A Case Study of the Terrorist Cult of Mojahedin

8/9/2019 A Case Study of the Terrorist Cult of Mojahedin

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From its very inception, MKO advocated an armed struggle policy andeclectic Islamic-Marxist ideology to further its political struggle

A Case Study of the Terrorist Cult of Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO,MEK, PMOI, NCRI, NLA)

M ojahedin.ws

Introduction

Since its formation in 1965, Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (People'sMojahedin Organization of Iran), generally known as MKO, has beenreferred to with different, mostly repugnant, epithets. In the course of itsfour-decade long history, and at critical junctures, MKO has recurrentlybeen identified as a political anti-monarchical and anti-imperialistmovement, Marxisist-Islamists, extremist revolutionaries, hypocrites,mercenaries of Saddam, and a blacklisted terrorist organization. Now, theex-members, the Iranian expatriates and the people who develop ananalytical study of the group say it has been transformed into a cult. Manycall it the cult of Rajavi, some prefer to name it the cult of Mojahedin,but the terrorist cult of Mojahedin seems to be the most notoriousepithet attributed to MKO.

It was in no way an overnight metamorphosis. The Islamic Revolution inIran ended the monarchical reign and influential permeation of imperialism in every aspects of the countrys political, economic, military,and social institutions. It was the want of MKO since it was the uppermost

achievement for which the early founders had initiated the struggle. Thepost-revolution events proved that the group was not sincere in its claims
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for struggle. Massoud Rajavi, an early member of MKOs CentralCommittee, expropriated the groups leadership, after he and many othermembers were released from prison by uprising people, to conduct it tothe precipice of a terrorist cult.

From its very inception, MKO advocated an armed struggle policy andeclectic Islamic-Marxist ideology to further its political struggle. Later on,it proved to be not the least bound to its own adopted eclecticism butgreatly hailing a philosophy of ends justify the means". Violence was theopt means to achieve the end of assuming the power. Expelled form Iranafter the revolution for its public, bloody rebellions, the group vowed as anarchenemy of Iranian people and has so far been orchestrating andconducting terror and violence against the nation and targeting Iranians,personalities as well as civilians. Its ideological drift and politicalmisconduct led it afield of a conventional political group and the worldcame to develop an idea of recognizing it not only a terrorist group butalso a highly destructive cult evolving its own mind control techniques andsharing common properties with other dangerous cults.

MKO defined as a terrorist group

In todays modern world, some political organizations with both rightistand leftist objectives, nationalistic ethnic groups, and revolutionaries (notspeaking of criminal gangs) use the method of terror, violence, andintimidation against governments, publics, or individuals to attain apolitical objective. While no universally accepted definition of terrorism is

yet arrived at, the UN's "academic consensus definition," written byterrorism expert A.P. Schmid and widely used by social scientists, runs:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, foridiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast toassassination the direct targets of violence are not the maintargets. The immediate human victims of violence are generallychosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively(representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, andserve as message generators. Threat- and violence-basedcommunication processes between terrorist (organization),(imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate themain target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation,coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought," (Schmid, 1988). [1]

The US and the European Union have also developed their own definitionof terrorism, but the most outstanding parameters in all these definitionsare the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or properties tointimidate or coerce a government to achieve political or social objectives.

Terrorism thus denoting a lack of legitimacy and morality, it is crucial formany terrorist groups, especially if struggling in exile for political ends,


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not to be labeled a terrorist group under the anti-terrorist laws of thecountries that ban the activities of terrorists and impose limitations.

The post revolution Iran was the scene of many terrorist operations andassassinations perpetrated by dissident groups. The first wave of theseassassinations was committed by the group of Forqan*. Forqan groupshook the newly established government by assassinating General Qarani,Mahdi Iraqi and his son, Dr. Mofateh, and Morteza Mottahari. At the timeMKO, seemingly siding with the revolution, took no clear position againstthe assassinations and their issued announcements were cunninglyambiguous; the group was careful not to provoke the either side. It welldepicted its inborn outlook on the issue of terrorism that advocated itsuse.

In the post-revolution power struggle and Rajavis bid for power, MKOwere actually repudiated to have any share in the governing structure of the Islamic Republic. MKOs function on 20 June 1981, massdemonstrations in Tehran and many other Iranian provincial towns, thatled it to make a fundamental shift in its strategy and tactic to initiate anarmed move against the Islamic Republic, steered the country to theverge of a chaotic atmosphere. From the 20 June (the start of the armedmarch) to Feb. 1982 (killing of 20 members of Mojahedin including MusaKhyabani, MKO commander inside Iran after Rajavis escape to France,and Ashraf Rabiee, Rajavis first wife), MKO expanded a wave of terror bylaunching armed operations, carrying out daily attacks against civilians,assassinating officials, and blasting the state-owned edifices and public

communities.

The most shocking instances of these atrocious, terrorist activities weredetonating a bomb in Jomhouri Eslami Party in Tehran, killing almost onehundred people including Ayatollah Beheshti, one of the founders of theIslamic Republic and the closest person to Ayatollah Khomeini, and thenbombing a meeting of the countrys National Security Council killing thenew president Ali Raja'i and his new Prime Minister, Mohammad JavadBahonar. MKO then went on to commit a series of suicide and publicbombings, including the killing of Ayatollah Dast-Gheib, an eminentclergyman and theorist close to Ayatollah Khomeini.

In June 1986, Rajavi acted in collusion with Saddam and moved MKOsbases to Iraq with the impression of availing an opportunity, granted byIraq-Iran tension, near the Iranian borders to fulfill the plan of overthrowing the Islamic Republic. Forming a liberation army equippedand financed by Saddam, the hot MKO fanned the flames of war andexceeded in hostile attitudes towards Iranians by launching militaryaggressions against Iranian border-lined cities. One should never forgetthat war of cities, Iraqis new tactic to shell Iranians far and near cities bylong-range missiles, started soon after MKOs move to Iraq. Rajavi took it

for granted that war of cities could disturb Iranians internal security that


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might consequently raise tension between the nation and thegovernment.

The Western countries, well aware of MKOs atrocities against Iranianpeople, had totally closed their eyes on MKOs terrorist feats. In 1992,MKO agents active in Western countries launched arson attacks on Iranianembassies in thirteen Western countries and, thus, concerns began togrow about the emergence of a terrorist phenomenon that could

jeopardize the national security of the countries where MKO memberswere painlessly acting.

The first step was taken by the US government. In an unclassified reporton the People's Mojahedin of Iran prepared by the US Department of State at the request of the Congress, it is clearly stated that The U.S,Government has been monitoring the group's activities since the1970s. The report reveals precise details on terrorist activities of MKO inthe career of its political struggle:

As part of that struggle, they assassinated at least six Americancitizens, supported the takeover of the U.S. embassy, and opposedthe release of American hostages. In the post-revolutionary politicalchaos, however, the Mojahedin lost political power to Iran's Islamicclergy. They then applied their dedication to armed struggle and theuse of propaganda against the new Iranian government, launching aviolent and polemical cycle of attack and reprisal. [2]

The move was completed in October 1997, when Secretary of StateMadeleine K. Albright, designated the Mojahedin as a terroristorganization according to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1997. The United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, andAustralia were the next to designate MKO as a terrorist group. MKOsoffices were closed down in the aforementioned countries, yet thesympathizer are active under the disguise of pro-democratic, peace-loving, student and women associations and communities.

At the present, wearing a pro-democratic mask and trying to highlightIrans peaceful nuclear activities as a threat against global peace, MKOpolitical wings active in the Western countries are lobbying in theparliaments and political parties to persuade them press theirgovernments to de-proscribe MKO and remove the attached terrorist tag.None of the countries have so far assented to de-proscribe MKO.

MKO defined as a cult

The original meaning of the term cult, derived from the French word"culte", comes from Latin noun "cultus" which is related to the Latin verb"colere" meaning "to worship or give reverence to a deity". The term has

originally a positive, religious connotation but in recent years, it hasturned to be a widely used popular term, usually connoting some group


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techniques. Massoud Rajavi, the long self-appointed leader, is known to bethe mastermind of MKO. Released from Shahs prison after revolution,Rajavi took up the responsibility of acting as the organizationsspokesman that awarded him an opportunity to develop authority bothwithin the organisation and in the public's perception.

How did the Mujahideen become a cult? The principal lever for thetransformation of the organization from a mass movement to a cult wasRajavis ideological revolution in January 1985. The first phase of thisrevolution basically involved Masoud Rajavi marrying Maryam QajarAzdanlou, the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, Rajavis most trusted lieutenant.

The marriage was an overt violation of Islamic marriage rituals and amajority of ranking members saw the whole affair as an ugly and bizarreform of cuckoldry. The event, more regarded as an internal coup data,promoted the husband to the rank of a guru and the wife to the rank of the joint leader of the organization. Massoud Rajavi indoctrinated theideological revolution as a purging process saying Those Mojahedinmembers who pass through this furnace, are more steadfastness, moresteel like person, and have more future in the resisting [6]

Masoud Rajavi was exalted as a charisma and some subservientconsidered the historic achievement as an outcome of an ideologicalgenius in Massoud Rajavi. Bijan Niyabati, a devoted a partisan, in adoringMassoud Rajavis personal charisma states:

In the front of revolution and progressiveness, you would not find two

people with the same political and organizational potentialities of Massoud Rajavi among all the opposition. [7]

Niyabati abruptly changes the position of Rajavi from a leader to that of areligious, Shiit imam:

The main core of Mojahedins ideological revolution was to solve theissue of leadership. It could put an end to a problem known to be theAchilles' heel in most contemporary revolutions and movements; onlya stabilized theory of imamate inside the organization could lead thenew revolution. [8]

Many of his messages imply that he has a close relationship with ImamZaman (the last and still awaited Imam in Shiite Islam) and therefore hehas direct contact with God. Under Rajavis instructions as an ideologicalleader, members began to give up Islamic practices and rituals because,as stated by their chosen ideological leader, they were no longerindividually responsible; they were only responsible to Rajavi and he wasresponsible to God. Later on, especial prayer texts were devised to praisehim and his wife, Maryam.

The ideological metamorphosis opened a new gate onto a path where, inthe first place, the rationality and even the social-political understanding


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of individuals were targeted. In other words, individuals would betransmuted into obedient and subjugated creatures serving the wills of the ideological leader. The whole idea can be concluded as:

That is clear that such process could pursue in no rational route. Thedominant element in the process is love and emotion that bypasslogic and reason. The means are not those of polemics andpersuasions but self-devotion. That is the point where Massoudclaims Mojahedins heart. [9]

A wave of advertising total devotion to the ideological leader began to beimposed on the minds of the insiders to indoctrinate that the ideologicalleader had an ideological vision which was broader and more universalthan understanding and vision of an ordinary follower. He could see thingsand think in a way that seemed illogical and irrational at the time butproved to be correct at the end. Hence the followers had to follow theleader not on the basis of understanding, but on the base of total trust.

The second phase of the full transition to the status of a cult started afterthe Iran-Iraq cease-fire in 1988. Rajavi launched thousands of his warriorson ''Operation Eternal Light'' across the border to capture Iranian territory.It was a total military failure. The operation before anything was aresolution of Rajavis own volition, a proven suicide operation excludingthe leader himself. The failure proved to be a victory for Rajavi; the madeamendments to the ideological revolution after the operation guaranteedhis position as a hallowed figure with the sole authority to question

anybody while the members were not in the least permitted to violate theleaders sacramental sphere. To create a compelling control atop, all theindividual attachments and values had to be detached. The detachmentdid not include physical spectrum, but above that, psychological scopes.

In a general meeting, Rajavi announced that as the ideological leader, hehad issued the divorce of all the members from their spouses and askedall to hand over their marriage rings. The physically divorce of spousesand, consequently, children was the first taken steps; the world outsidewith all its attractions and emotional attachments had to be cleaned of the mind and devalued. One had to replace them with an alternative thatwas no one but Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

Anne Singleton, a separated member of MKO in her book so describesmanipulation of the members within the cult:

The psychological manipulation of members springs from Rajavi'savid interest in using psychology as a means of controlling people.He has read voraciously from the time that he left prison, books onpolitics, psychology and history etc. His ideology is a mishmash of allthese books, and not a single part of it derives from original thinking.

Rajavi uses psychological manipulation to control people. Themassuls [responsible ranks] are instructed to behave in particular


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ways towards individuals according to what is required of them or inresponse to a problem they might have. On a simple level, thewarmth and affection shown to newcomers is a basic method of attracting them, fulfilling a basic need, which they lack. The person istold - and this is the ideological element - that if they look for loveand affection outside Maryam they will become corrupt and 'nothing',they will be condemned to a life of obscurity, drudgery andmeaninglessness. A picture of ordinary married life is portrayed as ahellish prison for both sexes. Children are the ultimate burden,removing the person further and further from the glorious joy andhappiness that could be theirs if they give all their love to Maryam.She will return their love a hundred fold, and only inside theMojahedin will they be able to fulfil their true potential as a humanbeing. [10]

During the first Gulf War and the US attack to Iraq, MKO leaders enforcedseparation of the members children residing in Iraq-based camps. Thechildren, about 800 including little babies, were sent to different Westerncountries for some purposes. First they could be abused as potentialfundraising instruments to collect large amounts of charity money onpretext of Iranian homeless children. On the other hand, the childrencould be trained as the next generation of MKO soldiers. Nadereh Afshari,an ex-member of MKO and who was posted in Germany and wasresponsible for receiving children during the gulf war, has revealed thatwhen the German government tried to absorb Mojahedin children intotheir education system, the organization refused. Many of these children

were sent to Mojahedin-run schools, particularly in France. She haselaborated that Rajavi ''saw these kids as the next generation's soldiers. They wanted to brainwash them and control them. Every morning andnight, the kids, beginning as young as 1 and 2, had to stand before aposter of Massoud and Maryam, salute them and shout praises to them.[11]

In June 2003, people in some Western cities were shocked to witness oneof the most appalling cult potentialities of MKO. On 17 June 2003 morethan 1.200 France police and gendarmerie forces raided 13 MKO-runoffices in Paris districts and arrested 164 suspected Mojahedin cadres aswell as Maryam Rajavi on charges of terrorist activities. In the next fewdays, to carry out premeditated missions, a number of the groupsmembers immolated themselves in public to protest Maryam Rajavisarrest. According to reports issued by the group itself, 16 peopleattempted to set themselves alight in three days in Paris, Berne, Rome,London, Ottawa, Athens and Nicosia. The human tragedy ended with twodeaths; two women, Sediqeh Mojaveri, 44-year-old, and Neda Hassani, 19-year-old, died because of the self-immolation injuries. [12]

Besides old members joining the organization for political causes, a large

number of the members are the young Iranian people who have beendeceived to join the group. These young, unaware recruits fall into the


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- To become H: used when demoting a rank- Organizational marriage: forced inter-organizational marriages

ordered by leaders- Food echelon: a food menu that qualitatively and quantitatively is

prepared according to hierarchical posts- Ideological pride: Massoud and Maryams marriage known to be a

glorious hallmark of the organization- Active: a member who well accomplishes the issued orders- Ring of connection: meaning Maryam Rajavi. Members are not

capable to unite with Massoud unless through Maryam- The host: meaning Iraq- The guesthouse: the jail where protesting members and quitters

were held- . And more

To determine how dangerous MKO cult might be, the Advanced Bonewits'Cult Danger Evaluation Frame can be a good help. As Bonewitsexplains, The purpose of this evaluation tool is to help both amateurand professional observers, including current or would-be members,of various organizations (including religious, occult, psychological orpolitical groups) to determine just how dangerous a given group isliable to be, in comparison with other groups, to the physical andmental health of its members and of other people subject to itsinfluence. [14]

The Advanced Bonewits' Cult Danger Evaluation Frame

Factors: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Low High

1. INTERNAL CONTROL: Amount of internal political power exercisedby leader(s) over members. 1. _________________________

2. WISDOM CLAIMED by leader(s);amount of infallibility declaredor implied about decisions or doc-trinal/scriptural interpretations. 2. __________________________

3. WISDOM CREDITED to leader(s)by members; amount of trust indecisions or doctrinal/scripturalinterpretations made by leader(s). 3. _________________________

4. DOGMA: Rigidity of reality con-cepts taught; amount of doctrinal

inflexibility or "fundamentalism." 4. __________________________


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5. RECRUITING: Emphasis put onattracting new members; amountof proselytizing. 5. __________________________

6. FRONT GROUPS: Number of subsid-iary groups using different namesfrom that of main group. 6. _________________________

7. WEALTH: Amount of money and/orproperty desired or obtained by group;emphasis on members' donations;economic lifestyle of leader(s)compared to ordinary members. 7. ________________________

8. POLITICAL POWER: Amount of external political influencedesired or obtained; emphasis ondirecting members' secular votes. 8. ________________________

9. SEXUAL MANIPULATION: of membersby leader(s); amount of controlexercised over sexuality of members;advancement dependent upon sexualfavors or specific lifestyle. 9. _________________________

10. CENSORSHIP: Amount of control

over members' access to outsideopinions on group, its doctrinesor leader(s). 10. ________________________

11. DROPOUT CONTROL: Intensity of efforts directed at preventing orreturning dropouts. 11. _________________________

12. VIOLENCE: amount of approval whenused by or for the group, itsdoctrines or leader(s). 12. _________________________

13. PARANOIA: amount of fear con-cerning real or imagined enemies;perceived power of opponents;prevalence of conspiracy theories. 13. _________________________

14. GRIMNESS: Amount of disapprovalconcerning jokes about the group,its doctrines or its leader(s). 14. _________________________

15. SURRENDER OF WILL: Amount of emphasis on members not having to


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be responsible for personal deci-sions; degree of individual dis-empowerment created by the group,its doctrines or its leader(s). 15. __________________________

16. HYPOCRISY: amount of approval forother actions (not included above)which the group officially considersimmoral or unethical, when done by orfor the group, its doctrines orleader(s); willingness to violategroup's declared principles forpolitical, psychological, economic,or other gain. 16. ___________________________

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Low High

A precise evaluation of MKO well crystallizes it as one of the mostdestructive and visible examples of a group intermingling thecharacteristics of a terrorist group and a cult to be nominated a terroristcult. A terrorist cult poses a greater danger because of the growing use of

mind control and cult control techniques. Most terrorist organizationsactively study and use mind control and cult control techniques toindoctrinate members into committing the horrific acts of terrorism thatshock our senses. The real cause of much of today's terrorism is not whatthe terrorists themselves advertise and claim in their publicly statedagendas and rationalized causes. The real cause of acts of terrorism ishow these agendas and ideas were implanted into the minds of themembers with mind control and cult control techniques by their handlers.

The responsibility lies on the shoulders of the responsible minds and elitesof a society to illuminate the nave minds and depict a clear-cut image of a destructive cult to stop any further jeopardizing the young generationscareer.

Sources:

* Forqan was an extremist religious-militia group established in 1977 byAkbar Godarzi, a part-time seminary student. He masterminded a number

of assassinations after the victory of Islamic Revolution according to hisinterpretations of Islamic sources; he was 25 at time of his arrest.


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[1]. www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html

[2]. The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran ; Library of Congress. Doc.call no.: M-U 42953-1 no.92-824F)

[3]. A Guide to Cults and New Religions; ed. Ronald Enroth, DownersGrove, Ill, InterVarsity 1983, p14.

[4].www.phact.org

[5]. www.refocus.org

[6]. www.banisadr.info\ideological\Chapter Five.htm

[7]. Bijan Niyabati interview with Zari Isfahani, Taliah-Sepidedaman.com

[8]. Niyabati Bijan; A distinct look at Mojahedins internal revolution,slightly from inside, slightly from outside , 113.

[9]. Ibid.

[10]. Singleton Anne; Saddam's Private Army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.

[11]. www.rickross.com\The Cult of Rajavi.htm

[12]. www.mojahedin.ws

[13]. www.mojahedin.ws\books\The People's Mojahedin of Iran: A strugglefor what?

[14]. www.qed.net/bonewits/ABCDEF.HTML

A Case Study of the Terrorist Cult of Mojahedin

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