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7/25/2019 A Hibrid Techne of the Soul
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A Hybrid Techn of the Soul?: Thoughts on the Relation between Philosophy and Rhetoric inGorgias and PhaedrusAuthor(s): Ramsey Eric RamseyReviewed work(s):Source: Rhetoric Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1999), pp. 247-262Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/466154.
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7/25/2019 A Hibrid Techne of the Soul
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RAMSEY ERIC RAMSEY
Arizona
State
University
West
A
Hybrid
Techne of the
Soul?:
Thoughts
on the
Relation between
Philosophy
and Rhetoric
in
Gorgias
and
Phaedrus
Introduction and Some Caveats
Whether
Plato coined
the
word
rhetoric,
what is
striking
is that he was
the
first to
attempt
to make it
disappear.'
My
argumentmay
well
add
some
strength
to
Schiappa's
contention that
Plato
may
have coined
the
word rhetoric
by
suggesting
that to make
something disappear,
one
would need to be
dealing
with
something
like a well-defined
object
(though entering
directly
into
the heart of
these often heated debates
is not the
focus
of
this
essay)
("Did
Plato Coin
the
Word Rhetorike?";"Neo-Sophistic RhetoricalCriticism").If Plato desires to
make
rhetoric
disappear,
as I shall
argue
he
did
at least in
the
Gorgias,
then
it
behooves
him to have a
well-articulated
arget
of
concern.
If it
is
the case that
naming
a
set
of
practices helps
to
constitute
those
practices
as an
object
domain,
then it makes sense to
suggest
that Plato
has cause to
name a
set of
practices
"rhetoric"
o as to be able to deal with
them.
A
strain
of Western
thinking
has
long
lamented the
presence
of
rhetoric,
from the
position
Descartes takes
in
the Meditations o the rise
of
positivism
and
on now to the crass materialismof
sociobiology.
Yet this
legacy,
often blamed
on Plato,may be if not a false thenat least a not wholly accurateaccusation.If
the
reading
below
is
persuasive,
then we
should
see
that what we
are
customarily
asked
to
accept
as
Plato's wholesale disdain for
rhetoric,
while
perhaps
at
the heart
of
the
Gorgias,
is not so
clearly
dismissive
by
the
time
we
get
to the Phaedrus. We have
contemporary
essons
yet
to
learn
from Plato
and
from
recognizing
that the
history
of
philosophy
and the
history
of
rhetoric
need
always
to be taken
together.
It is this lesson and not
simply
the
pervasive
accusations that
I
am
willing,
in
part,
to
attribute
o the
legacy
of
Plato
by way
of the
knowing misreading
of
Phaedrus
I offer below.
This essay argues that Plato does well in the Gorgias to perform a
philosophical slight-of-hand
that
renders
rhetoric,
if
not
invisible,
at
least
redundant. The
argument suggests
that after
the series of
exchanges
in
the
Rhetoric
Review,
Vol.
17,
No.
2,
Spring
1999 247
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RhetoricReview
Gorgias
with
Gorgias,
Polus,
and
Callicles,
Plato
finds
(strangelyperhapsgiven
the
thesis that
he
coined the
word)
that the set
of
practices
named"rhetoric"
by
his
interlocutors
was not
worthy
of a name at all. This
is
the case when
rhetoric,
as
Kahn
suggests,
is taken
as an art associated with the
"noble"
endeavor
to
influence the humansoul
(psvche).
However,
the
saga
does not end with the
conclusions
of the
Gorgias.
While
I shall
argue
that
Plato
made rhetoric
disappear
n
the
Gorgias
at least from the
list
of
arts,
it
does
not
remain
out
of
sight. Universally
held to
postdate
the
Gorgias,
the
Phaedrus has
rhetoric
as its
centerpiece
and
rhetoric
s
there treated
not as
the
object
with
which one
must do
away,
rather
Plato treats
it
as
something
with
which-perhaps against
his
wishes-he must
deal. When one
reads the
Phaedrus,
one
cannot
help
but
get
the
feeling
that Plato is not
pleased
by having
to
readmit
rhetoric
to the
discussion.
Nonetheless,
in
this
dialogue
rhetoric
comes to have
an
inevitable and
necessary place alongside
(or
perhaps
even
closer)
the
highest
of
Platonic
arts,
viz.,
philosophy.
This
hermeneutic
oray
into two
of
Plato's
dialogues
begins
with the
belief,
held
by
many,
that
we
can
trace
a
change
in
Plato's
thinking
n them
as concerns
the relation between
philosophy
and rhetoric. While
it is
the
case that this
change
in Plato's
position
is noted
by
a number of his
readers,
t nonetheless
remains
that
why
and
what comes
of
this
often-recognized
change
has
not
always
been
fully
explicated.
From
what
I
see as the
attempt
in
the
Gorgias
to make
rhetoric
disappear
to
the
recognition
in
the
Phaedrus
that
philosophy
without
rhetoric's
voice leaves the
truth
mute needs
further
nvestigation.
It
remains
to
ask
how
both
serve to
further this
argument
and
also
to
clarify
its
power
to
persuade
in
an
age
that
has,
by
and
large, forgotten
Plato.
As a
way
to
begin
these
investigations,
I
plan
to read
or
more
aptly,
misread,
the
myth
of the
charioteer rom the heartof
the
Phaedrus.
Perhaps
ess than
a
reading
or
even
a
misreading,
the
following
is a creative
attempt
to retell the
story
in a
contemporary
diom,
inspired
all the while
by
Plato's
beginning.
It is
always
difficult to
approach
philosophy
and rhetoric in
Plato's
dialogues
Gorgias
and
Phaedrus.
On the one
hand,
the
popular
philosophical
conception
is
that
Plato
simply
had
a
passing
critique
of
rhetoric
but
that these
dialogues
are
really
about
ethics
and
love,
respectively,
and
that the
discussion
of
rhetoric is
only
what
the
dialogues
are
"ostensibly"
about
(Levi).
But this
is
just
a
certain
philosophic arrogance
and misses
what
twentieth-century
continental
philosophy
takes
seriously,
that
is,
the intimate relation
between
philosophyandrhetoric Johnstone;Schrag).
Jacques
Derrida,
or
example,
cautions us
against
a
too-facile
acceptance
of
a
complete
collapse
of the
concepts
rhetoric and
philosophy.
Derrida
s
asked
if
its is not
the case that "ever since Plato's
opposition
to
rhetoric
as
a
discipline,
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A
Hybrid
Techne
of the
SoulI
philosophy
and
rhetoric
seem
to
have existed in
a
state
of
continual tension.
Why
does there
seem
to
be tension between these
disciplines?
Aren't
these
disciplines-rhetoric
and
philosophy-necessarily
bound
together?
Aren't
they
necessarily
intricately
and
completely
tied?"
(Olson
16-17).
In
response
Derrida
says:
Well,
from
that
point
of
view
I
would
be
on
the
side of
philosophy.
The tension comes
first from the fact that rhetoric
as a
separate
discipline,
as
a
technique
or
as
an
autonomous
field,
may
become a
sort of
empty
instrumentwhose usefulnessor effectivenesswould be
independent
of
logic,
or
even
reference
or
truth-an
instrument
n
the
hands
of the
sophists
in the sense that Plato
wanted
to
define
them.
So
contrary
o
what some
people
think
I
think-for
instance,
Habermas-I
would
be on
the side of
philosophy,
logic,
truth,
reference,
etc.
When I
question
philosophy
and the
philosophical
project
as
such,
it's not
in
the name
of
sophistics,
of rhetoric
as
just
a
playful
technique.
I'm
interested
n
the rhetoric
hiddenin
philosophy
itself because
within,
let's
say,
the
typical
Platonic
discourse
there
is
a rhetoric-a rhetoric
against
rhetoric,
against sophists.
(17)
If we
know
how to
listen,
then
Plato
has
some more
to
teach
us on
this
score as
we
question
rhetoric,
philosophy,
and theirrelations
(see
also
Derrida).
On
the
other
hand,
rhetoricians
often attack the
two
dialogues
without a
recognition
of the
broad
philosophical
issues
involved
in
Plato's
metaphysics,
or
they
treat his
metaphysics
as an indefensible
position
that is
dismissed
easily
from
a
postmetaphysical
standpoint.
Sharing
results
with a
certain
philosophic
arrogance,
his
latter
strategy
of
bold dismissal
(shared
also
by
any
number
of
so-called postmodernpositions) leaves much of importanceuncoveredin these
two
dialogues.
I
am interested
in
attempting
to
reinspire
Plato's
two
dialogues
from
my
metaphorical
frame
of
Plato-as-magician
(cf.
de
Romilly)
who tries
to
make
rhetoric
disappear
n the
Gorgias
and as the
resigned
but
powerful myth-maker
in the
Phaedrus
in which he
tells
of the
dangers
of
rhetoric,
knowing
now
that it
is
something
with which we cannot
do
away
(see
Curran).
Moreover,
if I
am
persuasive,
we
shall
see,
when we
get
to
the
Phaedrus,
that
we
no
longer
would
wish
for rhetoric
to
be
gone
and that
the
dangers
of
its
disappearance
utweigh
the dangers of its presence. Indeed, rhetoric becomes in Plato's Phaedrus
philosophy's
necessary
Other.
Following
Schiappa
("Neo-Sophistic
Rhetorical
Criticism")
I
shall
only
claim
for
the
unique interpretation
f Phaedrus
I
offer
at the
end of
the
essay
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Review
that
it
offers a
sense
of
organic shape
that
may
be outside
the
analytic
of facts
proper,
but
well
within
what
truths we
have
left to learn from Plato
concerning
the relationbetween
philosophy
and rhetoric.
Plato's
Sleight
of
Hand:
Philosophy
and Rhetoric
in
Gorgias
My
Plato-as-magician
reading
of
Gorgias
relies,
no
doubt,
on what one
might
call a rather
straightforward
eading
of
the text.
Enos
(Greek
Rhetoric
before Aristotle) and Benardete, for example, renderdifferent, nuanced, but
equally compelling
reads
of
the text as
they
pursue
their
particular
nds. For
my
part
in the
matter,
I shall
settle for
the rather
straightforward eading
caste
in
terms of
rhetoric's
disappearance
o
make
room for the
unique misreading
I
propose
for
Phaedrus.
Plato
opens
the
Gorgias
with
Socrates
arriving
too late to have
heard
the
demonstration
performed
by
the famous rhetor whose name
gives
the
dialogue
its title.
In
concluding
that
demonstration,
Gorgias
had
agreed
to answer
any
question put
to
him.
Socrates is
invited
to
join
in the festivities
by asking
Gorgias questionsthatget at the heartof Socrates' concerns.As Robinsonpoints
out,
Socrates often asks
questions
that
take
one
of
two
forms. Either
he asks
"what
is X?"or
he asks "is X
Y?" In this case
we
see that he
is
asking
the later
question
as he
is
attempting
o
ascertainwhether
rhetoric s an art
(techne).
Socrates uses the
analogy
of the techne of medicine
to
show how
rhetoric
fails
to
be
analogous
to this art. What
is
key
in
this
analogy
is
that Socrates
believes
that medicine is the
most
noble
techne with concern for
the
body,
whereas
in this
dialogue
the
question being investigated
is what is in
fact
rhetoric's concern. For
Socrates to
proceed,
he
needs
a firm
answer to this
question
so
that
one
can know if
rhetoric has
an
analogous knowledge of its
object
as
medicine
does vis-a-vis the
body.
Socrates
determines the
object
of
rhetoric based
on the
way
he
draws out
the
implications
of the
responses
he receives
early
in
the
dialogue.
Rhetoric
is
claimed
by
its
defenders
in the
Gorgias
to be concerned with
winning
the
conviction of
one's hearers
(Gorgias
454b
ff).
Now this telos of
rhetoric
is
ultimately
concerned
with the human
psvche
because
any
conviction one holds
or
can come to
hold,
for
Plato,
is held
in/by
one's soul. Thus he
claims that
if
the
set
of
practices
now
called "rhetoric"are
going
to be
given
the
designation
techne,
then
they
must
show,
as
medicine does with
its
knowledge
of
the
body,
its
knowledge
of the
object
of
its ultimate
concern
viz.,
the
soul.
Through
a now
famous
series of
questions
and
interrogations,
Socrates reveals
that each
of
the
interlocutor's
claims
concerning
the
benefit
of rhetoricfail to
demonstratesuch
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A
Hybrid
Techne
of
the
Soul?
a
knowledge.
Each
in
his turn fails on Plato's
account
to
give adequate
justification
for
rhetoric'sconcern
for
the Good of their hearers'souls.
This
position
and
judgment
s,
of
course,
generated
n
light
of
Plato's
larger
metaphysical
project
(Moline).
Clearly,
it
may
be
an
open
question
as to
when
exactly
we
get
Plato's
metaphysical
system
in
his written
work,
that
is,
when
in
the difficult-to-determine
hronology
of
Plato's work do
we
get
his
theory
of the
Forms.
One
thing,
however,
seems clear in
this
respect: Something
intimately
connected
with
Plato's
metaphysics
s at work in his
critique
of
rhetoric.
His attack
on
rhetoric
s
in
every
case
buttressed
by
the
distinction between
opinion,
of
which
he
charges
rhetoric
having
as its
ultimate
concern,
and
knowledge,
which
one must have
if
he
or
she
is
going
to do
justice
to
the soul.
The notions of
the
Good,
the
true,
and the
just,
as
well
as
the relation
of these
to
opinions
and
knowledge,
give
coherence to Plato's
critique
of
rhetoric
in the
Gorgias.
Without
some
sense
of the
abiding
truth
of
the
Forms,
one
has
little
foundation from which to
make
sense
of the sustained
critique
of
rhetoric
that
Plato
gives
us in this
dialogue.
Dramatically,
Socrates is
not
the
only
one
asking questions
here. His
first
sustained
critique
of rhetoriccomes
in
answer to a
question
put
directly
to
him,
by
Polus:
Whatdoes he thinks rhetoric s? In
essence,
Polus is
asking
Socratesa
very
Socratic
question
in the
form of
the other
of
the two famous
questions
Socrates
is
fond of
asking.
Socrates
has an
answer
ready
for
Polus and it
is that
rhetoric
is no
techne
at
all;
rhetoric is he
claims
nothing
more than
a knack
(tribe).
This knack
is,
like all such
practices,
concerned
with
pleasure
as an
end
distinct
from
the Good. It is here that a returnto the earlier-discussed
analogy
with medicine
is
crucial.
Comparing
hetoricas a knack to
cooking,
the
analogy
from
medicine
again
is
the basis for
his
argument against
rhetoric. As
the
interlocutors
have set
things up,
by
asserting
that
rhetoric
is
concerned
with
producing
conviction in othersand thus in the end concerned with the soul, the
argument
s
suggested by
rhetoric'sdefendersthat rhetoricdoes
for
the health
of
the soul
what
medicine
does
for
the health
of
the
body.
But Socrates thinks
he
has shown
that
rhetoric
is not
concerned with
the Good
of
the
soul but
rather
with
pleasure.
It remains
important hroughout
hat none
of
Socrates' interlocutors
object
to the
analogy.
As
Plato
presents
hem,
they
seem
to
think that
medicine
is
a fine
example
of
the art of
caring
for
the
body.
The
point
of
contention
s,
as
we have
seen,
whether
rhetoric
is medicine's
counterpart
for
the
soul.
Indeed,
can
rhetoric occupy the place of medicine in the analogy? Socrates argues that
rhetoric
s no art
(techne)
at
all,
but
a
knack,
and
like
cooking
is to
medicine,
so
rhetoric
is to
that
techne
which is
truly
concerned
with
knowledge
of
the
soul.
Consequently,
Socrates
sets
up
the
following
set of relations:
Cooking
is the
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Review
knack and medicine
the
art
concerned with the
body,
just
as
rhetoric
s
the
knack
and some as
yet
unstated
X is
the techne of the
soul.
It
is
at
this
point
that
we must
addressthe
major questions
that arise
in
this
light
but
have as
yet
been
unanswered.
Perhaps
it
might
put
like this:
If
not
rhetoric,
hen what?
or
more
directly:
What is the art
of
the
human
soul?
Before
we
address these
critical and fundamental
questions,
we
must
first
remember
that
many
philosophers
read these concerns with rhetoricas
something
of a
ruse.
It
is
suggested
or
ratheroften asserted that
these
dramatic
moves
simply
exist to
allow Plato
to
get
at the
real
issues
of
arguing
against
hedonism
(contra
Callicles)
and
against tyranny
and
dictatorship
contra
Polus and as he does in
the
Republic).
However,
this misses
what
I
take
to
be
at
least
one of the
major
points
of
the focus
here,
and that is
the relation between rhetoric and the
soul.
Plato cannot
help
but
deal
with
questions
of
the soul when he
deals with
questions
of
rhetoric.
Furthermore,
f
this
is the
case,
then
he
must when
dealing
with
the
soul also
deal with the
Good,
the
true,
and the
just.
This,
of
course,
demands
reference to his
larger
philosophic
commitments. Thus
discussions of
rhetoric
ead
necessarily
and
ultimately
to discussions of
morality,
which
in
turn
are
grounded
n
Plato's
other
philosophical
claims. Plato
relies
on
philosophical
claims that he
develops
elsewhere in his
corpus
to build a case
against
rhetoric.
In
the
Gorgias
these
positions,
even
if
unstated,
are not
unutilized.
On
this
reading,
the issues of
justice,
tyranny,
and
hedonism
arise
because
of claims
on
behalf of
rhetoric
to
be
concerned
with
the
human
soul.
Rhetoric
and the claims
made
in its
name
are
not
ancillary
to the
dialogue,
but form a
part
of
its
center. As
McComiskey
argues
generally
and Enos
argues
specifically
with
reference
to
Callicles,
the
practices
that
Plato
may
have
just
named
in
this
dialogue
for the first
time are at that
historical
moment
making
great
and,
to
Plato's mind
detrimental,
"democratic"and
"pragmatic"
hanges
in
Athenian
culture. Rhetoricis no passing interestor ruse on Plato's part;no, he is indeed
frightened
of
rhetoric
and it
political
as well as ethical
consequences-so
much
so that he tries in this
dialogue
to
make rhetoric
disappear, eeling
perhaps
hat
if
he
could
put
it
out of
sight
he could
be at
peace.
How,
then,
does Plato
attempt
this
sleight-of-hand?
By
establishing,
to his own
satisfaction
at
least,
that
rhetoric
s not
an art
but rather
a
knack and
thus
concerned with
pleasure
as
an
end
in
itself;
therefore the
question
of
what
is
the techne
of the
good
of
the
humansoul still
stands.
What
is
the
proper
techne to deal with the human soul?
Again
we can
put
it
this way: Based on the analogy that Socrateshas utilized throughout,medicine
is
the techne of the
body
and
cooking
is
the
knack,
rhetoric
is the
knack
of
the
soul
and
something
X
is the
techne.
What Plato believes himself to have
proven
in the
Gorgias
is
that one and
only
one techne merits such
a name
vis-a-vis
the
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soul
and that
is,
of
course,
philosophy. Only philosophy
(here
we are forced
to
think
of
Book
VII
of the
Republic,
537a-41e)
can
fulfill
the
knowledge
requirements
o deal
with
the soul.
Plato makes
it
clear
in
this
dialogue
that
rhetoric s
redundantbecause he
shows that
it
seeks
to rename
philosophy.
Yet
the name
change
is
dangerous
because the
justice deserving
of
the
soul
that
is
determined or
Plato
by
philosophy
cannot
afford the influences
of
rhetoric,
an
influence that rhetoric
claims for itself. Rhetoric's influence
is
unjust
because,
Plato
argues,
it
appeals
only
to
"flattery"
and
thus
places
pleasure
and
success
before
truth
and
justice.
On Plato's
account,
there
already
exists a techne for
dealing
with
the
affairs
of
convincing
others
in the
polis.
Furthermore,
t
already
has a name.
Even
if
Plato
coined the word
rhetorike,
it
turns
out
to
be
only
for
the
purpose
of
showing
that
the
practices
this
word
names
have
no
place
in the life of
a
polis
seeking
to
be
moral and
just.
Rhetoric
(rhetorike)
may appear
in
this
dialogue
for
the first
time,
but
only
to
disappear
because
Plato shows that on
his account
it renames a
practice
that is
truly
concerned
with the soul.
According
to
the
arguments
Plato makes
in
the
Gorgias,
rhetoric
ought
to
disappear
because
it
is
redundant
with
respect
to
the
just
dealings
with the soul.
It
is
important
o
keep
in mind that the
charge
is not that rhetoricdoes not affect the soul: In fact, it
does on Plato's
account,
and this
is
indeed
why
it
is so
frightening
o
him. Were
it
not the
case that
rhetoric
has an effect
on
the
soul,
then it
could
be
safely
ignored
and left alone.
However,
the claim
is not that rhetoric
does
not
affect
the
soul;
ratherthe
problem
is that it does
not do this well.
Rhetoric does
have
an
effect
on
the
soul,
but
it is
base and
at odds
with
Plato's desire
that
such soul-
effects be noble.
Plato ends
Gorgias
with Socrates
recounting
a
myth
of
the afterlife-
recounting
what Socrates
has heard
happens
to the soul after the
demise
of the
body. Heremy frameof Plato-as-magicianwho seeks to makerhetoricdisappear
allows
us
to see the
myth
not
only
as the basis for
Plato's
arguments
about
the
moral
manner
of
living
in
the
becoming
of
this world
(not
unlike
arguments
at
the end
of
Republic).
Beyond
this we
can
see
the
myth
as
also
a
direct
assault on
rhetoric.The
myth
makes
much
of
the
soul's
nakedness,
that
is,
stripped
of
any
of its
worldly
embellishments.
On Plato's
account,
it
seems,
when all
distractions
provided
by
rhetoric
are removed
(honors,
clothes
that
symbolize
status,
etc.),
then one cannot
hide,
divert,
or
pull
any
slights-of-hand
o
protect
one's soul. The
myth
recounts
the
story
of what
happens
after
rhetoric has
disappearedfor (the) good. If Plato fears he has not made rhetoricdisappear
from
this
world,
then
he seems
to
hold out a
hope
that rhetoric
will
surely
disappear
n the other
world.
However,
it is
only
a
hope-because
his
hope
is
based on a
story
Plato cannot
confirm;
it
is
a
story
he has
only
heard.
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It is
clearly
the
case
that Plato
accepts
the
challenge
of
the
rhetoric,
what
Nietzsche
calls
the contest. No
doubt,
too,
this contest
is
not,
as Enos
points
out,
one in
which the
rhetors
speak
for
themselves
(Greek
Rhetoric
before
Aristotle).
That is
to
say,
Gorgias
is
Plato's artful
creation,
his
magic
show
in
which the
rhetors are
merely
props
or
characters/caricatures.
However much this fact
concerning
the
dialogue
calls certain
aspects
of
Plato's
text into
question-and
indeed it does raise
suspicions-Nietzsche's insight
seems to save other
aspects
of
the text when he
argues:
What,
for
example,
is
of
special
artistic
significance
in
Plato's
dialogues
is for the
most
part
the result of a
contest
with
the art
of
the
orators,
the
sophists,
and the dramatistsof his
time,
invented
for
the
purpose
of
enabling
him to
say
in
the
end:
"Look,
I
too
can do
what
my
great
rivals can
do;
indeed,
I can
do it better than
they.
No
Protagoras
has
invented
myths
as beautiful as
mine;
no
dramatist
such
a
vivid and
captivating
whole as
my Symposion;
no
orator
has
written orations like those in
my
Gorgias-and
now I
repudiate
all
this entirelyand condemnall imitate art.Only the contestmademe a
poet,
a
sophist,
and an
orator."What a
problem
opens
up
before us
when we
inquire
into
the
relationship
of the contest to
the
conception
of the work of
art
(37-38)
With
this
reading
of
Plato-as-magician
n
hand,
we are
now
ready
to move to
Phaedrus because
the
contest,
even
if not
the
magic,
continues there.
Why
Did Rhetoric
Not
Stay
Away?: Philosophy
and
Rhetoric
in Phaedrus
Plato
attempts
o make
rhetoric
disappear
n
the
Gorgias by
arguing
that it
is
an
unnecessary
and
unworthy synonym
for
philosophy.
While
perhaps
convincing
in
the artful context of that
dialogue,
Plato
is
not a
powerful
enough
magician
it would seem to
keep
rhetoric
rom
reappearing.
But
the
Phaedrus is of
interest because
of
other
qualities.
Indeed,
as
Schiappa
(Protagoras
and
Logos;
"Isocrates'
Philosophia") argues
with
respect
to
Gorgias
and
Howland
with
respect
to the
Phaedrus,
Plato has
a
specific target
in
mind
in
his attacks on
rhetoric.
Both
authors
suggest
that
this
target
is
Isocrates,
one
of the main
reasons
being
that this
teacher
and
contemporary
of
Plato was
using
the word
philosophy
to describe
his
teachings
and
practice.
As
Schiappaargues,
this use of
philosophy
will not do
for Plato.
As
a
consequence,
Schiappa
argues,
"[i]f
Plato
could
identify
the
'product'
of his
rival Isocrates'
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training
as
something
unnecessary
or
undesirable,
o much
the
better
for
Plato's
school"
(Protagoras
and
Logos
45).
My reading
is
also
supportedby
Howland's
essay
"The Attack on
Isocrates
in
Phaedrus."
Howland
argues
that we understand he
critique
n
the
Phaedrus,
such as it
is,
as
an
attacknot
only
on rhetoric
n
general
but
as
also on Isocrates
in
particular.
With
Howland-as
with
Schiappa
above-if
we
follow this
reading,
then
philosophy
is
at
stake in these
debates
about
rhetoric
and who and
what
practices
will
have the
proper
claim
to
the name
"philosophy"
s a central
and
driving
force
of
these
dialogues.
Plato seems
to
have failed
to make rhetoric
disappear
or
good
and
to have
won
for himself the
sole
right
to the name
"philosophy"
n
the
Gorgias.
I
shall
argue
that
he
attempts
o
capture
this
concept
in
the
myth
of the charioteer
n
the
Phaedrus and
again attempts
to
ease his fear of rhetoric
and
to
claim
possession
of
the name
"philosophy."
Interestingly,
here
in
the
Phaedrus,
Plato treats his
object
of
fear much
differently.
He does
not,
we
may
begin
by
saying,
attempt
any
more
magic
of
the sort
practiced
in the
Gorgias.
However,
he is
up
to
something.
Given
what
we have
just
seen
in
the
Gorgias,
we
may
well be
surprisedby
what
he is
up
to
in this work.We cannot
help
but wonder:What
happened
to Plato between the
Gorgias
and the Phaedrus?
While
we
may
never know
exactly
what
answer to
give
to that
question,
we feel
quite
certainafter
going through
he Phaedrus that
we could with
great
confidence
answer:
"something
profound."
t is
the
case,
no
doubt,
that Plato
speaks
of rhetoric in other
dialogues
that
may
well have been
written
in the time between the two
works in
question
here.
Nonetheless,
these
instances
do
not
exhibit
what we
would
call
an
epiphany-they
do not mark an
announcedand
conspicuous
change
of hearton Plato's account.
Phaedrus
begins
with Socrates
again confronting
rhetoric,and,
initially,
he
does not seem to be
any
more
pleased
with the
practices
thathave come to bear
that
name;
as we
know, however,
this
will
change
in the course
of
the
dialogue.
If,
as
we did with the
Gorgias,
we
see
this
dialogue
as
having
rhetoric
as a
part
of its
center,
then we
get
a
reading
of
Plato that
highlights
his
articulationof the
relation
between
philosophy
and
rhetoric.
Of course
this
dialogue
is about love and
the
soul,
or it is said
to
be at its
best
when it is about love and
the
soul;
but this does
not
prohibit
ts
being
about
rhetoric as well.
Furthermore,
t
may
be about love because it
is
about
rhetoric
suggesting
the same causal relation
to which I
appealed
n
my
Plato-as-magician
reading of the Gorgias. Love, of course, becomes the theme of the dialogue
between
Phaedrusand Socrates
dramatically
because it is the theme
of
Lysias's
speech
that the
young
Phaedrushas in his
possession
(with
which,
it has
always
been
my
suspicion,
he
is
on his
way
to use at the
gym).
The
question
why
love
is
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related to
the rhetorical
theme
of the
dialogue may
not
be
quite
so
easy
to
recognize.
Love
(eros)
is not
unrelated o
the
new view
Plato
has on
rhetoricthat
he
develops
in this
dialogue.
Love
is
concerned
with the
soul and
thus
is
now
linked to
rhetoric
in
ways
that seem
to
have
been
forbidden
n
the
Gorgias.
To
keep
from
getting
ahead of
ourselves,
let
us
move
to
very
near the end
of
the
dialogue.
From a certain
hermeneutic
position,
the whole of
the
Phaedrus can
be
read
as Plato's
dealing
with the ramifications
of
the
relation
between
philosophy
and
rhetoric. This
is in
stark contrast
o the
nonrelationand
ultimate
incompatibility
betweenthe two for which Plato
argued
in the
Gorgias.
Without a
doubt,
Plato
does
not have
any
more
respect
here
for
rhetoric
per
se
nor
does
his
fear subside
in toto.
The
dangers
of rhetoricwhen
practiced
as a knack
still
haunt
him.
Yet
in
this
work,
Plato leaves
open
the
positive
possibilities
of
rhetoric. Can it be
that,
after
all,
rhetoriccan be a teche^?
Yes
and,
of
course,
no.
A
new
relation,
Plato's
coming
to
terms
with
the
necessity
of
rhetoric,
manifests itself
in
the Phaedrus.
As we
know,
rhetoric
gets
a
better
hearing
in
this work.
The voice of rhetoric
his
time is
not
represented
by
others
(or
was
it
always
misrepresented
before?
Certainly
these
are
real
suspicions
(Enos,
Greek
Rhetoric
before
Aristotle),but
speaks
(almost) for itself. At 260d she
speaks,
in
a
sense
at
least.
Socrates
says
that
perhaps
she has
been treatedtoo
roughly
(we
cannot
help
but wonder
if this refers
not
only
to
the
passages immediately
preceding
this
one
but
in the whole
of
the
Gorgias
as
well)
and
imagines
that
she
might
indeed
say:
"Whatnonsense is
this,
my good
sirs? I
do not insist on
ignorance
of
truth as
an
essential
qualification
for
the
would-be
speaker;
for
what
my
advice
is worth
I
suggest
that
he
should
acquire
that
knowledge
before
embarking
on me.
I do
emphatically
assert, however,
that
without
my
assistance
the man who knows
the
truth
will
make no
progress
n the
art of
persuasion."
Here rhetoric makes the case that without her the truth would in fact be
mute. Plato-and I
sense he
is
reluctant-comes
to
see in
this work that
rhetoric
will
not
accept
being ignored
and that it
certainly
will
not
again disappear
(indeed
it
never
had).
Plato has to find a
way
to
deal
with the
ubiquity
and
constant
presence
of
rhetoric,
he
object
of
his
fear that
now
is
face
to
face with
his
metaphysical
positions,
brought
there
by
we
still
wonder what.
The
consequences
are
greater
than
I
have
made
them
seem
because
the mute truth
s
no
truth
at all for
Plato.
Plato
suggests
that
philosophy
is a
worthless techne without
rhetoric,
and
he
puts these words into the mouthof rhetoricherself and she is left to be the first
to
say
this-as
if
Plato is unable
to
bring
himself to
say
this
directly.
We
must
wonderwhatit even means to have
a
worthless techne
and if it is
even
possible
we
get
the
feeling
that a
worthless
techne is
equivalent
to
not
having
a techne^ t
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all.
Why
would Plato
make
such concessions
to his
enemy?
I am
submitting
hat
such
concessions are made so that
philosophy
can
say
something.
The
voice that
philosophy
lacks,
it
gets
from rhetoric.Plato is
forced
to
make
a
place
for-even
if
not
a
peace
with-rhetoric.
Moreover,
this
place
is
next
to
philosophy,
the
very
techne that once
was
purified
from
any
infection
by
rhetoric. Next to
rhetoric-is
this even
too
far
away?
Better
to
say
entwined
with
rhetoric,
not
one
without
the other.
Read
this
way,
Plato comes
to
hold what looks
to be a
precursor
o
contemporary osition
on the relation
of
rhetoricand
philosophy.
In Phaedrus Plato comes
to
recognize
this fact of the
interdependence
of
rhetoric
and
philosophy.
Unmistakably,
Plato will not
have
this relation
forget
its
obligations
to
philosophy.
The
change
marked in his
thinking
does not
change
the
fact that this is still his
major
concern.
That is
to
say,
if
philosophy
is
mute
without
rhetoric,
it
is
still the case
that,
and here akin
to the
arguments
from the
Gorgias,
rhetoric
without
philosophy
is
a
real
danger
to
justice.
For
Plato,
this
point
is
not
to be lost on the
young
Phaedrus.
If Plato is
going
to
make
concessions to
rhetoric,
he
is
not
willing,
therefore,
o
give up
everything.
Socrates
calls on the
phantom
arguments
associated
with
the voice
of rhetoric o
persuade
Phaedrus of the
necessity
of
this relation: "Come
forward,
noble
creatures,
and
persuade
Phaedrus,
who
begets
such
lovely
children,
that unless
he becomes
an
adequate
philosopher
he
will
never
be
an
adequate
speaker
either
on
any subject"
261a).
Socrates
ends an
argument
at 269b
saying
that
practitioners
of rhetoric are
"unable
o define the
natureof
rhetoric,
and have believed
in
consequence
that
they
have discovered the
art
itself,
when
all that
they
have
got
hold of is the
knowledge
which
is a
necessary
preliminary
o it.
They
think that
by imparting
this
knowledge they
have
perfectly
discharged
the task of a teacher
of
rhetoric,
and that
the use of each
of
these
devices so as to
produce
conviction
and
the
composition
of a consistent whole is a
simple
matter which their
pupils
must
work out for themselves
when
they
come to make
speeches."
The
charge
that
rhetoric
by
itself
is
only
half a techneseems
on first
sight
to be
only
anotherslur
against
rhetoric.
Undoubtedly hough,
the other side must also
hold,
namely
that
philosophy
as
a mute
enterprise
s
only
half a
techne
at best
without rhetoric.
Admitting
to
the
former
to damn rhetoric also casts its
aspersions
on a
philosophy
that has no
voice. Plato
recognizes
that
he
cannot do
withoutrhetoric
any
more thanrhetoric
can do without
philosophy.
To this
point
this
seems
to
be the case:
Plato
recognized
that his
metaphysicsand his concerns for justice mean little in the silence of a world
without
discourse,
regardless
of how
many dangers
rhetoric
might
raise
in its
wake.
The silence that
would be
self-imposed
by continuing
his assault on
rhetoric
would be the
certain failure of
metaphysics,
of
justice,
and the Good.
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Plato must
give
up
the
better
part
of
what
Derrida calls above
Plato's "rhetoric
against
rhetoric." t has come to this:
Plato realizes
that
he
must
risk
the
dangers
of
rhetoric
for
the sake
of
philosophy.
In the
Gorgias
there
was
one
technte-philosophy-that
cared
for the soul
and
a knack
that
was
unjust
in its
attempts
to
usurp
philosophy's
rightful
place-rhetoric.
I
contend
that
in
the
Phaedrus
there
is
again
one
techne,
but
now it
is
a
hybrid;
both
rhetoricand
philosophy together
are needed for
the care
of
the soul. So were we
wrong
to
characterize
Plato
as a
magician
who made
things disappear?
Does
it turn
out
that
Plato is more
akin
to
the
famous
magic
acts that saw
things
in
half and in the
finale
put
them
back
together
again?
It
seems this
image
might
better
capture
he relation of
philosophy
and
rhetoricas
it is
treated in the two
dialogues
and
that
the
grand
finale
of the
Phaedrus has
reunited he two
necessary
parts
that
make
up
the
hybrid
techne of
the soul.
Beyond
Magic: Why
the
Relation
of
Rhetoric
and
Philosophy
Demand
That
the
Noble and Base Horses
Remained
Forever
Hitched
At the
end of Book
VI
of
the
Republic,
Plato
has
Socrates
notice the
bedazzled interlocutorswho have
just
struggled
to understandthe intricate
details
of
the divided
line.
Book
VII
begins
with
Socrates
attempting
o
care
for
these looks
that
suggest
confusion
by telling
the
allegory
of
the cave
to
explicate
in
another
manner
the dense
argumentssurrounding
he Divided
Line.
Perhaps
this
rather
unconventional
reading
of the
Gorgias
and the
Phaedrus leaves some
in a
similar
condition
to
those
at
the close
of
Republic
Book
VI.
Against
the
backdrop
of
this
reading
that has
pushed
the relation of
philosophy
and rhetoric
constantly
to
the
fore,
I shall
argue
for a
strong,
but
I
hope
creative,
misreading
or
retelling
of
anotherof Plato's
famous
myths.
Rhetoric as
a
concern
of Plato's
has
always
been motivated
by
his moral concern for the soul and that these
discussions
could not but
help
deal
with
Plato's
metaphysical
positions
on the
soul. And
this,
of
course,
includes the
role
of
eros and its
relationto
the soul: "It
is
towards the soul
then
that
all the rhetorician's
energies
will be
directed"and
again
"The
function
of
speech
is
to
influence the
soul"
(Phaedrus
27 la
and
d).
We
have established hat the relation
between
philosophy
and
rhetoric
s the
concern of
Plato
in
the
Gorgias
and
the Phaedrus.
Further,
we have from
this
position argued
that
what
others
see as rhetoric's
passing
place
is
really
central
to
these
two
works. The
appearance
n
these
works of detailed
and
elaborate
discussions of moralityand justice are thus attributed o concernsfor rhetoric
and the
necessity
of
philosophy
having
a
voice.
Said
differently,
rhetoric
s
not
seen
as an
addendum
o these
discussions
of
morality
and
justice.
Plato's
fear of
rhetoric
s
inextricably
inked
to
his
metaphysical
concerns for
justice.
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A
Hybrid
Techne
of
the
Soul?
The
myth
of the
charioteer
ells
the
story
of the
hybrid
structure
f
the soul.
The
story
recounts the
image
of
a
charioteer
who
must
guide
two
horses whose
pull
is
in
very
different directions. The
two
horses
are
said to
represent
he
two
parts
of the
soul,
the noble
and
the
base.
The
charioteer
must
bring
these
two
steeds
into
line
such
that
they
together
draw
the chariot
straight.
In
the
confrontation
with
an
object
of
beauty,
the
two
struggle,
at
odds
with
one
another,
for
the
form
the
relation
to
the beautiful
object
will
take.
(Remember
that the
sight
of
beauty
taken in
by
the senses
is the first
clue
to
the
sight
of the
eye of the mindthatdraws the soul toward the Forms.) I have suggestedabove
that
any story
aboutthe
care
of
another's
soul
might
also be read as a
story
about
the relation between
philosophy
and
rhetoricbecause
to
invoke
the
techne
fitting
of
the
soul
(philosophy),
one
only
has recourse
to
touch the
soul
by
means
of
discursive
practice
(rhetoric).
Accordingly,
then,
let
me consider
what
this
story
tells us
if
we read
it
as
the
story
of
philosophy
and
rhetoricon Plato's
account. The noble horse and
the
base horse
are
bridled
together,
and
Plato never
suggests
that
the
attempt
be
made
to
separate
hem.
They
represent
or him the
given
conditions
n which
we
find ourselves, so it is with this team and with this constitutionthat we must
deal.
What
then
follows
for
the relation between these
two horses? Let me
state
the
obvious
as I see
it
on
this
misreading
account
of which horse has the
task
of
representing
which
of
the constitutive
parts
in the
relation
between
philosophy
and rhetoric.
The noble
horse,
it
will
surprise
no
one,
is
philosophy
and
the base
horse
rhetoric.
Nevertheless,
the absence of
our
surprise
is
not
the
simultaneous
absence for
a set
of
reasons
as to
why
these
distinctions
are
made.
Plato was
clear even
in
his
concessions to rhetoric
that it
cannot have
everything
or that
it
did not still harbordangers. The base horse representsrhetoric because it is
strong
enough
to run wild and
to
drag
the noble
horse
behind
it.
Without
philosophy
as the stride of the
noble
horse,
the base horse can have its
way
and
lead
the
charioteer nto
the
irrationalities
of
flattery
as
expounded
both in the
Gorgias
and
the
Phaedrus.
The
task Plato demands from the charioteer
s
that
she
bring
her
study
and
skill to the reins and
restrain
the
base
horse while
simultaneously
bringing
the
noble horse
into
its stride. It
is,
and
this is
corroborated
by
the rest of
the
arguments
in
the
Phaedrus,
only
when
both
philosophy
and
rhetoric are
in
synchronizationand in harmonycan one be said to be on the just path. We
cannot
simply
unhitch
the base horse
(rhetoric)
because
of
the
dangers
it
portends.
If
Plato
thought
this was
possible
in
the
Gorgias,
he has come
to
realize the
impossibility
of this
attempt
n the
Phaedrus.
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Rhetoric
Review
The
base horse
running
unrestrained
represents
the
worst
examples
of the
abuse
of discourse. Yet the noble
horse
cannot
run
alone at all. Each noble horse
needs its
grounding
in this
world.
The
noble
horse,
even
if
it is able
to
run alone
somewhere,
cannot do so
in this world. For this
world
it
needs
the
desire for the
other and
access
to
the
other
that
is made
possible
by
the
base horse
(rhetoric)
(see
White).
It needs the
strength
of
the
base horse's contact with the world
to
advance
the
chariot
to
the
other,
to
the
polis,
and to
the
chance
at
communication.
Plato
may
have wanted
an
all
noble
team of
horses,
but the
existential reality of the necessity of discourse forced him to keep the base horse
rhetoric hitched
to
the
enterprise
of
caring
for
the
soul.
For
our
contemporary
situation,
it
is Plato's
efforts
to teach the
importance
of
bringing
the two
steeds
into unison that
one
must
ultimately respect
even
if
one
rejects
the
specifics
of his
metaphysics
and the details of his
equestrian
advice.
We
gain
something
perhaps by
seeing
this
conflict near
its
beginnings.
In
What
Is
Called
Thinking, Heidegger
uncondemningly gives
Kant an
"F" for
his
reading
of
Plato,
suggesting
that
by betraying
the
history
of traditional
readings
from the
history
of
philosophy,
Kant
succeeds in
giving
us
something
new. Perhaps we need to make readings of Plato that merit failure so that we can
make
readings
of him
that
make a
pass
at
being
relevant to
twentieth-century
concerns.
In
this
respect
I
wish to read Plato two
ways:
on
the
one
hand,
with a
deep respect
for the letter of
the his texts
and
on the
other,
with
an
equal
respect
for the
spirit
that lives within them.
By misreading
perhaps
we can
put
these horses
in
a
different
pasture,
to
graze
a different terrain so
that
today
we
might
beckon
them still
with
the
line:
Come
forward,
noble
creatures,
and
persuade.
Note
'The
author has accrued
many
debts
in
the
writing
of
this
essay
and is
hopeful
that
acknowledgment
will
signal
a
recognition
of
them without
believing
such
recognition
could
by
itself
repay.
The
germ
of
this idea first
occurred
n
a
seminar
some
years ago
with Professor
Don
Burks
whose
patience
with the
thesis allowed
it to maturerather
han to
die
a
quick-even
if
brightly
lit-
death.
The work has been
encouraged
or
some time
by
Professor John
T.
Kirby,
whose insistence
that the details should be worked
out was
the
only
thing
that
kept
the
project going.
The author s
grateful
to
all those
students
who shared
the
classroom
and
with
keen
eyes
read Plato.
Lastly,
Rhetoric
Reivew
peer
reviewers
professors
Richard Enos
and
Edward
Schiappa gave
this
essay
readings
that
led
to
so
many
fine
suggestions-the
author's
understanding
f which
are reflected
on
nearly
every page-that
the
essay
now
seems
to have
been
impossible
withoutthem.
Works Cited
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of
Morality
and
Philosophy:
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and Phaedrus.
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1991.
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Jane
V. "The
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Technique
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Philosophy
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lan
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Alan. Bass.
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F.
D. Wieck and J. G.
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RhetoricReview
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