CHAPTER I

A HISTORY OF THE TEST BAN: 1954-1993

This chapter examines the issue of the comprehensive test ban

historically. As we shall see, the issue of a test ban has gone through several

phases of "activism" and "apathy" since 1954, the year of its origin.1

Moreover, the talks were also conducted at various levels: bilateral, trilateral,

multilateral at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) and at the

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In addition, technical findings

were also to be combined with political negotiations, thereby complicating

the talks. This chapter attempts to broadly delineate the various phases of

negotiations to look into the conditions that brought about partial successes

and relative failures in the test ban talks. The first section deals with the

origin of the debate. The second section deals with the first phase, i.e. the

beginning of negotiation in 1958 until the signing of the Partial Test Ban

Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The third section deals with the second phase of talks,

which ends with the signing of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

(PNET) in 1976. The fourth section deals with the third phase, 1977-1980, of

the CTBT history. The final section deals with developments since 1980.

1 The terms "activism" and "apathy" were initially used by Paul Boyer to describe the US test ban debate historically. See Paul Boyer, "From Activism to Apathy: America and the Nuclear Issues, 1963-1980", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vo1.40, August/September 1984, pp.14-23.

I. THE ORIGINS

The origins of the test ban debate date back to the year 1954 when the

United States conducted its first ever thermonuclear explosion. The explosion

was conducted on March 1, 1954, at the Bikini Atoll, in the area of the

Marshall Islands in the Pacific. This atmospheric explosion caused

radioactive contamination in the region. It also affected a Japanese tuna

trawler Fukuryu Maru. As a result, the Marshall Islanders and twenty-three

Japanese fishermen, aboard on the trawler were exposed to radiation

poisoning. The tuna fish, which was for consumption in Japan, was also

exposed to radioactivity and later withdrawn from Japanese markets. Three

months later, a Japanese fisherman, Kubuyama,- who was on the ship and

was exposed to radioactivity, died. All this led to a public outcry against

nuclear testing worldwide.2

In response, the first most eloquent call against nuclear testing came

from the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Addressing the

Indian Parliament, on April 2, 1954, Nehru called for the following steps to be

taken immediately. First, some sort of "standstill agreement" on nuclear

testing between the three nuclear powers, pending substantial agreements

amongst them about the discontinuance of production and stockpiling of

nuclear weapons. Secondly, full publicity by the nuclear powers, and by the

United Nations, of the extent of the destructive power and the effects of

2 For a detailed discussion on the fallout of the first US thermonuclear explosion, see Robert Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

20

these weapons. Thirdly, to reswne discussions within the United Nations

Disarmament Commission to consider the "standstill" proposal. Finally, he

urged upon states and peoples of the world who, even though not directly

concerned with the production of the nuclear weapons, to voice and

influence in an effective manner to arrest the progress towards

. . 3 weaporusat10n.

Nehru's sentiments were shared by other influential men, like Albert

Schweitzer, noted European musician, philosopher and physician. Pope Pius

XII also expounded similar sentiment. Even within the British Parliament,

104 Labourites signed a petition calling for surrendering control of all nuclear

weapons to the U.N. and an immediate ban on the H-bomb tests.4 The UN

Trusteeship Council also discussed the issue as the Marshall Islands were

governed by the U.S. under the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947.6

Even US domestic opinion was outraged by the "Bravo" fallout. The

extent of the nuclear fear and outrage within the US can be assessed by the

fact that it started to become a major social force. Between 1954-60, the US

witnessed an upsurge of organised campaigns against nuclear testing.

Groups like Leo Szilard's Council for a Livable World, Physicians for Social

Responsibility and the Students for Peace Union attracted wider public

3 For the statement made by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on April 2, 1954 on Hydrogen Bomb See Gopal Singh and S.K. Sharma (eds.), Documents on India's Nuclear Disarmament Policy: Nehru Era, Vol.! (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2000), pp.23-27. ~ o·: ~

4 Divine, n.2, p.21. 5 Ibid., p.27.

THESIS 341.73 M3144 Ne

II I II II II \IIIII\ 111111111 TH8979

participation. Books and novels related to the ethical implications of nuclear

weapons stormed the markets. On the Beach, Fail-Safe, Dexter Master's The

Accident and Walter Miller's A Canticle for Leibowitz offered a vision of

nuclear holocaust.6 The film version of On the Beach as well as Stanley

Kubricks's Dr. Strangelove attracted large audiences.7 Indeed, the popularity

of On the Beach perturbed the Eisenhower Administration. In a desperate

attempt, the US Department of State warned that On the Beach's "strong

emotional appeal for banning nuclear weapons could conceivably lead

audiences to think in terms of radical solutions... rather than practical

safeguarded disarmament measures" .8 However, all this was insufficient to

deter the Eisenhower Administration. The Administration merely worked on

a public relations campaign to pacify the public outcry and to justify its

decisions to explode a thermonuclear device. This continued until the year

1956. With the prospects of US Presidential elections, the Democratic Party

nominee, Adlai E. Stevenson, raised the issue that year. During the

campaign, he made the test ban an issue and suggested that the United

States might unilaterally stop testing, as a first step towards obtaining an

agreement on a test ban.9 By this time, Americans had become more and

6 Boyer, n.1, p.15. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 See Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians: The

United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Neaotiations (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966), p.24. Also see Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and the Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p.l54;. Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The Test Ban Trap (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963), pp.31-34.

22

more aware of the ill-effects of nuclear testing. The Soviets had conducted

"hydrogen" test in 1954. In 1955, radioactive rain was felt in Chicago.

Moreover, a group of scientists like Linus Pauling, Barry Commoner and

several others warned of leukemia, bone cancer and genetic damage from

nuclear testing. Realising that US public awareness may be well

appropriated by the Democrats to their benefit in the elections, the

Eisenhower Administration went on the defensive. By this time, the Soviet

Union had also gained a propaganda advantage by its consistent demand for

a test-ban.10

To deal with the situation, Eisenhower's first step was to counter the

strong anti-CTBT view within the US bureaucracy. To do so, he brought into

his administration, scientists like James Killian of M.I.T. George Kistiakowsky

of Harvard, and Hans Bathe of Cornell. These scientists, turned-officials

began to change the view of the US bureaucracy in favour of a test ban. 11

All these developments later paved the way for the "Conference of

Experts". This conference was called after an initiative by President

Eisenhower and then the newly appointed Soviet Premier, Nikita

Khrushchev. Officially entitled "Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility

of Detecting Violation of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear

Tests", it was to study the possibility of verifying underground explosions, as

10 G. Allen Greb and Warren Heckrotte, "The Long History: The Test Ban Debate", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.39, August/September 1983, p.36.

11 Ibid.

23

a preliminary condition for any political decision on a test ban. The

"Conference of Experts" met in Geneva between July 1 through August 21,

1958. The Western delegation included two British, one Frenchman and one

Canadian, apart from the US delegates. On the other hand, the Soviet experts

were joined by colleagues from Poland and Czechoslovakia.12 Significantly,

the composition of the Soviet delegation was different from its Western

counterpart in one sense: it was led by a senior diplomat, Semyon Tsarapkin,

who was then heading the section for international organisation of the Soviet

Foreign Ministry and was a veteran of disarmament negotiations. The

Western delegation had only technical experts and, among its advisors, only

junior diplomats. The situation perhaps was a logical consequence of the

respective political positions of both the sides. At this point it may be worth

mentioning the basic difference between the U.S. and the Soviets towards

disarmament and arms control. Any U.S. disarmament plan, since the advent

of nuclear weapons, contemplated an effective verification control system

before taking any' political step towards disarmament. The Soviets thought

the other way round: disarmament first and then the establishment of any

control system. 13 ·

Despite this historical differences of approach, the Conference on

Experts came up with highly optimistic findings. After a detailed discussion

on the various techniques such as recording of acoustic and hydroacoustic

12 For the details of the Conference, see Jacobson and Stein, n.9, pp.34-81. 13

Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949 (Boston: Houghton Muffin Company, 1970), p.406.

24

waves, radio signals and other methods of verification, the conference came

up with its final communique on August 21, 1958. It stated:

The Conference adopted an agreed conclusion regarding the teclmical equipment of the control system necessary for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions. The Conference reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up, with certain capabilities and limitations, a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests. 14

This monitoring network, known as the "Geneva System", was

thought to be composed of 160 to 170 control posts stationed around the

world to identify nuclear explosions including low yield explosions from 1

kiloton to 5 kiloton.15 Encouraged by these technical findings, the United

States, Britain and the Soviet Union proposed to begin negotiations for a test

ban. At this stage, France had bluntly rejected any test ban measure until it

was coupled with other disarmament efforts.16 The talks nevertheless began

on October 31, 1958. This was the first serious beginning towards achieving a

test ban.

ll. THE BEGINNINGS : 1958-1963

The "Geneva Conference" began on October 31, 1958. It was officially

known as the "Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests".

The start of the Conference, however, was inauspicious. Soon after the start,

14 Quoted in Jacobson and Stein, n.9, p.80.

15 Fact Sheet No.37, A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (New York: United Nations, 1982).

16 Ibid.

25

the Soviets conducted two nuclear tests. In fact, the three nuclear states- the

US, UK and the USSR - had rushed to complete their test series before the

beginning of the Conference. Indeed, the US conducted its Hardtack series

comprising of fifty four nuclear tests.17 Furthermore, the tone of the public

statements between the two blocs was hostile.18

Moreover, the period between the call for the Geneva talks and the

actual opening of the negotiations witnessed some key events. Most

prominent was the bombardment of Ouemoy and Matsu islands by China. On

August 23, 1958, the island was hit by fifty thousand shells within a period of

two hours. 19 The crisis continued until late October. Although it cannot be

definitively established that this action had a link to developments

concerning the test ban, it cannot also be denied that a test ban would have

affected China's ability to develop an independent nuclear capability. It is

worth noting that the earlier conference of experts had suggested a global

system of control posts for verification, some of which were to be installed in

China. 20 This was the period, in addition, when the USSR and China were

discussing the question of the latter's obtaining a nuclear capability. Any

17 Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khruschev and the Test Ban (Berkley: University of California Press, 1981), p.15.

18 April Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.47.

19 Jacobson and Stein, n.9, pp.94-97. 20 Ibid., p.95.

26

conclusion of a test ban would have nipped in the bud China's nuclear

rnb. . 21 a 1t10ns.

Despite all odds, the Conference began on schedule. The Conference

was held outside the framework of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it was

serviced by the UN Secretariat.22 The US delegation was led by James

Wadsworth while the Soviets had Tsarapin as their head. David Ormsby Gore

of the British Foreign Office headed the British delegation.

At the outset, the Soviets tabled a one-line agenda along with a draft

treaty. The agenda proposed, first to stop all nuclear tests; second, to set up

a control system (i.e. a verification regime) based on the "Geneva System",

earlier recommended by the Conference of Experts; and thirdly, to dissuade

"others" from testing.23 As Glenn Seaborg, who was present in the meeting

notes, "In speaking of 'others', the Soviets surely had France in mind" .24

This Soviet position was widely criticised by the West. Their

contention was that it represented nothing more than the continuation of the

old Soviet sequence: the test ban was to precede the control system. It was

later, on November 29, 1958, that the Soviets agreed to incorporate the basic

provisions of a control system in the treaty text.

21 Ibid., p.96.

22 Carter, n.18, p.47. 23 Seaberg, n.17, p.15. 24 Ibid.

27

While the Geneva talks were gradually progressing, domestic

opposition to a test ban continued to remain strong within the Eisenhower

Administration. Indeed, Edward Teller, popularly known as the father of the

hydrogen bomb, himself along with several other US scientists, opposed a

test ban. They argued that the US should proceed towards developing new

strategic and tactical weapons. Moreover, they also argued that the

verification mechanism as suggested by the "Conference of Experts" was

inadequate to assure against Soviet cheating. The view was corroborated by

the technical findings of the US Hardtack tests conducted at Nevada in

October 1958. The scientists also came up with a new theory of "decoupling"

which indicated the possibility of camouflauging explosions from the

monitoring systems. 25 In a book titled, Our Nuclear Future, and an article

Alternatives for Security published in Foreign Affairs in early 1958; Teller

himself expressed strong suspicion regarding the Soviet motives vis-a-vis a

test ban and also the absolute effectiveness of a control regime in a fast

changing technological environment.26 The necessary corollary of these

findings was that it was vital to establish internationally controlled posts,

with a provision for on-site inspections. Knowing that the Soviets would

never accept it, the West remained adamant on this. Indeed, in a letter dated

25 Seaborg, n.17, p.16. 26

Edward Teller and Albert Latter, Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers and QQportunities (New York: Criterion Book, 1958). Also see Edward Teller, "Alternatives for Security", Foreign Affairs, Vol.37, No.2, Jan.1958.

28

May 5, 1959, Eisenhower asked Khrushchev to modify the Soviet position to

continue the test ban talks.27

The USSR, however, rejected the new US technical findings to form

the basis of the Geneva talks. It clearly stated that its participation was

based on the findings of the "Conference of Experts". However, the new data

had affected the Western position. In February 1960, the US delegation

presented a "threshold" ban: banning underground tests above a specified

yield of 4.75 on Ritcher scale along with a ban on atmospheric testing. The

Soviets accepted, with one proviso: a voluntary moratorium on tests below

that threshold. The United States, in tum, accepted this proposal, if it were

only for one or two years; the Soviets countered with four or five years. Both

sides also agreed in principle to an annual quota of on-site inspections.

However, none advanced a specific quota number.

Despite the divergence on the issue of verification the Geneva talks

continued. They had decided to settle the outstanding issues at the "Big

Four Sununit" to be held in Paris, later in May 1960, and to resolve the

remaining issues. Indeed, the momentum towards a test ban, at this stage,

seemed so strong that France and China which were opposed to a test ban

came forward in haste to make their positions clear. France, which had by

now conducted two nuclear explosions in the Sahara desert of Africa, stated

that it could abandon its nuclear programme only after the then three nuclear

27 Seaborg, n.17, p.18.

29

"haves" had destroyed their arsenals.28 China, however had stated that it

would be bound by no accord which it did not sign.29

In the midst of all this, the U-2 spy plane incident put an end to all

chances of a negotiated ban. Political relations between the two sides had

now begun to deteriorate. The Soviet Union had come up openly to say that it

could not ignore the fact that France, as a NATO member, could improve the

overall nuclear capability of the Western alliance by continued testing.

Indeed, the Kremlin also was under immense pressure from constituencies

within the Soviet bureaucracy to downplay the relevance of a test ban.30 It

announced on August 30, 1961 that it would resume its testing programme.

Following this, the US also resumed testing on September 3. Thus began on

extensive test series. The negotiations now had taken a back seat and the

Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests finally adjourned

in January 1962.

The Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 became another turning point.

Realizing the necessity of avoiding any future accidental crisis, teclmical

talks concerning a 'hotline' between the two capitals started in April 1963

with an agreement in the month of June. This month also witnessed

conciliatory public gestures and private contacts.

28 Ibid., p.23.

29 Ibid. 30 Greb and Heckrotte, n.lO, p.38.

30

In a conciliatory speech on June 10, 1963 at American University,

Washington D.C., the new US President John F. Kennedy talked of the

"mutually deep interest in a just and a genuine peace and in halting the arms

raca".31 The same day it was announced that the US, USSR and the United

Kingdom ware prepared to hold talks on the cassation of nuclear tests.

Within a month, on July 2, 1963, the Soviet Union stated that it was prepared

to accept a "partial ban". It had also indicated that it had withdrawn its

previous demand that a partial test ban be accompanied by soma form of test

moratorium. On July 15, the Moscow Conference began. It was conducted

under strict secrecy by the US President Kennedy's nominee Ambassador

Averell Harriman, Lord Hailsham for the UK, and the Soviet Foreign Minister

Andrei Gromyko. It lasted for ten days. The US, Britain and USSR had agreed

to ban testing in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space. Formally

signed on August 5, 1963, the Treaty entered into force on October 3, 1963.

France and China denounced the treaty, calling it an attempt to preserve a

"nuclear hegemony".

This treaty prohibited all nuclear explosions except underground.

However, it contained a provision to pursue a comprehensive ban. The

commitment to pursue a test ban is contained in the preamble of the Partial

Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which reads:

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue

31 Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin S. Loeb, "Approaching a Comprehensive Test Ban: A United States Historical Perspective", Disarmament, Vol.15, No.3, 1993, p.37.

31

negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive

32 substances ...

This treaty was the first major arms control agreement in the realm of nuclear

arms limitations. It was widely hailed. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

noted in its editorial that the "signs of rapprochement between Soviet Union

and United States encouraged public attention to turn in other directions". 33

Paradoxically, the treaty later served as an spur to the very arms race that it

was meant to control and reverse.

III. TOWARDS A "THRESHOLD" BAN: 1963-1976

After the signing of the PTBT, the issue of a test ban was increasingly

linked to the debate on non-proliferation. There were two reason for this.

First, the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, who followed John F. Kennedy,

did not share Kennedy's enthusiasm for a comprehensive test ban.34

Secondly, with France becoming a nuclear power in 1960, and China in 1964,

both the US and the Soviet Union recognised that it was in their mutual

interest to prevent further proliferation. As a result, both pushed through the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. According to the NPT, a

nuclear weapon state technically would be one which had manufactured and

exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices prior to

32 See the "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water", Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements (New York: United Nations, 1993), p.33.

33 Boyer, n.l, pp.15-16. 34 Seaberg and Loeb, n.31, p.38.

32

January 1967. Furthermore, each nuclear weapon state would undertake not

to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to

assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire nuclear

weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon states would also be obligated not to

receive such transfers. However, as a condition of renouncing their nuclear

weapons options, the non-nuclear weapon states sought a commitment from

the five nuclear powers that there would be substantial progress towards the

elimination of weapons of mass destruction. This commitment was

embedded in the preamble of the NPT. It reads:

Recalling the detennination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time and to continue negotiation to this end.35

Moreover, the Treaty also contains an article which obligates the nuclear-

weapon states to negotiate towards cessation of the nuclear arms race.

Article VI thus reads:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty nndertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measure relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament nnder strict and effective international control. 36

Article VI was later widely interpreted by the non-nuclear weapon states as

a promise to negotiate an early test ban. The NPT came into effect in the year

-------------·----35 See the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", Status of Multilateral

Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreement (New York: United Nations, 1993), p.lll.

36 Ibid., p.114.

33

1970 and has approximately 185 signatories. However, the three de facto

nuclear powers - India, Israel and Pakistan - have refused to accept the

treaty. India perceives the treaty to be "inherently" discriminatory in terms of

unequal responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear and non­

nuclear weapon states.

Although the focus of the nuclear powers had shifted more towards

non-proliferation, the test ban debate did not remain dormant. During the

intervening years, between the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963)

and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the debate on the test ban continued

primarily in the newly formed Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference

(ENDC). This body was formed by a General Assembly resolution in 1961,

after an agreement was reached between the US and the Soviet Union to

enlarge the previous Disarmament Committee. The ENDC convened its first

conference in Geneva in 1962 Apart from the then four nuclear powers -the

U.S., Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France - other prominent members of

the body were Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, and Sweden. The committee

worked on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapons tests as a priority measure

until 1969, the year the ENDC was further enlarged to include eight new

states. Its name also changed to the Conference of the Committee on

Disarmament (CCD).

Throughout the 1960s, the nuclear powers - the US and United

Kingdom oh the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other- continued to be

adamant on their earlier stated positions on the test ban. The Western group

34

continued to insist on intensive verification including on-site inspections as a

prerequisite for a political decision on a test ban. The Soviet Union, however,

emphasised national technical means (NTMs ). Indeed, the Soviet Union, at

this stage, backtracked on its earlier proposed two or three on-site

inspections annually.37 As a result, the issue of verification became the

principal hurdle to an agreement on a test ban.

Attempts by the non-aligned movement, which had by then became a

powerful pressure group, also proved futile in bringing about a

rapprochement between the US, UK and the Soviet Union. Several non-

nuclear weapon States had now started to work on alternative tactics to

convince the nuclear powers of the need for a test ban. Realizing that

verification remained the core contentious issue, Sweden in 1965 formally

proposed to work on international cooperation on monitoring technologies. In

a paper titled "Memorandwn on International Cooperation for the Detection

of Underground Nuclear Explosions", it suggested a sharing of seismic data

and also called for informal consultations on verification issues.38 A year later,

in 1966, it also proposed a novel mechanism for on-site inspections.

According to this, any on-site inspections would proceed in two steps.39

First, a party to the treaty suspicious of any violation on the other's territory

would be expected to furnish evidence of suspicion. The challenged party

37 Fact Sheet No.37, n.15. 38

Thomas Schmalberger, In Pursuit of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Guide to the Debate in the Conference on Disarmament (New York: United Nations, 1991), p.27.

39 Ibid.

35

would then provide new evidence to prove its innocence. Only if such a

demand for clarification was not heeded or failed to remove suspicion would

the requesting party, as a second step, demand an on-site inspections. If

such a challenge went unheeded repeatedly, then the requesting party could

withdraw from the treaty. Often lmown as "verification by invitation", this

mechanism was evolved to bring about a "verificational confidence" amongst

the nuclear powers, which was thought to break the ice further on a test ban.

While the non-nuclear weapon states continued to press for their

demand for a test ban and also worked on verification mechanisms, the two

major nuclear powers - the US and the Soviet Union - did not respond tmtil

1974.

The international pressure, however, was growing for a test ban.

Indeed, the ENDC which had in 1969 enlarged by the addition of eight

conntries and had been renamed the Conference of the Committee on

Disarmament (CCD), held a special meeting in 1973, on the occasion of tenth

anniversary of the partial test ban treaty. At this meeting, several non­

nuclear-weapon states expressed their dissatisfaction over the lack of

progress towards a complete ban. As has been earlier mentioned, the

prearnbular language of both the PTBT and the NPT called for the immediate

cessation of nuclear testing. Failure to achieve this was the major source on

concern and dissatisfaction during this conference.

36

Ironically, domestic pressures for a test ban had also increased within

the United States. In the year 1973, Senator Edward Kennedy tabled a

resolution in the U.S. Senate which recommended a moratoriwn on all

underground nuclear tests.40 The resolution had the support of 33 other

Senators. But the then US President, Richard Nixon, focussed his efforts on

the strategic arms limitations rather than a test ban. Moreover, the US

Administration had, by now, became sympathetic even to French and

Chinese nuclear sensitivities. The turning point came in 1974, the year of a

summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev with no strategic arms

agreement ready for signing.41 It was in this context that the Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko introduced the US Secretary of State Henry

Kissenger to the idea of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). The merit of the

TTBT was that it did not require any intrusive verification measures. As a

result, Kissinger responded favourably. However, there was an insidious

motive as well. At that time, the USSR was more reliant on high-yield testing.

The US, therefore, perceived that a TTBT would indeed work to its benefit by

limiting Soviet nuclear yields.42 After a brief negotiation, the TTBT was

formulated in terms of explosive yield which was set at 150kt. The Treaty'

was signed on 3 July 1974. Under the Treaty, the two countries undertook not

to conduct underground nuclear explosions exceeding 150 kilotons.

4° Carter, n.18, pp.81-2. 41 Greb and Heckrotte, n.lO, p.39. 42 Carter, n.18, p.83.

37

Moreover, both cormtries further reaffirmed their commitment to negotiate a

comprehensive test ban. As Article 1(3) of the Treaty reads:

The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view towards achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of

43 all undergrormd nuclear weapon tests.

For purposes of verification, the parties would use the national technical

means (NTMs ).

At this juncture, it may be worth asking why the US and the Soviets

agreed to a proposal which both had rejected for years? Perhaps it was a

desire of both states to bring about a "detente" that acted as a major

political incentives. Indeed in his memoirs, President Nixon writes, "we both

rmderstood that if the process of detente could be maintained through a

holding - pattern summit, we might be able to make a breakthrough at the

next meeting" .44 A similar view has been expressed in Henry Kissinger's

writings as well. He writes: "The Soviet conciliationes with respect to it [the

TTBT) must have been to maintain some momentum in the flagging

detente" .45

The rapid conclusion of the Treaty by the two powers was also Widely

criticised. Fears were expressed that the TTBT might actually result in

indefinite postponement of serious ti:liks concerning a CTBT. Moreover, the

43 See "Treaty Between USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests", in Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements: A Handbook, SIPRI (New York: Praeger, 1983).

44 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York, 1978), pp.1036-7. 45 Henry Kissenger, Year of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), p.1167.

38

TTBT did not prohibit underground explosions for civilian or peaceful

purposes. In response to this problem, a companion treaty was signed by

both the US and the Soviet Union on May 28, 1976. Commonly lmown as the

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), the Treaty sets a 150kt threshold

limit for individual explosions for peaceful purposes. However, it permits

group explosions in which the aggregate yield is less than 1.5 megatons and

where individual yields can be determined to be no greater than 50 kt.46

IV. TRILATERAL TALKS: 1977-1980

While the two nuclear powers were engaged in bilateral negotiations

leading towards partial successes in terms of the TTBT and the PNET, effort

were also on to achieve a test ban at various multilateral forums. For

instances, in the year 1976, the USSR put forward a draft treaty calling for the

complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon-tests. 47 The main

elements of this draft treaty were as follows. First, it asked for a cessation of

all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. Secondly, the verification

protocol was to be based on "national technical means" with a voluntary

exchange of seismic data. Thirdly, all nuclear-weapon states had to ratify the

treaty before it entered into force. Finally, the UN Security Council would

serve as a body for grievance redressal and complaints. This draft treaty was

attached to a resolution which called all nuclear weapon states to start talks

46 See "Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purpose", in Jozef Goldblat, n.43.

47 Schmalberger, n.37, p.32.

39

on a CTB. The resolution was, however, vehemently opposed by the US and

the UK. Later, in February 1977, the draft treaty was reintroduced in the CCD

along with an amendment which provided for "on-site inspections" on the

basis of invitation. 48

Moreover, working with a Swedish proposal, the CCD, in 1976, also

established an Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider "International

Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identity Seismic Events".49 This group

of scientists and technical experts have been working since then on the

seismological problems. Indeed, it should be mentioned at this juncture that

this Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) provided the technical expertise during

the 1994-96 CTBT talks on which the International Monitoring System is build

upon.

With Jinuny Carter assuming the US presidency in 1977, a good start

was made in terms of positive approaches towards achieving a CTBT. Within

six day of assuming office, the US President in a letter to Soviet General

Secretary Brezhnev urged the conclusion of a test ban.50 He also carne out

publicly stating that all nuclear tests be ceased. Given the strong personal

commitment of the President, the US bureaucracy was forced to initiate

studies and explore flexible solutions to the problems of verification. Paul

Warnke, a highly competent disarmament negotiator, was authorised to

48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p.61. 50 Carter, n.39, p.86.

40

expedite the possibility of a test ban with the Soviets. The US Secretary of

State, Cyrus Vance, visited Moscow with a proposal for the establishment of

a working group to consider the CTB in the month of March 1977. Preliminary

consultations were also held between the US and the USSR in June 1977 and

in this meeting it was finally decided to hold further private tripartite

negotiations. These negotiations began on July 30, 1977. The US, USSR and

Britain participated. Three issue became the major points of controversy. The

first issue related to the scope of the treaty. Should peaceful nuclear

explosions be covered by the treaty? The U.S. and the Britain wanted all

nuclear explosions including those for peaceful purposes to be prohibited by

the treaty.51 The Western position was based on the assumption that the

PNE technology is indistinguishable from that required for weapon purposes.

The PNE inevitably gives weapon related information and should, therefore,

be prohibited. The Soviets, however, wanted its exemption.52 It should be

recalled at this point that even the US had a civilian nuclear explosion

programme lmown as the "Plowshares" programme. It had explored its uses

for almost twenty five years before it finally terminated it in 1977. At that

time, the Soviets were continuing with their peaceful programme and for this

reason were opposed to its prohibition.

The second issue which dominated the debate related to the

accession of France and China to a test ban. The Soviet Union insisted that

51 Schmalberger, n.37, p.33. 52 Ibid.

41

any conclusion of a test ban should inevitably include the French and the

Chinese participation. Moscow feared that France may serve as a proxy for

USA's test programme. With China, it had a border hostility, hence its

participation. However both Paris and Beijing, had refused to sign any treaty

which they feared may cripple their nuclear weapon or testing programmes.

The most controversial issue though was that of verification. Ironically,

the US agreed to "voluntary" rather than its previously proposed

"mandatory" on site inspections. At the same time, the Soviets conceded the

US proposal that unmanned seismic stations be placed on its territory which

could transmit seismic data outside the country. These seismic stations were

to be called "black boxes". Thus, there was considerable progress on these

contentious issues and a test ban appeared imminent. Indeed, the possibility

of a test ban received such scrutiny within the US that it started proving

counter productive. The US bureaucracy wheeled out a new issue, perhaps to

bog down the talks. Opposition came from the US Department of Energy

(DOE}, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Weapon Laboratories. The major

contention related to the issue of reliability of the US nuclear stockpiles. The

argument here was that in the absence of nuclear testing the us nuclear

stockpile may not be reliable and, perhaps, may degrade. This might

eventually lead to a US-Soviet asymmetry in terms of weapon potential. 63 The

issue, termed "stockpile degradation", was raised by Roger Batzel, the then

director of the Livermore Laboratory. In a letter to a US Congressmen,

53 Greb and Heckrotte, n.lO, p.40.

42

Charles Wilson, dated September 25, 1978, Batzel wrote: "We cannot assume

that stockpile - degradation will be symmetrical with respect to US and

Soviet weapons. We just do not know how Soviet weapons are made or what

h . uf . bl " 64 t err reman actunng pro ems are .

While Batzel's apprehensions remained contested within the US

nuclear establishment, it did pressure the US political establishment to

review its position further on the issue of a CTB. As a result, progress in the

trilateral talks began to slow and, by late 1978, the US began to harden its

position on several issue where a near-consensus had been achieved.55 For

instance, the US now started demanding ten additional seismic stations to be

established in the US and the USSR, respectively. Furthermore, it proposed to

limit a CTBT to five years. Moreover, it also demanded the inclusion of

seismic instrumentation, to be potentially manufactured in the US only.

On July 30, 1980, the US, UK and the USSR submitted the report of the

"tripartite" talks to the Committee of Disarmament.66 The report stated the

broad areas of agreement and disagreement amongst the "three" nuclear

powers on the issue of the test ban. Amongst the areas of agreement was the

treaty scope. It was agreed that a potential treaty would prohibit only

nuclear-weapon test explosions. On nuclear explosions for peaceful

54 See note titled "Furthermore" by Gerald E. Marsh in The Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, Vol.39; August/September 1983, p.43. Also see J. Carson Mark, "Do We Need Nuclear Testing?", Arms Control Today, November 1990, pp.12-17.

55 3 Schmalberger, n.37, p.3 . 56

Ibid.

43

purposes, the states parties would observe a moratoria until arrangements

for conducting them were worked out which would be consistent with the

treaty. Verification would be based on national technical means (NTMs).

Moreover, it was agreed that there would be an exchange of seismic data.

This data could be transmitted through the Global Telecommunications

System or World Meteorological Organisation, both of which are based in

Geneva.57 However, consensus was yet to be arrived at on the formulation

related to the duration of the treaty. Also, while the three envisaged a review

conference, they remained undecided on its "timing" and its role. In one

sense, while the three had substantially progressed towards a test ban, final

decisions were still awaited, pending a few differences.

Unfortunately, all hopes for a test ban were belied by the changed

political context i.e. the beginning of the second Cold War and the Soviet

intervention in Afghanistan. On July 20, 1982, the United States formally

announced it was withdrawing itself from the test ban talks.58

V. DELmERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS: 1980 AND BEYOND

The failure of the tripartite talks between the US, UK and the USSR

brought a significant change in the overall approach towards negotiating a

test ban. First, the more unified position of the US and the UK vis-a-vis a test

57 Fact Sheet No.37, A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (New York: United Nations, 1982).

58 Schmalberger, n.37, p.33.

44

ban came to an end.59 In the new policy shift, the subsequent US Presidents

Ronald Reagan and George Bush, both Republicans, relegated the test ban to

a "long-term objective". At the Committee on Disarmament, the US declared

in 1982:

It seeks a CTB in the context of a time when we will not have to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep and effectively verifiable arms reduction, substantially improved verification capabilities and greater balance in conventional forces.60

At the same time, the redefined position of Britain stated that as long

as its security depended on deterrence, it was a "requirement to conduct

underground tests to ensure [its] nuclear weapons remain effective and up-

to-date" .61 While the Soviet position, at this stage, remained unclear France

and China had made explicit that the two superpowers must start to

negotiate disarmament, including a ban on nuclear testing. This by

implication meant that both of them visualised a test ban only in a

disarmament context.

France had till date refused to participate in test ban talks. Its major

condition to participate in negotiations remained: (a) to minimise the gap

between its strategic forces and those of the US and the USSR; (b) to

eliminate conventional force imbalances; and (c) to achieve total prohibition

59 Ibid., p.l. 60 Ibid., p.45. 61 Ibid.

45

f . 1 62 o chenuca weapons. Although China had started participating since

1980 in the CD, it continued to demand (a) that the super powers stop nuclear

testing in the first place, (b) that they reduce their nuclear arsenals by 50

percent, and (c) that they withdraw arms from foreign ground.63

The second major change came in terms of shift of the negotiating

activity towards the CD. This is not to say that the issue was never debated

in the Committee on Disarmament or its predecessor bodies. However, in the

early 1980s, the Conunittee on Disarmament and later, after 1984, the

Conference on Disarmament (CD), institutionalised its efforts to achieve a

test ban. This was done by establishing a subsidiary Ad Hoc Committee

within the CD which was exclusively devoted to the issue. The Ad Hoc

Committee was established in 1982, 1983, 1990 and 1991. However, as the Ad

Hoc Committees of 1982, 1983, 1990 and 1991 had non-negotiating mandates,

they could not commence negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty. Rather,

their efforts focussed on (a) the technical aspects of verification, (b) the

procedures for on-site inspections, (c) and the role of national technical

means.

In the interim, the UN General Assembly also adopted several

resolutions on the cessation of nuclear weapon - weapon tests, mostly

sponsored by the non-aligned and non-nuclear countries. Significantly,

increasing nwnbers of non-nuclear weapon states were now coming forward

62 Schmalberger, n.37, p.48. 63

Ibid.

46

ations Special Session on

Disannament (UNSSOD-11), held in 1982, a majority of States expressed their

anguish over the lack of progress, as also at the apparent absence of any

prospect of a break through in the matter. They also expressed concern over

the increase in nuclear testing. It should be mentioned at this juncture that

nearly two hundred nuclear tests were conducted between 1978 (the year the

first UN Disarmament Session was held) and 1982. Additional resolutions

were adopted by the General Assembly on the issue in 1982, 1983, and 198464

(resolution 37/72, 37/73, 38/62, 38/63, 38/72, 39/52, 39/53 and 39/60).

Moreover, by resolution 37/85 dated December 9, 1982, the UNGA referred to

the Committee on Disarmament to consider the "Basic Provisions of a Treaty

on Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests", earlier

introduced by the Soviet Union.

On June 14, 1983, Sweden even presented a draft treaty, titled "Draft

Treaty Banning any Nuclear-Weapon Test Explosion in Any Environrnent.65 In

May 1984, the leaders of the six non-aligned nations, Argentina, Greece,

India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, called for an end to the testing of

nuclear weapons. Popularly known as the "Five Continent Peace Initiative",

their call was repeated on several occasions after that.66 Later, on December

64 Fact Sheet No.37, A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (NewYork: United Nations,

1982). 65

Ibid. 66

Steve Fetter, ToVI(_!!_rds a Comprehensive Test Ban (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), p.18.

47

12, 1984, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar, made

an appeal for a test ban. He said:

Talks on a comprehensive test ban have been in abeyance for too long and their value has even been questioned. As with all anns limitation negotiations, there will never be a perfect time to begin them in the opinion of all sides. The time to reconunence these talks is now: they should not be delayed any further. 67

In August 1985, Mexico came up with a proposal to amend the 1963 Partial

Test Ban Treaty to include even underground explosions. Mooted by Mexican

Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, who later earned the Noble Peace

award, the idea gradually picked up support by 1987 especially amongst the

non aligned states.

In a significant initiative in 1988, the then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv

Gandhi, mooted a pragmatic "Action Plan" for phased nuclear disarmament.

Presented at the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-III), it

was officially named "A World Free of Nuclear Weapon: An Action Plan".68

The major elements of the "Action Plan" included, (a) cessation of the

production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, (b) conclusion of a test-

ban and a convention outlawing the use and threat of use of nuclear

weapons, and (c) halting the transfer of weapons, delivery systems and

weapon grade fissionable material. In response, the non-nuclear weapon

67 As cited in T.T. Poulose, The CTBT and the Rise of Nuclear Nationalism in India, (New Delhi: Lancer Book, 1996), p.153.

68 For the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, See Gopal Singh and S.K. Sharma (eds.), Documents on India's Nuclear Disarmament Policy: Rajiv to Vajpayee, Vol.III (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers, 2000), pp.1162-67.

48

states would be obliged not to acquire nuclear weapons. This plan had to be

implemented in a time-bound framework over 22 years. All these initiatives,

however, failed to pressure the nuclear powers to resume further talks on a

test ban.

Significant developments now occurred at the political level. In the

Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary in 1985.

Within months of asswning the highest office, Gorbachev announced his

decision to unilaterally suspend all nuclear testing. The moratorium was to

begin on August 6, 1985, the fortieth anniversary of Hiroshima bombing.

Gorbachev also urged other nuclear powers to join the moratorium.

Gorbachev extended the moratorium thrice until February 1987 in

anticipation that the US might reciprocate. The Reagan Administration

however dismissed the idea. This was despite the fact that during 1986 both

houses of Congress passed non-binding resolutions urging the President to

negotiate a CTB.69 The House of Representatives went further, voting to deny

funds for tests of more than one kiloton - yield. 70 While most of these efforts

did not become law and were non binding on the US Administration, it did

signal renewed domestic support for a test ban. Reagan's successor George

Bush also did not reverse the CTB policy. He characterised it as a "long-term

objective" and focussed on the TTBT and PNET ratification. Both treaties

were eventually ratified in 1990.

69 Seaborg and Loeb, n.31 p.40. 70 Ibid.

49

In August 1991, the Soviet Union permanently closed is Semipalatinsk

test site. The Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991. The new Russian

President, Boris Yeltsin, however, continued with the Soviet demand to

reswne talks on a test ban. Following the Soviet collapse, the problem of

fissile material proliferation brought forth a new challenge before the nuclear

powers. The immediate consequence was that France, which was till date

the staunchest test ban opponent, reversed its position. On April 8, 1992, the

then French Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy announced the French decision

to suspend nuclear testing.71 Moreover, it also expressed its willingness to

join the NPT.

Thus, a momentwn was building up in favour of reswnption of test ban

talks. Meanwhile, the Partial Test Ban Amendment Conference was

convened at UN headquarters between January 7 and January 18, 1991.72

This conference was initiated at the behest of six non aligned states:

Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. However, one

hundred other states also participated in the conference. The idea was to

amend the "partial" ban to a "comprehensive" one. The Conference failed to

do this due to stiff opposition by the US and Britain. While the Soviets

supported the proposal, the US and Britain went to the extent of threatening

to veto such a decision.

71 Quoted in Christopher E. Paine, The US Debate Over a CTBT (Washington: Natural Resources Defence Council, 1993), p.9.

72 For a detailed discussion on the Partial Test Ban Amendment Conference, see Harald Muller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.109-30.

50

The United States, as usual, faced domestic pressures from the

weapon laboratories to retain testing. The new excuse was "weapons

safety" .73 How would it be detennined that US nuclear weapons were safe?

How would it be ensured that the weapons were not accidentally detonated?

Although, it is learnt now that most US nuclear weapons which were to be

retained in US stockpiles had advanced safety features: Enhanced Nuclear

Detonation Safety (ENDS), Fire Resistant Pits (FRPs) and Insensitive High

Explosives (IHE). Those weapons which lacked these features were set to

. 74 retue.

Realizing this fact, and against the background of world-wide demand

for a CTB, the US Congress took a historic decision. Congress passed a highly

cumbersome amendment. Known as the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment,

it came into force on October 2, 1992.75 The main features of the amendment

were: (a) an immediate nine-month moratoria on US testing, (b) US testing

would cease after September 30, 1996, until another nation tested, (c) the US

President should submit to the Congress a schedule for the CTB talk with

Russia, and (d) in addition, the Administration should come up with a plan

for achieving a CTB by September 30, 1996.

In mid-1993, Bill Clinton took over the US Presidency. Clinton was a

social democrat and was himself a strong supporter of a test ban. During his

73 Paine, n. 70, pp.15-20. 74 Tom A. Zomara, "Put a Safety Cap on Testing", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

Vol.48, No.2, March 1992, pp.25-29. 75 Paine, n.70, pp.ll-14.

51

Presidential campaign, he had expressed himself openly in favour of a CTB.

In April 1993, at the Vancouver Swrunit Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to

negotiate a test ban. On July 3, 1993, the US extended its test moratorium.

Later, on November 19, 1993, the United Nations Committee on Disarmament

and International Security passed a resolution calling for negotiation of a

CTBT and asked all states to support it.76 On December 16, 1993, the UN

General Assembly further endorsed it.77 Moreover, on August 10, 1993, the

Geneva Conference on Disarmament took a decision to give a negotiating

mandate to its Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a test ban.78 Sweden

submitted a Draft Test Ban Treaty to the CD on December 6, 1993.79 Australia

also submitted a draft outline on December 9, 1993. On January 25, 1994, the

CD resumed negotiations. As a first step, it re-established its moribund Ad

Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban (NTB). It also mandated the NTB to

negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. The mandate read:

The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ·ban treaty, which could contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapon in all aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify

76 Seaborg and Loeb, n.31, p.51.

n Ibid.

78 Conference on Disarmament Doc.CD/1212. 79 Conference on Disarmament Doc.CD/1232, CD/NTB/WP.33.

52

Seismic Events. The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee to establish the necessary working groups in order to carry forward effectively this negotiating mandate: these should include at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, which should be established in the initial stage of negotiations, and any oth13r which the Committee may subsequently decide upon.

80

Thus began the negotiations to draft the CTBT.

CONCLUSION

The history of the test ban is a saga of contrasts. Ever since the first

call for a test ban in 1954, efforts have been on to achieve a treaty. However,

these efforts were repeatedly shelved in favour of more limited objectives like

the PTBT of 1963, the NPT of 1968, the TTBT and the PNET of 1974 and 1976,

respectively. The initial public outcry was in response to radioactive fall out.

After the signing of the PTBT, this fear faded. Other issues like verification,

stockpile degradation and weapons safety became fonnidable barriers to

achieve a test ban. The talks were also visibly influenced by wider

international events, both positively and negatively. However, international

pressures exerted by the non-nuclear weapon powers and also by domestic

interest groups furthered the momentum for talks. The collapse of the Soviet

Union in 1991 and the new proliferation threats created the key ccnditions

for the 1994 to 1996 talks in the CD. As a result the CD re-established its Ad

Hoc Conunittee to commence negotiations on a test ban.

8° Conference on Disarmament Doc.CD/1238.

53