Control over energy resources is key in regional domestic conflicts 

Ongoing developments in the struggle for oil in the Middle East has revealed that production facility

protection forces are one of the most effective parties in the conflict between governments, terrorists

and militias. Generally, protection forces have played a supportive role to governments in the region

such as Iraq and Yemen. They have occasionally taken on a combative role against ISIS, as seen in

Iraq and Kurdistan. These forces even assist when it comes to preventing illegitimate forces from

gaining control of oil production facilities, as is seen in Yemen.

Oil protection forces have played a similar role in Libya, countering ISIS attacks over the first few months of

2016. This might change in the coming months, as their role has been decreased due to the Libyan National

Army retaking control of the primary oil fields in the Oil Field Crescent on Sep. 11th, 2016.

It seems that for the protection forces to undertake their roles efficiently in the coming period, continued

financial and logistical support must be received by the local governments or the International Community.

This all falls within the framework of combatting terrorism, with ISIS as the top priority.

Continued support for the protection forces also requires that regional aspirations move towards merging all

political factions involved with the protection forces in order to stabilize the environment surrounding oil

production facilities.

Differing Patterns:

These forces, in almost all cases, are comprised of tribal men and armed local militias. They can be divided

into two main characterizations:

1. Official Forces: The protection forces in Iraq fall under the jurisdiction of the Energy Police. Their

structure is considered to be a security apparatus and has shifted in the last couple of years from

depending heavily on local security firms and tribal fighters, to helping them combat ISIS and playing

a much larger role in protecting the oil fields. Aside from these forces, the Iraqi government still relies

on semi-official forces, such as the Shiite Militias, to secure oil production fields and their resulting

pipelines. The government also relies on security firms in a limited scope to help in securing their

facilities. For example, “Basra Gas Company” signed an agreement with security company G4S in

2014 in order to secure their facilities.

2. Semi Official/Unofficial Forces: In most cases, protection forces that work in regional countries

experiencing struggle, work under a semi-official status, as is the case in Syria, Yemen and Libya. In

this respect, and despite the government creating an official protection force, the Libyan Facilities

Protection Forces, in 2005, the current status after the collapse of the Libyan National Institutes is

mostly based on military alliances that include tribal fighters in the Oil Crescent Region, specifically

the Magharebia. Yemen presents a similar case. After state institutions collapsed once the Houthis

seized the capital of Sanaa in September 2014, popular resistance forces began to protect these

facilities alongside tribal forces in the provinces of Maareb and Hadramout. In Syria, due to the

splitting up of the oil fields between ISIS, the Kurds and the Syrian Regime, each party is responsible

for protecting their own oil facilities.

Mapping the Struggle:

Oil protection forces have been transformed into a primary actor in the struggle for oil. Other actors are the

numerous terrorist and militia groups of the region. Given the value of what the forces are protecting, they

were always going to be a source of conflict. Their role in the regional conflict can be summarized by the

following:

1. Taking Control of Oil Production Facilities: The protection forces are one of the leading causes of

strife for oil resources in regional states since 2011. The Libyan Facilities Guard is a standard model

for this, as per the indicators over the last couple of years. Besides the number of protests that have

been repeatedly started by the Libyan Facilities Guard over the last period in order to receive higher

salaries, in March 2014 the Libyan Oil Guard, led by Ibrahim El Gadran, undertook their first attempt

at an illegal oil sale with approximately 230 thousand tons of crude oil from the port of Sedra. The

result was that the tanker was forced to return to the Libyan coast after a US fleet was able to take

control of the ship in the middle of the Mediterranean, sending a clear signal that the US would not

allow for the illegal sale of Libyan oil. This action was in line with Security Council Resolution 2146

issued in 2014 which stated that illegal oil sales from Libya would be met with reprimands on all who

seek to abuse this, or who try to turn Libya’s oil into their own fortune.

2. Protecting Facilities from Terrorist and Militia Groups: Until recently, oil was a primary resource

for ISIS, who had succeeded in gaining control over a number of oil fields in Syria and Northern Iraq.

However, in light of the increased military strikes against their positions and oil facilities from the

international coalition, their production capabilities have been reduced to only 30,000 barrels of oil per

day, roughly half of its former capacity.

In the same way, ISIS in Libya (who are centered around Sirte), have repeatedly tried to take over the

Libyan oil fields (Mabrouk, El Ghany and El Baidaa), however protection forces have been able to

prevent them from carrying out their attacks.Besides these losses, the Peshmerga Kurdish forces

have also sought to take responsibility for protecting oil fields in the provinces of Kirkuk. That would

include the fields of Kirkuk, Bay Hassan, Gambour and in Khabaz. In light of the military and security

vacuum caused by the retreat of Iraqi forces from these facilities, the Kurdish forces may gain control.

At the moment, this region produces almost 150,000 barrels of oil a day and Kurdish control would

allow the Kurdistan government to put pressure on the central government in Baghdad in the ongoing

negotiations over splitting up oil revenues.

From another point of view, the Libyan National Army’s control over the ports in the Oil Crescent

Region (Ras Lanouf, El Sedra, El Zawyatena and El Berqya) will increase confrontations with

protection forces of oil fields in the coming months. The Libyan National Army is more than certain to

seek control over these ports, with the aim of regaining its financial and political status through its

security ventures there.

Since the Houthi takeover In Yemen, the mission of the resistance forces, in cooperation with the

internationally recognized government in Aden, has been to protect oil facilities in the province of

Maareb, Hadramout, and any others that need military and financial support in order to face up

against attempts by the Houthis or Al Qaeda to take over the oil fields.

In light of Arabian support, these forces have been able to secure the oil facilities. In fact, the Yemeni

government declared in August 2016 that it has been able to resume production and export crude oil

from the province of Hadramout after it was cut off for nearly 1.5 years, showing an improvement in

the security environment there.

Future Paths:

Until now, the balance of power is in favor of protection forces in most of the countries in the region. Mostly

due to the support being given to these forces from a number of regional and international actors.

The success of government plans in retaking control over oil resources will depend on two primary factors:

one, reinforcing the military power of the oil guard and two, supporting the opportunities of rapprochement

between the various political actors involved.

Targeting leadership in the war against ISIS

The announcement by the US Department of Defense of the killing of a prominent ISIS leader, Abu

Mohamed Al-Adnani who was the group’s promotion and recruitment officer on August 30, 2016. This

raised a number of questions about the repercussions of targeting leadership of terrorist groups and

whether this could impact the groups cohesion due to the leader’s role and influence. These questions

have gained particular importance in light of the increased targeting of such leaders recently. This

particular targeting of leaders appears to have become one of the main mechanisms followed by the

members of the allied forces participating in the war on terror, aiming to inflict the greatest amount of

damage to terrorist groups, especially ISIS.

Rising Trend

Recently, there has been a noticeable increase in targeting the leaders of prominent terrorist organizations in

the region. This is especially true of leaders of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. Leaders of terrorist groups have

been targeted by military strikes from the international coalition led by the US and other world powers.

Before the killing of Abu-Mohamed Al-Adnani, other leaders were also directly targeted. These include

Abdelrahman Al-Kadouli (March 25, 2016), who the US considered the number two man in ISIS, Abu-Al-Haija’

al-Tunisi, an ISIS leader killed in an American drone strike near Raqqa on March 31, 2016,as well as ISIS

leader in Al-Anbar in Iraq Wahib Ahmed Al-Fahdawi, killed on May 6, 2016, in an airstrike by the international

coalition – the Pentagon had described him as the military leader of Al-Anbar and a former Al-Qaeda member

– and Amr Al-Chichani, nicknamed ISIS’s minister of war, who was killed near Mosul on July 13, 2016.

This increase in direct targeting of ISIS leaders has led Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook to say that “It

is dangerous to be an ISIL leader in Iraq and Syria these days and for good reason.”

Besides ISIS, the leaders of other terrorist groups, such as Jabhat Fath Al-Sham (previously Jabhat Al-Nusra)

have also been targeted. On April 3, 2016, it was announced that the group’s spokesman Abu-Firas A-Souri,

was killed in the bombing of a training camp in Idlib.

An American drone strike also resulted in the death of prominent Al-Qaeda in Yemen leader Jalal Bileidi,

known as Abu-Hamza, in February of 2016. Other world powers have also participated in such missions, such

as Italy’s airstrike on the Libyan city of Sirt in the beginning of June, 2016, which led to the death of Mirghhani

Badawi Al-Bashir, known as Abu-Al-Hareth, one of ISIS’s most prominent leaders in Libya.

All of these above missions offer a clear indication that the powers involved in the war on terror now recognize

the importance of individual leaders within terrorist organizations, as well as the effects of their absence on the

cohesion of these groups and their ability to continue to exist. Therefore, these powers have started targeting

these leaders to take them out in a way that would weaken the terrorist organizations and push them to divide

or even disintegrate altogether.

Possible Repercussions

Multiple indicators show that the targeting of high-profile leaders within terrorist organizations greatly affects

these organizations. This is especially true at a time when terrorist organizations are the subject of military

missions from the international coalition and other forces. The most prominent results from the targeting of

leaders include:

1. Decline in foreign terrorist attacks: Attacks by terrorist groups outside their direct spheres of

influence – especially attacks by ISIS – depend strongly on the presence of leaders with deep

organizational and mission expertise for planning. With that in mind, the targeting of specific leaders

should lead to a decline in foreign attacks, especially in Europe. This is especially true with the death

of Abu-Muhamed Al-Adnani, nicknamed ISIS’s foreign mission engineer. This does not, however,

remove the risk of so-called lone-wolf individual attacks.

 2. Increase in random attacks: Second tier members who can replace targeted leaders usually lack

the experience of their predecessors. This will clearly reflect on the level of missions these new

leaders can prepare for and carry out going forward. Due to the lack of experience, these attacks will

most likely be of the random kind to enable the new leaders to prove their ability to take on main

missions within the terrorist groups. As random attacks, they will most likely not have as big an

impact as previous attacks by these groups.

There is no doubt that these groups will be under a lot pressure going forward. This is because the

attacks by the international coalition and other groups do not leave a lot of room for these groups to

carry out large missions in response. This does not, however, mean that some of these groups

continue to have the relative ability to withstand the pressure and restraints they are currently under.

3. Organizational dysfunction: The main leaders of terrorist organizations usually have the support of

various members and factions due to their hierarchical status. This is known in terrorist group

literature as “the superiority of jihad elders.” Meanwhile, young members promoted to fill the

vacancies left behind by these leaders lack organizational skills and are usually the same age as

many of the members, leading to divisions about the authority of these new leaders who generally

lack internal consensus. This absence of consensus usually leads to a state of organizational

dysfunction, later reflected on the groups’ performance, cohesion, and effectiveness.

4. Intellectual decline: Targeting intellectual leaders within terrorist groups often leads to intellectual

decline, especially when facing competing terrorist groups. This is due to the group losing leaders

who defend it, keep it cohesive, and help attract new members.

5. Imbalance among terrorist groups: Targeting high-profile leaders in terrorist groups has a direct

effect on the power balance between the various groups, which is a crucial factor in their interactions.

Indicators show that the targeting of a large number of ISIS leaders will lead to a shift in the power

balance towards Al-Qaeda, ISIS’s traditional rival seeking to put themselves back on the map, and

which has seen a decline as ISIS has become more prominent in recent years.

All of this is not to say that targeting the leaders of terrorist groups has led to their complete collapse. ISIS, for

example, still has the ability to maintain its activities in Iraq and Syria, despite the pressure it is under whether

thanks to losing control of major regions recently or the targeting of its military and organizational leadership.

It may be worth mentioning that terrorist groups are now aware of the importance of strengthening and

supporting its leaders and members to handle the absence of their main leadership tiers. This means

that this new direction that focuses on targeting the main leaders of terrorist groups may affect their

existence and cohesion in the long term by affecting their ability to recruit new members to replace the

vast losses incurred by military strikes. This may be a definitive way to weaken and eventually

overcome these groups in the future.

FARAS Highlights October 6, 2016

Iran

Iran’s attempts to politicize the Hajj PilgrimageThe article sheds light on demands set forth by Tehran with regard to the Hajj pilgrimage. It states that Iran is exacerbating tensions with Saudi Arabia by turning the Hajj pilgrimage into a proxy battleground in which they compete with the Kingdom. Read more

Effectiveness of mediation between Riyadh and Tehran Following the execution of cleric Nimr al-Nimr, escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and an absence of traditional mediators (the US and EU) the article studies other possible mediators to the conflict and explains their motives. Read more

In Reading Putin, Don’t Mistake Nostalgia for Ambition

Photo:EPA/MIKHAIL KLIMENTYEV /SPUTNIK

Does Vladimir Putin want to restore the Soviet Union? Nobody can irrefutably prove that he does not. However, nobody can prove either that Barack Obama does not want to turn the United States into amonarchy or that Bill Bailey has no wish to become the new Dalai Lama. It is apparent that Putin feels nostalgic about the Soviet past, which is only natural for a person of his age and background. I also feel nostalgic about the 1970s and 1980s: these were the times of my childhood and my youth, with all the wonderful, unforgettable things so uniquely associated with that period in life.

All the dreams, wishes, hidden desires and nostalgia brushed aside, can Putin realistically plan to restore the Soviet Union? The answer is a definite “no” assuming that the Russian leader is a rational politician capable of a realistic assessment of Russia’s current capabilities as well as of the nature of today’s international system.

First, the Soviet Union was erected on the foundation of a cohesive and powerful communist ideology that had – at least in the first half of the 20th century – hundreds of millions of enthusiastic supporters all over the world.

REUTERS/Sergei KarpukhinThe Marginalia of Russia’s Foreign Policy Today

The current Kremlin emphasis on “sovereignty” and importunate concerns about the “color revolutions” demonstrate isolationist rather than expansionist reflexes of the regime; both display the evident fear of foreign ideologies penetrating Russia rather than an intention to promote another universalist ideology abroad.

Second, the Soviet Union had at its foundation a unique modernization model. It was cruel and ruthless, but in many ways, it provided for very efficient social and political mobilization. The most graphic example of this capacity is, of course, the Second World War, but there are others, such as the Soviet space program. Today this uniqueness no longer exists – Russia has become a capitalist state, even if its transition from communism is incomplete and incoherent.

Third, there is simply not the political will and commitment needed to start restoring the former Soviet Union. After German reunification, Berlin introduced the so-called “solidarity tax” to facilitate the integration of the former East Germany into the Federal Republic; German society accepted this additional burden without too much opposition. However, the idea of a similar “solidarity tax” to integrate Crimea into Russia did not meet with a lot of enthusiasm in Moscow and was swiftly abandoned.

Does this mean that Russia is not trying to maintain its influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union? Of course not. The former Soviet republics are not the same for Russia as British colonies in Africa were for the UK; the level of Soviet economic, social and cultural integration makes these republics more similar to Ireland and Scotland.

REUTERS/Darren OrnitzWhy a Plan for Future Russia-EU Relations Is Necessary

The chronicle of Kremlin policies in its neighborhood for the past 25 years has been to a large degree a chain of attempts – mostly quite clumsy and unsuccessful – to create a belt of friendly states along Russia’s borders, to maintain economic, social and humanitarian ties that have deep roots in the history of this vast region.

Long-term repercussions of the crises in Georgia and Ukraine make this goal more challenging and distant than ever, but even these bloody conflicts do not change a fundamental reality: Russia can be secure and prosperous only if it is surrounded by stable, vibrant and friendly neighbors.

The most recent attempt to approach this daunting task is the concept of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Should the West be concerned about this undertaking? Is it a disguised attempt to resurrect the Soviet Union?

Once again, my answer is “no.” In my view, EEU is either hopeless or harmless. It is hopeless if it remains a “holy alliance” of antiquated economic and social regimes unable and unwilling to launch any meaningful reforms. It is harmless if Eurasian economic integration goes hand in hand with a deep transformation of member states in the direction of free market, social innovation and political pluralism. In this latter case, Russia may finally overcome its post-imperial trauma without accumulating more costs in blood and treasure.

First published in RBTH

07 october2016

Russia’s Syria Campaign: Measuring Costs and Benefits

Photo:REUTERS/Vadim Savitsky Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visitsHmeymim air base in Syria, June 18, 2016

A year ago Russia announced the beginning of its military campaign in Syria which has become the first military operation of the Russian Armed Force in the Middle East. Being one of the major external actors in the Syrian conflict Russia has been staying away from direct involvement for four years. Interfering in the Syrian civil war upon the request of Bashar Assad’s government on September 30, 2015 Moscow changed the tide of the war on the ground safeguarding positions of the regime and proving Russia’s global power status.

Naturally, Russia’s involvement in Syria inflicted certain costs, brought some benefits and caused repercussions not only on the local and regional levels but also on the global scale.

Costs of Russia’s military campaign in Syria

Losses, casualties and expenses

According to the official data, until today Russia acknowledged the loss of 20 Russian servicemen who perished during the Syria campaign (three of them being non-combat casualties). It also lost three helicopters (two Mi-8 and one Mi-28N) and one Su-24 bomber jet. According to the Russian Defense Ministry the financial part of the military campaign in Syria does not require additional funds from the budget as it is covered by the current Defense budget. In March 2016, Vladimir Putin announced that Russian military campaign in Syria cost Russia about $500 million. In fact, this amount meets the assessments of the independent sources. Russian daily RBC says one year of Syria campaign cost Russia about $892 million (58 billion rubles), while UK’s IHS Jane’s think tankestimated it at the level between $2.3–$4 million daily.

Russian airliner was downed over the Sinai Peninsula on October 31, 2015 killing all 224 passengers and crew. Islamic State took responsibility for the attack. Many view it as a consequence of the Russia’s air campaign in Syria, hence, adding it to the overall costs of the military involvement in the conflict. Thus, this logic implies that by going into Syria and starting its bombing campaign Russia increased chances to be hit by the terrorist attacks at home and elsewhere.

At the first glance Syria is situated quite far from the Russian borders, however, it is relatively easy for terrorists to go through Turkey into the Caucasus and further to Russia, directly projecting the terrorist threat. Russia’s intervention into Syrian conflict sparked an increase in a number of Russian citizens who joined terrorist groups in Syria fighting against Assad. It also led to the amount of ISIS recruiters and cells rising domestically, making more troubles for the security

services. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of the Internal Affairs enhanced its anti-terrorist work since the start of the campaign in Syria as the terrorist threat increased. According to the FSB and Russia’s Interior Ministry there areup to 5,000 Russian citizens involved the terrorist organizations’ activities in Syria. This created quite real threat to Russia’s national security. Besides, in March 2016, Russia’s Prosecutor-General talked about 1,000 criminal cases against those who fought in the ranks of ISIS in Syria. Recently FSB said that terrorist organizations plan to expand their activities in the North Caucasus which increases the terrorist threat.

Russians and Arabs: in Search of a NewModus Vivendi

On November 24, 2015 Russian bomber jet Su-24 was shot down with an air-to-air missile fired by a Turkish F-16 over the Turkey-Syria border and crashed in Syrian territory. As a result, one pilot was killed, another one was rescued. This incident threw Russia-Turkey relations to the new low, although changing the situation on the ground in Syria. After the incident Moscow basically set up a non-fly zone by deploying its state of the art S-400 missile defense system which buried Turkish long-awaited plans for creating a non-fly zone in northern Syria and cut all military contacts with Turkey as well. Being an important player in Syria, Turkey is a necessary vis-à-vis in order to cooperate with if one wants to achieve its goals in Syria. Fortunately, the rift in Russia-Turkey relations is almost over now and countries are in the process of resuming their cooperation including the case of Syria. The restoration of Russia-Turkey ties and especially their coordination on Syria gives a hope for more effective struggle against ISIS in the region, especially in northern Syria. However, a big progress on Syria is quite unlikely as both Russia and Turkey have already invested too much to change their positions substantially. But still, such technical aspects as pilots’ code of conduct and military and air force cooperation to avoid incidents like the one with Russia’s Su-24 in November of 2015 are relatively easy to agree on and it seems that military-intelligence ties between the two have intensified. When Turkish Army launched its offensive Euphrates Shield in northern Syria many saw it going against Russia’s interests. In fact, by entering Syria Turkey took the border under its control, something that Russia called for a long time. It actually helps to prevent jihadists from the free passage of the Syria-Turkey border and to distract some of the terrorist forces from Aleppo. Participation of the Turkish jets in the Syria offensive has become the first time since Russia had deployed the S-400 in November, 2015. It essentially indicates that Russia granted Turkey an exemption from its no-fly zone in certain areas which means Putin and Erdogan agreed on some trade-offs in Syria and Moscow gave a green light to Ankara.

On the other hand, Turkey’s military operation in Syria is also against Kurdish militia (apart from being against ISIS), whom Ankara views as a branch of Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) which is labeled as a terrorist organization in Turkey. Although Russia supports Syrian Kurds to a certain degree, it maintains ties with both Turkey and Syrian Kurds and unlike the U.S., did not invest that much in Kurds which allowing itself more room for maneuver.

Public image costs and controversies

Russia’s intervention into Syrian conflict sparked an increase in a number of Russian citizens who

joined terrorist groups in Syria fighting against Assad.

Russia’s support for Assad regime, which is also backed by Shia Iran, makes Moscow a backer of Shias (Assad belongs to the Alawi minority which is considered to be a part of the Shia Islam) in the eyes of the majority of Sunnis who are against Assad regime. Hence, it may precipitate an anti-Sunni image of Russia contributing to the loss of its image among Sunnis in the region. Although it is quite a questionable argument which is aimed at exploiting the sectarian issues in the region, there is a certain narrative in media which frames the entire conflict in Syria as part of the greater Sunni-Shia confrontation. Therefore, there is a certain risk of growing pro-Shia perception of Russia which may change its image into that of a public enemy in the region.

According to the Zogby Research Services survey on the current crisis in the Middle East the majority of people residing in Sunni-dominated countries believe that Russian support for Assad regime is a significant factor in causing the Syrian conflict. Even in Egypt with whom Russia enjoys quite good relations 90 percent of population believe that Moscow is responsibility for the civil war. Contrary to that 68 percent of Iranians disagree with that. Moreover, given the fact that Russia’s own Muslim population is predominantly Sunni, it might contribute to increase of those among the Muslims who does not support Russia’s actions in Syria. Although it is unlikely to become an mass trend, it is certainly a cause for concern.

By interfering in the conflict, although at the request of the legitimate Syrian government, Russia has officially become a part of the conflict, which degrades its role as a moderator significantly. It alienates certain part of the Syrians and many of the Arab states as they do not see Russia as a moderator when it simultaneously bombs Syrian cities.

A Critical Look at Mainstream Analysis ofthe Russian Operation in Syria

Russia’s air campaign in Syria quite predictably led to the numerous accusations of the attacking civilians and “moderate opposition.” Although Russia insists that no hard evidence has been provided, it is hard to avoid casualties among civilians especially when the civil war is ongoing. As a result, it inflicts quite serious image losses as well.

Lack of control over the Syrian government

Contrary to the belief of many, Russia, as well as the U.S., has a limited influence on the Syrian regime. It is important to note that priorities for Moscow and Damascus in the conflict are different. Russia wants to save state institution and the figure of Assad is not its top priority. Moscow can compromise on the figure of the future Syrian leader on the condition that its interests won’t be harmed. Moreover, Moscow is also not ready to “go all-in” for Assad: its involvement in the conflict is limited and it won’t transform into a full-scale ground military operation which could provoke uncontrolled escalation of the conflict and lead to unpredictable consequences. So, Russia is ready to make certain concessions which go in contrast with the Syrian approach. Assad strives for keeping his power and reclaiming the entire Syria and is very reluctant to compromise. In addition, Iran-Syria alliance also should not be ignored. Tehran is interested in preserving Assad in power as

the representative of the Shia minority in the country. If Assad is deposed there is no guarantee that Iran’s interests in future Syria will be taken into account. Thus, the situation for Russia is becoming quite challenging with no guarantee that Assad and its Army will follow its instructions. As a result, everyone pursues their own, often diverging interests, which hinders any attempt to settle the conflict. As the recent Russia-U.S. Syria ceasefire agreement demonstrated, lack of control of patrons over their clients is one of the major obstacles.

Benefits

Preservation of the Syrian Army and other state institutions

Moscow is also not ready to “go all-in” for Assad: its involvement in the conflict is limited and it won’t transform into a full-scale ground military operation which could provoke uncontrolled escalation of the conflict and lead to unpredictable consequences.

The Russian air campaign stabilized the Assad regime and reinforced the Syrian Arab Army as it was quickly losing the ground during spring–summer of 2015. About 70 per cent of the Syrian territory was controlled by ISIS according to the Russian Defense Ministry. One of the Moscow’s primary goals in Syria is to preserve its state institutions, in particular its government and the army that can function, maintain relative order and fight terrorists. Preserving existing state structures is of the crucial importance because it does not let the country slip into chaos like it happened with Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and Yemen at various times. Given the chaos which might appear should the existing state structures collapse, Syria will turn into another terrorist hub. This creates quite real threat to Russia’s national security.

At the moment, on the territories controlled by the Syrian Arab Army state institutions (educational, medical, banking, etc.) continue to function and provide services, which saves the country from collapsing. This is what makes it important to preserve functioning (more or less) state institutions.

Although it cannot be said that Assad has gained a decisive advantage over its enemies, one can claim that his positions now are more stable and reinforced than they were before September 30, 2015.

Global power status and inter-power relations

Countering the threats from the Middle East

Russia has proved to be indispensable actor in the Middle East. Fighting ISIS and playing a major role in conflict resolution in Syria raises Russia’s global and regional status, refutes a myth about

Russia’s global isolation and gives it an upper hand in negotiating other issues with the West, such as the Ukraine crisis and lifting the sanctions imposed after the incorporation of Crimea.

Over the last year Moscow came much closer to the real military coordination with global actors like Washington and Paris in Syria. As Syrian skies got more crowded with U.S.-led coalition, Syrian and Russian jets, it required coordination to ensure the safety of flights. Russia has long been calling for exchange of intelligence and coordinates to fight terrorists more effectively and to avoid hitting “wrong targets” which usually spark a large wave of criticism and threaten to back roll all diplomatic efforts. However, it did not happen so far, although certain exchange of the information between Russian and the U.S. military is present. First, there is a Russia-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding on safety of flights, and second, as recently was stated by CENTCOM, exchange of information between the two militaries “is not uncommon.”

Russia set up military coordination with regional states like Jordan and Israel (the first from the U.S. allies in the region who agreed to coordinate with Russia after Kremlin’s decision to enter Syria on September 30, 2015), Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Such coordination underlines Russia’s important role in the Syrian crisis and in regional dynamics in general.

Contrary to some forecasts Russia managed to save and even improve its relations with the Gulf States, especially with Saudi Arabia which plays an important role in the Syrian crisis supporting various opposition militias like Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam famous for being extremist.

Demonstration of the Russian military power

For the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia is using military force far from its borders. What is even more significant is that it is the first combat experience of the Russian Army, in particular its Aerospace Forces, after the major military reform which started in 2008. It proved significantly increased mobility and coordination between different branches of military. It demonstrated Russia’s ability to quickly deploy quite significant amount of the military units abroad, thus showcasing its capacity to effectively project power beyond its borders.

Russia demonstrated its cutting-edge weapons and successfully tested them in combat for the first time. It allows Russia to uncover the shortfalls and glitches of the weapons at relatively low cost and to improve them for the future. The operation also greatly helped Russia to advertise its new weapons, such as advanced bombers and fighter jets Su-34 and Su-35, Kalibr cruise missiles, S-400 air defense system and Pantsir-S1 air defense artillery system, for prospective customers.

According to some estimates, Russian weapons exports are expected to receive a boost from $6 to $7 billion as a result of “marketing effect” of military campaign in Syria. Algeria, Indonesia, Vietnam and even Pakistan, which has long been buyers of the U.S. and Chinese military aircraft, expressed its interests in purchasing Sukhoi fighter and bomber jets. This can potentially expand Russia’s share of the arms market and increase the revenue.

Russia and Turkey: More Than a Rapprochement?

Russia has set up its first and only permanent military base in the Middle East which now guarantees its military presence in the region. Hmeymim base is located in the eastern Mediterranean cost of Syria near the city of Latakia. While the U.S., UK, France and Turkey already do have their military bases in the region it puts Russia on par with them in terms of the power presence.

Russia’s Defense Ministry regularly released reports with video andphoto footage of the airstrikes in Syria, together with regular press briefings and press tours for foreign journalists to the Russian airbase Hmeymim in Latakia and Russia’s warships off the Syria coast. This attempt to increase transparency of the Russian military actions in Syria and in general to make Defense Ministry more opened and media-friendly is quite successful. It makes it harder for opponents of the Russia’s involvement in Syria to disseminate false info or accuse it of various violations.

Degrading ISIS capabilities

It would be too hasty to conclude that Russia has achieved its declared goal of defeating ISIS and other terrorists in Syria. Rather, Russia degraded their capabilities. In mid-July 2016, Russian Defense Ministry wrapped up the results of the Russian military involvement in Syria stating that termination of the terrorists’ expansion is the most important achievement. According to the Ministry over 2,000 terrorists from Russia were killed in Syria including 17 field-commanders, with Russian artillery and air support 568 inhabited areas were liberated including 150 towns (including symbolic liberation of Palmyra in March 2016) and over 12,000 square kilometers which allowed to return 264,000 refugees. Certainly, terrorists are still far from the defeat but their capabilities were largely decreased. Rather than expanding their territories, they are but trying to keep under control what is left.

Pushing the political process forward

Russia demonstrated its cutting-edge weapons and successfully tested them in combat for the first time. It allows Russia to uncover the shortfalls and glitches of the weapons at relatively low cost and to improve them for the future.

After Russia started its military campaign in Syria the political process has been intensified. “Moscow found a way to translate the use of military power into desired political ends in the Middle East, something we have struggled with repeatedly in the US. I think looking a year on it is both remarkable how much Russia has achieved on the ground with the little military power they committed,”says Michael Kofman from the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute.

It created conditions for the ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and launch of the intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the UN Syria Envoy Stefan de Mistura. Although the political process is moving very slow and hard, and the ceasefire agreement is difficult to implement, it shows that

Russia and the U.S. can discuss Syria issue and possible ways of their military cooperation, which in general contributes to the dialog.

Contrary to concerns of many, Syria did not become Russia’s second Afghanistan, although it did not achieve a decisive victory there. Certainly Russia gained invaluable combat experience, increased its global military stature, and enhanced cooperation with regional and global powers on Syria. However, the major problem is still at place — to translate its political-military gains into a political solution of the Syrian crisis. Despite Russia’s involvement in the conflict it’s pacification or at least a freeze is still very distant.

So, now, with the Russia–U.S. Syria ceasefire agreement collapsing and no clear alternative for the resolution on the horizon, Moscow will have to adjust its tactics in Syria (as well as the U.S.). Russia will eventually need to increase its military presence in the country to get more leverage over Assad. That would ensure more control over Assad’s actions which will require the U.S. to act symmetrically. The apparent risk here is to be stuck in Syria for years. So, the second year will show whether Russia is able to learn from its and others mistakes and adjust its Syria policy accordingly.

 6 october2016

To the Israeli Front in American Boots

Photo:REUTERS/Baz RatnerIsraeli soldiers from the 605 Combat EngineeringCorps battalion take part in a training session onthe Israeli side of the border between Syria andthe Israeli-occupied Golan Heights June 1, 2016

On September 14, 2016, the United States and Israel signed anagreement (memorandum) of understanding on the provision of military help to the Jewish state worth $38 billion over ten years ($3.8 billion per year). The previous agreement, which was adopted by the Bush administration in 2007 and expires in 2018, provided$3.1 billion per year. The new document will come into force once the term of the existing memorandum expires and will last from 2019 to 2028. It is the largest package ever provided by the United States.

The Essence of the New Agreement

In accordance with the previous memorandum, which expires in 2018 and is “aimed at reducing security threats in the Middle East,” the United States allocated around $3 billion per year to

support Israel’s defence capabilities. Israel used the funds to purchase modern weapons in the United States, carry out joint scientific and technological research, and develop new weapons. Under the new agreement, Israel will receive $8 billion more over the course of the contract’s lifespan. The amount includes expenditures on the joint development of missile defence programmes; in the past, such programmes had been funded separately, costing around $5 billion. The memorandum was agreed against the background of strained relations between Benjamin Netanyahu and Obama Administration in connection with the Iranian nuclear issue and attempts by Israel to torpedo the signing of an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme in return for lifting the sanctions against Tehran. The Israeli authorities are convinced that the deal poses a threat to its state, as it grants Iran access to hundreds of billions of dollars, a large part of which is likely to be used to support terrorism both in the Middle East and around the world.

Factors Influencing the Signing of the New Memorandum

Israel cannot continue to call on Congress to increase funding for defence projects.

The main reason for the signing of the new agreement was the potential increase in security threats to Israel in connection with the situation in the Middle East. The memorandum has come at an opportune time, as it builds on Washington’s official doctrine of ensuring Israel’s qualitative military edge. According to this idea, Israel must have the capability to counter “credible military threats from any individual state, coalition of states, or non-state actor.” From a political point of view, the agreement softens criticism at home in both countries with regard to the deterioration of relations between the United States and Israel. Another important factor in the signing of the agreement is the desire on the part of the Israeli to maintain its military advantage in the region. This is especially important against the background of the United States increasing its military aid to the Sunni states and, of course, in connection with the ongoing crisis in Syria.

Criticism of the Signing of the Memorandum

REUTERS

As usual, opinions are divided in Israel about the signing of the document. Critics point to two conditions put forward by the Obama Administration that could prove problematic for Israel. First, Israel cannot continue to call on Congress to increase funding for defence projects (with the exception of large-scale military actions). Second, by the time the Memorandum reaches its expiration date in 2028, the amounts allocated by the American side for Israel to use for its own developments will be almost zero. What is more, Israel will not be able to request additional funding from the United States Congress that is not covered by the memorandum. The amount of aid to be converted into shekels will also be reduced. There is a loophole here, however: a refusal for additional funding through Congress applies to missile defence only. It does not apply to other

programmes, such as the development of tunnel detection systems. This is an issue that is extremely important for the United States, which is interested in protecting its own borders from illegal immigrants entering the country from Mexico. Since Congress was not involved in the signing of the Memorandum, it is under no obligation to follow the conditions set forth therein. The document was also not signed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which can lobby anything it wants in Congress. Finally, as some experts have pointed out, the Memorandum is not legally binding, and Congress has the power to increase the budget as it sees fit. Some politicians in Israel believe that, by providing financial assistance, the United States is putting itself in a position to exert pressure on politics in the country, particularly with regard to concessions in Israel–Palestine relations. For example, during the military actions in the Gaza Strip in 2014, Barack Obama stopped shipments of certain types of missiles (Hellfire missiles), and the new agreement will increase pressure on the blockade issue and on the Israeli settlements on the West Bank.

Obama wants to put an end to effective U.S. subsidies for the private Israeli military industry.

The agreement has also faced serious criticism from military experts, who argue that Israel does not need U.S. military assistance. The agreed sum, $3.8 billion per year, is just a quarter of the Israeli military budget ($15.47 billion). Israel’s annual budget is around $89 billion. Its gross national product, which is approaching $300 billion today, will clearly double over the next ten years. A key part of the deal is that Israel is no longer permitted to spend up to 26 per cent of the aid it receives on shoring up the needs of its defence industry. As such, Obama wants to put an end to effective U.S. subsidies for the private Israeli military industry. Now Israel must spend every dollar on U.S.-produced goods: even military footwear manufactured in Israel has to be ordered from the United States. The worst thing, however, is that U.S. aid to Israel hampers the development of domestic military production in Israel: if Israel is unable to produce its own weapons, then it will become even more dependent on the United States, thus weakening its position as a sovereign state. What is more, the agreement does not necessarily ensure Israel’s qualitative military edge, as the United States sells its most advanced weapons to the country’s potential enemies (as a counter to which Israel will not be allowed to develop its own military potential).

The fact that the agreement was signed before the end of President Obama’s term in office reaffirms the importance and immutability of the strategic partnership between Israel and the United States for both sides, and prevents the issue of bilateral relations from becoming a point of contention among in the presidential campaign.

07 october2016

EU should realise its real friend is Moscow

Russia has had good bilateral contacts in recent months with a number of EU member states, the interruption in relations is taking place only at the level of the EU itself, the Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov told EurActiv.com in an exclusive interview.

Chizhov spoke to EurActiv’s Senior Editor, Georgi Gotev.

US-Russia relations are at a very low point over the Syria conflict, the US has suspended the ceasefire talks. Is it because the US and Russia cannot agree on what is Al-Nusra?

I wouldn’t put it that way. Al-Nusra (or whatever it may call itself now) is a terrorist organisation recognised as such by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Russia and the United States, for all the difficulties and complications over the multi-sided conflict in Syria, have been able to agree on a lot of things. And they came up with a number of joint documents which they signed.

For some reason the US was quite hesitant, to put it mildly, to make them public, and to seek the endorsement, as we proposed, of the UNSC. But they were leaked anyway by the Americans and

are now in the public domain. The problem is not that we have been unable to agree.

The problem is that unfortunately, the US has been unable or unwilling to deliver on those commitments that State Secretary John Kerry had actually signed up to. Among those the primary issue is separation between the so-called moderate opposition and Al-Nusra.

A lot of attention is now focused on Aleppo, where the eastern part of the city is under control of Al-Nusra and a number of organisations effectively affiliated to Al-Nusra. The Americans have been indicating that some of those maybe linked to the moderate opposition, rather than Al-Nusra.

But Russia sees them as Al-Nusra, which means Al Qaeda.

We say: OK, if the Americans believe some of those do not belong to Al-Nusra and don’t have any such links, please tell them to leave the area. Or let them dissociate themselves from Al-Nusra. This is something that was agreed not at the last meeting between [Russian Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov and Kerry, this was agreed back in February.

The Americans undertook a commitment to effectively separate the bad guys from the not-so-bad guys, the terrorists from the moderates. But they have been unable to do that since February. The commitments came not only from the State Department, but also from the head of the CIA. That is public knowledge.

The latest that we heard from the State Department is that those groups will define who they are themselves, through self- identification. Well, that doesn’t sound serious in the situation we all see in Syria and particularly in Aleppo.

That’s why the fragile ceasefire that held for a week collapsed. There is the famous Castello Road, which is practically the only supply route to eastern Aleppo. The latest agreement was that the government forces and the opposition would withdraw heavy weapons 3.5 kilometres from that road, on either side. That was a very equitable understanding and the government forces started withdrawing, whereas the opposition didn’t move a finger. On the contrary, they started moving forward. So in this situation, of course, the ceasefire was doomed to collapse.

In a previous interview, with some irony, you said the Americans didn’t have enough opposition figures to put at the negotiating table. Is this part of the picture?

Well, if you view this comment as irony, I am a bit surprised because I’m not sure I was trying to sound ironic.

Because that’s a real problem. Staffan de Mistura, the UN special envoy who has been tasked to launch intra-Syrian dialogue, has not been able to do that so far. The Syrian government has always been in favour and ready to participate, but opposition figures, each having an agenda of his own, mostly concentrated on achieving a change of government and President Assad leaving office. But the situation on the ground doesn’t indicate this is a feasible objective.

What we agreed with the Americans is that we should have a political solution, provided there is a ceasefire, but unilateral ceasefires don’t work.

That’s where we stand today and I was very disappointed with recent statements by State Department spokespersons and also by the US ambassador in New York that are not compatible with norms of diplomatic behaviour. [NB: Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the UN, used the word “barbarism”].

But it is a major political player, isn’t it? [smiles]

I think so.

And it is, of course, a potentially important player in terms of post-conflict rehabilitation, a major donor, to put it squarely. This was an issue discussed yesterday between Foreign Minister Lavrov and High Representative Mogherini. They spoke on the phone, she called him.

The statement was very short.

There are actually two statements, the Russian one is longer. Mogherini presented the new humanitarian initiative she had launched last Sunday.

I believe that international humanitarian assistance will be vital for the overall reconstruction of the country, provided there is a proper ceasefire and the launch of a proper Syrian political dialogue.

Let’s talk about the next EU summit on 20-21 October where EU-Russia relations will be discussed…

Russia is not invited [laughs].

Well, Russia is not an EU member, but the UK is still invited. It looks like at 27 it will be easier to discuss big issues such as European defence…

The UK has stated publicly that as long as they are part of the EU, they are going to oppose any moves towards European defence.

Russia is probably in favour of a European army, because this would weaken NATO?

You know, it’s not Russia’s policy to weaken anybody, except the terrorists. I believe that this is an issue not of a European army, because it’s not on the cards, but of a European military potential. I think that’s an element of forging a more focused and hopefully more independent role for the EU on the global arena.

We want the EU to be strong, united, positively oriented towards our country, naturally, seeing where its real friends are, which is Moscow. We don’t even chlorinate our chickens, as I usually say [laughs]. And being more independent, without the need to look back over their shoulder, towards somebody who twists the arms of Europeans and uses obscene terms vis-à-vis the EU itself.

I hope that the “strategic review” as it is called turns out to be substantial and leads to certain positive decisions on the part of the EU in its relations with Russia. Certainly, the current state of play in our relations is unnatural. This is an issue that needs to be addressed by the EU. Because this situation has been created by the EU, perhaps with the assistance or advice of somebody else. But this problem should be resolved by the EU. And when the EU gathers enough political will to do so, they know where to find us.

There have been a number of visits, of leaders of European countries, with Mr Putin. Slovak PM Robert Fico visited Russia, Mr Putin was invited to Slovenia, and recently the Bulgarian PM Boyko Borissov spoke on the phone with him…

There was also a meeting with Commission President Juncker in St Petersburg in June.

…What is common between the three leaders of EU countries is that the three are lobbying for their candidates for UN Secretary General…

You are making that link, not me [laughs]. By the way, I don’t remember any recent visit to Portugal,

or from Portugal.

Does the Portuguese candidate have any chance?

I don’t know. He came first in the straw polls.

But maybe Russia expects a good discussion at the summit, because a number of leaders are going to deliver on promises they made.

We actually had good bilateral contacts in recent months with a number of EU member states. Not only those you mentioned. I remember when President Juncker was in St Petersburg, the Italian Prime Minister was also there. And the President of Cyprus recently met in New York with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

There has been no interruption of high-level contacts across the EU. The interruption has been at the level of the EU itself. Unfortunately. And that has produced a negative impact on the interests of both sides, and on the interests of Europe as a whole.

I’m not linking the calendar of visits to the election of a new UN Secretary General, that’s a long shot. There are many other issues to be discussed with each country, including with your home country Bulgaria. Like energy issues.

Speaking about energy, will there be a new winter gas package this year?

A package by definition is something consisting of several issues packed together. A year ago, and two years ago, the issues were three. One was the outstanding debt of the Ukrainian side – the unchallenged part of the debt, because the challenged part is dealt with by the arbitration court in Stockholm. The second was to define the volumes and procedures for gas supply from Russia to Ukraine. And the third element was the price.

Today, I don’t see any of the three elements being on the table. That part of the debt issue has been settled, Ukraine has stopped buying Russian gas last November, almost a year ago, which in turn makes the issue of price irrelevant.

Of course, I understand the concerns of the EU and of the Commission, they calculate that should there be harsh winter, or even a mild winter, Ukraine will not be able to live without Russian gas, and only of gas brought by reverse procedures, which basically is also Russian gas. But at a higher price.

Are you sure? I have heard Vice President Šefčovič saying that Ukraine has saved a lot of money thanks to reverse flows.

No, they saved money because they consumed less. The prices for households increased more than three-fold.

So you confirm that gas from reverse flows is more expensive? Because I asked the Commission, and they say they cannot comment, because this is a commercial secret.

Yes, that may be so. But looking logically, if you send x cubic metres of gas by a direct pipeline, or if you send it via a much longer route, through additional transit countries, which would be cheaper?

Everything is possible.

That is indeed so, but within the framework of laws of nature…

04 october2016

A look at international relations from a Russian viewpoint

To understand Russia’s foreign policy today, its relations with Turkey and the West, one needs to look at the past.

Today, we have vast nuclear arsenals and the number of countries with nuclear capabilities has increased around the world. Current threats are being addressed with temporary solutions. Iran officials have already said they intend to resume their nuclear programme after the 15-year deal they struck with the US and other countries expires. In an even more alarming prospect, the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Europe due to a local conflict is now on the table. Who could have imagined this scenario five years ago?

Decades have passed since the Cold War. There’s a new generation of politicians, officials, and military personnel. Those in power today do not know what it means to count warheads everyday and go to sleep with the thought that tomorrow may never come. They didn’t live through a state of permanent fright, dreading the end of the world. They did not experience dealing with a crisis that pushes the world to the brink of a global war. They came to power during a time when relations between Russia and the West are relaxed. They take this situation for granted and focus on each other’s faults instead. When tensions rose a few years ago, it was easy for them to talk about the use of nuclear weapons and not think of the consequences of such actions.

Of course, the world faces serious problems today: terror group Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant), the war in Syria and Iraq, the migrant crisis, slow growth. But these are issues civilised nations are capable of solving one way or another.

The system of controlling nuclear weapons is falling apart. This system was an integral part of nuclear war prevention. It was built over the course of the previous half century by the tireless work of government leaders, diplomats, soldiers, scientists and public figures. Now, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a landmark 1987 agreement between the US and the former Soviet Union to eliminating certain missiles, is threatened.

There’s the possibility that the successor of US President Barack Obama will declare that the treaty was breached by Russia, and withdraw from it. Then everything will crumble. Treaty after treaty will fall, carrying the risk of new nuclear powers emerging in the near future. Instead of the current nine, we will face dozens. This means that terrorists will inevitably access these weapons. The likelihood of the disintegration of nuclear arms control, and the rate at which it happens, depends on who will be in power in the US by the end of the year, and what decisions will be taken by the Kremlin.

From partners to rivals

During his first two terms, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that his country is a European nation, characterised by European values and standards. Those statements have faded today.

US Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton is quick to point fingers at Russia. Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, appears to be on the fence about the Kremlin. Clinton is in the middle of a heated campaign in which politicians compete in “patriotism.” Russia is as an adversary

of the US and Nato, so her words are understandable in this context.

The current state of relations was triggered by Moscow between 2011 and 2012. The Kremlin decided not to put up with the model of cooperation at that time. Russia believed its position in the world was not acknowledged and its relations with the West had not been established on an equal footing.

For a while, the West didn’t want to believe that it was necessary to consider Russia an enemy. Not because of any great love for Russia. It was because life was too good after the Cold War and relations with Russia had been acceptable for the West. The US considered itself the world’s only superpower. The European Union was achieving the kind of prosperity and security the likes of which the continent hadn’t seen for more than 1,000 years.

This era of wellbeing lasted only a quarter of a century. It was enough to miss drastic changes in Russia’s rhetoric. In the midst of this contentment, it was easy to overlook Russia’s change of policy in 2012, when the country started to focus on Eurasia. In 2014, Russia embarked on a power struggle with the West over Ukraine.

This is bad news for dealing with threats such as terrorism, which need the combined effort of the civilised world. Russia and the West aren’t able to come together to address this threat because their judgement is obstructed by fear and distrust due to the deceptions of the past.

It’s hard to believe today but Russia had supported Nato in battling extremist groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan despite its irritation over the alliance’s involvement in Yugoslavia in the ‘90s. At the time, the Kremlin believed that helping the US in the fight against Al Qaida was of greater importance.

Today, Putin apparently has different priorities and opponents. He no longer talks about Russia being “European”, and his views are backed by political analysts, deputies and television journalists in Russia. At the same time, the worldview of the West also changed but it’s not so quick to label yesterday’s friends as enemies, or vice versa.

The Turkish trap

With this background, we can better understand Turkey’s warming relations with Russia. Turkey is not the West. It’s not a member of the EU and will never become a part of it. The way things are going, Ankara will move further and further away from the bloc, and then from Nato, an alliance that it’s currently a member of. The rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has shown signs that such an outcome is likely. It would not be the first time a country would leave Nato. France briefly withdrew from the alliance in 1966 because it didn’t like American hegemony and the new world order. Ankara may follow a similar path and demand US troop withdrawal from Turkish territory.

Such a turn of events would probably be favoured by the Kremlin. But here’s the trap: A tactical victory can turn into a strategic loss for Russia. The West would manage the Black Sea region and the Middle East by consolidating allies such as Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Georgia and Ukraine. Even without joining Nato, these nations could formalise bilateral military relations with the US and allow large military bases on their territory, much like Japan and South Korea.

Playing on fears and nerves

Moreover, Erdogan is not a very predictable politician and his current mood is not a sturdy foundation for long-term relations with Russia. The interests of Turkey conflict with those of the

Kremlin on a variety of issues: the Middle East, the Caucasus, Ukraine, and central Asia. In the long run, these differences outweigh the momentary relief that the deterioration of relations between Turkey and Nato brings. Another important point to consider is that Turkey is gradually moving toward Islamism. Is that the greater threat to Russia than Nato?

Accusations are routinely traded between Russia and the US about violations in airspace and water. For now, this is just a mutual show of force. The US doesn’t do it to frighten Russia but to calm down their Nato allies, who ask for aid against the Russian “military threat”. The US needs to respond so that their leading role in Nato and their promises of security are taken seriously. In Moscow, of course, we aren’t going to allow such moves to be made at our expense. So, Russia responds the only way it can, and the vicious circle continues.

Our offensive operations are seen as a legitimate means of defence against the threat of war. The threat is not very clear so maybe our counter-measures are excessive. Perhaps the fears of the West are unreasonable. But they didn’t come out of nowhere. For instance, the alliance fears Russia’s ambition to mobilise pontoon bridge brigades, which is a qualifying criterion of a highly offensive military strategy, particularly in Europe where waterways are abundant.

When it comes down to it, neither side is preparing an attack. But the difference in the perception of the current situation breeds mutual distrust. If this is followed by the buildup of tension and military advancement, it could result in armed conflict.Have the US and Russia begun a new arms race? During the Cold War, the US initiated the race. They advanced, and the former Soviet Union had to catch up. In the ‘90s, the arms race was over. Russia and the US simultaneously reduced their nuclear arsenals. The period of tension was followed by an era of modernisation. Each nation embarked on research and innovation, minus the competition.

But since 2008, Russia began to allocate substantial funding to military upgrades and training. The country had considerable revenue due to high oil prices and wanted to quickly improve its nuclear forces. But the US does not want to embark on another arms race with Russia. It believes economic sanctions against the country will force the Kremlin to change its foreign policy. So far, this move has been unsuccessful.

Russia must rationally evaluate which parts of planned military advancements are required for safety and defence, and which are for the sake of prestige, for the benefit of military manufacturers, and the like. Russia must not repeat the mistakes of the past. Its national tradition appears to be to step on the same rake over and over again. As noted by Grigory Yavlinsky, a Russian economist and politician, this repetition stems from the fact that some get to step on the rake. Others feel its jab in their face.

— Worldcrunch 2016, in partnership with Kommersant/ New York Times News Service