A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute

A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani DisputeAuthor(s): Niall M. Fraser, Keith W. Hipel, John Jaworsky, Ralph ZuljanSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 652-677Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174183Accessed: 15/04/2010 09:42

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A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute

NIALL M. FRASER KEITH W. HIPEL JOHN JAWORSKY RALPH ZULJAN University of Waterloo

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the Soviet Union is modeled and analyzed using conflict analysis methodology. To allow a conflict analysis approach to be conveniently and expeditiously applied to the dispute, DecisionMaker: the Conflict Analysis Program is employed. After acquiring the background information pertinent to the conflict, DecisionMaker was used to develop two conflict models at different times, in terms of decision makers, options, and preferences. Based on the conflict model, DecisionMaker calculated the equilibrium resolutions to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Several other analyses were then carried out on the basis of the equilibria generated. The overall results match well what has happened in the dispute.

The objectives of this article are (1) to demonstrate how conflict analysis methodology can be employed to study, systematically, an ethnic dispute such as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in the Soviet Union; and (2) to derive from the conflict analysis some predictions about the future development of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Further- more, DecisionMaker: the Conflict Analysis Program' was used to research the conflict models and execute all calculations necessary for a conflict analysis. This exercise in formalization was found to be helpful both in terms of analyzing the dispute and as a means of rapidly discovering plausible

1. DecisionMaker: the ConflictAnalysis Program constitutes a comprehensive decision support system which can be employed for modeling and analyzing real-world conflicts. The program is available for use on a microcomputer from Waterloo Engineering Software (22 Dupont Street East, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2J 2G9; telephone: 519-885-2450). The copyright is owned by N. M. Fraser and K. W. Hipel.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 34 No. 4, December 1990 652-677 (? 1990 Sage Publications, Inc.

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Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI DISPUTE 653

resolutions which had not been considered previously. Therefore, conflict analysis is seen as a useful tool to be applied to ethnic conflict research, and, due to its generality, conflict analysis is considered applicable to any conflict situation.

CONFLICT ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

Conflict analysis is a game-theoretic solution concept tailored to the practical study of conflicts; it was developed by Fraser and Hipel2 as an improvement on the metagame analysis procedure created by Nigel Howard (1971). Any conflict situation, where it is possible to specify a set of rational actors with meaningful options and at least ordinal preferences, can be studied using the conflict analysis method. The procedure begins with at least the preparation of a historical account of the conflict in question. A model based on this history is formulated by specifying actors, options, and preferences. Possible resolutions of the conflict are determined from the model by apply- ing the Fraser-Hipel solution concept. Finally, various sensitivity tests are used to ascertain how stable various solutions are following relatively minor changes to the model. Consequently, a set of solutions judged to be stable resolutions to the conflict can be revealed.

The first step in developing a conflict model is to decide on the actors and options. An actor, hereafter referred to as a decision maker, may be an individual or a group of people represented by an organization. To be included as a decision maker in a conflict model, he/she/it (hereafter, it) must have some power to influence the conflict; the power of the decision maker is expressed in terms of options or courses of action which are under its control to initiate in order to alter the conflict situation.

The final type of information required to complete the conflict model is the relative preferences of each of the decision makers. Specifying preferences for a given decision maker can be broken down into two stages. At the first stage, the options available to all decision makers are ordered from most important to least important for a particular decision maker. Second, the decision maker has a preference as to whether it would want the option always to be taken, always not be taken, or sometimes taken and sometimes not taken. The third case is referred to as conditional preferences. By

2. For a comprehensive description of conflict analysis, the reader can refer to the book by Fraser and Hipel (1984) as well as references cited therein. Articles dealing with conflict analysis have appeared in International Studies Quarterly (Hipel, Wang, and Fraser 1988) as well as in other journals.

654 JOURNAL OFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

specifying each decision maker's relative preferences for options, one is actually stating the decision makers' ordinal preferences over the possible outcomes.

An outcome in conflict analysis is any particular combination of options resulting from each decision maker choosing which options it wants to take. There are at most 2' possible outcomes (where n equals the number of options). However, some combinations of options may be judged to be infeasible; it is necessary to remove such outcomes from consideration before carrying out the search for conflict resolutions.

Generally, a feasible outcome is stable for a decision maker if it is not advantageous for the decision maker to unilaterally move away from the outcome by changing its selection of options. In such a situation, the decision maker may be able to move to a more preferred outcome by selecting different options under its control, but other decision makers would be able to put it in a less preferred situation by choosing other options. Therefore, the outcome is stable and the decision maker is better off to stay where it is.

An outcome is unstable for a decision maker if it can move to a more preferred position by changing its selection of options to form what is called a unilateral improvement. It is impossible, in this case, for other decision makers to block the improvement by changing their option choices.

If an outcome is stable for all of the decision makers, it is referred to as an equilibrium and is a possible resolution to the conflict. In any specific situation, if an equilibrium is reached during the evolution of a conflict from an unstable initial outcome, the conflict will remain at the equilibrium, unless the conflict model changes because of changes in preferences or other alterations in the conflict model. If one were closely modeling a conflict over time, one would update the model as soon as new information became available.

The process of building the conflict model provides a convenient means for communicating about any complex dispute. The structure furnishes a language for discussing the conflict and a notation for recording it. However, a manual stability analysis (i.e., the calculation of equilibria), becomes unmanageable in some conflicts because of the exponential growth of outcomes as the number of options increases. Hence a computer program was designed that is capable of carrying out the stability analysis procedure. This program is called DecisionMaker: the Conflict Analysis Program or, in short, DecisionMaker.

DecisionMaker uses the conflict model to carry out a stability analysis. By carefully examining the many possible moves and countermoves that can be exercised by the decision makers, DecisionMaker can decide if an

Fraser et al. IARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANIDISPUTE 655

outcome is stable for a particular decision maker. Furthermore, in a status quo analysis, DecisionMaker can be used to explain how a dispute evolves from the current situation through some transitory outcomes to an eventual equilibrium.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH

During the past few years, there have been dramatic outbursts of nationalist unrest within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which underscore the extent to which the multinational nature of this state continues to pose many difficult problems. Most of the disturbances have taken place in the non-Russian republics located along the periphery of the USSR. Of particular interest are the massive demonstrations and violent clashes in the Transcaucasian republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), where the most dramatic conflict has centered around a long-standing territorial dispute between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the political, socioeconomic, and cultural future of an area called Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous oblast falling entirely within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and populated predominantly by ethnic Armenians.

Many Armenians had migrated to Transcaucasia after Russia's wars with Persia and Turkey, and the first major Armenian-Azerbaijani clash occurred in 1905 in the ethnically mixed city of Baku, on the Caspian Sea. Here, cultural-religious differences were exacerbated by the animosity of the local Azerbaijanis, who were largely of peasant background, toward the more affluent, urbanized Armenians and, according to some reports, by the attempts of the Russian tzarist administration to exploit Armenian-Azerbaijani hostility (on the whole, the Christian Armenians were favored over the Moslem Azerbaijanis by the Christian tzarist regime of the nineteenth century). The conflict soon spread beyond Baku, and intercommunal violence led to the deaths of several thousand Armenians and Azerbaijanis.3

During the turmoil of World War 1, Armenia and Azerbaijan briefly achieved independence. However, the complex demography of Transcauca- sia made it impossible to create ethnically homogeneous states, and the focus of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict shifted from Baku to the area known as Nagorno-Karabakh where, at the time, Armenians formed the great majority (over 90%) of the population, although many of them had come to

3. See Altstadt-Mirhadi (1986), 303-13, and Swietochowski (1985), 38-46.

656 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

this area in the nineteenth century as immigrants from Turkey and Iran. This mountainous "island" of Armenians in an Azerbaijani "sea" was separated from the rest of eastern Armenia, and it was fiercely contested throughout the short period of independence of the Caucasian states.4

The population of this area opted clearly for Armenia, and after Soviet rule was established in the Transcaucasus in 1920, the new revolutionary authorities decided initially to place Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan (another disputed territory, populated largely by Azerbaijanis) under Arme- nian administration. They reversed this decision in 1921, and placed both territories under Azerbaijan's administrative control. In 1923, Nagorno- Karabakh became the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) of the Azerbaijan SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic), while in 1924, Nakhichevan became the Nakhichevan Autonomous SSR of the Azerbaijan SSR.5

Although reasons for this change in jurisdiction are not perfectly clear, developments in Soviet-Turkish relations possibly played a certain role, for Kemalist Turkey was one of Soviet Russia's first and closest allies. Allocating Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan may have been a con- cession to the new Turkish state, which, the Soviet leadership hoped, would play an important role in leading the anticolonial, revolutionary struggle in Asia (Walker 1980).6 However, commentators in the central Soviet press usually claim that the change in jurisdiction was motivated primarily by economic considerations.7 Regardless, the decisions on territorial jurisdiction of the early 1920s have been a constant source of dissatisfaction among Soviet Armenians.8

Armenian attempts to change the status of Nagorno-Karabakh can be traced back to the 1930s. Various petitions and appeals demanding the transfer of this area to Armenia were made in the 1960s and 1970s with no positive response from Moscow. By this time, the autonomy of Nagorno- Karabakh had been highly restricted, and deteriorating socioeconomic con-

4. On the complicated developments in this area during and immediately after World War I, see Kazemzadeh (1951) and the relevant sections of Hovannisian's trilogy (1967, 1971, esp. chap. 6, 1982, esp. chap. 7).

5. An autonomous oblast (province) is supposed to have considerable cultural and administrative autonomy and is distinguished by a particular national composition and way of life, while an autonomous republic, which is structured as a semisovereign state, is supposed to have greater political clout and prestige. In reality, both autonomous oblasts and autonomous republics are highly dependent on the republic to which they are subordinated.

6. See also the comment by Polyakov (1988), 15, and Reese (1988a). Most Armenian commentators strongly stress this Turkish factor and Stalin's role in the decision to change jurisdictions (e.g., Kaputikyan 1989). For an Azerbaijani point of view, see Aliev (1988).

7. See, for example, Pravda (21 March 1988). 8. See, for example, Kaputikyan (1989), 30.


ditions combined with Azerbaijan's insensitive cultural policy which dis- criminated against Armenians and favored Azerbaijanis in the NKAO. In addition, the percentage of Armenians in the NKAO was slowly changing (from 91.2% in 1939 to 80.5% in 1970), and Armenians considered this to be the result of intentional population manipulation (Glasnost Information Bulletin 1989; Lang 1988, xi; Walker 1988).9

A CONFLICT ANALYSIS OF THE NKAO CONFLICT

In the following sections, a comprehensive conflict analysis, using Decision- Maker, is presented. Two separate points in time have been chosen to model the conflict. The first moment, 18 October 1988, precedes the central government's imposition of a "special administration" for the NKAO in January 1989, after escalating tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis; the second moment selected, 30 January 1990, coincides with Moscow sending in large-scale military forces to end a massive outbreak of intercommunal violence throughout Armenia and Azerbaijan. Each conflict model is intro- duced by a historical background section. After the model is specified and the results are determined, a discussion of the results follows.

HISTORICAL BACKG ROUND TO 18 OCTOBER 1988

Protests by Armenians concerning the NKAO increased dramatically between 1985 and 1987.1' The notable rise in activity was clearly linked to the greater ease of voicing pent-up grievances because of the new Soviet policy of glasnost or openness, and it was natural that, under these new conditions, Armenians renew their Karabakh campaign in a vigorous fashion. Another important factor which contributed to public activism in Armenia was growing concern over ecological issues.1" In fact, several of the mass demonstrations in Yerevan calling for the unification of the NKAO with

9. According to Walker (1988), from the early 1970s on, the late foreign minister of Armenia used to raise the Karabakh issue at the annual meeting of foreign ministers of the Soviet Union.

10. The Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the USSR Council of Ministers received thousands of individual and collective letters addressing this issue. These letters included demands that, at a minimum, television broadcasts from Yerevan (the capital of the Armenian SSR) to the NKAO be permitted, that road links between the two areas be improved, and that Azerbaijani harassment of Armenians in the NKAO cease. Many petitioners also demanded the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (see Muradyan 1989, 19-20, 22).

11. See Fuller (1986, 1987a) and the comment by Kaputikyan (1989, 31).


Armenia followed immediately on the heels of demonstrations protesting environmental pollution (Fuller 1987b, 1988a, 1988b).

In late 1987 and early 1988, several delegations from the NKAO met with senior party officials in Moscow to discuss the status of the NKAO and other Armenian grievances.12 However, no concrete progress was made, and in February 1988, a stream of telegrams from the NKAO, as well as resolutions passed at meetings held in various local enterprises, began to arrive in Moscow demanding that the autonomous oblast be reunited with Armenia. On 10 February, the Azerbaijani Information Agency announced that Azerbaijan would never agree to such demands,13 and Azerbaijani officials increased their pressure on Armenian activists in the NKAO to stop raising this issue. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of Armenians in the NKAO supported unification with the Armenian SSR, and they looked to Moscow for a favorable resolution to this issue. On 22 February, they began to hold strikes protesting a CPSU Central Committee resolution which stated that separating the NKAO from Azerbaijan was not in the interest of the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples.

At approximately the same time, daily demonstrations and strikes calling for the return of Nagorno-Karabakh began to be held in Yerevan, and soon they paralyzed the city. Attempts by officials from Moscow to mollify the protesters were unsuccessful. By 26 February 1988, nearly one million people were reported on the streets. On this date Gorbachev met with two prominent Armenian activists, and listened carefully to their arguments. He promised that a "just solution" would be found to the problem of Nagorno- Karabakh (although he is also reported to have complained that the Arme- nians were "stabbing perestroika in the back") and stated that in the course of the next month the situation in the NKAO would be thoroughly reexam- ined. The next day, the organizers of the demonstrations in Yerevan agreed to end protests until 26 March in order to allow a special commission newly struck by the CPSU Central Committee to come to its conclusions.

The calm in Armenia did not spread to Azerbaijan. There had been earlier reports of scattered, nonlethal violence, but on 27 February, Baku radio reported the deaths of two Azerbaijani youths in connection with unrest in the NKAO, and on 27 and 28 February, retaliatory violence occurred in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait. This incident contributed to an already sizable

12. Unless noted otherwise, the chronicle of events presented is based primarily on Soviet and North American press reports, the articles and chronologies found in the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin and its successor, Report on the USSR, and Glasnost Information Bulletin (1989, 12-17).

13. This was followed by many similar statements in the Azerbaijani media.

Fraser et al. /ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI DISPUTE 659

flow of refugees who crossed the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in both directions to escape intercommunal violence.

The central Soviet press initially blamed the Sumgait tragedy on "hooli- gan elements," but Armenian sources claim that it was a well-organized "pogrom" which was aimed only at Armenians and conducted in complicity with local Azerbaijani party officials."4 Armenian despair and anger over the events in Sumgait were compounded when, by the end of March 1988, it became clear that the authorities in Moscow continued to oppose any change in the territorial status of the NKAO. Although the federal government announced an eight-year development program for the NKAO, this clearly did not satisfy many Armenians' demands, which had become more insistent in the wake of growing intercommunal violence.

To prevent further disturbances, several prominent Armenian activists were arrested, and large numbers of troops and police were deployed in Yerevan and the NKAO. Although a general strike at the end of March closed down Stepanakert, the capital of the NKAO, for several days, it seemed that a return to a situation of relative calm might be possible. However, Armenians were convinced that Moscow was taking a consistently anti-Armenian, pro-Azerbaijani stance, and felt betrayed.'5

The relative calm in April soon proved to be deceptive, and the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments' inability to prevent new disturbances in May led to the "retirement" of the Communist party heads of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and their replacement by individuals who were expected to be more amenable to negotiation and compromise. Even so, matters again came to a head in June 1988, when the Armenian Supreme Soviet, the republic's legislature, voted to incorporate the NKAO into Armenia."6 Two days later,

14. For Armenian eyewitness reports which may not be fully reliable, since they include rumors about what happened to other people, see Glasnost Information Bulletin nos. 16-18 (1989), 26-28, and Detente no. 13 (1988), 8-11.

15. See Kaputiyan (1989). Many Azerbaijanis claim that Armenians have a great deal of influence in circles close to Gorbachev, and also have the strong moral and financial support of Armenian emigres. See, for example, the comments of an Azerbaijani writer quoted in the New York Times, 11 March 1988.

16. Its claim was justified by Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution, which affirms the right to self-determination of the peoples of the USSR. In fact, this recognition of the principle of self-determination is only part of a general declaratory statement about the nature of the Soviet federation: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an integral, federal, multi-national state formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics. The USSR embodies the state unity of the Soviet people and draws all its nations and nationalities together for the purpose of jointly building communism." There is no mechanism, other than the right of the union republics to secede (Article 72 of the constitution), through which to express the right of self-determination.

660 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet endorsed a resolution on the unacceptabil- ity of such a transfer."7

This situation was not resolved at the Nineteenth All-Union Party Con- ference at the end of June. Proposals were made to transfer control of the NKAO to a third party (e.g., by making it part of the Russian republic or handing over control to the USSR Supreme Soviet); another compromise solution-granting the NKAO the more prestigious status of an autonomous republic instead of autonomous oblast-generated little interest and support, although it seemed to provide a logical solution."8 Azerbaijan's delegates rejected all these proposals, and Gorbachev again stated that no change in the territorial status of the NKAO would be permitted. The NKAO Soviet of People's Deputies decided, in a dramatic move on 12 July, to secede from Azerbaijan, but on the same day, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan declared this decision null and void. When the issue was presented before the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 July, it repeated its argument that a change in borders was impossible.

Although a number of strikes and demonstrations took place in the NKAO and Armenia throughout the summer of 1988, tensions mounted considerably in September. The NKAO was the scene of renewed strikes and demonstrations, as well as intercommunal violence involving firearms. This led finally to Moscow declaring a "state of emergency" in the NKAO on 21 September and the deployment of troops and armored vehicles in the NKAO and several Armenian centers.

A CONFLICT M(OI)EL ANI) ANALYSIS FOR OCTOBER 1988

The analysis presented in the forthcoming section was conducted on 18 October 1988. No changes were made to the modeling and analyses after the historical facts became known so that the results could be fairly compared to what eventually took place.

17. It referred to Article 78 of the Soviet Constitution, which states that boundaries between union republics can be changed only with the agreement of both republics concerned.

18. According to one analyst (Field 1988):

There can be little doubt that there is a strong case for changing the constitutional position of the oblast, on the basis of the internal logic of the Soviet constitutional system. It is patently inequitable that Nakhichevan, as a territory inhabited by Azerbaijanis separated territorially from Azerbaijan, possess the status of an autonomous republic within Azerbaijan while Karabakh is refused analogous status. If the Soviet authorities take their constitutional system seriously, the Karabakh area should be permitted a status equivalent to that of Nakhichevan (i.e., as an autonomous republic within the Armenian Union Republic). (P. 3)


The decision makers and options selected for the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict on 18 October 1988 are listed in Table 1. Comments opposite each decision maker and option explain who the decision maker is and what each option means, respectively. As can be seen, the conflict consists of six decision makers and a total of ten options. Notice that the main types of decision makers appear in groups. For example, the decision makers repre- senting the Armenian factions appear as decision makers numbered 2, 3, and 4, whereas the Azerbaijani decision makers are numbered 5 and 6.

Two sets of options are mutually exclusive. First, the decision maker Moscow can select only one of its three possible options at any point in time; that is, options 1, 2, and 3 are all mutually exclusive. Second, the Azerbaijani Government is able only to maintain the status quo or integrate NKAO-it could not do both. Thus options 7 and 8 are mutually exclusive. Preferences for each decision maker are expressed in terms of options, as shown in Table 2. The importance of options is indicated in a vertical list of the option numbers ranked from most important at the top to least important at the bottom. A negative sign before an option number means that the decision maker prefers that the option not be taken. Option preferences can also be conditional-the decision maker can prefer that an option be taken or not only if certain other options are taken or not-although conditional preferences do not arise in this conflict model.

Notice that for the Armenian dissidents, option 5, in which the Armenian people demonstrate, is of second highest importance and the preference for taking this option is unconditional. One may think that the preference for invoking option 5 should be conditional on Moscow not transferring NKAO to Armenia, since demonstrations would not be needed if Moscow allowed this transfer to take place. The preference is considered to be unconditional because it is believed that the dissidents do not think Moscow would ever allow NKAO to be transferred to Armenia, so the dissidents prefer demonstrations regardless of what happens. In other words, even if Moscow did give in to the demands to transfer NKAO to Armenia, the dissidents would not believe that Moscow was sincere and would actually continue to carry out its promise.

A single, very strong equilibrium was determined for the Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict. It is the situation where Moscow maintains the status quo (option 2), the Armenian government supports the Armenian demands for incorporating NKAO (option 4), the Armenian people demonstrate (option 5), the Armenian dissidents agitate openly (option 6), the Azerbaijani government tries to integrate NKAO (option 8), and the Azerbaijani people both apply slow pressure and retaliate (options 9 and 10). A number of


TABLE 1

Decision Makers and Options for the October 1988 Conflict Model

Decision Maker and Options Comments

1. Moscow Central Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) which is under the control of the Com- munist party

1. NKAO to Armenia NKAO (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) is a region located within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Because NKAO is inhabited mainly by Armenians, Mos- cow could transfer NKAO to the jurisdiction of the Soviet Republic of Armenia.

2. Status quo NKAO remains under the control of Azerbaijan.

3. Improve NKAO conditions For Armenians living in NKAO, improve cultural, language, education, and other conditions. However, NKAO would remain within Azerbaijan.

2. Armenian government Government of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia

4. Support demands Support main demand of Armenians to incorporate NKAO into Armenia. The Armenian Government did support these demands previously in spring 1988 but dropped its support under pressure from Moscow. Not taking this option means ignoring the demands of the Armenian people. Moscow, of course, would have to approve the annexation of NKAO by Armenia.

3. Armenian people Refers to Armenians living in Armenia and also NKAO

5. Demonstrate The Armenians can demonstrate in the streets of major urban centers. A vast majority of Armenians would like NKAO to become part of Armenia.

4. Armenian dissidents These people organize and lead most of the demonstrations. 6. Agitate openly The dissidents can speak openly about incorporating

NKAO into Armenia. In addition, they can encourage mass demonstrations. If agitation is not carried out openly, it will be done covertly.

5. Azerbaijani government Government of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic 7. Status quo Keep NKAO within Azerbaijan. At most, the Azerbaijani

government may make some cultural concessions to the Armenians living in NKAO.

8. Integrate NKAO Try to absorb NKAO as much as possible into Azerbaijan. This would mean de-emphasizing Armenian culture and encouraging Armenians to leave NKAO.


TABLE 1 Continued


6. Azerbaijani people Azerbaijani people living in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan

9. Slow pressure From cultural, economic, and other viewpoints, the Azerbaijanis would make life uncomfortable for Arme- nians living in NKAO. The objective of this pressure is to try to encourage Armenians to leave NKAO.

10. Retaliate This option refers to coercive action taken against Arme- nians living in NKAO. This action includes physical attacks on Armenians.

sensitivity tests were performed, and these showed that several other equilibria can occur. However, none alter the conclusions drawn from the present model.

A STATUS QUO ANALYSIS

The status quo, or current situation, identified by Jaworsky, is the situation where Moscow maintains its policy toward NKAO (only option 2 is taken by Moscow), the Armenian government does not support the Armenian people's demands to annex NKAO (option 4 is not taken), the Armenian people do not demonstrate (option 5 is not taken), the Armenian dissidents agitate openly (option 6), the Azerbaijani government maintains its current status quo policy rather than trying to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan (option 7 but not 8), and the Azerbaijani people apply slow pressure but do not retaliate (option 9 but not 10). This status quo is shown on the far left in Figure 1. In this figure, a letter Y opposite an option means "yes" it is taken by the decision maker controlling it, while N signifies "no" it is not selected.

In Figure 1, arrows are used to indicate which options can be changed to allow the decision maker controlling them to take advantage of its unilateral improvements to move to a more preferred outcome. For example, in Figure 1, notice the arrows joining options from the status quo outcome to the first transitory outcome. Because there are arrows beside options controlled by the Armenian government, Azerbaijani government, and Azerbaijani people, each of these decision makers can move to a more preferred outcome and other decision makers cannot block the unilateral improvement. An expert


TABLE 2

Decision Makers' Preferences and Their Meanings for the October 1988 Conflict Model

Decision Maker and Preferences Meaning

1. Moscow 2 Moscow maintains the status quo.

-5 The Armenian people do not demonstrate. 7 The Azerbaijani government maintains the status quo for NKAO.

-8 The Azerbaijani government does not try to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan. -1 Moscow does not transfer NKAO to Armenia.

-10 The Azerbaijani people do not retaliate against the Armenians. -9 The Azerbaijani people do not apply pressure on the Armenians in NKAO. -4 The Armenian government does not support the demands to incorporate

NKAO into Armenia. 6 The Armenian dissidents agitate openly. 3 Moscow improves conditions for Armenians in NKAO.

2. Armenian government 3 Moscow improves conditions for Armenians in NKAO. 4 The Armenian government supports the demands to incorporate NKAO

into Armenia. -10 The Azerbaijani people do not retaliate against the Armenians.

I Moscow transfers NKAO to Armenia. -8 The Azerbaijani government does not try to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan. -9 The Azerbaijani people do not apply pressure on the Armenians in NKAO.

7 The Azerbaijani government maintains the status quo for NKAO. -5 The Armenian people do not demonstrate.

6 The Armenian dissidents agitate openly. 2 Moscow maintains the status quo.

3. Armenian people 1 Moscow transfer NKAO to Armenia. 4 The Armenian government supports the demands to incorporate NKAO

into Armenia. -8 The Azerbaijani government does not try to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan.

5 The Armenian people demonstrate. 3 Moscow improves conditions for Armenians in NKAO.

-10 The Azerbaijani people do not retaliate against the Armenians. -9 The Azerbaijani people do not apply pressure on the Armenians in NKAO. -2 Moscow does not maintain the status quo.

7 The Azerbaijani government maintains the status quo for NKAO. 6 The Armenian dissidents agitate openly.

Fraser e al. /ARMENIAN-AZERBAUJANI DISPUTE 665

TABLE 2 Continued

Decision Maker and Preferences Meaning

4. Armenian dissidents 1 Moscow transfers NKAO to Armenia. 5 The Armenian people demonstrate. 4 The Armenian government supports the demands to incorporate NKAO

into Armenia. -8 The Azerbaijani government does not try to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan.

3 Moscow improves conditions for Armenians in NKAO. -7 The Azerbaijani government does not maintain the status quo for NKAO. -2 Moscow does not maintain the status quo.

-10 The Azerbaijani people do not retaliate against the Armenians. -9 The Azerbaijani people do not apply pressure on the Armenians in NKAO.

6 The Armenian dissidents agitate openly.

5. Azerbaijani government -1 Moscow does not transfer NKAO to Armenia.

2 Moscow maintains the status quo. 8 The Azerbaijani government tries to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan. 7 The Azerbaijani government maintains the status quo for NKAO.

-10 The Azerbaijani people do not retaliate against the Armenians. 9 The Azerbaijani people apply pressure on the Armenians in NKAO.

-5 The Armenian people do not demonstrate. -4 The Armenian government does not support the demands to incorporate

NKAO into Armenia. 3 Moscow improves conditions for Armenians in NKAO. 6 The Armenian dissidents agitate openly.

6. Azerbaijani people -1 Moscow does not transfer NKAO to Armenia.

8 The Azerbaijani government tries to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan. -3 Moscow does not improve conditions for Armenians in NKAO.

9 The Azerbaijani people apply pressure on the Armenians in NKAO. 7 The Azerbaijani government maintains the status quo for NKAO. 2 Moscow maintains the status quo.

10 The Azerbaijani people retaliate against the Armenians. -5 The Armenian people do not demonstrate. -4 The Armenian government does not support the demands to incorporate

NKAO into Armenia. 6 The Armenian dissidents agitate openly.

must decide which of the three decision makers would move first. Jaworsky determined that the decision maker most likely to move first would be the


Decision Maker Transitory Transitory Transitory Equilibrium and Options Status Quo Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3

1. Moscow 1. NKAOtoArmenia N N N N N 2. StatusQuo Y Y Y Y Y 3. Improve NKAO

conditions N N N N N

2. Armenian Government 4. Support Demands N N - Y Y Y

3. Armenian People 5. Demonstrate N N N N - Y

4. Armenian Dissidents 6. Agitate Openly Y Y Y Y Y

5. Azerbaijani Government 7. StatusQuo Y- . Y .- Y - N N 8. IntegrateNKAO N -. N -. N -. Y Y

6. Azerbaijani People 9. Slow Pressure Y Y Y Y Y

10. Retaliate N -. Y Y Y Y

Figure 1: Progression from the Status Quo to the Very Strong Equilibrium in the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

Azerbaijani people, and this is indicated by the solid arrow in Figure 1 showing the option that was changed to result in the first transitory outcome. This means that the Azerbaijani people can improve their situation by deciding to retaliate and thereby cause the conflict to evolve from the status quo to the first transitory outcome.

From the first transitory outcome, the Armenian government and the Azerbaijani government could make unsanctioned unilateral improvements. In this case, it was determined that the Armenian government would be the first to move, leading to the second transitory outcome in which the Armenian government decides to renew its support for the demands of the Armenian people. The only decision maker able to change options from the second transitory outcome is the Azerbaijani government, leading to the third transitory outcome. To accomplish this, the Azerbaijani government stops supporting the status quo and decides to try to integrate NKAO into Azerbaijan. For the status quo and transitory outcomes 1 and 2, the Armenian people had a unilateral improvement to demonstrate (option 5) that was sanctioned by the


possibility that the Azerbaijani government would react to demonstrations by proceeding to integrate NKAO (option 8). In this last transition, the Azerbaijani government finally took this action, leaving the Armenian people an unsanctioned unilateral improvement to demonstrate. Taking this option leads to the equilibrium outcome, as illustrated in Figure 1.

The prediction given by the model at the time it was developed is that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will escalate. The first party to change its course of action will be the Azerbaijani people who will begin to retaliate against the Armenians. Following this, the Armenian government would renew its support for the demands of the Armenians for Nagorno-Karabakh to be joined to Armenia. The Azerbaijani government would react by trying to integrate Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan. Finally the Armenian people would begin demonstrating. The Soviet Union would continue to try to maintain the status quo relationships among the other participants.

This sequence of events coincided with Jaworsky's view of how this complex dispute might evolve. The DecisionMaker results, therefore, pro- vided credible support to the expert for his opinion that the Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict would intensify as the various parties entrenched their positions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO JANUARY 1990

The prediction that the decision maker most likely to move first would be the Azerbaijani people (transitory outcome 1) was borne out in mid- November 1988 when a series of demonstrations in Baku, lasting eighteen days, grew to include several hundred thousand individuals. The protestors demanded that the NKAO lose its status as an autonomous oblast by coming under the routine administration of Azerbaijan. These demonstrations coincided with growing intercommunal violence and the first mention of a new organization known as the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, which was set up supposedly by Azerbaijani intellectuals to further perestroika (USSR 25 August 1989).

These events likely increased the Armenian government's determination to support actively public demands to annex the NKAO (transitory outcome 2). However, there is no solid information on the steps which the Armenian government planned to take in response to the demonstrations in Baku, since a meeting of the Armenian Supreme Soviet on 22 November was prematurely adjourned because of the worsening situation in Azerbaijan. The earthquake in Armenia on 7 December further disrupted the Armenian government's plan of action.


However, even the massive earthquake which devastated parts of Armenia failed to bring about a diminution of tensions in the area, and the Soviet press noted that some Azerbaijanis openly rejoiced over this tragedy. Soviet troops maintained a heavy presence in Yerevan to prevent further demonstrations, while more members of the dissident Karabakh Committee, who were accused of exploiting the disruption following the earthquake to spread rumors and further destabilize the situation, were arrested.

Given the rapid deterioration of the situation in the Transcauscasus in late November and December of 1988, any strong measures taken by the Arme- nians would have certainly led to the Azerbaijani actions which were pre- dicted in transitory outcome 3. However, in the aftermath of the Armenian earthquake, the central authorities intervened to break this action-reaction cycle in an unprecedented manner.

In January 1989, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared that Nagorno-Karabakh would be temporarily placed under the control of a special administrative committee directly responsible to the central authorities, although it would maintain its status as an autonomous oblast in Azerbaijan. This possibility had first been proposed by Armenian delegates to the June 1988 All-Union Party Conference (RL 295/88). More careful consideration of this information, as well as greater sensitivity to the implications of allowing the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to escalate, would have led to a more accurate modeling of the situation in fall 1988, and this would have generated a solid prediction of the developments in early January 1989.

Despite attempts to "normalize" the situation in the NKAO, and improve interethnic relations in the Transcaucasus, the stalemate continued, and in April 1989, hundreds of thousands of Armenians combined officially ap- proved commemorations of the 1915 massacre of their people in Turkey with protests against the detention of leaders of the Karabakh Committee. There were further disturbances in May, when the capital of the NKAO was closed down by strikes expressing dissatisfaction with the work of the committee appointed to run the territory, and large numbers of Armenians demonstrated in Yerevan, demanding the annexation of the NKAO by Armenia. The Azerbaijani and Armenian party first secretaries met with the Soviet leadership in mid-May and they agreed to the continuation and "strengthening" of the NKAO's special administration (USSR 29 December 1989); however, demonstrations and scattered violence erupted persistently in the NKAO, as well as in Armenia and Azerbaijan, throughout the summer of 1989. Arme- nians renewed their demand for the transfer of the NKAO to the Armenian SSR, while the Azerbaijani government continued to refuse to acquiesce.

Fraser et al. /ARMENJAN-AZERBAIJANI DISPUTE 669

Perhaps the most significant development in the conflict over the NKAO during 1989 was the growth of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan. Beginning in August 1989, mass demonstrations in Baku, organized by the Popular Front, called on the Azerbaijani government to officially recognize the group (USSR 25 August 1989). The Azerbaijani government refused to do so, and the Popular Front called on Azerbaijanis to join in strikes which were quite successful in achieving the Popular Front's goals.

In particular, the Popular Front sought recognition from the Azerbaijani government and it opposed the NKAO's special administration. Strikes during August and September, 1989, sponsored by the Popular Front, included railway workers who managed nearly to isolate Armenia from the remainder of the Soviet Union. Some observers have suggested that the "rail blockade" was a response to the Armenian attempt in late July to cut off rail traffic to the Nakhichevan ASSR (which belongs to Azerbaijan but is separated from it by Armenia) (USSR 13 October 1989). Although no causal relationship can be established, the Azerbaijani government did call on Moscow to abolish the NKAO special administration in September; the Popular Front called on workers to end the strike in mid-October; and Moscow eliminated the special administration on 28 November (USSR 8 December 1989).

At the same time that Moscow restored the NKAO's previous administration, it decreed that an "organizational committee" be created that would give Armenians effective control of the NKAO, and the Azerbaijani government was explicitly ordered not to interfere with the NKAO's autonomy (USSR 8 December 1989). Neither the Armenians nor the Azerbaijanis responded positively to the new situation. In December, the Armenian government once again declared its preference for transferring the NKAO to Armenia, and the Azerbaijani government rejected Moscow's decree as "unconstitutional" (USSR 29 December 1989).

The situation came to a head in January 1990, when the Popular Front, which had begun to advocate increasingly radical measures in late 1989, protested the Azerbaijani government's position on the NKAO. It organized a mass rally on 13 January at which speakers called for a referendum on the secession of Azerbaijan from the USSR. Following the rally, there were numerous incidents of anti-Armenian violence in Baku. The conflict continued to escalate until Moscow declared a "state of emergency" on 15 January, and several thousand military troops were deployed in Azerbaijan to restore order (USSR 26 January 1990). By 23 January, the Azerbaijan government demanded an end to the state of emergency and the withdrawal of Soviet troops; it also threatened to secede (Globe & Mail 23 January 1990). The


arrest of several Popular Front leaders was reported two days later (Globe & Mail 25 January 1990), though there are rumors that the Popular Front attempted to encourage strikes in Azerbaijan as of 30 January. Azerbaijani and Armenian nationalists are said to have agreed to a truce around 28 January. The death toll to 30 January is estimated at 197 (Globe & Mail 30 January 1990).

A CONFLICT MODEL AND ANALYSIS FOR 30 JANUARY 1990

In the fifteen months since the first model of the conflict over the NKAO was developed, a number of substantive changes occurred in the real-world conflict which are accounted for in a revised model and analysis presented here. This model was constructed based on information available on 30 January 1990. Note that DecisionMaker is sufficiently flexible to allow for a virtually daily revision of the conflict model in order to account for new information, and this allows the conflict models to have a dynamic structure.

Table 3 indicates the new set of decision makers and options available. Notice that in contrast with the first model's decision makers and options, formal popular opposition groups now exist in both republics. In the Arme- nian SSR, the duality of dissidents and the people supporting the dissident position has been replaced by a single decision maker, the Karabakh supporters, which represents Armenians outside the government seeking to change the NKAO's status. The Popular Front of Azerbaijan replaces the earlier model's Azerbaijani people decision maker; this is in recognition of the fact that an organized opposition has formed around Azerbaijan's intelligentsia, who were not considered in the original model. The three government decision makers presented in the first model remain unchanged in this revised model. Some consideration was given to the possibility of including other decision makers, such as Turkey and Iran, which have ethnic and historical ties to the Central Asian republics. However, such external actors have no identifiable options which could be considered viable. Furthermore, it is believed that such decision makers' influences can be presented adequately in terms of adjustments to Moscow's relative preferences.

While an effort was made to change the decision makers so that they were more representative of the real-world situation, the central aims in revising the options were greater precision in specifying particular options (e.g., options 14, 15, and 16) and consideration of some radical possibilities based on historical precedents (e.g., options 4 and 13). Consequently, the analysis results were expected to yield superior conclusions about possible conflict resolutions.

Fraser et al. LARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI DISPUTE 671

TABLE 3

Decision Makers and Options for the January 1990 Conflict Model


1. Moscow The central government of the USSR

1. Maintain troops Soviet troops enforce "peace" and limit the republic governments' actions

2. Special administration Return the NKAO to central control as per January 1989

3. Transfer NKAO Make formal border changes giving Armenia control of the NKAO

4. Resettle Move the Armenians in the NKAO to Armenia or elsewhere

2. Armenian government Government of the Armenian SSR

5. Discuss NKAO Enter formal talks with the Azerbaijani government regarding the future of the NKAO

6. Crack down Silence Armenians seeking the transfer of the NKAO

3. Karabakh supporters Armenians who want the NKAO to be part of the Armenian SSR

7. Legal means Attempt to get the NKAO transferred through political lobbying

8. Demonstrate Encourage mass demonstrations in Armenia

9. Strike Attempt to make Armenia ungovernable in order to extract concessions regarding the future of the NKAO

4. Azerbaijani government Government of the Azerbaijani SSR

10. Seek normality Get Moscow to pull out Soviet military forces

11. Integrate NKAO Change the demographic composition of the NKAO to achieve an Azerbaijani majority

12. Discuss NKAO Enter formal negotiations about the NKAO with the Armenian government

13. Secede Attempt secession from the USSR by votes or violence

5. Popular Front Azerbaijani nationalists with anti-Armenian sentiments

14. Protest Hold mass rallies in support of Popular Front positions

15. Strike Shut down Azerbaijani oil fields and the rail network

16. Violence Organize attacks against Armenian persons and property

One immediate implication of enhancing the precision of options is the requirement to place a larger number of restrictions on feasible outcomes. For Moscow, options 2, 3, and 4 are mutually exclusive. Some action on Moscow's part is necessary, so Moscow must take at least one of its options. The Karabakh supporters' options 8 and 9 are also represented as mutually exclusive in order to model the inherently escalatory nature of moving from


TABLE 4

Decision Makers' Preferences for the January 1990 Conflict Model

Armenian Karabakh Azerbaijani Moscow Government Supporters Government Popular Front

6and12 3 3 11 11 1 2 2 -3 -3 5 6 and 12 7 -2 -2

-11 -14 8 -1 -1 2 -15 9 5 5

-13 -16 6and 12 10 14 7 1 if 14/15/16 -11 6 and 12 15

-9 -11 -14 -9 16 -8 10 -15 -8 13 10 7 -16 -7 -9

-16 8 1 if 14/15/16 14 -8 -15 9 -5 15 -7 -14 5 -4 16 6and12 -4 -4 -10 13 10 -3 -13 -13 4 4

occasional protest rallies to strikes aimed at shutting down Armenia's econ- omy. As for the Azerbaijani government, seeking a return to normality and attempting to secede (options 10 and 13) are clearly mutually exclusive, as is a willingness to discuss the NKAO situation and secession (options 12 and 13). Finally, the Popular Front's options are considered mutually exclusive (options 14, 15, and 16) for the same reasons as the similar restrictions on some of the Karabakh supporters' options. Preferences for each decision maker are listed in Table 4.

After completing the design of a revised model, it was entered into DecisionMaker and a stability analysis was performed. Two very strong equilibria and 241 strong equilibria were found. Several suggestive conclusions can be derived from these results. In all of the equilibria, the Azerbaijani government attempts to integrate the NKAO by changing the demographic situation (option 11) and it never attempts secession (option 13).

The very strong equilibria both have Moscow maintaining troops (option 1) to enforce peace between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, while it adminis- ters the NKAO (option 2); the Armenian government is willing to discuss the future of the NKAO (option 5); the Karabakh supporters agitate for the transfer of the NKAO through legal means and demonstrations (options 7 and 8); the Azerbaijani government seeks the removal of Soviet troops and

Fraser et al. IARMFNIAN-AZERBA!JANI DISPUTE 673

the integration of the NKAO (options 10 and 11); and the Popular Front protests against developments (option 14). The noteworthy difference between the two very strong equilibria depends on whether the Armenian government attempts to silence the Karabakh supporters (option 6). When Armenia does crack down (i.e., it takes option 6), the Azerbaijani government is prepared to discuss the future of the NKAO (option 12). Otherwise, Azerbaijan does not negotiate with Armenia. However, Armenia's crack- down will not guarantee that Azerbaijan will negotiate, since one of the strong equilibria is identical to the very strong equilibrium whereby Armenia suppresses the Karabakh supporters but the Azerbaijani government does not respond (i.e., takes option 12).

Another result of the stability analysis with substantive implications is that the Popular Front's behavior cannot be determined with any accuracy in any given situation. In fact, one reason why so many equilibria exist is that each of the four possible Popular Front strategies, given a fixed strategy for each of the other decision makers which generates an equilibrium, happens to be an equilibrium. Therefore, the attempt to ascertain what the Popular Front's strategy will be in the NKAO conflict did not succeed; this suggests that its preferences are uncertain. Several other attempts to model the Popular Front's preferences also produced this result. Consequently, there is no certainty about what Azerbaijan's popular opposition will do in the NKAO conflict.

Finally, it should be noted that in several strong equilibria, Moscow chooses to resettle the Armenians presently living in the NKAO to another part of the Soviet Union (e.g., Armenia; option 4). That such an action would lead to a stable situation and, possibly, a resolution to the NKAO conflict, implies that a radical solution should not be dismissed. Resettlement would not necessarily be a forcible action; hence there is no reason to believe a Stalinist system would be a prerequisite to implementing a resettlement program. Rather, Moscow could offer economic incentives for Armenians to leave the NKAO.

CONCLUSIONS

The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over the NKAO poses a difficult problem for the central authorities in Moscow. As noted earlier, the Soviet Constitution provides no mechanism for handling conflicts when republics clash over territorial changes, and there is no mention in the constitution of settling conflicts by arbitration or by using third-party procedures. Minor

674 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

concessions to the Armenian population of the NKAO have been ineffective in bringing peace to the area, and transferring the NKAO to the Armenian republic would provoke the Turkic population of Azerbaijan and possibly other republics. Placing the NKAO under federal jurisdiction, the option chosen in January 1989 was only a temporary solution to the problem and made little sense in constitutional terms. Likewise, the present solution of stationing a large contingent of Soviet military personnel in the region is at best a short-term solution.

The conflict over the NKAO also has much broader implications, for the Soviet leadership is deeply concerned about restiveness among other national minorities with territorial claims. Gorbachev has clearly implied that the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh is not unique, and that for Moscow to set a precedent by agreeing to transfer the NKAO to Armenia would encourage groups with similar grievances to agitate for comparable concessions."9 It is interesting to note, in this context, that in October 1988, there were clashes in southern Georgia between Georgians and Azerbaijanis, who are heavily concentrated in this area (Fuller 1988b). In addition, one reason for large- scale demonstrations in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in April 1989, which were put down by force, was a campaign by the Abkhaz intelligentsia and party leadership for the detachment of the Abkhaz ASSR from the Georgian SSR and its upgrading to union republican status (Fuller and Ouratadze 1989).2) In a clear response to the threat that such disturbances could be duplicated elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the consequences of the recent conflicts in the Transcaucasus have frequently been raised by the central leadership in attempts to intimidate other national rights activists.

No matter how broad its support, national rights activity in many parts of the country has often been blamed by the central media on small groups of "extremists" who are often "aided from abroad," and the violence accompa- nying the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh has been cited in arguments for strictly enforcing legislation "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes."2' Thus disturbances in the Transcaucasus may provide the central Soviet authorities

19. See, for example, his comment about "the abuse of 'glasnost' in an attempt to recarve international boundaries," in a speech to the Party Conference (Pravda, 29 June 1988).

20. Concerns about the broader implications of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have probably been the main reason for the lack of prompt and reliable information on this issue in the Soviet press (see Reese 1988b).

21. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from Pravda (12 April 1989):

The slogans of democratisation, glasnost and the expansion of human rights and freedoms are increasingly often exploited by sundry small groups of those who, while portraying themselves as supporters of restructuring are in fact its frenzied opponents.... Certain self-styled leaders-extremists and nationalists hiding their true nature behind a mask of

Fraser et al. /ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI DISPUTE 675

with a convenient rationale for clamping down on other groups agitating for greater national rights. Certainly, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the difficulty of resolving this conflict have very significant implications for the multinational Soviet state.22 As Gorbachev noted in a television address on 1 July 1989, ethnic tensions and violence threaten his entire reform program, "as well as the destiny and unity of our state" and the Soviet Union's reputation abroad.

Conflict analysis is probably the most thoroughly formalized methodology based on rational actor assumptions and, as demonstrated by the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, conflict analysis methodology can be used successfully for modeling and analyzing ethnic disputes. Besides furnishing a prediction of what would take place in the NKAO conflict, conflict analysis provides a better understanding of the dispute. DecisionMaker provides a comprehensive and flexible mechanism for the formulation and analysis of a complex real-world conflict.

At the modeling stage, the conflict model is efficiently formulated in terms of decision makers, options, and relative preferences:

* The key participants are identified. In the early model, six main participants were recognized, and in the later model, five.

* The important actions available to each of the participants are identified. The available actions are expressed as options for each of the decision makers. Special relationships among these options are also identified.

* The interests, goals, and aspirations of each of the individual parties are captured in the preferences. For each decision maker, these preferences are expressed by listing options from most important to least important and by stipulating whether or not a given option should be taken. If necessary, the conditions under which the decision maker wishes the option to be taken or not can be described.

Whatever conclusions develop from the computer analysis, they rep- resent derivations from a clearly specified set of assumptions, that is, the conflict model structure, and a solution concept, the conflict analysis methodology, which is well founded on logic and set theory. While several avenues of criticism exist for those who disagree with the conclusions of a

commitment to restructuring-have on their conscience the events in Armenia and Azerbaijan... and the nationalist actions in the Baltic, Moldavia and other regions.... Nationalist phenomena have increasingly and noticeably begun to take on an anti-Soviet and anti-socialist complexion.

22. Soviet scholars have begun to respond to this problem by devoting more attention to the experience of other multinational states in dealing with ethnic conflict. See, for example, the recent articles by Bromlei and other scholars in the journal Sovetskaia etnograflia.


conflict analysis, such criticism can be presented in ordinary language by experts who are not necessarily familiar with conflict analysis, and it is likely to stimulate further analysis. In fact, alternative models may be constructed in order to accommodate critiques. This situation is in sharp contrast to other game-theoretic analysis, such as that based on expected utility models, where the focus can degenerate from substantive problems to debates on the appropriate measurement of a hypothetical value. Consequently, the compre- hensiveness of conflict analysis methodology tends to discourage polemical commentary.

Computer analysis produces a domain of possible equilibria for the conflict, based on the assumptions specified in the model. A critical appraisal of the results generated by DecisionMaker can (a) furnish novel insights into the conflict, (b) reveal flaws or contradictions in the analyst's knowledge about the conflict, and (c) in certain cases, can uncover unexpected resolutions to the conflict.

REFERENCES

Aliev, 1. 1988. Spravka (v sviazi s sobytiiami v NKAO). Materialy Samizdata 44/88; Arkhiv Samizdata no. 6283.

Altstadt-Mirhadi, A. 1986. Baku: Transformation of a Muslim town. In The city in late imperial Russia, edited by M. F. Hamm. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Field, F. 1988. Nagorno-Karabakh: A constitutional conundrum. Radio Liberty Research Bulle- tin 313/88 (15 July): 3.

Fraser, N. M., and K. W. Hipel. 1984. Conflict analysis: Models and resolutions. New York: North Holland.

Fuller, E. 1986. Is Armenia on the brink of an ecological disaster? Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 307/86 (5 August).

. 1987a. USSR minister of health cites data on infant mortality and infectious diseases in two transcaucasian republics. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 419/87 (16 October).

. 1987b. Armenians demonstrate for return of territories from Azerbaijan. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 441/87 (20 October).

. 1988a. More demonstrations in Armenia. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 79/88 (22 February).

. 1988b. Marneuli: Georgia's potential Nagorno-Karabakh? Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 477/88 (18 October).

Fuller, E., and G. Ouratadze. 1989. Georgian leadership changes in aftermath of demonstrators' deaths. Report on the USSR 16:29.

Glasnost Information Bulletin. 1989. A chronicle of events 1920-1988 in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nos. 16-18 (January): 11-13.

Hipel, K. W., M. Wang, and N. M. Fraser. 1988. Hypergame analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. International Studies Quarterly 32:335-58.

Hovannisian, R. G. 1967. Armenia on the road to independence. Berkeley: University of California Press.


. 1971. The republic of Armenia: The first year, 1918-1919. Berkeley: University of California Press.

. 1982. The republic of Armenia: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Howard, N. 1971. Paradoxes of rationality: Theory of metagames and political behavior. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Kaputikyan, S. 1989. An open letter. Glasnost Information Bulletin nos. 16-18:30. Kazemzadeh, F. 1951. The struggle for Transcaucasia. New York: Philosophical Library. Lang, D. M. 1988. The Armenians: A people in exile. London: Unwin Hyman. Muradyan, I. 1989. Glasnost and Nagorno-Karabakh: The public speaks. Glasnost Information

Bulletin nos. 16-18:19-20, 22. Polyakov, Y. 1988. The turbulent years in the Caucasus: On the sources of national contradic-

tions in Nagorny Karabakh. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. Reese, W. 1988a. Turkish claims to a say in the status of Nakhichevan. Radio Liberty Research

Bulletin 136/88 (28 March). . 1988b. Situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan said to be exacerbated by lack of informa-

tion. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 532/88 (14 December). Swietochowski, T. 1985. Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The shaping of national identity in a

Muslim community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walker C. J. 1980. Armenia: The survival of a nation. London: Croom Helm.

. 1988. Between Turkey and Russia: Armenia's predicament. The World Today (Aug.- Sept.): 142-43.

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A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute

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