A A REVIEW OF 27TH NSG PLENARY AND T D

CIS

S

RO

UN

DT

AB

LE

R

EP

OR

T

THA REVIEW OF 27 NSG PLENARY AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA

6 JULY, 2017

©Copyright,CenterforInternationalStrategicStudies(CISS)Allrightsarereserved.

Nopartofthecontentsofthispublicationmaybereproduced,adapted,transmitted,orstoredinanyformbyanyprocesswithoutthewrittenpermissionoftheCenter

forInternationalStrategicStudies,Islamabad.

Editorial Board Editor inChief Ambassador(Rtd)AliSarwarNaqviEditor Col.(Rtd)IftikharUddinHasanAssociateEditor Ms.SaimaAmanSialAssistantEditor MaryamZubair

IT SupportShahidWasimMalik

CISSCISSROUNDTABLE REPORT ROUNDTABLE REPORT

CISSROUNDTABLE REPORT

THA REVIEW OF 27 NSG PLENARY AND THA REVIEW OF 27 NSG PLENARY AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIAIMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA

6 JULY, 20176 JULY, 2017

THA REVIEW OF 27 NSG PLENARY AND

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA

6 JULY, 2017

ISBN: 978-969-23235-1-2

Pakistan's Engagement with NSG

AReviewof27thNSGPlenaryandImplicationsforSouthAsia

CenterforInternationalStrategicStudies

I

Contents

Acknowledgement


AReviewof27thNSGPlenaryandImplicationsforSouthAsiaII

TheCenterforInternationalStrategicStudieswouldliketooffer

itsdeepestthankstoGeneralEhsan-ul-Haqforpresidingoverthe

discussion as the Keynote Speaker and sharing his valuable

insightsasthekeynotespeaker.TheCenteralsoacknowledgesthe

participationof the respected speakersof the roundtablewho

madevaluablecontributiontotheproceedings;andAirCdr.(R)

Khalid Banuri and Ambassador (R) Ali Sarwar Naqvi for

chairingthesessions.TheCenteracknowledgesthediligenceof

its researchers in transcribing all the roundtable proceedings

withoutwhichthepublicationofthisreportwouldnothavebeen

possible.

INAUGURAL

SESSION

Ambassador (R) Ali Sarwar Naqvi

ExecutiveDirectorCISS

Mr.Naqvihas a longdiplomatic careerof thirty-sixyears,from1970to2006,whichculminatedinseniorambassadorial positions. He served at the UnitedNations,bothinNewYorkandVienna,aswellasinWashingtonDC,London,ParisandBrussels.

Ambassador Naqvi was appointed Member(Chairman'sAdvisoryCouncil)inthePakistanAtomicEnergyCommission(PAEC)afterhisretirementfromForeign Service, and functioned as Adviser to theChairman PAEC on International Affairs, withparticularfocusonIAEAmatters.

AmbassadorNaqviisthefoundingExecutiveDirectorof Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS),whichwasestablishedin2010CISSisanindependentandautonomousthink-tankforresearchandanalysisofcurrentregionalandinternationalstrategicissuesfromaPakistaniperspective.

AReviewof27thNSGPlenaryandImplicationsforSouthAsia 1

WelcomeRemarksbyAmb.AliSarwarNaqvi


AReviewof27thNSGPlenaryandImplicationsforSouthAsia2


GeneralEhsan-ul-Haq,Excellences,distinguishedguests,ladiesandgentlemen,goodafternoontoyouandAsalam-o-Alaikum.

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to this roundtable on animportant subject. We have put together two sessions as wasannounced for this roundtable andwewill �irst hear the openingremarksofourchiefguestMr.Ehsan-ul-Haq,Ithinkoneofthemostdistinguished soldiers of our time and one who has a very deepinsight into nuclear matters. I participated with him in someinternational conference and meetings and I know how well heunderstands thissubjectand these issues.AfterGeneralEhsan-ul-Haqhasgivenhisremarks,wewillhavethe�irstsessionwherewehave a presentation by Mr. Khalil Hashmi, Director General ofDisarmamentintheforeignof�iceandadearfriendwhowillreview

ththe27 NSGplenarywhichjustconcludedlastmonthinBern.Hewill


befollowedbyMr.TariqRaufwhowillgivehisperspectiveontheNSGmembershipissueandthenwe'llhearBrigadierZahirKazmionthePakistaniperspectiveontheNSG.

InthesecondsessiontobechairedbyMr.KhalidBanuri,whichwehaveorganizedwiththecooperationofDr.RizwanaAbbasiandDr.ZafarKhanoftheNationalDefenseUniversity(NDU),wewillheartwo eminent British Scholars, Professor Christoph Bluth and Dr.Andrew Futter, who are visiting and we will bene�it from theirinsights.Weareveryhappytohavebothofyouhereattheroundtabletoday.ThelastbutnotleastinanywayDr.NaeemSalikofCISSwillmakehispresentation.

Ladiesandgentlemen,

Pakistan'sinterestintheNuclearSuppliersGroupislongstandingandgoesbacknearlytwodecadeswhenIwasambassadortotheIAEAinVienna.IusedtomeetthethenchairmanoftheNSGtheCzechambassador in every general conference session. Then the NSGtroikawas invitedanumberoftimesbytheforeignof�icehere inIslamabad for informal dialogue. I myself attended two of thesemeetings in Islamabad. Pakistan then formally applied for NSGmembership in 2016. Pakistan, in our view, and in the PakistaniperspectivecomplieswithanumberofimportantconditionsoftheNSGincluding

1. commitmenttonuclearnon-proliferation2. nuclearsafety3. nuclearsecurity4. a strong regulatory framework and robust command and

controlstructure.

Ofcourse,PakistanisnotasignatoryoftheNPTanddoesnotacceptcomprehensive safeguards but it has committed and implementsvery faithfully industryspeci�ic safeguardsunder the INFCIRC/66thusPakistanmeritsmembership in itsoverallcommitmentsandundertakings.Iwillveryquicklymentiontwofundamentalpoints;�irstly,theprimaryobjectiveoftheNSGistopreventproliferationof nuclear material and technology which Pakistan shares and


supportsandsecondlytheNSGbasicallycontrolsnucleartradewithregard to peaceful uses of nuclear energy thus Pakistan seeksmembership for access to nuclear material for technology andmaterial foradvancingitspeacefulusesprogramespecially inthe�ield of power generation. This is a very valid desire and arequirementthatwehaveputforwardandmustbesupportedbytheinternationalcommunity.

Youwillhearmoreonthesemattersbyourlearnedspeakersandwealllookforwardtoastimulatingdiscussionaheadthisafternoon.

Ithankyouall.

4 AReviewof27thNSGPlenaryandImplicationsforSouthAsia


General Ehsan-ul-HaqFormerChairman,JointChiefsofStaffCommittee(JCSC)

General(retd)Ehsan-ul-haqisaformerchairman,JointChiefsofStaffCommittee(JCSC)ofPakistan.

Afterhisretirement,in2007,General(retd)Ehsanhasbeen engaged in a number of corporate, intellectualand humanitarian activities. He is also a frequentspeaker in international forums,reputedthink tanksanduniversitiesongeopolitical,defenseandsecurityissues.Thegeneralisalsopatronizingahumanitariantrust run by his family named, EHSAN (Education,Health,SocialAwareness,Network)

ThegeneralisalsoamemberoftheAdvisoryBoardofCISS,andonBoardofGovernorsofIslamabadPolicyResearchInstitute,aprestigiousthinktankonstrategicandsecuritymatters.

In recognition of his meritorious services, he wasawardedHilal-e-Imtiaz(Military)andNishan-e-Imtiaz(Military)bytheGovernmentofPakistan.

He is also the recipient of Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur from the FrenchGovernment and theKingAbdulAzizMedalofExcellencefromtheKingdomofSaudiArabia.


Key n o t e S p e a ke r

KeynoteAddressbyGeneralEhsan-ul-Haq

Bismillah-i-Rahman-i-Raheem,

AmbassadorSarwarNaqviSahib,Excellences,distinguishedguests,ladiesandgentlemen.AsalamoAlaikumandaverygoodafternoon.

Iconsideritaprivilegetohavebeeninvitedtoparticipateintoday'sdeliberationsontherecentlyconcludedplenaryoftheNSGheldon

nd rdthe 22 and 23 of June last month. As I prepared my openingremarksforthiseventandasIlookedattheprogramofthiseventfranklyspeakingIthoughtIshouldlistentoareviewbythevariousspeakersbeforeIcanreallycommentonwhatisthestatusorwhatisthesituationposttheplenary.However,wehopetobene�itfromthepresentationsthatwilldealcomprehensivelywiththedetailsofwhathastranspiredinNSGplenaryanditsimplications.

6





AsweallknowtheNSG,acartelof48countriesregulatesnuclearcommerce for civilian uses and is an important forum for non-proliferation. Pakistan has been endeavoring to be a part of thisforumandtobetreatedfairlyinenteringtheforum.Inmyview,therecentplenarywasasigni�icantevent,the�irstbeingheldsincethedeparture of the Obama administration, which had lobbiedaggressively insupportof India. Itwas the �irstplenarysince theGrossiproposalwasputforwardandofcourse,inthewakeofPrimeMinisterModi'sraisingoftheNSGissueswiththeChinesepresidentXiandRussia'spresidentPutin.

AsitendedinconclusivelyontheissueofthenonNPTmemberstates,Iwouldwanttosaythatinfactthesensethatonegetsfromthemediaisthattherecentplenary,particularlyfromtheaspectofIndiaandPakistan,sthattheIndianattemptstogatecrashintotheNSGwiththe support of the previous US administration has becomemorecomplicated; particularly in the background of the dip in Indo-Chinese relations reaction over the Grossi proposals that wereclearlyfavorabletoIndia.ThereisnowaninternationalrecognitionaboutthenegativeeffectsofthepolicyofexceptionalismwhichhadbeenextendedtoIndiainthepast.Thereisalsothefeelingthatthedeep�inancialcrisisinWestinghouseandArevaarelikelytoleadtotherenegingontheircontractswithIndia,therebyloweringIndianleverageintheirdealingswithFranceandtheUnitedStatesonthetransferofciviliannucleartechnology.

Ladiesandgentlemen,

Pakistan has been fully committed to the principles of non-proliferationandwishestoplayitsrightfulroleintheinternationalorder.Itsnuclearprogramisafunctionofitssecuritycompulsionsand aimed at achieving regional strategic stability through aminimum credible deterrence. Pakistan desires friendly relationswithitsneighboringstatesincludingIndia.Itmaintainsasafe,secureandreliablenucleararsenalwhilstfollowingthefundamentalpolicyofcrediblenucleardeterrence.Pakistan'sfullspectrumdeterrenceisqualitativetopreventallkindsofwarsintheregionandmaintainsapolicy, as I said earlier, of credibleminimumdeterrence,with nointenttoproduce�issilematerialsbeyonditsquanti�iedneeds.Thismaybeunlikesomeothercountriesintheworld.


It is ironic that while Pakistan's reactions in the context of itsnational security are noted and acknowledged but no apparentattentionispaidorgiventothecausesthatledittoreactthisway.Pakistan is not into conventional or nuclear arms race with anycountry leastof allwith Indiabutof course, it cannot ignore thedevelopment of overwhelming conventional and strategiccapabilitiesbyIndia.LetmealsoaddthatPakistanhasnoneedtolook beyond its immediate neighborhood. Pakistan's threatperception emanates from India and our deterrence posture isprimarilyIndia-centric.Wecontinuetoadheretoourdeclarationofmaintaining a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and thebogeyofashavingthefastestgrowingnuclearprogramisamythcreatedinthewesternperception.

Ladiesandgentlemen,

TheNSGmembership,inourview,shouldbebasedontheprinciplesofnon-discrimination.GrantingIndiamembershipwouldadverselyimpactthenon-proliferationregimeaswellasregionalpeaceandstability.ThepreconditionsofsigningNPTinordertogainaccesstotheNSGhasbeenviolated in thepast case andpoint to France'sadmissionintothegroupwhichwhenitwasadmittedintotheNPT,wasnotapartytotheNPT.PakistanisthereforenotobligatedtosigntheNPTeither.Tothiseffect,inmyview,denyingnon-NPTmemberstates access toNSG is a faulty approach. It is the right of everynuclear weapon state, abiding by the rules and regulationsprescribedbytheIAEA,tohaveaccesstothestateoftheartnucleartechnologyforpeacefulpurposes.

ArealisticandworkableframeworkmustbefollowedbytheNSGforan objective, equitable and non-discriminatory approach foradmittingnewmembers.WearealsoconcernedthatincaseIndiamanages to gainmembershipof theNSG,Pakistan'sprospectsofjoiningthegroupwilldiminish.India'sentryintotheNSGwithoutPakistanbeingtherewillthreatenthestrategicstabilitysituationinSouth Asia which has already been affected by the NSG waiverprovidedtoIndiaunderthe123agreementwiththeUnitedStates.Pakistanwillnotacceptanymeasures,offeredasaquidproquotoentry into the NSG, which in our perception jeopardize oursovereigntyandnationalsecurity.




Ladiesandgentlemen,

WeareencouragedtoseethattheprincipledoppositiontoIndia'sgatecrashingintotheNSGhasnotonlybeenopposedbyChinabutitsvalidityhasbeenrecognizedbyothermembersoftheNSGandinfactthenumberhasbeengrowing.WehopetohearthedetailsofthisinthesubsequentdeliberationsandthenIamsurewewillbecleareronwhere the situation is and where we stand with regards to theprogressofnon-NPTmembersentryintotheNSG.

IwouldonceagainliketothankAmbassadorNaqviforinvitingmetoparticipateintoday'sroundtableandIampleasedtoseeaverylargenumberofdignitaries,participants, someofcoursetravelingfromtheUKandotherpartsoftheworldtoparticipateinthisroundtable.Iamcon�identthatwewillbene�itverysigni�icantlyfromtheirviewsonthissubject.Thankyouverymuch.


SESSION I

Expansion in NSG Membership:

Current Developments and Prospects

Mr. Khalil HashmiDirectorGeneral(UN&ArmsControl&Disarmament)MoFA

Mr.KhalilHashmiiscurrentlyDirectorGeneral(UN&Arms Control & Disarmament) at the Ministry ofForeign Affairs. Mr. Hashmi joined the PakistanForeignServicein1994.Hebringsovertwodecadesof diplomatic and policy experience, both bilateralandmultilateral.

His diplomatic career includespostings at PakistanEmbassies inCopenhagen (1999-2002) andBeijing(2008-2010). Mr. Hashmi has twice served atPakistan'sMissiontotheUnitedNationsinNewYork(2004-2007)and(2012-2016), includingasDeputyPermanent Representative. At the ForeignMinistry,Mr. Hashmi has previously held portfolios such asDirector General for European region, Director forDisarmamentAffairsandSouthAsia,UnitedNationsaswellasOIC.

Mr. Hashmi has worked extensively on a range ofpolicyissuesrelatedtoWMDs,includinginareassuchas export controls and nuclear security. He hasattended several international conferences andrepresented Pakistan in a number of Group ofGovernmentalExperts,heldundertheUnitedNationsauspices.


S p e a k e r

SESSION1:Reviewofthe27thNSGPlenary

ThankyouAmbassadorNaqvi,thankyouforthisinvitationandyourkindwords.Itisagreatpleasuretobeamongstverydistinguishedsenior colleagues, generals, former Foreign Secretaries,ambassadorsandothermembersofthethinktankcommunity.

WhatIplantodois,Ijustwanttoprefacemyremarksbymakingfourpoints. First, what I am going to lay out to you is essentially anoutsidersaccount.AlthoughIwasinBern,butIwasnotinsidethehallwheretheNSGplenarytookplace.SecondtheNSGmaintainsaverystrictcodeofcon�identiality.

Sowhilstwehaveattendedmeetingsonthesidelinesandinteractedwithdelegations,wefullyrespectthatcodesomyremarkswouldalsofollowthatoverallframework.Third,theNSGplenaryinBernwas-I just want to emphasize this point that of course we are

14

Reviewofthe27thNSGPlenary




discussing Pakistan India membership applications in thisroundtable-wasnotaboutonlythisissue.Thisplenaryhadalmost14agendaitems;onlyoneoftheagendaitemsrelatedtoPakistanandIndia's application for NSG membership. The Bern plenary wasimmediatelyprecededbytwoothermeetings;onewasofcourse,theconsultativegroupmeetingwhichisakindofexpertbodyoftheNSGwhichpreparesfortheNSGplenarymeetings.AnothermeetingthattookplacepriortotheBernplenarywasaninformationexchangemeeting.

thNowweallknowthisBernplenarywasthe4 meetingsincePakistanformallyapplied forNSGmembership.PakistanappliedasyouallknowinMayof2016.SotheSeoulPlenarytookplaceinJunelastyearfollowedbyaninformalmeetingoftheNSGonthesidelinesoftheconsultativegroupmeetinginViennathatwaslastyearinNovemberandthentherewasanotherconsultativegroupmeetinginearlyAprilthis year and then came the NSG plenary. Why I mention thesemeetingsisjusttoputthingsincontext.SeoulplenaryisactuallythestartingpointwherethemembershipsofPakistanandIndiawere�irstformallyconsidered.AndSeoulplenary'ssigni�icanceisevidentfromthefactthatthereisnowaformalagendaitemontheNSGwhichsaysthelegaltechnicalpoliticalaspectsofparticipationofnonNPTstates.Sothat'sthebaselineorthat'stheformalagendaiteminwhichthesediscussionstakeplace.Andasweallknow,beforeIgointowhattypeofdiscussionstookplace;apartfromtheconsultativegroupandtheplenaryformat,theNSGhasatroikamechanismwhichcontainsthree countries; the previous NSG chair, the current one and theforthcomingchairoftheNSG.Soatpresentwehaveofcourse,theprevious chair which is Republic of Korea; the present one i.e.Switzerlandandthefutureoneisawaited.Thereisonecountrythathasindicateditsdesiretochair,it'snotformalyetsotillthattimeArgentina,whichwaspriortoROKthechairoftheNSG,iscontinuingasoneofthethreemembersofthetroika.

Iwon'tgointothesubstanceofthediscussionsperse. AmbassadorNaqvihaspartiallyalludedtowhyPakistanisseekingmembershipoftheNSG.GeneralEhsanhasalsohighlightedsomeaspects,especiallytheimplicationsofanIndiaalonemembershipontheregionandonPakistansoIwon'tgothere.WhatIwillfocusonarethediscussionsthattookplaceunderthisagendaitemwhichisthelegaltechnical


politicalaspects.Justtogiveyouasense,therearetwoschoolsofthought thathaveemergedsincetheSeoulplenary.Oneschoolofthoughtwhichadvocatesthatalotofdiscussionhastakenplaceonthe legal, political and technical aspects andperhaps it is time tomovetowardsadecisionphase.ThereisofcourseanotherschoolofthoughtwithintheNSGwhichsaysthattheissueisprettycomplex,giventhatthisisanewparadigminwhichtooperateconsideringthatbothPakistanandIndiaarenon-NPTstatessothemembershipissueis not that straightforward. Their view is that we need morecomprehensivediscussionsandthesediscussionsshouldbedirectedtowardsevolvingsomesortofbenchmarksorsomesortofcriteriaandoncethatcriteriaisagreedupon,onlythencanwemoveontothedecisionphase.Thisis,whatisinformallycalledwithintheNSG,'twoprocess'or'twostepapproach'.

Sotherearecountriesonbothsidesofthisargument,i.e.thosethatdesire to accelerate the process ofmoving towards a decision orothers that of course, want a detailed discussion leading to theevolutionofsuchbenchmarks.ThereisanothersetofissuesthatisbeingdiscussedwithintheNSG,i.e.especiallyintheBernplenary,thereareagaintwotypesofcountries,i.e.onecomprisethosethatadvocateacriteriaorbenchmark,thereisagroupofcountrieswhichadvocates for hard criteria, bywhich Imean adherence to CTBT,FMCT,separationplanbetweencivilianandnuclearfacilitiesandsoonandsoforthandperhapsafewothercommitmentsintheareaofnon-proliferation.Thereareothersthatthinkthatifwegothatwayitmaybeverydif�iculttoagree,becauseofpoliticalconsiderationandotherfactorstoagree,onaneatcriteriasotheyadvocateamoreamorestreamlinedapproachwherebythespiritoftheNSGcriteriafactors of participation of member states is captured and thenadheringtoCTBTorothertreaties.Adherencetoadditionalprotocolandstufflikethatshouldnotbepursuedanditshouldbeaneaterarrangementprovidingforbasiccommitmentswherebycountriesthatareaspirantsundertakethosecommitmentsandtherebypavethewayforothermembership.

This discussion is still going on, in anticipation, in terms of theprocess.WealsothoughtthatthisBernplenarywasnotconvenedtotake a decision on the matter because the process-the way it isevolving-isinaway,Iwon'tusethewordstalledbutiscertainly




sloweddownand therewereseveral factors for that.ThekindofenthusiasmshownbysomecountriesintheSeoulplenary,Ithinkhasdissipatedandthesortofhardrealitythathasdawnedisthatthereare real issues and it is dif�icult to short circuit them becausecountrieshavetakenpositionsonewayoranother.Asweallknow,consensusisthedecisionmakingprinciplewithintheNSG,sothesediscussionscontinueandthisiswhatmanyhadanticipatedthatthiswouldbeaprocessrelatedmeetingratherthanameetingthatwouldgodeeper into substance and then evolve a decisionpalatable toeveryone.

IthinktherewasageneralagreementthattheSwiss,thenewchairthat has taken over from ROK, conducted the meeting veryprofessionally.Thechairwaswidelyseenasanhonestbrokerandthechoiceofvenueandthewayitwasconducted,suf�iceittosaythatitwasprofessionallydone.Sotherewasaspeci�icvenue,whichwasoneoftheinternationalorganization'sheadquarters,whereaccesswaslimited.Soitwasn'tlikewhathappenedinSeoul.itwasinthatsense handled and managed differently. So the people that weinteractedwithwerehighlyappreciativeoftheroleofthechair,beingimpartial,beinganhonestbrokerandsoonandsoforth.

Inthisplenary,thesigni�icantpointofcourse,wasthattherewasn'tthatmuchchangeintermsofcountriespositionseitherway.Itwasessentiallyareiterationofpositionsthere,i.e.fromwhatweknowthatsomecountrieshaveexpressedsupportforPakistanorIndiasotherewasn'tthatmuchofachangeintermsofcountrypositions,butmostlyareiterationofpositions.Asweunderstand,almostover30countries spoke on this speci�ic item again, there was no newproposal,althoughsomecountriesdidraisetheGrossiformulaorproposal;othershaddifferentviewsandthishasbeenthecasesinceNovember last year. There are two divergent views on whetherGrossiproposalorformulaservedabasistopursuemembershipornot.ThepressreleasethatNSGplenaryissuedaftertheconclusionofthe meeting makes reference to two points. One is that itacknowledgesthatadiscussiontookplaceonthisspeci�icagendaitem,i.e.thelegaltechnicalandpoliticalaspectsandcountriesortheparticipatinggovernmentsagreedtocontinuethesediscussionsandthesecondaspectwasthattheparticipatinggovernmentsnotedtheintentionsofthenewchairtoconveneaninformalmeetinginVienna


inNovember.Sothisisprettymuchinpublicdomain.WhatIthinkisthattheroleofthechairnotespeciallythecurrentchairbutallchairsissigni�icant,i.e.,theyhavethejobofreconcilingdifferentviewsandtrytodevelopconsensusandthenmakethe judgment.Whenanymeeting takesplace, there issuf�icientgroundworkthathasbeenundertaken so that the environment could be assessed, where adecisioncouldbeassessedandthenactedupon.ThisiswhatIthinkpeoplebelievethattheSwisschairwilldo,i.e.leadittotheinformalmeeting thatwill takeplace inVienna inNovember.Hewill holdconsultationsashedidpriortoassumingasChair.Thisisnothingnew,thisiswhattheNSGchairshavebeendoingandwouldcontinuetodo.

Asfarasourdelegationisconcerned,thisispartofourdiplomaticoutreach.Wemetseveralcountriesonthesidelinesandouroutreachcontinuesatvariouslevels,atvariousforumsandofcoursewearemakingourcasebasedonthreemainpoint.Oneisofcourse,intermsofwhatshouldbethebasisfordecidingontheapplicationofnon-NPTstates.OurpositionhasbeenveryclearandconsistentthatanycriteriathattheNSGevolvesshouldbetransparent,objectiveandnondiscriminatory. The second point is with regard to PakistanjoiningtheNSG.Weseeitasamutuallybene�icialproposition.ItisnotjustthatoncePakistanisinsidetheNSGitisnotonepartygainingmoreortheother;butweseeitasmutuallybene�icialproposition.Third,wehaveofcourse,andAmbassadorNaqvireferredtoit,andIam sure other colleagues when they speak will also talk aboutPakistan'scredentials;ourabilitytosupplyitems,ourtrackrecordwithexportcontrolsandsoonandsoforth.

So all in all, this was amore a process relatedmeeting. I wouldcharacterizeitasaworkinprogress.Iwouldn'twanttoventureintowhenandhowapositionwouldbe takenwhether thegroundorwhetherthere'senoughpoliticalwillthatexists.Thatwouldperhapsrequireanotherseminarorasessiontodiscussthat.

ThisiswhatIhadtosay.ThankyouverymuchambassadorNaqvi,thankyoufortheinviteandthankyoueveryone.



Dr. Tariq RaufFormerHeadofVeri�icationandSecurityPolicyCoordination,IAEA

Tariq Rauf is the former Head of Veri�ication andSecurity Policy Coordination, Of�ice reporting to theDirectorGeneral,attheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency.

FromMarch2013toMarch2017,hewasDirectorofthe Disarmament , Arms Control and Non-Proli feration Programme at the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). HewasSeniorAdvisortotheChairofMainCommitteeI(nuclear disarmament) at the 2015 NPT ReviewConference and also to the Chair of the 2014 NPTPreparatoryCommittee.

From 1987-2000, he was Non-ProliferationExpert/Advisor with Canada's delegations to NPTConferences, and advised Canada's ParliamentaryCommittees on foreign affairs andnational defensefrom1987to1995.Hehascontributedtotheworkofthe Tokyo Commission (1999) and the CanberraCommission(1996)onreducingnucleardangers.


S p e a k e r

SESSION1:PossibleCriteriaforNSGMembership

20

PossibleCriteriaforNSGMembership


Thank you verymuchAmbassadorNaqvi for invitingme to youreventhere.AsAmbassadorNaqvimentioned,I'veknownhimsinceIjoinedtheIAEAinViennain2002.AmbassadorNaqviwasverykindandhewouldofteninvitemetodinnerathisverynicehouse.Athisdinner table there was always a very interesting mix of guests,including at times, the conductor of the Vienna philharmonicorchestra.

So Ihavebeenverygrateful toAmbassadorSarwarNaqvi forhisfriendshipovertheyears.OnhisreturntoPakistanheestablishedhisCenterwhichisorganizingthiseventheretoday.AndIhavealsobeenprivilegedtoknowGeneralEhsan-ul-Haqinthecontextofnuclearworking groupwhereboth of us havebeenworking on trying tofacilitatetheimprovementofinternationalcooperationwithregardstociviliannuclearprogramsinPakistanandofcourse,mytwoother



panelistsMr.KhalilHashmi aswell asBrigadier ZahirKazmi.Mycommentsherearemypersonalcommentsandtheydon'trepresenttheviewsofanyorganizationIamwithorwaswith,inthepast.

IwanttoputnuclearexportcontrolsinaslightlybroaderperspectiveandthennarrowthemdowntotheNuclearSuppliersGroup(NSG)andthenthecurrentPakistaniinterestinjoiningtheNSG.Nuclearsupplycontrolhasbeenontheinternationalagendafromtheverybeginningofthenuclearage.Rightafterthe�irstnuclearexplosioninJuly1945,therehavebeenvariousproposalsonhowtocontrolthespreadofnucleartechnologyandto�indwaystofacilitateitsuseforpeaceful purposes. Some of the earlier proposals, if you willremember,theBaruchplan,PresidentEisenhower'sspeech'AtomsforPeace'intheGeneralAssembly1953,allwerestrugglingto�indways tomakeavailablenuclear energy forpeacefulpurposesbutminimizeitsusefornuclearweaponsandothermilitarypurposes..Sotheexportcontrolscameaboutinthe50sand60swhenthe�irstnucleartransactionsweremadebytheUnitedStateswithitsallieswithinEuropeandCanada.AndthenwiththeestablishmentoftheEuropean Commission following the Treaty of Rome, as part ofEurope'stradewithnuclear issuesEuratomcontrolledallnuclearactivities within the European community. The Euratom stilloccupiesthatpositionandEuratomthendevisedsafeguardsforthecontrol of civilian nuclear technology within the Europeancommunity.Thenwiththeadventofthenuclearnon-proliferationtreatyin1968,whichenteredintoforcein1970,theresponsibilityfor administrating nuclear veri�ication in the case of non-nuclearweaponstatespartytotheNPT,wasgiventotheIAEA.Thetreatydidnot specifywhat typeof safeguardswouldbeapplied.The treatyspeci�ied that the safeguards or nuclear veri�icationwould be inaccordancewiththeIAEAsafeguardsystem.SoitleftituptotheIAEAtode�inewhatthesafeguardsystemwouldbe.Butthetreatyitselfalsospeci�iesthatallnuclearweaponstatesareobligatedtoplaceundersafeguardsitsentirespectrumofnuclearactivities,nuclearmaterialsandnuclearfacilities.

So in order to come up with the technical de�inition of what iscontainedinthearticle3oftheNPT,1)Special�issionablematerial,i.e.materialthatisusedformakingnuclearweapons,whichcanonly





be HEU and/or Pu. How would one de�ine it for veri�icationpurposes?Howwouldwede�ineitforpurposesofaninternationally,legally binding treaty, between a state and an internationalveri�icationorganization?

And thenArticle3 also calls for regulating tradeand transfersofequipment specially designed and prepared for production andhandlingofspecial�issionablematerial.Sothisrelatestocontrollingtransfers of uranium enrichment and plutonium separationtechnology.Theseare theonly twosensitivepartsofnuclear fuelcycle.Andasyouknowthenuclearfuelcyclehasnodifference,youenrichuranium,youcanenrichittocertainlevel,under5%,normallybetween3.1to3.67percentforrunningalightwaterreactor.Oryoucanenrichuptoaround40,45%forrunningnuclear-poweredice-breakers, like in the Russian ice-breaker �leet. Or you can enrichuraniumabove90%foruseinnuclearweapons,aswellasuseinnaval nuclear propulsion, fast attack submarines, ballisticmissilesubmarines,andnuclearpoweredaircraftcarriers.Theprocessisexactlythesame,andsometimeswhenIamspeakingtostudentsinmy class, I say it is the same process as usingmilk to churn outyoghurt and tomake cheese and yoghurt at the other end of thespectrum.

Sothatisthechallengeoftheinternationalveri�icationsystem,thatthistechnologyhasspread,itisinuseinseveraldifferentcountriesand how do we verify its cut-off point for use only for civilianpurposes.Thevery�irstdocumenteddescriptionofexportcontrolswasmadebytheZanggerCommittee,thiswaschairedbyProfessorClaudeZanggerofSwitzerland,whichmetinViennaundertheaegisoftheIAEA.Anditsmandatewastode�inethetermsusedinarticle3intheNPTforpurposesofsafeguardsveri�icationandwhatitemswouldneedtobesafeguardedintermsofwhenitwouldbesuppliedorexportedbysupplierstates.The�irsttriggerlistforexportcontrolwasmadebyZanggerCommittee.Andthenfollowingtheshockof1974,whenIndiausednuclearmaterialdivertedfromasafeguardedreactorincontraventionofexclusivelypeacefulusecommitments,giventothegovernmentsofCanadaandtheUnitedStates.Thisshockledtoareexaminationofthenuclearexportcontrols.Atthattime,seven countries the UK, France, Germany, Canada, US, including



Australiaaswell,decidedthattheseweretheprincipalsuppliersofnuclearmaterialandtechnology,thattheywould�indawaytocopewiththechallenge,i.e.acountrythatwasnotpartytotheNPT,hadmanagedtoacquirenucleartechnology/expertiseandhadusedtoitformilitaryandweaponspurposes.AsGen.Ehsanpointedout,FrancewasnotamemberoftheNPTatthetime, itwasneverthelessinvitedtobememberoftheLondonSuppliersGroupasasupplier.TheconditionofNPTmembershipdidnotexistatthetime.Thiscamelater.Japanwasalsoinvitedtojointhesupplier'sgrouportheLondonclub.JapanalsoatthetimewasnotamemberoftheNPT.Itissortofinterestingthatinsteadofexpandingthe mandate of the Zangerr committee, which already had arecognizedstatusinthecontextoftheNPTandtheIAEA,theNuclearSuppliersGroupmetseparately,itdidnotmeetinVienna,whichistheUNheadquartersforallthingsnuclearandintermsoftheIAEA.Thechairmanshipwasalsochangedfromachairmancomingfromanon-nuclear weapons state which was Switzerland, to achairmanshipcomingfromoneofthenuclearweaponsstateswhichwastheUnitedStates.Italsoexpandeditsmandatetowhatisnowknownasdual-use items.Theseareessentiallynon-nuclear itemsthathavecivilianusesintechnologybutalsocanbeusedinnuclearweaponstechnology.Someofthisisveryspecializedequipmentsuchas high speed streak cameras because you need to capture theexplosion,expansionof thenuclearmaterialand its �issioning forpurposesofevaluatingthedesignofthenuclearweaponafterithasbeendetonated.Othertypesoftimingandfusingmechanismswhichareneededtodrivethefusingmechanismsforanuclearweapon–manyof thesehaveperfectly legitimatecivilianuses,but someofthesehaveonlyasingleuseandthatisnuclearweaponuse.Thiswaspublished in Annex II of NSG. By publishing its Annex II it alsoprovidedalistofcriticaltechnologiesthatacountryseekingnuclearweaponswouldrequire.AndthereforeitisnotsurprisingthatintheclandestineIraqinuclearweaponsacquisition,thatwasexposedin1991,afteritsdefeatinthe�irstGulfWar,manyofthethingsthatappearedon theAnnex II of theNSGwereexactlywhat the Iraqinuclearprogrammewaschasingafter.

Imentionthesetosaythatthenuclearsuppliersgrouphasalong





history.IntheNon-proliferationreviewconferenceprocess,thisisthesovereignrightofthestateparties.ThisistheonlyforumwhereNPT non-nuclear state parties, and nuclearweapon state partiesmeetevery�iveyearsandagreeonthestrengtheningofthenuclearnon-proliferationmechanism. In the agreed outcome documents,principallyof1995,2000and2010,thereisrecognitionoftheutilityofexportcontrolsbecauseitismentionedintheNPT.Thereisalsorecognition of the Zangger Committee because it has a directconnectiontotheNPT.Buttherehasneverbeenasinglementionofthe NSG. So that tells us something: that 48 countries that aremembers of the NSG do not represent the international nuclearcommunity,thisisaself-appointedgroup,which,becauseitincludestheprincipalnuclearsuppliers,hasaparticularstatusincontrollingthetransferofnucleartechnologyandmaterialsincivilianuse.

Nonetheless, in recentyears somepeoplehavesaid thatwith theexemptiongiventoanon-NPTstatein2008,thisparticularactionisadirectviolationofagreedNPTreviewconferenceoutcomesof1995and2000,wherein1995,178partiestotheNPTandin2000,190partiestotheNPT,agreedbyconsensusthatallnewnuclearsupplyagreements must require a condition of supply (i.e.) full scopesafeguards. “Full-scope safeguards” means comprehensivesafeguards.Comprehensivesafeguardscanbeappliedonlyinnon-nuclearweaponstates,whichmeansthattheentiretyofthenuclearactivityisunderinternationalveri�ication.Full-scopesafeguardsarenotappliedinNWSorinnon-NPTstateswhichhaveitems-speci�icsafeguardsashasalreadybeenpointedoutbyAmbassadorNaqviinhisintroductorycomments.

So,givinganexemptiontonon-NPTstatewithouttherequirementofa full-scope safeguard is going against what these 48 countriesthemselveshaveagreedoninadifferentforum.Sothey'realreadyincontradiction to their own earlier decision. If you look at theproceedingsofthereviewconferencesafter2000and2005andafterthe Indian nuclear cooperation agreement with the US, in 2015RevConand even this year in Vienna in the �irst preparatorycommitteeofthe2020reviewconference,severalcountriesfromthenon-alignedhavebeenverycriticalofopeningupnuclearcommercewith non-NPT nuclear states. And they have used the term“privilegedaccess”,theyhaveusedtheterminasenseofnon-NPT



states having a more privileged access than NPT NNWS whichalreadyhavethosefullsafeguards.

Mysecondpointrelates to theso-called factors thatyouwill �indlistedontheNSGwebpageasdeterminingthecriteriaorfactorsforconsiderationthatthegroupcantakeintoaccountfortakinginnewmembers. Then,when you look at the composition of the group,you'llhavesomestrangecountries likeCroatiaorCyprus.There'snothingwrongwiththesecountriesassuch,buttheyarenotnuclearsuppliers.Theyarenottransitpoints.Singaporeisatransitpoint.NotCyprusorCroatia,soifyoulookatthemapofnuclearsuppliergroup, this isallnortherncountries.Except forMexicoandSouthAfrica.SothebulkofAfrica,thebulkofAsia,andmanyoftheSouthAmericancountriesareoutsidetheNSG.Thisalso,inreality,affectstheinternationalpowerbalance.

IremembermySouthAfricanfriends,whenSouthAfricaappliedforNSGmembership,theyweregivenaverytoughtime.SouthAfricanswere very upset with NSG because they had given up sixmanufacturednuclearweapons,voluntarilydismantledthem,joinedNPTasanon-nuclear-weaponstate(NNWS)andbidedtheIAEAtoverify that theyhadnonuclearweapons,put thehighlyenricheduraniumcomingoutoftheirnuclearexplosivedevicesunderIAEAsafeguards. They had the potential to supply uranium, uraniumenrichment technology, and yet, theNSGwas �inding excuses fordelayinggivingmembership.Ittookthemnearlythreeyearstogetaccess.AndthataccessonlycamewhenSouthAfrica�inallysaidifwedon'tgetaccessnow,wearegoingtowithdrawourapplicationandwewilldowhatweneedtodoinournationalinterest.AcountrylikePakistanwhichisanon-NPTstatedoesnotneedmembershipintheNSGifitwantedtosellnuclearproductsinthenuclearmarket.Ofcourse,ithasaproblembuyingfromthenuclearmarket,butnotinselling.

ThenextpointthatIwanttomakeisthatintherecentdiscussionsfollowingtheUS-Indianuclearcooperationagreement,alotofthinktanksandacademicshavecomeupwithallsortsofdifferentcriteriaandfactorsthatcouldbetakenintoaccount.Forme,theonlyoneconcern is that the non-NPT state parties have not taken on aninternationally legally binding non-proliferation commitment. So





theyarenotgoingtosigntheNPT,astheirnuclearweaponsareareality. So that's off the table. But then, I don't see these threecountries,oratleasttwoofthesethreecountriestakingsomeotherinternationallylegallybindingnon-proliferationcommitmentasanactofgoodfaithasanactofbecomingcloserto the internationalcommunity. One of these is the CTBT, although this is not adisarmament treaty, it still restricts one element of the nuclearweapons by taking away nuclear testing which obviously hasimplicationsformodernizationofnuclearweaponarsenals.ThisIknowisasensitivesubjectinthecountryandsoIamjustputtingitonthetable.Othercriteriathathavebeenputaspartofthisdiscussionissigninguptovariousinternationalconventionsonnuclearsafetyandsecurity,UNSCresolution1540,andabunchofotherthings.Theseareveryseparate.IAEAmembersaspartoftheirmembershipintheIAEAalreadyhaveinthesensearesponsibilitytoensurethattheirciviliannuclearprogrammesarealreadyatthehigheststandardsofnuclear safety and security as agreed by them themselves in theframework of IAEA guidelines, fundamental various codes andvarious conventions. But that does not necessarily belong in thebasketofnuclearexportcontrolmechanisms.Nordo,forexample,otherelementssuchasadherencetootherexportcontrolregimes.

ThereisalsotheMissileTechnologyControlRegime(MTCR),whichisagainanotherself-selectedregime,again,notrecognizedintermsof legitimacy, international resolutions or international fora. SoMTCRis�ineforthosewhowanttojoinbutIdon'tfeelitbelongsinthediscussiononNSGguidelines.Andthisisnotwell-knownbutIalways takesomestrangedelight inmentioning toeach incomingMTCRchairman thatwehave twomembersof yourMTCRgroupwhich are engaged in the import and export of strategic ballisticmissileswhichhaveacapabilityof500kmandapayloadcapacityof300kgs. There is one nuclear weapon state whose SubmarineLaunchedBallisticMissiles(SLBM)isleasedfromanotherNWS.Itputsitsownnuclearwarheadsonthosestrategicmissiles,butthisisstraightbetweentwocountries.Ifthemissileis�ired,asatestmissile,thenthereisafeethatisagreed,sotospeakfortherentalofthesemissiles.SothisreallyistransferbecausetheuserNWSputsitonitsstrategic submarine and therefore is under its jurisdiction andcontrol.Soitisagainintermsasmallcontradictionbutnonethelessquitesigni�icant.



InanotherforumIhavediscussedtheutilityoflookingatmultilateralexport control regime in the UN framework. We already have achemicalweaponsconventionthatentered into force in1997,wehaveanorganization for theprohibitionof chemicalweapons, sowhydowestillneedtheAustraliaGroup?Wedon'thaveaglobalmissile control regime,which iswhy theMTCR is there andnowthey'veexpandeditintotheHaguecodeofconductwithmorethanahundredcountriessubscribingtoit;Pakistanisoneofthem.Thenfornuclear export controls, we already have the non-proliferationtreaty.Thereareonlyfourcountriesthatremainoutsideit,allothercountriesalreadyhaveanuclearexportcontrolobligation.So,ifwehadamultilateralsystemwhichwasproperlynegotiated,thenwehave more of a buy-in. Then we don't need these unique self-appointedgroupingsorstateshavinganunreasonablein�luence.

And�inally,IwasalsoresponsibleattheIAEAfortheNSG.EveryyearthechairmanwouldcometouswiththeagreedstatementsandaswellaswiththeagreedupdatestothetwoannexesoftheNSGwhichwerepublishedinINFCIRC25.AndwealwaysaskedthemwhatweattheIAEA,areinterestedin,i.e.informationondenial.Denialintermsof inquiriesmadeby countriesor companies seekingdualuseorotheritemssothatIAEAcanmatchittoseeifanyofitscountriesundersafeguardsareseekingtoacquirenuclearweaponcapabilityinaclandestinemannerwhichisillegalundertheNPTforNNWSortheymightbeacquiringnucleartechnologyormaterialsthatarenotdeclaredtotheIAEA.Theanswerwewouldalwaysgetwouldbethatwell,thechairoftheNSGasagroupcannotprovidesuchinformation,onlyindividualcountriescanprovidethatinformation.Sothenmyreplywouldbe,sowhyareyouinmyof�ice?Icangotoeachofthe48countriestorequestthatinformation.YouarenotprovidingaservicetotheIAEA.Thisofcoursewouldn'tgodownwellbutpointedtowhatis sometimes advertised as non-proliferation bene�it of somemechanisms,inpracticedoesn'tendupbeingso.

Finally,theIAEAGeneralConferenceinSeptemberprovidesagoodvenueforcountriestoholdsideeventsasawayofhavingdiscussionsorputtingforwardwhattheymighthavedoneinprovingnuclearsecurity.EspeciallyinthecaseofPakistan,whichisunderdiscussionhere,toreachabroaderaudiencetopeoplewhodon'tknowaboutthisissueortoremindthemofthesigni�icantstridesthatPakistan





has made over the past ten years or so on its export controllegislationandthecasethatithasmadeanditisgenerallybelievedthat if you compare nuclear regulators, the Pakistan regulatoryagencyhasbeencerti�iedbytheIAEAtobeanindependentregulator.TherearestillsomequestionswherethePNRA'sindependencecouldbefurtherstrengthenedbutasimilardeterminationhasnotyetbeenmadeoftheIndiannuclearregulator.Again,thisissomethingthat'snotwellknown–thereisaCentreofExcellence(CoE)inPakistanonnuclearsecuritywhichisusedbytheIAEAasproviderofnuclearsecuritytraininginaregionalcontext.TheIAEADGvisited,Ithinkitwaslastyear,andmentionedintheopeningstatementoftheBoardofGovernorsthatyoudonothaveasimilarequivalentontheothersideoftheborder.

SoIwillstophere.



Brig Zahir KazmiDirectorACDA,SPD

BrigadierZahirKazmihasbeenDirectorattheArmsControlandDisarmamentAffairs (ACDA)branchofPakistan’sStrategicPlansDivisionsince2014.Earlier,he was the �irst Visiting Fellow for South Asia(Strategic Affairs) at the IISS. His interests includearms control, deterrence, non-proliferation,terrorism,andstrategicandsecurityissuesinSouthAsia.Heiswidelypublishedandamuchsought-afterspeaker at prestigious international forums onstrategicissues.Hispublicationsinclude‘NormalisingtheNon-ProliferationRegime’, a 2015article in theIISSjournalSurvival.

S p e a k e r

SESSION1:Pakistan'sEngagementwithNSG



30

Pakistan'sEngagementwithNSG

WhatIamgoingtobetalkingaboutwillbeslightlyprovocativeatsome places and will be in my personal capacity, it does notnecessarilyre�lectwhatSPDorACDAthinksabout.

I'll start with a provocative and perhaps technically incorrectremark,whichbasicallydrawsfromtwocomments.OnemadebyGeneral Ehsan-ul-Haq, once he called NSG a cartel, and likewise,whenonceDr.TariqRaufwasmentioningthatwhileemphasizingonZangerCommitteeandthensayingthe48memberswithinNSGarealsonotreallyfollowingtheNPTorthespiritofnon-proliferationregime.(Imaybemisinterpretingwhathesaid)butathoughtthatcametomymindwasthatwhyisitthatthe48countrieswithinNSGprefertocallthemselvesParticipatinggovernments(PGs)andnotmembers.Perhapsthatisbecausetheyalsoneedsomelegitimacy.Sopronouncing the word “government” perhaps gives that




statusoritistheissueofseekingsomesortofstatusbecauseofwhichtheyprefertocallthemselvesparticipatinggovernments.MyexamquestiontodayisabouthowhasPakistanengagedwiththeNSG.Itisaprettysimplequestionandmostof theparticipantsheredoknowaboutit.SoI'llbebriefaboutit,itmakesmyjobeasier.

PakistanhasalonghistoryofengagementwiththeNSGandinfactitsengagementwiththeNPTgoesbackevenbeforeNSGwascreatedin1975,afterastateproliferatedandtestedanuclearweapon.SoIthinkifoneweretobecorrect,Pakistan'sengagementeventhoughithadnever signed NPT, goes much beyond that in 1950s. So thisengagementwithNSGhastakenamorestructuredformoverthelastfewyearsthathasresultedinthreeoutreachmeetingswiththeNSGtroika,asintroducedbyMr.KhalilHashmi.Onewasin2011,secondin2013andthethird in2015inVienna.MymentorAirCommodoreKhalid Banuri has been personally engaged in some of thesemeetings.Andtheseinteractionsprovidedanopportunitytocandidlyexchange views on commitments related to non-proliferation,national export controls, NSG standards as well as other relatedtechnicalissues.PakistanhasinvitedNSGtroikatovisitPakistanatitsearliest convenience, I think itwould be one of the best times todiscuss before they meet, perhaps in the latter part of the year,informally again. During the outreachmeetingwithNSG troika in2015, Pakistani delegation held constructive discussions andelaborated its credentials for NSG membership, highlighted theimpactofdiscriminatoryapproachonthenon-proliferationregimeandstrategicstabilityanddiscussedthewayforwardforPakistan'scontinuedengagementwithNSG.Pakistanalsosharedanon-paperwithNSGtroikaandrequesteditscirculationtotheNSGmembers,and I don't know whether it was circulated because as it wasmentionedthatweareyetnotamemberintheNSG.

Sowhat'sPakistan'scase?IfIweretosumitupinveryfewwords,it'sapopulouscountry;it'sahugemarketofaround200million,ithasgrowing energy needs, and nuclear energy plays a small butimportantroleinanenvironmentwhichisbasicallyfossil-fuel-based.Sotherehastobeanenergymix,andthemorewerelyonfossilfuel,the more we spend. The reliance on nuclear energy is less costintensiveanditalsodealswiththeglobalidealsofusingenvironmentfriendlymeans of energy. So Islamabad desires to build on these


engagementswiththetroikaandwithNSGandgainthemembership.WeappliedinMay2016,remindsmeofMay1998,sowefollowedIndiaonitsheelsandappliedforNSGmembership.

BeforeIgivesomemoreremarksonourengagement,andmyviewsontheNSGmembershipandthepoliticsetc.aroundit,Icameupwiththesefour�iveprincipleswhichIthinkshouldbekeptinmindwhileconsidering the applications of non-NPT states, and the �irst onewouldbeperhapstransparency.Notmuchisknownaboutwhatgoesoninthiscartel.TheonlythingyougettoknowissometimesforexamplelastyearwhentheArmsControlAssociationtalkedabouttheso-calledGrossiprocess.That'sonetimethatsomethingcameoutinpublic.Thesecondisthatwhateverhappensinsidethisgroupworksonthebasisofconsensus,itshouldcontinuetoworkonthebasisofconsensus,ratherthanaplurilateralprocesswhichactuallythen tries topressurize themembersordiscriminateagainst anynewapplicantsbethesenon-NPTstatesorthestateswhichareNPTsignatories.

Moreover,thegroupalsoshould,asamatterofprinciple,workfornon-proliferationandpeacefulcooperationofnuclearenergyratherthanrelyingmoreonpoliticsandenforcingatechnologicalapartheidoncountrieswhichneedaccesstopeacefulnucleartechnology.Andthelastoneis,thelittlethatIhavetriedtounderstandthe70yearsofnuclearnon-proliferation,myimpressionisthatthereareperhapstwosetsofinternationallawinthe�ieldofnon-proliferationi.e.,thestatesthatarelike-mindedandtheoneswhicharenotlike-minded.AndasMr.KhalilHashmihadmentionedearlierthattherearetwogroups,andItendtoechohissentiment,withintheNSG.One,whichhasthenon-proliferationpuristsandtheotherwhichisinahastetoviolatenon-proliferationnorms.That'swhyitissometimescalledacartel.Forthem,allstatesareequalbutsomestatesaremoreequalthanothers.

Soasfarasthesenon-proliferationpuristsareconcerned,theyarerelyingonNPTasitscornerstoneinwhichNSGandIAEAareitstwoprominentinstitutions.AndforthemthecartelrequirementisNPTmembershipandasMr.TariqRaufmentionedfull-scopesafeguards.SothatmakesthecaseofcountrieslikePakistan,IndiaorIsraelverycomplicated because if it is etched into stone and there is no

AReviewof27thNSGPlenaryandImplicationsforSouthAsia32 AReviewof27thNSGPlenaryandImplicationsforSouthAsia


�lexibilitythenyoucan'texpandthenon-proliferationregimeandnormsbyincorporatingthesecountriesthatlieoutsidetheregimeandyoucannotreviseNPTaswell.Sothencomesthesecondoption,whichis,tohaveauniformcriteriononthebasisofwhichyougettheothernon-NPTstateswithintheNSGfold.AndIthinkanattemptwasmadebyAmbassadorImmanuelGrossiwhogavecertaincriteriainthisarmscontrolorganization'spaperofDecember6butitmaybeprematuretotalkaboutwhatcriteriasuitsPakistanbecause�irst,asastepone,NSGshoulddecidehowdoesitwanttodealwiththenon-NPTapplicants.

Towards the end, I would just conclude by saying that Pakistanremainscommittedtotheobjectiveofnon-proliferationandsharestheglobalconcernregardingtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction and the means of delivery. And as a participatinggovernment, or member of the NSG, Pakistan would like tocontribute constructively to the global non-proliferation regime.Besides NSG membership, it is essential for its socio-economicdevelopment,technologicaladvancementandthePGstendtogainmorebyacceptingPakistanintotheirfoldratherthankeepingitoutinthecold.



SESSIONIQ&A/Discussion

w w w . c i s s . o r g . p k


Question:Thankyou,Chair.MyquestionisforDr.TariqRauf.ShouldPakistan sign Additional Protocol and would this step improvePakistan'schancesofmembership?Thankyou.

Question: My name is Dr. Shahid Bokhari from Strategic VisionInstituteandmyquestionisforMr.Hashmi.WhatkindofdiplomaticeffortshasPakistantakentoextendsupportinfavourofitsclaimforitsmembership?

Question: I'm Nida Shahid. My question is for Dr. Rauf. I waswondering,sinceyoualludedinyourcommentsthatNSGisn'tdoingthatmuchandthere'saneedforanothermultilateralforumcomingfromeithertheUNortheIAEA,sohowfeasibleisthat?AndshouldwebeaspiringforthatratherthantheNSG?

Dr. Tariq Rauf: So theAP ismuchmisunderstood in a lot of theliterature and the writings out there. There are actually threeversionsoftheProtocol:NNWSpartytotheNPThastoaccepttheentirety of themeasures of the AP,which gives the IAEA greateraccess to information, greater access to locations as well as theauthoritytogoandlookforundeclaredmaterialandsiteswhichtheIAEAmightsuspectexistsontheterritoryofsuchstates.NWScanpick and choose elements of the Protocol that they think willcontributetonon-proliferation.Thisisintheprologue.SoChinaandRussiahavesignedaprotocolthatthatonlyprovidesinformationtotheIAEAonnuclearexportstonon-nuclearweaponstates.SoitdoesnotgivetheIAEAaniotaofveri�icationauthority.Similarly,intheUK,FranceandUS,whiletheyhaveacceptedmoremeasuresonpaper,inreality the IAEAdoesnot get any additional veri�ication rights inthosethreeNWS.Forexample,intheUS,theIAEAneedstotakeanenvironmental sample of a nuclear facility, the President of theUnitedStatesofAmerica(POTUS)hastoissueanauthorization.Inorder to remove that sample from US to Vienna, anotherauthorizationisneeded.So,inpractice,therearezerobene�itstotheIAEA.

IndiasignedtheAPmodelbasedonChineseAP,onlyinformationonfuture exports of nuclear itemswhich need to be safeguarded to

Q&ASessionI

36




NNWS.ButIalsoneedtopointoutthatallmemberstatesoftheIAEAunderthestatutehavetherighttodecidewhichpartofthenuclearfuelcycletheywanttoputundersafeguards.Soforanon-NPTNNWs,theyhavetoputeverythingundersafeguardsbut,PakistanandIndiaasnon-NPTstatesgettodecidewhattheywanttooffer.Sothereasonwhy I am concerned is that India because it has an additionalprotocol,inalotoftheliteratureitisbelievedthatithasaprotocollikeaNNWsandtheIAEAhasexpandedveri�icationpowersandthatisnotcorrect.

Withregard to thismultilateral framework,at themoment, therereally isn't much possibility of doing that but people have beentalkingaboutitsothereisapossibilitythatifacountrylikePakistanweretothinkthatthisissomethingofinteresttothem,theycouldtryandbuildacoalitionatthe�irstcommitteeandthinkaboutapossibleresolutioninafewyears'timeandonceyougetagoodideaanditstartstocollectmoreandmoreadherence.SoIwillleaveitatthat.

Mr. Khalil Hashmi:Verybrie�ly,asIsaidearlier,ourengagementandoutreachatvariouslevels,invariousforms,invariousformats–this takes the form at the leadership level, diplomatic level andexpert level. So whenever, in terms of meetings, with the PrimeMinister,theAdvisor,andsoonandsoforth,wheneverthereisanoccasion for interactionwith a NSGmember country, that is theoccasionwheretheseissuesaretakenupandhighlighted.Also,asIexplained,IwasinBern,IwasinViennainAprilandbeforethatourcolleagues before me, had interacted with other NSG membercountries.SothatprovidesyouanopportunitytoputacrossourownideasandperspectiveonwhyandhowwewanttobecomemembersofNSG.Thereareofcourseotherinternationalplatformswherewemake our statements. All in all, we do, and will continue to dowhateverisnecessarytoarticulateourcaseandprojectourposition.

Question:Sir,honoredtobehereinfrontofaveryillustriouspanel.IhaveonequestionforDr.RaufandforMr.Hashmi.Dr.Rauf,youhaveextensivelydealtwithPakistaninvariouscapacitiesinternationally,relatedtonuclearmatters.Mr.Hashmihasmentionedlegal,politicalandtechnicalaspectsonwhichthediscussionshavesofarfocused.Inyourownindependentassessmentcanyouidentifysomeofthe

Q&ASessionI

37


speci�ic measures which Pakistan can consider in each of thesedimensions which would hopefully improve Pakistan's case formembership? AndMr. Hashmi, looking at Pakistan's approachtowardsitscaseforNSGmembership, ifyoulookatit intermsofwillingnesstotakeadditionalobligationsortooffermoreincentivesto the international community, speci�icallyNSG, canyou identifyanyspeci�icincentivesthatPakistancanoffertotheNSGmemberstates which will allow states to look more sympathetically toPakistan'scase.

Question:ThankyouChair,IamGhalibfromSPD.IhavethreebriefquestionsfromDr.TariqRauf.YoutalkedaboutsafeguardsandAPs–ArgentinaandBrazilhavearegionaltreatyandbothcountrieshavenotsignedtheAPandlikethem,someotherNSGPGshavetermeditburdensomeandnotnecessarilyrequired.DoyouthinktherecouldbeanyproposalforregionalmechanismbetweenIndiaandPakistanakin toABACCof course in theNon-NPTcategory?Maybea littleinnovative.

Second is regarding safeguards. Once initially the document wasbeingformulated,USandIndiaplayedaverypowerfulroleinthelate1950sandthenegotiateddocumentthatwascreatedwasthatUSwantedtokeepcontrolintheirhandsinthefuturenegotiationsinthebilateral nuclear cooperation for the reactors which were beingconsideredatthetimewhichwereprobablyofsmallermegawattsmaybe5MWandbelow,forthecategoryofmuchmorepower.USwanted to maintain leverage. However, India was successful inscuttlingtheUSeffortsat that timeandthesafeguardsdocumentwhichwas�inalizedwasnotall-encompassing.

LastpointisabouttheNPTRevConinthiscontext–arethereanyideas that in the next conference maybe there could be someinnovativeideasforamendingcertainconditionswhichwerelaidbythoseNPTstatesatthattimetoaccommodatenewNSGaspirants.Thankyou.

Question: This is Anam Khan. I wanted to ask Mr. Khalil, youmentioned that there hadn't beenmuch change in the countries'positions in this plenary. So how would you rate the Pakistanidiplomacywhichwasmuchbetterbackin2008?Secondly,whatis

Q&ASessionI

38




yourinsightaboutthecriteriathatPakistanmayhave�loatedtothemembercountries,whatwouldbethemainpointersofthatcriteriawhichPakistanwouldwantthatmustbefollowedbythePGsandtherecouldbesomecommonalitiesbetweenthatcriteriaandthecriteriathatisbeinggivenbythePGswhichfavorsIndiaaswell.

Question: IamRubinaWaseemandI'maPhDcandidateinNDU.Myquestion is directed at Dr. Rauf. I justwant to ask about the eightreactorswhichareunsafeguardedandtheseparationofthosereactorsdoesn't exist – can IAEA play any constructive role to bring thosereactorsundersafeguards,becauseobviously theuraniumwhich itwillgetafterthedeal,canbeusedintheirmilitaryprogramme?

Khalil Hashmi: The �irst question onwhat type of incentives thatPakistancanoffer:Ithinkatthisstageitisabitprematuretoaskthatbecause�irstofallintermsofprocedure,itisfortheNSGtodeterminecriteriaorbenchmarks.Thatdiscussionisstilltakingplace.Thereisnoagreementorevenemergingonwhatcouldconstitutethecriteriaorbenchmarkorelementsofthesecriteria.

Wehaveafairunderstandingofwhatcouldconstituteacriterionbutitwouldbepremature to list.FromPakistan'spointofview,wehavemadestatementsatthehighestlevelthatwewanttobemainstreamedintheNon-proliferationregime(NPR);thatisasigni�icantstatement.PakistanwillnottransferWMDtechnologiesoritemstostatesornon-stateactors.Wehaveaveryrobustexportcontrolregimeandduringourdialoguewithseveralcountries,wheneverthatopportunitycomesatvariousinternationalforums,wetrytohighlightthat.SoourpostureisthatwearepreparedtolookatwhateverNSGcomesupwith.Themain point we highlight is that whatever criteria the NSG evolvesshouldbeapplicabletoPakistan.

Secondly,whenImentionednochangeincountries'position, IwasactuallyreferringtotheirownpositionsintermsoftheprocessorintermsofsupporteithertoIndiaandPakistan.IgatherwhatyouintendmetosayiswhetherPakistan'soutreacheffortshaveresultedinmorecountries' support. Certainly they have helped in creating anunderstandingandappreciationofourargumentsandourcasebutasweallknow,theultimatedecisionwilltakeintoaccountnotjustthetechnicalaspectsorthelegalaspectsbutthepoliticalaspectsofitwillplayanimportantrole.

Q&ASessionI

39


The second part of your question in terms of criteria, whetherPakistanhassuggestedsomecriteria.Again,itisprematuretosayforusbecausewearenotmembersoftheNSGyetanditwouldbeoutoflineforanon-membertosuggestcriteria.

Tariq Rauf:Firstofall,ashasbeenmentionedbyBrig.Kazmi,theNSG has participating governments- that means that guidelinesagreedbytheNSGarenotlegallybindingonthemembersoftheNSG,whichiswhytheyarePGs.Thesetofguidelineswhicharevoluntarilyagreed on include national legislation for each country whichdeterminesexportpolicy.Similarly,theNSGguidelinespublishedbyIAEAarealsonotlegallybinding.

I think some of the measures that Pakistan could take are thatcontinuebeinganobserverstateinNPTRevCon(Whichwestoppeddoingafter1998).Whenacountryisinaroom,criticalstatementsmadeagainstonearemoderated.Youhavetheopportunitytomakeastatementback,alsocirculatepaperswhichcanbecomepartoftheinternationalrecordforever.Andsothisistyingone'shandbehindone'sback.

AndhereIthinkfaultliesnotonlywithbureaucracyabutalsocivilsociety community which is always up in arms. In my view this�ixationwithIndiaandsaying“thisisnotinourvocabulary”and“thatisnotinourinterest”,“delayisinourinterest”,“goingslowisinourinterest”,ishamperingourinterestandprogressandispreventinganew face and a new narrative. This is 2017. Times havemoved,people need to change their thinking. Doesn't mean that onecompromisesallofone'sprinciples.Weneedtopresentanewfaceand have a new initiative. There are some other services,international physical protection service and so on at the IAEA,which is the right of any IAEA member state, which could beundertakenbyPakistanforitsownnationalinterest,notforanyoneelse.

Two very quick questions, a price that was paid for the 2008exemption to India that Brazil insisted that ABACC should beconsideredasafunctionalequivalentoftheAPandArgentinaandBrazilshouldnotsigntheAP.Thisconcessionwasgiven.WhichgoesagainstwhattheDGIAEAhasbeenaskingsince1997thatfortheIAEAtocarryoutitsveri�icationitneedssafeguardsagreementsplus

Q&ASessionI

40




theAPinforceasanewveri�icationstandardforNNWS.BrazilandArgentinaareNNWS.ItwasalsomyresponsibilityattheAgencytonegotiate the additional protocols and part of the problem withBrazilwasthattheyhaveanavalnuclearprogrammethattheywanttoexemptenrichmentfrom.ArgentinaisreadytosigntheAPbutBrazil is not. ABACC is quadripartite agreement where you haveBraziliansonArgentineanterritoryandviceversa.ThatIdon'tthinkisgoingtohappenhereatnuclearfacilities.Withregardtotheeightnuclearpowerplantsorwhatever inIndiathatmaybeoutsideofsafeguards,asImentionedasmemberstateoftheIAEA,IndiaandforthatmatterPakistanhastherighttodecidewhichpowerplantstoputundersafeguards.SoiftheIndiansleftoffsomething,it'snotuptotheIAEAtogouptothemandsaywhydon'tyouputthatundersafeguards.

SomaybePakistancoulddo that,where in thenextdiscussion inNovember,thereisanagendaitemonreviewingNSG'scooperationwithIndiainraisingthisissue.IsIndiareallyful�illingthetermsoftheagreementthattheymadewithyouin2008?Andifyouthinktherearede�iciencies,youcanpointthoseout.Question:ThankyouChair.IamSaimaAmanSial,SeniorResearchFellowhereattheCenterandIhaveaquestionandacomment.MyquestioncomesfromwhatBrigadierKazmiwastalkingabout,thattransparency should be one of the conditions which PGs sittinginsidetheNSGshouldconsiderandinthisregard,IwasrecallingoneofourmeetingsattheStatedepartmentwhereastafferraisedthispointanditstruckme;hesaidthatweweremovingaheadwiththeNSGmembershipofIndiaifithadnotbeenforthenewsleakingout.SoIfeelthisisoneofthethingsthatnegativelyimpactshowIndiawasbeingbroughtinthroughthebackdoor.Myquestionishowdoesopacityhinderourprospectsformembershipandouroutreach?Ifthisisthewaythingsgoabout,iftheGrossiformulahadnotcomeoutthroughonenewsstory?

Secondly,IwouldwanttocommentonthemeasuresthatPakistancantake.IfeelthatPakistanisaresponsiblenuclearweaponstateandcantakesomemeasuresthatarecostfreeforit,withouttyingthemtoanyquid-proquo.IfeelthattheseparationofthemilitaryandcivilianfacilitiesaswellassigninganAParetwomeasuresthatareinPakistan'sinterestasitshowedinterestinbeinganuclearfuel

Q&ASessionI

41

supplieraswell.

Question:AdilSultan–Thankyousir, Iwill try tobebrief. I justwantedtobringoutadifferentperspectivesinceIwaspartofthatcore teamwhichwas involved inNSGconsultations lastyearandprimarilyIwillgivemyownassessmentthatoncewegetintothetechnicaldetails,welosesightoftheoverallstrategicscenario.

NSGisapoliticalissue;itisnotalegalortechnicalissue.BecauseNSGisnotaformalregime,thereisnolegalityintoit. It isgoingtobepoliticallymotivated.WhenNSGdecidesthecriteriaformembershipforIndiaandPakistan,itwillbepoliticallydriven.Thatisthemainthingthatweshouldnotlosesightof.WhyIamsayingthisisthatweneedtorecallthehistoricalfactsalso.In2008onceIndiawasgrantedthe nuclear exemption, it became entitled to nuclear trade. SobecomingNSGmemberdoesn'taddanytechnicalvalue,butpoliticalvalue to it. Indiasubsequentlybecameaggressive inpursuing themembership of all four export control regimes. In 2010,the USPresidentBarakObamastatedthatIndiashouldbemadepartoffourregimes.AndsubsequentlyweseestrongerandveryaggressivepushbytheUS;armstwistingofEuropeanstates,itsallies,tocreatethatexemptionforIndiainallthefourregimes

Andwewitnessedthat�irsthandduring2016proceedingsontheNSGplenaryonthesidelinesofexportmeetingseverywhere.Andwealso saw Prime Minister Modi aggressively pursuing this NSGmembershipcriteriaduringhisbilateralengagementswithalltheworldleaders,whethertheywerepartoftheNSGornot.SoIndiabecameamemberoftheMTCR,Indiaisdesperatelytryingtobecomeamemberof theNSGand India inMay2017hadsaid that ithasaligned its six export control guidelines with the WassenaragreementandnextistheAustraliagroup.

Nowwhataretheadvantagesafterbecomingthememberofthefourexportcontrolregimes?IndiaisalreadygettingeverythingitwantsfromitsEuropeanpartnersandtheUnitedStates.Soitisessentiallyaprestige issue which PM Modi has made and Obama's politicalinvestmentwasbehindit.Now,Obamaisnomorethere.PresidentTrump doesn't generally like any of the initiatives started byPresidentObamaandlikewiseEUcountriesdonottaketheUSthatseriouslyastheyweretakingObama.Ithinkwehavetotakethese


Q&ASessionI

42


factors into considerations and likewise we should build up ourmomentumtocounterbecauseitisnotthatwewantdesperatelytobecomemembersoftheNSGbutitisaprinciplepositionforanythingforwhichIndiaquali�ieswehaveequalcredentialsweshouldalsobemadeapartofthatregime.

Ambassador Naqvi:ThisquestionraisedmadebyDr.AdilSultanbeforethecomment,BrigZahirKazmiifyouwouldwanttoaddresssit.

Brig. Zahir Kazmi: I think some of the answer is already in theremarksDr.AdilSultanhasmade thequestion ispartyansweredoncehewastalkingaboutthepoliticsaroundthenon-proliferationregime and Imade this comment about transparencywithin thegroup.Pleaserecallhowthe2008tradewaiverwasmanagedforaparticularcountrythroughaplurilateralprocesswithinthegroupandthenstrongarmingtheothersintogivingitthewaiver.Ithinkwhen there is opacity within the group, there can be problems,becauseforexamplethetwostepprocessesthatMr.KhalilHashmiwas mentioning, if the step one is being discussed and theengagementevenwithinthegroupisselectivethatyouengage inpennypacketsonecountryaftertheotherandyouthinkthatnowyou have a consensus and leaving others and present it as aconsensusdocument,youcanhaveproblems.Thatishowyoucanmaneuver the process and build the pressure in making adiscriminatorydecision,that'swhatIwasreferringto.

Q&ASessionI

43


ConcludingRemarks

General Ehsan-ul-Haq

Thankyouverymuch,yescertainlyIamgratefulbecauseasIsaidthetopicwasthedeliberationthattookplaceintheplenaryandIwantedto hear a more informed input on what happened there. Myinformationwasallfromtheopensourcesandfromthenewspapers,butnowweknowwherewestandintermsoftransparencyofthosemeetings.

First, what we have to realize is that our nuclear capability, ournuclearprogramisareality.Itcannotbewishedawaybythosewhodidn'twantittobethere,sowehavegottoproceedfromthatpointofself-con�idence.Itisthere,itisareality.Youhavetomoveforwardfromthere.NowitwillbeahugepoliticaladvantageifwecanbepartofNSG.Ifwecanbeinsidetheregimeandtheinternationalnuclearorder accepts us as a nuclear state, we would have crossed amilestoneonthewaytoourmainstreaming.IthinkitshouldbeourutmostpoliticalanddiplomaticendeavortogetintoNSG.Let'sbeveryclearonthat.

Thereareafewthingsthatdeterminethecontextinwhichwecangetinto this regime. First, we must understand that our nuclearcapabilitiesarethefoundationofournationalsecuritycompulsionssomething which I said at the outset. There is total nationalconsensusonthat.Thisiswhattheinternationalcommunitymustunderstandandappreciate.TherearenotwoviewsinPakistanthatwhetherweshouldhaveanuclearcapabilityorweshouldnothaveanuclearcapability.As longas thismessagegoes loudandclear tomembersoftheNSGorbeyondthenIthinktheywillappreciatewhattoaskfromPakistanandwhattoexpectfromPakistan.Wewouldliketobetreatedinafairandanon-discriminatorywaytomainstreamasanequalmember.Thesewordsareimportant,wehavetobeanequalmemberandofcourse,wehavetobe�lexible.Iabsolutelyagree,withSaima,therearemanythingsthatwecandoandIamsogladthatDr.Tariqisherebecauseinourworkinggroup,IhadbeeninsistingthathemustcometoPakistanandspeaktoawideraudienceonissueswhichwecandowithoutacostanddon'treallyimpingeonanyred.

44

ConcludingRemarksGeneralEhsan-ul-Haq



line as far as our nuclear capabilities are concerned Now, as aconsequenceofwhatIsaid,wewillnotacceptanyconditions,andinthiscasevery,verysubjective,whicharenotapplicabletoIndia.WehavebeensayingthisandI thinkthere isnoharminrepeating iteverytimethatwewillbepreparedtodo,whatyouasktheIndianstodoandwhattheyhavedonetogetthatextraspecialtreatment.Wewillbepreparedtodothat.Pleasegiveusthattreatmentbutdon'taskusanythingbeyondthatbecauseforusNSG,asIsaid,isvery,veryuseful.Itisverydesirablebutthenwearenotdesperateaboutit.IthinkwearelivingwithouttheNSG,thisisamessagethatmustgooutfromthisforumthatwecanlivewithoutNSG,wecanlivethroughsanctions,wecanlivethroughdiscriminationbutwethinkitistoouradvantage to be mainstreamed. It is to our advantage to makeprogressandweareprepared,weare�lexibleonthataslongasIsaiditdoesn'tinfringeonthered�lags.Itcannotbeusedasacoercionoracontainmentoracurtailmentofourlegitimatesovereignrights.ThisisamessagethatIthoughtwemightsendout.

Now,inmyview,Pakistan'sinclusionintotheNSG,infactPakistan,India,letmeusetheIword,theotherIwordbecauseModiisvisitingIsrael, I think our inclusionwill strengthen, the non-proliferationregime, rather thanweakening it; as in sometimes the argumentpresented.Pakistanhasaverygoodrecordonexportcontrol,safety,security, and we cannot be in a perpetual punishment andbanishmentfortheA.QKhanaffair.Ithinkatimehascome,wehavenowpassedthatadecadeormorethanadecadeandahalfback.Wedid take somevery stringentmeasures and Iwas apart of thoseproceedings so I think, we should, very con�idently, with self-assurancegouptotheinternationalcommunityandsay,'holdon!don'tkeepgoingbacktotheA.QKhanaffair,wearewaypastthat,wehavevery,veryenviablerecordonalltheseissuesandwehaveaverylegitimatecasetobeconsideredparticularlywhenitcomestoourenergyneeds'.

Ispeci�icallyonceagainwanttosay,self-con�idenceisthekey.Ithinkthesituationischanging.InthelasttwoplenarieswhentheIndianswentoutandPresidentObamawassortofkeepinghishandontheirback it didn't work and I think since then there is a far greaterrealizationwithintheNSGmembersandoutsidethattherecan'tbeanydiscrimination.ItwillnotworkandIthinktheIndianshavealso

45


realizeditandrealityhasdawneduponthemthatitcannothappenthatway.Ijustwanttomaketwomorepoints,�irstisontheoutreach.Iamgladourdiplomacy,ourdiplomaticoutreachhasgonebeyondUnitedStates.Franklyspeaking,foralongtime,ouroutreachwaspremised on the assumption that if we can convince the UnitedStates,thentherestofthemembershipoftheNSGandthebroaderinternationalcommunitywillcomeonboard.Whereassomeofusfeltthat no, we have to know all these members of NSG and theinternationalcommunityareequallyimportantandweneedtoreachouttothemindividuallyandcollectivelyandmakeourcaseandwehaveseenthataverylargenumberofthemhaveturnedaroundtoourviewpoint;whichinitselfissomethingwhichwillbewitnessedandwillbemonitoredbytheUnitedStates.

LetmealsotellyouthatourAmericanfriendsevensuggestedthistousthatlookguys,allthetimeyouaretryingtoconvinceus,wearenottheonlyones,goouttherearemanymorestates.TalktothemanditwillmakeadifferenceandIthinkitwillmakeadifferenceanditismakingadifference.Finallythereweremanyquestionsregardingwhatinourview,isthecriteria.Inmyviewitisverysimple,wedon'treallyhavetowriteathesisonwhatisourcriteria.Ourcriteriaisverysimple:Nodiscrimination.Anythingthatisnon-discriminatorywillbeacceptabletousanditwillcarryusthroughtothemembershiporonto any other forum, as long as it is non-discriminatory. If it isdiscriminatory,itwillinvariablybeaimedatknockingusdown.Ifwecankeepthedetailsupoursleeves,butaslongaswethrowoutthismessage“nodiscrimination”Ithinkwewillbeabletocomeuptothecriteria.Onceagain,AmbassadorsahibIamverygratefultohavebeenaskedonthisforumandtobeabletosharemyviewswiththisverywellinformedandverydistinguishedgroupandIamparticularlygratefultohaveTariq,Kazmi,andKhalilSahabwithusonthepanelanditisindeedaprivilegetobe listeningtoyourwell informedopinion. Icertainlyambetterinformed.

Thankyouverymuch!


46

SESSION I I

Global Conventional and Nuclear Force

Modernization:

Implications on South Asia

Dr. Christoph BluthProfessor,BradfordUniversity,UK

ProfessorChristophBluthiscurrently,teachingattheBradfordUniversity.Hehasalongcareerofteachingand research. He served as Research FellowDepartmentofWarStudies,atKing'sCollegeLondon.HewaslectureratUniversityofEssex,UniversityofReading,UniversityofLeeds,YonseiUniversity,Seoul.HewasalsoaResearchFellowatKoreaInstituteforDefenseAnalyses.Hehasauthoredfourbooks:


S p e a k e r

USForeignPolicyintheCaucasusandCentralAsia:Politics,EnergyandSecurity(I.B.Taurus,2013)Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, (Dulles Va,PotomacBooks,2011)Hanbondodilemma,HanulPublishers,Seoul,2009HotspotKorea,Cambridge:PolityPress,2008.

48

SESSIONII:ColdWarNuclearStrategies:ImpactonSouthAsia


ColdWarNuclearStrategies:ImpactonSouthAsia

Thankyouverymuchandgoodafternoonladiesandgentlemen,

IamveryhonoredtobeheretogivesomeofmythoughtsaboutthestrategicsituationinSouthAsiausingtheexampleoftheColdWarwhichIhavestudiedveryextensively.IthinkthesituationinSouthAsiaisveryinterestingjustfromanacademicpointofviewbecausetheconsensusintheacademiccommunityisthatstatesthathavenuclearweaponsdon'tgotowarwitheachotherandthatgenerallynuclearweaponshaveawarpreventingcapacity.WhatappearstohavehappenedinSouthAsia,atleastintheearlyyearsoftheovertnuclearization,isthattheoppositehashappenedandthatcon�lictshaveinawaybecomesmallerbutperhapsmorefrequent.So,thisleavesavery seriousquestionwhethernuclearweaponsat somepointortheotherbeactuallyused?

49



NowwhatIamgoingtodoistolookalittlebitatthemilitarydoctrineandthoughtonbothsidestogainagreaterunderstandingabouthowtheroleofnuclearweaponsisconceptualizedandinparticularifwelook at the academic and expert literature on nuclear threats,deterrence, and forcepostures.Thiswas largelydeveloped in thecontextoftheColdWarconfrontationbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatesandtheirrespectiveEuropeanalliesandthereforeitisnotsurprisingmanyPakistaniandIndianmilitaryexpertsarelookingattheconceptsandstrategiesdevelopedduringthattime.

Inordertounderstandthisalittlebitmoreclearly,IamgoingtotalkabitabouttheNATOnuclearpolicyduringtheColdWarperiodandIshould say that I have studied of course very extensively indeclassi�ieddocumentsaswellassecondaryliterature.NowIthinkifwelookatthisveryclosely,weseethattheanalyticalconceptsthathavebeendevelopedshowsthatourimportantmisconceptionsandfalseanalogsand the factors that gave rise toa strategic stabilityduringtheColdWarintheEast-Westcon�lictwaslargelyabsentinSouthAsia.NowIamgoingtosummarizethembrie�lyasfollows.

First of all, the persistent con�lict between two protagonists thatemerged after World War II did not involve territory disputesbetween them although there were territorial disputes at theperipheryoftheColdWarsystem.Secondly,theheartlandsofthetwoprotagonists were separated by very considerable geographicaldistances.Therewaslittleprospectofeithertheprotagonistbeingsubjecttoadirectmilitary invasionbytheotherandanymilitarycon�lictwaslikelytobecarriedontheterritoryofthealliesunlessitescalatedtothelevelofanexchangeoflongrangestrategicnuclearweapons. In other words, the two protagonists operated fromvarioussubstantialstrategicdepthswhichisabsentinSouthAsia.Thirdly, thedevelopmentofverysubstantial strategicarsenalsonboth sides that involved signi�icant second strike capabilitiesenabledbothsidestothepointofmutualassureddestruction.Thedevelopmentofverysophisticatedearlywarningsystemsbecameanotheressentialcomponentofstrategicstability.

NowIwouldliketodevelopthehistoryjustalittlebitfurtherbecauseIthinkwhatisinterestingisthatoneoftheissuesthatwearelookingatinSouthAsiaistherelationshipbetweenthestrategicbalanceandthenuclearbalanceandtheconventionalimbalance.Now,therewasa


50


conventionalimbalanceduringtheColdWarperiodinEurope.Thisis quite a complex subject because on the one hand therewas aconventionalimbalance,lookingatthepeacetimedeploymentsofSovietandNATOforcesandontheotherhandthemoreimportantimbalancerelated to the fact that theUnitedStates thought therewould be a very serious force de�iciency thirty days aftermobilizationintheeventofawar.Andwhathappenedwasobviouslythe United States had sought to counter this imbalance bydeploymentoflargenumbersoftacticalnuclearweaponsinCentralEuropebutIthinktheimportantthingtobearinmindisthatifwetake the global strategic balance, the Unites States was morepowerfulthantheSovietUnioninmanyrespects,bothintermsofitseconomy and in terms of its global military capabilities and thestrategiccapabilitiesreachedakindofsaturationpointintermsofthedevelopmentofnuclearcapabilities.

Bothcountries,talkingofSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates,wentthroughasimilarkindoflearningcurveifyouwouldlikebecauseintheearlynuclearage,theverysharpdistinctionbetweenthenuclearandconventionalweaponsdidnotexistandnuclearweaponswerejustmorepowerfulweapons.SotheideathatnuclearweaponsareadifferentcategoryofkindofweaponscamealittlebitlaterandweseebothintheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionintheearlyyears,avery strong reliance on the nuclearweapons and increase in thenuclear arsenals and thenwe see the Eisenhower administrationsubstituting nuclear capabilities for the lack of conventionalcapabilitiesinEuropethroughwhatwascalledthe“newlook”inthe1950's.Whathappenedthengraduallywasthat theUnitedStateswantedtocreatewhatwascalledanuclearthreshold,sothatanywarinEuropewouldn'tautomaticallyleadtonuclearescalationthrougha strategy that came to be known as �lexible response. Now theproblemwith�lexibleresponsewasthatitwasnotuniversallyagreeduponinthe1960's,whenespeciallytheGermanswantedtohaveacommitmenttoaveryearlyuseinordertodeteranykindofSovietaggressionagainstWesternEurope.Thishoweverchangedbytheendof1960'sovertheconsensusof�lexibleresponseandwiththeideathatnuclearweaponsshouldonlybeusedasalastresortintheeventof anattack from theWarsawPact that couldno longerbecontainedbyconventionalforces.Nowagain,fromtheUnitedStates'pointofview,theefforttousetacticalnuclearweaponsasaformof


51


escalationcontrolwasverycriticaltoraisethenuclearthresholdtothehighestlevelpossible.NowthecenterofpuzzleofthestrategicrelationshipbetweenIndiaandPakistanhasbeenthatmanypeoplethought that the acquisition of the nuclear weapons and overtnuclearstatusdidnotresultincompletecessationofmilitarycon�lictbetweenthetwosideseventhoughthatisnormallytakentobethefactofnuclearweapons.Andforthisreason,youwill�ind,thattheliteraturefocusesonwhatiscalledthestability-instabilityparadox.The stability-instability paradox was created by Glenn Snyder toexplainthateveninasituationofnuclearplentywheretwosideshave large strategic nuclear arsenals, the conventional militarybalancedoesbecomeimportant,precisely,becausethereisakindofmutuallyassureddestructioncapabilityatthestrategiclevelandthisexplainsthatinEuropethatthepossibilityoftheuseofconventionalforces by the Soviet Unionmight be possible because the SovietUnionwasdeemedtohaveagreaterconventionalcapability.Now,whathashappenedinSouthAsia,though,isveryinterestingbecausetheappearancehasbeengiventhatthestatethatisprovokingthemilitaryclashesinSouthAsiahasbeenthestatethathasaninferiorconventionalcapability.

The lack of strategic depth obviously means that the distinctionbetween the tactical and strategic nuclear forces is less relevant.Thereisnopotentialbattle�ieldforlimitedwarthatdoesnotinvolvethe territoriesofmainprotagonists.Thisalsomeans that there isvery littlestrategicspace forescalationcontroland inthetimeofmilitaryconfrontation,thereisatemptationtoescalateduetothevirtualabsenceof tacticalwarning.Anotherkeydifference is thatwhiletheWarsawPactenjoyedasuperioritybothinthepeacetimedeploymentsofconventionalforcesincentralEuropeandpotentiallythe earlyphasesofmobilization in the leadup to armed con�lict,overallthecapabilitiesofbothsideswerebalancedandequivalentandthisisnotnecessarilythecaseinSouthAsia.BothsidesintheColdWar possessed a surplus of strategic capabilities to mutualassureddestructionwhereasinSouthAsia,thestrategiccapabilitiesaremorelimitedonbothsides.SowhereasinCentralEurope,theSoviet Union enjoyed a temporary advantage, in South Asia it isunclearwhatthebalanceofpowerwouldbeintheinitialphaseofanarmedcon�lict.Andoverall,however,thereissubstantialimbalancebetweenthetwosidesasIndiaenjoysasubstantialedgeinthesizeof


52


landmass, size of population, its economic capacity, and itsconventional military capacity. India has adopted a no-�irst usepolicywhilePakistanhasrefusedtoadoptsuchapostureandhasdevelopedbattle�ieldweapons todeteran Indianattackwith thethreatofapotential �irst-useofnuclearweapons.Thisis inmanyrespects the inverse of stability-instability paradox as generallydiscussed in the literature. The fundamental principle of thestability-instability paradox is that the nuclear strategic balancereducestheeffectivenessofnucleardeterrenceagainstconventionalaggressionandthatthesidewithsuperiorconventionalforcecouldriskatleastlimitedaggressioneventhoughbothsideshavenucleararsenals. But in South Asia this would imply that India wouldconduct conventional attacks against Pakistan but Indians,obviouslywouldclaimthatinthevariouscon�lictssincethenucleartests,itwasthePakistanisidethatinitiatedcon�lict.NowthereisaninterestingquestionbecausethewayinwhichPakistanisdeployingorat leastdeveloping tacticalnuclear forces, thereseems tobeabelief in some way that India would be deterred from using itsnuclear weapons even if Pakistan initiated nuclear use. ThispresumesanasymmetryofdeterrencethatmeansthatIndiaismorerobustly deterred than Pakistan despite the fact that India hasadvantages inboththeconventionalandnuclearcapabilities.ThebeliefthatIndiawouldbedeterredbythepossibleuseofnuclearweapons and thereforebe restrained in its response to low levelmilitary confrontationswas encouraged by the experience of theregionalcon�lictssincethenucleartestsespeciallyBrasstacksandtheKargilcrisis.

AcloseranalysisrevealsathingthatintheBrasstackscrisis,nuclearweaponsdidrestrainIndia'sresponsebutitwasnotthecaseintheKargilcrisis.Now,Iunderstandthatitiscontroversial.SoIthinkthatisopentodebate.TheIndiansbelievethattheKargilcrisiswasnotanuclear crisis at all. The involvement of the United States incompellingPrimeMinisterNawazShariftoendthecrisisdidtosomeextentcon�irmthePakistaniviewthatifacrisisescalated,theriskofanuclearcon�lictwouldcompelagreatpowertointervene.Butthisintervention was not in Pakistan's favour and therefore did notcon�irmthatPakistancouldachievegainsinitscon�lictwithIndiabytakingnuclearrisksinthehopeofexternalintervention.Aslongastheprotractedcon�lictbetween IndianandPakistanenduresand


53


remains frozenby thenuclearbalance,while in clashes in severeregional crisis would recur that involve very signi�icant risks, asprovocativebehaviorincludinguseofarmedforcebyproxy�ighterscouldresortinunintendedescalationintheuseofnuclearweapons,especially,ifonesideiscommittedtouseundercertainconditions.Sothe risks are exacerbated by the deployment of tactical nuclearweapons,ifitexists,thepre-delegationofauthorityofuseduringacrisiswouldcomeintocalculation.SotheconclusionthatIdrawfromthisisthatsomeofthelessonsthathavebeenlearntapparentlyfromtheColdWareraareperhapsnotthecorrect lessons.Andthestrategicstability inSouthAsia is farmore dif�icult to achieve, partly because of the nature of theunderlined con�lict, partly because of the structure of nucleararsenals,partlybecauseof theproximityof the twoprotagonists,whichmakeanynuclearwaruseastrategicuseratherthanatacticaluse.InconclusionImaypointtosimplythefactthatstabilityinSouthAsiaisstillrelativelyfragileandthereforenewwaysmighthavetobefoundtoenhancethestrategicstabilityandperhapswillrequireadeepdialoguebetweenIndiaandPakistan.Thankyou!


54

Dr. Andrew FutterAssociateProfessorofInternationalPoliticsatUniversityofLeister,UK


S p e a k e r

Dr. Andrew Futter is an Associate Professor ofInternationalPoliticsatUniversityofLeister.PriortothishewasaVisitingLecturerattheUniversityofBirminghamandaTeachingFellowattheUniversityofWarwick.HewasaVisitingFellowattheCenterforArmsControlandNon-ProliferationinWashingtonDC.in2015.AndalsoworkedasaVisitingScholaratthe James Martin Center for NonproliferationStudiesinMonterey,California.

He isalsoamemberof thecyber-nuclearsecuritythreats task force run by the Nuclear ThreatInitiative,anHonoraryResearchFellowinNuclearStrategy at the Institute for Con�lict, CooperationandSecurityattheUniversityofBirmingham,andamember of the Euro-Atlantic Security nextgenerationworkinggroup.

SESSIONII:ModernTechnologiesandImpactonSouthAsia

56

ModernTechnologiesandImpactonSouthAsia

ThankyouverymuchandIwantedtosaythankstoeverybodyintheroomforcomingtodayandtothewonderfulpeopleIhavemethere.

Thisismy�irsttriptoPakistan,IarrivedonMonday,Ihavesurvivedtheheat,andthespiceIthinksofar.IambackhometomorrowbutIamverymuchlookingforwardtocomingbackagain.Ihavehadareallywonderfultrip,sothankyouforthat.

Iwasaskedtodaytotalkaboutemergingtechnologies.ButIthoughtratherthanlookatdevelopmentsinsubmarines,cruisemissilesetc.whichareveryimportant,IthoughtIwouldtakeaslightlydifferentlookatthisandunfortunatelyexpandthisproblemevenfurther.Soasaresult,IamgoingtotalkaboutwhatIseeasthenextbigchallengeforglobalnuclearorderofwhichSouthAsiaisofcourseanintrinsicandincredibly



57

important part, i.e. the rise of a suite of advance non-nuclearweapons.Eachofthesehavethepotentialtounderminethenuclearsystems indifferentwaysandwhentakentogether, I think,mightnecessitateareassessmentofhowwemanageournuclearworld.This isn'tnecessarily todaybut I am trying to think the future,ofcourse I don't have a crystal ball, so these are just ideas at themoment. These technologies include ballistic missile defencesystems,whichItalkedaboutyesterdaybutIwouldbehappytotalkabout in a bitmore inQ&A, conventional precision strikemissilesystems–increasinglyexotictechnology–antisubmarinewarfarecapabilities, anti-satellite technologies, and all of the variouschallenges which are posed by this nebulous concept that cyber,whichIthinkisincrediblyimportantaspect,ofhowwethinkaboutmanagingournuclearorder.

Nucleararmedstateshavefacedanunsettlingtechnologicalchangebefore,Iamsureyoucanthinkofmanyexamples,butthisembryoniccyberenabledorITenablednuclearenvironment,whichIthinkweareonthecuspoforperhapsevensteppingintonow,inmyviewrepresentsquiteashiftinhowwethinkaboutandmanagenuclearweapons, how we conceive nuclear strategy, proliferation,deterrence and manage global nuclear order. And I think thesechallenges,thesedynamicswillhaveimplicationshereaswell,thatwillneedtobethoughtabout.ThesetypesofconventionalweaponrythatIwilltalkabout,increasingly,areabletoperformrolesthatwereonly reserved for nuclear forces or at least best carried outwithnuclearweapons.Andthiscreateslotsofnewchallenges;Ithink,forstability,pressuresforarmsracing,andthereforethepossibilityofafutureconventional�irststrikecapability.

WhatIamgoingtotalkaboutisquiteUScentricbutIthinkwecanseein the medium or short to medium term that these ideas,technologies and dynamicswill proliferate to this region aswell.Becauseofthis,itisatleastconceivablethatwemightatstartofathirdnuclearage,wheretherulesofnuclearagechangeyetagainandIwillcomeontothattowardstheend.

Sothe�irstcomponentofthisnewcontextandthemostestablished,particularlyintheWest,butincreasinglyhereaswell,istheriseandspreadofactiveballisticmissiledefences.Iwillnottalkmuchabout



58

BMDs,Italkedaboutthatyesterday,butIwillbehappytotalkinQ&A.Suf�icetosaythatamovetowardsgreateralliancesanddefencesandin thiscontext,particularlybyIndia,iscreatingnewpressuresfornuclearbalancing.Toputitbluntly,defencescastoutontheabilityofone state always holds vulnerable targets of another, a keycomponentofMADanddeterrence.ItismostobviousinUS-Russiadyad,perhapsalsoinEastAsia,butIthinkincreasinglyhereinSouthAsiaaswell.

Secondcomponentofthis,whatIwilllabeltheadvancedconventionalweaponschallenge,ortheACW,thosearemixtureofnewtechnologiesthatmightbeusedinnuclearcounterforcerolei.e.topreventnuclearweapons, delivery systems, and associated command and controlapparatus from being used. Again, historically, many of thesechallenges or operations, could only be best carried out throughnuclear weapons. But major advances in precision, tracking,manufacturing and processing power, all driven by the latestinformationtechnologyrevolution,hasmeantthatmanyofthesetaskscan now be performed potentially or undertaken by non-nuclearweaponry.Andthat'saveryimportantshiftinwhereweare.The�irstsetof thesetechnologies,areconventionalammunitionsable tohittargetsquicklyandwithhighprecisioneithergloballyorregionally.Suchtechnologiescouldbeusedagainstanuclearmissilebeingreadyto �ire or other key nuclear facilities such as command posts orcommunications infrastructure. The concernhere is, of course, theconventionalweaponsmight be used to retard or prevent nuclearsystemsfromworkingandcouldtheoreticallybeusedasadisarmingnon-nuclear�irststrike.TheUSisattheforefrontofthesetechnologiesandhasstatedthattheaimofitspromptglobalstrikeprogramwhichhasbeenaroundnowforoveradecadeistohittargetsanywhereintheworld under thirty minutes either with conventional forces orpotentiallywithcyberforcesaswell.WhilstthisispredominantlyUScenteredprogramatthemoment,wehavealreadybeguntoseethesetechnologiesproliferatetoothercountriesandIthinkthiswillbecomeincreasingly apparent in this region too. Many of these systemsremainedintheirinfancybutitispossibletoseethebeginningofanewarmsraceindualuseoratleastnon-nucleartechnologiesandwecouldbegintoworryaboutnon-nuclearweaponsasmuchasnuclearweapons.Again,thisisnotnecessarilytoday,butthisprompttobeginthinkingfurtheralong,strategicallyintothefuture.



59

Asecondsetoftechnologiesincludenewwaysofattackingnucleararmedsubmarines,anti-submarinewarfare. Ithas longbeenheldthatthebedrockofnucleardeterrenceinasurvivablenuclearsecondstrikecapabilityisanucleararmedsubmarine,preferablynuclearpoweredbutwhateveronethatisquiet,concealedatthebottomofthe ocean, hopefully undetected. But I think this has also beenchallenged in many ways. New underwater systems, particularly,unmannedunderwatervehicles(UUVs),locallyunderwaterdrones,as well as enhanced monitoring and listening capabilities arebeginningtochallengethesanctityofsubmarinebasednuclearforce.UUVsmight be able to silently track submarineswhile on patrol,sendingback locationdata tocentralserveror toanearbyattacksubmarine or even able to carry weapons themselves. Thesetechnologiesareunlikelytomaketheoceanstransparent,as Iamoftentoldbythepolicymakersonthisissuethatthatoceansareverybig.ButIdothinkthisbeginstochallengethatsecuredsecondstrikecanpurelybebasedonsubmarineswhichagain I thinkwillhaveinterestingimplicationsforthisregion.

Lastly,signi�icantadvanceshavebeenmadeinanti-spaceandanti-satellite technologies. Anti-sat technologies or weapons are notdirectcounter forcecapabilities in thesamewayasBMD,PromptStrike Technologies or Anti-Submarine warfare but they do posedistinctthreatstonuclearinstallations.Thisseemsparticularlythecase,likelytobethecaseduringacrisis.Thisinturncanwellprovideescalatorypressuresandcomplexcrisisstabilityinunforeseenandunplannedways.Chinais,ofcourse,knowntohaveananti-satelliteprogram and it seems others will follow suit too. I think, morebroadly, this suggests, that developments in computers enabledweapons,particularlydrivenbythislatestinformationtechnologyrevolution,arebeginning to transformthisability to track targetspreviouslyreservedforthenuclearforces.Itmaynotbetodaybutitisslowlymoving in that direction.Well, of course, there are lots ofcountermeasures available, the trend seems to be towards bothmorequalitativeandquantitativeimprovementsinthefutureandthespreadtonewactors.

And the last part of this puzzle and I think perhaps the mostfascinatingarethechallengesposedbywhatwetermascyberandIthinkthisissomethingthateverynucleararmedstate,irrespectiveof



60

wheretheyareintheglobe,orwhattypeofcapabilitytheydeploy,needstotakenoteof.So�irstlyitisimportanttoknowthatcyberisafundamentallycontestedterm.Itmeansalotofdifferentthings,lotsofdifferentpeopleuseitindifferentways,thedebateisverycomplexandnotveryhelpful.ButIthinkinthenuclearcontextandtheSouthAsiancontext,perhapsbestthinkofitasasetofcapabilities,

toolsandperhapsweaponsthatmightbeusedtoexploitorattacknuclearsystemsaswellasinabroadanddigitizedcontextinwhichnuclearoperationsarecarriedout.Soitisthecontextaswellasthetool.AndIthinkbothofthoseareimportant.Nowthissuggeststhatthechallengesposedbycyberarediverse, impactrightacross thenuclearweaponsenterprise,allthewaybacktothethreat,ofdesignand operational secrets being stolen, increasingly stored oncomputers, attacks on communications, spoo�ing, making aparticularlyearlywarningsystems,radars,satelliteetc.rightuptotheworst case scenario which would be an attack designed tocompromise nuclear weapons themselves or in the worst casescenariocauseanuclearlaunchoranexplosion.

TherearesomeintheUSatthemomentthatfearthataUSICBMcouldpossibly be launched in some way through cyber capabilities orcyber-attack.This isavery,verysmallpossibilitybut it cannotbeprovedthatitcouldnothappen.Sothisisaninterestingareatolookat. I think there are also dangers inherent in the increasingcomputerizationofnuclearoperations.Andthis isparticularly thecase for the likelihoodofmistakes, andwhat Iwanted to termasnormalnuclearaccident.ThoseofyouthatmaybefamiliarwithEric'sbookCommandandControl,Idon'tknowsomepeoplewhohavereadthat will know how close we have come in the past to nuclearaccidents.Thishasnothingtodowithwar,thishasnothingtodowithpeopleattacking,thisisjustthefactthatalotofnuclearsystemsarecomplex.Theyrelyonlotsofthingsandtheymustallworkinthesameway at the same time. The argument here being that the morecomplex youmake nuclear systems, the command structures, themoreyoudigitize,themoresoftwaresyourelyon,themorechances,notjustforthepeopleattackingonsoftwaresorsystems,buttheycouldjustsimplygowrongornotworkinwaysthatyouwouldexpect.AgainIcantalkaboutthismoreinQ&A.



61

Thereareimportantdifferences,wetalkaboutCyberbetweenthoseattacks designed to enable something thatmay cause a launch orexplosionandthosethatseektodisable themi.e.stopthemfromworking in their normal way. Attacks might also be carried outdirectly against nuclear systems, such as through hacking C2 orpreventing launch orders or sending false go-codes, or indirectlysuch as through interfering with those spoo�ing early warningsystems,sothattheyseenothingorbombardthemwithfalseattackinformation.Agoodexampleofthishappenedin2007whenIsraelpurportedlyhackedintoaSyrianAirDefenceandallowedthenon-stealthIsraeljets�lyoverunnoticed.Inmanywaysyoucouldlikenthis to Hollywood �ilms or Bollywood �ilms when a bank robbersomehowhacksintotheCCTV,turnsitoffsoitrecordsnothingsotherobbercanwalkrightin.It'sjustanexample.Thiswasn'tanuclearearlywarningsystembutitgivesanideaofhowyoumightattackthesesystemsinthefuture.It'salsointerestingtothinkaboutwhowouldwanttocarryouttheseattacksanditstrikesmethatstateswould most likely want to disable systems and with free cybercapabilities, while terrorists or non-state actors would like toprecipitatealaunch,explosionoracrisis.

I think it is important to differentiate the nature of that attack.Hackerssomehowmightaccessthesystemsremotely,stuxnet,whichI am sure some of you are familiar with, which was unveiled orrevealed almost a decade ago, 2010, shows that even systems ornuclearsystems thatareair-gappedarenot invulnerable.Stuxnetwasair-gappedandinthelikelihooditwasinfectedbysomebodyeither using a USB or one of the contractors having a malwareinfectedintotheirlaptopwithwhichtheythencrossedtheair-gapandpluggedin.IcantalkmoreaboutStuxnetinQ&Aifyoulikebutitjustshowshowimportantthepossibilitiesareintoinfectingsystemsthat are air-gapped. It also shows the importance of human andpersonalreliabilityprogramswhenitcomestonuclearoperationseveninthecaseofcyber.Ifyou'reanythinglikeme,youhaveanastytendencyofclickingonemailsbeforeyouthoughtofwhat it isorpickingupaUSB,puttingitinyourcomputer,andtheseareoftentheeasiestwaysofgettingintoasystem.

Cyberthreatwill,ofcourse,varyanawfullotdependingonsystems,postures,threatenvironment,andthat'swhyIthinkitisparticularly



important , potentially in this region. The push towardsmodernizationofnuclearC2andweaponswillexacerbateandthisisparticularlyIthinkthecasefornuclearforceskeptonhigheralert.



Brigadier (retd.) Dr. Naeem SalikSeniorResearchFellow,CISS


S p e a k e r

Brigadier(Retired)Dr.NaeemSalikhascompletedhisPhDinScienceandInternationalRelationsfromthe University of Western Australia. He holds aMaster'sinfromtheUniversityofWales,UKandaMaster'sinHistoryfromthePunjabUniversity.Hehas been a visiting fellow at the Stimson Centre,Stanford University, Brookings Institution andSchool ofAdvanced International Studies at JohnsHopkinsUniversity.

He has served in the Pakistan Army and also asDirectorArmsControlandDisarmamentAffairsattheStrategicPlansDivision.HeteachesattheQuaid-i-AzamUniversityandNationalDefenseUniversity,Islamabad. He has been part of numerousinternationalconferencesandtrack-2initiatives.Hislonglistofpublicationsincludestwobooks'Genesisof South AsianNuclearDeterrence' by theOxfordUniversity Press in 2009 and second book on“LearningtoLivewithTheBomb–Pakistan1998-2016”.Currently,heisworkingasaSeniorFellowatCISS,Islamabad.

SESSIONII:EmergingTrendsinNuclearCompetitioninSouthAsia

64

EmergingTrendsinNuclearCompetitioninSouthAsia

Istartbothwithanadvantageandadisadvantage.Thedisadvantageofbeingthelastspeakerofthedayisthatmostofwhatistobesaidwouldbeiscoveredalreadybythedistinguishedpanelofspeakerswehavetoday.ButtheadvantageisthatIhavethelastword.Iwillmakeuseofthatadvantage.

IfwelookatthesituationinSouthAsiaandwiththeadvantageofhindsightofhalfacentury,bothIndiansandPakistanisdonotseemto have fully absorbed the nuclear reality. The �irst impact ofnuclearizationofaregionisthatittendstofreezethestatusquoandthat realityhasnotdawnedon India andPakistan; theyhavenotrealizedthisandhavebeentryingactivelytochangethestatusquointheirownways.Ratherthangivinguptheoptionofusingforceforchangingthestatusquoandadoptingtherouteofnegotiations,theystillwanttowrestlewitheachadoptingtherouteofnegotiations,



65

theystillwanttowrestlewitheachother.IndiaisactivelychallengingPakistan'snucleardeterrenceondifferentplanes.On thedoctrinalplane, by the introduction of a very provocative and aggressivedoctrineintheformof'ColdStart'andpracticallyonthegroundintheformofviolationofcease�ireagreementinLoC,reachedbetweenthetwosidesin2003.TheresultisthatifyoucombinethiswithPakistan'ssubstantial commitment to counter-terrorism operations on itswesternborder, there is a feeling of vulnerability over the easternborderbecausetheforceshavebeenthinnedoutfromthere,andonceyouarebeingactivelychallengedthroughdoctrinesandpracticallyonground,thenPakistanhadtorespond.YoualsoknowthatPakistan'snuclearweaponsarenotmeantonlytodeterIndia'snuclearcapabilitybut they are also meant to deter Indian conventional aggression,whichmeansthatPakistan'snucleardoctrineandpostureremainssensitivetoanychangesinIndia'sconventionalforcecon�igurationandconventionaldoctrines.ThatiswhyPakistanhadtoreacttotheColdStartDoctrinebytheintroductionofbattle�ieldweapons.Soithastobeunderstoodinthatcontext.At the very outset after the nuclear tests in 1998, both India andPakistanprofessed'CredibleMinimumDeterrence'.Thepurposewasto put the international community at ease and giving themreassurances that there is not going to an unbridled arms racebetween India and Pakistan in the nuclear and missile deliverysystems,butwhatwehaveseenisthattraditionallyIndia-Pakistanrelationshavebeendominatedbytheaction-reactionphenomenon,whichhasbeenworkingintheconventionalaswellasinnuclear�ield.

Theothertwomodelsofnucleararmsracing,whicharethedomesticstructuremodelandthetechnologicalimperativemodelwerenotsopronouncedintheearlierdays.Butnowweseethatthesefactorsareatplay.Itisnotonlyaction-reactionsyndrome,butalsothedomesticstructuremodel,whichhasbecomepartofdomesticpoliticsofbothcountries; thenmoreso the technological imperativestructure.Astheysaythatbecauseofthetechnologicaldevelopments,sometimesthere is thepull of technology rather than thepushofpolicy thatdrivesthearmsrace.Andthatisexactlywhathashappenedbecausetheresearchanddevelopmentisgoingoninbothcountries.Asyoudevelop news technological capabilities, there is always thetemptationofacquiringthosetechnologiesanddeploythem.Thathasbeenhappening.



66

AllthesemodelsareatplayinSouthAsianow.India,asIsaid,madechangesatdoctrinallevelsandhasalsotalkedaboutalimitedwarunderthenuclearoverhang.TheultimateoutcomeofthatistheColdStartDoctrine',butthentheyalsoareactivelyworkingonaballisticmissiledefenseprogram.AlthoughgoingbytheclaimsofDRDO,theyare far ahead of American Missile Defense Agency because thesuccessrateoftestsconductedsofarbyit is40-50%,butIndiansclaimmorethan90%successrate,whichIverymuchdoubt.Butthentheproblemisnucleardeterrenceisallaboutpsychology;itisthestateofmind.Ifyouhaveevenasuspectcapabilityintermsofmissiledefensesystems,whichgivesyouafalsesenseofsecurity,thatwilllead to greater proclivity for brinkmanship during crisis andwillultimatelyleadtoatendencytoapreemptive�irststrike.ThatiswhatIndianshavestartedtalkingnow.

It was mentioned here about India's No-�irst Use policy, whichPakistanhasrefusedtoaccept,itwasveryobviousthatasidewithweakerconventionalcapabilitycouldnothaveadoptedNo-�irstUsepolicy,butwiththesemissilesdefensesystemandinternaldebatewhich is going on in India, initiated by no less than their formerNational Security Advisor, who was heading their executivecommittee in Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), Shev ShankarMenon.Hehasinitiatedthatdebate,talkingofapreemptivekindofstrategytobeadoptedbyIndia.Soallthesethingscombinetogether-ballistic missile defense and the talk of preemptive strikes- hascreatedanotherdilemmaforPakistanandPakistanhascomeupwithanothertechnologicalresponseintheformofintroductionofMIRVmissilesystems,whichIndiaisalsoworkingon.

Now with the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems,battle�ield nuclear weapons and the MIRV systems, the wholephilosophy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and the targetingphilosophyaregoingtochange.Somepeoplemaynotagreewithmeon this and they have their arguments. But I feel after theintroductionofMIRVsystems,thecounter-valuetargetingmayshifttowards counter-forcebecauseyouperforma taskby thekindoftoolsyouhave.Youcantightenascrewwithascrewdriver;youcandrive a nail with a hammer not with a screwdriver. If you havemissileswithsmallercompactmultiplewarheads, therearemoresuitedtocounter-forcetargeting,notforcounter-valuetargeting.Soyourwholeforcepostureandtargetingphilosophyandtheoverallsizeofforcesisgoingtochange.



67

Then is the move towards cruise missiles. As India develops itsballisticdefensesystemscapability,Pakistanwillbeforcedtomovemore and more towards the cruise missile capability and it hasalready displayed a substantial cruise missile capability, surface-launchedcruisemissileaswellastheair-launchedcruisemissilesandrecentlythesubmarine-launchedcruisemissile;soallthethreeversionsareavailabletoPakistan.

ThecompetitionbetweenIndiaandPakistanhasnowmovedintothemaritimedomain.Normallytheconventionalwisdomsaysthattheassured second-strike capability is provided by the maritimecapability,butinthiscasethismaynothappenatleastforsometimetocomebecausethereisadisparitybetweencapabilities.WhereasIndia has introduced a nuclear-powered submarine capable oflaunching submarine-launched ballistic missiles, Pakistan, as aninterim arrangement, has tried to put cruise missiles on itsconventionaldiesel electric submarinesandobviouslyonce thoseplatforms are there, despite the fact that there have been lot ofadvancesinanti-submarinewarfare,itwillstillbeverydif�iculttodetermine whether a diesel electric submarine underwater iscarryinganuclearwarheadoraconventionalwarhead.Andthatcancauseconfusionandproblemsduringacrisisorevenduringwar.Sothereislikelytobeaverydif�icultsituation.Then,themovementofthis competition into the maritime domain is also going to haveimpacton thecurrentCommandandControland theoperationalposture.At themomentboth IndiaandPakistanhave centralizedassertiveCommandandControl,whichwillnotbepossibleinthemaritime domain because of the communication problem in themediuminwhichmaritimeplatformsarelikelytooperate.Becauseofthat, therehastobesomedegreeofpre-delegation.Secondistherecessedposture.Bothcountriescurrentlyclaimtohaveinthelandsystem,oncetheygointomaritimedomain,thereisnogeographicalseparationbetweenthedeliverysystemandthewarheads,andsoyoucannothaverecessedposture.Isitgoingtoremaincon�inedtomaritime domain or once a part of your force has a heightenedreadinessandheightenedoperationalposture,willthatnottransferintoothersegmentsoflandandair.Sothatisyettobeseen.

The second thing about centralized assertive control versus pre-delegativecontrol,ifthatishappeninginonesegmentofyourforce,will not that have an impact on other segments. so these all arequestionsthatneedtobeanswered.AlthoughwecantakeIndia'sclaimofapreemptivestrikeagainstPakistaninuclearforceshouldbe



68

takenatthemomentwithapinchofsalt.Thereareseverelimitationstoitscapabilitiesandthereal-timetargetacquisitioncapabilities.IagreewithprofessorinhisassessmentofstrategicstabilityinSouthAsiathatitistenuous.ThereareaPakistanhasdevelopedbattle�ieldsystemsbutIwillnotagreewiththischaracterizationofdeployment.Theseweaponsarenotdeployedyetandprobablywillbedeployedattheverylastmoment.Thisismyopinion,mypersonalassessment.Thisisjustademonstrationofcapability,optionenhancement,andthreatmanipulationjusttosendamessageacrosstodeterIndiafromattemptingany'ColdStart'operation.Thesemaynotoperationallybedeployed,becausethereareotheroptionsavailable.Butthisisacapability,anoptionthathasbeendemonstratedandoperationallytested.AnditalsocomplicatedIndia'scalculations.Soitshouldbeseeninthatcontext.

Therewas amention of Brasstacks andKargil Crisis. I have readabout it and heard about it for many many years, but I �ind itextremelydif�iculttoagreethatBrasstackswasanuclearcrisis.ThefamousinterviewbyAQKhanappearedinMarchin1987andthedisengagementofforceshadalreadybeensignedinFebruary.TheforcesweremovingbackalreadyintheRavi-Chenabcorridor.Soifatallsomeimpactitmighthavehad,itdidnotrelatetotherealityonground.ItwasactuallythedeploymentandplacementofPakistan'sconventionalstrategicreserveswhichmadetheIndiansrethinkandcome to the table to talk of disengagement. Certainly, if at all thecapabilitywasthereatthattime,itwasnotoperationalized.AndifyougobywhatGeneralMusharafhaswritteninhisbook,heevenclaimedthattherewasnotoperationallyreadynuclearforceduringtheKargilCrisis.Itwastoosoonafterthenucleartestsandneithersidehadinrealtermsanyoperationaldeliverablenuclearcapabilityotherthanprobablysomecrudeweaponsdeliveredbyair.ButitdidhaveanimpactonKargilCrisisinthewaythatIndiansdeliberatelycon�inedthecon�licttoanarrowstripofLineofControlintheKargilsector,itdidnotescalatetowholeoftheLineofControlspilloroveronto International Boundary. India did introduce its air force butwithveryrestrictedinstructionsandPakistandeliberatelyavoidedbringingitsair forceinbecauseboththeair forceshadcomeintoclash;itwouldhavegoneintoaquickescalation.Brasstackstomeisadoubtfulcase.

Wehaveheardaboutthecyberthreat.Yes,thisisanemergingthreatandIbelievethereisthepossibilityofIndiaandPakistanconsideringacon�idencebuildingmeasurelikethecon�idencebuildingmeasures



69

similartonotattackingeachother'snuclearfacilities.Theycouldaddonnon-cyberattacksoneachother'sfacilities.Theproblemwillstillnotberesolved;itmaypartiallyberesolvedbecausethenatureofcyberthreatissuchthatitisnotinastates'power.Itcanbeanindividualorasmallgroupofindividualswithsuf�icienttechnicalskillsandtherightkindofmachines.Theycancarryoutanattackontheir own. But still if there is a con�idence building measure,probablythatwillhelpincontributingtostrategicstability.Similarlywealsoknowthat,thereisnocon�idencebuildingmeasureinthemaritimedomain.Thereisnoagreementonincidents,thoughitwasagreed upon by both sides in Lahore MoU, but that is oneoutstanding CBM that has not been negotiated or completed,probablyitistimenowasbothsidesaremovingintothemaritimedomain,theyalsoconsidersigninganincidentagreementtoavoidanyuntowardincident.Iclosehere.



SESSIONIIQ&A/Discussion


72

Question:Anybodywithakeyboardandamachinecanhackandplayhavocwiththesystem.Recently,datahascomeoutthatUShasinvested$2billionandNSAhasbuiltcybertools,whichhavebeenleaked.Therearehackergroupssellingthemonblackmarket.Howdogovernmentstakecontroloftheirowncybertoolstheyareusing.UScybercommandhasexpressedtheirinabilitytocontrolthat.LastweekMicrosoft system in Pakistan was affected; people runningwindows10werelocked.Question: Iamnotanacademic,but Ihavebeenassociatedwiththeseissues.Ihavejustafewpointsto�lagandwilltrytodoitbrie�ly.First,whatisthepurposeofnuclearprogram?Inmyview,itistokeepthe deterrence credible. That is the basic objective. Secondly, theessenceofanydeterrence,toputitsimplistically,iscounter-value.Third,Iwouldsaythatwedohaveallkindsofcomplicatedsituationsand all kinds ofwar-gaming. One needs to be careful in evolvingdoctrines on the basis of war-gaming themselves becauseescalationsarenevermilitarilylinear.Thereisalsothedimensionofcrisismanagementanddiplomacy.InthecaseofPakistanandIndia,beitKargiloranyotherexperience,diplomacyhasplayedacrucialroleandsamegoesfortheglobalpowersofyesteryears.

Fourth,wehavetolookatpostureswhendiscussingthesethings.InPakistan it is all reduced to two things: the rangeof thedeliveryvehicles and miniaturization. Dr. Salik gave an excellentpresentation.Hetalkedaboutbattle-�ieldweapons.Herewehavetobeextremelycareful.Forexample,whenwearetalkingaboutrangesinPakistan,shouldwebeconcernedifIndiaistryingtobuildandplacethingssouthoftheequatororinsomefar-offislands?Shouldwebegoingforthingsbeyondtacticalnuclearweapons?Thesearecomplicated issues. One thing is important when we talk aboutposture. Doctrine must be reasonable and responsible. Call itwhatever you will, call it 'minimum deterrence' or whatever weprefertocallit,butithastoberesponsibleandreasonable.Wehavetounderstand,economicandsecuritypolicies,internalandexternalpoliciesareanintegratedwhole.Ifyouareputtingyourresourcesinoneside,youarebasicallytakingresourcesfromanotherside.

MylastcommentisaboutNSG.Alothasbeensaidabouttechnology.Technology drives the dynamics for deterrence. Here India has

Q&ASessionII


73

anadvantage, without NGS membership India has access totechnology,alltechnologies.Pakistandoesnothavethatluxury,butfordeterrencetherearecertaintechnologiesthatareessential.Wehavetalkedaboutcyber.There isalsospacetechnology.Theyareessentialinmakingthedeterrencecredible.Wehavetofocusonhowwe can mainstream ourselves. Here I should emphasize thatdiplomacyisconductedinaparticularcircumstanceandweshouldnotbe shyof engagement.The circumstances change after everytwentyorthirtyyears.ForPakistantheonesourceoftechnologyisChina.Weknow,ofcourse,howmuchwecangetandhowmuchwecannot.Therefore,wehavetokeeptheirconcernsinmind.Ifthereisanopportunity,weshouldgoformainstreaming.

Andrew Futter: Thank you for the range of questions andcomments. If Iamunable tocoverall theaspectsof these issues,pleasecometomeanddiscussthemwithmelater.

Firstquestionabouttheleakofcyberweapons,itisreallyagoodone.Youareabsolutely right. Ineed toclarifysome things.Onecyberweaponsrepresentasmallamountofwhatwecallcyber.Mostofitisespionage,nuisanceandalotofotherthings.Unlikeaconventionalor nuclearweapon, when you use a cyberweapon, you send itsblueprintaswell.Thepersonwhohasbeenattackedwillbeabletounpackthat.Itdoesmeanthatyoucanlearnfromthisact.Thethirdthingwhichmakescyberverydifferentisonceyouuseaparticularweapon,onceyouhaveexploitedvulnerability,everybodyelsethenrushestopaththatvulnerability.Yesyouareabsolutelyright,itisabigchallenge.Whatcancountriesdoaboutit?Bemorecareful,trytosecureitmore.Perhapsdonotpursuesomeofthesetechnologies.AnotherthingthatIhavenoticedspeakingtopeopleinUnitedStatesisthatpeoplewhodevelopcyberweaponsinNSAorwhereverelseare not always the same people who are talking to the defenseplannersinPentagon,forexample.Onehandisdevelopingweaponstodosomething;theotherhanddoesnotreallyknowwhatisbeingdeveloped.Iwillbehappytodiscussthatabitmore.Thiskindoflinkswiththereconcilingtechnologyquestion.Dr.Saliksaidearlier,a moratorium on not attacking nuclear command and control isright.Youdonotgoaroundmessingaroundsomebodyelse'snuclearC2s systems let alonemissiles. It is possible, though verifying itwouldbeveryhard,butasanormitwouldbeanincrediblygoodidea.

Q&ASessionII


74

Morebroadlyreconcilingothertechnologiesmightbeproblematic.Arms control tends to happen when somebody has developedsomething and they want to give it away, which makes it veryexpensive.Itsuggestswemayhavetoletsomeofthisemergebeforewecanstopit.Iamhopingtheremightbepreemptivearmscontrolmoratorium,etc,butitisasfarasIcango.Ithinkmoreimportantthingisaboutestablishingnorms.

And lastly, could nukes be ever made redundant through thesetechnologies.Possibly,itisnotinconceivable;themostlikelywayofgetting to a global nuclear zero tomewhen somethingworse orpowerfulcomesalong.Iamnotsurewehavethatnow,butIdonotthink itwillbecyber. In themeantime, Iguess, themostsensiblethingtodoistonotgetcaughtupinthefetishizismoftechnologiesand keep your nuclear weapons fairly simple. It is a must cost-effective way to do, in the meantime. There are two differentquestionshere.Oneisyourdeterrencerequirement.Theotheristhebroadernon-proliferationregime.Thesetwothingsdonotlinkupverywell.Iwillbehappytotalkaboutmore.Dr. Bluth: One of the fascinating developments in recent humanhistoryhasbeenthatmoreadvancedtechnologyforwarfarehavebecome,thelowerinnumberofcausalitiesactuallyhavebeen.Lookat the causalities ofWWI,whichwas inmillions, similarly in theWWII.WehavenothadwarsofthisnaturesinceperhapstheKoreanWar and VietnamWar. Of course, it is true nuclearweapons areincrediblydestructive,astheycoulddestroylifeonearthasweknowit,butithasledtotheparadoxofnucleartaboothatnostatehasusednuclear weapons since the WWII. The deterrence broadly hasworked.Wearenowinaninterestingsituation.I lookbackatthedocumentsfromtheColdWarandthediscussionsKissingerhadwithpeoples in National Security Council, when he estimated thecausalitiesofapotentialnuclearwarinEurope,theywerelookingatahundredmillioncausalities.Nowforusathousandcausalitiesisamajorwar.This isaverygoodand interestingdevelopment.Thatdoesnotmeantherearenonewthreatsoutthere.

Theimportantthingisthatwehavedevelopedstrongnormsagainstwar.Itusedtobethecasethatwarwasanormalactivityofstateandstateswouldengageinitfortheirnationalinterests.Wethinktheuseofmilitary force is not appropriate for thepromotionof national

Q&ASessionII


75

interestandcouldbeacrime.Wehaveobserved that the levelofarmedcon�lictbetweenstateshasbeenreducedsubstantially,eventhoughsomeareasareatrisk,suchasSouthAsia,stillexist.Now,withregardtocyberweapons,wearenowbreachingnormsandhavenotdevelopednewnormsforitthatcanbeveri�iedandpolicedinsomeway.Thatisareallyimportanttaskforthefuture.

Intermsofthecommentsregardingkeepingdeterrencecredibleandso forth I am very grateful for your comments. It is absolutelyessentialthatwedonotthinkaboutnuclearwar-�ightingoranythingofthatsort.IthinkitisimportantinSouthAsiathatwetrytograppleanddonotusethepresenceofnucleardeterrenceorweaponsasanexcuse not to deal with fundamental con�lict between India andPakistan.

Dr. Naeem Salik: Firstofall,IwouldliketomakeacommentonthequestionthatwasaskedbyAnumaboutnewtechnologiesmakingold technologies redundant andmaybe she was speculating thatnuclearweaponswouldalsobecomeredundant.Butunfortunatelythatisnotthecase.Wehavetalkedabouttheadvancedconventionalweapons,butdespitethatboththeUnitedStatesandRussiahavebeen forced to develop more advanced nuclear weapons, theAmericanaredevelopingnewcruisemissiles,whichisgoingtocostbillions. If these new conventional technologies could replacenuclearweapons, theywouldhave theneed to spendsomuchofmoney on the modernization of existing nuclear arsenals. Thesecond issue that will remain questionable about the utility ofadvanced conventionalweapons is that �irst they areprecise andsecondtheyareveryfast;forinstance,supersonicweapons,sotheycanreachfromoneendtotheotherwithinhalfanhour.Theyareaccurateandpowerfulweapons.Thepoint is,does it giveyouanadditionaloptiontocarryoutacounter-forcestrikeagainstnuclearforceswithaconventionalweapon,andhowwoulditbereceivedbytheothersidebecauseacounter-forcestrikewillremainacounter-force strike, whether conducted by an advanced conventionalweaponornuclearweapon.

Unfortunately, the point is that, we all talk about minimumdeterrenceandcredibleminimumdeterrence,butwedonotbelieveinthatbecausethephilosophybehindthatminimumdeterrenceisthatyoudetermineforyourselfastohowmanyyoureallyneedtohit,

Q&ASessionII


76

tohurttheothersidebadlyandirrespectiveofwhatyouaredoing,Iyoushouldmaintainthatforcesize.Makesuretheyaresurvivableandthatiswhatyouneed.Ifyoustartcomparingthenumbers,thereisnoendtothisnucleararmracing.IalwaysmaintainthatIndiamayneed�iftyweaponstodestroyPakistancompletely.Iftheymake�ivehundredor�ivethousands,whyshouldbotheraboutit?Theywillbewastingtheirownresources.TheanalogyIalwaysgiveislikeagoat,itfeelspainafteritsthroatiscut.Afterthatyoutakemincemeatoutofitormakesteaks,itwillnotmatter.IftheywanttodestroyPakistanhundredtimes,weshouldnotworry.Weshouldbeconcernedthatwhether we need sixty weapons, a hundred weapons to hit thetargetsthatarereallygoingtohurtIndia,weshouldbehappywiththat.Thatistheonlywaywecanavoidarmsraceandremainwithinourresourceconstraints.

Q&ASessionII


About CISS

CISSwasestablishedinOctober2010andhasembarkedonachallengingtask,that

ofpromotingabetterunderstandingofinternationalstrategicissuespertainingto

ourregion,bothinPakistanandabroad.Wefeelthatthereisaneednow,morethan

everbefore,forobjectiveandimpartialanalysesandassessmentofinternational

issuesfromaPakistaniperspective.

Other Publications

CISSInsight:QuarterlyJournal

Ms.SalmaMalik(ed.),Pakistan'sSecurityProblems&ChallengesinNextDecade(2016)

NaeemAhmedSalik,LearningtoLiveWiththeBomb,Pakistan–1998-2016(2017)

Forthcoming Books

NaeemAhmedSalik(ed.),NuclearLearninginIndia

SaimaAmanSial(ed.),Pakistan'sContemporarySecurity:IssuesandDiscourse

Suite 506, 5th Floor, Evacuee Trust Complex, Agha Khan Road,

Sector F-5/1, Islamabad. Pakistan

Ph: +92-51- 8315410-423, 2722343, Fax: +92-51-2826865


A A REVIEW OF 27TH NSG PLENARY AND T D

Documents

Transcript of A A REVIEW OF 27TH NSG PLENARY AND T D