A History of ATM Violence - OWASP Chapter Night

69
Erik Van Buggenhout & Daan Raman OWASP Chapter Meeting - May 2014

Transcript of A History of ATM Violence - OWASP Chapter Night

Page 1: A History of ATM Violence - OWASP Chapter Night

Erik Van Buggenhout & Daan Raman

OWASP Chapter Meeting - May 2014

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Penetration testers

Instructor

SEC 560 & 542

Certification lovers

NVISO ApkScan

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Introduction

Attacking the ATM

Common ATM system design

Assessing a sample ATM

Conclusion

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Introduction

Attacking the ATM

Common ATM system design

Assessing a sample ATM

Conclusion

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Automated Teller Machine

Cash disposing & dispensing

2.2 million devices worldwide

Different vendors

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The first ATM was installed in 1939 in

New York City, known as “Bankograph”.

Removed after 6 months because

it was not used

It was reintroduced in Ohio in 1959,

with huge success.

There are currently more then 2.2

million ATM’s worldwide.

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PIN validation

Account balance

Transfer / withdrawal

authorization

...

The ATM is a “stupid” device, part of the bank’s overall architecture

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1. ATM computer

2. (Touch)screen

3. Card-reader

4. PIN pad

5. Cash dispenser

6. Cash cassettes

Typical lay-out of a modern ATM

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1. ATM computer

2. (Touch)screen

3. Card-reader

4. PIN pad

5. Cash dispenser

6. Cash cassettes

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1. ATM computer

2. (Touch)screen

3. Card-reader

4. PIN pad

5. Cash dispenser

6. Cash cassettes

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1. ATM computer

2. (Touch)screen

3. Card-reader

4. PIN pad

5. Cash dispenser

6. Cash cassettes

CD / DVD

Disk bays

Auxiliary ports

USB

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Introduction

Attacking the ATM

Common ATM system design

Assessing a sample ATM

Conclusion

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It stores MONEY

Handles interesting customer data as well,

which could be abused to get MORE MONEY

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Safe certification standards, bolts, video surveillance...

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Ink cartridges that stain money upon breach

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Anti-skimming devices

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Security awareness campaigns

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Awareness + force change of default passwords

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

Barnaby Jack

“Jackpotting ATMs” - 2010

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

Network access?

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

Network access?

Shodan HQ (Internet search engine) lists 800+ ATMs on the Internet

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Blow up the safe

Copy cards &

steal PIN codes

Steal the entire

thing

Attack back-end

communication

Attack the OS

Access

“operator” mode

...

CCC 2013

“Electronic bank robberies”

Boot ATMs from USB

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Introduction

Attacking the ATM

Common ATM system design

Assessing a sample ATM

Conclusion

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CEN/XFS (eXtensions

for Financial Services)

provides a standard set

of APIs that can be

used by Windows

applications to operate

the ATM peripherals

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XFS Manager

Windows-based application

XFS APIs

XFS SPIs

XFS Service Providers

ATM peripheralVendor

Dependent

Vendor

Independent

Operating System

CEN/XFS (eXtensions

for Financial Services)

provides a standard set

of APIs that can be

used by Windows

applications to operate

the ATM peripherals

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95% of ATMs was running Windows XP in January 2014(NCR, 2014)

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“How will you approach the Windows XP end-of-support?”(KAL 2013 – ATM Software Trends & Analysis)

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Introduction

Attacking the ATM

Common ATM system design

Assessing a sample ATM

Conclusion

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Attack failed

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Using openly available forensic toolkits we managed to recover the majority of the original hard disk content.

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Sweet... But I don’t have a bank back-end (yet)

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DEMONSTRATION

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Introduction

Attacking the ATM

Common ATM system design

Developing ATM “malware”

Conclusion

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Modern ATMs are standard, Windows-based, computers full of money

Developing ATM “malware” is a piece of cake

Highly interesting target, protection is required!

Application whitelisting

Network segmentation

Disk encryption

Protect the BIOS

Patch management (No WIN XP)