A Novel, Countermeasure-proof, P300-Based Protocol for Detection of Concealed Information

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A Novel, Countermeasure- proof, P300-Based Protocol for Detection of Concealed Information J.Peter Rosenfeld, Michael Winograd, Elena Labkovsky, Ann Ming Lui Department of Psychology Institute for Neuroscience Northwestern University

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A Novel, Countermeasure-proof, P300-Based Protocol for Detection of Concealed Information. J.Peter Rosenfeld, Michael Winograd, Elena Labkovsky, Ann Ming Lui Department of Psychology Institute for Neuroscience Northwestern University. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: A Novel, Countermeasure-proof, P300-Based Protocol for Detection of Concealed Information

A Novel, Countermeasure-proof, P300-Based Protocol for Detection of Concealed Information

J.Peter Rosenfeld, Michael Winograd, Elena Labkovsky, Ann Ming Lui

Department of PsychologyInstitute for NeuroscienceNorthwestern University

Page 2: A Novel, Countermeasure-proof, P300-Based Protocol for Detection of Concealed Information

Previous P300 DD protocols used Separate Probe(P),Irrelevant(I) and Target(T) trials.

80% to 95% correct detection rates….but….

*Rosenfeld et al. (2004) and Mertens, Allen et al. (2007):These methods are vulnerable to Counter-measures (CMs)

via turning I’s into covert T’s.

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Results from Rosenfeld et al. (2004): Farwell-Donchin paradigm(BAD and BCAD are 2 analysis methods.)Diagnoses of Guilty

Guilty Group Innocent Group CM Group

9/11(82%) 1/11(9%) 2/11(18%)

Amplitude Difference (BAD) method,p=.1

Cross-Correlation(BC-AD) Method, p=.1

6/11(54%) 0/11(0%) 6/11(54%)

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Results (hit rates) from Rosenfeld et al. (2004): Rosenfeld paradigm

Week BAD* BC-AD*

1: no CM 12/13(.92) 9/13(.69)

2: CM 6/12(.50) 3/12(.25)

3: no CM 7/12(.58) 3/12(.25)

*Note: BCD and BAD are 2 kinds of analytic bootstrap procedures.

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In the “Complex Trial Protocol,” P/I and T/NT decisions are separated:

Two stimuli per trial, 1.2-1.5 s apart. The first is P or I presented in white

font. The second is the same P or I

presented either in T color (green) or one of 4 non-T colors (red, yellow, etc.)

(The second could also be T and NT numbers, or whatever.)

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4 STIMULUS TYPES

STIMULUS TYPE NUMBER PROBABILITY

Probe Target 30 .09 Probe non-Target 30 .09 Irrelevant Target 30 .09 Irrelevant non-Target 240 .73

All Probes 60 .18 Oddballs 90 .27

One probe and 4 irrelevants

P (T/P) = .5… vs… P (T/I) =.11 (Confound?)

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DESIGN: as in ’04 paper, Exp. 2: 3 weeks in one group Week 1 Naïve Week 2 CM Week 3 Repeat Week 1 One block with one probe type, but

category varied and counterbalanced across subjects/weeks: 1)mother’s first names 2) family surnames 3) home towns

Main Study plus near replication. Innocent Control Group for FPs.

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Countermeasures in Week 2: Also as in ’04 paper

Left finger press to Irrelevant # 1 Left toe wiggle to Irrelevant # 2 Right toe wiggle to Irrelevant # 3 Imagine Prof slaps you for Irrelevant#4 All these are done covertly so that

operator cannot detect them.

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RTs (all stimuli). Replication like ‘04 study: no overlap.

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P & I Individual RTs in CT Protocol (Flat liner at bottom did not beat test.)

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Statistical tests within each subject:

T/F-tests comparing Week 1 RT or RT Variance versus Week 2 are all p<.01, and < .001 in the one subject who beat the test in Week 2.

Thus CM use is detectable.

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In ’04 paper (old protocol), probe declines over weeks:

0 1 2 3 4WEEK

200

300

400

500

600

700

AM

PLI

TU

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NEW RESULTS: P300s

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P300, p-p

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Two* possible (P-I) tests:

1)Traditional: Probe versus mean of all Irrelevants, P vs I-All.

2)Probe versus Maximum Irrelevant P vs I-max (“simple hit”) or Probe

versus I-max not associated with elevated RT (“RT-screened Hit”).* at .9 or .95 confidence levels.

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Main Study. Within-subject correct detections of guilty subjects based on bootstrap comparison of probe P300 against the average of all irrelevant P300s over 3 weeks.

WEEK Hit Rate [Hit Rate] Week 1 (no CM): 11/12 (92%) [12/12*( 100%)] Week 2 (CM): 10/11 (91%) [11/12* (92%)] Week 3 (no CM): 11/12 (92%) [12/12* (100%)]

Main Study: False positive(FP) group.   Confidence=.9 Confidence=.95   Test FPs Hits A’ FPs Hits A’ Iall .08 .92 .95 0 .92 .98 Imax 0 .92 .98 0 .92 .98 

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Main Study: Simple and RT-qualified diagnoses (at confidence = .9, Probe vs. Imax (or RT-qualified Imax) across 3 weeks (n values in parentheses). CM use also shown.

Week 1 (12) Week 2 (11) Week 3 (12)

Simple hits .92 .73 .92

Hits/RT qualified .92 .91 .92

CM use 0.0 1.0 0.0

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Near Replication: Within-subject correct detections (“Hits”) of guilty subjects based on bootstrap comparison (at 2 confidence levels) of probe(P) P300 against the average of all irrelevant P300s (I-All) over weeks, and against the largest irrelevant P300 (I-Max).

CONFIDENCE LEVEL: 0.90 WEEK P vs I-All: Hits, [FPs], A’ P vs I-Max: Hits,

[FPs] A’ 1: 12/12 (100%),[8%] .91 11/12 ( 92%), [0%]

.98 2: 12/12 (100%) 11/12 ( 92%) * 3: 9/10 (90%) 7/10 (70%)

CONFIDENCE LEVEL: 0.95   WEEK P vs I-All: Hits, [FPs], A’ P vs I-Max: Hits, [FPs],

A’ 1: 11/12 (92%),[0%] .98 11/12 ( 92%), [0%] .98 2: 12/12 (100%) 11/12 ( 92%) * 3: 9/11 (82%) ** 8/11 (73%)**  

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CTP Mock Crime Study: Preliminary Results. Note Target= 11111. (Mike Winograd’s study)

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Conclusions (& Why ? ) The complex trial protocol is CM-

resistant and accurate in the CIT Context.

*The S1 involves no classification or decision, unlike older protocols, whose target classification task is removed, leaving all resources devoted to probe/irrelevant recognition.

*CMs force more attention to first stimulus increased probe (& Irrel) P300s.

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NEXT? We need to extend CTP to our

hybrid CQT screening protocol (Rosenfeld et al., 1991.)

We need to try 3-4 blocks a session, each with different probe category.

CTP should be even better with more Irrelevants.

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A Novel, Countermeasure-proof, P300-Based Protocol for Detection of Deception (DD).

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