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Diplomacy & Statecraft

ISSN: 0959-2296 (Print) 1557-301x (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdps20

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and theRepublic Of Korea

Juergen Kleiner

To cite this article: Juergen Kleiner (2006) A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the

Republic Of Korea, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 17:2, 215-235, DOI: 10.1080/09592290600695235

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290600695235

Published online: 22 Sep 2006.

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Diplomacy and Statecraft , 17: 215–235, 2006

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN 0959-2296

DOI: 10.1080/09592290600695235

FDPS0959-22960000-0000Diplomacy andStatecraft, Vol. 17, No. 02, April 2006: pp. 0–0Diplomacy andStatecraft

A FRAGILE RELATIONSHIP: THE UNITED STATES

AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The United States and the Republic of KoreaJuergenKleiner

Juergen Kleiner

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and devel-

oped democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assumemore responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The nec-

essary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the

US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and

South Korea’s attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the

DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was ampli-

fied by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy

that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmo-

sphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A

new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For

South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an

attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled

out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America’s

paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this ratio-

nale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the

other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North

Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success

is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined

with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.

CLOSENESS

The United States and the Republic of Korea fought a war side by side,even before formally concluding a military alliance. Both countries werethe main contributors to the United Nations Command during the KoreanWar (1950–53) and suffered the heaviest losses. Not until the 1st of October 1953, after the war had come to an end, did the two countriesagree on a Mutual Defense Treaty that has been the basis of South

Korea’s defense against threats from North Korea ever since.1

The UnitedStates assisted in building up the South Korean forces and left US troopsstationed in Korea. The Republic of Korea acted in the spirit of the

D o w n l o a d e d b y [ N a t i o n a l T a i w a n O c e a n U n i v e r s i t y ] a t 0 7 : 4 9 1 5 M a y 2 0 1 6


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216 Juergen Kleiner

Mutual Defense Treaty by sending combat troops to Vietnam in the late1960s though this was an out of area mission.

The interaction between Americans and South Koreans in other fields

was also of an extraordinary nature. Originally the relationship wastotally unbalanced. The United States helped South Korea to develop itseconomy, first by huge amounts of economic assistance and later byopening the large American market for products of the South Koreanexport industry. During the collapse of the South Korean economy in1997 it was again the United States that inspired the rescue operation.

American-South Korean cooperation was based on a tremendousexchange of people. American soldiers, government officials, businessman,scholars, students, Peace Corps members, and private citizens came to

Korea. Thousands of Koreans went to the United States to learn, to study,and to do business. Many of them returned to Korea, carrying their newlyacquired knowledge and Western ideas with them. The South Koreansviewed things American as modern, exemplary and desirable. Theyadmired the American way of life though their country’s traditions differedmuch from that of the great partner. The Republic of Korea would havedeserved to be called the ally of the allies of the United States.2

ADJUSTMENTS

Relations between states are rarely stable as conditions change. The har-mony between South Korea and the United States lasted more or less untilthe end of the 1970s. Changes were caused because South Korea becameeconomically and militarily stronger and succeeded in reforming its insti-tutions on the way to democratic government. It, therefore, demandedmore of a say in its own destiny. The United States on the other hand pur-sued its own interests in the Far East that oscillated between containment,engagement, and various forms of disengagement. As a superpower the

United States expected South Korea to follow the changing definitions of US foreign policy.

In the military sphere reasonable adjustments that were acceptable toboth sides were reached. In spite of endless discussions of Americantroop withdrawal from Korea, the United States continued to maintaintroops on the peninsula. They amounted in the summer of 2004 to 37,000,including the Second Infantry Division and some airforce units.3 SinceSouth Korea could afford a larger defense budget its forces increased tonearly 700,000 troops. The South Korean forces could, therefore, assume

larger responsibilities within the alliance.4

The Republic of Korea hasbecome well integrated into joint command structures. In 1978 a US/ ROK Combined Forces Command was established, headed by the Com-mander-in-Chief of US forces in Korea and a Korean deputy. Bi-national



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The United States and the Republic of Korea 217

manning was implemented throughout the command structure. In 1994peacetime operational control over those South Korean units, still underUS control, was transferred to South Korea. The South Korean govern-

ment complained that according to an agreement with the United Statesconcluded in 1979 Korea was allowed to only have missiles with a rangeof only 180 km. Korea asked for a change. After South Korea joined theMissile Technology Control regime in 2001 the United States agreed thatthe ally might develop missiles with ranges up to 300 km.5

Cost sharing contributions from South Korea have also been a contro-versial subject. The South Koreans complained that their partner did notfully acknowledge the support of Korean forces to augment US forces(KATUSA) and the provision of land for US bases as South Korean con-

tribution.6

There is no doubt, however, that South Korean contributionshave increased steadily. According to US statistics, in 2001 South Koreaoffset approximately 39% of US non-personnel stationing costs and theseoffsets promised to increase further.7 The status of US forces in Koreaused to be a bone of contention because the original agreement gave theUnited States far reaching jurisdiction over its own service personnel. Theconflict intensified since crime is relatively low in Korea with the resultthat crimes committed by US personnel, though small in numbers,became very visible. Revisions in February 1991 and in January 2001

aimed at meeting Korean concerns.8

It was agreed that criminal jurisdic-tion of the United States over its servicemen is restricted to cases thatoccur while they discharge official duties or when the crime is committedagainst other US personnel. These manifold changes indicated that the USforces in Korea were going to assume a more modest role.

The surprising rise of the Republic of Korea from a poor developingcountry via a newly industrialized country (NIC) to membership inOECD, made a readjustment of trade relations with the United Statesinevitable. Liberalization of the Korean market and a better protection of

intellectual property rights were particularly urgent. The South Koreangovernment gave in to American demands only reluctantly and slowly.The international clearing-up efforts after the collapse of the SouthKorean economy in 1997 provided additional opportunities to insist onimproved access to South Korea’s market and better investment opportu-nities. Korean public opinion adopted the unjustified attitude to cry foulwhenever the United States asked for a removal of trade restrictions.

That the Koreans were so sensitive to American pressure had its rea-sons. However hard they tried, they always remained the little brother.

They had built up impressive military forces, but it was basically the fire-power of US forces and of the US nuclear shield that guaranteed SouthKorea’s security. The Republic of Korea had been accepted in the club of the industrialized countries, OECD, but when its economy collapsed the



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218 Juergen Kleiner

country depended on the goodwill of others, particularly on that of theUnited States. The asymmetry of the relations continued to exist andmade itself felt from time to time.

In the 1980s the civil society in South Korea developed. Public opinionturned to democratic ideas and, in 1987, to democratic forms of govern-ment. One should have thought that this development would facilitaterelations with the United States. The contrary, however, was true. Koreansstarted to question why the United States administrations had cooperatedfor so many years with succeeding authoritarian leaders of South Korea.Remarks by President Chun Doo Hwan had made them particularly suspi-cious. In 1980 he had spread the news that the United States had beeninformed in advance of his seizure of power in 1979 and of the declaration

of full martial law in May 1980. Therefore, many Koreans assumed that theUS administration had tacitly approved Chun’s coup d’état and the bloodysuppression of the rebellion against the military dictatorship in Kwangju.Chun’s assertions were false, but the United States did not succeed in inval-idating them. A considerable number of those Koreans who demandeddemocratic reforms believed that the United States government was on theside of those in power. These assumptions together with the feelings of remaining the underdog that was bullied by big brother, gave rise to ananti-American mood. This attitude found its expression in numerous attacks

on American institutions in the 1980s. The days when America appearedidentical with progress were gone.

SHIFTS

For decades the joint mission to deter the threat from the North haddominated the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea. When both countries started engaging the secluded country, differ-ences between the allies began to show.

In the period after the Korean War, the US administrations had onlyoccasionally negotiated with North Korea when need arose becauseAmericans or American equipment had been seized by the North. Thebest-known example are the talks for the release of the crew of thespyship USS Pueblo in 1968. The decisive negotiations, held bilaterallybetween the United States and the DPRK though within the framework of the Military Armistice Commission, were dominated by the spirit of theCold War. How sensitive the South Korean government considered thebilateral talks of their American ally with the North Korea became obvious

at that time. South Korea was concerned that it was excluded from the talksfearing that the DPRK’s status might be improved by negotiations with theUnited States.9 The Johnson administration, however, succeeded in reassur-ing its ally of American willingness to continue protecting the South.



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When the Clinton administration tried to freeze the North Koreannuclear program, it negotiated with the DPRK for a prolonged period of time, that is, from June 1993 until October 1994. The administration had

no consistent plan that it followed but developed its policy over timewavering between a tough and a soft approach. It was aware of the neces-sity to coordinate its North Korea policy with the South Korean ally andtried to do so. For South Korea it was difficult to react to the changingAmerican ideas. To compound matters, the government of President KimYong Sam (1993–1998) also showed a lack of consistency that extendedto its North Korea policy. Thus, the coordination between the allies wasrather difficult and led to tensions.10 When the Agreed Framework thatshut down the North Korean plutonium program in exchange for rewards

was finally concluded the South Korean government officially commendedit. In a White Paper published in 1996 the Kim Yong Sam government evenclaimed that the Agreed Framework was the result of the efforts “by theROK government and the support of the international community.”11 TheSouth Korean concerns could, however, have been seen from the samepaper when it stressed that in implementing the light water reactor projectpromised to North Korea in the Agreed Framework Seoul should take thecentral role.12 This was a problem indeed. The United States had nowrecognized the DPRK as a partner causing South Korean concerns that

Americans might negotiate about the peninsula’s future directly and withthe exclusion of its ally.13 The daily Chosun Ilbo reflected this moodaccurately when it suggested in October 1994 breaking away “from thesingle track diplomacy of depending only upon the United States.”14

The South Korean concerns persisted, though the policies towards NorthKorea of President Kim Dae Jung (1998–2003) and President Clinton weremore in sync.15 The sunshine policy of Kim Dae Jung was based on thewillingness to tolerate the DPRK’s existence. Like the US government heconsidered North Korea a partner whom he wanted to engage with the hope

that the neighbor would slowly change so that tensions would be reduced.The Clinton administration supported the sunshine policy. It continuedtalking to the DPRK trying to freeze the country’s missile program. TheUnited States furthermore joined South Korea in providing food for thesuffering people in the DPRK. These activities made close coordinationbetween the two allies necessary. The relations of the United States and theRepublic of Korea towards the DPRK became more and more the dominantfactor in the relationship between the two allies.

DISSONANCE

When President Kim Dae Jung visited Washington in March 2001 to meetthe new American President, he had succeeded in getting inter-Korean



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220 Juergen Kleiner

relations moving. He had his summit with Chairman Kim Jong Il in June2000 and was expecting the return visit of the North Korean leader. TheNobel Peace Price winner was in for a surprise. In a press conference

following the summit with the Korean president on 7 March 2001,President George W. Bush made various remarks about North Korea.16

He said that he was skeptic about the North Korean leader and about thereliability of North Korea, keeping “all terms of all agreements.” Heinsisted on complete verification of agreements. He further put off adialogue with North Korea to the future. Whatever his intentions mayhave been, Bush’s attitude caused a setback for the sunshine policy of Kim Dae Jung.

The South Korean president should not have been too surprised by the

subdued reception that he received in Washington. Only a week before histrip to the United States, he had publicly agreed with Russian PresidentPutin that the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty was “a cornerstone of strategic stability.”17 This was exactly the treaty that President Bushwanted to scrap in order build a national missile defense system (NMD)for which North Korea’s missiles served as justification. The SouthKorean president may have had good reasons to oppose the stationing of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems on Korean soil. By indirectlyexpressing his opposition he had, however, publicly taken sides against an

important strategic plan of his ally that was aimed at protecting the USterritory against missile attacks.The sunshine policy was not only intended to warm the North Koreans

but included a cautious, still minor effort of breaking away from theAmerican patronage. The Joint Declaration of 15 June 2000 stated thatthe North and the South agreed to solve the question of reunification“independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsiblefor it.”18 There were old North Korean efforts behind that formula.The South could, however, easily agree to the formula: Though other

countries, like the United States, would have to be involved in the process,unification was—in the view of both Koreas—basically a national task.

It was the policy towards North Korea during the second nuclear crisisthat caused a rift between the Republic of Korea and the United States.19

The South Korean government supported the demand that North Koreashould abandon its nuclear programs. It preferred, however, an approachthat left the aims of the sunshine policy intact. President Roh Moo Hyun,like his predecessor, insisted on a “peace-first, unification-later”approach.20 South Korea excluded any military solution since a war on the

peninsula would bring destruction and suffering also to the South. Nor didthe South Korean government support the collapse of North Korea asPresident Roh Moo Hyun has repeatedly stated.21 The South Koreangovernment was afraid that a sudden unification would be too expensive



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and socially too demanding.22 The Roh government also hesitated aboutbringing the North Korean nuclear issue before the UN Security Council.South Korea was even not willing to include specific military measures

into a contingency plan of how to deal with a possible internal turmoil inNorth Korea.23 The South Korean government was also willing to meetNorth Korean demands with a view to keeping the channel of communi-cation open. In the summer of 2005 the South Korean government offeredto provide 2 million kilowatts of electricity annually to the North in orderto encourage the DPRK to end its boycott of the six-party talks.24 Aninteresting reversal can be observed. While the Kim Young Samgovernment had complained that the US administration was too soft onNorth Korea, the present South Korean government feels that the admin-

istration is too hawkish.25

Both cases have, however, common ground.They show a significant difference in the assessment of and approachtoward the DPRK by the two allies. Since the sunshine policy has gainedbroad support in South Korea, the gap has become wider. While SouthKorea tries first of all to promote reconciliation with North Korea and isno longer too afraid of a North Korean attack, the United States considersthe North Korean leadership a tyrannical regime that contributes danger-ously to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US administrationdiscards up-front incentives and keeps the option of economic sanctions

open, also those to be imposed by the UN Security Council.In view of the South Korean sensitivities it would have been appro-priate for the Bush administration to consider the ties with the Republic of Korea a “high maintenance” relationship.26 This did not happen.Secretary Rumsfeld’s remark during a news briefing on 23 December2002 disregarded Korean concerns. At a moment when the United Stateswas increasing military pressure on Iraq, the Secretary of Defense wasasked whether the US was capable of pursuing the war against terror,Iraq, and North Korea at the same time. He answered in the affirmative:

“We are capable of fighting two major regional conflicts.”27

It madeSeoul also nervous that the administration did not hide its preference for acollapse of the DPRK.

South Korea tried to keep the bilateral talks and negotiation with theDPRK going. The South Korean government answered the North Koreanroller-coaster policy of refusal and giving in with a policy of appeasementand prior concessions. Even after the DPRK on 10 February 2005, for thefirst time, did not only speak of its nuclear deterrent but also of having“manufactured nukes,” the South Korean government tried to downplay

the North Korean statement.28

Unification Minister Chung Dong Youngsaid on 14 February 2005 that it was too early to claim North Korea as anuclear state and that there was “no reason to immediately change ourpolicies towards North Korea.”29 In April 2005, the South Korean



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222 Juergen Kleiner

government made it known that substantive economic support was onlypossible after the nuclear problem was solved.30 This statement, however,was quickly forgotten. Only weeks later South Korea started delivering

200,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea and in the summer of 2005offered the North an aid package that included the delivery of 500,000tons of rice.31 Cooperation in the Kaesong Industrial Park, built north of the demilitarized zone, got started. The South Korean government triedhard not to hurt the feelings of the North Koreans. This was clearlydemonstrated when, on 14 April 2005, the South Korean delegation to theUN Commission on Human Rights abstained from voting on a resolutioncondemning North Korean human rights abuses.32 On 17 November 2005South Korea equally abstained from voting on a similar resolution by the

UN General Assembly.33

This did not go unnoticed by the American ally.Jay Lefkowitz, US Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea,expressed his hope, during a conference on 9 December 2005 in Seoul,that in the future South Korea would join a vote on similar resolutions.34

In the fall of 2005 the US government banned the activities of the BancoDelta Asia SARL, a bank in Macao, in the United States because it hadcooperated with North Korea in money laundering.35 It also banned theactivities of eight North Korean companies that supported the prolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruction.36 The South Korean ally considered

these actions obstacles to the six-party talks and demanded removalimmediately.37 After the US ambassador to Seoul, in defense of thesanctions taken by his government, had described the North Koreangovernment as “a criminal regime,” the Speaker of the South KoreanNational Assembly called his remark “undesirable.”38 In view of the factthat the DPRK used vile language to describe the United States fordecades on a daily basis, this was an astonishing statement. Apparently,even the use of tough language towards the North by the US governmentmade the South Korean side nervous.

Seoul tried to influence the attitude of the allies towards North Korea.Shortly after the beginning of the new nuclear crisis, President Kim DaeJung had suggested that the United States should guarantee North Korea’sright to exist in return for abandoning the nuclear weapons program.39

This proposal had aimed at the heart of the matter. The North Koreanleadership was not sure about the goals of the new administration. It hadreason to feel that the US government intended to remove the DPRK’ssystem. Under the formula of safeguarding the country’s sovereignty theDPRK leadership tried to receive guarantees for its survival. The Joint

Statement issued at the end of the Six-party talks in September 2005promised North Korea international recognition. It also mentionedeconomic benefits in exchange for an end to North Korea’s nuclearprograms.40 This statement was, however, not a breakthrough because it



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described aims but not a roadmap. Therefore, it was not astonishing thatthe talks quickly lost momentum again.

South Korea would have preferred that the Agreed Framework be

maintained and renegotiated.41

This was an excellent idea. At the begin-ning of the crisis the United States should have focused on keeping theAgreed Framework alive. It was bad enough that a new nuclear issue hadappeared, namely whether North Korea had a program to enrich uranium.Therefore, efforts should have been concentrated on keeping the plutoniumissue frozen. This could only be achieved if the remnants of the AgreedFramework were maintained and thus North Korea’s access to the pluto-nium contained in the 8000 spent fuel rods was blocked. The administrationmade only weak efforts to save the remnants of the Agreed Framework.

The suspension of the oil deliveries to North Korea in November 2002implied that the administration treated the Agreed Framework asscrapped. In January 2000, Condoleezza Rice had characterized theAgreed Framework as an attempt “to bribe North Korea into forsakingnuclear weapons.”42 The Agreed Framework had, however, succeeded infreezing North Korea’s plutonium program. It would have been wise, asSouth Korea proposed, to maintain that freeze. The Perry Report hadsuggested exactly the same: “Unfreezing Yongbyon is North Korea’squickest and surest path to acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Agreed

Framework, therefore, should be preserved and implemented by theUnited States and its allies.”43 The Bush administration, however, dis-carded the Agreed Framework with the result that efforts to contain NorthKorea’s plutonium program had to be started from scratch.

President Roh Moo Hyun had demanded a leading role for his countryin resolving the nuclear crisis. He admitted, however, that the UnitedStated had “the final key to the six-party talks.”44 Indeed, the views of theUS administration regularly prevailed. The differences between the twoallies could not be bridged. Neither side hid its disappointment. President

Rho Moo Hyun even showed understanding for the claim by the NorthKoreans that nuclear weapons and missiles were a means of safeguardingtheir security.45 The differences with the United States resulted in a sort of backlash in South Korea. President Roh Moo Hyun had envisaged a for-eign policy that was not completely dependent on the United States. Hesaid that he would try to enhance relations “to a more balanced levelbased on reciprocity.”46 Though his government could not carry throughits ideas on how the talks with North Korea should proceed, PresidentRoh went so far as to demand that the United States-South Korea relations

should stand “on an independent and equal footing.”47

President Roh’spolicy towards the United States was later called a new “independentpolicy.”48 Immediate cause was a bureaucratic infighting between offi-cials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade who favored the



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224 Juergen Kleiner

traditional cooperation with the United States and had ridiculed thepresident’s policy on the one side, and the president’s staff on the otherside. The results of the National Assembly elections of 15 April 2004 that

gave the president’s Uri Party a strong majority, confirmed public supportfor a progressive policy. Since then the South Korean government hasbeen playing with varying formulas. Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon usedthe formula of a “horizontal relationship.”49 President Rho demanded “abalancing role” for his country in Northeast Asia.”50 Later on, the SouthKorean government made it clear that an independent policy includeswartime operational control over its forces. In December 2005 the twoallies agreed to establish a task force to discuss the transfer of wartimecommand of the Korean forces from the United States to the Republic of

Korea.51

The problem is that as far as questions of security are concerned,South Korea still has to rely on the United States. This became once againobvious when dramatic changes in the military set-up were discussed.

In June 2004 the administration informed the South Korean governmentof its plan to reduce the number of US troops in Korea by a third (i.e.,12,500 troops) calling this realignment a result of the Global DefensePosture Review.52 Not much was left for the South Korean governmentbut to ask for a review of this decision or at least a delay. The first UStroops leaving Korea were the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division

which moved to Iraq in the summer of 2004, a move that had beenannounced already in May 2004.53 After long discussions within “TheFuture of the Alliance” (FOTA) framework, the allies reached agreementin 2004 about the relocation of US troops in Korea. US troops nowstationed in Seoul and the 2nd Infantry Division, now stationed north of Seoul, will move to bases south of the Han River.54 Accordingly anumber of US military bases were closed.55 Various missions will betransferred to South Korean forces. In the Joint Security Area in theDemilitarized Zone, for example, South Korean forces took over patrol

duties.56

The really interesting move is that of the 2nd

US Division frompositions close to the DMZ to areas south of the Han River. When thismove is completed, the US forces in Korea will be outside the artilleryrange of North Korean forces. They will not automatically get involved inan attack by North Korea. Thus, they will no longer serve as trip wire. It issurprising that the two allies agreed on such a fundamental change.Apparently both allies felt that the likelihood of a North Korean attack islow and/or that they could cope with it with the new military setup. Therelocation of the 8th Army to areas south of the Han River can also be

justified by the argument that the administration wanted to have its forcesstationed in safer positions in case it decides for the military option.57

The South Korean government reacted by talking about advancing itsself-defense schedule. Indeed, South Korea needs better capabilities for



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intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as a stronger airforce and navy.58 In spite of all its efforts to strengthen its military capa-bilities, South Korea will remain the junior partner.59

FRICTIONS

The recent differences between the South Korean and the American gov-ernments were accompanied by anti-American outbursts in South Korea.The disqualification of a South Korean skater in favor of an Americanskater during the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games in February 2002caused significant anti-American sentiments.60 The fiercest outburst wastriggered by the accidental killing of two schoolgirls in June 2002 by a US

Army tank during an exercise near Uijongbu.61

Other actions weredirected against American policies, some showed outright hostility, thebounders being fluid. Vigils against a possible American attack on NorthKorea or against the presence of US troops in Korea were held.62 Americanflags were burnt. An “Oh! No∼USA festival” as well as a comic audioclip featuring a simulated telephone conversation between Kim Dae Jungand George W. Bush amused many Koreans. A novel by Kim Jin MyungThe Third Scenario, depicting the US as wanting to suppress Koreans,became very popular. Anti-American activities and feelings were of

changing strength, and Pro-American rallies were held to counter the anti-American demonstrations. Cardinal Stephen Kim, well known for hisintegrity, expressed concern about the anti-American and pro-NorthKorean sentiments of South Korea’s youth.63

Various elements of this anti-Americanism are new. As Cardinal Kim hascorrectly remarked, anti-Americanism is strong among the youth. Accordingto a Pew Global Attitude Survey of May 2003, 71% of the 18–29 years oldshad an unfavorable opinion of the United States, while a year earlier thepercentage stood at 57%.64 Of the South Koreans who held unfavorable

views of the US, 72% expressed general hostility and not just disagree-ment with the policies of the Bush administration. One has to add thatamong the younger South Koreans the better educated tend to have partic-ularly unfavorable views of the United States.65 Among the Koreans of 50 years and older favorable opinions about the United States prevailed:In May 2003 the percentage stood at 63%. Thus there is a generation gapamong Koreans with regard to their attitude towards the United States.66

Those who remember the great support of the United States since thefounding of the Republic of Korea, and particularly during the Korean

War and thereafter in developing their country, retain a positive memoryof their ally. The younger generation that has no personal recollection of that period is critical of the United States. Their views are strengthened bya changed threat perception. They have little tendency to fear an attack by



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North Korea.67 The negative attitude by South Koreans toward the UnitedStates was confirmed by a public opinion survey done in January 2005according to which 395 of the respondents named the US as the country

most threatening to South Korea and 33% North Korea.68

Probably it wasthe administration’s policy of preemption, converted into prevention inIraq, which has considerably harmed American prestige among SouthKoreans. They suspect that a similar US policy towards North Koreacould result in a catastrophe on the peninsula.

Under the influence of the sunshine policy another gap among SouthKoreans has developed that is more of an ideological character, namelyone between liberals and conservatives.69 This gap only partly overlapsthe generation gap. The confrontation between these two groups is to a

certain extent reflected in the confrontation between the Uri Party and theGrand National Party. Liberals ( jinbo) consider North Koreans first of allas cousins in distress who deserve support.70 The South Korea MediaRating Board, appointed by the President, banned US made video gamesthat depicted the North Koreans as bad guys since it is no longer fashion-able to consider the North Koreans enemies.71 Liberals try to minimizethe military threat from the North and, consequently, have a critical, oftennegative view of US forces in South Korea. What they, however, fail tonotice is the fact that they have partly become the victims of clever North

Korean nationalist propaganda. It was particularly worrisome that in the fallof 2003 38% of respondents thought President Bush was more threateningto peace in Korea compared to 42,1% for Kim Jong Il.72 Conservatives(bosu) on the other hand consider the DPRK as still dangerous, insist on amore balanced relationship with the North Koreans, and plead for acontinuation of strong ties with the United States.

Some voices in the United States showed consternation with regard tothe anti-American sentiments in South Korea. During the CongressionalHearing with Assistant Secretary Kelly on 13 February 2003, various

representatives showed disappointment about the lack of appreciation of the decades of American assistance.73 A survey—not a scientific poll—by FOX Television done in mid 2004 showed that 825 persons of thoseAmericans who took part agreed that the withdrawal of one-third of USforces from South Korea was a good idea.74 The American disappoint-ment is understandable. Gratitude is, however, not a political category.One has, furthermore, to note that the Bush administration’s lack of respect for Korean sensitivities contributed to the negative feelingsamong Koreans towards the United States. A case in point is the “axis of

evil” statement by President Bush. The South Koreans reacted negativelyregarding it as inappropriate.75

The way in which the administration handled the nuclear crisis createdfurther distrust in South Korea. According to the Pew Survey mentioned



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above 76% of the South Koreans believed in May 2003 that the UnitedStates does not take into account South Koreans’ interests when makinginternational policy decisions. The administration should have treated the

ally with sensitivity. Instead it did not pay much attention to the intentionsand aspirations of the South Koreans.

ANOTHER TRY?

Both governments have repeatedly assured that the relationship is in greatshape. The fact, however, is that both countries have contributed to mak-ing the relationship a fragile one. Countries can of course define theirinterests as they see fit. If both sides come to the conclusion that it is in

their interest to preserve the alliance, they must energetically try to reacti-vate and deepen the relationship.76 Since the urgency of the next stepregularly defies efforts for a long-term strategy that has to take manyvariables into account, the allies’ considerations will probably focus oncurrent problems.77 The unification tunnel cannot been seen yet.78 Isstrengthening of the alliance in the interest of both allies?

In official publications by the South Korean government the impor-tance of the alliance with the United States is sometimes played down.The general remarks on the Blue House website, for example, do not

mention the alliance at all.79

If the South Korean government were toreconsider the situation, it would likely come to recognize that good rela-tions with its only ally are crucial. The United States remains the decisivepartner for manifold exchanges, for trade, for technology, for investment,and for higher education. It is still the indispensable ally as long as anattack by the North cannot be ruled out definitely. As has rightly beenpointed out, the intelligence capability of US forces in Korea alone iscrucial to keep North Korea in check.80 If the DPRK has indeed nuclearweapons, South Korea has to rely on the nuclear shield provided by the

United States. It is still unknown whether North Korea has nuclear weapons,but Siegfried Hecker, one of the best experts who has visited NorthKorean nuclear installations twice, stated recently that one has to assumethat the DPRK has nuclear bombs.81 Perhaps South Korea might considerproducing its own nuclear arsenal and thus become independent fromAmerican protection.82 In view of the many complications involved, thisis, however, a remote option.

Since it is, therefore, necessary to maintain the alliance with the UnitedStates the South Korean government should actively try to improve the

climate for a strong cooperation. It should opt for a more mature, steadycourse of its foreign policy. The South Korean government should acceptthe fact that a split between its own policies and those of the US administra-tion towards the DPRK enlarges the options for Kim Jong Il. Realpolitik ,



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228 Juergen Kleiner

not dreams is in demand. Not the United States but the DPRK stands inthe way of reunification. The South Korean government should realizethat its present policy which gives absolute priority to an engagement of

North Korea means that a leader remains in power who brutally suppresseshis people. The South Korean government should realize that in spite of allefforts and many prior concessions, the DPRK did not change internally,that no real reduction of tensions on the peninsula was achieved, and thatSouth-North relations do not yet follow any steady trend. Proliferationhas to be taken seriously. Cooperation with the United States shouldreturn as the leitmotiv for the South Korean foreign policy. South Koreahas made a move to act once again in the spirit of the Mutual DefenseTreaty by sending troops to Iraq in the spring of 2003. The mission of

these forces was twice extended, but in December 2005 with the provisothat 1,000 of the 3,200 military personnel will be withdrawn.83 In addi-tion, South Korea’s top politicians should publicly speak out for such apolicy and not just confide their good ideas to government websites.84

Public opinion should be won for continuing close ties with the UnitedStates. The South Korean government should take the lead and try tooppose erroneous public assumptions about the relationship with theUnited States. It has already defended the latest revision of the Status of Forces Agreement.85 It will have to get over possible local opposition

against the relocation of US forces to the Osan-Pyontaek area. The SouthKorean government should also fight the symptoms of anti-Americanism.This should not be too difficult. As Jinwung Kim has shown, South Koreanshave ambivalent views of the US military presence. Polls show “thatmany South Koreans are skeptical of the American military presence intheir country but still feel a need for it.”86 The ambivalence of the SouthKorean attitude towards the United States became also obvious when theRho Moo Hyun government, though it was looking for a self-reliantdefense, asked the administration not to withdraw military forces from the

peninsula.87

Thus it demonstrated the same reflex that all preceding SouthKorean governments had shown when a withdrawal of US troops wasthreatening. This situation is an excellent starting point for reviving closerties with the United States.

For the United States the alliance does not have the same importance asfor the South Korean partner. It has even been suggested that South Koreahas little security relevance for the United States and that a war on thepeninsula would be irrelevant to the US.88 The South, this argument contin-ues, could defend itself alone. Therefore, the subsidies for South Korea,

including its “military free-ride,” should be ended, the American militarywithdrawn from the peninsula, and the Mutual Defense Treaty cancelled.

The estimates of the costs for raising and maintaining US units inSouth Korea and their reinforcements vary between $15 and $30 billion



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annually.89 A withdrawal of US troops from Korea would only diminishthe burden of the American taxpayer if it were accompanied by an similarreduction of overall military forces of the United States. As long as fight-

ing continues in Afghanistan and Iraq, this is not likely to happen. Tomove the troops now stationed in Korea to bases in the United Stateswould not help to save costs. On the contrary, there will no longer beanybody available who helps out with cost sharing.

Disengagement is not in sight. It can be assumed that the Bushadministration will stick to its National Security Strategy. As long asNorth Korea is a troublemaker in Northeast Asia the United States will“maintain vigilance towards the North” and will develop the alliance withthe Republic of Korea to contribute “to the broader stability of the

region.”90

The United States will maintain forces in the region as asymbol of its commitment and “to contend with uncertainty.”91 Indeed,the United States has maintained forces in Korea not only to defend itsally, but also to satisfy its own interests. Ever since US forces weredeployed to South Korea in 1945, this part of the peninsula has beeninside the American strategic “defensive perimeter,” declarations to thecontrary notwithstanding. The alliance guarantees American predomi-nance by keeping the Republic of Korea within the US imperium. A waron the peninsula might not pose a threat to the security of the United

States, because it would be fought far away from the US homeland. Itwould, however, affect the political position of the United States as thedominant pacific power. The United States would react in the same way itdid in 1953: it would oppose an attack on a country that belongs to itssphere of influence. By completely withdrawing its troops from Korea theUnited States would give up its most valuable instrument of influencingdevelopments on the peninsula. The day may come when little brotherwill propagate such a development. For the time being, however, bothsides seem to prefer that the present setup be continued.

As long as the uncertainties about North Korea prevail, it is a sensiblestrategy to provide for a worst case scenario. The administration should,however, take the South Korean efforts of reconciliation seriously. It shouldabstain from hurting the feelings of the South Koreans. Some importantsteps in that direction have already been taken. The relocation of the USgarrison from Seoul to Pyontaek removes “an irritant to the population of South Korea” since it occupied precious real estate in the heart of the city.92

The relocation of the 7th Division to a rear area leaves the mission to mandefenses directly behind the DMZ to the South Korean forces.

In his press conference on 13 April 2004, President Bush talked abouthis vision “to change the world for the better.”93 A large part of his secondinaugural address on 20 January 2005 was devoted to the idea of spreadingliberty in the world. The president said, “The best hope for peace in



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230 Juergen Kleiner

our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.”94 He added that theUnited States would support the growth of democratic movements “withthe ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” This vision is noble, but

it is unclear what actions are envisaged. It comes to mind that moral valueshave often been used to justify American interventions. Translated to thesituation on the Korean peninsula it is unrealistic to assume that foreignerscould undertake the task of fundamentally changing the relationshipbetween the two Koreas. Only the Korean people can decide about thetrack that it wishes to follow. The general idea is clearly expressed inthe Friendly Relations Resolution of the UN General Assembly.95 Theresolution states that “all peoples have the right freely to determine,without external interference, their political status and to pursue their

economic, social and cultural development.” In the eyes of the Koreansthe relationship between South and North is an issue of self-determination.Korea, they feel belongs to the Koreans, and it is not up to the UnitedStates government to decide Korea’s fate. The United States, however,is used to being deeply involved in Korea’s fate. The American role inthe Korean War, that had basically started as a civil war, and the subse-quent support for South Korea had expanded American involvement.The United States can reassert its influence on the peninsula only if itrespects the Koreans’ right to self-determination. Rhetoric is not good

enough. It will be an upward battle to regain the trust of a majority of South Koreans. The doubts of American allies worldwide about thecourse of the administration’s foreign policy and its reasoning havespread to the peninsula.

This means in concrete terms that the administration should return itsfocus on Korea and be willing to discuss basic South Korean assumptionsfor the policy towards North Korea. Perhaps the strategic consultations ona ministerial level that got started in January 2006 provide a basis formeaningful discussions.96 The US government should abandon the option

of working for a collapse of the North, not because the North has sud-denly changed its ugly face, but because the South Koreans are strictlyagainst such a turn of events. The responsibility assumed by the UnitedStates and the DPRK in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 “torespect each other’s sovereignty” should be translated into reality imme-diately. The new attitude should be reflected in the way both sides treatand talk publicly about each other. The US government should acceptSouth Korean suggestions to show more flexibility. It is difficult to seethat any meaningful progress can be reached without demonstrating to the

North Koreans that their security is not in danger.The efforts by the governments should be supported by track two

diplomacy.97 Citizens and private organizations from South Korea and theUnited States should get together and focus on ways to improve the ties



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between their countries. As private persons they are not bound by instruc-tions and have more leeway in coming to results. They should first of alldiscuss a reasonable approach to solving the nuclear problems posed by

the DPRK.

PERSPECTIVES

To maintain a strengthened bilateral alliance is also in the long-terminterest of both allies. A united Korea will be preoccupied with theproblems arising from the task of unifying the country. During transi-

tion, a period of uncertainty, it will appreciate a continuation of USbacking and support. To have a united Korea as an ally is in the strategicinterest of the United States, less in the name of military redundancy butmore with a view to strengthening America’s position as a pacificpower. Forward-deployed US forces on the Korean peninsula are a clearsymbol of power projection.

It would be a good idea to transform the two separate alliances of theUnited States with Korea and Japan into a trilateral partnership. With aview to the track record of Korean–Japanese relations it seems, however,

unlikely that the historical enmity of Korea against Japan can be sur-mounted. Whether it will be attractive for Seoul to become a party to aloose coalition of allies of the United States in Asia remains to be seen.During transition a united Korea will be afraid of being dragged into anyconflict. Neither will counter-terrorism be a convincing argument to drawKorea into a coalition of willing allies.98 The Republic of Korea hassuffered from terrorism, namely state terrorism by North Korea, andcoped with it. This kind of terrorism will be gone after reunification. Theterrorism of other groups, particularly of the dangerous type that are

based on common ethnicity, history, and religious fervor, has so far notbeen directed against Korea.

Thus the two allies might focus on transforming their bilateral militarycooperation. These talks will be difficult enough since they will have todeal with sensitive issues, off-peninsula missions of US forces stationedin Korea, wartime operational control by the South over its own forces,the future of the Combined Forces Command, and perhaps even off-peninsula missions of Korean forces.

Even if both sides, the Republic of Korea and the United States of

America, are willing to try a new learning curve, success is not guaran-teed. Korean nationalism and the dynamism of the present Americanforeign policy with its occasional traces of overestimating the possible areobstacles that are hard to overcome.



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232 Juergen Kleiner

NOTES

1. For details see Chapter 18 “South Korea’s Great Partner’” in Juergen Kleiner,

Korea. A Century of Change , Singapore 2001, pp. 307–322.2. The term was used for the original United States–Pakistan relationship.

3. Department of State, “Background Notes: South Korea” (October 2004), on the

Web site of the State Department; “Combined Forces Command,” on the Web

site of US Forces Korea.

4. In 2002 South Korea used 2.8% of its GNP for defense, see the Report on Allied

Contributions to the Common Defense , A Report to United States Congress by

the Secretary of Defense, July 2003, Part I-3, II-5 and II-19 (on the Department

of Defense Web site).

5. Arms Control Association, “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a

Glance,” September 2004 (at www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/mtcr.asp).6. Jin Young Chung, “Cost Sharing for USFK in Transition: Whither the US-

ROK Alliance?” in Donald W. Boose, Jr., Balbina Y. Hwang, Patrick Morgan,

Andrew Scobell, Recalibrating The US-Republic of Korea Alliance , May 2003,

pp. 44–45.

7. See the Report , mentioned in footnote 5.

8. Web site of US Forces in Korea: “US-ROK SOFA and Related Agreements.”

9. Chuck Downs, Over the Line. North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy , Washington

1999, pp. 130–131.

10. Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, New York 1995, pp. 109–112

and 169–171; Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers, Nuclear Diplomacy with NorthKorea, Princeton 1998, pp. 86–89 and 193.

11. Peace and Cooperation, White Paper on Korean Unification 1996 , Ministry of

National Unification, Republic of Korea, Seoul 1996, p. 60, similarly p. 122.

12. Ibid. p. 123.

13. Ryan J. Barilleaux, Andrew Ilsu Kim, “Clinton, Korea, and Presidential Diplo-

macy,” World Affairs , Summer 1999, Vol. 162, Iss. 1, p. 29.

14. Quoted by Mazarr p. 176, and footnote 93.

15. Hong Nack Kim, “Foreign Relations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government,” in

Kongdan Oh, Korea Briefing 1997–1999 , pp. 148–155; Edward A. Olsen, “US

Policy Toward the Inter-Korean Dialogue,” in Kongdan Oh and Ralph C.

Hassig, Korea Briefing 2000–2001, pp. 149–179.

16. Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea,

7 March 2001 (on the White House Web site).

17. New York Times , 28 February 2001.

18. Text in People’s Korea, 15 June 2000.

19. Juergen Kleiner, “The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by

North Korea,” Diplomacy and Statecraft , Vol. 16 (June 2005), pp. 203–226.

20. Speech on 31 October 2002 (on the Chongwadae Web site).

21. See for example his statements on 31 October 2002 (on the Chongwadae Web

site) and on 13 April 2005 (Korea Herald , 14 April 2005).

22. With regard to the costs see Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse. The Future

of the Two Koreas , Washington 2000, p. 285 et seq.



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23. Korea Herald , 16 April and 6 June 2005.

24. Washington Post , 12 July 2005, Korea Herald , 14 July 2005, International Herald

Tribune , 13 July 2005.

25. For details on South Korean reactions see for example Jinwung Kim (2001),

p. 187 et seq.

26. The term was coined by William M. Drennan, “The US Role in Korean Reuni-

fication,” Korea and World Affairs , Vol. 22 (Summer 1989), p. 172.

27. Department of Defense News Briefing, 23 December 2002 (on the Department

of Defense Web site).

28. KCNA, 10 February 2005.

29. Korea Herald , 15 February 2005.

30. Reuters quoting President Roh Moo Hyun on 13 April 2005.

31. Washington Post , 23 May 2005, Korea Herald , 13 July 2005.

32. Korea Herald , 15 April 2005.33. Korea Herald , 19 November 2005.

34. Korea Herald , 10 December 2005.

35. US Department of the Treasury, Press Release, dated 15 September 2005 (on

the Treasury Department Web site, accessed on 18 December 2005; see also

John K. Cooley, “The Rogue money printers of Pyongyang,” International

Herald Tribune , 25 October 2005.

36. Reuters, 20 October 2005 (english.epochtimes.com/news/5–10–22/33618.html,

accessed on 18 December 2005).

37. Korea Herald , 5 and 29 December 2005.

38. Korea Herald , 7 and 16 December 2005, International Herald Tribune ,21 December 2005.

39. New York Times , 23 November 2002.

40. Text of the statement: Washington Post , 19 September 2005.

41. New York Times , 25 October 2002; Kim Sung Han, “1994 Agreed Framework

Should Be Maintained,” Korea Times , 5 November 2002.

42. Condoleeza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs , January/

February 2000, p. 61.

43. “Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recom-

mendations,” Unclassified Report by Dr. William Perry, 12 October, 1999 (on

the Department of State Web site).44. New York Times , 23 January 2003, Washington Post , 18 July 2005.

45. See President Roh’s speech in Los Angeles on 12 November 2004 that summa-

rized his view on the nuclear crisis (on the Blue House Web site).

46. Press Conference, 4 December 2002 (on the Chongwadae Web site).

47. Interview, 23 January 2003 (on the Chongwadae Web site).

48. Korea Herald , 16 January 2004.

49. Korea Herald , 11 November 2004.

50. Speech at the Military Academy on 22 March 2005 (on the Blue House Web site).


52. Reuters , 7 June 2004.53. Department of State Washington File, EPF206, 18 May 2004 (on the Web).

54. US Department of Defense, News Releases No.706–04 and 995–04, 23 July and

6 October 2004; see also the Joint Communiqué: 36th Annual US-ROK



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234 Juergen Kleiner

Security Consultative Meeting, 25 October 2004 (Department of State

Washington File EPF 109, on the Department’s Web site).


56. Korea Herald , 1 November 2004.

57. Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, The Korean Conundrum. America’s

Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, New York 2004, p. 93.

58. Kang Choi, “Restructuring the Alliance for Regional and Global Challenges,”

(http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS53491).

59. See also Lee Sang Hyun, “Past, Present, and Future of the Korea-US Alliance,”

East Asia Review , Vol. 15, No.2 (Summer 2003), pp. 82–83.

60. Eric V. Larson, Norman D. Levin with Seonhae Baik, Bogdan Savych, “Ambiv-

alent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the United States,”

RAND Corporation March 2004, p. 75, Table 4.3.

61. Donald Kirk, “US and South Korea start a new dance,” The World and I , May2003, Vol. 18, Issue. 5, p. 62.

62. For the examples mentioned in the text see New York Times , 13 December 2002,

5 January and 31 March 2003; Korea Times , 30 April 2002; for the difficulties

concerning a definition of anti-Americanism see Balbina Y. Hwang, “Anti-

Americanism in Korea: Implications for the Future of the US-ROK Alliance,”

East Asia 20, No. 2, Summer 2003, p.60.

63. Korea Herald, 3 February 2004.

64. For these and the following figures see Pew Research Center for the Peoples and

the Press: International Public Concern about North Korea, but Growing anti-

Americanism in South Korea (on the PEW Web site); see also the poll conductedby Seoul National University in January 2003 (Korea Herald , 11 April 2003).

65. Larson and Levin, p. 75, Table 4.7, and pp. 95–99.

66. See also the Chungang Ilbo poll of 13 January 2003, quoted by Jinwung Kim,

“Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States

Forces Korea (USFK),” Asian Affairs , Washington, Winter 2004, Vol. 30, Iss. 4,

p. 268; Stephen W Linton, “US policy on Korean peninsula needs an overhaul,”

Korea Herald , 23 July 2004.

67. Balbina Y. Hwang, loc. cit. p. 68.

68. Washington Post , 12 May 2005.

69. Taewoo Kim, “Perceptions of North Korea and Polarization of ROK Society,”in Boose and others, loc. cit., pp. 139–159.

70. Similarly Donald P. Gregg, “The United States and South Korea: An Alliance

Adrift,” in Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto, The Future of Amer-

ica’s Alliances in Northeast Asia, Stanford, 2004, p. 148.

71. New York Times , 7 December 2005.

72. Lee Chung Min, p. 212.

73. US Congress Hearing with Jim Kelly, 13 February 2003 (on the Web site of the

Federal News Service, 13 February 2003).

74. Korea Herald , 10 June 2004.

75. Katrin A. Fraser, “Reflections on Anti-American Sentiment in Korea,” The Korea Society Quarterly , Spring 2002, pp. 15–16 with footnote 10.

76. Different C. S. Eliot Kang, “Restructuring the US-South Korea alliance to deal

with the second Korean nuclear crisis,” Australian Journal of International



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Affairs , Vol. 57, No.2 (July 2003), pp. 309–324, who recommends more distance

in the alliance.

77. For an overview over the discussions of the future of the alliance see Charles M.

Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, James L. Schoff, Toshi Yoshihara, Alliance Diversifi-

cation and the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Alliance, 2004 , particularly pp.

36–51. The authors focus on policies for the post-North Korea period.

78. For the term “unification tunnel” see Lee Chung Min, “Domestic Politics and

the Changing Contours of the ROK-US Alliance: The End of the Status Quo,”

in Armacost and Okimoto, p. 216 footnote 14.

79. http://english.president.go.kr/warp/en/news/goals.php (accessed on 4 January

2006).

80. Lee Sang Hyun, Past, “Present, and Future of the Korea-US Alliance,” East

Asian Review , Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 2003. p. 82.

81. Washington Post , 9 November 2005.82. An option favored by and Bandow loc. cit pp. 84–100.

83. KOIS: Activities of Korean Troops in Iraq, on the KOIS Web site, July 2004;

JoongAng Daily, 27 December 2004; Washington Post , 31 December 2004;

Washington Post , 30 December 2005.

84. See the chapter ROK-US Relations on Korea.net that suggests a mature

Korean–American relationship.

85. Facts and Current Developments of Korea-US Status of Forces Agreement,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 11 April 2002 (on Korea.net).

86. Jinwung Kim loc. cit. in footnote 54; Jinwung Kim, “From ‘American gentle-

men’ to ‘Americans’: Changing Perceptions of the United States in South Koreain Recent Years,” Korea Journal , 41 Issue 4, Winter 2001, p. 179; see also Victor

D. Cha, “America and South Korea: The ambivalent alliance?” Current History ,

September 2003, Vol.102, Issue 665, p. 279; Larson, pp. 51–59.

87. Korea Herald , 7 March 2003.

88. This idea has been advanced Carpenter and Bandow from the Cato Institute

since many years, recently in the book quoted in footnote 57, passim, particu-

larly chapters 4 and 5.

89. Carpenter and Bandow p. 118; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 1997, p. 311.

90. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September,

p. 26 (on the White House Web site).91. Ibid. p. 29.

92. C. Rice, quoted by The Korea Herald , 20 August 2004.

93. President Addresses the Nation in Prime Time Press Conference (on the White

House Web site).

94. New York Times , 21 January 2005.

95. A/Res.2025 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

96. Korea Herald , 11 and 21 January 2006.

97. For example by Lee Sang Hyun (mentioned in footnote 58), p. 85.

98. Different Charles M. Perry a. o. p. 59 et seq.



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