—-.

. —.

—-.,,.---

,. ...’.:4A A4”I

Nora Kinzer Stewart . .. . . .– . ---- “i%

Mifkary anaipr%watched w“drkeen interestarrdlravesincestudiedtfreshort but irrterrsewrr3ict in the SouifrAlarrticisr

I

19S2. ~tbe SUZSSylefzosrs Oftk?ld irr iacdcd aadb#stic sqr-era.tio~ tireauthortinds thatone rind- f%ctorappeaed tohave a decisive impacfi This case study bigbEgktsdse impo~tams ofursitwhesion assdaof&r mode ti die relativesuccess L(oriiikae of theBn”tiskarrdAsgentissefosrxsitsdsat wrrfkt.

mORE THAN a thousand young mendied in May and June of 1982, on tiny

lonely islands near the tip of South Ameri-ca. In theqnceofth~ rhreeandahalfweeks,746 Argentines were killed; 1,336 wounded and11,4CQtaken as prrscrners of ww 256 Bnrish~F w~ ~d and 777 wounded. The Brit.ish navy lest 16 ships, auqk or damaged, andthe Argentine air force last appmxunately 90airplanes. %inrares of the ccsr to Britain, ex-chding the reinforcement and cuntinued garri-son troops on the island, are approximately$1.6 bfion Argentina expended at l=t $850rndhon in the campaign and perhaps $1 bdbonin arms pumhases.

MILITARY REVIEW ● April 1989

,Called the “Malvinas” by the /@enti@

and the “Faildarrds” by the British, this nastvlittle war in a cold, ~lated spot in d-d .S@~Atlantic contains many lessons for .mifi~~analysts. Once again the British proved thatthey can perform logistic miracles @ soddingup rrrmps, ships and equipment,. and ~porting men and~k+nes over 8,L%0males.Argentine navy and air force pilot~, whothundered down San Cados’ “bomb alley” solow under the radar that they had salt sprpyon their canopies, were examples of courageand daring. The legality of the British sinkihgof the Generuf Belgnrno faschates jurist andpolitician. W’Me geopolitical analyses are in-

\

,, 31,

teresting, the real lesson of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 for military man-‘power specialists is how morale or cohesionaffected the outcome of battles.

Thii article d~usses the findings of a USArmy Research Institute for Behavioral and

-,

* Thete isakugebodyofsociologicaliwsdpsychologfcalresearchwhichindicates

thathmmm factcmsuchascohesion,trustinpeers, trustinleaders,unitckte,teamworkandcompetenceam exttemely

importantthctorsin determiningwhymen fightin combatorrsmaway.

Social .%ences (ARI) research project deal-ing with the South Atlantic confkct of 1982as a case study in military cohesion. 1 ThisARl research is a post hoc comparatwe rmalY-sis of a combined arms conflict of short dum-tion between two technologically well-equipped forces. The focus here is to indicatethe “lea-mm learned” for the study of cohesionin a cross-cultural comparative analysls mgeneral and for US forces in parncrrlar. Basedon interviews conducted with officers and en-listed personnel in Argentina and Great Brrt-ain in 1987, findings deahrrg with the humandimension of warfare are presented here.’

WB “hum~ dimemion” IS often defined

= “writ” or “will to fight” or “morale” or“cohesion.” Military analysts often focus onquarrtf[able factors such as level of technolo-gy, adv~ced weaponry, supply capability andsheer number of troops rather than on thequalitative components of “suldler will” thatlead to mmbat effectiveness.

Nonetheless, there is a large baly of socio-logical and psychological research which indi-cates that human factors such as cohesion,trust m peers, trust in leaders, unit climate,teamwork and competence are extremely im.portant Factors in determinkrg why men fight

in combat or run away.] Military cohesion is aSpecial bonding which implies that men arewilling to die for the preservation of thegroup, or the code of honor of the group, orthe vrdor and honor of the country. M&rycohesion consists of horizontal or peer bond-ing, vertical bonding, organizational bmdngand societal factors. Horizontal bondl~therelationship of offlcet to oflcer, nonconunis-sionwf oftlcer (NCO) to NCO and enlistedto enllsted—inchrdes such intangibles assense of mssion, technical and tactical profi.ciency, lack of personnel turnover, teamwork,trust, respect and friendship. Verticalbonding—relationships up and down thechain of cornrnand+nvolve.s open versus au-thoritarian climate, leaders’ concern for themen, leader example, trust and respect ofleaden, sharing of discomfort and danger andshined training. Organizational bonding-thevalues of the society as inculcated in the sol-dier or offlce+enrails loyalty and patriotism,military rrdtion and Kstory, strong religiousbelief and a well-defined concept of valor orheroism.

Forty yearn of military research show thathigher military cohesion results irx

o less nonbattlefield castiakies.cs more soldiers firing their weapons in

combat.o k desertion in time of war.0 more soldiers fighting valiantly.0 less absence without leave, drug addic-

tion, alcoholism and sick call in peacetime.Cohesion is a necessary, but not stitcient,

causal factor leading to combat effectiveness,Societal factors such as tactics, supply, logis-tics, weather, meckal facilities, physical fit-ness of the troops and training all contributeto combat effectiveness and affect cohesion.Societal factors that impinge on military co-hesion are those of society’s attitudes towtithe military in general, or toward a pamcukrrwar. TMs attitude will determine if an ade-quate defense budget exists for training of-ficers and men, purchasing supplies and ar.

32 April 1989. MILITARY REVIEW

mament, and smt%ng mdltary hospitals. Ofcourse, even high levels of morale and astaunch will to wm among o~]cem and menwho trust each other will come to naught ifrhe men have no weapms or fowl. If politicalwill is absent or political strategy is incomecttmili~ stmtegy will suffer. Or if the level oftechnology of the war has an imbalance,troops are drrnmed. Wolld War 11Polish offi-cers using cavahy charges against Germanranks may dhrstrate high levels of cohe.won,but their valor was to no avail.

In the spcific case of the land forces in the1982 South Atlantic conflict, the strength ofthe British forces was neither weapons nortechnology, but men. As Brigadier DawdChaunc!ler of the United Kingdom 5th Air-Ixrme Brigade said in an interview.

MILITARY REVIEW * April 1989

“NO matter how sophisticated the weapm. ~rry, the ultimate test is the man hwnself on thebardefield. It is always a soldier wwh a fikedbayonet and rifle who wms the war.”~” , f

Many Argentine units fought bra~el. and

4well. Other Argentine units bruke an ran.Why? Pmnsh Paras and Royal Mari~ew$ddedanother page co their already dkting~’ishedbattlefield history. In those areas of tht bat-tlef ield where Brmsh rroops foughr prpfes~slonal and well-trained Argentine groups suchas the Argentine Marines, the 25th Warm-y,the Argentine 3d Artdlery and ,.mmando601 and 602, Enghsh fir-m like the W@hand Scors Guards paid a high price. ~

The price might have been much worse. IfrAe Argentine navy had not gone to porq Ifthe seven unexploded Exocet missiles that hit

,“

33,.., ,

~, ]

tiheaion isanecesasq butnotariflicien~cmraalt%ctorleadingtowmbateflkctiveneas.Societalr$rctorssuchastat.

tie+ aupp~,logistics,weather,mediealr%ilities,phytn”calfitnessof the troopsandtminingallwntribute to wmbat

ei&ziverreaaandafiixt cohesion.

.,

their targets had gone off; if Argentim hadwaited a few months until the English hadd~mantled their surface fleeti if the Argen-tine air force and naval air arm had notsquabbled over tactics and command if Ar-gentina had only prepzued adequate logisticplans; if Argentina’s medical services hadbeen better prepared, then p+raps, and only@MPS, the outcome would have ken differ-ent. “What if” is an interesting exercise forarmchair historians, but in order to learnfrom this violent incident, one must dealwith the facts at hand. The Argentine loss isa repetition of errors made by other peacetimearmies in other wars on orher battlefields.What is most interesting is that most, if notall, the mistakes made by Argentine officersand men in the Malvinas were very similar tothose made by the Brazilian army in dre ini-tial months of the Italian Campaign of 1944.’As important as supply, logistics, commrmica-tions and strategy are, the relationships be-tween and among men often determine theoutcnmes of batk.

Were there d~emlble dfierences in selec-tion, rra”ning, leadership or experience?

}Which land forces or which units manife=+redhigh levels of morale and cohesion? It is ap-propriate to begin with a discussion of socieralfactors. ~

SoGie!al FactomBorn of a 4C0.year tmdition of overseas en-

gagements involving long supply lines, joinropem’tions and amphibious landings, British

\

troops exkbked high morale, esprit and co-hesion. Several British NCOs spoke of %k.ing the Queen’s ShWrrg and go~ where shesends us.” And it mattered not where theywere sent. Cne Para NCO said, “1 thoughtthe Falldands were wmeplace near .%rdand.”

Britain was convinced that a war was nee.wary to defend the Falklands against a for-eign aggressor. She sent her very best tmo

~to the Falklands. Conaary to Argentine eval~tuations of the war, not all British mcwps we~barde.experienced veterans. Frdly one-half ofBritish erdisted were young boys with an aver-age age of 20. Few officers had participated inpitched modern battles, with enemy navaland air bombardment. But Britain’s lengthymilitary tradition and experience and thearmed forces’ continuing training and pre~a-ration for NATO exercises have temperedtheir forces’ attitude toward combat. This,combined with living memory of reeent wars(World War II, Korea) and firsthand experi-ences irr Cypms, Behze and constant duty inNorthern Ireland, make British forces awareof the essentials of battlefield tactics andquick response in combat.

Argentine forces, too, were fully convincedof the historical and political justification fortheir invasion of the Malvinas. From hk fimtday in school, every Argentine child is taughtthat the Malvinas are Argentine territory.Nrdy all the Argentines interviewed statedthat they were proud of having tried to liber-ate the Malvinas. Their loyalty and patriot.ism were bolstered by smong religious faith.V/Me Argentine forces have a long tmditionof geopolitical srmtegy and political involve.ment, their lack of combat experience pr-oduceddeficiencies in mpply logistics, com-munications and intelligence. Argentinearmed forces have recent experience in thewar agaimst subversion, but no living memoryof mcdem battlefield Conditions.

Yet few nations have such long h~toriealrrdtion in the mea of rapid and innovativemobkation as the British. England is a na-

34

.’ ,,

AIMI 1989. MILITARY REVIEW

tion that mobilized coal barges and saiIingyachts to evacuate 300,000 men from thebeaches of Dunkiik in 1941. Thus, it is notsurprising that the United Kingdom, onceagain, performed logistics, supply and mobib-ration miraclea in May and June of 1982. Ci-vilian workers performed heroic tasks. TheCan&m was refitted in 60 hours. The QueenElizabeth 2 was outfkted as a troop ship inthree and a half weeks, although war planscalled for a three-month period to do the job.In the rmdition of Dunkirk, the Q=n Efiw-beth 2 elegantly sailed alongside four mll.omroll-off Channel ferries that lumbered 8,000miles to the FaUdands.

While Argentine forws have a long tradi-tion of geopolitical stmtegy and political in.volvement, they have little experience inmundane activities such as supply and logis-tics. Argentine troops were sent to theMalvirms with summer uniforms and no ra-tional supply or logistics system was set up.WI-de British forces suffered from Cotilonand supply problems, they were able to quick-

ly setup headquarters. Their long hktory andevrience in overseas Warsl amphhious l~d-;ings, joint openrtions, combmed arms tactics,

and command and corm-d served them well..British supply and logistics capabilities werewell managed by their N(X?S. ,.

Britain’s creative Iogmics were repeat&I in j,brilliant tactical strategies applied by the landforces in their march across the Falldands atidparticularly the Royal Marines 42 @rn@mdo’saasault on Mount Harriet.

As World War 11sccial science researc“ $ in-dicated, most soldiers find it diiicult ,t@~tetheir views of patriotism and loyalty. In wfirefight, ideology is not the issu=urvivzil is.However, experiences in previous wars haveshown that patriotism is an impmant factorin determining the wiil to endure and the willto fight. Both Argentine and B~tish forcesare profoundly loyal and parnotic. They bqhhave a proud militmy heritage, deep religio,uaconviction and an ~med sense of valor orheroism. The Argentines were not lack~ invalor or patriotkm, but were woefirlly lacking

MILITARY REVIEW ● APril 1989 35.. .

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in experience and unable to translate heroism@to formation of cohesive units.

The British were a combined arms andcombined unit team. Their Imnds of trust, re.spect and friendship with each other werestronger by reason of history, training, timespent together in garrison, on exercises and,on the long sea voyage from England. In theclose confhes of the ships, troops ran andjumped around decks until bolts in the plat-ing came Ioore. Medical ofkem taught self.administered first-aid, how to inject mor.phine and an innovative method of atilnis.termg saline drips. British troops used 37 1/2years’ worth of training munitions in practiceon their sea voyage.

‘ Lke the British, teamwork and peer bond.ing are particularly strong among the Argen.tine o&lce corps. Argentine officers evinced aZrighdegree of trust m’th their fellow officemdue to close personal relationships developed

The LJm”tedKingdom... perfbmredlogfstica,supplyandmobifimtionmiracles

inkfay andjsrrreof 19$2 . . . TheCanbems wasrefiitedin60hosus. The

Queen Elizabeth 2 m outflfedsssa troopshipin the arrdafrsdfwetdcs,akbosrgh

warpl.rsfrscakffora *month periodrQdo thejob. lis the traditionof Wsmkirk,

dse[QE] 2 efegarsdysaifedaforrgsideforrrrolLon.rtrU-off&mneft2m”esthatlurrrbered$@Orsriles m dreMkliurds.

.!in the service academies. But their schooling,based on rote memory and no living memoryof modem battlefield condkions, produced arigid intransigent attinrde toward battlefieldtactics and doctrine. Lack of combat experi.ence produced deficiencies in logistics, supply, communications aad intelligence.

Even though Argentine troops were enthu,siastic afxmt their liberation of the Malvinas,

many individual soldiers evinced self-doubtabout their ability to fight pitched battles.The Argentine conscript himself knew hisown liabilities and strengths. A young 19-year.old conscript with only one month’straining was well aware of his inadequatepreparation. The majority of troops in theMalvirms were conscripts with scarcely onemonth’s training. Argentine conscripts hardlyknew each other, their officers or even howto load their weaprmk For these conscripts,horironral konding was nonexistent.

Yet those Argentine units with conscriptswho had completed a iidi yeads trait-kg, suchas the Argentine 25th Infano-y Brigade, theArgentine 3d Artillery Infantry Brigade, the5th Argentine Marine Brigade or the specialcase of 601 and 602 Commandos, trustedtheir leaders, knew their weapons and en-dured against firghrenmg odds of continualbombardment, cold, wet, humid weather,lack of fomf, lack of sleep and the sight oftheir fellow so~dlers wounded and dying.These units exhibned high levels of horizon.tal and vertwal hondmg.

In th~ case of British troops in theFalklands, an open orgarnzational climate, ,1

combined wdt the ot%cer’scredo of caring forhis men, serving as an example and sharingtrarmng and discornfbrt, led to incredibly mungpusitive relaaomhrps up and down the vertical’diienslons of the cornrnrrndstructure fium pri-vate to regimental commander. An open orga-niraaonal cbrnate is a characteristic of a sccierywith htde regard for hierachy. This open cli.mate, in turn, produces and fosters ccrcprationand flexibikty. Teamwork, trust, respect andkiend+rip are asmaated within an open organi-ratioml climate and also are strengthened byleaders and subordinates sharing discomfort and

Sti -.British soldiem and NCOS were confident .

that their officers were well-versed in battletactics. British NCOs are trained to accept re-sponsibility at all levels of command. Anopen organiratioml climate with little regard

36 APnl 1989 ● MILITARY REVIEW

,..

~- @o,m~conhcedof tfrehistotiealandpoticaljss@?8xstion% t%eirirrvaskmoft4ef@vinas . . . IVeadyalltheArgeniiacainterviewed

for privileges of rank and accompanied byswift gocd humor led to continual adaptationin the fluid and ever-changing batt Ie andspelled swift success on the battlefield. Arigid, highly stratified officer corps ethos,such as the Argentine case, ‘produces little orno lmnd~ from conscript to commander.

Thii rigid srmtifkation ‘ivasnot present inall units. Many Argenrin~ offmsrs, particular-ly in those units mentioned, werv deeply con-cerned about their men. One Argentine or%-cer commented, “1 took care of my men. Imade sure they were warm and fed because 1knew that terrible things were yet to come:

Both Argentine and British soldiers report-ed that a caring and competent officer wasone of the, if not the mcxx, salien~ factors inpromotmg high levels of cohesio~. Britishand Argentine ot%cers constantly used thewon3 “love” to describe the manner in whichan officer must treat hk men. They dld notsay “like” or “nurture” or “care for your men,”but emphasized the word “love.”

interrelationship of FaclomSuch close bonds do not exist in a vacuum.

For example, high personnel turnover de-stroys cohesion. Budgetary constraints impacton training, education and purchase of medi-cal supplies and armaments. Attitudes of thesociety and cultural attitudes toward the m~li-

tary as an orgamzation, or individuals asmembers of a parttcrdar service, relate to theself-roncept of d-me individuals, their dedicsr.tlOn, loyalty and patriotism. .

If a particular war is political anathema tothe population as a whole, cohesion maymean nothing in the battlefield situation.Men may either refuse to fight or fight insuch a desultory fashion that the enemy v+llwin. Also public disapproval may be ex-pressed in cuts ti miiitary budgets which eor-tail purchase of armaments and rtainii. Mil.

itary ~i~ may have Kigh levels of coh=hj.but without adequate training and Weapons;fthey cannot fight a conflict. Or, TMrd Worldnations may spend an inordinately large per-centage of their budgets on high.&l@dogyweapons, but not have soldiers sop&il&tedenough to use or repair the weap6n~ Suchwas not the case for the Falkland+@@vina.sconflict. In combat, distinctions based onrank are blurred. Surwval and victory ~ependon the intense cooperation of all ranks duringcombat. We must not make the fallacious as-sumption that rm open climate is endemic ex-clusively to demccrauc societies. Even organi-zations that appear, at first glance, to be rigidand inflexible, such as the Wehrrnac~t inWorld War II and the North Vietnamesearmy, showed that in battlefield situationsand at the small-unit level, critic@ms and sug-

MILITARY REVIEW o Agnl 1989 37.*,

gestions were a part of an open climate.’Eyen though British society is still somewhatstratified, British forces exhibited such anopen chrome. Argentine forces generally didnot. Those Argentine units that stood andfought exhhited high levels of cohesion and~ %n omtioml climate with nurturingleadership.

Recent US AN research indicates that an,,opkn conrmand climate leads to high levels ofmorale, cohesion and competence. However,morale and competence are inter twined.’High-performing groups have high moraleand thus perform well. Such an ambience re-quires patience and rime.

Tie is an important factor for the devel-oprrient of cohesion. Military odtion growsout of years and years, if not centuries, of mil-itary heritage, lore and myth. British soldlersand Argentine officers recount with pridetheir military traditions. Perhaps more thanany army in the world, British soldiers andNCOS readily speak of their forebears andlong-ago battles. David Cooper, chaplain of

Those Argentine rrnks with conscriptswho hadcompleted fidlyear’stmining

. . . trustedtheirleadem,knew thetiweaPerrsarrdendumdagafrrstfi@tenfng odds

of wntkrunibombmdrnen~cold we~hsrmkiweather,lackoffbod, lackof

sleepandtfresfghtof theirti+flowsokiietsworrndedarrddying.

z Pam inf the Falklands srates, “Every Paraknows abut the men at Arnhem. We can’tlet that uadition down.”

As interesting as analyses of the sea, landand air war of the South AtIa@c conflict of1982 may be for the military analyst, ,what arethe salient lessons for the US Army man-

,power specialists and trainem? Fmt of all, wesee that cohesion was a force multiplier for all

38

British units and specific Argenrine units.The issue of conscript versus vohrnteer soldieris moot, given char Argentine conscripts withone year’s maining, such as the Argentine 3dArtillery, fought valiantly and held theirground. British and Argentine battle successor Wrre was shown nightly on televidon andseen in ddy papers.

In thii era of high.@ communicationswith television and prcw coverage of a war,public opinion impacts on the conduct of thewar and the attitudes of the soldlers themsel-ves. Regardless of reductions in the sire OFtheir armed forces and curs in military budg-ers in the ycrm preceding the conflict, Britishand Argentine citizens were strongly in favorof the FalklanclaMalvinas conflict of 1982.Had the war lasted for much longer and casu-alties rate-s mounted, the British populationmight have had second thoughts about con-tinuing to support their task force. Con-versely, we see how public opirion dmmati.tally changed witkii Argentim after the sur.render. The Argentine nation’s anger againstits 10ss in the Malvinas resuked in topplingthe mditary p.mra and the return of democ-racy to Argentina.

The United States learned that a pro-longed war such as Vietnam may lead to pub-lic dkappmval. The 1983 invasion of Orena-da met with high levels of public approval.But the short duration of thii conflct shouldnot lead military leaders or pditiciams to theconclusions that public opir-don is now, andconstantly, in favor of mikuy action regard-less of its strategic implications. Military ana-lysts need to have a sense of history andknowledge of cultural idiosyncrasies and theirpeter-yial impact on soldier and unit moraleand cohesion.

While the US Army teaches military histo-ry to its officer cadetx, there seems to be IirtIeempha$is on military h~tory witMm the rrain-ing cycles of the average soldier. There are re-cent attempts to resmt traditions and his-torical lore; for example, the IOrh Mountain

April 1989. MILITARY REVl13&

Division of the US Army. The US Armymight model its trainii of history and mi~i.tary tradition by examining how British forcesincultate soldlers with a sense of military hu.tory. One factor in teaching soldiers theirmilitary madition is time in service. Britishtroops generally serve long tours which reducepermnnel mrbulence.

Close personal bonds and learning whomone GUI and cannot trust take months andprobably years to come to full fruition. Highlevels of personneI turbulence adversely affectofker and roldier competence. High morale,dedication, loyalty, patriotism, devotion toduty and sincerity are fine words for boyworm, but they have little import to a lonelysokler on a battlefield who is unsure of hlm-self and his officers.

Current US Army policy of developingunirs with strong cohesive bonds as in theCOHORT (cohesion, operational readinessand tminii) system is an excellent merhcdto counter perscmnel tutbrdence and promotecohesion. But throughout the US Army,training should emphaske developing an opencmnrnand cliite that produces freewheelingcriticism and, of couise, geod humor.

Tme also is a compellii factor on the im.mdlate outcome of a mcdem war. Warningtime to prepare for immerhate mobilizationand deployment is shorter rmd shorter. Warsborn of a short- or no-notice crisis themselvestend to be of brief duration. The Argentinescalled their war urra Guemr Impmridu (animpmvised war) and the British called theirwar one of “muddlii through.” As the timefactor becomes more compressed for mobiliza-tion and deployment, and duration of a battleshorter and shorter, the few days or monthsusually needed for the chaos of war to shakeout the basic irrationality of the mainii sys-tem, logistics plans or the battle tactics maysimply not be there.

If we (US and NATCl)>lan for a six-daywar, then it will be an “impmvised and mud-dling through” war. If we cannot rely on

H&h levels ofpersmmeltutbrrleireeadveraelyaflbctofficerandsoldier

competinee F@ momlq dedication,loyaltypatrbtism,devotionto drrtyandsincerityarefie wordsforboy scows,but theyhavefittkimport to alonefy

sokfieron a battt%fieh/who is unsureofbirnselfandHaoffices

the industrial might of a war machine, as wtdid in World War 11, then we ought to IW

carefidly at British military and civilian ingenuity in quick adaptation to ships, airplanesand equipment at hand. And such adaprabil- ~,ity IS much more feasible with well-trained, ~fwell-led, cohesive units made up of motivatedroldlers. .

The Falklandd?vfalvinas conflict sfiows kttoday’smodem battlefield of increased Je#mli-ty and shorr duration requires Competin# Offi-cers and NCOS who me capable of ,a~ptingquickly to a fluid situation. Such flexibilityresults from consmnr, arduous and appmpri.ate rrainiig which, in rum, requires monthsand yeara. .SoIdlemand oflcers train irs ~ce.time for war and hope that their trhining,doctrine and tactics are sfilcient, appropriateand ensure development of high morale qndcohesion in order to achieve succw in com-bat.

A decided srrength of the British andweakness of the Argentine land forces

MILITARY REVIEW * A@ 1989 . 39.

{:

Although themisa US culturalbktsagainstefitem“~ withtheirpecofiarcustoms,reginsentalinsigniaandstmnge-lookingberets, theBrit&hshowoverarrdover againthateliteUS-IS”*produce,maiss-

tainaodbter highIeve.kofmomfe,espn”~organiratiomdirr~”ty andhorizon.

talandverticalcohesion. The success,“ of.4gentirse ek u“6 undemcomsthe

combateff’ti”venesaof cohesiveek+es.

proved to be their NCOS. Argentine NCOShaue little tmming in battlefield tactics andare ‘used mainly for administrative duties.British officers rely heavily on their NCOS fordirect leadership of troops in garrison, inmaining and on the battlefield. British NCOtraining is rigorous and thorough. More im-portant, British NCOS have a well-definedsphere of command and influence that theirofficers respect. US forces mighr well look tothe British model in order to reheve officersof administrative responsibilities which couldlie widin the purview of the NCO.

Although there is a US cultural bias

against elite umts with their peculiar customs,regimental insignia and strange-lookinghere=, the British show over and over againthat elite unitx produce, maintain and fosterhigh levels of morale, esprit, organizationalintegrity, and horizontal and vertical cohe-sion. The success of Argentine elite units un-derscores the combat effectiveness of cohesiveelites. Whether Argentine or British, when-ever there was a lull in the fighting in theFalklandsfMalvinas, members of elite unitswould remove their helmets and put on their <red or green berets.

Fhally as Chaundler says, “wars are alwaysand fimlly a question of a lonely soldler on abattlefield fighting his war.”

This soldier on the battlefield of today ortomorrow wins or Iosa the battle based onsupply, weaponry rmd cohesion. His training,his confidence in his weapons, Ku reliance onthe experience of his officers and his belief inthe battle at hand will win or lose the battleand perhaps the war. The single mosr imWr-rant elemenr in developing bonds betweenand among ranks are caring, nurturing Offl.cers and NCOS. The hallmark of a competentofficer is, as both the Argentines and Britishsaid, “Youmust love your men.” %

........ . ...... -- . ...- .tied m emsed men m 01k3rs ofthe And ‘-

NOTES1 Nom Slmmr %wari, SLWWIALISIIDCOmT.r of 19S2 A .Sltml m M/lr- Army Rnsati Insmuie,AJexmana,VA 1987

WY cahmkn R.sati e%mfi Lsedetilu and Manaue.eti T~n~ 4 Imtwwewsw!h Aqmbns armyS01S17.5602 mmnww.x, rdwssllr.gMea US .woYR6s%ardI 1-. “--n=-= ‘b *- .I “,f,rxs . “d .O,”m”,rnlsa$a”edOficam only mere am m enlL$E4per.

2 stevmn tmewwvm mnduc4wtbne amv IA@ EG-5AJ?@ 19WI and e.lsted wxmnal Md off,.c%. cdme Snhshatmy and R@ Mums (Mud! anti Jub 19S71She mme frsi m,ltq restwmer oven .-s5 t. mm $3nUshm-d#qwmne 088.mm erd .nks!ti perscmel fora SudYoftits IYP.3Fora d.hzlsc explananon of me sarnpllnriand memadolow see Stewart. Resewn Retort,~, -d,”.

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40 April 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW