Religion, Culture & Society (MOMD)

Critically compare the theories of religion expounded by

any 2 of the following: Max Weber; Karl Marx; William

James; Emile Durkheim; Sigmund Freud; Carl Jung.

MARX &

DURKHEIM

Student ID: 908911

Word Count: 3,726

INTRODUCTION

Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim are often cited as the founding fathers of the social sciences. In

their respective times they emphasised the social nature of man, and the effect of society on him –

justifying their study of society as they tried to pose alternatives to the abstract and individualistic

view of man that had dominated before them since the enlightenment and Calvinism. They lived in

times of mass scale industrialisation and witnessed mass social change that came as a result of this.

Marx travelled around Europe agitating and preaching revolution, whereas Durkheim was totally

committed to study made every effort to establish social science as a serious academic discipline.

While Marx dealt with the relationship that common religious ideas and organised religions had

with capitalism, Durkheim sought to understand how religion in a social-psychological sense

affected the individual and society, and the relationship between the two. Yet they were both

influenced by the idea that religion is a projection of man's hopes and desires, and were both

atheists, so their works on religion are based on similar epistemological assumptions: And so their

theories are comparable in a number of aspects. The first section of this essay shall briefly outline

the theories of religion expounded by Marx and Durkheim, contextualising them within their

theoretical predecessors, philosophical standpoints and changes in their ideas – for the sake of

thorough and profound critical comparison. So it follows that the second section shall critically

compare different aspects of the theories of religion expounded by Marx and Durkheim, working

through the key themes to outline similarities and differences. This essay will then conclude with a

critical summary of the most important similarities and differences and suggestions for future

analysis of their theories.

KARL MARX

At university in 1835, Marx joined a discussion group of students and lecturers with radical

religious and political leanings called the Doktorklub, more commonly known today as the 'Young

Hegelians', who had a fascinated interest in Hegel's philosophy of history and his analysis of

modern society. Marx and others were dissatisfied with Hegel's conservative, statist leanings but

gave their own critical interpretations to his ideas particularly on the dialectic of history and concept

of alienation. Marx's interpretation was that that the dialectic process of history applied not to ideas

but material factors (which produced ideas), and that the same was true of alienation – he would

later call this 'dialectical materialism' as opposed to what he called Hegel's 'dialectical idealism'. It is

questionable whether Marx really understood Hegel's theory of history, but much of Hegel's a priori

assumptions form a hidden base of Marx's theory.

In perhaps an early indicator to his attitude to God and religion, he prefaced his doctoral dissertation

on the philosophy of nature in 1841 with the Promethean motto “In one word, I hate all the gods”

(Dupré, 2005).

In 1842, when Marx became a communist, he became more attuned to Ludwig Feuerbach's ideas.

Feuerbach, using Hegel's concept of alienation, asserted that man projects his own nature into

religious ideas, alienating himself from his own nature. He said that God was the projection of

man's strongest desires, and that the concept of eternal life was man's projection of his fear of death

– blinding him to his own mortality. Marx agreed with the idea of religion as alienation, but found

Feuerbach's negation of social-economic factors leading to alienation problematic. After having

written 'A Critisim of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' (in 1843), outlining most of his disagreements

with Hegel and laying the groundwork for his 'dialectical materialism', he wrote an introduction to it

(in 1844) as an essay which contained his theory of religion. It contains that phrase 'opiate of the

people' often quoted as the summary of his views, so it would do it justice to quote the passage in

full:

The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Reli-

gion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to

himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world.

Man is the world of man – state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an in-

verted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory

of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur,

its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and

justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not ac-

quired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that

world whose spiritual aroma is religion.

Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest

against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world,

and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. (Marx, Contribution)

Crucially, Marx has outlined here the dual function of religion. It provides a genuine treatment to

the human from worldly suffering, but one that can never be an escape from worldly suffering,

keeping man sedated: Like a medicine that provides relief but no cure. Later in the passage he

states:

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happi-

ness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a

condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that

vale of tears of which religion is the halo.

Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to

bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the

living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his

reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move

around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory Sun which revolves around man as

long as he does not revolve around himself. (Marx, Contribution)

Here he is advocating atheism and criticism of religion as a political philosophy, believing it will

awaken man to his real condition and lead to his emancipation, and the true realization of his

essence. However, in spring 1845, Marx wrote his 'Theses on Feuerbach' in which it is not clear

whether he is reacting against theoretical idealism, or merely criticising the 'idealism' of Feuerbach's

ignorance of socio-economic factors:

VII: All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their

rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

XI: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

(Marx, Theses)

This problematises his theory of religion as 'opiate', the problem is not that this is the inherent

function of religion but that this is how it functions in reality. However, this work was not published

until after Marx's death by Engels – perhaps Marx did not yet want to make this public – and as

such it never became a part of traditional Marxist theory.

Between 1845-46 Marx wrote 'The German Ideology', where he expounded his theory of history

(Marxist dialectical materialism), and developed the concept of ideology. He said that capitalism

had caused a division between mental and physical labour: Mental labour was dominated by the

bourgeois class, and the proletariat were condemned to physical labour. He proposed that due the

detachment of the bourgeoisie to the socio-economic basis of society, their theories became

'ideologies': theories that ignored the social conditioning of the ideas that founded them, yet

presenting themselves as objective. In other words, bourgeois theory perpetuates capitalism by

ignoring reference to the exploitation of the proletariat – Marx believed his theory was true theory

because it addressed this.

On the development and future of religion, Marx believed that early human societies were primitive

communist societies, and that when (for example, if a natural disaster struck the village) they

experienced alienation from their environment, they came up with religious ideas to help them deal

with this. Similarly Marx believed that once material inequalities set in to early human societies,

those who suffered would become alienated and religious ideas would cure them of alienation but

blind them to reality. To Marx, the development of religion was always subordinated to oppressive

economic systems (culminating in capitalism) and the aims of their rulers. However it is crucial to

see that Marx did not see this as primarily due to the development of priestly classes that negotiated

with the rulers for power and control. Although he recognised this reality, asserting that the

development of religion was clerical conspiracy was more of an enlightenment philosophy (Marx's

good friend Engels pointed out the stratification of the clergy, the higher being toned to bourgeois

interests, the lower clergy sometimes lending their support to revolutionary peasant struggles);

Marx identified the cause of religion's development as the alienation of the human essence.

Marx feared that alienation from society would cause more intense and reactionary religion to cover

for it – stalling genuine class consciousness and the possibility of emancipation for the moment. He

predicted, of course, that religion would wither away from human consciousness when humans

emancipated themselves from capitalism, established communism and realised themselves.

DURKHEIM

Towards the end of the 19th century, when Durkheim was rising through the academic rank and file,

anthropology had already been established as a major discipline and was a major influence on

Durkheim's thought by the time he came to establish his theory. Durkheim was a Cometan Positivist

and a social realist (the epistemological perspective that social realities exist independently of the

individual's perception of them). The thesis of Auguste Comte's sociological positivism with which

Durkheim was most concerned was; that the study of society should be based on facts, that the only

way to objective knowledge was by applying the scientific method of the natural sciences, and that

the social sciences would only be truly scientific if free from philosophical and metaphysical

speculations and abstractions (Morrison, p151).

Durkheim's study from which he constructed his theory of religion was of aboriginal religion in

Australia. Apart from this, his theory was also based on the work of anthropologists who had

studied the aboriginal people and their religions. Durkheim sought to study what he believed was a

'simple' and functional religion, in order to find solutions for what he saw as the slow breakdown of

social cohesion in Europe. At the beginning of his main book on religion, 'The Elementary forms of

religious life', Durkheim outlines what he means and does not mean by searching for the origin(s) of

religion: “It is seen that we give a wholly relative sense to this word "origins," just as to the word

"primitive." By it we do not mean an absolute beginning, but the most simple social condition that

is actually known or that beyond which we cannot go at present.” (Durkheim, footnote p8). He

proposes that what should be searched for are the “ever-present causes upon which the most

essential forms of religious thought and practice depend. Now for the reasons which were just set

forth, these causes are proportionately more easily observable as the societies where they are

observed are less complicated.” (Durkheim, p8). This was his justification for the aboriginal

communities in Australia being the ideal case-study, and concluded from his study of aboriginal

religion that “A religion so closely connected to a social system surpassing all others in simplicity

may well be regarded as the most elementary religion we can possibly know.” (Durkheim, p167,8) –

in other words; simple societies will have simple religions. He saw the development of religion as

an evolutionary process; changing and/or becoming more complex in order to meet the needs of

society. He believed all religion started with totemism; where expressions of a society's values are

eulogised and sanctified. He identified the division between sacred and profane (which he

emphasised, is not the same as good and evil) as the defining characteristic of any religion. He also

concluded that religious sentiment is reinforced by 'collective effervescence', a euphoric feeling of

solidarity that is felt at collective gatherings (whether explicitly religious or not).

Durkheim described the phenomenon of societal disunity as 'anomie', and noted that increasing non-

religiousness paralleled this increasing anomie. Durkheim believed this happened because religion

no longer catered for people's needs in a society that was radically and rapidly changing – and he

feared that this would lead to breakdown (and identified it as a social cause of suicide), and

proposed a constructed 'civil religion' as a solution to this. It should be noted that Durkheim was

inspired by the ideals of France's Third Republic, and he feared what other ideas could take the

place of these Republican values in anomie, a vacuum or mass uncertainty of belief in society.

Durkheim proposed 'civil religion' because to him civil religion was a dynamic of social life itself,

and so it would only be logical to study how it functions and fill the gaps with ideals that would

bring French society together.

CRITICAL COMPARISON

Durkheim's seeking of a simple religion in the aboriginal societies of Australia is profoundly

problematic. For one, he assures his readers that he will not use his study of them to draw baseless

conclusions on religion in the West in the following manner: “they are rudimentary and gross; we

cannot make of them a sort of model which later religions only have to reproduce.” (Durkheim, p8).

And yet despite this supremacist dismissal, this was his only actual study of religion, so it is

inevitable that his views on religion in general were based on a study on totemic aboriginal religion.

With all due respect to the aboriginal religions, it is certain that Christianity and Islam (the two

major world religions) never began as totemic religions; in their local origins they were a reaction

against corruption of Jewish priests and totemic clan-polytheism respectively.

To be fair to Durkheim though, he was one of the first to propose the idea of common forms of

religious practice being shared by all the world's religions, and among the non-religious. Marx's

view of the origin of religion makes more sense of the transition from polytheism/totemism to

monotheistic faith: Over the course of time, religious stories covering for various types of alienation

from the environment become numerous and contradicting, causing clan societies to become

alienated from their previous religious practices – requiring new and reformed beliefs. However this

view is still problematic: For example, there is very little indication that most of Arabian society in

the time of Muhammad felt alienated from Arabian polytheism; there was no collective effort by

Arabian tribes to construct this 'new' religion (while it is accepted by Muslims that Islam was new

to the Arabians, they emphasise that Islam is a return to the old and true religion); indeed there was

many clans who renounced Islam after the death of the prophet – leading to the apostasy wars.

Do we eulogise and sanctify everything that we find to be good in our lives; or do we only do this

when we feel alienated from the world around us – searching for “the soul of soulless conditions”

(Marx, A Contribution to Hegels Philosophy of Right - Introduction) It seems that Marx identifies

the causal origins of religious sentiment, yet he fails to see how this plays out on his own belief in

socialism (although there is evidence that later in his life he attempted to break away from his own

idealism); whereas Durkheim identifies how cultures (such as football) can become religious, yet

fails to identify alienation as a cause due to his regrettable view of the aboriginal peoples as living

in blissful ignorance of modernity. Both views are grounded in a presupposition of social evolution

that dissuades one from taking them seriously. Already by having explained a mere part of these

men's theories we have had to introduce errors in their epistemology and methodology, and the

effect of eurocentrism on their theories, particularly a failure to understand Islam; and indeed these

are recurring themes throughout this comparison of their work.

For Marx, religion keeps man sedated, by declaring his own nature to be other than his, and this is

alienation. For Durkheim, it brings society together, and anomie poses a risk to this. Both thinkers

have faults in their theory, and this inevitably comes from their theoretical-philosophical

standpoints. Durkheim was a pro-establishment functionalist, he saw no problem with the structure

of society and he was not a structuralist in the Marxist sense, as he spoke of social relations and of

‘social facts’ (phenomenon that are not bound by individuals in society and influence their

behaviour – sounds like social structure). Marx was an essentialist, religion was alienation. And by

religion Marx meant the religions, leaving no room for Durkheim’s concepts such as ‘civil religion’

or ‘organic solidarity’. Ironic, as Marxist theory in general could be described as a constructed civil

religion, channelling organic solidarity into Marxist conclusions. Indeed Feuerbach, who so

influenced Marx, made God into man – releasing his potentialities. Yet man wanting to be God is a

religious pursuit. It is also ironic that Marx never thought of his theory as an ideology, in the same

sense he described the German ideology. Marx showed evidence of potentially breaking out of his

own idealism, yet he never applied this to his theory of religion – perhaps the equation of religion

with alienation was too powerful, and to taint it with doubt would not advance the cause of political

atheism for the sake of waking the proletariat up to their material condition. However, undeniably

the idea that religion can and does keep people sedated is fairly well grounded. Were it not for

Marx’s essentialism, the possibility of religion as opiate could be applied to Durkheim’s concept of

religion: Opening up the possibility of understanding how secular nationalisms, for example, can

keep people sedated and obedient. On the other hand, Durkheim must be critisised for failing to see

that religion as a protesting expression of a solidarity founded upon class difference.

Durkheim was describing with the term 'anomie' what Marx spoke of as alienation, only their

concerns were reverse; due to the pro-establishment functionalism of Durkheim and Marx's

structuralist conflict theory. For Durkheim, the worry was about the disorder it could cause in

society, and what would fill the vacuum in the abscense of wholesome religion, whether organic or

mechanical. For Marx, religion was what people turned to as a result of alienation.

Durkheim was right to be concerned – luckily he didn't live to see the rise and results of politically

fascist civil religion in Germany in the form of Nazi ideology. And even today, in secularised

European countries, we can observe people finding collective effervescence and other aspects of

religiousness in sports, television shows, clubs, gigs, and still of course in the differing nationalisms

to be found in Europe, whether the secular state ideology of France or the attachment to England

displayed by the English Defence League. In a sense, one could say that Durkheim was right in that

people are finding 'new totems'. However a minority religion in Europe today defies all of this; the

Muslim community. Durkheim's theory alone cannot explain how these urban Muslim minorities

believe and practice similarily to, and feel bonded to, Muslim societies living in what is effectively

natural anarchy with an agriculture based economy. Durkheim studied collective effervescence and

solidarity as localised phenomena, but not as universal ideals/commands.

Fortunately for Marx's prediction, humankind has not yet emancipated itself from capitalism.

Nevertheless, attempts to reach communism resulted in the establishment of socialist states in the

age of capitalism. Marxist ideology as developed by Lenin became, unquestionably, the state dogma

in the USSR, and because Marx advocated atheism in order to destroy capitalism these states were

also committed to atheism as a political philosophy. However the USSR became what many

socialists (whether Marxist or non-Marxist) would describe as a 'defunct workers state'. With the

continuing existence of a capitalist world economy, and the attempts by the capitalist powers to

defeat socialism, the USSR went through the totalitarian repression (of religion and society) by

Stalin in order to compete with capitalism, and eventually became 'state-capitalist', and collapsed.

Russia then saw a resurgence of Orthodox Christianity as the sphere of religion was liberalised.

Marxists point out that this only confirms Marx's thought and that the Russian revolution was

premature, as the revolution had been defeated elsewhere in the world. Is this to be celebrated or a

cause of concern? Unfortunately, the reductionism of Marxist analysis seems self-confirming. Take

the case of the Islamist Revolution in Iran, one of the most important anti-imperialist powers in the

world today, and in real terms not too different from Bolívarian Socialism in Venezuela. Is this

dismissed as merely another historical aberration? The essentialist idealism of Marxist dogma

prevents it from engaging with Islamism as it understands itself, and it's forever yet unfulfilled

prophecy of communism justifies the negation of all defunct workers states and religious

revolutions (or revolutionary interpretations of religions) as invalid, rather than re-assessing itself.

CONCLUSION

Both theories of religion had useful concepts to offer, but both Marx and Durkheim were too tied up

in theoretical rigidity. While Marx bucked against the idea that he himself had fell into materialist

idealism, Durkheim was too caught up in the idea of his own objectivity, as if his conscience could

render itself conscious to itself. Only the work of the radical poststructuralists can save the theories’

concepts from being lost. Marx is to be commended more for his critique of capitalism, rather than

his almost identical critique of ‘religion’ which ignored that religion is not just a structure, but a

property of social relations. He allows no place for God in his theory, because it is an ideology.

Durkheim on the other hand did not present us with an ideology and had concepts about the

function of religion to offer, which if separated from the dominating assumptions of his times which

coloured his reading of them, are of benefit to theists and non-theists alike in understanding

religious behaviour.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dupré, L. ‘Marx, Karl’ in; Encyclopedia of Religion, Ed. Lindsay Jones. Vol. 8. 2nd ed. Macmillan

Reference (Detroit, USA). p5745

Durkheim, E. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, George Allen & Unwin Ltd (London).

Marx, K. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (introduction), Ed. Joseph

O’Malley, Cambridge University Press, 1970. (accessed on web:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm)

Marx, K. Theses on Feuerbach in; ‘Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. 1. Progress Publishers

(Moscow) 1969, p13-15. (accessed on web:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm)

Marx, K. A Contribution to the Critique of political Economy, Progress Publishers (Moscow),

1977. (accessed on web: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/

preface.htm)

Morrison, K. Marx, Durkheim, Weber: formations of modern social thought, 2nd edition. SAGE

publishers (London). p151