess-ments, but, they are a necessary complement to the process bybroadening the number of dimensions that are considered (Holmesand Scoones, 2000). Policy development that actively promotes theinclusion of a multiplicity of stakeholders can succeed in improvingtransparency, accountability and understanding—conditions forimproved sustainable energy policy outcomes (Zoellner et al.,2008; Agterbosch et al., 2009; Mendonc-a et al., 2009).

3. Implications for participatory processes for sustainableenergy policy

What emerges from the practice-based observations describedabove is that policy making as a traditional ‘top down’ bureau-cratic process where policy makers heed only the input of a selectfew actors is insufficient to address the policy requirementsneeded to address the complex issues of today. It is necessaryto improve the quality of the information involved by activelyintegrating insight and expertise from a broader set of sourcesthan is typically available to the bureaucratic process. As such, theinclusion of stakeholders in the process – right from the ‘problemdefinition’ – through to the development of the policy that willguide the ‘solutions’ will aid in addressing potential emergentproperties and conditions (and thereby creating a more resilientframework) that would otherwise be overlooked.

Decision makers who recognize the complexity of contempor-ary policy processes will need to think and act differently thanthey have in the past. Decision makers will need to employ novelmethodological approaches to address the various factors at playand meet higher stakeholder expectations. This suggests a morecreative and innovative approach that is responsive to emergingpatterns and can respond to shifts in social and other systems asrequired. Successful strategy-development that can addressemergent properties will necessarily involve stakeholder input.Using participatory approaches, particularly in situations of highstakeholder expectations and/or low trust/social capital (Nahapietand Ghoshal, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002), policy-makers candemonstrate openness to diverse, multi-disciplinary opinions andexpertise, and therefore co-create successful policy developmentprocesses directly with stakeholders. Mendonc-a et al. (2009)reiterated the importance that this innovative democracy couldplay in creating a decision making process that formally inte-grates all relevant stakeholders, thereby garnering improvedsocial capital within the stakeholder ranks and simultaneouslyaccelerating renewable energy project development.

The adoption of a policy strategy informed by this kind of openapproach, i.e. one of being adaptive to stakeholder expectations andthe policy-induced behaviours, can help overcome the issue ofmistrust between the various actors (Thompson, 2006; Rayner,2010; Ricci et al., 2010). Proponents of an approach that involvespolicy makers being responsive to emergent information describean increasing number of cases with successful outcomes (Buchholzand Rosenthal, 2004; Thompson, 2006). Specifically, some of thenumerous proposed benefits of participatory approaches to sustain-able energy policy development (Holmes and Scoones, 2000;

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–25592552

De Marchi and Ravetz, 2001; Vigar and Healey, 2002; Khan, 2004;Munda, 2004) include the following:

�

better appraisal of proposed policies; � framing of policy issues in broad terms, including all sectors of

society and the environment;

� generating novel policy solutions; � reducing opportunism by committing participants into a range

of interdependent decisions;

� addressing the growing distrust in the policy process and

towards related institutions;

� promoting consensus building; � promoting higher public acceptance and legitimacy of policies; � generating shared ownership of policy outcomes, which assists

in subsequent policy implementation;

� promoting citizen empowerment; and � increasing the knowledge and democratic capabilities of citizens.

However, care is also required with such approaches. Thequality of the participatory process depends on a number offactors such as the accuracy of information provided to theparticipants, the degree to which the dialogue includes expertisefrom a range of institutional actors, and the diversity of viewsrepresented. The degree to which participants weigh issues onmerit versus the way they relate to the participants’ specific self-interest is also important (Fishkin, 2002a, b). As De Marchi andRavetz (2001) note, frustration can arise when participants fearthat participatory approaches are used as a means of deflectingprotest, inhibiting actions or controlling outcomes.

Within the sustainable energy policy development process, themost frequent call for public participation has been at theplanning stage when new generation facilities are being sited.This has been in part due to fears of local opposition that oftenemerge at this stage, and hence many researchers encourageparticipatory approaches during this phase (Upreti, 2004; Upretiand van der Hors, 2004). In particular, researchers have promotedlocal stakeholder inclusion during the siting of wind farms,largely as a means of bridging the divide between nationalenvironmental objectives and local concerns (Blazquez Garcıaet al., 2003; Khan, 2004; Jobert et al., 2007; Soderholm et al.,2007; Wolsink, 2007; Wustenhagen et al., 2007; Agterbosch et al.,2009). Some have suggested that it would be appropriate toinstitutionalize participation in energy development policy fra-meworks in order to enhance the likelihood of acceptance at thelocal level (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007; Wustenhagen et al.,2007; Agterbosch and Breukers, 2008; Agterbosch et al., 2009).

There is rather less discussion in the literature about publicparticipation related issues focused on demand-side managementand energy efficiency processes. However, numerous recent pub-lications have focused on the importance of developing trustamongst the various stakeholders to effect positive transitions tomore sustainable energy systems, including the policies thatunderpin those transitions (Bellaby, 2010; Kydd, 2010; Ricciet al., 2010)

Many methods have been used to engage stakeholders in theformation of policy, including mediation, citizen juries, consensusconferences and referendums (Smith, 2001; Fishkin, 2002a, b).Enzensberger et al. (2002) offer an approach that begins with theformation of a precise political target based on an analysis of thetechno-economic characteristics of the energy supply system andexisting market mechanisms. Following the creation of this target, aniterative and participatory evaluation of policy options is suggested.

Other research into the development of sustainable energypolicy by Greening and Bernow (2004) suggested that a diversityof stakeholder preferences can be incorporated into energy policyanalyses, for example through multi-criteria decision-making

(MCDM) methods used in an integrated assessment (IA) frame-work. However, while these and other examples demonstrate thatpublic participation during the formation of sustainable energypolicies has been discussed (and in select cases implemented), adetailed literature search has revealed that the actual approach tostakeholder inclusion in these processes has rarely been fullydescribed in an operational sense. Therefore, the policy-makingapproach to guide progress on energy efficiency and renewableenergy in Nova Scotia – a jurisdiction with especially highdependency on fossil fuels – offers a potentially unique lens intothe issue. In our approach we drew on the experience of theprincipal facilitator in corporate strategic management settings(Wheeler and Sillanpaa, 1998), combined with an absolute com-mitment to academic objectivity as ‘honest broker’ between thevarious parties. Trust and goodwill (social capital) was builtintentionally through both processes, consistent with the theoriesof Adler and Kwon (2002) and Freeman (1984), and adapted tothe needs of innovative democracy in energy policy-making(Mendonc-a et al., 2009) in the presence of a clear political target(Enzensberger et al., 2002). Using the constructs of social capitaland stakeholder theory it was hoped that sufficient goodwillmight be created through the processes to allow the ProvincialGovernment to act both ethically and effectively whilst beinginsulated from charges of bias or self-interest in what hadpreviously been a problematic domain based on a history ofmisunderstanding and mistrust.

4. Methodology

Two stakeholder-led strategy processes were designed and exe-cuted in the period January–April 2008 (Energy Efficiency Strategyfor the Province of Nova Scotia—EES) and September–December2009 (Renewable Energy Strategy for the Province of NovaScotia—RES). In both cases the independent facilitator was theFaculty of Management, Dalhousie University and the client wasthe Government of Nova Scotia Department of Energy (DoE). In thefirst case (EES) the agent of the Government was the provincialenergy efficiency agency Conserve Nova Scotia. The lead facilitatorwas unpaid, and only the direct costs of the process were charged tothe Government. In both cases a key stakeholder was the energyutility itself: Nova Scotia Power Inc (NSPI), regulated monopolyelectricity utility privatized in 1992. In 2008 NSPI had a mixedreputation for stakeholder responsiveness, in part because of theadversarial nature of the regulatory and electricity rate-settingprocess that the company was forced to undergo. Other keystakeholders in the processes were environmental and social justicegroups, domestic electricity ratepayers, industrial and commercialelectricity ratepayers, municipalities and (in the case of the RES),renewable energy developers.

The Energy Efficiency Strategy (EES) process was moderatelycomplex, exhibiting early agreement amongst the stakeholders(40 in total) regarding the general direction of the likely outcome,but greater divisiveness when addressing programmatic details.In contrast, the Renewable Energy Strategy (RES) process washighly complex and somewhat contested (involving more than300 stakeholders).

In both cases a ten stage dialogic methodology was pursued bythe independent facilitators that adopted the following sequence:

1)

Identification and inclusion of stakeholders. 2) Establishment of cognitive baseline with stakeholders (agree-

ment of principles, goals and objectives).

3) Development of plausible scenarios. 4) Elaboration of scenarios through expert presentations and

commissioned papers.

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–2559 2553

5)

1

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Iterative discussion of all of the above through a number offormal dialogue sessions (to be discussed in greater detailfurther on).

6)

Independent assessment of stakeholder trust in process anddeveloping recommendations (opinion surveys conductedafter each formal dialogue session).

7)

Continuous solicitation of written and other submissions. 8) Presentation of draft policy recommendations back to

stakeholders.

9) Presentation of policy recommendations to government.

10)

Enactment of policy recommendations by government.

The principal difference between the two processes was theneed to establish a Project Advisory Steering Committee for theRES—essentially a quasi-representative expert panel under anindependent chairperson. This body was established to helpaddress some of the deeper complexities and tensions inherentin the renewable energy stakeholder mix and to provide a sourceof expert feedback on recommendations.

In both cases the independent facilitators were given fullresponsibility for moving the processes forward swiftly and formaking recommendations that would be reasonable and haddemonstrated support from by the majority of stakeholders(elucidated through the feedback surveys to be described below)and therefore more likely to be actionable by the ProvincialGovernment. In doing this the facilitators had to absorb pressurein public that in a more conventional process might have led toparalysis of decision-making or a descent into private politicallobbying. In both processes stakeholders were coached to committo a process with an absolute deadline and an absolute commit-ment to transparency but where no particular outcome or solu-tion was assumed. Below are set out the observations for some ofthe key steps outlined above.

5. Discussion and observations

5.1. Energy efficiency strategy (2008)

5.1.1. Development and elaboration of plausible scenarios

Prior to the first formal meeting of stakeholders a paperentitled Overview of Administrative Models for Electricity DSM

was commissioned and circulated to all stakeholders in order totry and clarify definitions and characteristics of the availableadministrative models based on an international scan of options.The paper was drafted by independent expert consultants andwas subsequently updated according to input from stakeholdersduring the process (Lipp and Baston, 2008).

5.1.2. Inclusion of stakeholders through formal dialogue sessions

Potential stakeholders for the Energy Efficiency Strategy pro-cess were identified through discussions with readily identifiedactors followed by telephone and email outreach to those stake-holders and the further identification of names of potentialstakeholders through a snowball sampling process.1 In addition,mid-way through the process an advertisement was placed in thelocal newspaper to further identify individuals and organizationsthat might wish to participate in the consultations and theproceeded to the recommendations stage.

Three formal dialogue meetings were held with stakeholdersover a six week period and up to 40 stakeholders and their

A number of stakeholders with an interest in energy efficiency, including

onmental and social justice groups, municipalities, industrial users and

ler scale electricity consumers had already self-organized into an interest

p focused on regulatory and rate-setting processes.

representatives attended on each occasion. The first meetingestablished the ‘rules of the game’ for the process togetherwith key ‘principles for success’ in making recommendations forthe administration of electricity demand-side management inNova Scotia. The meeting also received and debated the commis-sioned expert paper which described four principle adminis-trative options based on a scan of international best practice(Lipp and Baston, 2008). The objectives of the first meetingwere to:

�

discuss and try to achieve consensus on the existence offour principle options and their potential advantages anddisadvantages; � discuss and prioritise the key principles that will drive recom-

mendations for a preferred administrative option for NovaScotia; and

� discuss the process and timescale which will allow consensus

to be achieved on a preferred option for Nova Scotia.

At the initial meeting, four ‘Principles for Success’ and fifteenassociated objectives were identified by stakeholders. The Princi-ples for Success were:

�

Accountability and oversight: there need to be ‘crisp and clear’delineation of authority and responsibility between the deliv-ery agents and the administrator. � Administrator effectiveness: fast and market responsive deci-

sion-making.

� Compatibility with public policy goals: avoidance of unhelpful

politics—e.g. pressure to deliver funding to constituencies,rather than to acquire cost-effective energy savings.

� Secure funding allocation: avoidance of misuse of funds for

other budgetary purposes.

The second meeting received five expert presentations on thefour main potential administrative models which were:

�

Utility Administration (a) with Regulatory Oversight (presentedby a representative of National Grid USA), and (b) with a stake-holder Advisory Board (presented by a representative of Envir-onment Northeast); � Government Administration (presented by a representative of

the Efficiency New Brunswick);

� Efficiency Utility Administration (presented by a representa-

tive of the Vermont Energy Investment Corp);

� Third Party Administration (presented by a representative of

the Energy Trust of Oregon).

The third meeting received the preliminary recommendationsof the facilitators based on the logic of the process to that pointand the likelihood of acceptance by stakeholders. The decisioncriteria applied in making the recommendation were:

�

Consistency with Principles for Success � Maximize Speed–Minimize Risk � Maximize Stakeholder Consensus–Minimize Divisiveness � Accountability to Funders (ratepayer versus taxpayer)

The facilitators did not meet with stakeholders outside theseprocesses in order to avoid generating side conversations andpossible perceptions of non-transparency between stakeholdergroups.

Fig. 1. Stakeholder scoring of administrative options.

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–25592554

5.1.3. Inclusion of stakeholders through regular confidential surveys

of opinion

In addition to the three formal meetings, four rounds oftelephone and email outreach were conducted (one before eachmeeting) in order to ascertain views that stakeholders mightprefer to express privately. Finally, some stakeholder groups sentin letters and other communications that summarised theirperspectives.

Broadly speaking, stakeholders engaged with the process ingood spirit, although trust in the process did come under straintowards the end when certain stakeholder positions were beingadvanced with more vigour and persistence. This was perhapsunderstandable as the potential implications of the modelsbecame clearer for stakeholders and decision-time drew closer.This was reflected in a slight softening of trust in DalhousieUniversity’s facilitation and the Government of Nova Scotia’sability to respond effectively to final recommendations.

At the beginning of the process it was very important forstakeholders to agree that the range of administrative optionsopen to the Province was a fair and comprehensive list, and thatthe advantages and disadvantages of the various options werewell understood. A strong majority of stakeholders whoresponded (12 of 13) to the first survey of stakeholder opinionbelieved the Administrative Models paper ‘‘captured the mainoptions for electricity demand-side management’’. Nearly asstrong a majority (11 of 13) believed ‘‘fairly captured the potentialadvantages and disadvantages identified for each identifiedoption’’. The broad consensus established on the available admin-istrative options, together with the co-creation of criteria forsuccess, allowed the process to move forward with some momen-tum based on sense of common purpose, shared knowledge and agrowing level of cognitive alignment. It was vital then to establishthe level of trust and support for the process itself.

From before the first stakeholder meeting through to the run-up to the final stakeholder meeting stakeholders were asked thefollowing question:

Based on what happened at the meeting on [date], on a scale of1–5 where 1¼no trust and 5¼total trust, can you please tellme how much trust you place in Dalhousie University now torun a fair and objective consultation process?

Over the six weeks trust in Dalhousie University’s processwent from a score of 5.0, to 4.4, to 3.9. Care should be taken wheninterpreting the data; sample sizes were relatively low (typicallyless than 15) and respondents were not identical each time.

Stakeholders were also asked:

Based on what happened at the meeting on [date] on a scaleof 1–5 where 1¼no trust and 5¼total trust, can you pleasetell me how much trust you are willing to place now in theGovernment of Nova Scotia responding effectively to therecommendations of the consultation process?

Over the six weeks trust in the Government’s ability torespond effectively went from a score of 3.5, to 3.3, to 2.7. Again,care should be taken in interpreting these data. Clearly stake-holders were keen to send a signal to the Government that they

expected action and their answers to this question allowed themto send such a signal.

Finally, between the first and third meetings stakeholderswere asked:

Based on what happened at the meeting on [date], where1¼Much Less Optimistic and 5¼Much More Optimistic, areyou now more or less optimistic that we will be able to makeclear recommendations to the Province in a timely and con-sensus-based way?

Stakeholder opinion on this question went from 3.2 to 3.3,demonstrating perhaps that despite the signals being sent to thefacilitators and to the Government, stakeholders were not dis-couraged by the unfolding of the process, although the level ofoptimism remained moderate.

5.1.4. Stakeholder attitudes to the administrative options as the

process unfolded

Before each stakeholder meeting stakeholders were asked:

Based on what you learned at the meeting [date], on a scale of1–5 where 1¼highly undesirable and 5¼highly desirable canyou please comment on what you now think will work forNova Scotia.

Again, we must note the care with which these data must beinterpreted given the relatively low number of respondents andthe likely variability in the respondents over the course of theprocess. Nevertheless, as we can see below, the popularity ofthe different options remained remarkably stable throughout theprocess. Scores should be read from right to left with the firstscore on the right and the final score on the left (Fig. 1).

The data can be summarised as follows: (i) the Utility Admin-istrator option was generally not favoured by stakeholders;(ii) the Government Administrator option was generally notfavoured by stakeholders although it was supported strongly bysome of the industrial stakeholders; (iii) the Efficiency UtilityAdministrator option merited both strong support and strong(if more minor) opposition and (iv) the Third Party Administratoroption merited strongest and most consistent support amongstakeholders, including among some of the industrial stakeholders.

The outcome of the process was the recommendation of ahypothecated charge on electricity consumers equivalent to 5% ofelectricity costs and the establishment of a ‘performance-based’independent agency to maximize the impact of energy conserva-tion measures. The newly elected Government of Nova Scotialegislated to establish these measures in the fall of 2009.

5.2. Renewable energy strategy (2009)

In the summer of 2009 the new Government of Nova Scotiaissued a challenge for the Province to reach 25% renewableelectricity generation by 2015, with greatest benefits for thesocial, environmental and economic health of the Province.To achieve this, a ‘Renewable Energy Stakeholder ConsultationProcess’ was commissioned by the Government, convened by theFaculty of Management of Dalhousie University. Stakeholdersfrom across the Province expressed a desire to achieve theshort-term objective, at the same time laying the ground formore ambitious targets to 2020 and beyond. There was also anexpressed desire for the Province to achieve competitive advan-tage through minimizing electricity costs to consumers (large andsmall) and maximizing industrial technology leadership possibi-lities for the long term—particularly in renewable energy sectorsfor which Nova Scotia is particularly well endowed, such as tidalenergy.

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–2559 2555

Although more complex than the EES process, the RES processbroadly had a similar series of steps. Again the key observationsfor some of these steps are set out.

5.2.1. Development and elaboration of plausible scenarios

In September 2009 a group of invited knowledgeable personscame together to construct a series of scenarios. These scenarioswere developed to represent a spectrum of ‘‘possible’’ renewableenergy futures that could meet the 25% target in 2015 andpotentially also meet a 40% target by 2020. The session wasfacilitated a former Shell International executive familiar withscenario planning work. It was attended by around 80 individualsrepresenting environmental organizations, social justice organi-zations, provincial and municipal governments, academic institu-tions, renewable energy developers, and power generators. Theparticipants were asked:

�

to discuss the context for the process, including highlightingthe attitudes of Nova Scotians regarding the development ofrenewable energy capacity within the Province; � to explore individual energy and technology options and the

current enabling conditions found within the Province to bringthese options to bear on meeting the targets of 2015 (andbeyond); and

� to develop a series of scenarios designed to expand the

thinking of what could be possible for Nova Scotia – buildingupon the earlier technology/enabler discussions – that wouldthen be further examined from a specific economic, environ-mental and social context through the commissioning of threesubsequent expert papers

It was assumed that Nova Scotia’s energy demand would be12,000 GWh in 2015 (if energy conservation measures imple-mented through the provincial EES was to prove effective). Thusthe production of roughly 3000 GWh of renewable energy by2015 would be required to reach the target. The intent of thescenario-building process was to provide stakeholders with acomprehensive, high-level overview of the implications of thevarious options, keeping in mind the illustrative nature of specificpercentages for energy generation from various sources in thefour scenarios. The constants for each scenario were:

�

attaining the target of 25% electrical energy coming fromrenewable sources by 2015; and � ensuring flexibility to allow for increasingly stringent targets

to be set in the future.

The four scenarios developed for further elaboration were:

�

large-scale, centralized developments using only wind; � large-scale, centralized developments capitalizing on wind and

biomass (thermal generation);

� multi-scale, geographically diverse technologies with a pri-

mary focus on innovative, nascent technologies with the aimof creating a renewable energy development sector; and

� multi-scale, geographically diverse technologies with a primary

focus on known technologies with a gradual integration ofnascent technology as it has demonstrated cost-effectiveness

5.2.2. Inclusion of stakeholders through formal dialogue sessions

Prior to the first formal meeting of stakeholders a paper entitledNova Scotia Renewable Energy Strategy—Scenarios and Policy Options

was commissioned and circulated to all stakeholders in order toensure that (a) the information captured during the scenario

planning day was accurately documented and (b) to provideclarifications to newly participating stakeholders not present atthe scenario planning session of the mandate of the process andthe stepping off point for the day. The paper was drafted by anindependent consultant and was updated according to input fromstakeholders prior to its final submission to all participants.

In addition three papers were commissioned from authors whowere independently nominated by the stakeholders to evaluate theimpacts of the four scenarios developed at the scenario planningsession from environmental, social and economic perspectives.Having established and described the scenarios, the writers wereasked to assess the environmental, social and economic impactsof these initial scenarios. The three papers were intended to be apreliminarily contribution to the process that would provide a foun-dation for input and commentary surrounding the initial scenarios,as well as to illuminate considerations that would need to beincluded in any final recommendations.

All material submitted to the project team by external stake-holders was provided to the writers and was reviewed to ensurethat applicable information from contributing expertise and pastexpert sessions was assessed as part of this process and includedwhere appropriate.

In the first public session, approximately 115 stakeholdersattended. The main points of the three commissioned papers weredelivered. The intentions of this day were: (i) to obtain fromstakeholders their insights with respect to the primary gaps andconcerns that need further consideration and (ii) to build con-sensus around key success factors from economic, social andenvironmental perspectives. This session was another opportu-nity to ensure the mobilization of wisdom and knowledge fromstakeholders into the process. All the information generated fromdiscussions was consolidated and returned to the writers for theirconsideration, along with submissions offered in the days follow-ing the session. Their revised draft papers were then posted forfurther public comment. This iterative process of review was usedthroughout the process to ensure the comprehensiveness of thediscussion documents.

Prior to the second public session a synthesis paper (Gagnon,2009) was prepared to:

�

receive and absorb outputs of the process thus far, mostespecially the outputs of stakeholder consultations and thethree commissioned papers; � refine the initial scenario work and suggest candidate scenar-

ios for Nova Scotia to meet short term and long term renew-able energy targets, taking special note of economic, social,technological and environmental factors;

� describe the candidate scenarios in terms of relative likely

costs, benefits and risks based on international experience andthe particular local circumstances of Nova Scotia and AtlanticCanada; and

� identify enablers and barriers for options and the timescales

involved.

Similar to the process preceding the commissioning of thethree expert papers, nominations were accepted from stake-holders and evaluated against a set of terms of reference devel-oped in advance by the project team.

In the second session, approximately 120 stakeholders attended.The main points of the synthesis paper were presented (Gagnon,2009). The intentions of this day were: (i) to obtain from stake-holders their insights with respect to the gaps and concerns that stillneeded to be addressed and/or given further consideration; (ii) tosecure stakeholder feedback on the paper and (iii) to identify factorsthat could provide the basis of recommendations to Government.Again, all information generated from discussions was consolidated

Table 1Response to question ‘‘how well were the objectives of the session met?’’.

Response Sep (%) Oct (%) Nov (%) Dec (%)

Completely met 32.5 15 8 45

Partially met 50 54 60 35

Somewhat met 17.5 24 25 14

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–25592556

and returned to the author for consideration, along with submis-sions offered following the session. The revised paper was thenposted for further public comment.

At the final stakeholder session an interim report to stake-holders outlining draft recommendations was developed andpresented (Adams and Wheeler, 2009a). The objective of theinterim report was to:

Not met 0 7 8 6

�

absorb the outputs of the process, most especially the outputsof stakeholder consultations and the various papers; � describe the recommended candidate scenarios in terms of

applicable timeframes (i.e. when would they come on-stream),and the relative likely costs, benefits and risks;

� describe the recommended administrative frameworks and

program requirements necessary to optimize the success ofthe various candidate scenarios; and

�

Fig. 2. Key outputs from stakeholder surveys.

describe the policy/regulatory implications based on theexperiences within other jurisdictions and the particular localcircumstances of Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada.

The project team reviewed all materials accumulated to date,including submitted reference materials, the three commissionedpapers, the draft synthesis paper, stakeholder commentary, andthe outcomes and notes taken from the stakeholder consultationsessions. Inputs gathered from a series of expert, content-drivenmeetings (held on key themes such as biomass sustainability, costimplications and policy implications) were also included. Thisinterim report was circulated to stakeholders and also postedpublicly for review on the project website.

At the final public session, approximately 125 stakeholdersattended and the main points of the Interim Report to stakeholderswere presented. The intentions of this day were: (i) to effectivelypresent the Interim Report to stakeholders; (ii) to secure stakeholderfeedback on the Interim Report and (iii) to discuss any remainingconcerns and address any outstanding issues. Ultimately the objec-tive was to crystallize recommendations where significant consen-sus was identified and to provide an opportunity for stakeholders torespond to draft recommendations related to issues where onlymodest consensus was possible.

The consolidation of the information and input through thisprocess resulted in the final report that was submitted to theGovernment of Nova Scotia in late December 2009 (Adams andWheeler, 2009b). Similar to the previous DSM process, theprincipal facilitator did not meet with stakeholders outside theseprocesses in order to avoid generating side conversations andpossible perceptions of non-transparency between stakeholdergroups.

5.2.3. Inclusion of stakeholders through regular confidential surveys

of opinion

In order to gauge the level of stakeholder support for theoutcomes of each session, shortly after each of the four stake-holder meetings an on-line survey was issued to all registrants tocapture their thoughts and attitudes towards the process. Theintention was to use this information to determine: (i) how wellstakeholders felt their input was being captured; (ii) what aspectsof the sessions could be improved; (iii) how well the stakeholdersfelt their concerns were being addressed; (iv) how well eachsession met the expressed objectives of the day; (v) how con-fident stakeholders were in the Dalhousie team to run a fair andobjective process and (vi) the level of stakeholder confidence thatthe Government would respond effectively to the process recom-mendations. There was also a general comment section wherestakeholders could offer their input in a free form. The results of

each survey were then presented at the following session,unedited.

While there were minor fluctuations in the level of satisfactionwith the process over time, the final survey reflecting thestakeholder attitudes about the whole process and their satisfac-tion with the direction of the final recommendations werepositive. Table 1 provides an overview of stakeholder satisfactionwith session objectives being met throughout the process. Giventhe very significant amount of material that needed to bepresented and discussed, it was particularly pleasing to see thelevel of confidence in objectives being met at least partiallythroughout the process, and particularly at the final session.Fig. 2 demonstrates the average output for each of the sessionsfor two other key questions with the bold text representing theoutput from the culminating session.

5.2.4. Stakeholder attitudes towards the legitimacy of the process

While the primary intention was to develop policy recom-mendations created from a consensual stakeholder inclusiveprocess, a secondary objective was to deliver the social/politicallicense that would provide the Government a measure of con-fidence to act. To this end, it was necessary to monitor stake-holder opinion regarding the perceived legitimacy of the processand the level of expectation stakeholders had that the Govern-ment would act. Fig. 3 provides the output of this survey. Theresults from the final session are in bold. As can be seen, therewas a reasonably high level of confidence in the facilitation teamas well as trust in the government to respond effectively torecommendations—both ending on upward trends.

As noted above, the final policy recommendations weredeveloped through dialogue involving several hundred stake-holders, many of whom had a direct financial stake in theoutcome. Consensus was not absolute, but it was predicated onthe premise that the policy recommendations represented thebest value for money for consumers and also contributed to thegrowth and competitiveness of the provincial economy. A keyelement of the policy recommendations was the development ofpolicy that would safeguard and enhance the natural environ-ment, as well as contribute to social justice, with particularconsideration for mitigating ‘energy poverty’.

In order to meet or exceed the 2015 Provincial target andachieve compliance with climate change and other goals, apragmatic, low risk, low cost strategy was advocated whereby:

�

the power utility and independent power producers areresponsible for lowest cost delivery of the bulk of the target,

Fig. 3. Key outputs from stakeholder surveys.

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–2559 2557

overseen by a new renewable energy procurement body and(potentially) a new system operator;

� community-based renewable energy projects receive a guar-

anteed price for electricity with an initial goal of 100 MWinstalled capacity (with a secondary aim of promoting com-munity economic development); and

� ordinary citizens and small and medium sized enterprises

(SMEs) would be encouraged to become engaged in renewableenergy generation and use.

The Government of Nova Scotia announced its response tothese recommendations in April 2010.

6. Outcomes

In 2007 the Nova Scotia government enacted the Environ-mental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act (Government ofNova Scotia, 2007). While this legislation included a rangeof targets and specific goals, the overarching theme was one ofcreating an economy that was based on the concept of ‘sustain-able prosperity’. Key elements in the Act related to energysecurity and GHG emission reductions; a particularly challengingtask given that 88% of the province’s electricity generation was atthat time based on fossil fuels, 75% of which was imported coal.The transition to a more secure energy future required anequitable focus on demand-side management to reduce theoverall energy needs of the region, and the integration of renew-able energy. Both strategies endeavoured to impact the keydrivers of energy sustainability; long-term energy security (andultimately future costs) and GHG emission reductions.

As noted previously, the number and diversity of stakeholdersimpacted by the adoption of energy efficiency or renewableenergy strategies can be daunting for policy-makers to address.However, for Nova Scotia to deliver the radical transformationneeded to achieve ‘sustainable prosperity’, new public policyrelated to energy demand and energy generation had to bedeveloped. These reforms also had to be developed in the shortesttime possible and with the greatest degree of social license inorder for this transformation to be effective on the scale required.Policy makers expressed that a novel strategy for creating policywas likely required. Therefore, in both cases (energy efficiencypolicy and renewable energy generation policy) the governmentsought to maximize the inclusivity and accountability of thepolicy development process. Any success of this innovativeapproach was contingent on four key elements:

�

use of an independent third party facilitator to ensure theobjective development of recommendations that were freefrom influence of special interests and lobbying (in this casethe Dalhousie University Faculty of Management); � use of transparent and iterative approaches to ensure clarity

for all stakeholders on how their contributions were beingintegrated into the policy development process;

� concurrent ‘check ins’ with stakeholders to gauge their level of

confidence in the process and the resulting outputs; and

�

Government’s willingness in both situations to use the processoutputs as the basis for their new public policies on these twoissues.

In the case of the demand-side management process, newlegislation based on those recommendations was passed in thefall of 2009 (Government of Nova Scotia, 2009). And in the case ofrenewable electricity generation, the new ‘Renewable ElectricityPlan’ was announced on April 23, 2010, by Darrell Dexter, thePremier of the Province of Nova Scotia. Most major recommenda-tions put forth were embraced; key items included:

�

enacting legislation committing to a 2015 target of 25%renewable electricity; � a new commitment of 40% Renewable Electricity by 2020; � the announcement of a plan to establish a community-based

feed-in tariff for renewable energy developments by munici-palities, First Nations, co-operatives and non-profit groups;

� the assurance that a portion of the large- and medium-scale

renewable energy projects will be set aside for IndependentPower Producers (IPP), with a bidding process that would beoverseen by a new authority, the Renewable ElectricityAdministrator (in the stead of the local monopoly electricalutility); and

� the establishment of a feed-in tariff for tidal energy in the Bay

of Fundy.

It should also be noted that since April 2010, new announce-ments regarding major investments into to renewable energyresearch and development have been announced—including:

�

a $20M investment into FORCE (Fundy Ocean Research Centrefor Energy) by the Government of Canada, and the award of a$11M contract to FORCE for the production and installation offour subsea cables at the test site in the Bay of Fundy; � the approval of a 60 MW biomass-fired cogeneration facility to

be operated in Northern Nova Scotia by NewPage Pulp andPaper; and

� an MOU between the Province of Nova Scotia and Newfound-

land to build a subsea cable to allow for the transition of aportion of the �3000 MW of hydro-electric power that iscurrently under development in the Lower Churchill region ofNewfoundland. This will contribute to Nova Scotia’s renewableenergy targets, but will also provide key stability to thetransmission and distribution (T&D) system in Nova Scotia[ideally] permitting increased capacity from ‘variable’ sources,such as wind and tidal, than would otherwise be possible withthe current T&D system.

The willingness on the part of policy-makers to accept themajority of recommendations that arose out of these participa-tory mechanisms should reinforce the level of trust betweenstakeholders and policy makers. Although there will inevitablybe ‘special pleading’ from specific groups seeking to maximizetheir advantage from the overall changes announced by theGovernment of Nova Scotia, it is believed that the policy frame-works now in place are internally consistent and resilient, pre-cisely because of the process that took place to design them.

7. Conclusions

While the ultimate success of these particular policies cannotbe assessed at this time, by incorporating multiple viewpointsand perspectives into the development process, these resultsshould be both resilient and adaptive to future conditions,

M. Adams et al. / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2550–25592558

including changes in political priorities. It should be noted thatthe processes described in this paper spanned several years whena significant change in political leadership occurred in Nova Scotia– from a conservative to a social democratic government – andyet cross-party consensus prevailed throughout. At times duringboth processes, significant negative opinion was expressed byparticular parties, often aimed at the monopoly energy supplier orthe Government of Nova Scotia and its agencies. However, the factthat the principal facilitator was both unpaid and his employerobjective, that the Government of Nova Scotia and the monopolyutility were committed to embrace the outcomes without tryingto influence them, and that all voices were included, made it verydifficult for the process itself to be undermined. Thus, theoccasional strident voices seeking media attention and externalinfluence outside the process appeared self-serving whether theycame from industry, environmental organizations, or developers.Irritation was certainly expressed with the facilitators for notbeing amenable to conventional lobbying or making specialprovision in large meetings for dominant voices, but this servedonly to reinforce the perceived integrity of the process.

Of course, any process can be captured by political, institutionalor individual forces through the explicit or tacit exercise of powerthrough control of knowledge, technical expertise or language. Thismay happen in international policy-making (Haas, 1992), organiza-tional settings (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and everyday socialinteractions (Foucault, 1980), as well as in the field of energy policy-making. However, as we believe has been demonstrated here,stakeholders and policy-makers can build on a clear political target(Enzensberger et al., 2002), and address problems and deliveroutcomes that are built on inclusivity, transparency and trust. Byemploying novel methodological approaches to address the variousfactors at play and meet stakeholder expectations, policy makers canadopt more creative and innovative approaches such as thosesuggested by Thompson (2006), Mendonc-a et al., (2009), Rayner(2010) and Ricci et al. (2010) provided they are prepared to relinquish

control to an independent process and accept the emergent nature of

the outcomes.

Given the difficulty of establishing national and internationalconsensus on effective responses to climate change, as evidencedby the failure of the Copenhagen process (Wheeler et al., 2010), itis now worthwhile to consider the advantages for Canada onextending the processes described in this paper to other provin-cial jurisdictions. Provinces such as Alberta and Saskatchewanwith high dependencies on fossil fuel provision need to radicallyimprove their administrative arrangements for delivering energyefficiency. Provinces such as British Columbia and Quebec, withtraditionally very high levels of hydro-electricity provision, mayneed new processes to enable more effective export of theirendowments, both to other provinces and to the United States.Provinces such as Ontario and Newfoundland, with aggressiveplans for development of new renewable resources, will requireprocesses to that legitimately engage their own citizens, includingFirst Nations, in how those resources will be developed andexploited.

Whilst there is no attempt here to broaden the public policyimplications of the Nova Scotia case beyond Canada, there may beespecially relevant insights from this work for jurisdictions withhigh levels of fossil fuel dependency and/or low trust environ-ments elsewhere in the world.

Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the support and hard work ofPenny Slight, Zoe Caron (both Dalhousie University’s Eco-EfficiencyCentre) and Corrine Cash (University of Waterloo) – as well as the

eleven graduate students from the School of Resource and Environ-mental Studies (Dalhousie University) – who were instrumental inthe successful delivery of the two stakeholder participation processesreferred to in this work. In addition we would like to note that twoanonymous referees made very useful and objective comments thathelped improve the final manuscript; their input is appreciated.

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