Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought.

Studies in Honour of Carlos Steel

Edited by: Pieter dHoine & Gerd Van Riel

Contributors: Lambros Couloubaritsis (Universit Libre de Bruxelles), Pierre Destre

(FNRS/Universit Catholique de Louvain), Sylvain Delcomminette (Universit Libre de

Bruxelles), John Dudley (KU Leuven), Jrn Mller (Universitt Wrzburg), Frans De Haas

(Leiden University), Keimpe Algra (Utrecht University), Jan Opsomer (KU Leuven),

Luc Brisson (CNRS, UPR 76, Paris), Riccardo Chiaradonna (Universit di Roma Tre),

Alessandro Linguiti (Universit di Siena), John Dillon (Trinity College Dublin),

Bert van den Berg (Leiden University), Christoph Helmig (Universitt zu Kln),

Antonio L.C. Vargas (Humboldt Universitt Berlin), Danielle A. Layne (Georgia Southern

University), Alain Lernould (CNRS, Lille III), Geert Roskam (KU Leuven), Gary Gabor

(Hamline University), Claudio Moreschini (Universit di Pisa), Caroline Mac (KU Leuven),

Michele Trizio (Universit degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro), Peter Van Deun (KU Leuven),

Erika Gielen (KU Leuven), Daniel De Smet (CNRS, UMR 8584, Paris), Jules Janssens (KU

Leuven), Richard Taylor (Marquette University), Wu Tianyue (Beijing University),

Valrie Cordonier (CNRS, Laboratoire SPHERE, UMR 7217), Andreas Speer (Universitt zu

Kln), Rudi Te Velde (Tilburg University), Pasquale Porro (Universit degli Studi di Bari

Aldo Moro), Marialucrezia Leone (KU Leuven), Gordon Wilson (University of North

Carolina, Asheville), Jean-Michel Counet (Universit Catholique de Louvain), Kent Emery, jr

(University of Notre Dame), Demmy Verbeke (KU Leuven), Filips Defoort (KU Leuven), and

Guy Guldentops (Thomas Institut, Kln)

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FATE, PROVIDENCE AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN THOUGHT

The De Wulf-Mansion Centre is a research centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the KU Leuven,

Kardinaal Mercierplein, 2, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium).It hosts the international project Aristoteles latinus and publishes

the Opera omnia of Henry of Ghent and the Opera Philosophica et Theologica of Francis of Marchia.

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

DE WULF-MANSION CENTRESeries I

XLIX

Series Editors

Russell L. FriedmanJan OpsomerCarlos Steel

Gerd Van Riel

Advisory Board

Brad Inwood, University of Toronto, CanadaJill Kraye, The Warburg Institute, London, United KingdomJohn Marenbon, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

Lodi Nauta, University of Groningen, The NetherlandsTimothy Noone, The Catholic University of America, USA

Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder, USAMartin Pickav, University of Toronto, Canada

Pasquale Porro, Universit degli Studi di Bari, ItalyGeert Roskam, KU Leuven, Belgium

FATE, PROVIDENCE AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

IN ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL AND EARLY

MODERN THOUGHT

Studies in Honour of Carlos Steel

Edited by Pieter dHoine and Gerd Van Riel

LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS

2014 by De Wulf-Mansioncentrum De Wulf-Mansion CentreLeuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain /Universitaire Pers LeuvenMinderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium)

All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers.

ISBN 978 90 5867 970 3D / 2014 / 1869 / 15NUR: 732

Published with support of Universitaire Stichting van Belgi

Contents

Gerd Van Riel (KU Leuven) & Pieter dHoine (KU Leuven): Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility. An Introduction iX

Part 1: Plato and aristotle 1

1. Lambros Couloubaritsis (Universit Libre de Bruxelles): mergence de la thmatique de la providence divine de Diogne dApollonie Platon 3

2. Pierre Destre (FNRS/Universit catholique de Louvain): Comment tre responsable de son destin? Platon et le mythe dEr 23

3. Sylvain Delcomminette (Universit Libre de Bruxelles): Libert et caractre dans le mythe dEr 39

4. John Dudley (KU Leuven): The Fate of Providence and Platos World Soul in Aristotle 59

5. Jrn Mller (Universitt Wrzburg): Was Aristotle an Ethical Determinist? Reflections on His Theory of Action and Voluntariness 75

Part 2: HellenistiC and earlY iMPerial PHilosoPHY 101

6. Frans A.J. de Haas (Leiden University): Presuppositions of Moral Action in Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias 103

7. Keimpe Algra (Utrecht University): Plutarch and the Stoic Theory of Providence 117

8. Jan Opsomer (KU Leuven): The Middle Platonic Doctrine of Conditional Fate 137

Part 3: Plotinus 169

9. Luc Brisson (CNRS, Paris/Villejuif): The Question of Evil in the World in Plotinus 171

Vi CoNteNtS

10. Riccardo Chiaradonna (Universit Roma Tre): Plotinus Metaphorical Reading of the Timaeus: Soul, Mathematics, Providence 187

11. Alessandro Linguiti (Universit di Siena): Choice, Self-Determination and Assimilation to God in Plotinus 211

Part 4: tHe neoPlatoniC CoMMentators 225

12. John Dillon (Trinity College Dublin): Signs and Tokens: Do the Gods of Neoplatonism Really Care? 227

13. Robbert M. van den Berg (Leiden University): A Problem concerning Providence: Proclus and Plutarch on Inherited Guilt and Postponed Punishment 239

14. Christoph Helmig (Universitt zu Kln) & Antonio L.C. Vargas (HU Berlin/Princeton): Ascent of the Soul and Grades of Freedom. Neoplatonic Theurgy between Ritual and Philosophy 253

15. Danielle A. Layne (Georgia Southern University): A Fatal or Providential Affair? Socrates and Alcibiades in Proclus Commentary on the Alcibiades i 267

16. Alain Lernould (CNRS, Lille iii): Le cycle triadique de la causalit dmiurgique: Bont, Vouloir, Provi-dence. Linterprtation proclienne de Time 29e1-30c2 291

17. Geert Roskam (KU Leuven): Hermias of Alexandria on Socrates Divine Sign 309

18. Gary Gabor (Hamline University): When Should a Philosopher Consult Divination? Epictetus and Simplicius on Fate and What Is Up to Us 325

Part 5: Greek PatristiCs and tHe BYzantine tradition 341

19. Claudio Moreschini (Universit degli Studi di Pisa): Goodness, Evil and the Free Will of Man in Gregory of Nyssa 343

CoNteNtS Vii

20. Caroline Mac (KU Leuven): dition dun fragment Contre les astronomes, contenant une contri-bution la thorie des quatre humeurs et des tempraments 357

21. Michele Trizio (Universit degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro): A Late Antique Debate on Matter-Evil Revisited in 11th-Century Byzantium: John Italos and His Quaestio 92 383

22. Peter Van Deun (KU Leuven) & Erika Gielen (KU Leuven): The Metochion, Holy Sepulchre 363 Manuscript and an Unpublished Byzantine Opuscule on Predetermination 395

Part 6: tHe araBiC tradition 419

23. Daniel De Smet (CNRS, Paris): La Providence selon le Livre de la rprimande adresse de lme attribu Herms Trismgiste. Un document noplatonicien arabe oubli 421

24. Jules Janssens (KU Leuven): What about Providence in the Best of All Possible Worlds? Avicenna and Leibniz 441

25. Richard Taylor (Marquette University/KU Leuven): Providence in Averroes 455

Part 7: tHe Medieval latin tradition 473

26. Tianyue Wu (Peking University): Are First Movements Venial Sins? Augustinian Doctrine and Aquinass Reinterpretation 475

27. Valrie Cordonier (CNRS, UMR 7219/Universit Paris Diderot/KU Leuven): La doctrine aristotlicienne de la providence divine selon Thomas dAquin 495

28. Andreas Speer (Universitt zu Kln): Divine Government and Human Freedom 517

29. Rudi te Velde (Tilburg University): Thomas Aquinas on Providence, Contingency and the Usefulness of Prayer 539

VIII contents

30. Pasquale Porro (Universit degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro/Universit Paris-Sorbonne): Divine Predestination, Human Merit and Moral Responsibility. The Reception of Augustines Doctrine of Irresistible Grace in Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus 553

31. Marialucrezia Leone (Humboldt-Universitt zu Berlin): Henry of Ghent and the Ethics of Intention 571

32. Gordon Wilson (University of North Carolina, Asheville): Henry of Ghent on Fatalism and Naturalism 591

33. Jean-Michel Counet (Universit catholique de Louvain): Voir la Providence. Autour du De Visione Dei de Nicolas de Cues 605

34. Kent Emery, jr (University of Notre Dame): Fate, Providence and Predestination in the Sapiential Project of Denys the Carthusian 617

Part 8: Early ModErn thought 637

35. Demmy Verbeke (KU Leuven): Human Nature and Moral Responsibility in the Work of Juan Luis Vives 639

36. Guy Guldentops (Thomas Institut, Kln): Lanti-fatalisme de Julius Sirenius 653

37. Filips Defoort (KU Leuven): Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) on Predestination, Providence and Free Will 677

BiBliograPhy 697

1. Editions and Translations 697

2. Studies 719

indicEs 771

1. Index of Primary Sources 771

2. Index of Secondary Authorities 777

a late antique deBate on Matter-evil revisited in 11tH-CenturY BYzantiuM

John Italos and His Quaestio 92

Michele Trizio (Universit degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro)

The so-called by John Italos, who succeeded Michael Psellos as consul of philosophers in Constantinople and held this post until his condemna-tion for heterodoxy in 1082,1 contains a treatise bearing the peculiar title Treatise Demonstrating that Matter does not exist the way the Greeks speak of it ( - ).2 The text has an aporetic struc-ture and addresses a series of issues concerning the causation of matter, drawing on ancient philosophical positions which are generally presented anonymously. Yet despite concealing his sources, most of Italos treatise can be shown to de-rive from the Late Antique debate on the causation and status of matter among Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and Proclus. In this paper, I shall identify Italos Neoplatonic sources and demonstrate how this 11th-century Byzantine scholar perceived and even exploited them.

1. FroM Plato to Plotinus via siMPliCius

Italos treatise commences with a general summary of the properties attributed to matter by the wisest among the Greeks. These, Italos maintains, believed

1 On John Italos biography, see A. Rigo, Giovanni Italo, in: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, vol. 56, Roma: Istituto dell Enciclopedia Italiana, 2001, 62-67. The text of Italos official condemnation is contained in J. Gouillard, Le Synodikon de lOrthodoxie. dition et commentaire, Travaux et Mmoires 2, 1967, 1-316 (here 56-71). On the trial itself, see L. Clucas, The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the Eleventh Century (Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia; 26), Mnchen: Institut fr Byzan-tinistik, Neugriechische Philologie und Byzantinische Kunstgeschichte der Universitt, 1981, updated and sometimes corrected in J. Gouillard, Review of: L. Clucas, The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the Eleventh Century, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 76, 1983, 31-33; J. Gouillard, Le procs officiel de Jean lItalien. Les Actes et leurs sous-entendus, Travaux et Mmoires 9, 1985, 133-174.

2 The text is edited in Joannes Italos. Quaestiones Quodlibetales ( ), ed. P. Joannou (Studia Patristica et Byzantina; 4), q. 92, Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag, 1956, 144-149 [=hereafter QQ, 92]. Unfortunately, Joannous edition lacks line numbers. I will refer to these by counting them from the beginning to the end of the text. Italos treatise on matter has been briefly discussed by M. Marchetto, Nikephoros Chumnos Treatise on Matter, in: S. Mariev-W.M. Stock (eds.), Aestethics and Theurgy in Byzantium (Byzantinisches Archiv; 25), Boston-Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2013, 31-55, at 52-55.

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that matter is something simple ( ) and incorporeal (), and at the same time unengendered and imperishable ( ). Therefore, since it provides the unchanging substrate of all change and generation, Italos claims that matter is according to the Greeks co-eternal with the creator ( ).3 As has been noted by the modern editor of this text, Italos statement is reminiscent of Aristotles Physics, and specifically of Aristotles critique of the supposed Platonic confusion between matter proper i.e., pure potentiality and privation, where only the former is truly imperishable and un-engendered.4 But Italos takes the genealogy of his idea from the tradition of the commentators, in particular Simplicius commentary on the Physics, which cites Plato as the first source (besides the Pythagoreans) for the Stagirites position, one which was only later endorsed by Aristotle. Nevertheless, Italos adds his own touch to Simplicius doxography, writing that after him [Plato] also Aristotle, who held this view to a greater extent, supported such a folly, as he said that matter is something evil and a female ( , )5, thus distancing him-self from the view which he was reporting.6

Concerning the introductory part of Italos treatise, I would like to make two observations. The first concerns Italos rather polemical reference to the idea that matter, in the way the Greeks conceived of it, would be co-eternal with God, and his characterisation of this as folly. Echoing Philoponus attack on Proclus al-leged view of the universe as co-eternal with the creator,7 this statement by Italos is interesting when one considers that this is precisely the charge on which he was himself condemned as unorthodox.8 The second concerns Italos ascription

3 Johannes Italos, QQ, 92, 144.4-11.4 Aristoteles, Physica i 9, 192a26-30. See also Aristoteles, Metaphysica Vii 7, 1032a12-

20; Vii 7, 1032b30-1033a5; Viii 1, 1042a32-1042b1. 5 The reference is from Aristoteles, Physica i 9, 192a22-23.6 Compare Simplicius, In Phys. 254.27-28:

, with Johannes Italos, QQ, 92, 144.11-12: , .

7 Cf. Johannes Philoponus, De aet. mund. 126.2-9. Excerpts from this work (24.1-8 and 238.3-239.1 in Rabes edition) are present in another treatise by Italos (QQ, 71) that rejects the eternity of the world.

8 See Gouillard, Synodikon Orthodoxiae, 59,198-202. That the charges against Italos do not reflect Italos philological thought has already been noted by J. Gouillard, La reli-gion des philosophes, Travaux et Mmoires 6, 1976, 305-324, in part. 310-315, and Clucas, The Trial, 140-162. Rigo, Giovanni Italo, 62-63, makes the reasonable suggestion that the charges against Italos derive from a previous, though as yet unidentified heresiological collection.

a late aNtiQUe deBate oN MatteR-eVil ReViSited 385

to Aristotle of the view that matter is something evil and female. Since, to my knowledge, Aristotle never speaks of matter as evil, this reference should be re-garded as inaccurate. The Philosopher certainly does, however, refer to matter as female () in his Physics:

if we are to regard matter as the female desiring the male or the foul desiring the fair, the desire must be attributed not to the foulness itself, as such, but to a subject that is foul or female incidentally.9

Eventually, according to Aristotle it is privation, not matter, that is contrary to and destructive ( ) of what is divine, good and desirable.10

We shall later return to Italos attitude towards the sources of his treatise on matter, and for the time being will concentrate on the sources that Italos uses in his account of Aristotles view on matter as something evil. The tradition of the Late Antique commentators does not support Italos link between Aristotle and the doctrine of matter-evil; therefore, one may consider the authors own misun-derstanding of the Aristotelian view to be at stake. It may also be the case, given the aporetic character of Italos treatise, which aims to highlight the varied and self-contradictory ancient philosophical standpoints on matter, that the author was not really interested in reporting these views with full philological accuracy. There could be yet another explanation of Italos mistake, though, deliberate or accidental as it may be. Simplicius commentary on the Physics with which, as we have seen, Italos was quite familiar draws a very clear distinction between Aristotles view that matter is like the female desiring the male or the foul de-siring the fair, meaning that matter is a principle that could not be the opposite of the productive and final cause if it really also desires the material world, and the view of heterodox people who claim that matter is evil and posit that this prin-ciple is opposed to the good, and thus opposed to it as a productive principle.11 Simplicius reference to the heterodox provides us with a valuable clue as to who Italos is actually thinking of when he ascribes to Aristotle the view that matter is evil, viz., Plotinus.

9 Aristoteles, Physica i 9, 192a22-25: , , , , .

10 Aristoteles, Physica i 9, 192a14-16.11 Simplicius, In Phys. 256.25-26.

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2. Plotinus vs ProClus

As is well known, the link between matter and evil is evident throughout Plotinus Enneads. When talking about the weakness of the soul, Plotinus argues that so matter is the cause of the souls weakness and vice; it is then itself evil before soul and is primary evil ( . ).12 Matter is, in this account, the last term of the causation process and as such void of any good; from matter follows even the very necessity of evil ( ).13 Matter is there-fore absolute evil,

For this thing is not want of wealth but want of thought, want of virtue, of beauty, strenght, shape, form, quality. Must it not then be ugly? Must it not be utterly vile, utterly evil?14

This latter passage from Plotinus tackles the aforementioned Aristotelian criti-cism of an alleged identification between matter and privation, which the Philoso-pher ascribed to the Platonists.15 There is no contradiction in stating the identity between matter and privation, Plotinus implies, for contrary to what Aristotle

12 Plotinus, Enn. i 8 [51], 14.49-51. All English translations are taken, with some slight modification, from Plotinus, The Enneads, with an English Translation by A.H. Armstrong, 7 vols. (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge (Ma): Harvard University Press/London: Heinemann, 1966-1988.

13 Plotinus, Enn. i 8 [51], 7.22-23.14 Plotinus, Enn. ii 4 [12], 16.21-24: [ ],

, , , , , , . ; ; ; On Plotinus view of matter-evil, see D. OBrien, Plotinus on Evil. A Study of Matter and the Soul in Plotinus Conception of Human Evil, in: P.-M. Schuhl (ed.), Le Noplatonisme. Royaumont 9-13 juin 1969 (Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Sciences humaines; 535), Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1971, 113-146; D. OBrien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter. An Exercise in the Interpretation of the Enneads (Elenchos; 22), Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1991 ; D. OBrien, La matire chez Plotin: son origine, sa nature, Phronesis 44, 1999, 45-71; C. Horn, Plotin ber Sein, Zahl und Einheit: Eine Studie zu den systematischen Grundlagen der Enneaden (Beitrge zur Altertumskunde; 62), Stuttgart-Leipzig: Teubner, 1995, 172-173; K. Corrigan, Plotinus Theory of Matter-Evil and the Question of Substance (Recherches de thologie ancienne et mdivale; suppl. 3), Leuven: Peeters, 1996, 198; D.J. OMeara, Das Bse bei Plotin (Enn. i,8), in: T. Kobusch B. Mojisisch (eds.), Platon in der abendlndischen Geistesgeschichte. Neue Forschungen zum Platonismus, Darmstadt: Wis-senschaftlichte Buchgesellschaft, 1997, 33-47.

15 Cf. D. OBrien, Matire et privation dans les Ennades de Plotin, in: A. Motte J. Denooz (eds.), Aristotelica Secunda. Mlanges offerts Christian Rutten, Lige: Centre In-formatique de Philosophie et Lettres, 1996, 211-220.

a late aNtiQUe deBate oN MatteR-eVil ReViSited 387

says, privation does not cease to exist after change or after the fulfilment of desire. The recipient of something, maintains Plotinus, is not a state or a disposition (), but a privation () of that disposition, and therefore there is no problem at all in speaking of matter as privation, absence of form, or evil.16

This digression concerning Plotinus views on matter-evil serves as an intro-duction to Italos own discussion of the Greek views on matter, which is based entirely on Plotinus views and the later critiques of Plotinus. Taking his cue from Aristotles metaphor of matter as female, Italos proceeds to compare the relation-ship between matter and form with that of an adulterous woman with her many changing lovers. More importantly, Italos makes it clear right from the start that his intention is polemical, using this metaphor of matter as an adulterous woman to suggest that the Greeks thought that the cause of our corruption is not the compound [between body and soul], or even less, original sin, but matter. After this statement, which introduces Christian overtones to Italos whole discussion, he declares that we must first inquire whether matter is really simple, incorporeal and the worse of all being, as they (i.e., the Greek philosophers) affirm,17 a state-ment which, as I shall demonstrate, reflect a Proclean background. Italos then formulates the very same inquiry in an aporematic form: therefore by necessity either such a nature (i.e. matter) is caused by God, by itself, or neither of these possibilities.18

Italos first addresses the former possibility, discussing the nature of Gods cau-sation of matter i.e., whether this takes place directly or through an interme-diary, given that, states Italos, all that is produced from many causes is composite, while that which is not produced in this way is simple.19 This statement echoes proposition 58 of Proclus Elements of Theology, where Proclus states that all that is produced by a greater number of causes is more composite than the product of fewer causes,20 and this Proclean axiom determines all the subsequent steps of Italos discussion on the causation of matter. He continues:

16 Plotinus, Enn. ii 4 [12], 16.6. On this see the critical remarks by J. Opsomer, Proclus vs Plotinus on Matter (De mal. Subs. 30-7), Phronesis 46.2, 2001, 154-188 (in part. 162-164). According to Plotinus, Enn. ii 4 [12], 16.14-15, as the female desires the male she is not de-feminized, but on the contrary becomes more feminine ( , ). In reporting both the Greek text and the English translation I follow the emendation suggested by OBrien, La matire chez Plotin, 69-70.

17 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 145.16-20.18 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 145.20-21.19 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 145.23-24:

, .20 Proclus, El. theol. 56.17-18:

.

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thus, if they say that matter is produced directly, they had better explain in what manner matter is the last of all beings. In fact that which is produced di-rectly from the First because of this is a being and is self-sufficient; but matter is at the same time a non-being ( ), shortage (), absolute poverty ( ) and truly privation ( ). If then that which has been produced immediately is evil and bears a similarity with the producer, then also that from which it has been produced will be evil.

On this logic, implies Italos, the first among all beings will be evil, and the last will be the noblest.21 This polemical argument is constructed from three contrasting standpoints that can be traced back to Late Antique sources: 1) Proclus view that matter derives directly from the One;22 2) Plotinus view that matter is non-being, absolute evil;23 3) Proclus critique of Plotinus view of matter-evil, which states that, given the general metaphysical principle that all that is caused is contained in a more eminent manner in its cause, if matter is evil as Plotinus believes then so also the One from which it emanates would be evil. Moreover, argues Italos summarizing an argument from Proclus De malorum subsistentia, which he nevertheless utilizes against Proclus since causation entails a double movement in Neoplatonism, downwards and upwards, then not only the First Being would be evil (and therefore equal to the last being), but as matter-evil in the reversion process will assimilate itself to its nobler cause, it would become good.24

Italos deliberately pits the one against the other two contrasting views on matter, i.e., the Plotinian and the Proclean, in order to point out the paradoxical consequences following from holding this or that ancient standpoint on matter.

21 Johannes Italos, QQ 92,145.24-29.22 Cf. Proclus, El. theol., prop. 59, 56.36-37; prop. 72, 69.24-29; Proclus, Mal. 35, 217.2-

219.27; Proclus, In Tim. i 385.9-17. Elsewhere Proclus maintains that matter is produced by God, like in Proclus, In Tim. i 384.30-385.17. On this point, see Opsomer, Plotinus vs Proclus, 173-175.

23 In reporting the view that matter is non-being ( ), shortage (), absolute poverty ( ) and truly privation ( ), Italos is freely referring to Plotinus, Enn. i 8 [51], 5.21-26: , , . On matter-evil as non-being, see also Plotinus, Enn. i 8 [51], 5.9-12: , , , . Enneades i 8 [51], 3.3-6. On matter-evil as poverty () and shortage (), see Plotinus cosmological account in Enn. iii 5 [50], 9.45-53. On matter-evil as privation (), see Enn. V 9 [5], 10.17-20: , . See also Proclus account of Plotinus view on matter-evil in Proclus, Mal. 30, 211.11-14.

24 Cf. Proclus, Mal. 31, 211.6-18. On this argument, see also Opsomer, Proclus vs. Plotinus, 170.

a late aNtiQUe deBate oN MatteR-eVil ReViSited 389

This strategy cannot be regarded as accidental: like modern scholars, Italos too must have noticed that Proclus theory of matter is mostly a critique of Plotinus view on matter as identical with evil.25 Yet, quite evidently, since he aims to em-phasize the apparent contradictions present in the Ancient standpoints on his topic, Italos deliberately overlooks the complexities of these different positions. For example, when he reports that Proclus view of matter as simple and produced by the One directly is problematic since, on the one hand, everything that comes from the One must participate in its properties somehow, while, on the other (as Plotinus says), matter is evil, he either deliberately or accidentally ignores the fact that this Proclean view is based on precisely the idea that (against Plotinus) matter is not evil.26

After rejecting the view that matter is simple and derives from the First Cause directly, Italos then concerns himself with the idea of a production of matter through intermediaries, which Italos, as with the previous view of matter as pro-duced directly from the First Cause, regards as inaccurate and self-contradictory:

if so, matter wont be one of the last beings, nor the worst, as they believe, nor simple. In fact, as has already been said, that which is produced by a greater number of causes is not simple, but derives from other principles, and is infe-rior to them.27

Italos argument is entirely derived from propositions 58 and 59 of Proclus Ele-ments of Theology, on the simple or composite nature of a thing depending on the number of its causes. Italos rejects the possibility that matter is composite, as well as Proclus suggestion that the last being is, like the first, perfectly simple,28 on the grounds that according to Proclus himself:

if the extreme of being is produced by fewer and simpler causes, the interme-diate existences by more, the latter will be composite. For the last being is, like

25 On Proclus critique of Plotinus view on matter and the related modern scholarly debate, see J. Opsomer, Some Problems with Plotinus Theory of Matter/Evil. An Ancient Debate Continued, Quaestio 7, 2007, 165-189.

26 On this point Proclus is very clear in stating that matter is neither good, nor bad. It is simply necessary. Cf. Proclus, Mal. 37. 220.34-35. Being a pupil of Michael Psellos, Italos could have found a short but concise summary of this Proclean statement in Michael Psellos, De Omnifaria Doctrina 101, 57.1-13.

27 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 145.31-34: , , , , , , , .

28 See in part. Proclus, El. theol. 58, 56.36-37.

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the first, perfectly simple, because it proceeds from the first alone; but the one is simple as being above all composition, the other as being beneath it.29

So, Italos implies, if matter is produced through intermediaries, surely it cannot be regarded as simple, for in Proclus view (i) being simple and (ii) being composite belong respectively to (i) the extreme of being and (ii) the intermediate existences, and production through intermediaries clearly falls within the latter class, (ii). But in this way one will also have to exclude the idea that matter is composite, insofar as composition is in Proclus view peculiar to the intermediate existences, while matter as the last term is, accordingly, an extreme term beneath composition it-self. Thus, if matter is neither simple nor composite, Italos presses harder still, matter will neither be one of the existing beings nor will it be the substratum of the physical forms.30

The conclusion of Italos argument is paradoxical: given all these contradic-tory Greek views on matter, one has to conclude that matter does not exist.31 This makes it clear that Italos is not endorsing any of the previously mentioned stand-points on his topic. Contrariwise, his strategy consists in pitting these ancient views one against the other in order to demonstrate their inconsistencies, as when, immediately after revisiting the Proclus-Plotinus debate on matter, he freely cribs an aporia on matter as a self-producing principle from Simplicius commentary on the Physics, an obviously unsustainable position. For in this view 1) matter would be alike the First Cause and the productive cause; 2) if matter were the First Cause, then it could not function as a substrate, and thus one would need to postulate the existence of another matter that serves this purpose, and then given that the starting assumption implies the consideration of matter as a productive principle one would again be required to admit the existence of a yet further matter that works as a substrate, and so on, in a sort of regressus ad infinitum.32 The whole

29 Proclus, El. theol. 58, 56.30-32.30 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 145.30-35: , ,

, , , , , , , , .

31 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 145.35-36.32 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 145.37-41: ,

, , , , , . The source-material for this argument is Simplicius, In Phys. 256.15-26: , , , . , [] . Italos starts from Simplicius reference to the objection that if matter is eternal and unengendered, it cannot

a late aNtiQUe deBate oN MatteR-eVil ReViSited 391

argument is somewhat naive, but demonstrates that Italos intention is polemical. In fact, he concludes: if matter is [if we are to believe the Greeks] neither self-produced, nor produced by something else, what sort of being is it? By all means nothing.

Interestingly, matter is not the only topic that Italos approaches in this manner. In fact, a very similar strategy is found in Italos discussion of nature () as a creative principle and cause of movement, which is in fact contained in a treatise that like Italos work on matter is entitled, That Nature Does Not Exist (and given the content, one might well add, the Way the Greeks Speak of It). Italos men-tions several definitions of nature which can more or less be traced back to ancient philosophical schools or philosophers. For example, the reference to nature as a creative principle33 might be loosely traced back to a well-known passage of De incessu animalium, in which the Philosopher states that nature does not create anything without purpose.34 Other definitions mentioned by Italos include Ar-istotles definition of nature as the principle of movement and rest contained in his Physics,35 which obviously reverberates through the entire tradition of Late Antique commentary;36 the Stoic definition of nature as a craftsman-like fire, proceeding methodically to creation;37 the definition of nature as demiurge and perfect life which could have been loosely connected to Aristotle via the tradi-tion of the Late Antique commentators;38 and the Neoplatonic definition of na-ture as Gods instrument.39 As with Greek views on matter, Italos rejects all of these views on nature, one after the other, as absurd and blasphemous, and in each

be caused by God, going on to forge his own reference to the position of those who claim that matter is a self-producing principle. He then mixes this argument with Simplicius reference, a few lines later, to the heterodox position, a reference to Plotinus, who regards matter as the causative principle, opposed to the Good, of something (evil) and therefore as a productive cause. Also in this case Italos true target seems to be, directly or indirectly, Plotinus. That the target of Simplicius apory is Plotinus theory of matter-evil is also evi-dent in a parallel passage from Simplicius commentary on Aristotles Categories, where this commentator rejects the position (ascribed to Plotinus explicitedly) of those who posit the existence of contrary principles which they regard as substances. Cf. Simplicius, In Cat. 109.12sq.

33 Johannes Italos, QQ 93, 150.38-40.34 Aristoteles, De incessu animalium 12, 711a18. 35 Johannes Italos, QQ 93, 149.2-3. The reference is to Aristoteles, Physica ii 1, 192b20;

Viii 8, 253b7-9.36 See e.g., Simplicius, In Phys. 220.22; Johannes Philoponus, In De gen. et cor. 99.23; In

Phys. 199.12-13.37 Johannes Italos, QQ 93, 149.3-4. The reference is to Zeno, SVF, 171.9; Chrysippus, SVF,

1133.1-2.38 Johannes Italos, QQ 93, 149.4-5. The reference is e.g. to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In

An. prior. 3.19. Italos reference to nature as perfect life is probably taken from Simplicius, In Phys. 289.25.

39 Johannes Italos, QQ 93, 150.4-5. The reference is to Asclepius, In Metaph. 187.17-18.

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case attempts to demonstrate their incoherency and inconsistency. Accordingly, quoting from John of Damascus, Italos concludes:

by necessity nature must be that which includes the individuals. This is what we have learned from the Fathers, that is to say: substance, form and species are one and the same most specific species.40

Taking my cue from this passage on nature, I shall now draw some conclusive remarks on Italos treatment of the problem of matter-evil and on his approach to Ancient and Late Antique philosophical material generally.

3. ConClusions

The lack of a monograph on Italos collection of ninety-three philosophical trea-tises by question and answer examining the way this collection was assembled, its institutional framework and intended audience has quite reasonably been noted.41 Italos treatise on matter is a striking instance of this more general, schol-arly neglect of this point. Scholars like P. Joannou, for example, have simply de-scribed the contents of Italos quaestio without making any effort to unpack its argumentative strategy.42 Accordingly, Joannou suggests that the conclusion of Italos question 92 on matter, namely, that given the inconsistency of all the philo-sophical views on matter, the latter is a mere product of phantasy a spurious reason, as Plato says43 basically corresponds to Italos own view.44 This has led to some misunderstanding of Italos work, I believe, which is evident from the fact that, precisely in regard to question 92 of the , it has recently been stated that while denying that matter is caused without intermediaries, Italos denies Gods free will and freedom and stands against his predecessor, Michael Psellos, and the teaching of the monastic author, Niketas Stethatos (11th c.).45 But as we have seen, Italos discussion of the causation of matter whether through intermediaries, or directly does not reflect any personal and autonomous view

40 Johannes Italos, QQ 93, 150,59-60. The reference is to Johannes Damaskenos, Insti-tutio Elementaris, 1, 20.2-21.1.

41 See the illuminating remarks by Rigo, Giovanni Italo, 62-63.42 P. Joannou, Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz, I. Die Illuminationslehre des Michael

Psellos und Joannes Italos (Studia Patristica et Byzantina; 3), Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag, 1956, 71-78.

43 Plato, Timaeus 52b.44 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 149.179-180.45 See F. Lauritzen, Psello discepolo di Stetato, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 101.2, 2008,

719.

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of the author, nor is a conflict with Psellos and Stethatos implied by any of Italos statements the causation of matter. By contrast, Italos merely points out the re-spective inconsistencies in Plotinus and Proclus views on matter: from both of their positions, Italos suggests, inconsistency will follow.

It seems clear to me that the aporematic structure of Italos treatise on matter, though typical of the tradition of the Late Antique commentators,46 corresponds to Italos aim of rejecting Ancient and Late Antique philosophical views in favour of Christian ones derived from the teachings of the Church Fathers, as indicated by Italos above-quoted use of the teachings of John of Damascus on nature. In fact, even the conclusion of Italos treatise on matter astonishingly overlooked by Joannou, who refers only to the first part of it47 suggests this conclusion:

therefore [if we are to believe the Greeks, we have to conclude that] matter does not exist, but it is just a groundless phantasy, spurious reasoning, as Plato says, insofar as it failed in discovering any truth on the subject at stake, for it stood away the farthest from the divine wisdom.48

In light of this, the recently proposed depiction of Italos as a dissenter Platonist can scarcely be defended.49 Rather, starting from his approach to the problem of matter, I would like to propose a view of Italos that, though less fashionable than that of a neo-pagan rebel, is more securely grounded in his actual work. I propose that it is safer for us to conclude that, far from being an innovator, Italos approach in this text on matter is quite traditional in its reliance on the idea of the dissen-

46 See e.g., P. Golitsis, Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon la Phy-sique dAristote: tradition et innovation (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzan-tina; 3), Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2008, 127-150; 232-250.

47 See Joannou, Christliche Metaphysik, 78.48 Johannes Italos, QQ 92, 149.179-181. Unsurprisingly, given the Christian overtones

of this passage, the authors reference to the Greek views on matter as groundless phan-tasy ( ) can be traced back to the Church Fathers vocabulary against heresies, like for instance in Gregorius Nyssenus, Contra Eunomium, 2,1.11 , 229.29-31 ed. Jaeger. See also G.W.H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1961, 164, sub voce . As for the Platonic expression spurious or bastard reasoning (Timaeus 52b2), which Plato refers to the chora as grasped with the absence of sensation, it is worth noticing that it occurs in Plotinus (Enn. ii,4 [12], 10.10) and in Simplicius criticism of Plotinus (In Phys. 226.25sq.), which as demonstrated in this paper Italos knew quite well.

49 I am thinking of N. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium. Illumination and Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge: CUP, 2011, 82-85. Other scholars that held views similar to Siniossoglous are I. Dujev, Lumanesimo di G. Italos, Studi bizantini e neoellenici 5, 1939, 432-435; N.N. Keamadze, Iz istorii obestvenoi mysli Vizantii, Vizantiniskii Vremmenik 29, 1968, 170-176; Lauritzen, Psello discepolo, 725.

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siones philosophorum, i.e., the widespread Patristic topos or argument that chal-lenged the validity of philosophical truths on the grounds that Ancient and Late Antique philosophers actually disagreed on every subject-matter.

To now discuss the circumstances of Italos condemnation for heterodoxy in 1082 would take us far beyond the bounds of the present paper,50 the aim of which is primarily to show the presence of a Late Antique debate on matter-evil in an 11th-century treatise written by a Byzantine scholar. This paper has sought to dem-onstrate that an emphasis on Plotinus and Proclus differing views on matter-evil, and the latters critique of the formers standpoint (which has recently received a lot of scholarly attention),51 was evident even in 11th-century Byzantium. One of the most important witnesses of this Late Antique debate, Proclus De malorum subsistentia (chapters 30-37) with which Italos was probably acquainted, as shown above52 was also known to Italos master, Michael Psellos,53 and was later re-edited by Isaak Sebastokrator together with two other Proclean treatises.54 In this context, John Italos played an important role in the longue dure of the Late Antique debate on matter-evil. For like modern scholars, Italos clearly noticed that Proclus challenged Plotinus stance on matter as absolute evil, and played with Proclus critique in order to point out the disagreement among philosophers on this topic. Beyond this, the present paper is intended as a token of my gratitude to Carlos Steel, for his scholarship on the Greek, Byzantine and Latin reception of Proclus views on providence and evil.

50 For a summary of the literature on this topic, cf. supra n. 1.51 Cf. supra n. 25.52 Cf. supra 388.53 See L.G. Westerink, Notes on the Tria Opuscula of Proclus, Mnemosyne 4.15, 1962,

159-168.54 For an account of the scholarly debate on the identity of Isaak, see J. Opsomer

C. Steel, Proclus. On the Existence of Evils, London: Duckworth/Ithaca (Ny): Cornell Uni-versity Press, 2003, 48, n. 19.

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