A defense by Dr. Andrew McNaughtan against defamation by Jill Jolliffe

8/12/2019 A defense by Dr. Andrew McNaughtan against defamation by Jill Jolliffe

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/a-defense-by-dr-andrew-mcnaughtan-against-defamation-by-jill-jolliffe 1/64

Andrew McNaughtan 19/09/2006

1

IN RESPONSE TO THE BOOK COVER UP BY JILL JOLLIFFE

INTRODUCTION

This piece is written in a number of parts to clarify a number of matters in response torepresentations in the book Cover Up written by Jill Jolliffe. There are three sections to

what follows.

Part 1 is Andrew McNaughtan s defence against allegations by Jill Jolliffe in the book

Cover Up of trickery and falsification .

Part 2 outlines important matters concerning the credibility or otherwise of key witnesseswhose testimony appears to have been misrepresented by Jolliffe. The (false) testimony

of one of these witnesses had a significant impact on investigations of Balibo. I (Andrew

McNaughtan) believe there is a need to balance the record about the background andtestimony of these two significant witnesses who gave evidence to Tom Sherman andwith whom Jolliffe and I were both involved. Jolliffe and I had diametrically opposing

views of the credibility of these two witnesses. This background may be of wider interest

and relevance to understanding the events at Balibo and how they were dealt with by

Tom Sherman. I believe Jolliffe s book misrepresents these matters to the readers.

Part 3 outlines some of the evidence relating to Indonesian foreknowledge of the

journalists presence at Balibo and pre-meditated intentions towards them. As I wasreading Cover Up I realised that it dealt poorly with these two important questions did

the Indonesian led attacking force have foreknowledge of the presence of the journalists

in Balibo? And if so, did they have any premeditated intentions towards them ? So thelast 10 pages look at some of the evidence from various sources related to this question.




2

PART 1

THE ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST McNAUGHTAN BY JOLLIFFE:

The significant allegations are contained in paragraph 2 on page 176 in which Jolliffe

writes :

I spoke later to Adelino Gomes about the interview (with Lourenco Hornay). He said

there had been no interview, and that McNaughtan had tricked him into having an on-

camera talk with Hornay which was later presented in Australia as an interviewconducted by him. Gomes is a prize-winning reporter of great prestige in Portugal with a

reputation to defend for conducting rigorous interviews, hence his annoyance. Had he

conducted a real interview it would certainly have involved hard questioning about thesource. This was the first of two incidents of apparent falsification of Balibo material, andit marred the ICJ colloquium. The sad thing about such an approach was that it would not

be difficult to expose by the Indonesian government, and would cast doubt on the

credibility of those presenting seriously researched evidence. This was apart from the

lack of respect it showed for the Timorese involved, who were seen as objects to be used (emphasis added).

Jolliffe suggests that I tricked Adelino Gomes and that I was implicated in apparentfalsification of Balibo evidence 1. She says that the cumulative effect of these actions

was to marr the ICJ colloquium on Balibo (see above). Jolliffe went on to say in the

same paragraph that this alleged falsification could be exposed by the Indonesiangovernment and thus cast doubt on the credibility of those presenting seriously

researched evidence . She says it also showed lack of respect for the Timorese

involved who were seen as objects to be used .

My responding to Jolliffe s accusations is made more difficult because what she says is

somewhat illogical. There are ambiguities open to different interpretations. An example

is the allegation of apparent falsification . This allegation would seem to be directedagainst me as it follows the allegation that I tricked Gomes and seems to be related to the

alleged trickery. The additional comment that this showed lack of respect for the

Timorese involved, who were seen as objects to be used indicates that the person

responsible for the alleged falsification is not Timorese. That would indicate that theallegation must be against me. Yet I am now told by Jolliffe and her publisher that this

allegation (of apparent falsification ) should not be read as against me, but should beinterpreted as being against the witness Lourenco Hornay (who is Timorese, though

living in Portugal). However those reading the book would think the allegation refers to

me.

1 Middle paragraph, page 176, of Cover Up




3

This problem of lack of clarity has been compounded because of Jolliffe s refusal to

speak to me about these allegations making it impossible for me to determine exactlywhat she means.

Therefore because off the slipperiness of some of the accusations, I have tried torespond to the differing possible interpretations. This necessitates a more complicated

response which I apologise for.

1. THAT McNAUGHTAN TRICKED ADELINO GOMES

I have provided an explanation of the sequence of these events under the heading

Background to the Lourenco Hornay Interview - on page 7. It may be useful to read this

sequence first.

The essential background is that in mid 1997 I asked a friend in Lisbon (Amilcar Dias) toarrange for a man I had previously interviewed in Lisbon (Lourenco Hornay) to provide a

recorded statement or interview about his knowledge relevant to the Indonesian attack on

Balibo and the planning of this. Lourenco Hornay had been a UDT commander stationed

in Batugade, where the Indonesian military intelligence was based during their attack onEast Timor s western border in 1975. I was in Sydney and had learned that the ICJ would

hold a colloquium on Balibo in October 1997. When interest was expressed in this man s

testimony, I tried to arrange a recorded statement to be forwarded. I could not afford toreturn to Lisbon to conduct the interview myself. There was therefore some discussion

between Amilcar Dias and myself about who could help make this recording. My

communications with Amilcar mentioned that the interview would be for the BaliboColloquium and that journalists might also be interested in the interview. After some

discussion of options Amilcar confirmed that Adelino Gomes (a friend of his) had agreed

to do the questioning. Adelino Gomes is a Portuguese journalist who was at Baliboaround the time of the matters in question. I received the videotapes a couple of weeks

later. These included a section of Adelino Gomes speaking in English at the beginning

outlining the conditions for use of the tapes the stated condition was that the identity of

Hornay not be revealed and that his face should be blacked out. Gomes himself referredto the discussion as an interview three times in this preface. No other conditions were

mentioned and I was not aware of other conditions. The testimony was translated by

Beatrice Miranda and presented to the ICJ Colloquium (unaltered) by myself.

In response to Jolliffe s statement that (Gomes said) that McNaughtan had tricked him

I make a number of points :

A. Gomes did not say this to Jolliffe. In an email on 22nd November, 2001 Gomes wrote

to me since I don t know your role in the events, I m not in a position to criticize you 2.

In a later email he wrote, I didn t say that you tricted [sic] me because I was not aware

of your participation in this3. Gomes thus confirmed that he did NOT say McNaughtan

2 email from Adelino Gomes to McNaughtan 22 November 2001 3 email from Gomes to McNaughtan 26 November 2001




4

had tricked him. Jolliffe apparently made this interpretation herself and then inaccurately

ascribed the quote to Gomes.

B. Furthermore Gomes does not believe that any trickery took place - although he is

not entirely happy with the circumstances of his interview with Mr. Hornay. It wouldappear (from what I can glean from my subsequent email communications with Adelino

Gomes) that he feels his communication with Mr. Hornay was a somewhat informal

discussion rather than an interview (in spite of the fact that the discussion lasted a halfhour with reasonably detailed questioning and occurred in front of two video cameras).

Gomes has also indicated that he did not expect the video to be used publicly. However

Gomes has commented by email he feel(s) that there has not been probably no intention

by anyone to trick anyone or falsify anything 4.

After Gomes and I corresponded by email he wrote Thank you for your explanation.

Now I understand better what happened. Before answering to your questions let me tellyou that I do not blame you neither Lourenco (Hornay) for this. And as I have goodfeelings about Amílcar [Dias] I consider all this a regrettable misunderstanding due to

something that we in Portugal call nacional-porreirismo (a typical Portuguese way of

solving problems counting on the good auspices of the gods...) 5. Gomes, though

apparently somewhat unhappy about the circumstances of the interview added I don'tsee Amílcar (Dias) as a trickster . Furthermore Gomes noted I consider all this a

regrettable misunderstanding 6. In other words Gomes does NOT believe that I or

anyone else tricked him.

C. Anyway there is an illogical jump from Jolliffe s allegation that the interview between

Gomes and Hornay was obtained by trickery (which is an incorrect allegation) and thesubsequent interpretation by Jolliffe that the alleged trickery may have led to or been a

been a factor in apparent falsification of the evidence in the interview. Even (for

argument s sake) if it was the case that the interview WAS obtained by tricking theinterviewer somehow, it does not logically follow that the contents of the interview were

falsified . Thus Jolliffe s interpretation is flawed.

D. I was not present whilst the interview was arranged or recorded. Jolliffe does not pointout (and may not have been aware) that I was in Sydney when the interview with

Lourenco Hornay was arranged and done in Lisbon. I was communicating with Amilcar

Dias in Lisbon who dealt with the witness and the interviewer and made all the

arrangements for the recording. My capacity to influence events was therefore almostnon-existent. As noted below I sent an email request via Amilcar Dias that Gomes call

me if there was anything that needed clarification.

E. My emails to Amilcar Dias (who arranged for the recorded interview between Adelino

Gomes and Lourenco Hornay in Lisbon) and other sources of information show that I had

no intention to trick Adelino Gomes in fact I took steps to enable communications

4 email from Gomes to McNaughtan 27 November 2001






5

that would have clarified everything between Gomes and myself. I communicated with

Amilcar Dias who arranged for the interview to be done and he communicated withAdelino Gomes. If I was aware of any conditions that might have affected the use of the

interview, I would have asked that things be done differently. My purpose in obtaining

the interview with Mr. Hornay was to use it and that was always clear.

Emails between Amilcar Dias and myself show that :

i. I had not asked that Gomes do the interview with Hornay 7,

ii. Gomes s agreement to do the interview was the result of discussion between Gomes

and Amilcar Dias 8,

iii. I had made it clear in emails to Amilcar Dias that the purpose of the interview was to

allow Hornay s testimony to be presented to the ICJ9,

iv. no discussion in the emails suggested any desire by me to mislead Gomes about the

nature of what was being donev. on the contrary, I had asked Amilcar Dias to pass my phone number to Gomes so hecould call me if he had any matters he wanted to discuss with me 10

From my own memory I am aware that :

vi. Gomes didn t call me - which suggested to me that he was happy with arrangements

vii. there were no conditions to the use of the interview (apart form the need to keep

Hornay s identity private) communicated to me and there is no evidence that anycommunications of this sort were made to me

The recorded interview between Gomes and Hornay shows that :

viii. Gomes outlined his conditions for use of the tape on the tape at the beginning of his

interview and these simply concerned the need to protect Hornay s privacy there wasno mention of other conditions by Gomes even though this was the perfect opportunity

for him to convey them to me 11

ix. Gomes himself considered that he was doing an interview because he described it as

an interview three times in English at the beginning of the video12

Additionally :

x. From my perspective it wasn t important whether Gomes did the interview or not. Theimportant thing was that appropriate questions be asked of Hornay by whoever

interviewed him

7 email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 18 September 1997

8 email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 1 October 1997 9 email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 18 September 1997

10 email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 30 September 1997

11 introduction (in English) by Adelino Gomes before videoed interview with Hornay 12

introduction (in English) by Adelino Gomes before videoed interview with Hornay




6

xi. if I was aware that there might be conditions precluding or limiting the use of the tape,

I would have asked that the interview be done differently because the intention wasalways to do an interview that could be presented to the ICJ Colloquium (and as

mentioned this purpose was spelt out)

xii. In fact it was of little significance to me whether the interview was done by a well-known Portuguese journalist such as Gomes or not as few people in Australia would

know him anyway

xiii. I did not believe that the interview would be more credible because Gomes asked thequestions I believed (and still believe) that Hornay s evidence was the main issue and

that its ultimate veracity should (like everyone else s evidence) be assessed in a proper

inquiry.

I did not attempt to trick Gomes and I believe the evidence supports this.

2. THAT McNAUGHTAN WAS GUILTY OF APPARENT FALSIFICATION OFEVIDENCE

I believe this is a false conclusion no matter how one tries to interpret the events. It is

evident from her words that Jolliffe is trying to link me to the alleged apparent

falsification of evidence, yet I don t believe there is any logical basis for this. I alsodoubt that the allegation applies to anyone else involved.

A. According to a recent letter from Jolliffe s publisher (Henry Rosenbloom), Jolliffedoes NOT suggest that I was involved in any apparent falsification . Rosenbloom writes

that Jolliffe made no statement or imputation that McNaughtan was responsible (for the

apparent falsification) ; indeed the paragraphs immediately before this section of the bookmake it clear that Hornay was the one with the credibility problems 13. So the

interpretation that most readers would make from Jolliffe s distorted writing - that I was

involved in the falsification - is specifically refuted by Jolliffe s publisher. That issuewould seem to have been cleared up.

B. However most readers of this section of the book would probably assume that the

person accused by Jolliffe of falsification is me : earlier in the same paragraph I am saidto have tricked Gomes. Some lines later Jolliffe speaks of the apparent falsification

that marred the ICJ colloquium and showed lack of respect for the Timorese

involved, who were seen as objects to be used . Thus Jolliffe implies that the perpetrator

of this apparent falsification was not Timorese. Her writing connects the allegedtrickery sequentially to the apparent falsification suggesting they are linked. In this

context most readers would believe Jolliffe is accusing me of falsification . Thus I feel Ishould rebut this implication in the book (in spite of the later claim made by the publisherthat this is not an intentional implication).

My response is that the following sequence of events resulting in Mr. Hornay s interviewbeing put before the ICJ colloquium confirms that I could not be implicated in any

apparent falsification

13 Letter from Jolliffe s publisher, Henry Rosenbloom, top paragraph of second page




7

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The videotaped interview with Lourenco Hornay was done in Lisbon on 5th October,

1997 (whilst I was in Sydney) by Adelino Gomes and Amilcar Dias. The tapes (inPortuguese) were subsequently sent to Sydney and translated by Beatrice Miranda of SBS

Portuguese radio in Sydney. The version presented to the ICJ was the translation made

and typed by Miranda (with no input by me). Beatriz Miranda s hard copy of theinterview was then given to Rodney Lewis at the Colloquium. Therefore it can be

established at each step of the way that I could not have been involved in any

falsification or apparent falsification . The exact sequence of events that resulted in

Mr. Hornay s interview being presented to the ICJ is included in a section below

( Background to the Lourenco Hornay Interview on page 7). I reject that I had anyintention to mislead the ICJ colloquium or that I did mislead the colloquium in any way.

I reject the implication by Jolliffe that I was involved in apparent falsification whetherconnected to the colloquium or not.

3. IS IT CORRECT TO SUGGEST McNAUGHTAN S ACTIONS MARRED THE

ICJ COLLOQUIUM ?

The above material shows that Adelino Gomes did not say I tricked him, does not

believe that I tricked him and that the evidence shows that I did not trick him and that Ihad absolutely no intention of tricking him, or anybody else.

Furthermore I was not involved in any apparent falsification . In fact Jolliffe and herpublisher now deny that her accusation of falsification is made against me.

Yet these are the allegations that Jolliffe used to justify her accusation that my actionsmarred the ICJ Colloquium.

Therefore I think it is fair to say my actions did not marr the ICJ colloquium.

I certainly would be disappointed if they did because I had spent some time working

voluntarily to help organise it and had then contributed a critique of the Sherman Report

(which I believe has stood up well over time) as well as the Hornay interview in order to

help make the Colloquium a success.

The remaining issue is whether Hornay s actual interview might somehow justify

Jolliffe s allegation of apparent falsification against him. Presumably only his actionscould now explain this serious charge by Jolliffe. I deal with that possibility below (see

section called Does Mr. Hornay Have Credibility Problems ? ) and believe I provide

enough information to indicate that Jolliffe s accusation of apparent falsificationagainst Lourenco Hornay is not justified either.




8

If it is accepted that Hornay didn t engage in falsification I think it is reasonable to

conclude that the assertion that the ICJ colloquium was marred by falsification isincorrect.

BACKGROUND TO THE LOURENCO HORNAY INTERVIEW

The first Sherman Report was released in June 1996 and concluded that the journalists at

Balibo had died in circumstances of continuing fighting. This interpretation restedheavily on the testimony of a key witness from Lisbon Lisbon 1 witness, or L1 . I

was curious about this man and had a chance to look for him during a visit to Portugal in

1997.

It was in the course of searching for Sherman s witness L1 that I was introduced toLourenco Hornay. After talking to Hornay about who L1 might be (and finding that he

did not know), I asked him where he was in October 1975 and what his experiences hadbeen. In the subsequent conversation he told me (through the translation of Amilcar Dias)some very significant things that he understood from his dealings with Indonesian

commanders in Batugade at the time.

I thought it was important to present his evidence to the ICJ Colloquium on Balibo laterthat year , as he had not been interviewed previously on this subject (and had not spoken

to Tom Sherman when he was in Lisbon). However I had not recorded my original

conversation with him and did not want to just rely on my memory and some notes I hadtaken at the time. Therefore I decided that a recorded interview should be done, so there

could be no doubt about Mr. Hornay s evidence. This would also allow him to give his

testimony more formally and allow him to drop any assertions previously made to me ifhe didn t want to stand by them.

I was in Sydney and could not travel to Lisbon for this, so I communicated with AmilcarDias (who had previously helped me look for L1 ) and asked if him to arrange for the

interview to be recorded in Lisbon and sent to me in Sydney. He asked Mr. Hornay who

agreed to do an interview that would be recorded. I was concerned only that Lourenco

Hornay answer questions on tape (audio or video) so that I could quote him withconfidence. I had felt what he had to say (about Indonesian foreknowledge about the

journalists at Balibo, and intent to eliminate them) to be quite important. The person who

would pose the questions to Mr. Hornay was not important to me in this context. I had

originally envisioned Lourenco Hornay talking directly to a camera or recorderanswering questions posed (quite possibly) by someone out of view. I simply wanted a

recording of what he said. This would allow me to have the interview translated and

quote directly from Hornay s statements to the 'Colloquium' on Balibo - to be held in

Sydney in late 1997.

I said to Amilcar Dias that we needed to get Lourenco Hornay's responses to questions

recorded. I didn t realise at that time that Dias could video it adequately himself with aHi8 video camera and so I suggested that Adelino Gomes or someone at LUSA might

be willing to help him record an interview. I was simply referring to assistance with the




9

technical aspects of videoing or audio recording. Amilcar Dias wrote back that he knew

Adelino Gomes personally and subsequently Dias asked Gomes to do the interview withHornay. Adelino Gomes is a Portuguese journalist who was at Balibo during October

1975. I did not initially imagine Adelino Gomes doing the interview. Nonetheless when

Dias told me Gomes would do it I was pleased because I knew Gomes had an excellentgrasp of the events of the time and would be ideally placed to interview Mr. Hornay

about what had happened.

My only concern was that questions be asked of Hornay and answered clearly by him and

the questioner have sufficient understanding of events to do that. From my perspective

the witness himself is / was responsible for the honesty of his answers (not the personasking the questions, whoever that might be).

My communications to Amilcar repeatedly referred to an 'interview' being done for use

by the ICJ and journalists and in the Colloquium. So when I heard Gomes would conductthe interview, I assumed that the purpose was understood by him. I had suggested byemail to Amilcar Dias that Adelino Gomes ring me if he had any questions and provided

my phone number. When I did not hear from him I assumed there were no problems. If I

thought there were constraints to the use of the material, I would have directed that things

be done in some other way. My objective was to make use of the material publicly at theColloquium. The only conditions articulated to me (by Dias and Gomes) were that Mr.

Hornay would need his identity suppressed. Adhering to Mr. Hornay s request was my

main concern at the time. I have no memory (and can find no evidence) of any otherconditions attached to the use of the recordings that Amilcar Dias sent over.

The interview was done at Gomes house in Lisbon, with Gomes talking to Mr. Hornayon a patio as they sat in two chairs with a table between them. It lasted about a half -hour

and was in Portuguese. Two video cameras recorded the event : one was fixed on a tripod

and the other was mobile . I believe Amilcar Dias did the filming himself. The soundwas quite clear and the discussion was in Portuguese. At the beginning Gomes spoke in

English outlining the conditions for the use of the tape. He re-iterated that the condition

was that Hornay s identity should be suppressed. Gomes himself referred to the interview

as an interview three times (in English before beginning the interview) and there wereno other conditions for the use of the interview mentioned.

After the Hi8 tapes were couriered to Sydney, the tape was dubbed to VHS and I gave

a copy to Beatriz Miranda to translate. Miranda is an experienced journalist with aninterest in Timor who is a native Portuguese speaker (from Brazil). She has extensive

experience teaching and practicing journalism and was working on the Portugueselanguage radio program for SBS in Sydney. I thought she was an ideal translator for this

material.

Beatriz Miranda produced a hard copy of the translation of the video and that was what I

used. I never altered Miranda s translation in any way. I simply read from her translationat the Colloquium (having shown an excerpt on TV initially in Portuguese so people

could briefly view the original interview). Miranda s original translation was then given




10

to Rodney Lewis (who was documenting the Colloquium for the ICJ) in hard copy. No

changes had been made to Miranda s original and independent translation. I believe thetranslation was ultimately put online with the full report on the Colloquium and linked

to the Sydney Morning Herald website. I believe Hornay's statement was translated and

presented accurately and in accordance with all conditions of which I was aware.

DOES MR. HORNAY REALLY HAVE CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS ?

When I began writing this response to the accusations in Jolliffe s book, it seemed to me

that Jolliffe was stating I was responsible for the apparent falsification to which she

referred. This was because my name appeared (in a very negative context) in the same

paragraph as the allegation of apparent falsification and her wording indicated that theculprit was not Timorese (because it was suggested by Jolliffe that these actions showed

lack of respect for the Timorese involved who were seen as objects to be used ).This seemed to rule out Lourenco Hornay as the culprit responsible for apparent

falsification (as he is Timorese) and confirmed that I was being accused (as no othernames were mentioned in this context).

However I have subsequently received a letter from the publisher (Mr. HenryRosenbloom) who assures me that Jolliffe made no statement or imputation that

McNaughtan was responsible (for the alleged falsification). Rosenbloom continued that

Hornay was the one with the credibility problems 14. So it seems the position nowtaken by the publisher is that it is Mr. Hornay who is guilty of the apparent

falsification .

I do not believe that this is the interpretation that would be made by most readers (who

would assume that the allegation is being made against me).I have responded to this

interpretation already and believe the evidence shows it is not true. I also doubt theaccusation against Mr. Hornay is justified and I believe Jolliffe s portrayal of Hornay and

his testimony is misleading and unfair. I think a few points should be made about this.

Jolliffe s attempts to undermine Mr. Hornay s credibility by demeaning him.

Jolliffe suggests that Hornay was not in a position to have known or understood the

military significance of events at the border at that time. She says that Hornay was a

UDT supporter (emphasis added) who had been at Rai Icu with the UDT leadership at thetime of the Balibo attack 15. Later she states Gabriel ate with the Timorese refugees,

and Hornay had gleaned scraps (emphasis added) of information over several meal timeconversations with him, he said, information which Gabriel had allegedly obtained from

the Indonesian officers 16. The distinct implication is that Hornay was in a lowly

position within UDT and, as a Timorese refugee , was only in a position to glean second

hand scraps of information from others about what was happening. Such a man would

14 top paragraph, second page of Henry Rosenbloom s letter

15 line 8, page 175, Cover Up 16

line 8, page 176, Cover Up




11

presumably not have much of an understanding of the overall picture of events at the

border in 1975.

Jolliffe s interpretation is contradicted by Hornay s testimony - which is corroborated by

another significant source. Hornay s testimony to Gomes indicates that he was not theinsignificant refugee that Jolliffe suggests. Hornay testified (concerning the UDT flight

from Timor after the civil war in Dili)

I went to the command of the forces abandoned by Capt. Lino called the personal

command of the UDT . These forces were abandoned and I assumed their command. I

took nearly 10,000 people and placed them on the border .

In response to the later question How many of you re men entered Batugade? Hereplied A company

Q It was under your command wasn t it?A One was under my command, the other by Joao Carrascalao and the other by Manuel

CarrascalaoQ And who gave orders to the three commands

A We received orders from Indonesia. 17

This exchange indicates that Hornay was in fact a rather significant individual within

UDT, who would have reason to have been at the side of the (Indonesian) commander

(Major Leo) just as he claimed.

Hornay s description of his role at the time is corroborated by Joao Carrascalao. I have

spoken with Carrascalao who noted that Hornay had been one of the senior UDTcommanders . Furthermore Carrascalao noted that Hornay had previously been one of

the highest-ranking Timorese in the Portuguese army having the rank of first sergeant

which Carrascalao says would be equivalent to sergeant major in our army. It is worthnoting that it was very difficult and rare for Timorese to rise to the rank of officers in the

Portuguese army.

This indicates that Hornay s testimony and insights about the military operations at theborder were significantly better founded and more relevant than Jill Jolliffe suggests, and

that his description of being present as the Indonesian commanders from Batugade

discussed their planned assault is much more credible than she suggests. The

circumstances suggest that Jolliffe interpreted Hornay s testimony selectively and in amanner which undermined the apparent credibility and significance of his testimony.

Further efforts to discredit Hornay

Jolliffe suggests Hornay was motivated by feeling offended

Jolliffe then suggests that Hornay s willingness to talk to me about the events at Balibo is

based upon his feeling of being offended because he had not been asked by Jolliffe to

17 page 3, Hornay testimony




12

give evidence to Tom Sherman when he was in Lisbon in 1996. Jolliffe wrote I had

heard that he was offended at not being consulted for the Sherman hearings18

.Elsewhere Jolliffe wrote that her approach to recommending witnesses to Sherman

was to have some repercussions later, with some refugees feeling offended because they

had been overlooked, and trumped up evidence being presented from other politicallymotivated sources 19. Thus she implies Hornay s testimony was inaccurate and driven by

dubious motives.

Hornay explained to me at the time that he was now willing to speak because he had

recently retired from the Portuguese army and had previously felt, as a soldier, that it

was inappropriate for him to speak. He also explained that he had been stationed away

from Lisbon when Sherman was there. He still seemed concerned about the ramificationsof speaking up for himself and his family and that was why he asked that his identity be

shielded when he was interviewed later.

It also seemed to me concern for his family previously could have constrained him fromtalking to a journalist (such as Jolliffe) about these matters - after all she might have put

the allegations in a story which would have had consequences for his family. Hornay may

also have had some reluctance to talk to Jolliffe about these matters because of her close

association with individuals from other factions of Timorese politics. He may havepreviously felt that revelations about Balibo were futile (and possibly dangerous) but

that circumstances were now changing. Or he may have felt that his evidence from

Batugade was not relevant as he had not been an eyewitness in Balibo. There are anumber of reasonable explanations for his prior silence on Balibo.

Certainly I found the manner in which he gave his evidence was convincing. He did notseem at all embittered or concerned that his testimony had not been solicited by Sherman.

I had asked him if he had any idea who Mr. L1 might be and he clearly indicated that he

did not know. It was only after I asked him about his own experiences at the Timoreseborder at the time that he gave a very sober and credible description of what he had

experienced and knew about. I feel that someone eager to tell a fabricated story to

assuage a sense of feeling offended would have been more eager. Yet Mr. Hornay did not

really volunteer information to me (let alone insist on telling me anything). He simplyanswered the questions I asked in a careful and thoughtful way.

Hornay struck me as honest and straightforward. Amilcar Dias (who was translating for

me) also considered him very honest. Subsequently Hornay agreed to be interviewed byAdelino Gomes (and what he told Gomes was almost identical to what he had told me

previously). Gomes later described his testimony as honest and measured20

. Hornaylater agreed to talk to Jolliffe (with Jonathan Holmes) and then Tom Sherman (when he

was doing his second report). This openness does not suggest someone who was

inventing or fabricating stories because he was feeling offended from not beingapproached previously.

18 line 10, page 175, Cover Up

19 bottom of page 157 of Cover Up20

Email from Gomes to McNaughtan, 27 November 2001




13

Jolliffe pre-judges Hornay s testimony as all hearsay

Jolliffe writes further that (upper page 175) she knew all he had to say about it (Balibo),

which was all hearsay (emphasis added). She does not explain how she could be certainof this. Having impugned his motives for talking (suggesting it was because he was

offended ) she attempts to pass a negative judgment on all that he might say (that it was

all hearsay ).

Yet clearly Hornay was present at Batugade and occupying a position of leadership that

would of necessity have involved interacting with the Indonesian military command. This

is confirmed by other UDT members such as Joao Carrascalao and Fernando Mariz. Thusit makes sense that he would have had interactions with Indonesian commanders (such as

Major Leo ) as he claims. Whether these interactions were through interpreters or not,

they would have been first hand experiences and thus (by definition) not simplyhearsay .

Jolliffe creates (then dismisses) a false argument - misrepresenting what the real crux

of Hornay s testimony is

Jolliffe writes the crux (emphasis added) of the supposed new evidence was that he had

seen an Indonesian company with Timorese auxiliaries moving up the road from

Batugade to Balibo the night of October 15-16 (although no troops had gone in thatdirection) 21.

Yet this interpretation was certainly not the the crux of Hornay s statements. It was, atbest, irrelevant to the thrust of what he had to say. In addition it seems unlikely that

Hornay was actually saying what Jolliffe attributes to him.

The true crux of Hornay s evidence was his allegation of the attacking force s

foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo and his suggestion of this force s pre-

meditated intent to physically eliminate the journalists.

It is hard to understand where Jolliffe has found a basis to conclude that Hornay was

saying those attacking Balibo came up the road from Batugade to Balibo . Jolliffe was

not at the ICJ Colloquium something she does not mention in her book. Her

interpretation seems to have been based on Hornay s response to a question put byGomes in his interview (which was posted with the Balibo Colloquium material on the

internet) :

Q. But did you see them leaving for Balibo?

A. Yes I saw them leaving on the night of the 15th to 16th 22.

21 Mid page 175, Cover Up 22

Testimony of Hornay, page 5




14

From this Jolliffe seems to have interpreted that Hornay said they were moving up the

road from Batugade to Balibo which is not what Hornay said in the interview.

In fact later in the same interview Hornay said :

I ve heard that they attacked on 4 fronts: one front coming from AKIESAK (Haikessak)

in Indonesia going in the direction of Maliana to cut the retreat from Balibo to Maliana:

other front let me think about it after 20 years.. from another 2 Indonesian villages closeto the border but I cant quite remember

Question, From Batugade could you see what the operation involved?

Answer, Helicopters and boats. From the sea, boats and helicopters flying over the

area.23

Thus Hornay makes it quite clear that he was not suggesting the attack on Balibo came

up the road from Batugade in fact it seems he was well aware of the structure andpositioning of the attacking force and provided quite an accurate description of it(although he did not claim to have been an eyewitness). The point is that the attack came

across the border further south from Batugade and not up the Batugade-Balibo road.

Hornay s testimony shows that he understood the real situation (and had outlined it in his

interview).

What Jolliffe does not seem (or chooses not) to understand is that troops leaving

Batugade on the night of the 15th to 16th were not necessarily moving up the road fromBatugade to Balibo . The troop movements from Batugade may have been connected to

the imminent attack the next day and could have been to a number of other locations

(after all Batugade was within 20 kilometers of where the attacks were launched from).And the next morning there was movement up the road from Batugade to Balibo, but it

occurred after Balibo had fallen to the attacking forces. Jolliffe s quotes are selective and

misleading.

Jolliffe then debunks her own argument when she confirms that Hornay told her the

attacking force didn t move off from Batugade (emphasis added), but moved in on four

other fronts24

- which is essentially correct. Thus it is odd that she asserts that he hadclaimed he had seen an Indonesian company with Timorese auxiliaries moving up the

road from Batugade to Balibo the night of October 15-16 (although no troops had gone in

that direction) . Jolliffe attributes an erroneous interpretation to Hornay in her book even

though she knows he didn t mean it (because he subsequently clarified hermisunderstanding of what he had said, when she questioned him later). Yet Jolliffe prints

the misrepresentation of what Hornay said even though this is not what he had said inthe Gomes interview she is supposedly quoting from and not what he subsequently said

to her. She then implies Hornay was mistaken by writing no troops had gone in that

direction . In fact it appears Jolliffe is mistak en, not Hornay.

23 Testimony of Hornay, page 13 24

bottom of page 175 - top of page 176, Cover Up




15

What Hornay did say in the Gomes interview (and what he had told me in our initial

conversation some months earlier) and what he then said to Jolliffe that the attackingforce didn t move off from Batugade, but moved in on four other fronts was consistent

and correct - and indicates that Hornay s understanding of the military actions at the

border was quite clear. Jolliffe seemingly mis-construes (or chooses to misrepresent)what Hornay has said and instead makes an issue out of a non-issue.

By creating and then refuting a straw argument Jolliffe apparently seeks to undermineHornay s credibility.

However Hornay s indication that there was increased military activity around Batugade

before the attacks on Balibo and Maliana and that troops from round Batugade weremobilized for some sort of military involvement in the offensive of 16th October is

supported by the evidence of others. It also seems logical that some of those who crossed

the border from the various staging points on 16th October may have come fromBatugade. The distances involved along the whole border are quite small and, as notedpreviously, troops leaving Batugade (or Rai Icu) going to Balibo need not necessarily be

going directly up the road that links Batugade with Balibo they may well have been

moving around to staging points in West Timor and moved across the border from

elsewhere. The military operations launched on October 16 were part of a major generaloffensive that commenced the intended Indonesian invasion of East Timor (although the

operation later bogged down). As the operation was large it would have been surprising if

some of the troops stationed near Batugade were not moving the night before the attackon the border.

Rogerio Lobato s report of the attacks on the morning of 16th October gives a sense of thesize of the Indonesian operation (of which the attack on Balibo was one part) :

Commandante Rogerio Lobato said that troops under cover of heavy artillery fire fromIndonesian Timor had attacked the southern villages of Fohorem, Tilomar, Fatomean, and

Fatolulic as well as the northern border towns reported earlier. This morning s report

claimed that Indonesian regulars had launched a co-coordinated attack on the northern

area at 5.00 AM today25

. The northern border towns that had also been attackedincluded Lebos, Cova, Maliana, Memo, Nunura, and Tunibibi as well as Balibo.

Clearly this was a major operation by the Indonesian attacking forces taking place in both

the northern and southern border areas. In those circumstances, it would have beensurprising if troops were not moving off from Batugade during the evening before.

Jose Martins affidavit is summarized by Sherman and sheds further light on this matter :

The Martins affidavit went on to state that on about 24 September 1975 there were about

200 Indonesian troops stationed at Batugade and the Commander was Colonel Dadin .Martins occupied the same room as the Colonel at the Batugade headquarters. Martins

was an intelligence officer and he refers to the build up of Indonesian forces in the border

25 Rogerio Lobato s statement quoted at bottom of page 75, Cover Up




16

area near Batugade, with regular troops, totaling about 3000, being landed from ships at

Atapupu. He says in the affidavit that on 15 October 1975 Dading told him thattomorrow is D-day. We attack Balibo 26. It seems unlikely that such a large troop

concentration as that reported by Martins to have been near Batugade would not have

participated in the October 16th

assault. In fact it seems very likely that troops would have moved out of Batugade in preparation for the assault (as Hornay had indicated in his

evidence).

In fact there is evidence to support the movement of troops from Batugade that night

from at least one other witness Joaquim Estorninho. Estorninho was located at Rai Ico,

a small place just outside Batugade, on the coast27

. Estorninho, who had been a

Sergeant in the Portuguese Army in Guinea Bissau , had provided testimony to Sherman

in 1996 that corroborated Hornay s comment that troops had left Batugade with the

destination of Balibo that evening. Estorninho had told Sherman that he recollected on

the same evening 15 October he saw troops passing from Indonesian Timor in themoonlight through Rai Ico going in the direction of Balibo

28.

Although the exact details (of which roads the troops were moving along) are unclear,

this is credible evidence that corroborates what Hornay said and indicates again that

Jolliffe s discrediting of Hornay on this matter was unjustified.

Jolliffe then tries to discredit Hornay s central evidence (concerning Indonesian

foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo)

Jolliffe then says that Hornay s main evidence (that the Indonesian forces had

foreknowledge of and malicious intentions towards the journalists) had come from anIndonesian interpreter called Gabriel, not from any specific conversation Hornay had had

with an Indonesian officer or overheard 29. Jolliffe discounts Hornay s evidence

apparently on the basis that the information was from an interpreter - and gives it noweight. A letter from Jolliffe s publisher has since confirmed that Jolliffe is accusing

Hornay of apparent falsification 30 and this is the basis for that accusation.

Jolliffe does not address at least one evident contradiction : if the above statement is true(and Jolliffe seems to accept that it is) it suggests that she did not know all he [Hornay]

had to say 31 about Balibo as she asserts. It also indicates that her assertion that Hornay s

knowledge of the border events was all hearsay32

was not completely correct. Even if

Hornay s information was derived solely from the Indonesian interpreter Gabriel thisevidence warranted being added into the total evidence and assessed. Instead of

acknowledging this Jolliffe chooses to portray Hornay s evidence as falsification .

26 3.29, page 32, Sherman Report 1 27

4.135, page 73, Sherman Report 1 28 4.138, page 73, Sherman Report 1 29

line 3, page 176, Cover Up 30

letter from Henry Rosenbloom of Scribe Publications, 17 January, 2002. 31 line 12, page 175, Cover Up 32 line 12, page 175 Cover Up




18

Q To whom did he say this to?

A They were talking between themselves and I caught itA And what did he say?

A That objectively it was to hunt the journalists so they wouldn t witness the case

[invasion].

Later in that interview Hornay was asked by Gomes would you admit you could have

been confused by not understanding what they said about the elimination of journalistsand do you think you reached this conclusion after the events?

A No I was (quasi) nearly sure they were going there to kill the journalists. Quasi sure.

Hornay said he had heard directly from an Indonesian officer that the attacking force

knew about the journalists presence in Balibo (something which is also confirmed by a

number of other witnesses) and to have concluded that the attacking force intended to kill

the journalists. It is also likely that a translator would have been translating theconversations between Indonesian commanding officers and UDT leadership, and thus

such a translator (for example the Indonesian interpreter called Gabriel ) would havebeen privy to important and relevant conversations. It appears to me that Hornay had

acquired his own understanding of what was happening (which would have been assisted

by his background of being a military commander) and that may have been confirmed byhis conversations with the translator. Even if Hornay s interpretation was simply based

on his conversation with the translator (as Jolliffe claims) it appears that that Hornay s

statement deserves to be added to the body of evidence to be assessed in a properlyconstituted inquiry which was what I was advocating in the ICJ Colloquium.

I hope to have a chance to further clarify these matters with Mr. Hornay and gain a betterunderstanding of what happened. But I feel that the distinction between the two

descriptions (the one given to Gomes and Jolliffe s version) is not extremely great. There

is certainly less variation between these two versions of Hornay s evidence than there isbetween different versions of the evidence of some other Balibo witnesses.

My strong impression was that Mr. Hornay was an honest and credible witness and that

the circumstances of his statements lent weight to the credibility of what he had to say.Gomes commented that Lourenco Hornay s testimony seemed to me honest and

measured - although insufficient (in Gomes opinion) to establish intentional murder by

the Indonesians.

I believe that Hornay s evidence (even the minimalist version acknowledged by Jolliffe)

has some weight and should be factored in to the overall picture. Yet there is evidence

that he does have other direct evidence of Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalistspresence at Balibo and this issue is dealt with in greater depth on pages 20-21. As far as

I am concerned the jury is still out on the value of Mr. Hornay s testimony.

Jolliffe s allegation of falsification against Hornay




19

Jolliffe s own assertions that Hornay s statements are unreliable (see above) appear to bethe basis for her subsequent conclusion that this was apparent falsification of Balibo

material 34. The letter from Jolliffe s publisher (Henry Rosenbloom) seemingly confirms

that in Jolliffe s and Rosenbloom s view Hornay was the one with credibility problems35 and thus the supposed source of the falsification .

Yet the allegation of falsification implies some improper intention - rather than sincerebut inadequate attempts to recollect events and interpretations that occurred quite some

time ago. Many of the Balibo testimonies have contradictions and inconsistencies

between them (and there are contradictions between the statements of the same

individuals on different days). Time and memory lapses, language difficulties, social andpolitical pressures and the lack of education of some witnesses are all factors in these

variations. It is hard to think of another Balibo witness who has been unfortunate enough

to be publicly accused of falsification under such circumstances. However thisrelatively slight variation in Hornay s testimony (under questioning from Jolliffe who had

already formed conclusions that she knew all he had to say which was all hearsay36)

leads Jolliffe to consider that this is apparent falsification - though these variations are

smaller and less significant than many backflips that have occurred in other testimonies

on Balibo. It is this apparent falsification that Jolliffe argues has marred the ICJcolloquium .

Jolliffe had advised Sherman not to interview Mr. Hornay in 1996

It appears Jolliffe s advice had convinced Sherman not to interview Hornay for his first

report. Tom Sherman wrote Lorenco Hornai is a new witness but I was aware of hisexistence in the first evaluation. I recollect I decided not to interview him because Jill

Jolliffe advised me then that she had known him and his family for many years and had

never heard him mention the events at Balibo in a way that suggested he had any directknowledge (page 74 second Sherman report, under heading Lorenco Hornai ).

Sherman continued This recollection was confirmed by a statement from Jonathan

Holmes in a letter to me dated 9th

November 1998. Mr. Holmes referred to a claim by Mr.Hornai that he heard his commander in Batugade, Major Leo, state a day or two before

the assault that there were eight journalists in Balibo who were to be killed during the

assault. Mr. Holmes said Jill Jolliffe who has known Hornay for many years has never

heard him make a similar claim . Sherman (page 137 in his second report) again usesJolliffe s comment that she has never heard him make this claim to denigrate Hornay s

credibility.

So Jolliffe had apparently given advice that convinced Sherman that Hornay was not

worth speaking to when he was doing his first report, then she had apparently helped

convince (ABC journalist) Jonathan Holmes that Hornay was not credible because she

34 mid page, page 176, Cover Up

35 letter from Jolliffe s publisher (Henry Rosenbloom), 17/1/2002 , top paragraph of page 236

2nd paragraph, page 175, Cover Up




20

had never heard him say what he said to Gomes and myself. Holmes had then written to

Sherman to reinforce Hornay s supposed lack of credibility based (again) on theassertions of Jill Jolliffe. Sherman then used Holmes letter to buttress his own reluctance

to seriously countenance what Hornay was saying.

It is clear that Jolliffe invested quite a lot of effort in demeaning Hornay s credibility as a

witness and thus has a subsequent interest in trying to establish in her book that Hornay s

statements lack substance.

Lack of respect for the Timorese involved ? By whom ?

The interpretation that there was a lack of respect for the Timorese involved who

were seen as objects to be used37

- again appears to be based on allegations that are not

upheld by the evidence. Jolliffe appears to have derived this interpretation from her

previous allegations of trickery and apparent falsification earlier in the sameparagraph. As I hope I have established that I did not engage in either of these activities, I

feel I cannot be construed as guilty of the interpretation derived ( lack of respect...for the

Timorese involved ). The evidence suggests that this criticism might be better directed

towards Jolliffe herself.

The Timorese involved in this is one man Lourenco Hornay. Presumably Jolliffe is

suggesting that the alleged lack of respect is directed towards him. The impression

created is that I am the person not showing respect and treating Hornay as an object tobe used . (If Jolliffe s allegation is not referring to Mr. Hornay then I am unable to

understand what she is trying to say here).

In fact I think the evidence suggests the opposite. I believe that I treated Mr. Hornay with

respect. I believed (and still believe) Hornay s evidence (which I think was sincerely

offered) to be useful and significant. I believed (and still believe) that he was honest andcredible. After initially speaking with me he agreed to the interview that was conducted

by Gomes, in which he gave evidence almost identical to that which he had previously

given me. I diligently adhered to his wish to remain anonymous. I have not heard any

suggestion that he feels I did not treat him with respect. It is Jill Jolliffe who sets herselfup in judgment and makes such statements in her book. I am not alone in viewing his

testimony as credible - Adelino Gomes wrote Lourenco s testimony seemed to me

honest and measured .

In fact it is Jill Jolliffe who publishes detrimental allegations that diminish Mr. Hornay.

She writes, I knew all he had to say about (Balibo), which was all hearsay38

. She sayshe claimed troops had gone up the road from Balibo to Batugade (which I believe is a

mis-representation), then writes no troops had gone in this direction 39 thus suggesting

publicly that he is (at best) ill-informed on matters he speaks about. She writes she heard

37 end of second paragraph, page 176, Cover Up

38 line 12, page 175, Cover Up 39

line 20, page 175




22

As the underlying analysis is flawed, this interpretation is simply unjustified. Moreassertions based on the same incorrect premise do not add weight to Jolliffe s case.

IS MR. HORNAY S EVIDENCE WORTHY OF PROPER CONSIDERATION ?

I believe that in spite of the consistent attack on Mr. Hornay s credibility mounted in JillJolliffe s book that the jury should still be out on the credibility of Hornay s evidence

and that further checking is warranted.

Apart from the testimony provided to Adelino Gomes and myself previously, Mr. Hornayspoke to Sherman and Jolliffe.

Sherman s interview with Hornay raises some questions. Sherman s style of questioningin his reports results in leads that are not followed up adequately, ambiguities that are leftun-clarified (then later subjected to selective interpretation) and crucial questions that are

not even asked. For example Sherman leaves matters quite muddled by not distinguishing

between Balibo and Maliana at a crucial point in his questioning of Hornay 47. Having

asked his questions in a misleading and ambiguous way, Sherman then dismissesHornay s testimony because Mr. Hornai had no knowledge of the Balibo 5 being in

Balibo prior to the attack 48 - a finding totally at odds with Hornay s prior (clear)

evidence. This is not the first time the outcome of one of Sherman s interviews has beenperplexing.

Nonetheless there are enough matters of interest in Sherman s interview with Hornay inhis second report (pages 75 to 79 of Sherman s second report) to warrant a proper

investigation.

For instance whilst some of Hornay s information is said to have come via the interpreter

Gabriel other material is clearly communicated directly to him. Hornay is quoted (page

76 Sherman Report 2) as saying I had some contacts with Indonesian officers ... I

understood a bit of what they said and sometimes I communicated with them directly49

.Sherman then asks Which officers, if he can identify them, told him about the eight

journalists ?

Interpreter So I got the information mostly from two. A lieutenant from the unit of

transmissions must be communications radio transmission, he cant remember hisname, and Captain Fernandes 50.

Later Sherman notes (4.50 page 79) Mr. Hornai goes on to describe a conversation hehad with Colonel Dading on 13 October through his interpreter where Dading expressed

47 bottom of page 78, Sherman Report 2

48 7.56, page 137, Sherman Report 2

49 Sherman interview with Hornay, page 76, Sherman Report 2 50

As above




23

some concern about the journalists but the nature of that concern is not at all clear 51.

Obviously this was not clarified by Sherman s interview, yet it indicates that Hornay wasin the loop in that he was able to speak directly to Dading (the overall commander of

Indonesian operations at the border). Sherman s interview (combined with Gomes s

prior interview with Hornay) suggests that Hornay may have quite a lot of usefulinformation based on his direct experiences to provide about the circumstances behind

the Balibo killings.

Hornay s mentioning of specific names, dates and details (regarding the foreknowledge

of those planning the attack on Balibo of the journalists presence and the intention to

physically eliminate them) and his position as a UDT commander located in Batugade

at the time support the credibility of his testimony. Significant parts of his evidence arealso corroborated by that of other witnesses - such as L1 (in his later version ), JoaoCarrascalao and Fernando Mariz.

Certainly what Hornay has said consistently appears substantial enough to warrant aproper assessment in a properly constituted inquiry.

OTHER MIS-STATEMENTS CONCERNING McNAUGHTAN IN JOLLIFFE SBOOK

A. About the shielding of Mr. Hornay s identity :

Jolliffe notes (mid page 175) that Hornay s identity was shielded in McNaughtan s

Lisbon interview, although he said later he had not asked for this 52. What point isJolliffe trying to make here ? In the context her comments seem to suggest that Hornay s

identity was shielded by McNaughtan for some inappropriate reason.

In fact it was made clear to me from two sources that Hornay s identity should be

suppressed. The first source is the email communications between Amilcar Dias and

myself, the second is the statement in English made by Gomes before commencing his

interview with Hornay. In this Gomes made it very clear (twice) that Hornay s identityshould not be revealed. I honoured this commitment. This was, in fact, the only condition

to the use of Hornay s statements that I was (and am) aware of.

Jolliffe s comments (in the context in which they occurred) seem to imply some dubiousintention by me in suppressing Hornay s identity. In fact the opposite is the case. The

emails between Amilcar Dias and myself show that I suggested that Hornay might bewilling to be identified because a peer of his (Fernando Mariz) had already publicly made

statements similar in nature to Hornay s. However it was relayed to me that Hornay

wished to remain anonymous.

51 As above 52

line 16, page 175, Cover Up




24

B An interview allegedly mistranslated by me

Jolliffe has made other mis-statements in her descriptions of my activities concerning

Balibo. Jolliffe writes (at the bottom of page 232) that an interview done by me with

Paolo Martins in Dili and used by SBS TV news was mistranslated, rendering itnonsensical in parts . This may be true. She then links me to the alleged mistranslations

by writing that according to the text presented originally by McNaughtan, Martins

claimed the Indonesians had piled policias, policemen on top of the dead bodies beforeburning them, and named the field commander as Yunus Sophia .

I have reviewed the translation that I used of this interview. I hand wrote the translationwhich had again been done by Beatriz Miranda and then typed it up. My translation

clearly says that the perpetrators took a mattress and put on top of the bodies and burnt

them . Later Miranda s translation of Martins states the man who commanded that

operation was Commander Yunus Yosfiah who is now Minister of Information ofIndonesia . So there were no such simplistic (and obviously absurd) mis-translations

presented by McNaughtan . The documents in my files suggest that if I gave anytranslation of the Martins interview to Sherman it would have been the translation done

by Beatrice Miranda which was correct. This was the translation I used and relied upon.

I am not sure where the absurd translation quoted by Jolliffe came from. It might have

been done by SBS TV who took the original interview (in Portuguese) and used it for

their news piece. I agree with Jolliffe that the news piece screened by SBS TV was notvery coherent 53. However, having handed over the interview and an outline of what I

considered was relevant and important in this interview to SBS, it was out of my hands.

Anyone with experience of dealing with the media would recognize that the resultingnews stories can often be garbled and less than satisfactory. It is possible the mis-

translated text she quotes was from SBS TV. I may have handed SBS s translation to

Tom Sherman for his interest (or given him a copy of the taped TV news piece) I m notsure where the text that Jolliffe quotes is from (or whether Sherman did in fact receive

such a translation). It might also have been a translation done by Foreign Correspondent

at ABC TV (who held the tape of the original interview in their vault for a period of time

and presumably had some sort of translation done by their own translation service).

But the mis-translation cited by Jolliffe is certainly not the translation that I relied upon

and Jolliffe again misrepresents me in a detrimental way by stating that the mis-

translation was supplied by McNaughtan .

C An interview that didn t take place / and other misrepresentations

Another inaccuracy concerning me appears on pages 241 and is repeated on page 257.

Jolliffe speaks of the witness Terrado and writes He had been interviewed by

Australian reporter John Martinkus and Andrew McNaughtan in September 1998 for a

story which appeared in The Australian54. Although there are no negative inferences

53 Bottom paragraph, page 232, Cover Up 54

Mid lower paragraph, page 241, Cover Up




25

towards me in this statement - the statement is simply wrong. I did not interview Terrado

only John Martinkus did. The statement is repeated on page 257 and is again wrong.This indicates (again) that Jolliffe did not check her information properly.

Jolliffe s also writes misleadingly of the interview with Hornay as McNaughtan sLisbon interview 55. In fact I was in Sydney when it was done - I did not do the

interview or have any direct input into the interview. It seems likely that Jolliffe was not

aware when she wrote the book that I was physically removed from the interviewprocess. This may have skewed her interpretation of what occurred. If Jolliffe was aware

how this interview was actually conducted, it would have been appropriate to describe it

differently.

Jolliffe again writes misleadingly about the process of the ICJ Colloquium when she

notes In 1997 the Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)

decided to hold a colloquium on Balibo in Sydney on the twenty-first (sic) anniversary ofthe deaths, and to give priority to reviewing the Sherman findings. Andrew McNaughtantraveled to Lisbon to prepare evidence, and families of the journalists were invited to

attend 56 (italics added). In fact my trip to Lisbon had preceded any decision by the ICJ

to hold the Colloquium. That is why I was I had to request someone else to arrange that

Mr. Hornay be interviewed in Lisbon by the time I realised that his testimony could beused at the ICJ Colloquium I was back in Australia.

Jolliffe s allegations and interpretations concerning me have been made without checkingthe facts

The inaccurate statements about me by Jolliffe could have been avoided if she haddiscussed these matters with me. She has not done so. Apart from our initial discussions

(about Sherman s report and L1 ) she has refused to talk to me about these issues.

This is in spite of the fact that I tried to clear up any misunderstandings with Jolliffe. We

met by coincidence at the Timor border in late 1999 and Jolliffe (in the course of a brief

and unfriendly conversation) accused me of mis-representations concerning Balibo (I

don t remember her exact words and she did not make her point clear at all). I pointed outthat there must be some mis-understanding and suggested we talk about it to get the facts

straight but she refused any discussion. In 2001 I received strong advise from former

Australian DF intelligence officer Andrew Plunkett (who had spoken to Jolliffe) that I

should urgently speak to her before Cover Up was published as it would containdetrimental (and possibly incorrect) allegations about me. On Plunkett s advise I did ring

Jolliffe however she continued her refusal to speak with me. Jolliffe later expressedanger towards Plunkett because he had suggested I ring her and had given me her numberin order for me to do so.

Sherman quotes Lord Denning (2.20, page 21, Sherman Report 1). Denning wrote:

55. Line 16, page 175, Cover Up. 56

Last paragraph, page 173, Cover Up.




26

The inspectors can obtain information in any way they think best, but before they

condemn or criticize a man, they must give him a fair opportunity for correcting orcontradicting what is said against him .

Jolliffe not only failed to give me the right to correct or contradict what she said againstme, she actually rejected two initiatives I had made to clear up her apparent

misunderstandings.

WAS GOMES TREATED UNFAIRLY ?

Gomes confirms having said to Jill Jolliffe that there had been no interview57

. Gomessays that he explained in his conversations with Amilcar Dias (who arranged the

recording of Hornay s testimony in Lisbon) that though we were talking in front of a

camera, that was not a journalistic interview 58. Apparently Gomes felt that hisdiscussion with Mr. Hornay was a conversation and not a journalistic interview (in spiteof it entailing a half hour of detailed discussion in front of two video cameras).

However if any conditions were placed on the on camera talk they were not passed on

to me. As my interest was simply in what Lourenco Hornay said, it was not very relevantto me who did the interview, as long as the right questions were asked . By way of

background to this, it needs to be understood that I was in Sydney and a friend, Amilcar

Dias (who is also a friend of Adelino Gomes) had agreed to arrange a filmed interviewbetween Gomes and Hornay about Balibo in Lisbon.

Gomes wrote that if those who used the interview were not aware of any mencionedconditions [sic] then the only one to be blamed is me [Gomes]. Being a professional

journalist, I should know that there are no innocent on-camera talks between a reporter

and a source 59. It is worth noting that what took place involved a conversation betweenGomes and Hornay, both sitting in chairs with a table between them and two video

cameras (one on a tripod and one hand held) recording the interview that lasted over half

an hour. This included some detailed questioning by Gomes of Hornay (although

possibly less probing than might be Gomes normal style in a formal journalisticinterview).

At the beginning of the video, Gomes described what he was doing as an interview ,

repeating the word interview on three occasions in English and mentioned no conditionsattached to its use (other than that Hornay s identity should be kept secret which he

mentioned twice).

I have gone over my communications at the time with Amilcar Dias in Lisbon and can t

find (and have no memory of) any conditions of use that relate to Gomes s involvement.

Obviously if I had been informed there were conditions that might, for example, have

57 Email from Adelino Gomes to McNaughtan, 22 November, 2001

58 As above 59

As above




27

precluded the interview being used at the ICJ Colloquium I would have found someone

else to do the interview. After all the whole point of questioning Hornay (as the initialemail communications show) was to present his evidence at the Colloquium. I was

unaware of any restrictions to the use of the interview and am still unclear what any

conditions to the use of the interview might have been.

Gomes was unaware of (and I think surprised about) the publishing of Jolliffe s book and

the inclusion of his supposed comments. After our communications he wrote to meThank you for your explanation. Now I understand better what happened. Before

answering your questions let me tell you that I do not blame you neither [sic] Lourenco

[Hornay] for this. And as I have good feelings about Amilcar [Dias] I consider all this a

regrettable misunderstanding due to something that we in Portugal call nacional-

porreirismo (a typical Portuguese way of solving problems counting on the goodauspices of the Gods ) 60.

I should add that the email communications that had taken place between Amilcar Dias

and myself show that I always made it clear that the recording of Hornay s interview wasbeing done to present his testimony to the ICJ Colloquium on Balibo and Beyond and

interested journalists. As I was actively helping ICJ members to organise the colloquium

(along with Peter Cronau) I certainly did not want anything to marr the colloquium .

My strong impression is that Gomes now regrets comments that he accepts he may have

made to Jolliffe and certainly would have preferred that they were not published. Heapparently accepts that these comments were made without a full understanding of how

things had occurred and that now he understands the background he does not blame Mr.

Hornay or myself but feels there was a regrettable misunderstanding .

Unfortunately Jolliffe seems to have picked up a comment made privately, then mis -

quoted it and then published it (to the surprise of Mr. Gomes). I reiterate that Jolliffemade no attempt to clarify these matters with me (in spite of having had opportunities to

do so and my having made attempts to clarify these matters with her).

There is a short post script to these matters : in Dili in June, 2002 I met and talked againwith Adelino Gomes and he told me he had talked over these matters with Amilcar Dias.

Dias had told Gomes he had no memory of any conditions imposed by Gomes on the use

of his interview. This indicates that Dias would not have suggested to me that there were

any conditions to the use of the interview.

I was also able to ask Adelino Gomes about his perception of Lourenco Hornay s

credibility. Gomes indicated that, though he found Hornay personally credible, he didn tbelieve Hornay s evidence about Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalists presence

in Balibo could be correct, because Gomes understood that the Australian crews had only

arrived in Balibo on the day before the attack in which they died (leaving no time for theIndonesians to have learned about their presence). I have since checked the evidence

about this issue - which confirms the crews were there for a number of days before the

60 Email from Adelino Gomes to McNaughtan, 26 November, 2001




28

attack and have sent this material to Gomes. This suggests that any doubts that Gomes

may have about the credibility of Lourenco Hornay s testimony are based on amisconception of events at the border at that time. This issue is still being sorted out.

PART 2

THE BACKGROUND CONTEXT MATTERS CONCERNING THE CREDIBILITYOR OTHERWISE OF KEY WITNESSES

It may be relevant and helpful to understand the context of these events, and so I haveoutlined the background below.

The first Sherman Report

The first Sherman report was released in June, 1996 and concluded that the deaths of the

journalists at Balibo had probably occurred in circumstances of continuing fighting61

.Thus Sherman s findings endorsed the crossfire or accidental death scenario.

Sherman s conclusions were founded almost exclusively on the testimony of one witnessL1 (Lisbon 1 witness) who Sherman described as a witness of truth 62. L1 s critical

role in justifying Sherman s conclusions was accepted by most observers including

Jolliffe. She wrote that the conclusion that the journalists were killed while fighting wasstill taking place was a conclusion he (Sherman) reached largely from the testimony of

L1 63.

My search for L1

In early / mid 1997 I had a chance to visit Portugal as I attended the Oporto Conferenceon East Timor. I took the opportunity to go to Lisbon and try to track down L1, for the

purpose of answering questions about his background and credibility.

Circumstances were quite different in 1997 because the struggle for East Timorese selfdetermination was very intense at that time.

Balibo was then a thorny issue that both Jakarta and Canberra wished would disappear. If

the first Sherman Report had been widely accepted as credible, the Australian andIndonesian governments would have been able to bury the Balibo issue and both

would have been happy to do so. Canberra and Jakarta also believed that if Balibo would

be resolved the Australian public support for and interest in East Timor would besignificantly reduced. Thus there had to be a level of concern that (given the high stakes)

some sort of influence or corrupt pressure might be brought to bear on the witnesses who

Sherman interviewed - and thus his investigation. It was in this context that I felt it

61 9.10 , bottom of page 137, Sherman Report 1

62 5.37 page 100, Sherman Report 1 63

mid page 160, Cover Up




29

relevant to go to Lisbon and try to find what I could about L1 - and hopefully interview

him.

Sherman relied heavily on L1 s testimony as he himself acknowledged. Yet L1 s

evidence was at odds with nearly all other independent testimonies from 1975 onwards. Italso bore a striking resemblance to the version propagated in 1975 in the statement by

one of the pro-Indonesian Timorese. That statement had since been repudiated by its

signatory, who revealed that it had been written by Indonesians who had subsequentlyforced him to sign it. The signatory (Guillerme Goncalves) had made a public recantation

in 1995 - and this recantation was one of the factors resulting in the commissioning of

the Sherman Report by Gareth Evans in the first place.

I was aware that Jolliffe had found L1 for Tom Sherman (she had played a significantrole in formulating and assisting Sherman s activities in Portugal). Therefore I first

approached Jolliffe. We had an initially congenial conversation though I could sensehostility if I questioned her about aspects of Sherman s report. Sherman s report had beenout for about a year at this time and (given her close association with it and interest in

Balibo) I believe Jolliffe would have been sent a copy and read it.

When I asked her about L1 and indicated some skepticism about the evidence he gave toSherman she became quite hostile. She told me that she knew L1 and strongly indicated

that she viewed him as a credible and significant witness and that she put faith in what he

had told Sherman. She then offered her opinion that people such as myself wereideologues who had fixed perspectives because of political bias. She strongly implied

that this attitude which she attributed to me was the basis of my questioning of the

credibility of L1.

I subsequently asked her if, even so, she would help me contact L1, or ask him if he

would be willing to speak to me. She said that she would not assist me. She also told me(with what seemed to be some satisfaction) that she was sure I would not be able to find

him. Although I don t remember our conversation word for word, I clearly recall the

content.

I then spent a week in Lisbon staying in the house of Pascoela Barreto who is from a

well-known Timorese family. She worked as a type of social worker with the community

in Lisbon and knew most of the Timorese community there. She and her husband

Amilcar Dias helped me arrange meetings over the next week. At the end of the week, Ihad met a number of relevant witnesses (most of whom had spoken with Sherman) but

none who had been able to help locate L1.

As a last resort I phoned Jolliffe again before leaving and told her I had been unable to

find L1. She seemed resentful of my activities in Lisbon. I asked if she would be willing

to at least pass a message to L1, asking him if he would be willing to communicate withme. I pointed out that this could be done completely anonymously, and that any

communications could be through an intermediary (such as Jolliffe) so that his identity

could be protected. Jolliffe adamantly refused to pass on my message to L1. When I




30

suggested that it should be the witness s prerogative to decide whether to communicate

with anyone else and that L1 should at least be given the opportunity to refuse personally,she again became hostile. It was obvious Jolliffe would not help and the conversation

ended.

The odd circumstances in Lisbon

During my time in Lisbon, I met and visited a number of Timorese, including AbilioAraujo. Araujo (considered probably the richest East Timorese individual) lived in a

large villa above Lisbon. His lifestyle was relatively affluent and exclusive and he was

very security conscious.

Araujo told me about his involvement with Suharto s daughter Tutuk with whom he hadcollaborated in organizing intra-Timorese discussions in London. He showed me photos

of himself with Tutuk. He also told me of his recent trip to Jakarta where he had met overlunch with Prabowo, the Suharto son-in-law (and Tutuk s brother in law). Araujo wasinvolved in import-export between Indonesia and Portugal and dealt directly with the

Suharto family in this. These deals had made him a rich man.

The trip he had made to Jakarta probably coincided with the visit there of Jose Martins (Ibelieve Araujo and Martins may have gone there together). Martins (the former leader of

Kota party) had relevant information about Balibo but had refused to meet with Tom

Sherman during his trip to Lisbon in spite of Sherman s requests.

Sherman noted I endeavoured to interview Jose Martins during my visit to Portugal in

April 1996, but he was unable to meet me. I did invite him to send me any material bymid May but no material came up to the date of this report 64.

Martins had not made himself available to Sherman but had gone to Jakarta. Given thecontext (Sherman s inquiry taking place), Martins lack of cooperation raised questions.

In Jakarta, Martins died suddenly of what was said to be a heart attack. There were

rumours in the Timorese community that Martins had been poisoned. This odd

background increased my concern about improper influence being brought to bear onthose giving testimony to Sherman and about circumstances that might lead to misleading

testimony being provided.

It was certainly possible to imagine a number of scenarios in which a false witnesscould be inserted into Sherman s investigation to support the more palatable conclusion

that the journalists deaths had been in crossfire . As mentioned this outcome (which

would eliminate the much more troubling option of death as the result of murder ) wouldbe popular with both the Indonesian and Australian governments. Clearly some Timorese

in Lisbon were in contact with persons in Jakarta who might be interested in influencing

Sherman s investigation towards the crossfire conclusion, if they could.

64 3.31, page 33, Sherman Report 1.




31

Jill Jolliffe was a long-term confidante and associate of Abilio Araujo in Lisbon.

However Jolliffe was adamant to me that she knew L1 personally and that she endorsedhis evidence to Sherman.

The ICJ Colloquium

Some months after I returned from this trip the ICJ began planning the proposed

Colloquium Balibo and Beyond . Rodney Lewis from the ICJ had responsibility fororganizing it. Peter Cronau (from the Centre for Independent Journalism) and I (from the

Australia East Timor Association) volunteered to assist with the organization as well as

contribute content to the colloquium.

At the Colloquium I presented the interview with Lourenco Hornay as well as my

Critique of the Sherman Report .

McNaughtan clearly articulated concerns he had about L1 s credibility at the ICJColloquium

I also wrote and presented a Critique of the Sherman Report to the Colloquium. Thisincluded a fairly extensive questioning of the credibility of the witness L1 , based on myexperiences in Lisbon and my own observations and analysis. I openly questioned

whether his testimony was truthful or if it could have misled Sherman and skewed his

report. Whether Sherman might have chosen to allow his report to be skewed is anotherconsideration.

The section concerning L1 from my Critique of the Sherman Report is copied below.A full copy of this Critique is available. I wrote:

8. THE (SHERMAN) REPORT S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT BALIBO AREFUNDAMENTALLY LINKED TO THE CREDIBILITY OF SHERMAN S KEY

WITNESS MR. L1 (LISBON 1 WITNESS). YET THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT

QUESTION MARK OVER THIS MAN. THE TESTIMONY OF MR. L1 THAT

ALLOWS SHERMAN TO CONCLUDE THAT FIGHTING TOOK PLACE FOR ATLEAST 2 HOURS IN BALIBO IS AT ODDS WITH ALMOST EVERY OTHER

ACCOUNT OF THE TAKING OF BALIBO BY INDONESIAN LED FORCES YET

SHERMAN MAKES LITTLE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THIS DISCREPANCY

(AND IGNORES EVIDENCE THAT MAKES THIS CONCLUSION UNLIKELY) .

I pointed out how much reliance Sherman had placed on L1 for his conclusions:

Mr. Sherman makes it clear that L1 is his main witness and that he gives him a lot of

credibility. He says that L1 impressed me as a witness of truth (5.37- page 100). Based

on L1 s evidence Sherman observes that his account is strong circumstantial evidencethat the Balibo Five were killed while fighting was still taking place. It is also direct

evidence that hostile fire was coming from the house where the journalists bodies were

located (5.36, page 100). In his conclusion he writes The evidence of L1 which was the




32

only reliable evidence on this issue, leads me to the conclusion that it is more likely than

not that the Balibo Five were killed in the heat of battle while fighting was continuing tooccur . The evidence of L1 is absolutely crucial to the conclusions that Sherman draws

about Balibo

I noted I THINK A NUMBER OF DOUBTS AND INCONSISTENCIES EXIST WITH

L1 - and outlined some of them.

I concluded my comments about L1 as follows:

To base the conclusions of a significant government investigation on the secret

testimony of one unidentified witness, when it contradicts much other testimony that isoffered publicly seems odd and raises doubts in my mind. The reason given for him not

being identified is that he would be in danger from the Indonesians this seems odd

considering it is his testimony that allows the conclusion that the journalists died in theheat of battle allowing the crossfire argument to be revived . 65

Although a number of people had privately expressed scepticism about L1 s testimony I

was (as far as I know) the only person to articulate this publicly in print.

Jolliffe changes her stated position towards L1 just prior to the ICJ Colloquium

By the time of the ICJ colloquium Jill Jolliffe had changed her position on L1 (compared

with what she had said to me in Lisbon). She now faxed Hamish McDonald saying, L1

was a new [emphasis added] and interesting witness whose testimony had not tallied(emphasis added) with her preliminary notes 66. This was a significant shift from the

position she had adopted with me in Lisbon when she said she knew him and expressed

confidence in his testimony.

Jolliffe s change deepened my concern about LI and his evidence. Given Araujo s close

and known association with the Suharto family there appeared to be at least one potential

conduit for the insertion of false evidence. I was concerned about this and did mention it(in conversation) to some people.

Subsequently L1 s reported testimony to Sherman has been shown to have been false

(when he was re-interviewed for the ABC Foreign Correspondent program in late 1998)- as I had initially suspected. The concern I had articulated in my critique to the ICJ

colloquium one year earlier was thus vindicated.

L1 WAS SHERMAN S KEY WITNESS

65 From A Critique of the Sherman Report by Andrew McNaughtan - section 8 deals with L1. This was

presented to the ICJ Colloquium in October 1997. 66

Fax from Jill Jolliffe to Hamish McDonald October 15th, 1997




33

The first Sherman report was released in June 1996 and concluded that the deaths of the

journalists at Balibo had probably occurred in the heat of battle while fighting wascontinuing to occur . Thus Sherman s findings endorsed the crossfire or accidental

death scenario.

Sherman acknowledged that his conclusions were founded almost exclusively on the

testimony of one witness L1. Sherman noted L1 impressed me as a witness of truth

(5.37 page 100 SR1). Sherman added his account is strong circumstantial evidencethat the Balibo Five were killed while fighting was still taking place. It is also direct

evidence that hostile fire was coming from the house where the journalists bodies were

located (5.36, page 100 SR1). He concluded The evidence of L1, which was the onlyreliable evidence on this issue, leads me to the conclusion that it is more likely than notthat the Balibo Five were killed in the heat of battle while fighting was continuing to

occur (5.86 page 110 SR1).

L1 s key role in justifying Sherman s conclusions was also accepted by Jolliffe. She

wrote that the conclusion that the journalists were killed while fighting was still taking

place was a conclusion he (Sherman) reached largely from the testimony of L1 67.

Jonathan Holmes (then of ABC Foreign Correspondent ) noted in the feature on Balibo -In his report Tom Sherman concluded that (the journalists) were killed in the heat of

battle. He based that conclusion mainly on the evidence of that anonymous witness that

he interviewed in Lisbon code-named L1 68.

I had made similar observations in my Critique of the Sherman Report.

It is clear that L1 s testimony was pivotal to Sherman s conclusion about the deaths of

the journalists a conclusion that endorsed the crossfire scenario.

YET L1 s EVIDENCE UNDERWENT A COMPLETE REVERSAL

L1 s evidence underwent a complete reversal from what he is reported to have said inSherman s first report to what he is reported to have said when Jolliffe and Jonathan

Holmes re-interviewed him some years later. The two key issues were whether or not the

attacking force had foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo (which would

obviously be a vital factor in interpreting their actions) and whether or not the journalistsdied in the heat of battle .

On the question of FOREKNOWLEDGE :

VERSION 1 (from Sherman s first report, early 1996)

67 mid page 160, Cover Up. 68

Quote from Jonathan Holmes from ABC Foreign Correspondent s TV special on Balibo




34

L1 was convinced that the attacking troops in Balibo did not know the five Australians

were there (Sherman Report 1, 4.141 bottom of page 74).

L1 was not aware prior to the attack of any intelligence about Australian journalists in

the area (4.142, page 75 Sherman Report 1).

VERSION 2 (the subsequent interview for Foreign Correspondent , late 1998)

It turned out that he was the second of the two Portuguese-speaking radio operators in

the Batugade fort, and that he had information about pre-knowledge similar to that of the

1979 witness (Cover Up - 4th paragraph, page 188).

Several days before the Balibo deaths L1 had monitored FRETILIN communications

discussing the presence of the journalists in Balibo which he duly transcribed and passed

on to Dading Kalbuadi (Cover Up - 5th paragraph, page 188).

On the question of DEATHS IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE / or otherwise :

Version 1 (Sherman Report, early 1996)

L1 told Sherman that when he arrived in Balibo the firing was still going on, so much so

that he had to borrow a weapon from the driver. The fire hostile to the attacking forcewas coming from three directions including the house at 9 o clock where he saw the

journalists bodies (meaning the house beside the Batugade road, as viewed from the

aerial map supplied in Sherman s report) (4.142, page 75 SR).

L1 s recollection is reinforced by the fact that he was wounded by an exploding grenade

in the course of the fighting. I saw the scar of his wound (4.142, page 75 SR).

In L1 s view the Fretilin deliberately let in the Indonesians, as it were, because they

placed themselves surrounding the whole of Balibo with the intention of trapping the

Indonesians and the Timorese who were on the Indonesians side, and he says that was atactical manoeuvre. And he said it worked in as much as the Indonesians did go in and

the Fretilin were surrounding the whole of Balibo (4.143, page 75 SR1).

When the firing from the house at 9 o clock ceased he (L1) moved around to the front ofthat house and saw the five Europeans as well as Timorese bodies. The Timorese were in

another part of the house and they had weapons with them (4.145, top of page 76, SR).

The shooting as far as he could see, was coming from the FRETILIN. The hostile

shooting was coming from the fort area (4.146, page 76 SR1).

The interpreter So he is saying that the fire fight was still going on when he left becausehe was injured and it was still the fire fight was still in progress (4.146, page 76 SR1).




36

L1 a known and credible witness / or a new witness whose testimony did not tally?

The man (L1) whom Jolliffe told me she knew and trusted is now reported in the book

Cover Up as a new witness, a man who had come to Lisbon with the other refugees in1976 who was pointed out to me by a young Timorese friend just before Sherman

arrived 72 (emphasis added). Why had Jolliffe told me something completely different ?

How could Jolliffe have had the confidence she initially expressed to me in L1 if shedidn t know him at all ?

On the 15th October 1997 (as the ICJ Colloquium started), Jolliffe faxed Hamish

McDonald a message in which she adopted another position that differed significantly

from that which she had taken with me in Lisbon just a few months earlier. She now

wrote that L1 s testimony did not tally with my (Jolliffe s) preliminary notes 73. Yet

Jolliffe had told me she had faith in the credibility of L1 s testimony. Why the change ?

Certainly the way Jolliffe writes about L1 now suggests he should not have been treated

as reliable and should (at least) have been re-interviewed sooner.

Presumably Jolliffe might explain these discrepancies by saying it was not of greatconcern to her to mislead someone like me whom she seemed to view as an unwelcome

intruder onto her turf . She might also say that it would have been wrong to reveal the

identity of someone (like L1) who requested that his identity be suppressed. Howeverthese issues could have been addressed without revealing L1 s identity.

Contradictory evidence about Jolliffe s concern from the outset casts other doubts onher depiction

In her book Jolliffe claims she was concerned about the accuracy of L1 s reportedevidence from the outset

Jolliffe says that she was concerned about how the L1 interview would be handled 74.

She said that there had been no preliminary assessment the spadework had not beendone . She also says she was concerned that the informant s cranky behaviour, accent

and chaotic household might present challenges . Here she was emphasising points that

she had already made: he was a difficult person to interview with a temperamental

personality thick accent and could only be interviewed in his chaotic living roomwith a television set blaring 75. Later Jolliffe distanced herself even further from L1 s

evidence to Sherman by writing My reservations about how the interview with L1

would transpire were borne out76 citing Sherman s interviewing and translating

techniques as a concern.

72 top of page 157, Cover Up 73

fax from Jolliffe to McDonald on 15/10/97 74

midway down page 159, Cover Up 75 2nd paragraph, page 157, Cover Up 76

mid page 167, Cover Up




37

Clearly Jolliffe is now claiming in her book to have had these doubts about L1 s reportedevidence to Sherman from the outset.

Yet Sherman s interviews were done in Lisbon from mid April 199677

and Sherman sreport was released in June 199678. I visited Lisbon over a year later (July/August

1997)79. Given Jolliffe s close involvement in Sherman s activities in Portugal (she had

helped to arrange and organise his visit80

) and her self confessed obsession with Balibo81, she must have been familiar with Sherman s report. When we met in Lisbon and

discussed these matters, I expressed strong concerns to her about the credibility of L1 s

testimony (and L1 was a witness Jolliffe had found for Sherman). Jolliffe would already

have had doubts about L1 s testimony if the depiction in her book is accurate.

Yet Jolliffe expressed no doubts at all to me at that time instead her response was to

defend L1 s credibility and express faith in the veracity of what he had said to Sherman.

She reinforced this impression by portraying L1 as credible and honourable and strongly

suggested that my doubts about his testimony were unjustified and improperly motivated.

It is difficult for me to reconcile the content of my conversation in Lisbon with Jolliffewith the position she now adopts in Cover Up that she had doubts about L1 s

evidence from the outset .

L1 s uncertain story and Jolliffe s changing explanations of it

Jolliffe now claims that she originally didn t know L1 s complete evidence. She writesthat when she met L1 she was not seeking to do a complete interview, merely a

preliminary interview 82 then The witnesses description sounded authentic, and I

decided I did not need to know more - it was up to Sherman to get the rest out of him.Besides I could do my own in-depth interview with him later 83.

This does not support the level of confidence about the veracity of L1 s testimony that

Jolliffe conveyed to me when I spoke to her over a year later in Lisbon.

But in spite of the doubts and reservations about L1 s evidence that Jolliffe now claims to

have had, and Jolliffe s subsequent comment that the outcome of Sherman s interview

did not tally with my preliminary interview notes 84, she apparently made no effort atthat time to resolve the contradiction by questioning L1. This is odd because Jolliffe is a

professional journalist who is a self -styled expert on Balibo.

77 mid page 158, Cover Up

78 front cover of Sherman Report 1, dated June 199679

from my own notes and records of this 80 last paragraph page 157 to page 158, Cover Up 81

quoted from a radio interview with Jolliffe 82

top of page 157, Cover Up 83 mid page 157, Cover Up 84

fax from Jolliffe to Hamish McDonald on 15/10/97




38

Instead Jolliffe s book is full of excuses explaining why L1 s interview with Shermanmight have come out wrongly temperamental nature, thick accent, difficult domestic

circumstances etc.

Clearly there is a major discrepancy between the faith in L1 s testimony expressed by

Jolliffe to me in Lisbon in 1997 and the attitude of doubt towards his evidence she now

claims in her book to have adopted at that time.

There is a further discrepancy : why if Jolliffe had concerns about the reliability of L1 s

reported evidence to Sherman did she not take the simple steps that could have clarified

these matters ? She recognised that Sherman s conclusions of death in circumstances of

continuing fighting were reached largely from the testimony of L185 and she knew

that at least one person (myself) had doubts about the credibility of L1 s evidence. She

now claims she also had misgivings about his evidence and she was one of the very fewpeople who was in a position to contact and re-interview him. Yet this did not happen tillwell over two years later.

Who publicly articulated doubts about L1 and when ?

The evidence clearly shows that I attempted to investigate the veracity of L1 s claims.

Having been unable to do this (largely due to the uncooperative stance taken by Jolliffeherself) I put my doubts and misgivings about L1 s evidence (and how it could have been

used to skew and mislead the Sherman Report into seriously flawed conclusions) into the

public arena by writing and presenting my critique at the ICJ Colloquium. As mentioned,my critique dealt in some detail with doubts I had about L1 s testimony.

Any fair depiction of these events should acknowledge these facts. Instead Jolliffe s bookengages in a significant revision of the history.

Jolliffe acknowledges that my critique of Sherman contained sound criticism of [the

report s] structural limitations and acknowledged that I criticized Sherman s heavyreliance on L1 s statement 86.

However Jolliffe does not acknowledge the critical fact that I also questioned the veracity

of L1 s reported testimony not simply Sherman s heavy reliance on L1 (seeMcNaughtan clearly articulated concerns he had about L1 s credibility on page 28).

This is something that is on the public record and something she was well aware of, as Ihad personally discussed the issue with her.

Jolliffe fails to acknowledge in her book that when I met her in Lisbon in 1997 I raised

my concerns about L1 with her. She neglects to mention that she would not assist myattempts to make contact with L1 (even when I suggested that could be done indirectly

85 mid page 160, Cover Up 86

bottom of page 174, Cover Up




39

and anonymously) and that she strongly argued to me in support of the credibility of his

evidence to Sherman.

Thus Jolliffe presents a selective version of events. This has the effect of altering the

record significantly and not acknowledging that my concerns about L1 s credibilityproved to be well founded and that her initial defense of L1 was subsequently shown to

be flawed.

The truth emerges belatedly and reluctantly

Jonathan Holmes and Jolliffe (working on the October, 1998 Foreign Correspondentpiece) eventually re-approached and re-interviewed L1 in September 1998. This wasabout two and a half years after the original Sherman interview. The reason for this long

delay was that Jolliffe continued to withhold his identity and yet had not taken any steps

to clarify the record herself.

This seems odd. Whilst it is not surprising that Jolliffe might fob off someone who shemay have seen as an interloper or a competitor, it is hard to understand why she did not

follow things up herself.

Jolliffe now claims in her book to have had misgivings about L1 s testimony from the

start. She points out that she didn t know him having only had him pointed out just

before Sherman arrived . His personality and circumstances had caused her unease allalong apparently and she was concerned about how the L1 interview would be handled87. Jolliffe s reservations about how the interview with L1 would transpire were borne

out 88 apparently . She notes elsewhere that the outcome of Sherman s interview didnot tally with my preliminary interview notes (section of fax from Jolliffe to Hamish

McDonald on 15/10/97 - that is mentioned in the book on pages 160 and 161, though this

bit of the fax is omitted).

Jolliffe was clearly able to resolve all this uncertainty because she could do her own in-

depth interview with him (L1) later 89. Jolliffe was aware that Sherman s conclusion

(which leant towards the deaths having occurred in crossfire ) was a conclusion reachedlargely from the testimony of L1 90 . Jolliffe was certainly aware of the misgivings of

some people about the accuracy of L1 s testimony because I had raised concerns with her

personally in Lisbon in late July 1997. She had also mentioned one of these concerns in

her fax to Hamish McDonald in October 1997 in this fax Jolliffe denied that L1 couldbe an Indonesian plant which had been suggested in some quarters 91. Thus Jolliffe

was aware of concerns about L1 s credibility.

87 mid page 159, Cover Up 88

mid page 167 89

mid page 157 90 mid page 160 91

fax quoted bottom of page 160




40

Amazingly Jolliffe made no effort to clear up the confusion by interviewing L1 herself -

though this was something she acknowledged she could easily do. Whilst Jolliffedeclined to take this simple step, the Australian and Indonesian governments and their

apologists were able to cite the Sherman Report as the final word and declare the case

closed . They thus endeavoured to dampen public concern in Australia about Balibo - andcertainly hoped that closing the book on Balibo would also diminish public interest in

East Timor at this crucial time.

L1 was finally re-interviewed in September 1998 92 and it was prompted by the deadline

for the Foreign Correspondent programme. Jolliffe wrote it had been decided to re-

interview L1 93 - her choice of words suggesting that it was not her initiative to re-

interview him.

It turned out that what L1 had to say was totally different from the evidence he had

reportedly given to Sherman in April 1996 - (see L1 s Testimony Underwent aComplete Reversal page 30).

L1 s story now completely different

Jolliffe writes : when revisiting L1 s testimony, we found his story was completelydifferent 94.

L1 s testimony at the second interview differed in two key aspects from Sherman sdepiction of his 1996 testimony . He now confirmed Indonesian foreknowledge of the

presence of the journalists at Balibo. Jolliffe writes that Several days before the Balibo

deaths L1 had monitored FRETILIN communications discussing the presence of the journalists in Balibo which he duly transcribed and passed on to Dading Kalbuadi 95.

L1 later debunked the crossfire picture that his prior testimony had created : He nowsaid that when he arrived in Balibo after the journalists had died the only shots being

fired from the square near the house were return fire from Indonesian soldiers digging in

at various positions. He was adamant that no shots were fired from the house itself. He

stressed there was no battle in progress which he said had finished before 6.00a.m.96

.

This was a total reversal of the reporting of his initial testimony to Sherman in 1996 and

showed that the foundation upon which Sherman s original conclusions were based was

completely flawed.

Some questions about this process

92 3rd paragraph, page 188 93

3rd

paragraph, page 188 94

mid page 188 95 5th paragraph, page 188 96

mid 2nd

paragraph, page 189




41

The whole sequence of events from the initial way Jolliffe was brought into contact

with L1, Jolliffe s provision of L1 to Sherman, the nature of L1 s original evidence toSherman, the inordinate amount of time (two and a half years) it took to debunk his

original misleading testimony (when the controversy could have been resolved at anytime

by Jolliffe) - to the way the whole matter has been obfuscated in the book Cover Upraises some more questions.

Given the concerns that Jolliffe acknowledges were raised that L1 could have been anIndonesian plant 97 it seems odd to have handled the issue of L1 s credibility in the way

Jolliffe has.

Certainly the way L1 appeared should raise reasonable concerns he was pointed out

to Jolliffe just before Sherman arrived98

. Although Jolliffe lived closely with thecommunity in Portugal 99 she didn t know L1 previously.

There were Timorese in Lisbon with close links to the Indonesian state and military

intelligence. Abilio Araujo was dealing with Suharto s daughter Tutuk (and showed me aphoto of them together in London) and told me when I spoke to him in Lisbon in July

1997 that he had recently returned from Jakarta where he had had a meeting with Tutuk s

brother-in-law Prabowo Subianto (who has headed both Kostrad and Kopassus).

When I asked Jolliffe in 1997 whether Abilio Araujo had any connection with L1 she

became defensive then terminated our conversation. It seemed a very sensitive point.

Another question about Timorese in Lisbon the Martins case

Another member of the Timorese community in Lisbon, Jose Martins, had gone to

Jakarta apparently on some sort of business in early 1996. Martins trip to Jakarta seems to

have coincided with Sherman s trip to Lisbon to pursue his investigation. Sherman hadrequested that Martins meet him however Martins had declined to do so.

Sherman wrote I endeavoured to interview Jose Martins during my visit to Portugal in

April 1996, but he was unable to meet me. I did invite him to send me any material bymid May but no material came up to the date of this report 100.

Martins died suddenly in Jakarta of a reported heart attack although some Timorese

believe he did not die of natural causes. It has been reported that Abilio Araujo was inJakarta with Martins. Such odd happenings amongst the Timorese community in Lisbon

about the time of Sherman s visit should surely raise some questions.

97 fax quoted, bottom of page 160

98 top of page 157

99 mid page 154 100 3.31, page 33, Sherman Report 1




42

Clearly the Jakarta government had an interest in facilitating the conclusion that the

journalists had died in crossfire in order to put an embarrassing issue to rest. TheAustralian government equally would welcome such a conclusion.

L1 s odd behaviour

L1 s own behaviour certainly does not engender confidence. Apart from being

temperamental , with a thick accent , and television set blaring etc, L1 was alsofearful and reluctant 101 according to Jolliffe. He could have been subject to pressure

because his wife still had family in Timor 102. He was nervous enough to agree only

on condition of anonymity103

.

Jolliffe explained in October 1997 that L1 sought anonymity because his testimonyendangered him and relatives with the Indonesians 104. Jolliffe had said the same to me

during our conversation in Lisbon some months earlier.

Yet did L1 have any logical reason to fear the Indonesians because of the content of his

evidence to Sherman ? His evidence clearly assisted those in Jakarta who wanted to rid

themselves of the Balibo issue, by allowing Sherman to reach the crossfire

interpretation. This was the most palatable conclusion Sherman could reach (fromJakarta s perspective) without stretching the credulity of the Australian public beyond

breaking point. Hamish McDonald had recognized this when he wrote to Jolliffe asking

about the credibility of L1, given that his account gives credence to the heat of battlenotion and thus should be welcomed by the Indonesians 105.

So if L1 had no logical reason to fear the Indonesians (because his testimony assistedthem), why did he insist on anonymity ?

When I asked Jolliffe about this inconsistency during our conversation in Lisbon she hadno response. My own feelings at the time were that L1 did not want his identity protected

from Indonesians so much as from others which, if true, raises more questions.

L1 s testimony is Sherman s basis for the death in the heat of battle scenario

According to Sherman L1 was convinced that the attacking troops in Balibo did not

know the five Australians were there (Sherman Report 1, 4.141 bottom of page 74)

this is the exact opposite of L1 s later testimony. Sherman s report continued that L1 wasnot aware prior to the attack of any intelligence about Australian journalists in the area

(4.142, page 75 SR).

101 lower 2nd paragraph, page 157 102

lower 2nd

paragraph, page 157 103

as above 104 from 15/10/97 fax Jolliffe to McDonald 105 bottom of page 160




43

L1 reportedly told Sherman that when he arrived in Balibo the firing was still going on,

so much so that he had to borrow a weapon from the driver. The fire hostile to theattacking force was coming from three directions including the house at 9 o clock

where he saw the journalists bodies (4.142, page 75 SR). When the firing from the

house at 9 o clock ceased he (L1) moved around to the front of that house and saw thefive Europeans as well as Timorese bodies (4.145, top of page 76, SR).

Sherman was sufficiently impressed to comment L1 s evidence relating to the firingcoming from the house where the journalists bodies were is worth setting out in full

(4.147, page 77 SR).

So L1 s evidence presented in the first Sherman Report seemed unequivocal about death

in the heat of battle and the absence of foreknowledge of the journalists presence by theattacking force.

L1 does a U-turn Jolliffe asks no questions, but provides excuses

The statements from Sherman s first report quoted above are diametrically opposed to the

statements that L1 later gave to Jonathan Holmes and Jill Jolliffe and it is inconceivableto me that such irreconcilable differences could have come about through simple

confusion or misunderstanding.

In her book Jolliffe seems to minimise concern about the discrepancies in L1 s different

testimonies by implying the contradictions may be explained by L1 s temperament ,

accent and domestic situation and by defects in Sherman s interviewing technique.Jolliffe complains about a garbled quality to L1 s reported interview that she relates to

a peculiarity of Sherman s method of registering interviews which was that he relied

on the oral translations done at the time . This defect in Sherman s technique and the thespecial conditions that translating L1 presented 106 are suggested by Jolliffe to explain

the discrepancies in L1 s evidence.

It stretches credulity to explain L1 s complete reversal of the evidence in all crucial areason the basis of his temperament and circumstances and the interviewing technique

used. Yet this is what Jolliffe endeavours to do.

Oddly Jolliffe does not suggest something more obvious that the major discrepancies inL1 s evidence might be the result of real falsification .

Certainly Jolliffe was not reluctant to describe Lourenco Hornay s evidence as apparentfalsification on much more tenuous grounds. Yet Jolliffe has tried hard to justify and

explain away the completely irreconcilable versions of L1 s evidence, for some

unexplained reason. Perhaps it could be because she feels uncomfortable about her role inproviding L1 to testify to Sherman and her subsequent defense of his original testimony ?

106 middle paragraph, page 167




44

Certainly Jolliffe is reluctant to blame L1, but rather she shifts the blame towards

Sherman noting, for example, Sherman had placed too much weight on the correctnessof L1 s testimony about the shooting he claimed was underway 107. Elsewhere The

government-commissioned investigator had failed to elicit the whole background of L1 s

presence in Balibo108

(emphasis added).

It seems in Jolliffe s mind the discrepancies in L1 s evidence are mainly Sherman s fault,

and L1 would have given correct answers if only Sherman s interviewing technique hadbeen better - and adequate to overcome the special conditions that translating L1

presented 109. Jolliffe bends over backwards to excuse L1 s total reversal.

Who is altering evidence Sherman or L1 ?

Yet it is L1 who apparently admitted that he had not been honest with Sherman.

According to Sherman in his Second Report In his interview with Jill Jolliffe L1 gaveevidence of his role in intercepting Fretilin radio communications. He stated in that

interview he didn t tell me [Sherman] about this in April 1996 because he didn t trust me

[Sherman] (7.43, page 135 SR2). I can t find reference to this important explanation in

Jolliffe s book, though I may have missed it.

If Sherman s quote of L1 is correct, then it is L1 who mislead Sherman, and did so

intentionally.

Why would L1 agree to be interviewed and then withhold the truth because of lack of

trust ? Surely if L1 felt so uneasy it would have made more sense to refuse theinterview altogether which he was clearly free to do under the conditions of Sherman s

investigation. Yet L1 chose to do the interview with Sherman but then (apparently) not

tell the truth certainly not the whole truth.

A possibility must surely be that L1 knowingly misled Sherman and fed him a

predetermined story. Yet Jolliffe does not countenance this possibility at all in her book.

L1 s evidence to Sherman was eerily similar to old and discredited disinformation

Aspects of L1 s testimony show a distinct resemblance to the original disinformation

propagated by Indonesian intelligence :

The statement signed by Guilherme Goncalves on 3 November, 1975110 referred to the

falling of 15 victims . Among the victims were four white men found in the burnedremains of the house used by Fretilin as their strongest resistance post .

107 3

rd paragraph, page 172

108 end of 4

th paragraph, page 188

109 mid page 167 110 a copy of the letter is available




45

Sherman describes L1 s evidence as when the firing from the house at 9 o clock ceased

he moved around to the front of that house and saw five Europeans as well as Timoresebodies. The Timorese were in another part of the house and they had weapons with them

(4.145 top page 76, Sherman Report 1).

L1 s evidence directly reflected the original story that the journalists bodies were

found in a FRETILIN resistance point from which firing had come (as in the 1975

Goncalves letter). L1 also described the European and Timorese bodies together - as inthe Goncalves letter.

Yet Guilherme Gonsalves had publicly admitted in 1995 that the letter he had signed was

false and had been written for him by Indonesian intelligence. This was one of the

revelations that triggered the public concern that had led to Gareth Evans initiating the

Sherman inquiry in the first place. It looks as if L1 could have been recycling a long

discredited myth. Certainly it is hard to explain all the contradictions between the initialand subsequent versions of L1 s testimony simply on the basis of confused translation.

L1 s subsequent behaviour raises more questions about motives and pressures

L1 s subsequent behaviour does not enhance his credibility.

When Sherman s subsequent (second) Report was initiated L1 refused to be

interviewed again 111. Sherman wrote I infer he was a witness under a lot of pressurenot to talk to me. I don t propose to speculate where the pressure was coming from and

why (7.41 , page 134 SR2).

According to Jolliffe, L1 had complained to one of the translators that after the Foreign

Correspondent programme he had been identified by someone in Australia and

threatened as a result112

. As his new evidence was now quite damaging to the Indonesianmilitary (and had changed from his previous evidence that was not damaging to the

Indonesian military) it is likely that these threats were emanating from the Indonesian

military or their sympathisers.

Clearly L1 was a man who was nervous and temperamental with family in Timor who

could thus potentially be subject to Indonesian pressures. He was someone who had

worked closely with the Indonesian attacking forces as a radio monitor and had thus been

close to the command structure having passed transcribed intercepts on to DadingKalbuadi 113 (the Indonesian commander on the border). Thus L1 must have been trusted

by some high Indonesian officers in 1975 and was probably still known to some of them.

Clearly L1 could be threatened and put under a lot of pressure as the threats and

pressures after the Foreign Correspondent programme was aired apparently did frighten

him and cause him to refuse [d] to be interviewed again .

111 last paragraph, page 196

112 last paragraph, page 196 113 second last paragraph, page 188




47

L1 had made another statement to Sherman that was demonstrably false that he had

arrived (in Balibo) with (Tomas) Gonsalves which, in the circumstances, could nothave been true (because Gonsalves had entered much earlier with the initial attack). In

this case Jolliffe offers further excuses for L1 writing that it is doubtful that L1 really

said this intentionally 117

and noting further that this speaks volumes for the confusionin dealing with this material. For some reason L1 s demonstrably false (and seriously

misleading) statements are dealt with sympathetically and explanations are offered by

Jolliffe for this.

On the other hand a relatively minor variation in the testimony of Mr. Hornay leads to the

accusation that he is involved in apparent falsification . It is reasonable to ask - why arethere such double-standards being applied ?

I feel that the most adverse conclusion that could be drawn about Mr. Hornay is that he

might have varied slightly in his recollection of exactly why he had concluded that theattacking force knew the journalists were there and intended to kill them - but that his

essential conclusions were consistent and unchanged. Jolliffe s primary charge againsthim is that the information he provided came from the interpreter Gabriel but not directly

from the Indonesian officers at Batugade. Whilst this discrepancy is significant (though

not fully established as far as I am concerned) it hardly seems to justify Jolliffe sconclusion of falsification by Mr. Hornay. In the context of Balibo evidence this is a

relatively minor change of testimony.

The manner in which Hornay gave his evidence (see the translation of his interview

which is available) and his willingness to speak to me, then Gomes, then Jonathan

Holmes and Jolliffe, then Tom Sherman seems to indicate good faith and honestintentions on his behalf. I don t believe the openness of his behaviour (at least once he

had decided to testify) is consistent with someone intentionally falsifying evidence. I

also don t believe the evidence supports Jolliffe s contention that Hornay intentionallyaltered anything see Does Mr. Hornay Really Have Credibility Problems ? (on pages

9 to 17). Jolliffe s publisher Henry Rosenbloom s states clearly in his letter that Jolliffe is

accusing Hornay of the alleged apparent falsification 118 yet I don t see credible

evidence that this accusation against him is justified or correct.

On the other hand L1 - whose story was central to Sherman s conclusions of death by

misadventure, the basis of which has now been completely discredited seems to be

excused for profound alterations to his evidence. These discrepancies in L1 s changingevidence are explained away and justified by Jolliffe. Why the double standards ?

A possible explanation for the discrepancy between treatment of the two witnesses

Jolliffe s book does clarify the circumstances of her involvement with these two

witnesses and that may shed some light on the differing views she takes of them.

117 mid top paragraph, page 170 118 see letter from Henry Rosenbloom on 17/1/2002, which is appended




48

The case of L1: Jolliffe now says in her book L1 was an individual who was pointed out

to her just before Sherman arrived, who she did not know and whose testimony she didnot really become familiar with. However Jolliffe selected him to be interviewed by

Sherman as part of her activities in support of Sherman s investigation in Lisbon in 1996.

In a sense Jolliffe had given L1 her imprimateur by advising Sherman to interview him.

Jolliffe then staunchly defended his credibility to me in discussions over a year later, long

after Sherman s report was published and L1 s key role in establishing Sherman scrossfire conclusions were on the public record. Jolliffe then affirmed that L1 had no

axe to grind and was not an Indonesian plant 119 as she said some were suggesting -

and suggested people who were raising these issues were doing so because they were

bringing all sorts of ideological baggage to the story120

. Jolliffe was personally aware

that I had questioned L1 s veracity because I had spoken to her about this exact issue

when I was in Lisbon. Jolliffe had evidently read the proceedings of the ICJ Colloquium

in detail and had therefore also read that I had openly questioned in print the veracity ofL1 s story. In spite of this Jolliffe did not set the record straight by going back to re-

interview L1, even though she had acknowledged that the outcome of Sherman sinterview did not tally 121 with her own notes and also acknowledged that she could

easily have done her own in-depth interview with L1122. When L1 was belatedly re-

interviewed two and a half years later (seemingly not at Jolliffe s initiative) it turned outthat he completely reversed his original story.

It seems to me that if Jolliffe acknowledged the above she would be obliged to admit thather original approach to L1 was not correct and that I was subsequently shown to have

been correct when I raised the issue of L1 s credibility in 1997. A possible interpretation

of the obfuscation in the book is that Jolliffe does not want to acknowledge that I wasright - and so has completely omitted the relevant facts that prove it from her book.

Instead she has created a mire of half -truths and confusion in order to suggest that she

was suspicious all along about the outcome of Sherman s interview with L1 and alwaysdoubted the veracity of L1 s testimony. She steers the blame for the mix-up towards

Sherman yet (in this case at least) it is not clear that Sherman is the culpable party.

Instead Jolliffe weaves a web of excuses and rationalizations to explain L1 s suspicious

reversal.

Why is Jolliffe simply refusing to acknowledge that L1 may have initially lied to

Sherman? Could it be because to acknowledge this would show that her defense of him

had been ill-founded and my questioning of his credibility had been correct ? Jolliffemight be concerned that if the facts were clear they might reflect poorly on her judgment

and actions: she had been the conduit for L1 s provision to Sherman, she had defended

L1 s credibility and she had failed to act for some years to rectify L1 s distortions. Inaddition Jolliffe had staunchly refused to assist my attempts to speak to L1 and had

denigrated me for making them. To put the record straight might have led to some sort of

119 second last line, page160, Cover Up

120 line 2, page 161, Cover Up

121 fax from Jolliffe to McDonald on 15/10/97 122 line 23, page 157, Cover Up




49

fair reckoning. Could it be that Jolliffe has subtly reworked the record and provided

copious excuses for L1 to avoid just such an honest reckoning ?

Could it also be that an honest appraisal of L1 s evidence that would lead to the

conclusion he had lied to Sherman might raise questions about why he did that andwhat might lie behind his actions ?

There seems to be the converse case with Lourenco Hornay:

Jolliffe had staked quite a lot of her own credibility on the assessment that Hornay did not

have anything to offer Sherman s investigation. She goes to great lengths to explain that

she was an old friend of Hornay s who had had long discussions with him on the

subject of Balibo, that she knew all he had to say about Balibo , which was allhearsay 123.

When Sherman arrived in Lisbon, Jolliffe played an important role defining the witnesses

Sherman would interview. She apparently decided that Hornay s evidence was notsufficiently hard to warrant inclusion and that Hornay was one of those who did not

merit a hearing 124. She advocated this to Sherman who consequently did not interview

Hornay even though Sherman was aware of his [Hornay s] existence in the firstevaluation 125. This was in spite of the fact that Sherman had interviewed other people

for his first report whose evidence was much more peripheral that Hornay s. Jolliffe had

played a clear role in defining Hornay s evidence as not meriting a hearing. Thus Jolliffemay have again felt her own credibility attached to the testimony (or in this case lack of

worthy testimony) of this witness.

If it turned out that Hornay did have something useful to say about Balibo, Jolliffe may

have felt it would reflect adversely on her actions and judgment.

I had encountered Mr. Hornay simply because I wanted to find L1. It was only by chance

that I came across his evidence about Balibo which seemed relevant and important to

me. I was not aware when I interviewed Hornay that Jolliffe had advised Sherman not to

interview him - and only became aware of this when I began to research my response tothe accusations in her book.

Hornay s testimony was brought out at the ICJ Colloquium and shown to be prima-

facie of some importance. Jolliffe seems subsequently to have devoted considerableeffort in her book to discrediting him, by methods that I do not believe are balanced or

fair. She certainly never approached me to get any clarification of my perspective on this.

Now she presents in her book a phalanx of attacks on the credibility of Mr. Hornay

some of which are themselves internally inconsistent. For instance Jolliffe had prejudged

Hornay s evidence as all hearsay and was sure she knew all he had to say . Yet that is

123 lines 9 and 12, page 175, Cover Up

124 last paragraph, page 157, Cover Up 125 Sherman Report 2, 4.45, page 74




50

seemingly not true because Hornay did have more to say. Jolliffe acknowledged this

when she responded to new evidence that Hornay has offered that she had never heardhim make a similar claim 126. Jolliffe doesn t acknowledge that there might have been

good reasons why Hornay would now choose to reveal things he had not previously

spoken of. Instead she suggests that he has done this because he is feeling offended .She portrays his testimony as inaccurate based on dubious evidence (see section DOES

MR. HORNAY REALLY HAVE CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS? from page 9 to16). Yet

some of Jolliffe s complaints against him seem simplistic, superficial and unnecessarilyunsympathetic. It seems as if she is trying too hard to discredit Hornay s evidence whilst

contradictions in the evidence of others are brushed over. Jolliffe then somehow lurches

to the conclusion that Hornay s evidence amounts to apparent falsification . Yet clearly

any alleged inconsistencies in Hornay s evidence are minor - especially if compared with

the complete reversal that took place in L1 s evidence.

Could the explanation for all this be that Jolliffe has invested a great deal of her owncredibility in the idea that Lourenco Hornay does not have any useful evidence tocontribute about Balibo ? She had previously concluded that he did not, had told Shermanhe did not and as a result Hornay was not interviewed.

After it appeared that Lourenco Hornay indeed did have some useful insights into whathappened at Balibo, Jolliffe worked to discredit that testimony. Having got Sherman not

to interview him back in 1996, Jolliffe convinced Jonathan Holmes in 1998 that Hornay s

claims were not credible. Holmes apparently reached this conclusion because Jill Jolliffetold Holmes she had never heard him make a similar claim 127. Holmes then wrote to

Sherman on 9th November 1998 128 to intercede with Sherman and argue Hornay s lack of

credibility again based apparently on Jolliffe s assertion that Hornay had never told her these things. Jolliffe had discredited Hornay s value as a witness with Holmes and

Sherman before she wrote her book (in which she made more efforts towards the same

end). The evidence that Hornay s testimony is unworthy comes mostly from one sourcefrom Jolliffe who asserts continually that what he says can t be true because he had

never told her that before.

McNaughtan s position in all of this

Jolliffe has taken a negative view of me in her book. I am described as a fundamentalist

who speaks sententiously129

.She claims that I am someone who has tricked a prize-

wining reporter 130, seemingly causing apparent falsification of important evidence.My actions thus marred the activities of an important legal body and undermined the

good work of those presenting seriously researched evidence131

. In addition I have

apparently showed lack of respect for some people who deserve respect and seen them

126 quote from letter Holmes to Sherman, 4.45 page 74, Sherman Report 2

127 4.45, page 75, Sherman report 2 128

as above 129

bottom of page 159 and top of page 160, Cover Up 130 mid paragraph, page 176, Cover Up 131

all from mid paragraph, page 176, Cover Up




51

as objects to be used 132. As if that was not enough - I was responsible for presenting an

interview that had been mistranslated, rendering it nonsensical in parts . The text of theinterview I had allegedly presented included the translation the Indonesians had piled

.. policemen 133 on top of the journalists dead bodies before burning them !

I assure the reader that I never suggested the Indonesians piled policemen onto the

journalists bodies before burning them !!

I believe most, if not all, of the above accusations are inaccurate and have dealt with

them earlier.

However there are certainly some things Jolliffe has not mentioned in her book. For

instance that I had correctly recognised that L1 was not the witness of truth as TomSherman described him134. I had gone to Lisbon and taken steps to identify and try to

interview L1. I had met and talked to Jolliffe who made it clear to me that she did notapprove of my actions. Jolliffe refused to even pass a message on to L1. She supported

L1 s credibility and did nothing to clear up any doubts about his testimony. I went on therecord recording my doubts. When the truth came out my doubts were vindicated and

Jolliffe assurances (after she had sat on the issue for two and a half years) were shown to

be ill-founded. She has now written a book revising all this and portraying this all in anentirely different (and misleading) light. She now portrays herself as someone who had

doubts about L1 from the beginning (which is not supported by the evidence and which

raises the question why she did not then act to clear up such doubts in a timely way).Meanwhile Jolliffe has omitted my role in articulating doubts about L1 although it is

something she is well aware of.

On the other hand I had inadvertently stumbled (whilst looking for L1) onto Mr.

Lourenco Hornay. I was unaware that Jolliffe had told Sherman a year earlier that Hornay

was not worth interviewing and that Jolliffe had thus adopted the position that Hornayhad nothing of substance to contribute to an inquiry about the Balibo deaths. As

previously outlined I found Hornay a credible witness with useful evidence that seemed

significant in the overall picture.

Obviously this brought me (unknowingly) again onto a collision course with Jolliffe over

another issue about the value and credibility of a witness. However in the Hornay case

things were reversed compared with the L1 case I doubted L1 and found Hornay

credible, whilst Jolliffe endorsed L1 and had already adopted the position that Hornayhad no credible evidence to offer.

Could it be that Jolliffe s adverse position towards me has been influenced by the factthat we had taken up completely opposing positions on these two witnesses?

132 as above

133 bottom of page 232, Cover Up 134 5.37, page 100, Sherman Report 1




54

the journalists presence in Balibo with sufficient rigour 138. She also quotes the criticism

in my critique for the ICJ of Sherman s failure to investigate the pre-knowledge issuemore deeply 139.

Yet in practice Jolliffe s approach to the issue of possible foreknowledge by theIndonesian attacking force of the journalists presence in Balibo seems very erratic. She

seems to make no effort in her book to pull all this evidence together into a coherent

analysis, and leaves references to foreknowledge that are made by many witnessesscattered randomly throughout the book.

This seems to be why Jolliffe appears ambivalent about the issue even as she comes to

the conclusion of her book. Five pages form the end (as she describes the Indonesian

military invasion of Balibo) Jolliffe writes there is no proof they knew that journalistswere also present 140. She does acknowledge there is a strong probability they did, and

that their brief was to finish off [sic] them as well but her conclusion is ratherambiguous.

This conclusion is odd because there is a lot of evidence on the issue, in her book and

elsewhere. Perhaps Jolliffe has concluded that there is no proof about foreknowledge

because she has made little effort to systematically analyse the evidence. It is strange tohave written a book about Balibo that apparently does not address an issue so central to

understanding what actually occurred there.

Some of the evidence that is available

In fact if one puts together the references to foreknowledge by various witnesses inJolliffe s book and from other sources a fairly strong and consistent picture emerges.

Evidence from the two Timorese radio monitors in Batugade

It has been established that Indonesian intelligence was monitoring FRETILIN radio

transmissions from the old fort in Batugade, using Timorese (presumably because they

would understand the language).

This is established from the testimony of the two Portuguese speaking radio operators

in the Batugade fort141

.

When Holmes and Jolliffe re-interviewed L1 it turned out he was the second of the two

Portuguese speaking radio operators in the Batugade fort and Jolliffe mentions L1 had

information about pre-knowledge similar to that of the 1979 witness, who had refused to

testify to Sherman . From this oblique reference it seems reasonably clear that the 1979

138 mid page 172, Cover Up

139 5 lines form the bottom of page 174

140 top of page 311, in Epilogue, Cover Up 141 line 21, page 188, Cover Up




56

sure 148. He repeats later in the interview You can be sure that they knew the journalists

were there149

.

Hornay also confirms hearing Portuguese radio broadcasts from Kupang (in Indonesian

Timor) to East Timor in which he remembers them talking about the arrival of theAustralian and Portuguese journalists 150. He also noted they had their thing very well

organised. They spied on every step taken by Fretilin 151. Hornay stated to Sherman

(when Sherman was preparing his second report) that the Indonesian secret service bythen knew that there were of the presence of eight journalists . Hornay got this

information mostly from two. A lieutenant from the unit of transmissions and Captain

Fernandes 152. Later, according to Sherman, Mr. Hornai goes on to describe aconversation he had with Colonel Dading on 13 October through his interpreter where

Dading expressed some concern about the journalists153 .

At least one other senior UDT figure confirms the foreknowledge by the Indonesians ofthe journalists at Balibo Joao Carrascalao (who is quoted as telling Tom Sherman in hisfirst report that the Indonesians didn t know the journalists were in Balibo) has since told

Beatriz Miranda at SBS radio that the Indonesians did know the journalists were in

Balibo 154.

Clear reporting of foreknowledge by the East Timorese military commander

In 1975 Rogerio Lobato held the position of overall commander of the Fretilin armedforces (known as Falintil) . He provided extremely lucid and coherent evidence about

Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalist presence in Balibo and outlined the

mechanisms by which the Indonesians had obtained this information and also proof thatthey knew the journalists were there. Given that he was the commander of the Timorese

military at the time, it is hard to understand why his evidence (having been provided) was

ignored by Sherman and Jolliffe.

Rogerio Lobato said The main objective of the Indonesians was Balibo because they

knew by the information, they knew, that the Australians were there. I presumed that the

main threat for the Indonesians at that time was the evidence of the invasion because wedid announce that many times by the radio, the television, that there was a violation of

East Timor territory by Indonesian troops

Sherman continued When I asked Rogerio Lobato how the Indonesians would haveknown the Australian journalists were at Balibo, his response was that Radio Loro Sa e

based at Kupang (Indonesian Timor) was broadcasting every night to East Timor talking

148 page 9, as above 149

page 11, as above 150 page 15, as above 151

bottom of page 6 and top of page 7, as above 152

page 76, Sherman Report 2 153 page 79, 4.50, Sherman Report 2 154 interview of Joao Carrascalao by Beatriz Miranda for SBS radio




57

about the presence of the Communists, the Australian Communists, in Balibo helping the

Fretilin soldiers

Rogerio Lobato also said that the attacking forces at Balibo [the Indonesian forces] had

the capacity to infiltrate Fretilin ranks with informants. He said that the maincommunication between Dili and the border area was a military radio network controlled

by Falintil and a civil telephone connection between Dili and Atabai. He knew that the

Indonesians listened into Fretilin radio communications and he therefore tended to usethe telephone for communications with Atabai 155.

Even the Indonesian commander acknowledged he knew the journalists were in Balibo.

David Jenkins had written in the Sydney Morning Herald 14th October, 1995 In aninterview a highly placed Indonesian military source [later confirmed as General Benny

Murdani] told the Herald that Jakarta was well aware that there were journalists inBalibo . Later Murdani claimed they viewed the journalists as enemies suggesting they

were helping Fretilin by conveying information of a military nature156. Jenkins same

article quotes Dading Kalbuadi as denying foreknowledge of the journalists presence at

Balibo. Kalbuadi said to Jenkins We didn t know from where the white men came 157

and we didn t know at the time they were journalists 158. However Kalbuadi s denialsof foreknowledge are discredited by the testimony of both radio monitors in Batugade

who report intercepting evidence of the journalists at Balibo and transcribing it and

passing it on to Dading Kalbuadi . L1 had done this - just as his colleague whotestified previously said he had done 159.

Ball and McDonald report (in their book Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra ) that therewas a conversation intercepted between Murdani and Kalbuadi. They report Murdani

said: We can t have any witnesses . Dading [Kalbuadi] replied in words to the effect of:

Don t worry, we already have them under control 160. This particular piece of evidenceis not absolutely confirmed at present. However it is consistent with the other evidence

that the Indonesian commanders knew the journalists were in Balibo and had already

adopted a hostile policy towards them.

The Balibo deaths occurred against a background of suspicion and hostility. The

Indonesian military and their commanders were inherently hostile towards white

foreigners, particularly Portuguese (who were perceived as colonialists ). Any

association with FRETILIN led the Indonesian military to suspect people of beingcommunists and the approach to suspected communists had been made clear in the

massive pogroms in Indonesia after the New Order came to power. Additionally

Suharto s New Order military government was hostile towards independent media

155 Rogerio Lobato s testimony from 4.127, 4.128, 4.129, page 72, Sherman Report 1156 taken from pages 85 and 86, Sherman Report 1157

quoted at 4.174, page 86, Sherman Report 1 158

top of page 87, Sherman Report 1 159 5th paragraph, page 188, Cover Up 160 page 115, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra




58

which had also been made clear after Suharto s seizure of power. Thus theoretically, if

(as some witnesses report) the Indonesian commanders of the attacking force believedthere were Portuguese and Australian-based journalists alongside FRETILIN at the

border, it is almost certain the Indonesian military would have been hostile towards them.

Practical evidence of this hostile stance towards foreign journalists has been provided by

the Indonesian military s execution of Roger East in Dili on December 8th 1975.

Circumstantial evidence supports this. For example Jolliffe has reported On 20 October

Timorese in Dili reported hearing a broadcast from Radio Kupang quoting Lopez da Cruz

as saying the Australians were Communists who were integrated with FRETILIN forces

and deserved to be killed . Later on the night of 21 October Radio Kupang was

monitored and a similar statement was recorded This included The Australiancommunists were supporting and aside FRETILIN to fight against our forces We are

not afraid of FRETILIN, nor the Australian communists 161.

Other Timorese reports of foreknowledge

There are other references to foreknowledge in Cover Up and elsewhere:

In the The National Times articles of 1979 - it was stressed that three witnesses had

claimed that Indonesian authorities knew before the attack that some journalists were

based in the town 162.

Jim Dunn is quoted (apparently from a letter in 1979) - radio Dili had given

considerable prominence to the movements of the newsmen, and, according to a wellplaced source who was in Indonesian Timor at the time, their presence in the border area

was communicated to the Indonesians who had been following the Dili broadcasts

closely 163.

Jolliffe writes of the evidence concerning Indonesian pre-knowledge of the Australians

presence in Balibo which had come from the scouts sent from Rai Icu at their

(Indonesian) bidding and the (previously mentioned) written reports of the radiointercepts at Batugade 164.

Joaquim Estorninho had testified that scouts had seen the journalists in Balibo and

reported the fact to the Indonesian commander 165.

Joaquim Estorninho had also told Sherman that Lopez da Cruz had told him there were

white foreigners in Balibo prior to the attack. Sherman writes On the af ternoon before

the attack on Balibo he recollected Lopez da Cruz saying in Rai Ico that some foreigners

161 Jill Jolliffe quoted in Sherman Report 1, page 28162

2nd

paragraph, page 131, Cover Up 163

quote from letter from Jim Dunn, page 132, Cover Up 164 4th paragraph, page 131, Cover Up 165 line 4, page 155, Cover Up




59

were in Balibo . .. he remembers that they were white and foreigners . Later that Lopez

da Cruz said that they were white foreigners who were in Balibo to help the Fretilin166

Manuel dos Santos also spoke of foreknowledge They heard FRETILIN radio broadcast

stating that there were five journalists in Balibo, yes, they did hear that167

.Earlier in the same interview he said three days before they attacked Balibo Indonesian

radio told the border population to flee to Indonesia and not to remain. If they were to

find anyone on the border it was to be considered a person belonging to FRETILIN, theywould be put down, whoever they may be. However, they knew very well there were

some Portuguese journalists, Adelino Gomes there were secretly eight names that

were established . Five journalists five Australian journalists and a journalist

Adelino Gomes. That makes up for eight, right? . Although dos Santos seems to ramblein this interview it is possible to pick up the thread of his meaning.

Jolliffe quotes Witness 2 interview (presumably from 1979) This witness also said thatbefore he left Atambua for Batugade, he had heard persistent stories that there were

Australian journalists in Balibo168

.

An interview with Timorese police officer Paulo Martins done in Dili in 1998 included

his comment And it appears that the Indonesian troops already knew of the existence ofthe 5 journalists at Balibo, because during one week Indonesia had done a search by

helicopter. It appears by doing this they knew the journalists were doing their activities

there in Balibo 169 . Martins also reported that after taking Balibo the Indonesianstortured Timorese associated with the journalists to force them to answer questions such

as Are they (the journalists) Communists ? .

This is certainly not a comprehensive collection of all the evidence of the attacking

force s foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo. It is almost certain that if

there was a systematic investigation more would be found.

Sources of information that support foreknowledge

The reports of foreknowledge therefore come from a number of different sources.

There are at least three reported radio sources :

1. FRETILIN military radio that was being systematically spied on by Indonesian

interceptors based in the fort at Batugade. Both known Timorese radio monitors workingfor Indonesian intelligence in Batugade now confirm hearing transmissions about the

journalists being in Balibo and passing this information to their Indonesian superiors.

Benny Murdani confirms his foreknowledge came form the radio intercepts They had a

166 4.136 and 4.137, page 73, Sherman Report 1

167 page 44, Sherman Report 2

168 line 13, page 127, Cover Up 169 interview with Paulo Martins by Andrew McNaughtan 10/10/98 in Dili




60

radio and we had a monitoring system 170. Rogerio Lobato the then commander of the

East Timorese forces acknowledges that FALINTIL was using radios and that they wereaware the Indonesians were intercepting their transmissions.

2. Publicly broadcast radio from Dili by FRETILIN. I understand this is what FernandoMariz picked up public broadcasts in which he heard that journalists were in Balibo.

Mariz reported this to Indonesian commander Major Leo. Rogerio Lobato (the former

commander of FALINTIL) confirmed these broadcasts were occurring. Jim Dunn s 1979letter refers to evidence that the Indonesians monitored Dili radio - which was referring tothe presence of the journalists on the border.171

3. Radio Kupang (apparently called Radio Loro Sa'e ) was broadcasting pro-Indonesian

propaganda from West Timor 172. Hornay confirmed hearing Portuguese radio broadcasts

from Kupang to East Timor in which he remembers them talking about the arrival of the

Australian and Portuguese journalists . Rogerio Lobato also confirms Radio Loro Sa ebased at Kupang was broadcasting every night to East Timor talking about the presence

of the Communists, the Australian Communists, in Balibo helping the Fretilin soldiers . Ibelieve Portuguese journalist Adelino Gomes also remembers similar broadcasts by

Radio Kupang.

Other sources of information

Foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo was also derived form other sourcessuch as direct (on the ground) spying, interrogation of those who came from or passed

through Balibo and elsewhere, and spying from the air, i.e. from helicopters.

Direct spying:

There is significant evidence for this:

Jolliffe interviewed a witness who spoke about the scouts sent from Rai Icu at

their (Indonesian) bidding 173.

Joaquim Estorninho testified that scouts had seen the journalists in Balibo and

reported the fact to the Indonesian commander174

.

Rogerio Lobato told Sherman that the attacking forces had the capacity toinfiltrate Fretilin ranks with informants 175.

Spies were seen to be entering Portuguese Timor for example in the film shot by

Shackleton and crew before their deaths they record the capture of an alleged spy

who has returned from West Timor.

170 Murdani interviewed by David Jenkins, page 86, Sherman Report 1171

letter from Jim Dunn, quoted second paragraph, page 132, Cover Up 172 the TV footage from Greg Shackleton includes a segment where propaganda from Radio Kupang is

being listened to in East Timor prior to the invasion 173

4th

paragraph, page 131, Cover Up 174 line 3, page 155, Cover Up 175 4.129, page 72, Sherman Report 1




61

The Indonesian special forces were reported to have entered Portuguese Timor in

plain clothes for many months prior to the actual military assault.

The Indonesian special forces had been conducting operations inside Portuguese

Timor prior to the Balibo attack. For example As early as 4 September [the CIA]

reported that : Communications intelligence indicates that two Indonesian specialforces groups, consisting of about 100 men each, entered Portuguese Timor on the

evening of September 3-4 176. (quoted in Indonesia s Forgotten War by John

Taylor). Other CIA reports indicated further Indonesian activity across the borderthroughout September 1975.

Lourenco Hornay reported Indonesian spying in his interview with AdelinoGomes. He said the Indonesians were expecting maybe one platoon. They had

their thing very well organised. They spied on every step taken by FRETILIN and

didn t expect much resistance in Balibo, but did expect journalists177

. Hecontinued They waited for the right moment to invade ... When they received

some information from a guy they put inside there ... This is what they said to me

in Batugade 178.

Spying from helicopter over-flights

Timorese police officer Paulo Martins reported Indonesian spying form

helicopter. He said the Indonesian troops already knew of the existence of the 5 journalists at Balibo, because during one week Indonesia had done a search by

helicopter . 179

Shackleton s TV crew filmed Indonesian helicopter activity over the border areain the days prior to the attack on Balibo.

Interrogation of Timorese witnesses by Indonesian intelligence

Timorese were held and interrogated:

An example is Manuel dos Santos who was jailed from 3-6 September. During

his imprisonment, because they knew he was the village policeman, theIndonesians sought information about Balibo: The Indonesians interrogated me

about the lay-out of the town, asking: Where is the military headquarters, where

the police post? 180.

Summary concerning the foreknowledge issue

176 mid page 58, Indonesia s Forgotten war by John Taylor177

Interview Lourenco Hornay , bottom page 6 to top page 7 178

Interview Lourenco Hornay, top of page 12 179 testimony of Paulo Martins in interview by Andrew McNaughtan 180 Manuel dos Santos, bottom page 127 and top of page 128, Cover Up




62

The evidence is that the Indonesians were accessing reliable intelligence that the

journalists were in Balibo from many sources radio intercepts, public radio broadcasts,interrogation of Timorese, insertion of spies and informants and over-flights.

The people who can confirm this include the men charged by the Indonesians withspying on FRETILIN radio communications, their peers stationed nearby who clearly

report conversations that confirm foreknowledge by the Indonesian commanders of the

journalists presence in Balibo and also other Timorese who were there at the time.

Most importantly foreknowledge has been confirmed from the mouth of the Indonesian

commander and corroborated (reportedly) by signals intercepts of his conversation with

his deputy on this issue. It has also been confirmed by his Timorese opposite number -the military commander of the FRETILIN forces as well. Additionally broadcasts from

Indonesian Timor referred to the known presence of journalists in Balibo before the

attack.

I find it surprising that it could be claimed the issue is in doubt. It would seem that the

evidence for this has already been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The evidence of premeditated intention to harm the journalists is also convincing

General Benny Murdani claims that they viewed the journalists more or less as

adversaries who were helping Fretilin by conveying information of a military natureand indicates that he believed the journalists reported to their chief in Dili or Darwin 181.

His depiction indicates the Indonesian attacking force would have regarded the

journalists as adversaries or enemies. This suggests there would have been negative pre-meditated intentions towards the journalists - according to the view articulated by the

Indonesian commander, Benny Murdani.

This is corroborated by the signals intercept quoted in the McDonald /Ball book in which

it is alleged Murdani said We cant have any witnesses and Kalbuadi responds Don t

worry we already have them under control 182.

Rogerio Lobato s comments to Sherman were The main objective of the Indonesians

was Balibo because they knew by the information, they knew, that the Australians were

there. I presumed that the main threat for the Indonesians at that time was the evidence of

the invasion . (emphasis added). Lobato suggests that that the journalists were, in hisestimation, specifically targeted by the attacking forces 183.

UDT commander Lourenco Hornay who was on the opposite side in Batugade had the

same opinion from overhearing conversations with Indonesian military officers (or at the

least hearing this from an Indonesian interpreter). He understood that the Indonesian

181 paragraphs 2 and 3, page 86, Sherman Report 1

182 bottom of page 115, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra .183 4.127, page 72, Sherman Report 1




63

attacking force expected to eliminate 8 journalists . Later he clarified that objectively it

was to hunt the journalists so they wouldn t witness the case (invasion)184

.

The notes of my original conversation with Hornay in Lisbon in 1997 (translated by

Amilcar Dias) record :

the witness said that there was great concern [amongst the Indonesian command] about

the journalists presence [in Balibo] and asserted that the attack on Balibo was done toeliminate the journalists. I asked him how he justified this and he said that it was his

opinion because of the interest expressed in them, his feeling about the attack, the

relatively large numbers deployed against an objective that was known to be barelydefended (he said that Indonesian intelligence was that only about 25 or less Fretilintroops were defending Balibo - and 600 or more were involved in the attack), the way he

was told they were killed and the fact that, on returning, the Indonesian troops bragged

that they had now cleaned 5 [journalists] and only three are left . He made theobservation that the Indonesians clearly knew ahead of time that the Australians werethere, they had plenty of time to plan how they might respond - and the fact that they

were killed indicated to him that that was an intended outcome. I asked him if it was

possible that he and others in UDT could know about the presence of the journalists in

Balibo from Indonesian intelligence without the Indonesian leaders knowing and he saidimpossible 185 .

Fernando Mariz (another UDT member located in Batugade at the time) said that whenMajor Leo was told about the journalists in Balibo he said Oh, don t worry, we know

this a few days ago. Oh don t worry. We have medicine for them. We have everything

ready for them 186. Mariz had previously spoken to the ABC 7.30 Report on 25/10/95and reported Major Leo had said (when told about the journalists in Balibo) Don t worry

we already know this. We re going to give a lesson and finish up with them 187 .

It seems to me on balance that the evidence supporting a pre-meditated intention by the

commanders of the attacking force to eliminate the journalists is strong. The motive the

elimination of unwanted witnesses to an officially denied and illegal military operation

is self -evident. Any genuine investigation should pursue the sources mentioned andothers available to further define this matter. It is centrally important to understanding the

motivations and actions of those entering the hamlet of Balibo early on the morning of

the 16th

October 1975.

Jolliffe criticises Sherman saying he had not examined the evidence on pre-knowledge

of the journalists presence in Balibo with sufficient rigour188 yet Jolliffe seems to

have made the same omission herself. Somehow Jolliffe concludes (5 pages from the end

184 bottom of page 7, interview between Gomes and Hornay

185 taken form my own notes summarizing my conversation with Hornay in Lisbon. These were written

within days of speaking to him. 186

Page 35, Sherman Report 2 187 quoted in my Critique of the Sherman Report in Foreknowledge section.188 mid page 172, Cover Up

A defense by Dr. Andrew McNaughtan against defamation by Jill Jolliffe

Documents

Transcript of A defense by Dr. Andrew McNaughtan against defamation by Jill Jolliffe