[a] Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit

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Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" Author(s): Kenneth R. Westphal Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 103 (2003), pp. 149-178Published by: on behalf of Wiley The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545390Accessed: 20-07-2015 12:57 UTC

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VIII*FHEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM IN THE

PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

by Kenneth R. Westphal

ABSTRACT For many reasons mainstream Hegel scholarship has disregarded Hegel's interests in epistemology, hence also his response to scepticism. From the points of view of defenders and critics alike, it seems that 'Hegel' and 'epistemology' have nothing to do with one another. Despite this widespread conviction, Hegel was a very sophisticated epistemologist whose views merit contemporary interest. This article highlights several key features and inno- vations of Hegel's epistemology-including his anti-Cartesianism, fallibilism, realism (sic) and externalism both about mental content and about justification-by considering his systematic responses to Pyrrhonian, Humean, Car- tesian and Kantian scepticism.

I ntroduction. For many reasons mainstream Hegel scholarship has disregarded Hegel's interests in epistemology, hence also

his response to scepticism. From the points of view of defenders and critics alike, it seems that 'Hegel' and 'epistemology' have nothing to do with one another. This impression results from the lack of interest of nearly all Hegel scholars in epistemology, on the one hand, and the lack of interest of epistemologists in Hegel's philosophy, on the other.1 This grave mis-impression accurately reflects one point: Hegel's epistemology differs fundamentally from standard views in epistemology, whether empiricist, ration- alist, Kantian or analytic (a very broad grouping, to be sure). However, the distinctness of Hegel's epistemology may result from his having already recognized key insights-along with key defects-in these kinds of epistemology.

This claim may seem most implausible in the case of analytic epistemology. However, analytic epistemology has followed,

1. A few recent books have addressed Hegel's epistemology. However, they have generally not been very successful because their authors lack adequate background in epistemology. See Westphal (1999). * Meeting of the Aristotelian Society, held in Senate House, University of London, on Monday, 10th February, 2003 at 4.15 p.m.


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150 KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

more seriously than is often recognized, Russell's 1922 exhor- tation, 'I would take "Back to the 18th Century!" as my battle cry, if I had any hopes that others would rally to it.'2 Russell's return to Hume's first Enquiry rooted analytic epistemology deeply in the Cartesian tradition that Kant, Hegel and Hume (in the Treatise) identified as the key source of irresolvable epistemological difficulties. In 1966 Strawson declared that two of Kant's key insights are 'so great and so novel that, nearly two hundred years after they were made, they have still not been fully absorbed into the philosophical consciousness'-a judgment he still regards as true.3 Failure to appreciate Kant's achievements exacerbates the difficulties in grasping Hegel's epistemology.

Though one essay cannot treat the entirety of Hegel's epistemology, I hope to convey some of its most important features and insights by summarizing the main points of Hegel's critical responses to scepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit.4 These points fall under four headings: Pyrrhonian (Section I), empiricist (Section II), Cartesian (Section III) and Kantian (Section IV) scepticism.

Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Pyrrhonian scepticism is not a doctrine, but rather a collection of sceptical argument-strategies, 'tropes', which supposedly result in suspension of judgment (Epoche), thus leading to tranquillity (Ataraxia). The Pyrrhonist rescinds both affirmation and denial. This frees him from pointless, unhealthy controversy over hopelessly inconclusive claims about alleged knowledge of reality, whatever that may be.

In his early essay on scepticism (1801) Hegel gladly appealed to Pyrrhonian tropes in order to undermine the pretensions of the 'finite understanding' to metaphysical knowledge.5 He held

2. Russell (1994), 9:39. One of his most devoted followers in this regard is Quine (1969, 72, cf. 74, 76), who maintains 'on the doctrinal side [sc. epistemological justification], I do not see that we are farther along today than where Hume left us. The Humean predicament is the human predicament.' 3. Strawson (1996), 29. In personal correspondence (May 1999) he affirmed that his statement remains true. 4. A synopsis of Hegel's epistemology appears in Westphal (2003a). 5. Forster (1989), Part I.


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HEGEL'S MANIFOLD RESPONSE TO SCEPTICISM 151

that 'infinite reason' avoids scepticism through 'intellectual intuition' of the absolute. The utter poverty of this response to Pyrrhonism was brought home to Hegel through an anonymous article by G. E. Schulze titled 'Aphorisms on the Absolute' (1803).6 By summer 1804 Schulze's essay had made clear to Hegel that his 'absolute idealism' also must scrupulously avoid question-begging (petitio principii).7 Thereafter Hegel treated Pyrrhonian scepticism not merely as a useful source of arguments against inadequate accounts of knowledge (e.g., naive realism8), but also as a profound philosophical opponent. Indeed, Hegel took the threat of Pyrrhonian scepticism more seriously, and developed a far more incisive response to it, than any other epistemologist.9 Unfortunately, this advance of Hegel's epistemology has proven to be a liability in the recognition of his achievement: neither proponents nor critics have recognized Heg- el's engagement with Pyrrhonian scepticism, much less understood it.

The whole series of 17 Pyrrhonian tropes need not be considered here, nor Sextus Empiricus's decisive criticism of representational theories of perception. (Hegel rejected such theories.) We should begin with the classic Five Modes (tropes) of Agrippa, for they are the classic statement of the sceptical regress argument.10

1.1. The regress argument consists in demanding, for any claim offered by anyone, a ground of proof for that claim, and likewise again a ground of proof for whatever ground of proof is offered. This regress supposedly leads to any of five untenable possibil- ities: a falsehood that grounds nothing, a dogmatic assertion that begs the question, an infinite regress that grounds nothing, a circularity that grounds nothing, or a supposedly self-justifying claim.11 Pyrrhonists then offer a series of further objections

6. Schulze (1803), brilliantly explicated by Meist (1993). 7. Westphal (2000b), ?5. 8. Dusing (1973), Graeser (1985). 9. Westphal (1989), (1997a). 10. For discussion of this 'Agrippa problem' in connection with contemporary epistemology, see Fogelin (1994). 1 1. Alston (1988), 26-27.



against 'self-justification' or 'self-evidence'. These further objections needn't detain us here; we need only focus on the problem of circularity, because Hegel rejected the essentially deductivist model of empirical justification which drives the regress argument and which has dominated mainstream epistemology from Descartes to Hume, and from Russell to William Alston (including, e.g., non-foundationalists such as Dretske).'2 Even more than Kant, Hegel was anti-Cartesian. Hegel understood as well as Kant that human empirical knowledge is not built on allegedly basic bits of sensory knowledge, nor can empirical knowledge be derived from such bits of knowledge. Like Kant, Hegel rejected the foundationalist model of empirical knowledge. Neither was Hegel a coherentist in any standard sense of the term; he recognized that both models are inadequate. 1.2. Sextus Empiricus averred that for any positive thesis an equ- ally compelling antithesis can be offered (equipollence), so that we suspend judgment and achieve Epoche'.3 Hegel criticized (among others) Sextus Empiricus for being satisfied with mere refutation, with merely 'abstract negation', i.e. finding sufficient fault with a theory to reject it as inadequate, but stopping at that.'4 In opposition to this Hegel maintains that a truly pene- trating refutation consists in a strictly internal critique that identifies both the insights and the defects of a philosophical theory, and through that critique derives grounds of proof for a more adequate theory. This Hegel calls 'determinate negation'. 5

At this general, programmatic level one cannot determine whether Sextus could respond to such an Hegelian 'determinate negation' by offering mutually opposed 'determinate negations' of two competing theories. Determining who is correct (or at least closer to the truth) about this issue instead requires examin- ing carefully actual internal criticism of various theories of knowledge. Elsewhere I have argued in detail that Hegel's internal criticisms of the epistemologies of naive realism,

12. For discussion of Dretske, see Westphal (2003a), Ch. 9. 13. Pyrrhonian scepticism is summarized in Westphal (1989), 11-16. 14. PhdG, GW 9:57.7-14. Hegel's remark also applies, e.g., to Popper's falsificationism. 15. PhdG, GW9:57.1-12; cf. Westphal (1989), 125-26, 135-36, 163. The term is mis- used by Brandom (1999), 174.



Descartes, Hume, Kant, Carnap, Russell, Alston, Dretske, Put- nam's 'internal realism', and Frederick Schmitt's 'social epistemology' provide their 'determinate negations' and hence provide considerable grounds of proof for Hegel's own epistemology.16 With all due respect to Wilfrid Sellars, no other epistemologist has so acutely probed and exploited the views of his opponents. Pace wide-spread prejudice to the contrary, Hegel was an acute epistemologist. (Pardon my use of the term, but prejudice it is because it is based on ill-considered reputation rather than knowledge of Hegel's views or texts.) 1.3. In Hegel's view, two important Pyrrhonian tropes, circularity and the Dilemma of the Criterion, share a common solution. Justificatory circularity is a problem, not because a series of grounds of proof mutually support each other, but because such a series appears to offer no independent proof to convince any dissenter. And so it seems when the circle consists solely in affirmations. However, a circle of grounds of proof appears quite differently if following it out (or around) consists instead in per- sistent critical reconsideration of each ground of proof. If this is the procedure, there is at least the possibility that any particular ground of proof or justificatory link within the circle may be affirmed, denied, revised or replaced. In these ways, the circle of grounds of proof can be improved, not merely reiterated. How can such critical reconsideration occur? Such reconsideration of the chain of grounds of proof must be critical, but to avoid begging the question and to identify one's own errors the reconsideration must be self-critical as well. A few epistemologists have noted in passing the importance of self-criticism.'7 Hegel, alone among epistemologists, developed an exacting analysis of the possibility of productive self-criticism."8 If constructive self-criticism is possible, we are not locked into the forced options epito- mized in the Five Modes of Agrippa.

How is a self-critical reconsideration of one's own views, or likewise the strictly internal criticism of others' views, possible? As mentioned above, this question was posed to Hegel sharply by G. E. Schulze, who drew Hegel's attention back to Sextus 16. Westphal (1989), (1998a), (2000a), (2002b), (2003a), Ch. 9, 10, (2003c). 17. E.g., Price (1932, 192), Sellars (1963, 170). 18. Westphal (1989, 1997a).



Empiricus's Dilemma of the Criterion. Sextus formulated the Dilemma thus:

In order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who make knowledge claims] to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. And further- more, since demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into circular reasoning.19

In his early essay on scepticism Hegel merely noted this dilemma in passing.20 By 1804, thanks to Schulze's intervention, Hegel saw how crucial this sceptical challenge to philosophy is. Accord- ingly, Hegel paraphrased the Dilemma right in the middle of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. Initially, Hegel notes the general problem of avoiding question-begging when presenting and defending any unfamiliar philosophical-'wissen- schaftlich' or 'scientific'-theory. (Surely Hegel's epistemology- part of his philosophical 'science'-is one example of an unfamiliar epistemology!) Merely stating or asserting one's view cannot justify it, for any position is of course stated by its advocates, whilst 'one bare assurance counts as much as another'.2' Hegel's pointed observation about 'bare' assurances again follows Sex- tus's own dictum,22 and poses the general problem of question- begging. Two pages later Hegel formulates the Dilemma of the Criterion directly, though he speaks of a 'standard' (MaJ3stab)

19. Sextus Empiricus, PH Bk. 2, Ch. 4 ?20; cf. bk. 1, Ch. 14 ??l 16-17, AL I ??316, 317. Remarkably, Fogelin (1994) focuses on the Five Modes of Agrippa and all but ignores the Dilemma of the Criterion, which is only mentioned in passing (ibid., 6). 20. Hegel (1802a), GW 4:212.8-10. Forster (1989) follows exclusively Hegel's early essay on scepticism. Forster (1998, 131) cites the passage in which Hegel refers expressly, if en passant, to the Dilemma of the Criterion. In neither book does Forster recognize Hegel's restatement of the Dilemma in the Introduction to the Phenomen- ology, nor Hegel's profound response to it. Consequently, Forster misrepresents Hegel's mature response to Pyrrhonian scepticism. See Westphal (1999, 2000c). 21. PhdG Introduction ?4, GW 9:55.18-24, my translation. 22. AD I ?315; cf AD II ?464.



rather than a 'criterion .23 The apparent implication of these problems is that Hegel's 'philosophical science', including his epistemology, cannot be based on any mere assurance, but also not on any proof, because the soundness of a proof can only be determined by criteria of soundness, and such criteria are just as controversial as the assurances or even the proofs that are offered on behalf of a philosophical theory. How can question-begging be avoided, how can genuine standards of justification be established, whenever philosophical debate concerns fundamentally different philosophical views?24

Hegel's response to this challenge grounds both his analysis of 'determinate negation' and his solutions to the problem of circularity and the Dilemma of the Criterion in an acute and subtle analysis of the possibility of constructive self-criticism. The basic points are the following.

A careful textual analysis reveals that Hegel analyses our consciousness of an object into six main aspects.25 Hegel distinguishes the object itself from our concept of the object itself. Likewise, he distinguishes between ourselves as actual cognitive subjects in our actual cognitive engagements from our self-concept as engaged cognitive subjects. More importantly, Hegel analyses our experience of an object, and likewise our experience of ourselves as cognitive subjects, as resulting from our use of these concepts in attempting to know their 'objects'. This is to say, our experience of the object results from our use of our concept of the object in attempting to know the object itself. Like- wise, our self-experience as knowers results from our use of our cognitive self-concept in attempting to know ourselves in our cognitive engagements.

23. PhdG Introduction, ?9; GW9:58.12-22. 24. Note that Chisholm thought there was no non-question-begging response to what he called the problem of the criterion, that sceptics, methodists, and particularists (himself included) can and must beg the question against each other. See Westphal (1989), 217; (1997a), ?0. 25. Westphal (1989), Ch. 7, 8; (1997a).



Consider this table of the aspects Hegel distinguishes: A. Our concept of the object. 1. Our cognitive self-concept. B. Our experience of the object. 2. Our cognitive self-experience. C. The object itself. 3. Our cognitive constitution

and engagement themselves.

In this way, our experience of the object (B) is structured both through our concept of the object (A) and through the object itself (C). Likewise our experience of ourselves as knowers (2) is structured both through our cognitive self-concept (1) and our actual cognitive constitution and engagement (3). Hegel's analysis implies directly that, on the one hand, we have no concept- free empirical knowledge, and likewise no concept-free self- knowledge. On the other hand, neither are we trapped within our conceptual scheme! Put positively, our experience of the object (B) can only correspond with the object itself (C) if our concept of the object (A) also corresponds with the object itself (C). Like- wise, our cognitive self-experience (2) corresponds with our actual cognitive constitution and engagement (3) only if our cognitive self-concept (1) also corresponds with them (3). Put nega- tively and critically, insofar as our concept of the object (A) or likewise our cognitive self-concept (1) fail to correspond with their 'objects' (C, 3), we can detect and correct this lack of correspondence, though only through sustained and pointed attempts to comprehend our 'objects' (C, 3) through use of our concepts (A, 1) in our experience of those objects (B, 2). Such attempts can inform us whether and how our concepts (A, 1) can and must be revised in order to improve their correspondence with their 'objects' (C, 3).

Moreover, our concept of the object (A) and our cognitive self-concept (1) must mutually correspond, in the sense that we conceive of the object (A) in ways that can be known in accord with our cognitive self-concept (1), and our cognitive self-concept (1) is of a cognitive subject who can know such objects as we conceive them (A). These concepts must not merely be consistent, but must support each other. Likewise our experience of the object (B) and our cognitive self-experience (2) must support each other. Finally, our concept of the object (A) must be such that it renders our cognitive self-experience (2) intelligible, and our



cognitive self-concept (1) must render our experience of the object (B) intelligible. In sum, the four aspects (A, B, 1, 2) must mutually correspond and mutually support each other in the sense that they ground or justify each other. However, those aspects can only do this insofar as our concepts (A) and (1) correspond to their objects (C) and (3). At the broad level of the critical examination of key concepts of human empirical knowledge, where different concepts (or models) of the objects of empirical knowledge require different concepts (or models) of empirical knowledge, this complex of correspondences is a sufficient criterion of the truth, and hence also the justification, of an epistemology.

Two important points must be noted directly. First, Hegel's criterion of epistemic justification directly entails a fallibilist account of philosophical justification. On Hegel's view, a philosophical epistemology can only be justified through pointed, not only prior but also on-going and future attempts to use its main concepts in connection with their 'objects' to account for human empirical knowledge. Hegel's fallibilism also results from the circumstance, central to his account of 'determinate negation', that an epistemology can only be justified through thorough, strictly internal critique of alternative theories of knowledge. However, alternative theories of knowledge form no closed series. Since 1807 a wide range of new theories of knowledge have been developed, along with new variants of older theories of knowledge. All of these must be carefully considered in order to reassess, and so far as possible preserve, improve, or if need be diminish the justification of an epistemology, whether Hegel's or any other. (Plainly, Hegel's epistemology and its attendant meta-epistemology requires of us lots of intensive homework. No doubt this is one reason philosophers have sought simpler, more straightfor- ward theories of knowledge.)

The second important point is that Hegel's epistemological criterion directly entails the rejection of semantic internalism. Heg- el's criterion directly implies that our experience of worldly objects and events is not restricted to the explicable content of our concepts of those objects. Instead, Hegel is clearly committed to the thesis that the semantic content of our concepts is only partly a function of whatever semantic content can be explicated in terms of descriptions of the objects those concepts purportedly refer to. On Hegel's view, the content of our concepts is also in



part a function of the objects in connection with which they are used, and in two ways: the content of a concept is partly specified by its paradigm instances (Putnam), and also by the particular object regarding which it is used on any particular occasion (Evans). This is to say, already in 1807 Hegel rejected the key thesis of descriptions-theories of semantic meaning and reference. In this way, Hegel avoids in advance both Kuhn's main arguments for paradigm incommensurability and Putnam's main arguments for 'internal realism'.26 Hegel's semantic externalism is supported by his transcendental argument for what we would now call 'mental content externalism' (see below, Sections III, IV).

In a word, Hegel was the original pragmatic realist.27 The key idea of pragmatism is put succinctly by Sellars:

Above all, the [foundationalist] picture is misleading because of its static character. One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the [coherentist] picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.28

The so-called 'Hegelian serpent' was invented by Hegel's expositors and critics, not Hegel. An exacting analysis of Hegel's epistemology reveals no such thing.29 In effect, we begin with our epistemological predilections, whatever they may be, and determine the extent to which they can be developed into an adequate epistemology that can withstand critical scrutiny-including critical self-scrutiny. If we are thorough and scrupulous about this, and if Hegel's accounts of constructive self-criticism and 'determinate negation' are sound, we can develop considered convergence by the fact that we epistemologists, all of us, share the human cognitive constitution and engage through it with a

26. For Hegel's response to Kuhn, see Westphal (1989), 146-47; to Putnam, see Westphal (2003c). 27. On Hegel's realism see Wartenberg (1993), Westphal (1989), 140-8. 28. Sellars (1963), 170. 29. See Westphal (1989), 56-7.



common world-whatever each of these ultimately proves to be. (Regarding our common world, see below Sections III, IV.) 1.4. Characteristic of Pyrrhonian scepticism is its thorough indifference regarding any thesis or claim, whether negative or positive. Characteristic of Sextus Empiricus's writings is his thorough indifference towards other philosophical views. However, Hegel identified one key substantive assumption made by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Pyrrhonian scepticism reduced all human experience to the experience of mere appearances by appeal to the classical Greek 'ontological' concept of truth, according to which something is true only if it is utterly stable and unchanging. If truth requires this, then any human experience counts as something untrue, as mere appearance, simply because it is transitory and variable. Precisely this absurd search for invariant existence (a.k.a. 'truth') in the context of the variability of human experiences is one key point in Hegel's internal critique of Pyrrhonian scepticism.30

The assumption that the truth must be stable and unchanging leads directly to the constant yet always unsatisfied Pyrrhonist search for truth.31 To the contrary, Hegel maintained that we must and can only grasp truth within our variable and various experiences of the world. This view can only be developed and justified through Hegel's entire epistemology. However, one step in this direction Hegel takes is already clear: he holds a semantic, correspondence analysis of the nature (not the criteria) of 'truth'.

II Empiricist Scepticism. The history of empiricism frequently repeats a striking phenomenon: one begins with the plausible assumption that knowledge of the world must be sensory knowledge, though ultimately one winds up espousing either subjective

30. PhdG, GW 9: 120-1/?205; Westphal (2000c). 31. PH I ??226, 236. The other factor supporting this (alleged) constant search after truth is to avoid the incoherence of denying that knowledge is possible. If we were demonstrably incapable of knowledge, the search for truth would be easy to rescind. However, if we were demonstrably incompetent in this way, we would know something after all. Pyrrhonists distinguished themselves from Academic Sceptics, who did argue (paradoxically) that we are cognitively incompetent, over precisely this issue.



idealism or empirical scepticism. The grounds of this phenomenon are complex, and cannot be discussed here. It suffices to recall this general tendency in order to frame Hegel's critical rejection of empiricism. Empiricism was well represented in Ger- many around the turn of the Nineteenth Century, most promi- nently by G. E. Schulze.32 Schulze responded to Kant's Critical philosophy by re-deploying Hume's criticisms of induction and of our very concept of causality, though he didn't recognize the problems besetting empiricism that Hume himself recognised (see below, Section 2.2). In order to assess empiricism critically, Hegel had to consider the paradigmatic empiricist, Hume, and that he did.34 2.1. Characteristic of strong empiricist foundationalism is the thesis that we enjoy concept-free knowledge of sensed particulars. Although this doctrine was not espoused by most of the Scottish school-though Hume's official 'copy theory' of ideas and impressions commits him to it-this thesis was common- place among German empiricists, e.g. Hamann, Jacobi, G. E. Schulze and W. T. Krug.35 Later, of course, it was espoused by Russell. Such concept-free basic knowledge is supposed to justify any and all derived knowledge. Such knowledge is also supposed to enable us to avoid both the Dilemma of the Criterion as well as Hegel's highly sophisticated response to it: if we enjoyed concept-free sensory knowledge of particulars, we could just look to see what are the relevant facts and thereby settle any disputes about claims to empirical knowledge. This strategy preserves the basic model of epistemological foundationalism (the distinction between basic and derived knowledge), which attempts to respond directly to the sceptical (classically, Pyrrhonist) regress argument.

Against this strong empiricist foundationalism, Hegel argued that foundationalism cannot answer scepticism because there is no such concept-free basic knowledge, and because the foundationalist model of our empirical knowledge is seriously misleading. It is misleading because it views the justification of 32. Kuehn (1987), Beiser (1987), 165-92, 266-84. 33. Regarding Schulze, see Westphal (1998a), 27-30; (2000a). 34. Westphal (1998a). 35. Westphal (2000a), note 18.



derived knowledge in essentially deductivist terms (otherwise it would lack persuasive force against sceptics), and because it views the justification of any basic bit of knowledge in terms of its independence of any other bits of basic knowledge (otherwise problems of circularity set in). Moreover, Hegel aims to show that the original realist orientation of empiricism can be justified, not by empiricism, but only by Hegel's own, pragmatically reconstructed rationalism (see Sections III-V).

Hegel defends this thesis in part in the first three chapters of the Phenomenology, the so-called 'Consciousness' section, containing the chapters 'Sense-Certainty', 'Perception', and 'Force and Understanding'. In all three chapters Hegel argues (like Kant) that human empirical knowledge of any one worldly circumstance (an object or event) can only be achieved contrastively, by distinguishing it from other possible and actual circumstances. Any one empirical state of affairs can be identified only by differentiating (discriminating) its spatio-temporal region from other spatio-temporal regions, and only by differentiating both its intrinsic and its relational characteristics from the characteristics of other actual and possible empirical circumstances. Moreover, these two forms of identification are mutually interdependent.36 If this is the case, then we can have no allegedly basic knowledge of any one empirical fact independent of our knowledge of other empirical facts. Hence the justification of human empirical knowledge is weakly holistic: our justificatory grounds for any one empirical claim are interdependent with our justificatory grounds for other empirical claims. This feature of empirical justification is weakly holistic due to Hegel's account of constructive self-criticism.

Hegel's criticism of allegedly concept-free bits of basic knowledge relates directly to his critique of concept-empiricism, the thesis that any legitimate concept either names a simple object of sensory experience, or is a logical term, or can be exhaustively defined by these two kinds of terms.37 According to this thesis,

36. Hegel's analysis concurs strikingly with some of Evans (1975), esp. pp. 351-52. I argue that Hegel's critique of 'immediate knowledge' holds of Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance' in Westphal (2002b). 37. This 'simple object' need not be understood in phenomenalist terms, though typi- cally it has been so understood in the Twentieth Century, following Hume's use of it in connection with sensory impressions.



as Locke and especially Hume showed, the supposed concepts 'I' and 'thing' cannot be defined at all, and so are not legitimate, and the concept of 'cause' can only be defined statistically or psychologically. Hence concept-empiricism is an crucial basis of empiricist scepticism.38

Concept-empiricism is also important because it distinguishes between a priori and a posteriori (or empirical) concepts. Any concept that can be defined in accord with concept-empiricism is empirical or a posteriori. Any concept that cannot be defined in this way is a priori. As the history of Logical Empiricism and the fate of attempts to replace talk of ordinary objects or events with constructions of sense data both showed, by this criterion most of our concepts, including scientific concepts, are a priori. Gener- ally unrecognised through these criticisms of Concept-empiricism is that there are certain a priori concepts that are also 'pure', in the sense that we must have and use these pure a priori concepts in order to have any self-conscious experience whatsoever, and so to have any occasion on which to learn, develop or to use the many rich concepts, whether ordinary or scientific, we use in making any even moderately interesting claims. This Kantian thesis about 'pure' a priori concepts has been widely rejected in Twentieth Century philosophy, though without sufficient consideration.39 Now that Kant's grounds for maintaining the completeness of his Table of Judgments have been made out,40 this issue must be carefully reconsidered. The crucial questions about pure a priori concepts are two: whether indeed we have any, and whether we can use them in genuine claims to knowledge. Only if this latter condition is satisfied are pure a priori concepts legitimate. Traditional rationalists overlooked this key question. Kant first posed it, and Hegel followed suit.

Hegel argues against concept-empiricism in 'Sense Certainty' that any empirical circumstance can be known, because it can be

38. Note that Concept Empiricism is a semantic thesis about the meaning or content of concepts. It is distinct from Verification Empiricism (Hume's Fork) which distinguishes two ways of justifying knowledge of two kinds of propositions, namely a priori knowledge of analytic propositions or a posteriori knowledge of synthetic propositions. 39. This way of distinguishing empirical and a priori concepts is too simple. Some of the necessary refinements are discussed in Westphal (2003a), ??21, 22. Also see Section 2.2 regarding the a priori status of the concept 'cause'. 40. See Wolff (1995, 1998, 2000).



identified, only by our using pure a priori concepts of 'I', 'other', 'time', 'times', 'space', 'spaces', and 'individuation'. In 'Percep- tion' Hegel shows that the very concept of 'perceptible thing' is pure a priori. In 'Force and Understanding' Hegel argues that our concept of 'perceptible thing' is only intelligible through the concept of 'cause', which also is pure a priori. Elsewhere I have argued in detail that Hegel's analyses in 'Sense Certainty' and 'Perception' are sound.41 The arguments Hegel provides show both that these basic concepts are pure a priori, and that our cognitive use of them is legitimate, because without them we could not even putatively identify or make claims about singular objects or events. Because the idea that we have pure a priori concepts has become so unfamiliar, it deserves brief discussion. 2.2. Hume's analyses of the concepts 'cause' and 'perceptible thing' ('the idea of body', Hume called it) deserve close reconsideration. Kant already saw that Hume's analysis of the concept of 'cause' undermined Hume's own account of our causal beliefs. According to empiricist principles of generalization through repeated experiences, only through many repeated experiences of particular (allegedly) causal relations among particular kinds of things; e.g. 'Today the sun warmed this stone,' 'Today the sun warmed that stone,' 'Yesterday the sun warmed some other stone,' etc., can we formulate and affirm the particular causal belief, 'Sunshine warms stones.' However, this is only the first step. Only by comparing many, many such particular causal beliefs can we formulate and affirm the particular causal principle, 'Each kind of event has some one kind of cause.' And only after comparing many more instances of this principle can we take the third step to form the general concept of causality, expressed in the statement, 'Every event has a cause.'

Kant noted (KdrV B240-41) that this Humean analysis is unsound because so often we experience only a supposed cause, though not its supposed effect; or likewise we experience only a supposed effect without experiencing its supposed cause. Conse- quently, we could hardly formulate, much less affirm, any beliefs in particular causal relations. Hence we could hardly formulate the particular causal principle, 'Each kind of event has some one

41. Westphal (1998), (2000a). I discuss some key points from 'Force and Understand- ing' in Westphal (1989), 159-160, (1997e).



kind of cause.' And if we could hardly formulate that principle, we could not at all formulate or affirm the general proposition, 'Every event has a cause.' That we do formulate and affirm this principle, along with various particular causal beliefs, shows instead that we presuppose the general concept of causality, on the basis of which alone we can sort out our quite mixed evidence regarding any particular causal relations.42 (This is why the principles Kant defends are not and cannot be high-level generaliza- tions from experience, pace the criticisms of Kant by Schlick and Reichenbach, still widely accepted among analytic epistemologists as conclusive.)

Unlike his followers, whether in Germany circa 1800 or in the Twentieth Century, Hume noted precisely this problem, though only in passing in the difficult and unjustly neglected section of the Treatise (1.4 ?2), 'Of Scepticism with regard to the senses'. The main aim of this section is to explain our 'idea of body', i.e., our concept of a perceptible physical object. The problem results from the fact that this concept is necessary for our very belief in 'outer' objects, though it cannot be defined in accord with concept empiricism. Any impression of sense instantiates the concept of unity; any group of sensory impressions instantiates the concept of plurality. However, the concept of the 'identity' of a perceptible object is distinct from both of those concepts, and cannot be defined on their basis, all the more so when we consider the changes we perceive in things. Hume observed:

'Tis confest by the most judicious philosophers, that our ideas of bodies are nothing but collections form'd by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities, of which objects are com- pos'd, and which we find to have a constant union with each other. But however these qualities may in themselves be entirely distinct, 'tis certain we commonly regard the compound, which they form, as One thing, and as continuing the Same under very considerable alterations. The acknowledg'd composition is evidently contrary to this suppos'd simplicity, and the variation to the identity.43

To resolve these 'contradictions', Hume introduced psychological propensities by which we produce a 'medium' between 'unity' and 'plurality', namely the concept of 'identity'.44 42. See Beck (1978), esp. 121-25. 43. Treatise, L.iv.3:219; bold added. 44. Treatise I.iv.2:201.



Hume's analysis is unsound. At most, Hume explicated the occasioning causes of our use of the concept of identity. He failed to define the content of this concept solely on the basis of concept-empiricism. (Could he have done so, he could have omitted psychological propensities.) In effect, his psychological propensities are propensities to use a priori concepts, in particular, the concept of a perceptible thing, i.e., its identity amidst its many perceived qualities and amidst is many perceived changes of qualities.45

In 'Perception' Hegel identified and critically analysed precisely this problem in Hume's empiricist scepticism. Through his strictly internal critique of Hume's analysis of our concept 'perceptible thing' Hegel established that this concept is pure a priori. To this extent, concept-empiricism provides no sound sceptical objection to our belief in, or to our knowledge of, perceptible spatio-temporal objects.46 2.3. In the 'Consciousness' section, Hegel justifies our use of the pure a priori concepts mentioned above (Section 2.1, end) by showing that without using those concepts we could have none of the alleged basic knowledge touted by (inter alia) empiricists. Without these concepts we could not even believe in 'body', that is, in perceptible things in space and time. Without them, neither could we have any awareness or knowledge of singular objects or events, whether commonsense or scientific. Hegel reinforces these results through his criticisms of Cartesian and Kantian scepticism (Sections III, IV).

45. Quine (1953, 66, 73-74; 1960, 116; 1969, 71; 1995, 5) recurs to this section of Hume's Treatise, sketching the error Hume ascribes to us in believing that there are physical objects. This appears to be Quine's (1953, 44) main reason for referring to the 'myth' of physical objects. One key problem with Quine's account is that he fails to recognize that if Hume's official empiricism is true, we would lack the very concepts required to make this mistake. Quine (1969, 75; cf. 1974, 1) remains persuaded that one 'cardinal tenet of empiricism remain[s] unassailable ... to this day ... all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence'. By 'ultimately' Quine surely means 'solely', even though sound arguments for our having some non-logical, pure a priori concepts, by use of which alone we can learn or acquire any empirical concepts, were developed at the turn of the Nineteenth century by Kant and Hegel. Indeed, Hume himself demonstrated that his official copy theory of impressions and ideas could not at all account for the generality of thought. (This last point I analyse in some forthcoming work.) 46. Westphal (1998a); summarized in Westphal (1998c).



2.4. Before turning to these criticisms, some key points of Heg- el's critical response to Hume's problem of induction should be mentioned. Hegel criticises several key assumptions of Hume's problem, namely Hume's justificatory infallibilism, deductivism and internalism. Hegel also notes that future events simply are not objects of knowledge because they do not presently exist. Hegel regards 'inductive reasoning' as an important form of ana- logical reasoning that enables us to 'anticipate' future events. Hegel's term for this is 'Ahnen', which has extremely weak cognitive connotations (Enz. ?190 and Zusatz). On Hegel's view, empirical knowledge requires both predication and singular demonstrative reference to the object of knowledge. Ex hypothesi this latter condition is not fullfilled in the case of future events or observations. Hence induction cannot be a case of knowledge. Thinking otherwise is the problem. The thought that, due to the universal claims at issue in inductive arguments, our predictive fallibility precludes present knowledge of the alleged universal characteristics of things; or the thought that on a fallibilist account of justification the truth condition of knowledge may not be satisfied-these are both infalliblist thoughts. Any sober fallibilist account of justification requires that the truth condition of knowledge is satisfied, even if sufficient (fallibilist) justification does not entail that this condition is satisfied.

III Cartesian Scepticism. Descartes was no sceptic. The problem, and the common name for this kind of scepticism, stem from the fact that the only philosopher ever convinced by Descartes' anti- sceptical arguments was their author.47 Thereafter 'Cartesian Scepticism' means more or less the combination of dream scepticism and the problem of the evil deceiver, developed in the first two Meditations. The refutation, or at least the dissolution, of Cartesian scepticism has been a central preoccupation of epistemology, especially in the Twentieth Century. Unfortunately, most attempted refutations have tried to develop a direct response to Cartesian scepticism, accepting the sceptical arguments as legitimate and trying to answer them, rather than critically to assess

47. Elsewhere (Westphal, 1987-88) I have argued that Descartes' argument suffers not one, but five distinct vicious circularities.



and reject the presuppositions of Cartesian scepticism. In this context, Kant's anti-Cartesian re-orientation is extremely revealing, as Hegel recognized.

Already in Hegel's early essays, 'The Difference between Fich- te's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy' (1801) and 'Faith and Knowledge' (1802b), Hegel followed out the insights of Kant's 'Refutation of Empirical Idealism' in a way further developed in the Phenomenology, especially in 'Self-Consciousness' and also in 'Observing Reason'. Hegel realized that Kant's 'Refutation' receives powerful support from Kant's doctrine of the 'transcendental affinity of the manifold of intuition'.48 Please bear with this jargon long enough for me to explain the key point.

Kant maintained that the matter of our sensations is given us ab extra. Kant further showed that we are not able even to think, and hence are unable to identify ourselves (and so to be self- conscious), just because we have complete and intact cognitive capacities (i.e. understanding and sensibility). To be able to think we must be able to produce and to use concepts. We acquire our pure a priori concepts, the Categories, 'originally', insofar as they are generated by our 'transcendental imagination', upon stimula- tion by our manifold of sensory intuitions, and on the basis of the twelve basic forms of logical judgment.49 (Kant calls this the 'epigenesis of pure reason'.50) On Kant's view, empirical concepts are generated in accord with concept-empiricism, though under guidance of the Categories, on the basis of repeated patterns of sensory experience. The main point in Kant's analysis is that we can make no cognitive judgments at all, and hence can have no knowledge whatsoever (whether empirical knowledge or self- awareness) without using schematized categories (categories further specified so as to hold of spatio-temporal objects and events)-in particular, a schematized concept of substance that serves as the concept of a perceptible thing-nor without using empirical concepts. However, we can only have Categories, schematized categories and empirical concepts insofar as we

48. On Hegel's early articles, see Westphal (1996, 2000b); on his PhdG, see Westphal (1989, 2002). 49. See Wolff (1995, 1998, 2000) for a brilliant explication and defence of Kant's claim that there are twelve basic forms of human logical judgment. 50. KdrV B167, GS 17:492, 18:8, 12, cf. 7:222-3; Longuenesse (1998), 221 note 17, 243, 252-3.



that is, our power of judgment-can and do detect both regularities and differences within the content of our manifold of sensory intuition. Such regularities and differences constitute what Kant calls 'the transcendental affinity of the manifold of [sensory] intuition'. Any world containing human beings but (some- how) lacking humanly detectable regularities and varieties among the contents of our manifold sensations is a world in which we may be flooded with sensations, but these would be to us 'even less than a dream' (Kdr V Al 12), Kant notes. The ratio cognoscendi, the ground of proof, that this affinity is a necessary transcendental condition for possible self-conscious experience lies in the argument just sketched, to the effect that we could not be self-conscious, we could have no self-conscious experience at all, unless such 'affinity' (regularity and variety) obtains among the contents of our sensations. Conversely, the ratio cognoscendi that such 'affinity' does obtain (if and when it does) is that we are self-conscious.

However, Hegel noticed that the ratio essendi, the ground of existence, for this affinity is quite distinct from its ratio cognoscendi. Because the manifold content of sensation is given us ab extra, whatever ground or reason for there being 'affinity' (humanly detectible regularity and variety) among the contents of our sensations must also lie outside us; it must lie in those sensory contents and their source (whatever that may turn out to be).

Hegel argues (see below, Section 4.3) that the ground of the regularity and variety among the contents of our sensations lies in our experiencing a regular, natural spatio-temporal world. If that is correct, then Hegel's reconstruction of Kant's doctrine of the 'transcendental affinity of the manifold of (sensory) intuition' powerfully supports the conclusion to Kant's 'Refutation of Empirical Idealism'. The conclusion of Hegel's combined and reconstructed Kantian proof is that we can be self-conscious only if we are conscious of a detectably regular, though changing natural world. If this is true, then we are only able to pose, to consider, even to formulate sceptical hypotheses regarding empirical knowledge, whether Pyrrhonian, Cartesian or Humean, if we in fact already have at least some genuine empirical knowledge, and so are able to reject those sceptical chal- lenges. This is one of Hegel's main justifications of his semantic and mental content externalisms.

If sound, this argument directly blocks the common sceptical argument that first adduces admitted perceptual misjudgments,



and then generalizes perceptual misjudgment into thoroughgoing perceptual delusion by asking, in effect, 'If you erred in those cases, how can you know now, how can you ever know, whether you deceive yourself perceptually now, in this instance?' Attempting to respond to this challenge piecemeal leads inevi- tably to foundationalism (whether strong or weak), which attempts to secure one at a time various definite instances of basic empirical knowledge. This strategy has never succeeded. Because Kant and, following his lead, Hegel rejected foundationalism, they are never tempted into this hopeless pursuit. Instead they purport to show, through the argument sketched above, that we can only be self-conscious if we in fact have at least some empirical knowledge. This blocks the sceptic's attempted generalization from occasional to universal perceptual error. Which empirical circumstances we correctly perceive and judge is a further issue. (How, after all, did honest epistemologists detect their occasional perceptual errors, cited by sceptics, if not by subsequent reliable perception?) Which instances of pur- ported empirical knowledge are genuine is determinable only through constructive self- and mutual criticism. If we had no empirical knowledge whatsoever, sceptical statements would merely beat the ear-drums of unself-conscious human bodies. (Recall that Hegel's response to the Dilemma of the Criterion consists in an account of how constructive self-criticism is possible; this account extends naturally to the possibility of constructive mutual criticism.5")

Part of Hegel's justification for his thesis that the natural world is the source of the 'affinity' among the contents of our sensations is provided by his internal critique of Kantian scepticism. This further supports Hegel's semantic and mental content externalisms.

IV Kantian Scepticism. Kant is now generally regarded as the great anti-sceptic, though the Critique of Pure Reason immediately won him a reputation as the most dangerous sceptic ever.52 The sceptical side of the first Critique is suggested by Kant's famous

51. On which, see Westphal (2003a), ??11, 13.9, 20, 24, 27, 28, 30, 35. 52. Beiser (1987), 4-5, 173, cf. 270, 292-93.


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remark, 'Hence I had to delimit knowledge, in order to make room for faith ...' (KdrV Bxxx). That Kant espoused some form of scepticism is also indicated by his rejection of knowledge of things in themselves. Recent interpreters have argued that Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves is not metaphysical, but rather epistemological.S3 In reply, others have argued, rightly I believe, that Kant's distinction is indeed metaphysical, and not merely epistemological.4 Kant's transcendental idealism brings in tow scepticism regarding 'transcendental' reality, namely, about anything that exists, and whatever characteristics it has, regardless of our human cognitive capacities and acts. Paradigmatic of Kant's 'changed method of thinking' is 'that we only know of things a priori what we ourselves contrib- ute to them' (Kdr V Bxviii)i55

One such human contribution, according to Kant, is causality itself. Kant contended that only transcendental idealism can answer Hume's scepticism about causality. 4.1. Hegel was not at all satisfied with Kant's metaphysical, ultimately sceptical distinction between appearances to us and things in themselves. Considered strategically, Hegel's response in the Phenomenology to Kant's transcendental idealism and its attendant scepticism lies in his attempt to validate human empirical knowledge, without at all adopting transcendental idealism. In particular, if Hegel's justification of our causal judgments in 'Force and Understanding' and in 'Observing Reason' is sound, then he answers Hume's scepticism about causality without appealing to transcendental idealism. If that is the case, then Hegel showed that Kant erred in supposing that only transcendental idealism can reply effectively to Hume's causal scepticism. 4.2. Considered critically, Hegel's 'changed method of thinking' is rooted in his 1802 insight that Kant's transcendental justification of our causal judgments is unsound.56 At best, Kant 53. E.g., Bird (1962, 18-35). Praus (1974), Allison (1983, 1987), Buchdahl (1992). 54. Rescher (1981), Guyer (1987), 333-69; Amneriks (1992), Westphal (1997d, 1998d, 2001), Adams (1997), Langton (1998). 55. Here and above I highlight some key points of the substance of Kant's philosophical re-orientation. I discuss his changed method in Westphal (2003b). 56. Hlere again, this is a shift in the substance of the views Hegel espouses, but this change is so basic that it required changes in method, rooted in his reconsideration of philosophical justification sketched above, Section I.


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proved transcendentally only the proposition, 'Every event has a cause'. Unfortunately, this principle is insufficient for justifying our causal judgments about worldly objects and events. Those causal judgments require a more specific principle, namely 'Every physical event has an external cause.' This specific principle does not follow from Kant's transcendentally justified general causal principle. Kant saw this gap in his proof in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and noted it again in The Critique of Judgment, where he confirms that the more specific principle of external causality can only be proved 'metaphysically' and not merely 'transcendentally'.57 Kant attempted to close this gap with his metaphysical justification of this more specific causal principle in the Metaphysical Foundations.

Ultimately, however, Kant recognized that even this further argument is invalid. The grounds for this are complex and cannot be discussed here.58 For present purposes it suffices to note first, that Kant's metaphysical cum sceptical distinction between human appearances and things in themselves didn't provide a sound reply to Hume's causal scepticism after all. Second, by 1802 Hegel identified exactly this problem with Kant's analysis, without any knowledge of Kant's private notes to the same effect.59 Hence Hegel, too, had overwhelming grounds to alter fundamentally his 'method of thinking'.

4.3. Hegel's Phenomenology provides not only a strategic (Sec- tion 4.1) and a critical (Section 4.2), but also a direct objection to Kant's transcendental idealism, and thus to Kant's sceptical distinction between human appearances and things in themselves. Kant argued that the 'transcendental affinity of the manifold of [sensory] intuition' is satisfied because it is a 'transcendentally ideal' condition of integrated self-conscious experience. Such conditions are satisfied due to the structure and functioning of our human cognitive capacities. Hence, Kant argued, only transcendental idealism can explain the satisfaction of this condition.

However, Kant's arguments for this conclusion are unsound because each of his four supporting arguments conflates the ratio

57. Westphal (I 995a). 58. Westphal (1995b). 59. Westphal (1997b).


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cognoscendi and the ratio essendi of the satisfaction of this condition. Kant's analysis of the 'transcendental affinity of the manifold of [sensory] intuition' (sketched above, Section III), provides the ratio cognoscendi for knowing that this condition is satisfied: We can be self-conscious only if this condition is satisfied; whenever we are self-conscious, this condition is satisfied. However, that line of reasoning does not explain how or why this condition is satisfied; it does not provide its ratio essendi. Hegel knew this by 1801.60 Hegel exploited this insight in the Phenomenology in 'Self-Consciousness' to show, first, that genuine transcendental proofs can be developed without transcendental idealism. In this, Hegel is in line with recent 'analytic transcendental arguments'.61 More importantly, Hegel exploited this insight to show, second, that a sound refutation of idealism, closely following Kant's own 'Refutation of Empirical Idealism', can be built on the 'transcendental affinity of the manifold of [sensory] intuition', though Hegel's refurbished refutation holds not only against what Kant called 'empirical idealism', but also against Kant's own transcendental idealism. The ratio essendi of the 'transcendental affinity of the manifold of [sensory] intuition' ultimately grounds realism (sans phrase) regarding natural, perceptible things in space and time.62

On Hegel's view, then, the justification of commonsense knowledge of particulars, e.g., Hegel's knowledge of the pen with which he wrote, is complex. Hegel's transcendental proof of realism and his transcendental justification of our use of such pure a priori concepts as 'physical object' justify the kind of empirical judgment represented by this example. Any particular case of this kind is justified in part by one's experiential evidence for it, and in part by a reliabilist account of our perceptual systems. (Hegel was deeply influenced by Aristotle regarding the proper functioning of our cognitive psychology and physiology, and he recognised the role for this within Kant's account of sensation.63)

60. Hegel (1801, 1802b), Westphal (1996). 61. On which, see Stem (2000). 62. Westphal (1995b), (1997b). 63. DeVries (1988).



V

The Persistence of Infallibilism. The details of Hegel's transcendental proof of realism cannot be discussed further here.64 However, a word can be said about the bevy of objections likely to have occurred to the reader, who may have considered such things as renewed dream scepticism, brains in vats, perhaps 'nar- row' construals of mental content or even a 'grand coincidence on a cosmic scale', among other contemporary philosophical commonplaces, none of which may be discussed in detail here. However, there is a common nerve running through these examples, taken as sceptical counter-examples, as disproofs of alleged genuine cases of perceptual knowledge. We're profession- ally trained to spot many kinds of logical gaps and defects in our positions and those of others. This is an important and instruc- tive philosophical technique. However, a danger lurks in its unre- stricted use in epistemology: it strongly encourages the implicit assumption that genuine justification must be deductively sound, even in the case of empirical justification. This assumption made Descartes into the father of Cartesianism, this assumption drives scepticism, and this assumption has been used to undermine analyses of knowledge ever since. The pervasiveness and apparent persuasiveness of this assumption is indicated by the wide- spread conviction among epistemologists that 'fallible (empirical) justification' is an oxymoron and that 'fallibilism' is incoherent.65 It is indicated too by the wide-spread use of the lottery paradox to argue against fallibilism and for 100% conclusive justification. It is also indicated by the deeply deductivist orientation of 'analytic transcendental arguments', which, interesting as they are, have systematically failed to answer scepticism.66

It would not be too much to say that this infallibilist assumption has played a role in Twentieth Century epistemology directly analogous to the role played in Pyrrhonian scepticism by the

64. In Westphal (1998b) I develop the argument independently of Hegel's texts, and argue inter alia that it provides a much stronger basis than Wright's (1992) 'cognitive command' and 'cosmological scope' for rescinding a minimalist and adopting a strong correspondence analysis of truth. 65. See, e.g., Kim & Lehrer (1990). Their key argument against fallibilism is valid- on one (strongly internalist) interpretation, though this interpretation is one that no fallibilist need or should accept. 66. See Grundmann (1994), Bell (2000), Westphal (2003b).



'ontological' concept of truth (above, Section 1.4). Insisting that justification must be deductively sound directly restricts human knowledge to logic and maths (depending on one's view of sets). The history of epistemology from Descartes to the present day ought to convince us this deductivist assumption cannot be correct. We need, in short, to 'change our method of thinking', as Kant put it. Change it to what? To transcendental-pragmatic accounts of justification, one sophisticated version of which has been sketched in the present essay. Hegel is the grandfather of pragmatism, and he showed that pragmatism has far richer resources than is commonly supposed, even by its advocates.67 Hegel showed, namely, that pragmatism not only is consistent with, but when thoroughly thought through, it requires realism about the objects of empirical knowledge. Hegel showed, too, that pragmatism is consistent with genuine transcendental proofs, proofs that (among much else) can block empirical scepticism-provided, of course, that we change our 'method of thinking' sufficiently to understand and appreciate such arguments.

VI Conclusion. The standard responses to scepticism have not been striking successes. This unfortunate track record strongly indicates that we need to 'change our method of thinking'. Given the animosity towards the views (mistakenly) associated with 'Hegel' that characterized the formation and development of analytic philosophy, I realize how paradoxical it seems to suggest that Hegel in fact had already gone where we now need to go. I have no doubt that many philosophers will reject this suggestion out of hand-probably long before having reached this concluding remark. Please do not mistake Hegel's views for those of his would-be expositors, especially those of the last century when these battle lines were drawn, who didn't care for epistemology and most often didn't have the acuity to identify Hegel's views beneath his apparent rhetoric. If Hegel's philosophy is read in terms of dichotomies standard in the field (such as, e.g., Agrip- pa's Five Modes), the result is gibberish. This has been typical

67. Westphal (2003c). The one exception is the too little known pragmatist, Frederick L. Will (1 997).



among his readers, whether critical or sympathetic. What is lost to such readers is the fact that, and the ways in which, Hegel challenged what he identified as false dichotomies. Even if every- thing Hegel wrote were deeply mistaken, we should still have to study his writings carefully, for they are the most powerful anti- dote to the worst of philosophical diseases: hardening of the categories. To lay scepticism to rest requires a 'changed method of thinking'. Genuine such changes are difficult, and cannot be effected by a few bright ideas. Hegel already contributed so much to a genuinely changed method of thinking that it behoves us to consider his views, analyses and methods very carefully indeed.68 School of Economic and Social Studies University of East Anglia (Norwich)

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Issue Table of ContentsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 103 (2003), pp. 1-401Front MatterThe Presidential Address: Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity [pp. 1-20]Morality and Emergency [pp. 21-37]In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness [pp. 39-60]Culpability and Ignorance [pp. 61-84]Where Is Philosophy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century? [pp. 85-99]Mercy [pp. 101-132]Rights as Enforceable Claims [pp. 133-147]Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in "The Phenomenology of Spirit" [pp. 149-178]Freud's Own Blend: Functional Analysis, Idiographic Explanation, and the Extension of Ordinary Psychology [pp. 179-195]The Structure-in-Things: Existence, Essence and Logic [pp. 197-225]Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaneity [pp. 227-256]Seeing Causing [pp. 257-280]Representational Advantages [pp. 281-298]Should We Trust Our Intuitions? Deflationary Accounts of the Analytic Data [pp. 299-323]Unity of Consciousness and the Self [pp. 325-352]Graduate Papers from the 2002 Joint SessionWorld and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds [pp. 353-360]Imagining Experiences Correctly [pp. 361-369]Singularism [pp. 371-379]

Back Matter [pp. 380-401]

[a] Hegel's Manifold Response to Scepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit

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