1

A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH

TO THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:

OPTION FOR CHINA AND ASEAN CLAIMANTS*

Rommel C. Banlaoi INTRODUCTION

One of the major irritants in China-ASEAN relations is the on-going dispute in the South China Sea. Because of the intransigence of claimants, the dispute already resulted in some military clashes prompting some experts and practitioners to describe the area as a potential trigger of major conflicts in the Asia Pacific region.1

How to manage the conflict in

the area has been baffling the minds of strategic analysts and practitioners in the region. But there are scholars who have proposed some policy options to manage the conflict.2 This paper

*Paper prepared for presentation during the Fourth China-ASEAN Research Institutes Roundtable at the University of Hong Kong from 18-20 October 2001. This paper was also based on the author’s paper entitled, “A Functionalist Approach to the Management of Conflicts in the South China Sea: Option for the ASEAN Regional Forum”, NDCP Occasional Paper, Vol. IV, No. 8 (August 2001).

1Ralph A. Cossa, "Security Implications

of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict", A Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report ", PacNet Newsletter #16. April 17, 1998.

2 See for example, Lu Ning, Flashpoint Spratlys (Singapore: Dolphin Trace Press Pte Ltd, 1995) and Mark Valencia, Mark Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, Paperback edition. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1997.

proposes the adoption of a functionalist option to manage existing conflicts in the South China Sea.3 A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS The functionalist approach is an approach in international relations that grapples with the process of regional cooperation and integration. The approach is based on the assumption that the cooperation among nations in functional areas limits the possibility of war and conflicts among cooperating nations. As the habit of cooperation in functional areas deepens and widens, prospects for integration becomes more and more promising, which may in turn lead to a more stable and peaceful regional and international security environment. Cooperation in Low Politics

David Mitrany, in his book A Working Peace System, introduces and

3Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The ASEAN

Regional Forum and the Management of Conflicts in the South China Sea," NDCP Occasional Paper, Vol. IV, No. 4 (March 2001), pp. 25-26.

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popularizes the functionalist approach.4 Otherwise known as functionalism, it offers alternative approach to the management of inter-state conflicts through cooperation in low-politics and non-controversial areas.5

Mitrany believes that the

attainment of world peace can be made possible through cooperative undertakings in various functionalist areas such as education, health, economics, environment, science and technology, culture and sports. He argues that international conflicts can be avoided and managed through international cooperation not among political elite but among technical people with no political agenda nor political motives such as engineers, scientists, economists, academics, and medical specialists.

Mitrany adheres to the idea that

cooperation among technicians brings more cooperation as they carry non-controversial agenda acceptable to all parties concerned. Experts and technical people also have the capability to develop common standards, by virtue of their respective disciplines, to guide their cooperative undertakings.

Cooperation Among Experts and

Specialists According to Mitrany, the

complexity of governmental systems in the twentieth century has increased the technical/functionalist tasks facing

4David Mitrany, A Working Peace System

(London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).

5David Mitrany, "The Functionalist

Approach to World Organization", International Affairs, XXIV (July 1948).

governments.6 These tasks can best be addressed by highly trained specialists or experts than by politicians.

Mitrany believes that "the

emergence of technical issues would lead first to the felt of perceived need for collaborative action, devoid of a political, or conflictual, content" and therefore can be assigned to technical experts "whose approaches were essentially based on apolitical considerations."7

Cooperation among political

elite, on the other hand, is hard to prosper, according to Mitrany, as they carry controversial agenda such as security and politics. Political elite seldom agree with each other not only because of their varying political motives and agenda but also because they view security and politics from different philosophical and ideological perspectives.

The Doctrine of Ramification

Crucial to the understanding of

Mitrany’s functionalist approach is the doctrine of ramification. The doctrine states that "Successful cooperation in one functional setting would enhance incentive for collaboration in other fields". The doctrine also posits that the "perceived need in one functional task would itself contribute to a change in attitudes in favor of even greater cooperation over a widening spectrum of issues."8

6See James E. Dougherty and Robert L.

Pfaltzgraft Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, Fourth Edition (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1997), Chapter 10.

7 Ibid., p. 422.

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Guided by the doctrine of ramification, Mitrany emphasizes that the broadening and widening of cooperation diminishes the prospect for and eventually eliminate war through an incremental transformation from adversarial to cooperative pattern of behavior. The transformation of behavioral pattern is incremental or gradual because the ramification effect takes time. Apparently, the doctrine of ramification works in tandem with the doctrine of incrementalism which also states that the broadening and widening of cooperation is a gradual process.

The Neo-Functionalist Approach

Another variant of functional

approach is the neo-functional approach first introduced by Ernst Haas and later adopted and improved by Philippe Schmitter, Leon Linberg, Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane and Lawrence Scheineman.9

In his work, The Uniting of

Europe, Haas identifies the political, social and economic forces that led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the forerunner of the European Union (EU).10 Haas argues that the decision to integrate Western Europe is not based on altruistic considerations but on the expectations of gain or loss held by dominant groups and forces within the unit to be integrated.

8Ibid. 9For a more elaborate discussion, see

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraft (1997).

10Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

Cooperation Among Relevant Elite

Unlike Mitrany who pays prime

importance on the role of technical people and experts, Haas posits that European integration has proceeded as a result of the work of relevant elite in the government and private sectors who supported integration for pragmatic reasons.11

For example, the removal of

barriers to coal and steel trade would increase markets and profits beneficial to stakeholders. Haas underscores that elite "anticipating that they will gain from activity within a supranational organizational framework are likely to seek out similarly minded elite across national frontiers."12 This leads to more cooperation.

As a result of the learning

process of cooperation, Haas assumes that power-oriented governmental activities may eventually lead to a welfare-oriented action – a functionalist oriented action. As players realize the importance of cooperation through increased commitment to a larger organizational unit, the learning process of cooperation may lead to greater integration.13 Haas points out that the "Integrative lessons learned in one functional context will be applied in others, thus eventually supplanting international politics."14

11Ibid., p. 13. 12See Dougherty and Pfaltzgraft, p. 423.

13Ibid. 14Robert Pfatlzgraft, Jr. Britain Faces

Europe, 1957-1967 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), p. 48.

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The Spill-Over Effect Important to the understanding

of Haas neo-functionalist approach is the concept of spill-over. The spill-over effect, or what Mitrany calls as ramification effect, states that cooperation in one functional area may lead to further cooperation in other areas that may include the political area. This "gradual politicization" of relevant players may lead to the deepening and widening of integration process.

In the “gradual politicization

process”, functional issues previously considered "technical" and "non-controversial" become "political" because in reaction to initial "technical" purposes, relevant players eventually agree to apply the spectrum of political means deemed appropriate to attain them.15 MANAGING CONFLICTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA THE FUNCTIONALIST WAY

There are functional areas where experts and elite in China and ASEAN claimants may cooperate to manage conflicts in the South China. Marine scientists in China and ASEAN claimants involved in various types of research in the South China Sea may contribute to the management of conflicts in the South China Sea. Marine scientists in these countries may learn lessons from a group of marine scientists engaged in research in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea , the Arctic Sea, and the Antarctic Ocean. This group of marine scientists advance the idea of marine regionalism, which provides a framework for a coordinated marine scientific research in various

15Dougherty and Pflatzgraft, p. 423.

parts of the world’s ocean which is a bone of contention among stakeholders.

Managing the South China Sea

Conflicts: Lessons from Other Seas In the Baltic Sea, marine

scientists have been involved in various forms of cooperation in marine policy. These marine scientists have played a vital role in enacting national legislation in various regional agreements aiming to manage disputes over continental shelf boundaries in the Baltic Sea.16 Disputes have also been mitigated by a web of both bilateral and multilateral agreements initiated by experts and specialists with the support of political leaders.

In the Mediterranean Sea, marine

scientists took an active part in numerous cooperative actions by the coastal states to protect the environment. They participated in the making of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea and its five protocols.17

In the North Sea, marine

regionalism may also be seen through the efforts of the marine scientists to arrive at a comprehensive sea-use planning which aims to develop a “balanced and effective battery of instruments for both national and

16See Ton Ijstra, “Development of

Resource Jurisdiction in the EC’s Regional Seas: National EEZ Policy of EC Member States in the Northeast Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 23 (1992).

17 Ibid. Also in Mark Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, Paperback edition (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 150.

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international administration and management” of the North Sea.”

In the Antarctic Ocean, the

Antarctic Treaty is an excellent model where marine scientists in the South China Sea may learn a lot of lessons from. According to Jim Barnes, the Treaty can serve as a practical model to resolve disputes in the South China Sea.18

The Antarctic Treaty Model

(ATM) provides a model to manage conflicts. The ATM, which was signed in 1959, calls for the eventual demilitarization of the area. As a demilitarized area, the twelve claimant states are strongly urged to prohibit “any measures of military rule, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out military maneuvers, and the testing of any types of weapon.”19

The ATM also upholds the

collective utilization of the resources in Antarctica. For any disputes that may arise, the ATM mandates the use of “negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice” to manage conflicts in the area20

What is notable in the ATM is the

vital role played by experts and scientists in convincing political leaders to eschew political issues in the area and to start cooperating in functional areas.

18Jim Barnes, “Using the Antarctic Treaty

as the Basis for Resolving the Spratly Islands Dispute” (14 May 1999).

19See Article XI, Section 1 of the 1959

Antarctic Treaty.

20Ibid.

Through their reliable scientific findings, experts and scientists push for the collective protection of the Antarctic Treaty for the benefit of all claimant states. Instead of competing for the resources of the Antarctic, experts and scientists propose a model that upholds the collective utilization of Antarctica and its resources through “joint management”. Experts and scientists also uphold the idea of making the Antarctic a pristine world park and “a center for peaceful scientific inquiry.” Thus, the Antarctic Treaty guarantees for the collective governance of the Antarctic Ocean.

Marine Scientists and Functionalism in the South China Sea

Learning lessons from the other

Seas particularly the Antarctic Ocean, there is now a proposal among marine scientists engaged in scientific research in the South China Sea to declare the disputed area a neutral area. There is a move among marine scientists to convert the South China Sea into a marine park.21

This proposal is based on the

scientific findings that the South China Sea is known breeding ground for tuna fish and other fish resources that migrate into nearby fishing areas of claimant states.

Marine scientists also describe

the South China Sea as “the center of marine generic richness and diversity in the world” and a macro-ecosystem characterized by “high bio-diversity and

21John .W. McManus, “The Spratly

Islands: A Marine Park Alternative” ICLARM Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July 1992). Also see his “The Spratly Islands: A Marine Park”, Ambio, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1994), pp. 181-186.

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fisheries productivity” due to the “intrinsic connectivity of coral reefs, sea-grass, and mangrove forests.”22 Because the South China Sea is the locus of complex ecological connectivities, the area has been considered a “savings bank” of all claimant states.23

By turning the South China Sea

into a neutral international marine park, marine scientists and experts firmly believe that “all claimants could continue to benefit from the living resources emanating from the area.”24 By so doing, they argue that “a host of potential conflicts could be avoided” including the tens of millions of dollars being spend annually on maintaining garrisons of troops that are used to guard against every claimant states.25

This proposal is gaining support from other scholars abroad. Stein Tonnesson, Director of the International Peace Research Institute based in Oslo and who has been writing intensively about the issue of the South China Sea, agrees to the functionalist approach of managing conflicts in the South China Sea. In one of his writings, Tonnesson strongly propose that:

All claimants transfer their alleged

sovereignty over the Spratlys to a regional or international authority, which is set up to administer a system of marine nature parks.

22 Miguel D. Fortes, “The Role of Marine

Environmental Science in the Western Philippine Seas”, University of the Philippines Marine Science Institute (Unpublished, 1999), p.

23See Clarita R. Carlos, “Ecological Connectivity in the South China Sea” (National Defense College of the Philippines, unpublished paper, 2001).

24McManus, p. 6.

25Ibid.

Within the parks, all economic activity should be prohibited except environment-friendly tourism. The Spratlys are thus given back to their original inhabitants.26 Dr. Celso R. Roque, President of the World Wide Fund for Nature Philippines (WWF Philippines), also subscribes with the proposal to convert the South China Sea into a marine park with the Antarctic Treaty as a model. In the WWF study, Roque underscores:

The main idea of an approach based on the Antarctic Treaty Model (ATM) and its protocols is the moratorium on all claims to sovereignty for a long period, sauy 30-50 years. The Spratly Islands and vicinity will be considered, in ther interregnum, as an International Marine Park or World Heritage Site. The principal purpose of the site will be for conservation and scientific research. Fisheries may be allowed in accordance with a sustainable management regime. Mineral activities will also be suspended for the duration of the Treaty. Demilitarization of the entire area is imperartive. The claimants and other stakeholders such as the scientific community may agree on a Framework of Joint Management.27

In his letter to then Philippine Defense Secretary Orlando S. Mercado, Roque contends that the ATM will be beneficial to all parties, without permanently giving up claims to sovereignty. Roque even recommended to Mercado to get cabinet approval of

26Stein Tonnesson, “Here’s How to Settle

the Rocky Disputes in the South China Sea” in International Herald Tribune,m (6 September 2000). Also see “Settling South China Sea disputes", The Straits Times (7 September 2000).

27Letter of Dr. Celso R. Roque to then

Secretary Orlando S. Mercado on 1 July 1999.

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the ATM approach to the ASEAN which will draft a Treaty on the South China Sea.28

The Role of Experts, Non-Governmental Players an Governments in Managing

Conflicts in the South China Sea Functionalism pays attention to the vital role of experts, non-governmental players and even governments in the management of conflicts. In the South China Sea, experts, non-governmental players and even some government officials have been initiating functionalist projects to manage conflicts in the area.

Aiming to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea, two experts (Ambassador Hasji, Djalal of Indonesia and Prof. Ian Townsend-Gault of Canada) initiated a series of informal multilateral workshops on the issue. Internationally known as the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, the series of meetings started in 1990 two years after the military confrontation between China and Vietnam over the issue of the Spratlys.

The primary objective of the

Workshop was to initially gather the parties for discussions on how to manage the conflict in the South China Sea in the light of the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Since its creation, four technical working groups have been created dealing with legal matters and scientific research. All meetings of the Workshop uphold some functionalist assumptions when the participants set aside the sensitive and highly controversial issue of

28Ibid.

sovereignty in the South China Sea . Participants rather focus on other subjects that may trigger cooperation rather than conflict on the issue. Their activities include mutual sharing of scientific findings and legal opinions.

Aside from the Workshop,

experts and practitioners from the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) initiated a project on the South China Sea with the aim of offering alternative approach to manage conflicts in the disputed territoy. UNEP project led to the development of the Strategic Action Program for the South China Sea. Officials from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philipines, and Thailand signed the Strategic Action Program for implementation.

However, political problems in

China prevented the program to be implemented. Although Chinese experts and officials were involved in the preparation stages, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to sign. According to Tom Naes of the University of Oslo, “The UNEP initiative, which was aimed at improving management and protection of the marine environment of the South China Sea, ran into difficulties because China has unresolved sovereignty conflicts with its Southeast Asian neighbors.” 29 Despite that, ASEAN experts and officials continue to engage China in various peaceful and confidence building talks through the

29 Tom Næss, Environment and Security in

the South China Sea Region: The Role of Experts, Non-Governmental Actors and Governments in Regime Building Processes .A thesis for the Cand. Polit. degree at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, December 1999. Published in the SUM Dissertations & Thesis series as No. 1/2000 (ISSN 0806-475X). Also see in http://www.sum.uio.no/southchinasea/.

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ARF and the South China Sea Workshops.

Another initiatives undertaken

by experts to manage conflicts in the South China Sea is the formation of the Association of Southeast Marine Scientists (ASEAMS) in 1986. The ASEAMS aims to provide independent, expert scientific advice regarding programs being implemented in the East Asian Sea region including the South China Sea. Its participants included not only marine experts but also members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, the ASEAMS was dissolved in 1996 due to funding constraints.

Aside from the above-

mentioned initiatives of marine experts, there are still a lot of initiatives from other groups. These initiatives are discussed in the study of Tom Naes who examines the extent to which maritime experts and organizations working with environmental issues can facilitate the establishment of an ocean management regime in the South China Sea.

Describing how scientists interact at the regional level, Naes articulates some functionalist assumptions when he tries to “discuss the likelihood that the regional scientific community will obtain political enough influence (sic) to make environmental questions take precedence in regional politics.”30 He also describes the factors that prevent scientists from influencing decision-makers in so far as ocean management is concerned. Naes also discussed the role of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Maritime Cooperation

30Ibid., p. 4.

Working Group in managing conflicts in the South China Sea. FUNCTIONALIST OPTION FOR CHINA AND ASEAN CLAIMANT STATES To effectively manage conflicts in the South China Sea, China and the ASEAN claimants may seriously adopt the functionalist option. The various collaborative efforts initiated by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Indonesian-Canadian Workshops on the South China Sea and other Tract Two activities in the region are proper venue where experts and scholars in China and ASEAN claimants may cooperate in managing disputes in the South China Sea.

Eschewing the discussion on the sovereignty aspect of the South China Sea issue is a very useful strategic move to lay down the proper framework for a fruitful cooperation in functional areas.

Rather than focusing on the

ownership of territory, China and ASEAN claimants shall push for maritime security. Rather than focusing on a highly sensitive issue of sovereignty, the China and ASEAN claimants shall uphold cooperation in navigation, communication, shipping and environmental research.31

Shelving the sovereignty issue

and upholding the functionalist issues may provide peaceful solution of the South China Sea conflict. This is an

31See Ramses Amer, “Towards a

Declaration on Navigational Rights in the Sea-lanes of the Asia Pacific”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April 1998).

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alternative option for China and ASEAN claimants.

To manage the South China Sea

conflict the functionalist way, China and ASEAN claimants shall create a climate of cooperation dominated by low politics. To do this, China and ASEAN claimants shall encourage more the participation of like-minded scientists and experts engaged in various functionalist areas of research. As experiences of other regions have shown, the establishment of like-minded group of scientists and experts engaged in functional cooperation in conflict ridded area has changed the both the normative and casual beliefs of decision-makers.32 This like-minded group of scientists and experts has formed an “epistemic community” which is an integrated, transnational network of scientists that can influence decision makers.33

China and ASEAN claimants

may capitalize on these experiences. They shall exert efforts to provide a climate of cooperation in the disputed area dominated not by high politics but by low politics. They may also encourage the development of an “epistemic community” to help all claimants functionally manage the conflict in the South China Sea.

32Tom Naes, “Epistemic Communities

and Environmental Cooperation in the South China Sea” (Paper presented during the Workshops on the Conflict in the South China Sea held in Oslo, Norway on 24-26 April 1999).

33Ibid. Also see Peter Haas (ed), Knowledge, Power and International Coordination: International Organization, Special Issue, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

By upholding functionalism –

the low politics approach, China and ASEAN claimants may manage existing conflicts in the South China Sea through the development of habits of cooperation among experts, scientists and political leaders. By enhancing regional cooperation in low politics area, cooperation in high politics area may eventually occur. As articulated by then Philippine Defense Secretary Mercado:

The regional “low politics” approach

is appropriate for the short-and-medium-term objectives…in the South China Sea. This will enhance the use of “high politics” approach in the long-term. By promoting habits of cooperation or building confidence through the “low politics” approach, “high politics” issues will have greater access of resolution.34

34 Orlando S. Mercado, “Philippine

Defense Policy on the South China Sea” (Paper presented on 20 October 1999 at the Department of Foreign Affairs during the Forum entitled “The South China Sea: Problems and Prospects).

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