A Comparison of Ship Self Defense Analysis Simulations · A Comparison of Ship Self Defense...
24
A Comparison of Ship Self Defense Analysis Simulations Tim Jahren Lee Schamp Hank Embleton Mike Kamrowski Shahrokh Hafizi 1
Transcript of A Comparison of Ship Self Defense Analysis Simulations · A Comparison of Ship Self Defense...
A Comparison of Ship Self
Defense Analysis Simulations
Tim Jahren Lee Schamp
Hank Embleton Mike Kamrowski
Shahrokh Hafizi
1
Agenda
bull Study Objectives
bull Overview of Models
ndash SSD
ndash SADM
bull Evaluation Process
bull Evaluation Results
bull System Life Cycle Utilization
bull Next Steps
bull SummaryConclusions
2
Study Objectives (1)
bull Compare capability of SADM model with the Raytheon Ship Self Defense (SSD) model ndash Find out what it can do that we currently canrsquot do but
would if we could
ndash Compare model inputsoutputsfidelity
ndash Establish common scenarios for ldquoapples to applesrdquo comparison
ndash Create test cases that we can directly compare with the same test case run in the Raytheon Ship Self Defense model to build confidence that we get the results we expect to get
ndash Model features bull Identify missions which each model works best for and why
bull Identify discriminating features of each model
3
Study Objectives (2)
bull Investigate capability of SADM model for usage in Raytheon ndash Get to know how to set it up exercise it understand
what it can and canrsquot do for the types of analysis we typically do
ndash Document what is immediately useful with the tool
ndash Document its naval weapons analysis issues bull Identify what is required to build new models for use in
SADM
bull Identify additional features that are required
ndash Build some scenarios with multiple firing platforms and related weapons coordination to understand what capability is there
4
SSD Overview bull Developed by Raytheon
bull First-order effectiveness model of
short range air defense against
multiple antiship missiles by a single
firing ship
bull Measures of Effectiveness
ndash Probability of killing all incoming
ASMs
ndash Number of Leakers
ndash Kill statistics
ndash Number of weapons expended
bull Monte Carlo events
ndash Probability of kill at intercept
ndash ASM launch times and azimuth
spacing
ndash Sensor detection range
bull User createdmodified ship
configuration files threat scenario
files and weaponsensor database
5
SSD Model Architecture
WEAPON PARAMETERS
- MAX RGE - MIN RGE - MAX INTERCEPT ALT - GUIDANCE TYPE - ILLUMINATION TIME - LOADOUT - SALVO POLICY - LAUNCH RATE - LAUNCH DELAY - RE-ENGAGE DELAY - RFIR UNIQUE INPUTS - PK FUNCTION OF RGE - TIME OF FLIGHT - GUN EXPECTED HITS
SENSOR PARAMETERS
- MAX ELEVATION ANGLE - DETECT TO TRK DELAY - ANTENNA HEIGHT - KILL ASSESSMENT DELAY - HANDOVER DELAY - DETECTION VS ALTITUDE amp RCS
THREAT PARAMETERS
- PROFILE - RCS - VELOCITY - ALTITUDE - GUIDANCE TYPE - SAFE KILL RANGE
- THREAT TYPE - QUANTITY - START RANGE - START TIME - RAID INTERVAL - AZIMUTH - SHIP TARGETING
SHIP PARAMETERS
- WEAPONSENSOR SUITES - NUMBER OF ILLUMINATORS - ILLUMINATOR TIE-UP TIME - NUMBER OF ESCORTED SHIPS - RANGE - BEARING
SSD
- PROBABILITY OF NO LEAKERS- ASMS KILLED BY WEAPON TYPE - AMMO EXPENDED - LEAKERS TO SHIPS - AVG KILL RANGE BY THREAT TYPE - MINMAX KILL RANGE - PROB ALL KILLS BEYOND SAFE RANGE - CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
OUTPUT SUMMARIES
ASM RAID
GRAPHICAL OUTPUT
- NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT - START RANGE - BEARING - ALTITUDE - VELOCITY - RCS - STARTEND TIMES - NO OF ASMs CARRIED - ASM TYPE - WPN RELEASE LINE - LAUNCH INTERVAL - SHIP TARGETING
AC-LAUNCHED ASMs
- PROB FIRM TRACK
VS RANGE
6
SSD Video Clips
7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Agenda
bull Study Objectives
bull Overview of Models
ndash SSD
ndash SADM
bull Evaluation Process
bull Evaluation Results
bull System Life Cycle Utilization
bull Next Steps
bull SummaryConclusions
2
Study Objectives (1)
bull Compare capability of SADM model with the Raytheon Ship Self Defense (SSD) model ndash Find out what it can do that we currently canrsquot do but
would if we could
ndash Compare model inputsoutputsfidelity
ndash Establish common scenarios for ldquoapples to applesrdquo comparison
ndash Create test cases that we can directly compare with the same test case run in the Raytheon Ship Self Defense model to build confidence that we get the results we expect to get
ndash Model features bull Identify missions which each model works best for and why
bull Identify discriminating features of each model
3
Study Objectives (2)
bull Investigate capability of SADM model for usage in Raytheon ndash Get to know how to set it up exercise it understand
what it can and canrsquot do for the types of analysis we typically do
ndash Document what is immediately useful with the tool
ndash Document its naval weapons analysis issues bull Identify what is required to build new models for use in
SADM
bull Identify additional features that are required
ndash Build some scenarios with multiple firing platforms and related weapons coordination to understand what capability is there
4
SSD Overview bull Developed by Raytheon
bull First-order effectiveness model of
short range air defense against
multiple antiship missiles by a single
firing ship
bull Measures of Effectiveness
ndash Probability of killing all incoming
ASMs
ndash Number of Leakers
ndash Kill statistics
ndash Number of weapons expended
bull Monte Carlo events
ndash Probability of kill at intercept
ndash ASM launch times and azimuth
spacing
ndash Sensor detection range
bull User createdmodified ship
configuration files threat scenario
files and weaponsensor database
5
SSD Model Architecture
WEAPON PARAMETERS
- MAX RGE - MIN RGE - MAX INTERCEPT ALT - GUIDANCE TYPE - ILLUMINATION TIME - LOADOUT - SALVO POLICY - LAUNCH RATE - LAUNCH DELAY - RE-ENGAGE DELAY - RFIR UNIQUE INPUTS - PK FUNCTION OF RGE - TIME OF FLIGHT - GUN EXPECTED HITS
SENSOR PARAMETERS
- MAX ELEVATION ANGLE - DETECT TO TRK DELAY - ANTENNA HEIGHT - KILL ASSESSMENT DELAY - HANDOVER DELAY - DETECTION VS ALTITUDE amp RCS
THREAT PARAMETERS
- PROFILE - RCS - VELOCITY - ALTITUDE - GUIDANCE TYPE - SAFE KILL RANGE
- THREAT TYPE - QUANTITY - START RANGE - START TIME - RAID INTERVAL - AZIMUTH - SHIP TARGETING
SHIP PARAMETERS
- WEAPONSENSOR SUITES - NUMBER OF ILLUMINATORS - ILLUMINATOR TIE-UP TIME - NUMBER OF ESCORTED SHIPS - RANGE - BEARING
SSD
- PROBABILITY OF NO LEAKERS- ASMS KILLED BY WEAPON TYPE - AMMO EXPENDED - LEAKERS TO SHIPS - AVG KILL RANGE BY THREAT TYPE - MINMAX KILL RANGE - PROB ALL KILLS BEYOND SAFE RANGE - CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
OUTPUT SUMMARIES
ASM RAID
GRAPHICAL OUTPUT
- NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT - START RANGE - BEARING - ALTITUDE - VELOCITY - RCS - STARTEND TIMES - NO OF ASMs CARRIED - ASM TYPE - WPN RELEASE LINE - LAUNCH INTERVAL - SHIP TARGETING
AC-LAUNCHED ASMs
- PROB FIRM TRACK
VS RANGE
6
SSD Video Clips
7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Study Objectives (1)
bull Compare capability of SADM model with the Raytheon Ship Self Defense (SSD) model ndash Find out what it can do that we currently canrsquot do but
would if we could
ndash Compare model inputsoutputsfidelity
ndash Establish common scenarios for ldquoapples to applesrdquo comparison
ndash Create test cases that we can directly compare with the same test case run in the Raytheon Ship Self Defense model to build confidence that we get the results we expect to get
ndash Model features bull Identify missions which each model works best for and why
bull Identify discriminating features of each model
3
Study Objectives (2)
bull Investigate capability of SADM model for usage in Raytheon ndash Get to know how to set it up exercise it understand
what it can and canrsquot do for the types of analysis we typically do
ndash Document what is immediately useful with the tool
ndash Document its naval weapons analysis issues bull Identify what is required to build new models for use in
SADM
bull Identify additional features that are required
ndash Build some scenarios with multiple firing platforms and related weapons coordination to understand what capability is there
4
SSD Overview bull Developed by Raytheon
bull First-order effectiveness model of
short range air defense against
multiple antiship missiles by a single
firing ship
bull Measures of Effectiveness
ndash Probability of killing all incoming
ASMs
ndash Number of Leakers
ndash Kill statistics
ndash Number of weapons expended
bull Monte Carlo events
ndash Probability of kill at intercept
ndash ASM launch times and azimuth
spacing
ndash Sensor detection range
bull User createdmodified ship
configuration files threat scenario
files and weaponsensor database
5
SSD Model Architecture
WEAPON PARAMETERS
- MAX RGE - MIN RGE - MAX INTERCEPT ALT - GUIDANCE TYPE - ILLUMINATION TIME - LOADOUT - SALVO POLICY - LAUNCH RATE - LAUNCH DELAY - RE-ENGAGE DELAY - RFIR UNIQUE INPUTS - PK FUNCTION OF RGE - TIME OF FLIGHT - GUN EXPECTED HITS
SENSOR PARAMETERS
- MAX ELEVATION ANGLE - DETECT TO TRK DELAY - ANTENNA HEIGHT - KILL ASSESSMENT DELAY - HANDOVER DELAY - DETECTION VS ALTITUDE amp RCS
THREAT PARAMETERS
- PROFILE - RCS - VELOCITY - ALTITUDE - GUIDANCE TYPE - SAFE KILL RANGE
- THREAT TYPE - QUANTITY - START RANGE - START TIME - RAID INTERVAL - AZIMUTH - SHIP TARGETING
SHIP PARAMETERS
- WEAPONSENSOR SUITES - NUMBER OF ILLUMINATORS - ILLUMINATOR TIE-UP TIME - NUMBER OF ESCORTED SHIPS - RANGE - BEARING
SSD
- PROBABILITY OF NO LEAKERS- ASMS KILLED BY WEAPON TYPE - AMMO EXPENDED - LEAKERS TO SHIPS - AVG KILL RANGE BY THREAT TYPE - MINMAX KILL RANGE - PROB ALL KILLS BEYOND SAFE RANGE - CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
OUTPUT SUMMARIES
ASM RAID
GRAPHICAL OUTPUT
- NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT - START RANGE - BEARING - ALTITUDE - VELOCITY - RCS - STARTEND TIMES - NO OF ASMs CARRIED - ASM TYPE - WPN RELEASE LINE - LAUNCH INTERVAL - SHIP TARGETING
AC-LAUNCHED ASMs
- PROB FIRM TRACK
VS RANGE
6
SSD Video Clips
7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Study Objectives (2)
bull Investigate capability of SADM model for usage in Raytheon ndash Get to know how to set it up exercise it understand
what it can and canrsquot do for the types of analysis we typically do
ndash Document what is immediately useful with the tool
ndash Document its naval weapons analysis issues bull Identify what is required to build new models for use in
SADM
bull Identify additional features that are required
ndash Build some scenarios with multiple firing platforms and related weapons coordination to understand what capability is there
4
SSD Overview bull Developed by Raytheon
bull First-order effectiveness model of
short range air defense against
multiple antiship missiles by a single
firing ship
bull Measures of Effectiveness
ndash Probability of killing all incoming
ASMs
ndash Number of Leakers
ndash Kill statistics
ndash Number of weapons expended
bull Monte Carlo events
ndash Probability of kill at intercept
ndash ASM launch times and azimuth
spacing
ndash Sensor detection range
bull User createdmodified ship
configuration files threat scenario
files and weaponsensor database
5
SSD Model Architecture
WEAPON PARAMETERS
- MAX RGE - MIN RGE - MAX INTERCEPT ALT - GUIDANCE TYPE - ILLUMINATION TIME - LOADOUT - SALVO POLICY - LAUNCH RATE - LAUNCH DELAY - RE-ENGAGE DELAY - RFIR UNIQUE INPUTS - PK FUNCTION OF RGE - TIME OF FLIGHT - GUN EXPECTED HITS
SENSOR PARAMETERS
- MAX ELEVATION ANGLE - DETECT TO TRK DELAY - ANTENNA HEIGHT - KILL ASSESSMENT DELAY - HANDOVER DELAY - DETECTION VS ALTITUDE amp RCS
THREAT PARAMETERS
- PROFILE - RCS - VELOCITY - ALTITUDE - GUIDANCE TYPE - SAFE KILL RANGE
- THREAT TYPE - QUANTITY - START RANGE - START TIME - RAID INTERVAL - AZIMUTH - SHIP TARGETING
SHIP PARAMETERS
- WEAPONSENSOR SUITES - NUMBER OF ILLUMINATORS - ILLUMINATOR TIE-UP TIME - NUMBER OF ESCORTED SHIPS - RANGE - BEARING
SSD
- PROBABILITY OF NO LEAKERS- ASMS KILLED BY WEAPON TYPE - AMMO EXPENDED - LEAKERS TO SHIPS - AVG KILL RANGE BY THREAT TYPE - MINMAX KILL RANGE - PROB ALL KILLS BEYOND SAFE RANGE - CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
OUTPUT SUMMARIES
ASM RAID
GRAPHICAL OUTPUT
- NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT - START RANGE - BEARING - ALTITUDE - VELOCITY - RCS - STARTEND TIMES - NO OF ASMs CARRIED - ASM TYPE - WPN RELEASE LINE - LAUNCH INTERVAL - SHIP TARGETING
AC-LAUNCHED ASMs
- PROB FIRM TRACK
VS RANGE
6
SSD Video Clips
7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SSD Overview bull Developed by Raytheon
bull First-order effectiveness model of
short range air defense against
multiple antiship missiles by a single
firing ship
bull Measures of Effectiveness
ndash Probability of killing all incoming
ASMs
ndash Number of Leakers
ndash Kill statistics
ndash Number of weapons expended
bull Monte Carlo events
ndash Probability of kill at intercept
ndash ASM launch times and azimuth
spacing
ndash Sensor detection range
bull User createdmodified ship
configuration files threat scenario
files and weaponsensor database
5
SSD Model Architecture
WEAPON PARAMETERS
- MAX RGE - MIN RGE - MAX INTERCEPT ALT - GUIDANCE TYPE - ILLUMINATION TIME - LOADOUT - SALVO POLICY - LAUNCH RATE - LAUNCH DELAY - RE-ENGAGE DELAY - RFIR UNIQUE INPUTS - PK FUNCTION OF RGE - TIME OF FLIGHT - GUN EXPECTED HITS
SENSOR PARAMETERS
- MAX ELEVATION ANGLE - DETECT TO TRK DELAY - ANTENNA HEIGHT - KILL ASSESSMENT DELAY - HANDOVER DELAY - DETECTION VS ALTITUDE amp RCS
THREAT PARAMETERS
- PROFILE - RCS - VELOCITY - ALTITUDE - GUIDANCE TYPE - SAFE KILL RANGE
- THREAT TYPE - QUANTITY - START RANGE - START TIME - RAID INTERVAL - AZIMUTH - SHIP TARGETING
SHIP PARAMETERS
- WEAPONSENSOR SUITES - NUMBER OF ILLUMINATORS - ILLUMINATOR TIE-UP TIME - NUMBER OF ESCORTED SHIPS - RANGE - BEARING
SSD
- PROBABILITY OF NO LEAKERS- ASMS KILLED BY WEAPON TYPE - AMMO EXPENDED - LEAKERS TO SHIPS - AVG KILL RANGE BY THREAT TYPE - MINMAX KILL RANGE - PROB ALL KILLS BEYOND SAFE RANGE - CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
OUTPUT SUMMARIES
ASM RAID
GRAPHICAL OUTPUT
- NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT - START RANGE - BEARING - ALTITUDE - VELOCITY - RCS - STARTEND TIMES - NO OF ASMs CARRIED - ASM TYPE - WPN RELEASE LINE - LAUNCH INTERVAL - SHIP TARGETING
AC-LAUNCHED ASMs
- PROB FIRM TRACK
VS RANGE
6
SSD Video Clips
7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SSD Model Architecture
WEAPON PARAMETERS
- MAX RGE - MIN RGE - MAX INTERCEPT ALT - GUIDANCE TYPE - ILLUMINATION TIME - LOADOUT - SALVO POLICY - LAUNCH RATE - LAUNCH DELAY - RE-ENGAGE DELAY - RFIR UNIQUE INPUTS - PK FUNCTION OF RGE - TIME OF FLIGHT - GUN EXPECTED HITS
SENSOR PARAMETERS
- MAX ELEVATION ANGLE - DETECT TO TRK DELAY - ANTENNA HEIGHT - KILL ASSESSMENT DELAY - HANDOVER DELAY - DETECTION VS ALTITUDE amp RCS
THREAT PARAMETERS
- PROFILE - RCS - VELOCITY - ALTITUDE - GUIDANCE TYPE - SAFE KILL RANGE
- THREAT TYPE - QUANTITY - START RANGE - START TIME - RAID INTERVAL - AZIMUTH - SHIP TARGETING
SHIP PARAMETERS
- WEAPONSENSOR SUITES - NUMBER OF ILLUMINATORS - ILLUMINATOR TIE-UP TIME - NUMBER OF ESCORTED SHIPS - RANGE - BEARING
SSD
- PROBABILITY OF NO LEAKERS- ASMS KILLED BY WEAPON TYPE - AMMO EXPENDED - LEAKERS TO SHIPS - AVG KILL RANGE BY THREAT TYPE - MINMAX KILL RANGE - PROB ALL KILLS BEYOND SAFE RANGE - CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
OUTPUT SUMMARIES
ASM RAID
GRAPHICAL OUTPUT
- NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT - START RANGE - BEARING - ALTITUDE - VELOCITY - RCS - STARTEND TIMES - NO OF ASMs CARRIED - ASM TYPE - WPN RELEASE LINE - LAUNCH INTERVAL - SHIP TARGETING
AC-LAUNCHED ASMs
- PROB FIRM TRACK
VS RANGE
6
SSD Video Clips
7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SSD Video Clips
7
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SSD Sample Measures of
Effectiveness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 M1 M2 M3 M4
Prob of No Leakers
Missiles Expended
Total Kills
Average Kill Range
8
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SADM Overview
bull Developed by BAE Systems
bull SADM is a software simulation tool directed at the Maritime Self Defence problem (air and surface threats)
bull Simulates the defence of a task group against other ships aircraft ASMs and background targets
bull Includes littoral effects
bull Consists of detailed models of ndash Platforms (ships aircraft land-based
weapon sites etc)
ndash Sensors (many types of radars IRST ESM)
ndash Trackers and track management systems
ndash Command and control weapons control systems
ndash Weapons (hard kill and soft kill)
ndash Anti-ship missiles (seekers body and electronic environment)
ndash Environment (atmosphere terrain propagation)
ndash Interactions between subsystems
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
9
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SADM Model Architecture
bull Composed of interacting objects
ndash Environment propagation and
signature models
ndash Sensors
ndash Trackers track management
data fusion and hostility
classification models
ndash C2WCS system(s)
ndash Hard-Kill Weapons
ndash Soft-Kill Weapons
bull This architecture is
ndash Useful to the user (add-ins)
ndash Useful for code maintenance
copy BAE Systems Australia Limited
10
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SADM Video Clip
11
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Evaluation Process
Identify Core
Capabilities
Develop Baseline
Scenarios
Run Scenarios
in each Model
Identify Differences
and Evaluate
Update Model(s)
Evaluate Unique Features
Interoperability
Missile
Type
Scenario
Description ASM Type
Start
Ranges
Firing
Doctrines Runs
Active
1 and 2
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
Active
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=0
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi
SLS SLSS
SSLSS 12
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
HAW
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Subsonic
300 msec
8 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
SATH
1 and 2
inbound
ASMs Pk=1
Supersonic
800 msec
12 nmi
20 nmi SLS SSLSS 8
12
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent
agreement for subsonic
threats with active
missiles
bull Generally times for
intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02
nautical mile
bull Some of the initial
detection ranges were a
little further out for SSD
but that difference can be
attributed to the fact that
SSD assumes ldquoperfectrdquo
radar detection and SADM
models actual radar
performance
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
1Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm Set PK = 1 148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
2Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm Set PK = 1 79 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
3Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1148 310 128 430 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
SAM2 124 450 Overki l l 437 Overki l l
4Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
5Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM2150 300 127 435 78 HIT 733 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM2SAM1 150 300 126 455 77 HIT 748 163 233 128 437 79 HIT 732
6Phased
ArraySLS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM2SAM1 81 10 61 130 39 HIT 262 80 1 61 121 41 HIT 243
7Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM1148 310 130 425 78 HIT 730 163 223 130 417 80 HIT 717
ASM1SAM2 126 445 Overki l l 437 Overki l l 737
ASM2SAM1 150 310 124 465 76 HIT 753 163 233 125 457 77 HIT 743
ASM2SAM2 120 485 Overki l l 477 Overki l l
8Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 1
ASM1SAM179 10 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 81 10 57 150 37 HIT 276 80 1 58 141 38 HIT 258
ASM2SAM2 54 170 Overki l l 161 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
13
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles
bull Results showed excellent agreement for supersonic threats
bull Generally times for intercept are within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges are within 05 nautical miles
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
9Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 140 140 57 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
10Phased
ArraySLS 1 SSS 12 nm Set PK = 1 114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
11Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1191 20 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 141 Overki l l
12Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 121 Overki l l
13Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1187 30 144 130 58 HIT 330 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
SAM2 135 150 Overki l l 141 Overki l l
14Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm
Set Pk = 1
SAM1114 10 71 110 27 HIT 213 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
SAM2 63 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
14
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Subsonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull In this case the probability of kill
(Pk) was set to 0 to compare
engagement ranges and
timelines with a special focus on
quantifying the ldquodepth of firerdquo and
reengagement timelines in both
models
bull Initial results found significant
differences in each modelrsquos
reengagement timelines with
additional analysis of the
parameters used to model
engagement timelines in both
models we were able to
reconfigure each model to
produce similar results
bull Generally times for intercept are
within 2 seconds and intercept
ranges are within 02 nautical
mile
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
21Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1150 300 131 415 79 MISS 723 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 66 798 44 MISS 931
SAM3 30 1020 17 MISS 1101 31 1012 19 MISS 1084
22Phased
ArraySLS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 28 307 17 MISS 376
23Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 130 420 79 MISS 726 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 67 800 43 MISS 943 63 818 42 MISS 944
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 25 1045 14 MISS 1109
SAM4 28 1030 15 MISS 1109 1065 12 MISS 1124
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124
24Phased
ArraySLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 28 320 15 MISS 398 25 327 14 MISS 391
SAM3 24 340 12 MISS 413 347 12 MISS 406
25Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM1162 230 128 430 78 MISS 730 163 223 130 417 80 MISS 717
SAM2 125 450 77 MISS 741 437 78 MISS 728
SAM3 63 820 41 MISS 957 65 809 43 MISS 938
SAM4 60 840 38 MISS 971 829 41 MISS 952
SAM5 25 1050 13 MISS 1124 27 1033 16 MISS 1100
SAM6 22 1070 10 MISS 1138 1053 13 MISS 1115
26Phased
ArraySSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm
Set Pk = 0
SAM179 10 63 110 40 MISS 245 80 01 63 101 42 MISS 227
SAM2 59 130 38 MISS 259 121 40 MISS 240
SAM3 26 330 14 MISS 405 26 32 15 MISS 386
SAM4 23 350 11 MISS 420 34 13 MISS 401
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
15
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Supersonic Threat Performance Active Missiles Pk=0
bull Both models were able to
generate results with good
agreement after some
reconfiguration of their
reengagement parameters
bull Generally times for intercept
were within 2 seconds and
intercept ranges within 05
nautical mile
bull The biggest finding in this set of
data was that SADM had a
different SLSS firing policy than
SSD SADM would shoot one
shot the first engagement and 2
shots for subsequent
engagements The SSD model
employed an adaptive algorithm
which would shoot 2 shots on
the first round if it was the only
engagement opportunity
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
39Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 HIT 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455
ASM2SAM1 196 20 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 143 141 60 HIT 333
ASM2SAM2
40Phased
ArraySLS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM2 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 72 121 29 MISS 219
41Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 144 130 58 MISS 329 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 28 400 04 MISS 455 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 139 150 57 MISS 342 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 181 54 MISS 347
42Phased
ArraySLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 63 130 23 MISS 224 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM3 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 218 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 161 21 MISS 238
43Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1187 30 127 170 52 MISS 343 191 21 147 121 61 MISS 320
ASM1SAM2 118 190 48 MISS 352 141 59 MISS 326
ASM2SAM1 191 30 148 130 60 MISS 335 191 31 134 161 57 MISS 340
ASM2SAM2 139 150 57 MISS 342 181 54 MISS 347
44Phased
ArraySSLSS
2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apart
Set Pk = 0
ASM1SAM1115 10 54 150 18 MISS 234 119 01 76 101 31 MISS 204
ASM1SAM2 46 170 13 MISS 245 121 27 MISS 214
ASM2SAM1 119 11 76 110 29 MISS 219 120 1 63 141 25 MISS 229
ASM2SAM2 67 130 25 MISS 228 161 21 MISS 238
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
16
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Threat Performance ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo Missiles SLS Firing Doctrine
bull Results for subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles engaging the ship ship employs
ldquoHome All the Wayrdquo (HAW) missiles using a Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to generate results with quite good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2 seconds and intercept ranges are within 02 nautical
miles for subsonic threats and 05 nautical mile for supersonic threats
bull Similarly we had good agreement while employing a SSLSS firing doctrine as well
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
45 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 20 nm 125 448 95 631 61 HIT 834 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
46 Default_Radar SLS 1 SBS 8 nm 79 15 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
47 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 123 472 46 938 28 HIT 1044 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 120 457 98 589 63 HIT 801 125 458 50 906 32 HIT 1011
48 Default_Radar SLS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 10 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM2SAM1 81 10 19 380 09 HIT 445 80 1 23 347 13 HIT 409
49 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 20 nm 161 89 108 214 44 HIT 362 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
50 Default_Radar SLS 1 SSS 12 nm 118 02 71 111 27 HIT 214 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
51 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 160 92 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM2SAM1 151 122 160 102
52 Default_Radar SLS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 116 08 64 128 23 HIT 222 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM2SAM1 113 23 120 1
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
17
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Threat Performance Semi-Active Terminal Homing Missiles SSLSS Firing
Doctrine bull Results for cruise missiles
engaging the ship ship
employs missiles with semi-
active terminal homing (SATH)
capability using a Shoot-Shoot-
Look-Shoot-Shoot (SSLSS)
firing doctrine
bull Both models were able to
generate results with quite
good agreement Generally
times for intercept are within 2
seconds and intercept ranges
are within 02 nautical miles for
subsonic threats and 05
nautical mile for supersonic
threats
bull Similarly the SATH results for
cruise missile threats
employing a SLS firing doctrine
also showed good agreement
Notes
Test
Search
Radar
Firing
DoctrineASMs
R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) T (s) R (nm) HM T (s)
69 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 124 457 105 570 66 HIT 803 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 102 590 Overki l l 569 Overki l l
70 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SBS 8 nm ASM1SAM1 80 04 63 110 40 HIT 245 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
Default_Radar ASM1SAM2 59 130 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
71 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 122 466 93 640 60 HIT 842 125 448 108 549 68 HIT 786
ASM1SAM2 90 660 Overki l l 569 Overki l l 805
ASM2SAM1 126 451 43 950 27 HIT 1052 125 458 65 817 43 HIT 947
ASM2SAM2 40 970 Overki l l 837 Overki l l
72 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SBS 8 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 79 13 61 120 39 HIT 252 80 01 63 101 42 HIT 227
ASM1SAM2 58 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l 246
ASM2SAM1 80 13 22 365 10 HIT 433 80 1 29 311 18 HIT 382
ASM2SAM2 19 385 Overki l l 331 Overki l l
73 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 20 nm ASM1SAM1 159 95 114 200 47 HIT 356 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 105 220 Overki l l 212 Overki l l
74 Default_Radar SSLSS 1 SSS 12 nm ASM1SAM1 114 11 67 120 25 HIT 218 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 59 140 Overki l l 121 Overki l l
75 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 20 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 156 103 160 92 117 192 51 HIT 345
ASM1SAM2 212 Overkil
l364
ASM2SAM1 160 103 105 230 43 375 160 102
ASM2SAM2 96 250 Overki l l
76 Default_Radar SSLSS2 SSS 12 nm
1 second apartASM1SAM1 113 14 119 01 76 101 31 HIT 204
ASM1SAM2 121 Overkil
l223
ASM2SAM1 117 14 71 120 27 HIT 224 120 1
ASM2SAM2 63 140 Overki l l
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
No launch - HIT SHIP
Intercept Initial Detect
No launch - HIT SHIP
SSD Data
Blue Ship Ship Ship
ThreatsSADM Data
Initial Detect Launch Launch Intercept
18
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SSDSADM Comparison
Fidelity Differences between Models Drive Data Requirements and Learning Curve
Criteria SSD SADM
Ease of use Easy to set up and use ndash low learning curve
Easy to set up exact conditions (detect launch
intercept etc) you wish to study
Significant learning curve for new users Large
set of default values available but analyst must
validate them for his study Requires many
more inputs to run a scenario
Execution Speed Runs fast and provides many Monte Carlo runs
to analyze in minutes
Runs fairly quickly though it can take hours to
complete large numbers of Monte Carlo runs
Modeling
approach
Uses look up tables to characterize most
performance Validity depends on source of
data excellent if from high fidelity sims
Uses physics based models more than look up
tables (models sensor detections flies missile
at physics level)
Sensor models Sensor models are very basic providing low
fidelity Analyst will use sensor as ldquoblack boxrdquo
using SSD
Sensor models are medium fidelity allowing an
analyst to configure a realistic sensor model for
their study with a sensor as key component
Weapon models Models exist for a large variety of weapons
and model can be readily adapted for new
weapon models using look up tables
Medium fidelity physics based models No
capability to model dual mode missiles like
RAM or future ESSM Block 2 today though in
development
Target audience Provides results tuned to missile analystrsquos
needs
Provide results tuned to ship system designerrsquos
needs with enhanced trade-offs for sensors
weapons and threats available Utilized in
Navy for hard kill soft kill interaction analysis
19
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
bull This illustrates how SSD and SADM might be utilized over the acquisition life cycle
bull SSD will utilize updated performance data as the weapon system design matures
bull SADM will incorporate updated models for the sensors C2 and weapons
bull The higher fidelity of the SADM model is expected to increase its utility later in the lifecycle while
SSD shines in the early stages of the lifecycle
bull We plan to update this initial assessment after we completed our next phase of the study
DoD 5000 Lifecycle Phase Goals SSD Data Produced SADM Data Produced
Material Solution Analysis Assess potential materiel solutions Develop ICD Conduct AoA Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats
Technology Development Reduce technology risk determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system demonstrate on prototypes
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for projected ship systems and threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Engineering and Manufacturing Development
Develop a system or an increment of capability complete full system integration (technology risk reduction occurs during Technology Development) develop manufacturing process ensure operational systems integration (HSI) design for producibility ensure affordability minimizing the logistics footprint and demonstrate system integration interoperability safety and utility
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor and weapon performance data from this phase
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for developed ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Production and Deployment Achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs Operational test and evaluation shall determine the effectiveness and suitability of the system
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Operations and Support Execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and operational support performance requirements and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats
Ship Self Defense combat survivability data for existing ship systems and projected threats This will include updated sensor C2 and weapon models using updated design and performance data during this phase
Model(s) Life Cycle View
20
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Extended SADM Applications
SADM w Missile 6 DOF
SADM can be extended to include
higher fidelity missile models for
stand alone analysis orhelliphellip
SADM can be
embedded into LVC
experiments for
Advanced Mission
Test Environments
(AMTEs)
21
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
Link AMTE into JMETC
Exercises
Army
Air Force
Navy
Marines
Joint
Industry
Ft Huachuca JITC
Redstone (3) DTCC GMAN SED
Charleston (2) IPC MEF-MEU
Ft Hood (2) CTSF TTEC
WPAFB SIMAF
Bethpage NG BAMS
Whiteman B-2
22
CNR Radio JLENS
Tucson RMS
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
SummaryConclusions
bull This study identified a strong correlation between fidelity data
requirements and learning curve for the models evaluated
bull Our initial results indicate that both SSD and SADM while similar
models in many ways provide unique capabilities
ndash SSD provides an important ldquoquick lookrdquo capability that is important early
in the lifecycle
ndash SADM provides a more ldquoin depthrdquo look at relationships between system
components that will increase in importance as the lifecycle advances
bull We are currently looking at a mixed use strategy where both SSD
and SADM will be used at different points in the system lifecycle to
support weapon system analysis
23
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
About the Author
bull TIM JAHREN PHONE 407-341-9780 EMAIL JAHRENRAYTHEONCOM
bull TIM JAHREN has been with the Raytheon family of companies for 30 years Tim has been a leader in the Simulation Interoperability Standards Organization (SISO) for 15 years He is the current chair for SISOs System Life Cycle (SLC) forum He has supported a wide variety of MampS and Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) programs including the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Enterprise the Navys DD-21 and DD(X) programs and the Armys Future Combat System Tim holds a bachelors degree in electrical engineering from Northwestern University and a masters degree in electrical engineering with a focus on communication systems from the University of Southern California
24
