A new approach to permit to work systems offshore

Safety Science, 15 (1992) 309-326 Elsevier

309

A new approach to permit to work systems offshore

Michael Booth

Shell U.K. Exploration and Production, Aberdeen, UK

and

John D. Butler

Integrated Safety Systems, Aberdeen, UK

Abstract

Booth, M. and Butler, J.F., 1992. A new approach to permit to work systems offshore. Safety

Science, 15: 309-326.

On the 6th July 1988, the North Sea oil installation Piper Alpha was destroyed following a series of explosions and a major fire. One hundred and sixty-five men lost their lives.

One of the most significant causes of the tragedy on Piper Alpha was the breakdown in co- ordination of hazardous acivities. This should have been achieved through the Permit to Work procedures. The failure of these procedures led many operators of offshore oil installations to review their own systems.

This article is about the radical overhaul of the Permit to Work procedure of one of the largest operators, Shell U.K. Exploration and Production and the introduction of the revised systems to over thirty of its installations over a period of 18 months.

Particular emphasis is placed on the control and co-ordination of dangerous operations,. the maintenance of effective plant and process isolations and the establishment of defined authorities and responsibilities. All these have been backed up by an extensive training and competence assurance programme reinforced by strict auditing and a quality improvement process.

Rdsum6

Le 6 juillet 1988 l’installation petroliere Piper Alpha installee dans la Mer du Nord a 6% detruite suite a une serie d’explosions et a un incendie tres important. Cent soixante-cinq hommes ont et6 tues.

L’une des causes principales de le tragedie de Piper Alpha Btait la manque de coordination des activitks dangereuses. On aurait dC mettre celle-ci en place par le biais de procedures dites de

Correspondence to: M. Booth, Shell U.K. Exploration and Production, 1, Altens Farm Road, Aberdeen AB9 2HY, UK.

0925-7535/92/$05.00 0 1992 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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“Permis de Travail”. L’absence de ces procedures a entrain6 plus dun operateur d’installations petrolikres off-shore a revoir de plus pres ses propres systemes.

Cet article decrit la revision complete de la procedure du Permis de Travail effect&e par l’une des plus grandes societes dans ce domaine, la Shell U.K. Exploration and Production et la mise en place d’un systeme revise dans plus de trente de ses installations sur une periode de 18 mois.

On met tout particulierement l’accent sur le controle et la coordination des operations dites dangereuses, sur le maintien d’une isolation efficace des installations et des procedures et sur la repartition de responsabilites et d’autorites clairement definies. Tout ceci a kte complete par une formation intensive et un programme d’assurance des compktences suivis par un audit severe et une procedure d’amklioration de la qualite.

Zusammenfassung

Am 6. Juli 1988 wurde auf der Nordsee nach einer Reihe Explosionen und einem grogen Brand die Bohrinsel “Piper Alpha” viillig zerstijrt. Dabei kamen hundertftinfundsechzig Menschen urns Leben.

Eine der Hauptursachen der Tragijdie auf der “Piper Alpha”war der Zusammenbruch der Koor- dinierung gefahrlicher Arbeit. Das sogenannte Arbeitsgenehmigungsverfahren hatte dies vermei- den sollen. Das Versagens dieses Verfahrens fiihrte dazu, daR viele Bohrinselbetreiber ihre eigenen Anlagen erneut iiberpriiften.

Dieser Artikel beschreibt die radikale Uberholung des Arbeitsgenehmigungsverfahrens eines der grogten Bohrinselbetreibers, Shell U.K. Exploration and Production, sowie die Einfiihrung des iiberholten Systems dieses Unternehmens in gut dreiBig Anlagen tiber eine Zeit von 18 Monaten.

Betont wurde dabei vor allem die Verwaltung und Koordinierung geftirlicher Arbeiten, die Wartung effektiver Anlagen- und Prozedisolierungen sowie die Festlegung von Befugnissen und Verantwortlichkeiten. All diese MaRnahmen werden durch eine grtindliche Ausbildung und Kom- petenzversicherung untersttitzt, die mittels strenger Kontrollen und eines Qualitltsaufbesse- rungsverfahrens gestiitzt werden.

1. Introduction

Offshore oil and gas installations are complex units which operate many miles from land and outside help. The range of activities that take place is staggering. For example, on a large installation these could include oil and gas production and storage at high pressure, drilling, construction and major maintenance. In addition a large installation will serve as a “hotel” for the 200 plus people who live there and a heliport for the frequent helicopter flights.

Given these activities and the consequent potential for minor and major accidents, it is obvious that the safety of everyone on board is critically dependent on the proper organisation and control of work.

Particularly important are isolations. These take place when sections of the plant are closed off from other sections so that work can be carried out. The correct valves must be closed, the appropriate blank plates must be in place and each isolation carefully controlled to a high standard. If this is not done there is a risk that hydrocarbons at high pressures may leak into the isolated

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sections. People may be welding, burning or grinding in these isolated areas so the consequences of an uncontrolled leak could be very serious.

Permit to Work (PTW) systems are widely used in the industry to achieve and maintain high levels of safety and much of the emphasis is placed on the isolations. They are the principal means to ensure that work other than routine operations is properly controlled and co-ordinated. Permits are the means of providing written instructions and authorisation to people carrying out potentially hazardous work. On a large installation there may be as many as 200 permits in progress at any one time.

Following the Piper Alpha tragedy in 1988, Shell U.K. Exploration and Pro- duction (Shell Expro), together with many other offshore operators on the UK Continental Shelf decided to re-examine the Permit to Work system that was in place on its offshore installations. It was evident that a breakdown of the permit procedures on Piper Alpha had been a major factor. This was later confirmed by Lord Cullen is his report on the tragedy (Cullen, 1990).

The government authority, namely The Department of Energy, also invited operators to comment on their proposals to strengthen the existing requirements for Work Permit procedures. A working party (The Oil Industry Advi- sory Committee) comprising government, industry and Trade Union repre- sentatives was set up to provide advice (Oil Industry Advisory Committee, 1991).

Whilst these immediate reactions were understandable, Shell Expro decided that a more fundamental review was needed. It was proposed that this would be carried out by a totally independent group with no preconceived ideas of offshore work. After careful research, consultants from the naval nuclear industry were engaged. The refit of nuclear submarines has several key parallels with work on an offshore installation. These are - strict legislative requirements, - potentially high hazard situations, - large numbers of employees, - complex technology, - tight timescales.

The consultants lacked any experience or knowledge of the offshore oil industry but this proved to be a strength rather than a weakness. They were in a position to challenge basic assumptions which others would have found more difficult.

First it is worth looking at the size of the task. Shell Expro, operating in the UK sector of the North Sea on behalf of Shell and Esso, is one of the largest operators. Current production is approximately 600,000 barrels of oil and 1700 MM standard cubic feet of gas per day.

There are some 6000 offshore based staff and approximately 4750 of these are contractors. The Company operates on 33 registered fixed installations together with Stadive, a multifunctional service vessel. On charter there are at

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present 10 mobile drilling rigs and 3 accommodation barges and flotels. The workforce is widely scattered and manning levels reflect the size and complexity of the installations. On Sean R (a gas platform) in the southern North Sea, there are 5 people. On Brent Charlie in the north there are over 200 personnel on board. The common feature is that work may be carried out that can involve significant risks unless it is properly controlled.

The review lasted 3 months. Large and small installations were visited and nearly 200 staff were interviewed. The whole exercise created widespread in- terest among the workforce, who made a major contribution to the findings and raised expectations of significant change.

It was evident that there were many healthy features of the existing system that should be retained but there were also areas where considerable improvement was necessary. Consequently Shell Expro set up a project team in May 1990, comprising their own staff and the consultants. The Project Team was tasked with an overhaul of the PTW system and to carry out a pilot exercise on one of the largest installations in the Central North Sea, Fulmar Alpha starting in January 1991.

The proposed new PTW system contained the following key elements: - Tiered authorisation of permits concentrating the higher management at-

tention to work of high potential risk. - Central co-ordination of permits. - Clear visibility of the status of work in progress. - Improvement in PTW system prescription. - Enhanced control of isolation boundaries - Computer based permit Information and Tracking System (PINS ). - Training and certification for all who work with permits. - Formal structured audit schemes.

2. Tiered authorisation

With the old Permit to Work system all permits had to pass through the same signatory route, regardless of their content. This was a requirement of the offshore legislation (Offshore Regulations, 1976). The end result was that everything had to be seen, and endorsed by one man - the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM). He became overloaded with paperwork, dealt with much trivia and had less time to spend screening work of a higher potential risk. There was also the danger that to avoid delays people would try to bypass the system.

Passing all permits through the OIM was the only way of ensuring that he had seen and approved all the work. Now this co-ordination role is transferred to a Platform Co-ordinator.

This extended routing had also been used to keep other platform supervisors informed of what work was going on. It served as much as an information

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timitafion of Access

Fig. 2. The permit form (hot work, category 11.

Name Sighed Date ---i&ii

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Fig. 2. Continued.

316

system as a work control system. Since improvements were to be made in the way in which this information was to be communicated around the platform, there was no longer any need to keep this long communication chain.

There was also a strong argument for allowing certain types of work to be authorised at a level lower than the OIM. The OIM is still required to sign for all permits that pose a high risk to the installation or to personnel. Permits with a lower risk are signed by the Department Heads. These will normally be the Production, Drilling and Services Supervisors. This ensures that permits are given the maximum consideration at the most appropriate level (Figs. 1 and 2).

3. Platform Co-ordinator

The first step was to appoint a Platform Co-ordinator. The Company’s installations vary from the “not normally manned”, with the occasional permit, to large installations with up to 200 people on board, where many different operations are in progress. The potential risks involved and the degree of co- ordination required vary accordingly.

To provide this co-ordination of work together with a firm discipline in the documentation of isolations it was decided that a Platform Co-ordinator should be appointed. As the number of permits increase on an Installation so does the importance of the role of the Co-ordinator until it reaches a point where it becomes a full-time job.

The Co-ordinator must be knowledgeable and understand the installation, its systems and layout.

This position is not simply that of a clerk. The Co-ordinator reports directly to the OIM and provides a service to all departments on the Installation.

Now all permits pass through the Platform Co-ordinator each time their status changes, i.e. when authorised, endorsed, suspended and cancelled. This enables a check to be made that the work does not conflict with any other permit work or other work involving isolations. The Co-ordinator acts as a focal point for communications. He works very closely with the installation control room, particularly in times of major shutdown, to ensure that the flow of authorised work aligns with the plan.

4. Platform Co-ordination Facility (PCF)

The Platform Co-ordination Facility (PCF) is a central point on the platform from which the Platform Co-ordinator operates. It provides full visibility of all permit work underway and all isolations. It acts as a prime source of

317

information to the control room and to other platform management over the current configuration of the plant.

The size and layout of the PCF depends upon the complexity and layout of the Installation. For a small installation it may be a section of the control room, whilst for more complex Installations it will merit a separate room. Whatever the size and shape it contains the following facilities:

The Permit Rack. This is a conventional rack in which are stowed paper copies of all permits. It is arranged such that the location where the work is being carried out and the status of the jobs are readily visible.

The Permit Location Board. This is a plan of all areas and modules of the installation, on which the location of all permit work underway is indicated with magnetic markers.

The Isolation Schematic Diagrams. This is a schematic diagram of all the process, drilling and important utilities systems, together with firemain and electrical systems. These are laid out so that the position of any valves that are part of an isolation boundary is indicated in a highly visible manner. These diagrams are further discussed below under Isolations.

The Permit Information System. This is provided on the larger installations and is a computer based permit tracking system providing up to date information on the status of all permits. It makes use of a flatbed scanner and optical character reader to minimise the number of key strokes for data input. Output is via VDU and various reports are produced for crew handovers and meetings.

5. PTW System Specification

A precise, complete description of the PTW system is vital if a common method of working is to be adopted across all crews and all Installations. In the past staff may have been confused by the differences in interpretation of the same PTW system as they carried out their duties on more than one platform, or across different shifts.

A new PTW manual has been written. This makes clear: - the type of work that requires a permit, - who is authorised to sign a permit, - what their responsibilities are, - who can authorise a permit for particular tasks. There is also guidance on how to complete the forms, and how they are handled through the permit lifecycle.

New features also include an improved definition of the types of work re- quiring permits (around 50 different types are covered) and there is also specification of the periods of worksite presence required by the Person in Charge of the Worksite (PICWS ) .

Pocket sized PTW handbooks are given to all those following a PTW course and these are freely available offshore. Induction brochures and posters have also been employed.

The PTW form guides all signatories through their role in the PTW system and reminds them of their responsibilities. It encourages discipline on the users so that planning, vetting and preparation are done thoroughly, in the correct sequence and in a systematic manner. Getting the job right first time, every time, not only contributes to an improved safety performance but also im- proves effiency and productivity.

The PTW form enables all the details of the work to be recorded along with the signatures of all the parties involved. The permit has to be re-endorsed at the start of each shift and by the person in charge of the worksite whenever he changes. An important addition to the form is space for the Co-ordinator to sign. His role is to provide an independent check to prevent permits that could conflict from being endorsed concurrently.

There are two main classes of permit forms; hot work and cold work. Hot work is sub-divided into category one; where an actual source of ignition is present and category two; potential source of ignition.

On the large Installations where many permits are likely to be in force, it is important for everyone to be able to distinguish high potential hazard work. At each worksite the current permit is prominently displayed and can be viewed by anyone to check on the work and particularly the precautions. Different colours for the different categores give this high visibility. These colours are the same for all operators on the UK Continental Shelf.

Safety Checklists

Safety checklists have been developed to assist in identifying precautions on a permit. They provide a common statement of the key safety features for regular work (see Fig. 3 ) .

There are over 50 checklists available written in a style, language and detail appropriate to the person most likely to be carrying out the task. They cover most work type categories. Most of the checklists have been drawn up by the operating staff using their experience and local knowledge. They are subject to regular review and improvement.

6. Isolations

The objectives of the mechanical and electrical isolation procedures are: (a) To isolate the boundary of a system or equipment in a manner that will

prevent its accidental de-isolation.

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PERHIT TD VORK SAFETY CHECKLIST Ref No: 20 Rev Date: 01.02.92

Title: Dry Grit/Shot Blasting PERMIT NO:

Installations Vhere Applicable: All

Associated Document: Code Of Practice 1.008

NAHE OF PICV: ..__......_................... SIGNATURE: . . . . . . . . . . . ..-....

NOTE : only closed circuit blasting normally allowed in Hazardous Area and then only when no other operations are taking place in that area which might lead to the release of hydrocarbons, (e.g. sampling, venting, draining and opening up equipment)

I

1.

2.

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11.

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14.

PREPARATION - Confirm:

you have a hot work tag for work in hazardous areas

only competent registered persons will be allowed to operate the blast cleaning equipment

a minimum of two persons have been assigned to the job (if gun operator is out of sight of plant operator, a third member will be assigned).

equipment has been checked thoroughly and all components are in good condition. The dead man handle is functioning

all external metal parts of the cleaning equipment are electrically bonded to earth and the rubber hoses are either of the electrically conductive type or externally metal braided to maintain the bond

the compressor has been located as indicated on the Permit to Work and electrically earthed

the cleaning lances have been electrically bonded to the workpiece

scaffolding used for access has been electrically earthed

no aluminium alloy equipment will be used

hoses have been routed tidily and do not present a tripping hazard inside or outside the work area

barriers and signs have been erected to prohibit passage of other personnel within 10 metres of the operating area. Sign indicates ‘Grit/Shotblasting in progress, No Unauthorised Entry’

shields have been erected to protect passing personnel from stray grit and debris

portable gas monitor is in use at worksite

a PA announcement has been made to indicate nature of operations

Safety Checklist 20 Page 1 of 2

Fig. 3. Safety checklist.

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SAFETY CHECKLIST - REFERENCE NO: 20 (cant)

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UORKSITE BRIEFING - Confirm vork party are aware of:-

access and escape routes are to be kept clear at all times or alternative routes provided

portable gas monitor to be in continuous use at the worksite and regularly checked for: i) battery level ii) alarm indication

hot work to be suspended if portable gas monitor is unavailable or becomes inoperable

on platform status changing to ‘alert’ all work must stop and hot work tag returned. No work is to resume until clearance from Control Room has been obtained.

lance should never be pointed at anyone, even if switched off.

the gun should never be used with the trigger tied or locked on

hood should never be removed while lance is operating

nozzle should never be changed while plant is in operation.

nobody should be allowed to pass in front of jet

the need for immediate medical attention if anyone is struck by grit blast on skin. Details of contaminant to be given to medic.

the grit blasting compressor must be stopped before being left unattended if not tied into the Platform Shutdown System

the location of the emergency alarm system and the need to make arrangements for signals between themselves when audio alarm might be masked by the noise from the cleaning operation

there must be no entry in to confined spaces by team members except as may be allowed by the Permit to Work

ensuring equipment must be stopped and depressurised before carrying out maintenance and when not in use (including meal breaks)

AFTER OPERATION

remove barriers and return to store

restore worksite to its normal state, leave clean and report any defects

arrange for PA announcement to be made advising that operations have stopped and area is clear

Fig. 3. Continued.

Safety Checklist 20 Page 2 of 2

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(b) To ensure that the completion of one task will not allow premature de- isolation before others are completed.

(c) To provide visibility at the Platform Co-ordination Facility (PCF) of the isolations.

(d) To establish a system which provides assurance that the isolations are as authorised.

To aid the control and monitoring of isolation boundaries a schematic display has been produced which depicts all the systems. The display shows all vessels, equipment, piping and all valves (including vents and drains), spades and spectacle blinds used to isolate equipment and systems. Separate displays are also available for drilling, the fire water systems and the electrical systems.

The schematics are mounted in the PCF and uses coloured pegs to indicate the status of all isolations.

All valve isolations, spade and spectacle blank insertions are marked with a clearly visible two part Isolation Tag label. One part is attached to the valve on the plant and its corresponding stub, with the same unique number, in the PCF. When the isolation is removed the two halves of each tag are compared to confirm that all isolations have been removed.

7. Permit Information and Tracking System

The aim of the computer based Permit Information System (PINS) is to disseminate permit information to all those that need it.

PINS fulfills a vital role in supporting the PTW System. It provides: - Management information

An important feature of the revised system is that the OIM only authorises those permits for work with a higher riks. However, he needs to be kept up-to-date with all current permit information. This information is now provided by PINS. One of the recommendations in Lord Cullen’s report into the Piper Alpha tragedy was that “Copies of all issued Permits to Work should be displayed at a convenient location and in a systematic arrangement such that process operating staff can readily see and check which equipment is under maintenance and not available for operation” (Cullen, 1990). On platforms where the PCF cannot be located in close proximity to the control room, PINS is a most cost effective means of doing this.

- Shift and crew handover reports Effective handover between shifts was recognised as one of the key concerns during the Piper Alpha Inquiry. Offshore installations, like large refineries, are 24 hour operations and the changeovers between the different shifts have to be as smooth and seamless as possible. PINS is of great help here. Permit status reports sorted by job discipline are produced which can be

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attached to the shift and crew handover reports. With up to 200 permits in the system, at various stages of their life cycle, the administrative burden in producing handover reports entirely by hand is prohibitive and prone to omissions.

- Permit information 24 hours per day Access to the PCF, in the absence of the Platform Co-ordinator, is controlled in order to maintain the integrity of the isolation schematics, permit racks and information boards. This restricts general access to permit information, particularly since the Platform Co-ordination Facility (PCF) is not manned 24 hours per day but PINS is continuously available at several points on the installation.

- Reduced administrative burden It is a requirement that the PTW system is audited effectively. PINS covers one aspect of this in that it automatically identifies expired permits. It is also a legal requirement to archive records of permits. Again PINS provides a means of reconciling our paper copies to ensure that the archive is complete.

- Emergencies In an emergency PINS will provide the OIM with information on permit work in progress and possible location of workers in the event of people failing to muster. But its limitations need to be stressed as well. The system operates as a tracking system only. The current paper copies of the permit are maintained since these are the visible signs of work approval and contain much information that would be both unnecessary and time consuming to enter into a tracking system. In addition, in any effective PTW system, it is essential that people meet to discuss the work and draw up the permits. This would not be achieved if the whole of the PTW form was incorporated into a com- puterised system.

8. Training

Everyone involved in the system now receives training. There are three main courses: (a) Permit Signatories; for authorised Permit Signatories (.e.g. approving

authorities) and originators. This course takes 2 days. (b) Person in Charge of the Worksite; a 2 day course for those supervisors

who directly oversee the worksite. (c) Permit Users; for those individuals that carry out their work within the

Permit to Work System. This is a 1 day course. Specialists courses, following on from the 3 day signatories course are:

(d) System Auditors; a 2 day briefing on auditing of the PTW System.

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(e) Platform Co-ordinator; a 3 day course for those that will man the Plat- form Co-ordination Facility.

All courses contain assessment tests and course participants must pass these tests before they can be issued with the appropriate certificate.

On successful completion of the course, individuals receive a uniquely num- bered Certificate. It contains the individual’s name and administration number. Details are entered in a formal Training Register held on a personnel database which can be accessed offshore.

Authorised Permit Signatories and Persons in Charge of Worksites are then required to satisfy Installation Management they have a sufficient knowledge of the Installation to operate the permit system at the specified location. Their training certificates are further endorsed for that particular installation.

This training has been one of the most successful aspects of the new system. It has been well received by the workforce and particularly appreciated by the contractor staff. It has gone a long way to ensure a consistent approach across shifts and different installations.

9. Audit

An essential feature is auditing. Audits are conducted for three main reasons: (a) To provide confirmation to senior management that procedures are being

followed. (b) To ensure that procedures continue to be relevant and to identify

deficiencies. (c ) To introduce improvements.

The effectiveness of the audits is critically dependent on: (a) The commitment of management to take action. (b) The ability of auditors to extract key issues.

In the past the lack of systematic auditing was one of the major contributory to the differences between installations and shifts. Vigourous auditing encourages attention to detail conveys to the offshore workforce, the message that management are committed to the system.

While daily “walkabout” inspections and safety reviews of the permit working are conducted by all levels of supervision, these inspections do not consti- tute an adequate audit of the PTW system. They are also not searching enough and are not documented sufficiently to enable deep rooted flaws to be identified.

In the revised system audits have been arranged in a tiered manner, weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually. Each has its own detailed cecklist, auditor and audit authority. All auditors receive training in both the PTW system and auditing procedures.

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Weekly audits

These are intended to provide regular checks on the working of the system and early notification of any emerging problems. They are likely to take no more than a few hours to complete and involve only one auditor.

Monthly audit

These are the formal check by the Installation Management on the overall adequacy of the operation of the PTW system. They are likely to take no more than one 12 hour shift to complete. The Installation monthly audit is generally conducted by the Installation Safety Officer.

Quarterly field audit

This is a more complex audit involving all the installations in a particular Field Unit (up to five) and each lasts several days spread over the 3 month cycle. A Field Audit generally involves 2 auditors.

Annual company audit

These annual audits examine a range of installations spread over all the Field Units and also involve interviewing people onshore. A Company wide audit requires a team with a lead auditor and lasts up to a week.

10. Implementation programme

During the second half of 1990, the Project Team worked with the Fulmar Alpha to prepare for the 10 week Pilot scheduled to start January 1991. Every- thing was first time - the training of 500 personnel, the new documentation, the isolation tags, locking devices and special display schematics, the design, build and equipping a Platform Co-ordination Facility and the appointment of Platform Co-ordinators.

It was decided at the start to build a complete full-scale mock-up of the Fulmar PCF in Aberdeen; this served 3 purposes: _ The design could be polished and proven and thus minimise offshore time

whilst building the Fulmar PCF. - The new procedures for permit co-ordination and control of isolations could

be subject to a series of trials and problems identified early and resolved. - The training of all Fulmar staff (and subsequently all installations) could

be presented in a very realistic manner. In the run up to the pilot, the most critical area revolved around the prepa-

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ration of the isolation schematics. The Project and the Fulmar platform were determined that these isolation schematics would be correct in all details. Even when they were deemed to be complete in the Aberdeen design offices, they were sent offshore several times for validation.

The Platform Co-ordinators for the Fulmar Pilot joined the Project at an early stage and soon became the principal links with the installation. They became the “champions” for the new system. This arrangement has since re- peated for all installations with the Platform Co-ordinators joining the Project several months before their own installations “switched” over.

By January, the motivation on the Fulmar Alpha was very high and they took ownership of the new PTW system to start their Pilot on the 26 January 1991. The Pilot lasted 10 weeks, giving all shifts at least 2 trips to settle in with the changes. Dispensation to introduce the tiered authorisation was received from the Department of Energy exactly on schedule and the second half of the 10 week Pilot saw the OIMs delegating signing authority to their trained and qualified deputies.

All platform staff and the very many visitors during the Fulmar Pilot were invited to give their comments on the new system. All these contributions were collected, sorted and analysed. None resulted in changes to point of principle but the Pilot proved essential in clearing up dozens of practical matters before a wider implementation.

In the Summer of 1991, the new PTW system was sequentially introduced to each of the 33 offshore installations operated by Shell Expro. Each installation followed the same logic patterns of 3 parallel paths.

TRAINING

Signatories, PICWS, Users, PC’s, Auditors

Prepare platform

Brief all 1 Design 1 Build & Equip shifts PCF PCF

ISOLATION SCHEMATICS

Change-over New System

>

Prepare I Validate ! Print I ~~~~. Accept

Before coming in for training, as many personnel as possible were given a brief on the installation covering reasons for change and details of how their installation fitted into the whole Project. Some 7,000 people went through the different training courses during 1991 and 1992 to effect the change-over. When all 3 parallel paths were completed, the particular installation changed over at an agreed time and date with the new system fully operational.

In addition to now having an enhanced system, and the enormous safety

awareness which this has generated, Shell Expro have identified many other benefits have been identified from this large and involved exercise. - All individuals on the installations have a much deeper insight into the rea-

sons for their own PTW system. - Safety meetings at all levels have a higher and more meaningful participa-

tion with the better education for all. _ Planning of jobs has improved - the more difficult and “one-off” tasks are

invariably also those that require the permit coverage. - The common and highly disciplined approach now demanded is resulting in

better safety standards and higher working efficiency. The new system must be kept under constant review. Trained Auditors con-

tinually check the system and feed back the results. All platform personnel are encouraged to bring up any problems to the Platform Co-ordinator and the Platform Co-ordinator will send on any proposals which in his/her opinion, require further investigation, and a formal change process has been set up.

The system will not stand still. Changes in technology, legislation and management organisation can all affect the system. Even so, the fundamentals will not change. There is now in place a quality system which is having a significant impact on the way we carry out our work offshore. This applies particularly on the older installations where plant and process systems will always require a greater degree of human intervention and control. Maintaining the system at the high standards we have attained will not be easy, but benefits of doing so are becoming more evident every day.

References

Cullen, 1990. The Department of Energy, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, by the Hon. Lord Cullen, Vol. 2.

Offshore Installations (1976). (Operational Health and Safety) Regulations 1976 S.I. 1019. Oil Industry Advisory Committee (OIAC), 1991. Guidance on Permit-to-Work Systems in the

Petroleum Industry, Published 1991 Rev. by HMSO.

A new approach to permit to work systems offshore

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Transcript of A new approach to permit to work systems offshore