A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Blackwell ... · PDF filecognitive dissonance...

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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35:4 0021–8308 © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. Oxford, UK JTSB Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 0021-8308 © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005 35 4 Original Article Understanding Terrorism Andrea Kohn Maikovich A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Cognitive Dissonance Principles ANDREA KOHN MAIKOVICH “. . . for the social psychologist it is not a question of who is good and who is evil, but how activists and defenders make sense of actions as morally or legally accessible acts” (Harré, 2004, p. 102). The earliest records of human civilization contain accounts of interpersonal conflict; the earliest accounts of interpersonal conflict contain evidence of the use of terrorism (Abi-Hashem, 2004). In other words, terrorism is not a novel phenomenon, and has been employed as a form of theatrical violence at least since the beginning of recorded human history, and most likely during pre-history as well (Sternberg, 2003). The September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. catalyzed a burgeoning interest in terrorism among researchers from a variety of fields, while the media became saturated with stories about terrorist organizations and their international roots (Colvard, 2002). Much of the coverage, however, has been emotionally charged and biased. Research suggests that the majority of today’s terrorists are neither psychologically insane nor driven by hate, as so vehemently purported by Western governments and the Western media (Stout, 2002; Bush, 2001). It is not terrorist organizations’ violent component that typically appeals to terrorists, but rather the sense of purpose and identity the organizations offer, as well as their purported central sociopolitical goals (defending Muslim culture against Western influence, for example). Within this paper I offer a new theory, rooted in the principles of cognitive dissonance, to help explain what differentiates the mass numbers of identity-seeking, politically and socially discontent individu- als from the few who actually become terrorists. I write this article “not to endorse terrorism, but to point out that terrorism is not typically the irrational act that it is often made out to be . . .” (Wessells, 2004, p. 261). BACKGROUND There is no clear consensus about the most valid and thorough definition of terrorism. A commonly accepted definition, and the one I use in this paper, is offered by the

Transcript of A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Blackwell ... · PDF filecognitive dissonance...

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

35:40021–8308

© The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Blackwell Publishing, Ltd.Oxford, UKJTSBJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour0021-8308© The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005354Original Article

Understanding TerrorismAndrea Kohn Maikovich

A New Understanding of Terrorism Using

Cognitive Dissonance Principles

ANDREA KOHN MAIKOVICH

“. . . for the social psychologist it is not a question of who is good and who is evil, but how activistsand defenders make sense of actions as morally or legally accessible acts” (Harré, 2004, p. 102).

The earliest records of human civilization contain accounts of interpersonal conflict;the earliest accounts of interpersonal conflict contain evidence of the use of terrorism(Abi-Hashem, 2004). In other words, terrorism is not a novel phenomenon, andhas been employed as a form of theatrical violence at least since the beginning ofrecorded human history, and most likely during pre-history as well (Sternberg, 2003).The September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C.catalyzed a burgeoning interest in terrorism among researchers from a variety offields, while the media became saturated with stories about terrorist organizationsand their international roots (Colvard, 2002). Much of the coverage, however, hasbeen emotionally charged and biased. Research suggests that the majority of today’sterrorists are neither psychologically insane nor driven by hate, as so vehementlypurported by Western governments and the Western media (Stout, 2002; Bush,2001). It is not terrorist organizations’ violent component that typically appealsto terrorists, but rather the sense of purpose and identity the organizations offer,as well as their purported central sociopolitical goals (defending Muslim cultureagainst Western influence, for example). Within this paper I offer a new theory,rooted in the principles of cognitive dissonance, to help explain what differentiatesthe mass numbers of identity-seeking, politically and socially discontent individu-als from the few who actually become terrorists. I write this article “not to endorseterrorism, but to point out that terrorism is not typically the irrational act that itis often made out to be . . .” (Wessells, 2004, p. 261).

BACKGROUND

There is no clear consensus about the most valid and thorough definition of terrorism.A commonly accepted definition, and the one I use in this paper, is offered by the

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Federal Bureau of Investigation: “[terrorism is] the unlawful use of force or violenceagainst persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, civilian popu-lation, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”(Whittaker, 2001, p. 3). Modern terrorist behavior is typically divided into twocategories—state-sponsored and non state-sponsored. Approximately 170 millionpeople died in state-sponsored terrorist activities in the 20th century alone, includ-ing 42 million under Stalin and 2 million under Pol Pot (Rummel, 1996). Thenumber of deaths resulting from non state-sponsored terrorist activities is dramati-cally lower, with estimates of 260 state-sponsored terrorism deaths for every one nonstate-sponsored terrorist death (Rummel, 1996). My focus is on non state-sponsoredterrorist activities, primarily because private terrorist networks have sparked suchconcern in the West following al Qaeda’s 2001 attacks.

There are several competing psychological theories about terrorists and terroristorganizations. The theory that has captured the public’s imagination is encapsulatedby a single word—psychopathy. McCauley (2002) describes the common belief thatterrorists must be so psychologically abnormal that they are best categorized aspsychopaths devoid of moral feeling and empathy. McCauley describes how diffi-cult it is for people to believe that the violence committed by terrorists is possibleunless it is explained by psychopathy. People want to believe that terrorists arepsychologically ill, that their theatrical violence falls far outside the realm ofnormalcy. When one turns on the television and sees pictures of devastation anddeath following a terrorist attack, it is easy to conclude that those responsible are“absolutely crazy.” Piven (2002, p. 128) embraces this common sentiment: “I havetermed [terrorist behavior] psychotic because such a dearth of empathy and suchmalignant rage, alongside such distorted and paranoid displacements constitutea massive deformation in personality development and reality testing.” However,data from over thirty years of research have not consistently supported this theory(McCauley, 2002). The majority of studies to date (most of which are based oninterviews and psychological evaluations of terrorists, because the topic does notlend itself to controlled studies) have concluded that few terrorists meet the criteriafor a DSM-diagnosable psychological disorder (McCauley, 2002; Long, 1990).

One of the most thorough studies of terrorists’ personalities focused on Germany’sBaader-Meinhof Gang, one of Europe’s most infamous post-World War II terroristorganizations (McCauley, 2002). Researchers meticulously reviewed the followingrecords for each terrorist: perinatal, pediatric, preschool, lower school, grade school,high school, and university. Researchers also conducted interviews with theterrorists’ family members, neighbors and classmates. Surprisingly, there wereno psychological differences between the Baader-Meinhof Gang members anddemographically matched controls. Further evidence that terrorists’ behaviorcannot simply be explained by psychopathy is rooted in the fact that many suchterrorists made the choice to sacrifice their lives in attacks. McCauley (2002)highlights the fact that no research exists suggesting that psychopaths areself-sacrificing in any sense. Furthermore, he describes how psychopaths are

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characteristically irresponsible and impulsive, two traits diametrically opposed tothe trust, mutual commitment, and cooperation terrorists typically display. Heuses the coordinated group of September 11th plane hijackers as an example ofhow terrorist personalities are the antithesis of psychopathic personalities.

A second common theory is that terrorists are motivated by hate and frustra-tion (Naimark, 2001; Staub 1996). This is one of the most popular explanationsendorsed by Western world leaders, and it is United States President GeorgeW. Bush’s public explanation for September 11, 2001 (Stout, 2002). A few monthsfollowing the attacks, for example, President Bush stated that, “The events ofthese seven weeks have shown . . . that America and the cause of freedom havedetermined enemies; that there are people in this world who hate what Americastands for. They hate our success, they hate our liberty” (Bush, 2001). At the 2002World Economic Forum, speakers also consistently identified hate as one of themain catalysts for terrorist violence directed against Western civilization (Stout,2002).

Sternberg’s (2003) triangular theory of hate is a coherent psychological explana-tion of how hate catalyzes terrorism and other forms of mass violence. Accordingto this theory, three core components of hate constitute a potent terrorisminstigator—negation of intimacy, passion (often expressed as intense anger),and cognitive devaluation of the targeted group to foster contempt and the desireto destroy. Furthermore, terrorists use propaganda to foster this hate, therebyrecruiting new “haters” and potential terrorists. Although Sternberg identifieshate as a main cause of terrorism, he admits that it cannot be identified as thesingular cause in most cases. Similarly, Baumeister (1996) identifies four roots ofterrorism, at least three of which are strongly related to hate. First is an ideologicaldivision between good (one’s own group) and evil (the enemy), leading to hatredfor the enemy because the enemy is evil. Second is a desire for revenge becauseof perceived injustice against one’s group at the hand of the enemy. Third is thedesire to reach a goal that is blocked by the enemy. Fourth is sadism, the com-ponent least related to hate. Some researchers endorsing hate theories havefocused more on the role of frustration. For example, Staub (1996) theorizes thatterrorism is likely to occur when basic human needs are not met, leading tofrustration, and subsequently violence as a form of need fulfillment.

Although some components of these hate theories of terrorism seem plausible,certainly hate and frustration cannot completely explain the phenomenon. Casestudies of terrorist leaders reveal that a high percentage come from middle orupper class families in which basic need fulfillment is not a concern (Stout, 2002).In addition, many terrorists have histories of academic and cultural exposure tothe West through positive scholarly interactions. For example, terrorist MohammedAtta came from a middle class Egyptian family. After earning status as a well-respected scholar in Germany, he enjoyed strong positive reception among theWestern academic world before becoming a suspected mastermind of theSeptember 11, 2001 attacks on the United States (Stout, 2002). Later, I will discuss

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several other examples of terrorists whose profiles suggest neither a paucity ofbasic need fulfillment, nor a history of negative exposure to Western culture thatcould potentially fertilize seeds of hate.

My theory about why certain individuals become violent terrorists is rooted incognitive dissonance principles. According to Festinger’s (1957) original cognitivedissonance theory, dissonance is aroused when two “elements of knowledge” (or“cognitions”) are both relevant to one another and dissonant. For example, if anindividual is cognizant of the fact that smoking is harmful to her health and canlead to premature death (one element of knowledge), but is a chain smoker andaddicted to nicotine (a second element of knowledge), she will experience highlevels of dissonance. Festinger asserted that dissonance is psychologically uncom-fortable, and that individuals will often attempt to reduce this arousal in one ormore of three ways: remove dissonant cognitions, add consonant cognitions, orreduce the importance of dissonant cognitions (Festinger, 1957). Other investigatorsadded a fourth means of reducing dissonance—increase the importance of consonantcognitions (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). There are two major cognitive dissonanceresearch paradigms that are relevant to terrorism, and that I discuss in depth later inthis article—the free-choice paradigm (Brehm, 1956) and the belief-disconfirmationparadigm (Festinger et al., 1956).

Within my theory, I argue that becoming a terrorist is a graduated process; ithappens not all at once, but over time, as the inhibiting forces of cognitive disso-nance are reduced within the individual contemplating terrorism. While I writeas a psychologist, it is important to note that sociologists of religion and sociolo-gists of social movements, most notably McAdam (1986), have also written aboutthis gradual conversion process as it relates to religious cults and social activismmovements. I discuss the work of these sociologists’ later in this article, but men-tion them here to acknowledge the fact that a basic component of my theory,gradual conversion, has been discussed in past sociological literature but inter-preted differently. Certainly the cognitive dissonance-based theory I propose isnot an all-encompassing explanation for terrorism, but is rather one more lensthrough which to look at a complicated, internationally threatening phenomenon.

THE THEORY

A surprisingly large number of people support terrorist organizations’ purportedultimate goals (such as to defend Islam against Western influence), and believethat terrorists’ actions are defensive against unfair, aggressive, and imperialisticWestern foreign policy. For example, the International Herald Tribune and PewResearch Center conducted a poll of international leaders two months followingthe September 11, 2001 attacks. They found that 76% of those polled reportedbelieving that the al Qaeda attacks were in direct response to offensive U.S.foreign policy (McCauley, in press). Some polls have also suggested that the

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majority of people within terrorists’ home countries support the use of violencegiven the current sociopolitical situation. For example, a July 2001 poll revealedthat 58% of Palestinians approve of the use of terrorist attacks against Israelicivilians (Wolin, 2003). Even if these data are overestimates, as is likely, it is clearthat the majority of citizens are not willing to actually use violence themselves, asevidenced by the relatively few number of terrorists compared to the generalpopulation. When these non-violent individuals try non-violent approaches toachieve sociopolitical goals and fail, or when they repeatedly witness the failureof non-violent approaches, some become more interested in terrorist organiza-tions as a last resort. In short, cognitive dissonance begins to arise at this point ofvacillation, peaking when these initially non-violent individuals contemplateactually becoming perpetrators of violence themselves. For the great majority, thisdissonance serves as an effective inhibitor, and they do not actually become ter-rorists. I suggest that what differentiates the few who do become terrorists fromthe majority who do not is often the ability to reduce this cognitive dissonance.

The major assumption of this theory is that dissonance arises when individualscontemplate utilizing violence (first element of knowledge) despite previouslyrejecting it as a solution (second element of knowledge). Data point to the exist-ence of dissonance at this point in terrorists’ lives, although it has not traditionallybeen interpreted in this way. First, there is clear evidence that many terrorist leadersand organization members originally attempt to achieve their sociopolitical goalsthrough non-violent means. One often-researched case study is Germany’s RedArmy Faction (formerly the Baader-Meinhof Gang), which did not originate as aterrorist group, but rather was formed during the 1960s European student demon-strations against the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe (Demaris, 1977).The founding members came from respectable, middle to upper class families(Long, 1990). Andreas Baader was the son of a historian; Ulrike Meinhof was thedaughter of an art historian, and was herself undertaking graduate study in phi-losophy. Another founding member, Gudrun Ensslin, was also a philosophy gradu-ate student and the daughter of a clergyman. None of the founding members hadviolent intentions and were actually originally pacifists, engaging solely in politicalaction (McCauley & Segal, 1989). When these peaceful attempts proved futile, thegroup gradually radicalized and eventually became extremely violent.

The organization’s violence escalated over a time span of years (Long, 1990).The group’s first terrorist act was attempted arson at a department store in Frank-furt, Germany in April of 1968. Andreas Baader was arrested, convicted, andsentenced to a prison term, but jumped bail and went underground. The follow-ing year, several leaders of the group (which now called itself the Red ArmyFaction, or RAF) began training in Jordan with the Marxist Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine. Between 1970 and 1972, the now clearly terrorist organ-ization staged a series of theatrically violent attacks on multiple American, NATOand German buildings, installations and officials. By 1977, most of the foundingmembers were dead, either as the result of hunger strikes or suicide. A new

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generation of leaders took over, and continued to escalate the violence withbombings and arson attacks, culminating in the July 1986 murder of SiemensElectronics Company director Karl-Heinz Beckurts. Long (1990, p. 24) sees theviolent transformation of the Baader-Meinhoff Gang/RAF organization asrepresentative of the transformation of many originally non-violent, even pacifist,organizations: “Groups generally resort to violent acts gradually over time. Theydo not spring up overnight as fully developed terrorist organizations but ratheradopt increasingly violent tactics as the group itself develops cohesion.”

Indeed this pattern is evident across nearly all major terrorist organizations.Many of the European-based terrorist groups began as peace movements in thelate 1960s in correlation with anti-Vietnam movements in the United States(Long, 1990). In the 1960s, future terrorists were peacefully demonstrating againstnuclear proliferation, and identifying themselves as pacifists as the Vietnam Warraged. With time, and the failure of these peaceful tactics, a few of these pacifistsbecame increasingly violent, eventually forming cohesive terrorist organizations.Groups that did not begin as violent organizations, but that morphed into such,include the Red Brigades of Italy, Action Directe of France, the 17 NovemberRevolutionary Organization and the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), bothbased in Greece, and two Japanese New Left organizations, Chukaku-Ha and theJapanese Red Army.

Organization members experience symptoms suggestive of cognitive disso-nance as their organizations progress to more violent tactics. Moghaddam (2004)describes how as organizations become more violent, and as terrorists move upthe ranks to more violent positions, members, out of necessity, must become moresecretive, even with close friends and family members. This aspect of terrorism isparticularly difficult for many recruits, especially the youngest. Several examplesdiscussed in the section on reducing dissonance also illustrate that many terroristsinitially report feeling ambivalent about committing violence (Long, 1990). Itheorize that the ability to reduce this dissonance distinguishes those who becometerrorists from those who abandon their organizations before becoming perpetra-tors of violence themselves.

What about individuals who join terrorist organizations that are already veryviolent? Indeed, recruiting young terrorists, especially ones willing to lose theirlives in suicide missions, is, ironically, a crucial life-sustaining mechanism for aterrorist organization. These individuals frequently undergo a transformationprocess that parallels the transformations described above, despite the fact thattheir organizations are already violent (Long, 1990). Many new recruits supportthe organization’s cause and appreciate the sense of identity and purpose thatmembership offers, but do not want to actually commit violent acts themselves.However, with time they become radicalized and contemplate taking on moreviolent roles, and some eventually become suicide bombers or perpetrators ofmassive-scale violence. For these individuals, too, dissonance arises and must beovercome prior to committing an act of violence.

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Terrorist organizations are extremely hierarchical, and are constructed so thatnew recruits do not have to commit violence right away. Long (1990) describesthe many roles new recruits can take, including administrative jobs, logisticalsupport tasks, accounting, courier roles, etc. He further notes that terrorist organ-ization members often take on more violent roles only after lengthy periods ofmembership. What happens during that period of non-violent participation iscrucial.

Terrorist organizations are designed so that once individuals are recruited tothem and take on non-violent roles, conditions within the organization favorradicalization and foster the desire to commit violence. Whereas new recruitscommence involvement with, at most, unpleasant roles that are not too violent(Bandura, 2004), leaders enforce the message that in order to

truly

make a contri-bution to the organization and its cause, recruits must engage in increasinglyextreme behaviors, and eventually violence (McCauley & Segal, 1989). Disso-nance begins to arise, and some members leave the organization at this point.Moghaddam (2004) identifies several “preconditions” that, when considered asa whole, can indicate when a terrorist organization is likely to evolve withina culture. These preconditions also demonstrate how the inner structure ofterrorist organizations favors the radicalization of new recruits: isolation fromthe outside world, emphasis on a categorical “good vs. evil” view of the world,portrayal of present society as illegitimate and unjust, portrayal of the need forradical social change, portrayal of a lack of legal means to achieve change,assertion that the ideal society justifies any means, assertion that the terroristorganization can bring about societal change, and assertion that societal changeimproves the organization’s standing (Moghaddam, 2004). Moghaddam alsonotes that terrorists report perceiving the option of leaving the group as extremelydifficult.

In table 1, I display how these organizational characteristics contribute tominimizing the arousal of cognitive dissonance during the recruits’ transforma-tion, based on Festinger’s (1957) original means of reducing dissonance.

Recruits often do not receive the details of their missions until just prior totheir occurrences. Osama bin Laden described how “the brothers, who con-ducted the [September 11, 2001] operation, all they knew was that they have amartyrdom operation and we asked each of them to go to America, but theydidn’t know anything about the operation, not even one letter. But they weretrained and we did not reveal the operation to them until they are there andjust before they boarded the planes” (Bin Laden, 2001). There is evidence tosuggest that despite terrorist leaders’ efforts to minimize the arousal ofdissonance in their recruits as they become indoctrinated and begin con-templating violence, dissonance does still arise. (It should be noted that terroristleaders likely do not see themselves as “reducing dissonance” per se, but rathersimply as reducing guilt or uncertainty.) I discuss specific cases in the section onreducing dissonance.

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So why, when dissonance is high, do individuals not simply leave a terroristorganization before actually committing an act of terrorism? Some do, despiteenormous pressure from their organization not to (Moghaddam, 2004). I proposethat although pressure from the terrorist leaders not to leave the group is partiallyresponsible for the low rate of attrition, another very important factor is somerecruits’ high motivation to reduce dissonance (traditionally interpreted as doubt,uncertainty, guilt, etc.) and advance in the organization. The reason for their highmotivation is best understood by examining data from cognitive dissonance studiesconducted in the free choice paradigm.

Brehm conducted the original free choice paradigm experiment (Brehm, 1956).Researchers presented the experiment to female subjects under the pretense of“market research.” Participants rated how desirable they found each of eighthousehold items, such as a coffee maker. After the women had rated the items,researchers asked them to choose one of two products, selected from the eight byresearchers. The two products were either items that the participants had rankedas very close on the desirability scale (making it a difficult decision), or that theyhad ranked as very far apart (making it an easy decision). After making a choice,the women re-ranked the products again. The participants ranked the product

Table I

ConditionDissonance-Reducing Mechanism How?

Isolation from outside world

Reduce dissonant cognitions Avoid hearing opposite perspectives from non-organization members

“Good vs. Evil” view of world

Increase consonant cognitions

Frame actions as “good” fighting “evil”

Society as illegitimate and unjust

Increase consonant cognitions

Legitimize using drastic means tofight unjust governments and their people

Need for radical social change

Increase importance of consonant cognitions

Make the situation seem urgent

Lack of legal means to achieve change

Increase consonant cognitions

Emphasize paucity of alternativesolutions

Ideal society justifies any means

Reduce importance of dissonant cognitions

De-emphasize doubts about violence because of the importance of an ideal society

Terrorists can bring about social change

Increase consonant cognitions

Idealize terrorists’ role

Societal change improves organization’s standing

Increase consonant cognitions

Emphasize how actions can bolster support for organization

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they chose after a difficult decision as more desirable than they had originally, butranked the rejected product as less desirable than originally. Brehm interpretedthis as demonstrative of the women’s high motivation to reduce the dissonancethat arose from rejecting a product close in desirability to the chosen product.This phenomenon, termed “spreading the alternatives,” laid the empirical founda-tion for future studies looking further at how motivation to reduce dissonance isincreased after making difficult decisions (Shultz & Lepper, 1996).

The decision to even join a terrorist organization, let alone actually commit an actof violence, is for many not an easy decision. Often it means deceiving family andclose friends, living a dangerous lifestyle, and eventually becoming quite isolatedfrom the outside world in a cult-like fashion (Moghaddam, 2004). I propose thatafter making the difficult decision to join an organization, individuals will behighly motivated to reduce dissonance by “spreading the alternatives.” For example,they might perceive the terrorist organization and its ideals as more desirable thanthey did from a more critical pre-membership stage, and simultaneously perceivethe outside world as less desirable. Of course, spreading the alternatives to reducedissonance does not spontaneously transform a non-violent individual into aterrorist. The process is gradual, and only over time do terrorists become morecommitted to their organization and more disengaged from the outside world,and less prone to self-censure (Bandura, 2004).

In sum, many terrorist organizations began as non-violent protest groupsthat radicalized and became violent only over time, as non-violent tactics failed.Recruits to already violent organizations also undergo a transformation, typicallyfirst taking on non-violent roles, and only later becoming violent themselves.Cognitive dissonance arises when these previously non-violent individuals discoverthemselves contemplating using violence, dissonance that they are highly motivatedto reduce as explained by free choice paradigm principles. Bandura (2004, p. 140)writes that the “development of the capability to kill is usually achieved throughan evolvement process, in which recruits may not recognize the transformationthey are undergoing.” The “evolvement process,” I argue, is possible because ofdissonance-reducing mechanisms.

In a study about recruitment to “high-risk activism,” (social activist activitiesinvolving a high level of risk or danger to the participant), McAdam found thatindividuals with a personal history of involvement in “safe” activism were morelikely to be successfully recruited into higher risk activism groups (McAdam,1986). Although McAdam was writing about positive high-risk activism activities,specifically participation in the pro-civil rights 1964 Freedom Summer movement, theparallel between the gradual radicalization of high-risk activists and high-riskterrorists is evident. McAdam found that a supportive network with a “pulling”influence also characterized those who were successfully recruited into high-riskactivist activities. As will be discussed later, integration into a supportive network(such as current terrorists trained to provide social support with a “pulling” influ-ence to potential terrorists) is a strong dissonance-reducing mechanism.

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Before discussing the dissonance-reducing mechanisms that I propose are socrucial to crossing the line from non-violent to violent, it is important to lookmore closely at the individuals about whom I write. Who exactly are the men(and increasingly women) drawn to and recruited by terrorist organizations?Terrorist researchers consistently identify youth as an important trait of theseindividuals. Abi-Hashem (2004, p. 178) describes how “leaders of the terroristorganizations such as bin Laden must now engage in the recruitment process, andnaturally their attention is going to turn to young men and women. These youngpeople find themselves at a time in their life when they are looking to the futurewith the hope of engaging in meaningful behavior that will be satisfying and getthem ahead.” This has serious implications for current terrorist leaders, whofind a reservoir of potential recruits in their countries’ youthful populations. Forexample, the majority of modern Arab nations have populations that are at least50% composed of individuals under age 25, which Zakaria (2003) describesas a demographic time bomb. He asserts that as the bulging Arab youth popula-tion ages, frustration with poor economic prospects will translate into resentmenttoward the Western world that was identified throughout childhood as the sourceof their troubles.

Several studies have been conducted to analyze terrorists’ personalities. Althoughlittle data support a tendency toward psychopathic personalities, two traits con-sistently appear—inability to tolerate uncertainty and low self-esteem. Hallett(2004) describes how terrorists typically have an inability to tolerate uncertainty,which is reflected by their eagerness to attach themselves to expansive, rigidideologies that leave little room for uncertainty. Similarly, terrorists tend toadapt extremely rigid mentalities, which are more tolerable psychological statesfor them (Woodberry, 2002). Terrorist organizations offer clear answers, andspecialize in minimizing uncertainty: “For the terrorist . . . blind commitmentto political, economic, religious, or philosophical beliefs comforts the mind byeliminating or reducing the uncertainty . . . when beliefs become linked to themeaning of life itself, the conviction becomes even more rigid” (Marsella,2004, p. 42). I propose that this inability to tolerate uncertainty makes theseindividuals particularly motivated to reduce dissonance, and makes them moresuccessful at it.

The second commonly identified terrorist personality trait is low self-esteem,frequently accompanied by a strong need to be acknowledged as worthy (Wood-berry, 2002). Joining the terrorist organization provides a sense of identity and asense of worthiness. As Taylor and Louis (2004, p. 180) ask, “What could be moreattractive than an organization that offers a clear set of guidelines for how tobetter the life for the individual and indeed for the entire group?” Again, this traitalso helps explain why some individuals are better at reducing dissonance thanothers. If they have a low self-esteem, they might be more motivated to reducethe dissonance that stands in the way of being accepted by an organization thatboth makes them feel worthy and provides them with an identity.

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REDUCING DISSONANCE

Thus, a plethora of evidence suggests that most individuals are initially drawn toterrorist organizations not because of their violent component, but rather becauseof the sense of identity and purpose that membership offers. As discussed above,it is frequently the central goal of the organization—to defend one’s Muslimculture against destructive Western influence, for example—that appeals to futureterrorists, most of whom commence their involvement in terrorist organizationswith non-violent contributions such as hiding sought-after members or providingsecretarial services (Long, 1990). Frequently these individuals are initially am-bivalent toward violent means of achieving sociopolitical goals; their affinity istoward terrorist organizations’ ends, not their means (Crenshaw, 1986). What,however, keeps these initially non-violent individuals in the organizations onceviolence escalates? And perhaps more importantly, what psychological mecha-nisms are involved in these individuals’ choices to become violent themselves, andin some cases to sacrifice their lives in suicidal attacks? The transition point fromnon-violent organization supporter or member to actual violence perpetratormarks the zenith of the individual’s level of cognitive dissonance. I propose thatwhat distinguishes terrorists from terrorist supporters is often the ability to reducethis dissonance. This portion of the article examines five commonly identifiedterrorist attributes that I propose function as dissonance-reducing mechanisms: (a)just world bias, (b) social support, (c) prioritizing dream imagery over externalreality, (d) diffusion of responsibility, and (e) moral disengagement.

Just World Bias

One of the major themes emerging both from the rare interviews that terroristsgrant researchers and uncovered documents is that terrorists’ justifications fortheir violent acts commonly are rooted in a just world bias, which I propose isone of the most frequently employed and most effective dissonance-reducingmechanisms terrorists use. The concept of a just world bias, introduced by Lerner(1980), is essentially the assumption that people deserve their fates, that their fatesare “just.” The bias frequently catalyzes a process of devaluing victims and theirsuffering because of the assumption that this suffering is deserved (Staub, 2004).When terrorists view the current sociopolitical situation through the lens of a justworld bias, their attack victims are not unjustly hurt or killed, but rather deservethese fates either because of what they did personally or, more commonly, becauseof what their governments’ did.

In

Terror in the Mind of God

, Juergensmeyer (2000) describes how if an individualor society perceives the world as peaceful, then violent acts are easily judged actsof terrorism. However, if the world is perceived as being in a state of war, violentacts appear more legitimate. In short, when previously non-violent individuals

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consider committing violence and subsequently experience cognitive dissonance,they can reduce this dissonance by seeking out evidence to corroborate theirleaders’ vision of the world as already in a state of global war. This belligerentoutlook on the current world situation reframes their organization’s violent actsas merely self-defensive or retributive acts of war against enemies, not innocents.In an interview, Hamas founder Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi described how his organ-ization’s “martyrs” (suicide bombers) acted in direct response to specific incid-ences of Israeli violence, usually violence that victimized innocent Palestinians( Juergensmeyer, 2000). Rantisi explained how if Hamas did not use violence inthis manner, Israel would use violence against them. When asked how he could,in good conscience, oversee and approve Hamas missions that frequently resultin the violent and brutal deaths of civilian women and children, Rantisi statedsimply: “We’re at war” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 73). He later expanded on hisstatement, explaining that Hamas was at war with all of Israeli society becauseIsraeli citizens support the destruction of Islamic nationalism; therefore, the Israeli-Hamas war can involve no innocent Israeli victims, because all Israeli societymembers are war enemies.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and Wash-ington D.C., the face and words of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden becameinfamous in the Western world. This terrorist leader’s rhetoric illustrates how ajust world bias can serve as a dissonance-reducing mechanism for terrorists; hisassertions that al Qaeda’s actions are

defensive

against the aggressive, intrusive,unjust United States have become mantras. In a 1997 CNN interview, bin Ladenwarned that, “A reaction might take place as a result of the U.S. government’shitting Muslim civilians and executing more than 600,000 Muslim children inIraq by preventing food and medicine from reaching them. So, the U.S. is respon-sible for any reaction, because it extended its war against troops to civilians” (BinLaden, 1997). Thus, even four years before the September 11th attacks, binLaden began establishing his official position that future al Qaeda violence wouldbe in response to United States actions. He would act defensively. He would actout of necessity. He could not be held responsible for any aggressive actions.

When bin Laden later spoke to his organization and to the Western worldthrough the Al Jazeera network three years following the September 11th attacks,his rationale echoed his 1997 warnings: “God knows it did not cross our mindsto attack the towers but after the situation became unbearable and we witnessedthe injustice and tyranny of the American-Israeli alliance against our people inPalestine and Lebanon, I thought about it. And the events that affected medirectly were that of 1982 and the events that followed—when America allowedthe Israelis to invade Lebanon, helped by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. As I watched thedestroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me punish the unjust the same way[and] to destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we are tastingand to stop killing our children and women” (Bin Laden, 2001). The consistency,repetition, and skillfully crafted rhetoric that are evident in not only these two

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examples of bin Laden’s speeches, but also in the bulk of all of his communication,powerfully reinforce the just world bias.

Recent terrorist studies suggest that this type of rhetoric, which reframes eachorganization member’s role from terrorist to defensive soldier fighting a war, isboth successful and extremely common. Juergensmeyer (2000) conducted inter-views with multiple terrorists, nearly all of whom emphatically insisted that theterm “terrorist” was not applicable to them. They were simply “militants” fight-ing a battle. For example, a Lutheran pastor convicted in a terrorist abortionbombing case described how he resorted to violence only because it was the soleway to defend the unborn against murderers, which made his violence not terror-ism but a defensive attack in an ongoing war against baby killers ( Juergensmeyer,2000). Belfast citizens deemed terrorists by Western standards declared themselves“paramilitaries;” Hamas suicide bombings were merely war “operations” in thewords of the group’s leaders. After extensive interviews with Hamas leaders,Juergensmeyer (2000) concluded that the organization’s leaders, like the leaders ofso many other terrorist groups, conceptualize their organization as an army thatplans violent attacks that are both defensive and necessary.

In

Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media

, Schmidand de Graff (1982) provide a table, which presents further examples of diamet-rically opposed terminology and concepts for terrorist-related issues (table 2).

The American Reverend Michael Bray’s defense of anti-abortion terrorist actsfurther illustrates how the just world bias functions as a dissonance-reducingmechanism ( Juergensmeyer, 2000). In a 1996 interview, Bray defended the useof violence against abortion doctors, and even the murder of these doctors, by

Table II Some In-Group & Out-Group Labelings for the Same Thing

Out-Group Labeling In-Group Labeling

Criminal RevolutionaryTerrorist GuerrillaMurderer Freedom FighterGang ArmySubversive Element LiberatorBloodbath PurgeLunatic MartyrMercenary SoldierThreat WarningAggression Preventive Counter-StrikeAssassin AvengerPropaganda CommuniquéExtremist Fanatic Dedicated Anti-ImperialistAttack OperationHired Killer Example of Revolutionary SolidarityMurder Revolutionary Justice

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explaining that once again this violence is merely defensive in an ongoing war inAmerican society (a war, he emphasized, that is largely unnoticed due to itsgradual and subtle onset and progression). This war, according to Bray, is similarto World War II, because in both instances violence is justified ( Juergensmeyer,2001). Specifically, Bray maintains that just as violence against Hitler and theNazis much earlier in the war would have prevented the murder of millions ofJews, violence against baby killers is justified now to prevent the future murder ofmillions of unborn children. Juergensmeyer (2000, p. 150) notes that “MichaelBray’s vision of a world caught in an imminent and almost eschatological con-frontation between the forces of good and evil arrayed on the battlefield of politicsis not idiosyncratic,” but rather is extremely similar to the views expounded bymany groups responsible for recent terrorist attacks, including Japan’s Aum Shin-rikyo, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman and his Egypt and New Jersey factions, themilitant Sikhs in India, and Rabbi Kahane’s Kach party in Israel.

As discussed previously, terrorist organizations frequently increase their use ofviolence with time. The dissonance that the increased use of force arouses isfurther reduced by the addition of consonant cognitions in the form of evidencethat non-violent tactics were attempted before resorting to violence. Hamasfounder Rantisi emphasized that originally Hamas militants exclusively targetedIsraeli soldiers, and that “every measure” was taken to prevent both massacresand the necessity of suicide bombings ( Juergensmeyer, 2000). However, in 1990when Israeli police attacked Palestinian demonstrators near the Dome of theRock, and when Dr. Baruch Goldstein massacred Palestinians in Hebron duringRamadan, Hamas was forced to conclude that Israel was attacking, and was atwar with, the entire Palestinian society. Thus, Hamas resorted to retaliation andself-defense. Rantisi emphasized that Hamas terrorists are victims in this ongoinggreat struggle, and certainly are not the cause of it. He lamented that Americaperceives his organization as aggressive, which he identifies as America’s numberone misunderstanding.

One of the reasons why I propose that a just world bias is so effective as adissonance-reducing mechanism is that in the current international sociopoliticalstate, it is not difficult for many individuals to interpret Israel’s military behavior,or much of the United States’ military behavior, as aggressive. As Dr. Max Man-waring of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (2001)described, there are many actions that fall somewhere in the gray area betweenwar and peace, and these gray area actions will likely only increase in number inthe future. It is not difficult, then, to add consonant cognitions to corroborateone’s dissonance-reducing conception of a world at war by interpreting actions inthe “gray area” as simply more black-and-white than perhaps they actually are.Some researchers suggest that it is now especially easy to accumulate evidencesupporting the just world bias given the current United States administration’sventure into the domain of preemption (Abi-Hashem, 2004). In the words of Steele(2002, p. 14), the United States now claims “the right to strike, pre-emptively, at

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any nation which it decides is developing weapons of mass destruction or support-ing terrorism. It is carte blanche for war on the world.”

Ironically and tragically, the Western media’s current language and images feedthe mouths of terrorists hungry for dissonance-reducing evidence to support theirjust world bias and perception of a world at war with pugnacious Americans onthe offensive. For example, following the September 11th World Trade Centerattacks, Steve Dunleavy wrote in a New York Post article: “The response to thisunimaginable 21st-century Pearl Harbor should be as simple as it is swift—kill thebastards. A gunshot between the eyes, blow them to smithereens, poison them ifyou have to. As for cities or countries that host these worms, bomb them intobasketball courts” (Piven, 2002, p. 138). Rich Lowry, editor of The NationalReview, similarly wrote: “America roused to a righteous anger has always been aforce for good. States that have been supporting if not Osama bin Laden, peoplelike him need to feel pain. If we flatten part of Damascus or Tehran or whateverit takes, that is part of the solution” (Piven, 2002, p. 138). On September 11,2001, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told CNN, “There is onlyone way to begin to deal with people like this, and that is you have to kill someof them even if they are not immediately directly involved in this thing” (Piven,2002, p. 138). A vicious cycle thus emerges: terrorists attack “defensively” and outof necessity in a world at war with eye-for-an-eye battleground ethics, promptingtheir victims to respond with belligerent rhetoric and a display of force. Terroristsinterpret this response as further evidence of the need for self-defense, whichreduces any dissonance associated with acting violently against the West. Theterrorists respond with more attacks. And it continues.

Social Support

Terrorist researchers frequently describe the strong social network that supportsindividuals as they train for terrorist missions. Again, I propose that this commonfeature can best be understood not simply as a common feature, but also as animportant and powerful dissonance-reducing mechanism. Bandura (2004, p. 141)asserts that, “the merchandising of terrorism is not accomplished by a few un-savory individuals. It requires a worldwide network of people, including reputable,high-level members of society, who contribute to the deathly enterprise by insula-ting fractionation of the operations and displacement and diffusion of responsi-bility.” I discuss displacement and diffusion of responsibility later in this paper, butfirst focus on the “worldwide network of people” Bandura describes that supportsand insulates each terrorist.

Festinger validated the ability of social support to reduce dissonance in hisfoundational studies conducted using the belief-disconfirmation research para-digm (Festinger et al., 1956). Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956) studied aLake City cult, the members of which believed that aliens had revealed to them

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the date on which a flood would destroy the world. The only human survivorswould be members of their cult, who would be evacuated by flying saucers. Whenthe doom’s day date passed (and the world still existed), the individuals who hadspent the supposedly ill-fated day with their fellow cult members did not lose theirfaith in the prophesy, but rather believed that God had decided to prevent theflood because the cult was such a force for good. However, individuals who were

not

with their cult on the pre-set date lost their faith in the prophesy and left thecult. Furthermore, after the date passed, those still in the cult proselytized muchmore passionately and frequently than before, seeking out further social supportfor their beliefs by recruiting and converting new members. Festinger interpretedthis behavior as an attempt to reduce dissonance by adding consonant cognitions,namely by seeking reassurance from each other and by increasing the number ofbelievers. Based on the increased faith of the cult members, their dissonance wasclearly dramatically reduced.

Arguably this dissonance-reducing mechanism operates in terrorist organiza-tions as well, as research indicates that terrorist organizations operate similarly tocults (Long, 1990). As discussed above, frequently terrorists make great sacrificesto join their organization, and sometimes agree to make the ultimate sacrifice oftheir life, with the understanding that their actions will help lead to the ultimatedefeat of their perceived enemies in the near future. Even as terrorist leaders’promises of imminent victory over the West fail to materialize, with each attackterrorists’ beliefs that they will soon prevail strengthen (Long, 1990). Festinger etal. (1956) hypothesized that five conditions must be met in order for there to bethis increased passion and fervor for a cause following disconfirmation of a belief:the belief is held with deep conviction and has some relevance to the believer’sactions; the belief holder has committed him/herself to the belief, and has com-mitted an important action for the sake of the belief; the belief is specific andconcerned with the real world, and thereby is vulnerable to refutation; undeniabledisconfirmatory evidence occurs and is recognized by the belief holder; and

thebelief holder has strong social support

. When all five of these conditions are met, as theyfrequently are for terrorists, one’s underlying faith in the holiness and importanceof the cause or belief becomes more passionate and engrained. Dissonance isreduced, paving the way for more violent actions in the future.

The wider the social support network available for terrorists to tap into, themore dissonance is reduced. Often isolation and secrecy from friends and familyis one of the most difficult aspects of joining a cult or terrorist organization, butwhen family and close friends offer support, as they increasingly do in manyterrorist-saturated regions of the modern world, dissonance is reduced evenfurther. A clear example is found in modern day Palestine. Funerals held for youngPalestinian suicide bombers are not somber events, but are rather celebrationsthat frequently inspire other youth to become terrorists themselves (Abi-Hashem,2004). The powerful dissonance-reducing potential of social support is no secretto terrorist leaders, even if they understand social support simply to be an effective

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means of encouraging self-sacrifice. Once a potential terrorist is identified, organ-ization leaders go to great lengths to ensure that he is continuously surroundedby supportive individuals who both encourage him to become a terrorist, andisolate him from outsiders who would present a different perspective (Post, 2001).Once someone makes the decision to become a suicide bomber, the tight network ofsupporters becomes even more insulating and supportive. Hamas founder Rantisidescribed in an interview how, for example, young Palestinians who agree tobecome martyrs/suicide bombers are instructed to sign friendship pacts and writegoodbye letters to their families in order to solidify their decision ( Juergensmeyer,2000). It is very rare for terrorists to act alone, and one of the most commonterrorist attributes is a strong social network (Long, 1990).

Seeking social support is therefore a very easy means of reducing dissonance.Just as it is not difficult to interpret American actions in such a way as to deemthem evidence corroborating a just world bias, it is also not difficult to tap into awidespread support network, which both adds consonant cognitions and simulta-neously reduces dissonant cognitions (through becoming isolated from peoplewith different opinions). Indeed, one of the most frightening aspects of thesepowerful dissonance-reducing mechanisms is that they are so easy to utilize. Ditzler(2004, p. 201) describes how, “as a general rule, every handful of core terroristoperators who actually commit acts of violence are supported by a structure thatevolves outward in an onion-layer fashion to include tens of thousands to hun-dreds of thousands of persons who provide varying degrees of support.” The twodissonance-reducing mechanisms discussed thus far frequently work together, asoften vast networks of terrorists and supporters share the just world bias thatlegitimizes the use of violence. Juergensmeyer (2000) describes how in order forterrorist acts to be executed successfully, usually a large community of support isnecessary. Only a large amount of social support can legitimize such acts ofviolence.

For those who commit the largest and most brutal attacks, or for those whosacrifice their own lives, dissonance may be so high that support from within theorganization is not enough to reduce it. Studies reveal that the most infamousterrorists frequently relied on outside support networks (real or imagined) toincrease consonant cognitions ( Juergensmeyer, 2000). There are several elucida-tory examples of this phenomenon: Yigal Amir, Yitzhak Rabin’s assassin, empha-sized his enormous amount of support from the Messianic Zionism movementboth in Israel and abroad; both Timothy McVeigh, who was partially responsiblefor the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in OklahomaCity, and Buford Furrow, the purported attacker of a Jewish daycare center, reliedon support from a militant Christian subculture with wide roots spread through-out the entire United States; Unabomber Theodor Kaczynski claimed that hewas supported by the “strident student activist culture” dominating the late 1960s;and the “trenchcoat culture” in theory supported the two 1999 Columbine killersin Littleton, Colorado. In all cases, the terrorists maintained that their vast, some-

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times international network of supporters confirmed the defensive and necessarynature of their violence, once again pointing to a strong link between a just worldbias and social support.

I digress here briefly to note that psychologically oriented social psychologistshave traditionally held the entire concept of cognitive dissonance in higher esteemthan have more sociologically oriented social psychologists and sociologists (Spilkaet al., 2003). Spilka et al. suggest that the reason for this divergence of opinionsis that psychologists have traditionally adopted more of an outsider’s perspective,identifying the presence of dissonant beliefs by rational, objective criteria. Forexample, Festinger assumed that cult members experienced dissonance after theirprophesy of the world’s end was undeniably disconfirmed (i.e. the world stillexisted). In contrast, Spilka et al. note that sociologists have traditionally adoptedmore of an insider’s perspective, focusing on a “socially constructed reality in-capable of any simply

[sic]

falsification” (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 358).For example, although from an outsider’s objective perspective the end of the

world prophesy certainly did fail, from an insider’s perspective the prophesy mightnot have failed at all (Pollner, 1987). Specifically, recent sociologists and sociolog-ically oriented psychologists have observed “failed” prophesies interpreted bycult members as tests of faith from God (Tumminia, 1998). Bainbridge points tothe historical example of Jehovah’s Witness Charles Taze’s failed prediction ofChrist’s return in 1874, highlighting the fact that Taze’s followers reported believ-ing that Christ had returned invisibly (Bainbridge, 1997). In sum, many currentauthors have repeatedly found examples of such “spiritualization,” the process bywhich failed prophecies are reinterpreted as having been fulfilled (Zygmunt,1972).

I note this because some sociologists and more sociologically oriented psycholo-gists might argue that labeling anti-Western terrorists’ beliefs “dissonance-reducing”is flawed because I have assumed a Western perspective. From the terrorists’perspective, a violent way of life might make complete sense, and might actuallynot lead to dissonance at all. Perceiving the world through a just world bias lensis not, in other words, a defense mechanism to reduce dissonance if the worldreally

is

, to them, at war. As discussed above, in recent years Western leaders’belligerent language has substantiated this view. This perspective is certainly valid;however, because terrorists have reported having to overcome ambivalent emo-tions in order to commit acts of violence, and because of the extreme measuresterrorist organization leaders take to reduce the guilt and uncertainty (or dis-sonance) experienced by their new recruits, there is good reason to believe thatpotential terrorists do in fact face the psychological task of overcoming dissonance.My identification of a just world bias serving a dissonance-reducing purpose forterrorists does not mean, certainly, that this belief lacks all epistemic merit. WhileI do acknowledge that I am writing from a Western psychological perspective, thiscertainly is not the only valid perspective from which to examine this complexphenomenon.

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Dream Imagery

The third common terrorist trait that I propose serves as a major dissonance-reducing mechanism is the utilization of dreams and dream imagery as justifica-tion for violence. The heavy emphasis on dream imagery and its legitimacy as asource of guidance has deep roots in many terrorists’ cultures, religions, andbackgrounds. For example, the Afghanistan Taliban movement was founded in1994 after its future leader, Mullah Omar, reported a dream in which Godordered him to restore order ( Judah, 2001). Omar’s disciples interpreted thedream as proof of God’s will to create the movement (Edgar, 2004). Osama binLaden reportedly relied on dreams as justification for many of his terrorist acts.When his followers questioned him about why they themselves had not experi-enced such dreams, bin Laden convincingly explained that God would not wanteveryone to see the dream images because this would threaten the secrecy of theattack plans (Lines, 2001). In one of his final emails, United Kingdom shoebomber Richard Reid talked about how his dreams revealed to him special divinemeaning about his role and duty as an Islamic militant (Edgar, 2004).

One way terrorists reduce the dissonance aroused when they contemplate uti-lizing violence, then, is to emphasize their dreams over external reality, therebyincreasing consonant cognitions. The dreams, or reported dreams, are consonantwith their acts of violence; external reality frequently is dissonant. As suggestedin early versions of cognitive dissonance theory, there are four basic strategies forreducing dissonance: remove dissonant cognitions, add new consonant cognitions,reduce the importance of dissonant cognitions, or increase the importance ofconsonant cognitions (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). In empha-sizing the authority of dream images, terrorists both add consonant cognitionsand augment these consonant cognitions’ importance. Researchers have notedthat, “it may be the case that some militant members, such as Richard Reid . . .the shoe bomber, are motivated or perhaps reassured by their dreams as to theirpath in life” (Edgar, 2004, p. 28). I propose that what motivates this action isdissonance, and that the reassurance the dreams provide stems from their abilityto reduce that dissonance.

Diffusion of Responsibility and Moral Disengagement

The final two terrorist traits that I propose function as dissonance reducing mech-anisms have much to do with the terrorist organization itself. The traits, diffusionof responsibility (Zanna & Sande, 1987) and moral disengagement (Bandura etal., 1996), are related. Researchers have repeatedly shown that individuals tendto act more violently when a legitimate authority source accepts responsibilityfor their actions (Diener, 1977; Milgram, 1974). Tilker (1970) found that displace-ment of responsibility lessens concern about the well-being of others who are

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being mistreated, and also lessens the moral restraints one feels on one’s ownactions. Terrorist organizations are typically extremely hierarchical, so that those whoactually commit the violent acts can nearly always be said to be following ordersof some higher authority. According to Bandura (2004, p. 132), “the higher theauthorities, the more legitimacy, respect, and coercive power they command, themore willing people are to defer to them.” Terrorist organizations are designed sothat the leaders are extremely legitimate, commanding of respect, and powerful.

Kilham and Mann (1974) found that individuals in the middle of a hierarchyof command most easily experience moral disengagement, since they are not heldresponsible for actually making the decisions, but also are not held responsible foractually carrying out the acts of violence. Often future terrorists fill these middlehierarchical roles, such as secretarial work, for some time before actually becom-ing perpetrators of violence themselves. In addition, some of the most importantcomponents of terrorist organizations include these middle roles, such as weaponssupplier. These crucial individuals sometimes very consciously use moral disen-gagement to reduce dissonance. The testimony of Frank Terpil, an ex-CIA agentturned terrorist entrepreneur, is illustrative (Thomas, 1982).

Terpil, who supplied terror weapons and torture instruments to anti-Americanterrorist groups worldwide, reported that he made a conscious effort to avoid anyinformation about the ultimate use of his “supplies.” He reported, “I don’t everwant to know that” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 141). He emphasized that his jobwas a weapons dealer; he focused on his job, not on any consequences for humanvictims: “If I really thought about the consequences all the time, I certainlywouldn’t have been in this business. You have to blank it off.” He explicitly statedthat he did not feel responsible for any ends to which the weapons were put, andthat avoiding knowledge about the weapons’ use helped him to avoid feeling anysense of responsibility.

Crenshaw (1986) describes another example of conscious use of moral dis-engagement as a dissonance-reducing mechanism. Layla Khalid, a member of theterrorist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), participated in the1969 hijacking of a Trans World Airline plane en route to Damascus. In aninterview, Khalid described how the only way in which she could carry throughwith the hijacking was to consciously repress thoughts about the potential nega-tive consequences for child passengers on the plane.

As seen above, individuals involved in terrorism actively reduce dissonancewithin themselves by avoiding potentially unappealing information about theiractions and by placing responsibility on a higher authority. Terrorist leaders,however, also make a huge effort to reduce dissonance in new recruits by shieldingthem from unappealing information. Much of this is achieved through isolatingpotential terrorists from their families and outside friends, as discussed above.Bandura (2004) describes how terrorist organizations are adept at managing theircommunication systems in such a way that members are uninformed (or evenmisinformed) about the harm resulting from their group’s actions.

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Finally, when terrorist organizations take hostages, they often displace respon-sibility onto the countries of which the hostages are citizens, stating that it is upto that country’s government to meet their demands (Bandura, 2004). In thesecases, dissonance is reduced by eliminating dissonant cognitions (by not focusingon the original kidnapping), and by adding consonant cognitions (by focusing onthe fact that it is up to the hostage’s government to save the kidnapped individ-ual). For example, when Kashmiri rebels took American and European hostagesafter the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa in 1995, they reported that they “didnot necessarily want to murder the young men . . . but felt they had an obligationto be true to their word after they had threatened to kill them if their demandswere not met” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 210).

CONCLUSION

Sternberg (2003, p. 299) wrote that, “the beginning of the 21st century has seena renewal of terrorism on a grand scale that threatens the entire world.” Clearlythere is a great need for further studies looking at the roots of terrorism, with theultimate goal of developing effective interventions to reduce terrorism. The theoryproposed here is by no means complete, nor is it all-encompassing. There arelikely many individual terrorists and terrorist organizations whose actions cannotbe explained by cognitive dissonance principles. In addition, this process of reduc-ing dissonance before committing acts of violence is not unique to terrorism, butlikely also operates in other non-violent individuals turned violent. However, it isimportant to note that many violent individuals grew up under circumstances thatnormalized and even promoted violence, and some were likely born with geneticpredispositions for impulsive and aggressive personalities. For many violent indi-viduals, then, violence is a reasonable conflict-reducing strategy that does notcause any dissonance whatsoever. My theory applies exclusively to those who areinitially non-violent, and for whom violence is not initially appealing.

When the Western world declared a “War on Terrorism,” it adopted the prin-ciple of revenge, of violence as a response to violence. Arguably the belligerentlanguage of Western leaders feeds terrorists’ well-documented just world bias;belligerent rhetoric adds the consonant cognition that America and the Westernworld

are

at war and therefore terrorism is a justified means of self-defense. Justone example of this rhetoric is President Bush’s speech that, “We are at thebeginning of what I view as a very long struggle against evil. We’re not fightinga nation; we’re not fighting a religion; we’re fighting evil. And we have no choicebut to prevail. We’re fighting people that hate our values, they can’t stand whatAmerica stands for. And they really don’t like the fact that we exist. And I wantto assure you all that we will fight this fight on every front. We will use everyresource we have. And there is no doubt . . . in my mind that in our time, we willprevail.” (Bush, 2001). While clearly terrorism provokes anger and the desire for

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revenge, if we understand that this belligerent language fuels the just world biasand reduces terrorists’ dissonance, we can see that it actually contributes to theever-escalating cycle of violence.

Marsella (2004, p. 13) writes that, “The governments of the United States,Great Britain, and Israel hold that terrorism can be defeated through vigilance,counterterrorism, and the elimination of terrorist resources. However . . . theseactions alone, potent though they may be, can never be sufficient to stem the tideof terrorism, which springs from human discontent with and resentment of ine-quality and indifference and from widespread beliefs that violence is justified inthe face of oppression and insult.” Similarly, Bandura (2004, p. 143) writes that,“A focus on fighting violence with violence while neglecting needed long-termremedies is likely to produce an escalative cycle of terror and retaliation.”

I argue that there is a desperate need for more peace psychology research onterrorism. Clearly there is a need to respond to acts of terrorism, and worldleaders must be presented with potentially effective non-violent means of inter-vention so that they have an alternative to violence. Of course the details ofdiplomacy and international policy are the material for a different article, butsuffice it to say here that this theory suggests that fighting violence with violence,although sometimes effective in the short run at destroying certain groups ofterrorists, not only will not halt the recruitment and fostering of future terroristsand terrorist organizations, but will actually fuel it. We should be careful not touse terrorist attacks as our own dissonance-reducing mechanisms that fuel ourown just world bias.

Andrea MaikovichUniversity of Pennsylvania3720 Walnut StreetPhiladelphia, PA [email protected].

Acknowledgements.

I would like to thank Peter Salovey for his mentorship and guid-ance during the completion of this article. I would also like to thank Marsha andWilliam Maikovich, Derek Fong, and four anonymous reviewers for their helpfulcomments on various drafts.

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