Record: 9

Record: 9

Title: Understanding Groupthink From a Self-Regulatory Perspective.

Subject(s): SMALL groups; JANIS, Irving

Source: Small Group Research, Apr99, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p139, 27p

Author(s): Flippen, Annette R.

Abstract: Discusses how differing initial motivations on the part

of group members combined with other antecedent factors can result in

various processes that lead to groupthink. Information on groupthink

proposed by Irving L. Janis; Effect of promotional leadership;

Self-regulation; Self-regulatory view of groupthink; Reexamination of

the case studies used by Janis; Conclusions; Interventions.

AN: 1743105

ISSN: 1046-4964

Full Text Word Count: 9665

Database: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection

UNDERSTANDING GROUPTHINK FROM A SELF-REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE

Contents

SELF-REGULATION

A SELF-REGULATORY VIEW OF GROUPTHINK

THE BAY OF PIGS

CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS

REFERENCES

NOTE

In the years since Janis first identified the group pathology he termed

groupthink, researchers have attempted to discover why groupthink occurs

and what can be done to prevent it. Although most researchers have

worked within Janis's original framework, the finding of McCauley that

there seems to be two different social influence processes at work

indicates that there may be a more complicated process at work. This

article uses a self-regulatory model of motivation as a unifying

framework to show how differing initial motivations on the part of group

members combined with other antecedent factors can result in various

processes that lead to groupthink. Based on this motivational approach,

interventions were suggested.

Groupthink has frequently been defined as premature consensus thinking,

that is, consensus seeking that occurs before all alternatives have been

realistically appraised (Gordon, 1987; Janis, 1982; McCauley, 1989;

Shaw, 1981). There is nothing wrong with group consensus on a decision,

indeed the task of a decision-making group is to produce a group

position from the initial preferences of its members' arguments (Whyte,

1989). The problem occurs when consensus seeking occurs before the

optimal solution to a problem has been identified, and when consensus is

reached without fully evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the

proposed solution. Groupthink is a process, not an outcome and does not

always result in a bad decision.

The original theory of groupthink was first proposed by Irving L. Janis

in 1972 and further expanded by him in 1982. Janis used the term

groupthink to refer to a type of dysfunctional group decision making

that he believed was the cause of several foreign policy fiascoes such

as the Bay of Pigs and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Janis's theory

was based primarily on his analysis of the historical data pertaining to

those events, and although not based on empirical evidence, the theory

has appeal and has often been cited in the social sciences literature

(McCauley, 1989; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986) and textbooks (Gordon,

1987; Sabini, 1995; Shaw, 1981). The eight symptoms of groupthink that

Janis identifies are a belief in the invulnerability of the group,

rationalization of behavior, belief in the morality of the group,

stereotyping of out-group members, pressure for conformity,

self-censorship of doubts, perception of unanimity, and the existence of

self-appointed mindguards (Janis, 1982). Janis believed that a crucial

determinant of groupthink occurrence is high group cohesiveness, which

then combines with several other antecedent conditions to cause a

situation where "group members' striving for unanimity override their

motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action"

(Janis, 1982, p. 9).

Janis (1982) identifies several antecedent conditions along with group

cohesiveness that he believes facilitate the occurrence of groupthink,

including lack of impartial leadership, lack of methodological norms for

decision making, insulation of the group, homogeneity of group members'

backgrounds and values, external threat, low self-efficacy of individual

group members (what Janis terms "low hope of a better solution than the

leaders"), and low self-esteem caused by recent failure. Although there

has been surprisingly little empirical research investigating

groupthink, there have been a few studies that attempted to manipulate

some of the antecedent conditions in the laboratory. The results of

these studies did not show any clear results for the effect of group

cohesiveness, with several studies finding no effect at all (Flowers,

1977; Fodor & Smith, 1982) and another showing effects in the opposite

direction as predicted (described in McCauley, 1989). More recently, a

meta-analysis by Mullen, Anthony, Salas, and Driskell (1994), as well as

an analysis of historical data by Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and

Feld (1992), found that cohesiveness alone was not an independent

predictor of groupthink. As Park (1990) concluded, "Group cohesiveness,

either alone or in interaction with other variables does not affect

groupthink in most cases" (p. 236). Bernthal and Insko (1993) found that

the type of cohesion being considered may be important because they

found that social-emotional cohesion was more likely to contribute to

groupthink symptoms than task-oriented cohesion and that the combination

of low social-emotional cohesion and high task-oriented cohesion

resulted in the lowest levels of groupthink symptoms as perceived by

participants.

The effect of promotional leadership (where the leader actively promotes

one idea very early on instead of encouraging the generation of many

different ideas), was also investigated in several studies. The results

showed that promotional leadership is, as predicted, positively related

to the occurrence of groupthink (Flowers, 1977; described in McCauley,

1989). In addition, the meta-analysis by Mullen et al. (1994) found that

poorer quality decisions were made by cohesive groups only when

directive leadership was also present. A recent study by Peterson (1997)

investigated the role of two different types of directive leadership on

group decision making and found that process directiveness (the degree

to which a leader regulates group process) was much more likely to

result in negative outcomes than was outcome directiveness (the degree

to which a leader advocates a particular position), although both types

could have negative impact. Callaway, Mariott, and Esser (1985) measured

the effects of priming some groups with procedures for decision making

(similar to Janis's concept of methodological norms). Results indicated

no effect of priming of decision-making procedures on the occurrence of

groupthink symptoms.

The existence of external threat has not been actively investigated but

was present in one form or another in every study. As McCauley (1989)

noted, "External threat may be necessary but not sufficient for

groupthink, but this prediction is not tested in the examples cited" (p.

258). Research by Flippen, Homstein, Siegal, and Weitzman (1996) has

shown external threat to be a direct cause of in-group bias, which is

one of the symptoms Janis identified, suggesting that the perception of

threat may indeed be a contributing factor, although not necessarily a

primary one. The effects of the other antecedent conditions that Janis

proposes have apparently not yet been systematically examined.

SELF-REGULATION

One way to understand the behavior of members of a group that is

undergoing groupthink is to use a self-regulatory model of motivation.

Self-regulatory models examine behavior in terms of the goals the

behavior is trying to achieve and the feedback the individual is

receiving about the progress toward that goal. Before attempting to

analyze groupthink from a self-regulatory model of motivation, a brief

discussion of self-regulation in general is in order. Self-regulatory

models of human behavior have been formulated by theorists from both

control theory and social cognitive perspectives. However, despite the

differing backgrounds, the more recent versions generated from each

school are practically the same, with no major substantive differences

(Bandura, 1986, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Karoly, 1993; Klein,

1989). The basic concept in self-regulation is a discrepancy reducing

feedback loop in which the individual decides on a goal, acts toward

that goal, and then seeks performance feedback that is used as the basis

for adjusting their behavior in continuing attempts to reduce the

discrepancy between their goal and their present state (Carver &

Scheier, 1990).

In the self-regulatory model, goals refer to the desired state of the

individual, which may come from many sources, such as personal values,

organizational standards, and past experience. There must be goal

acceptance or it will not be seen as a desired state (Campion & Lord,

1982). The goals in this model are not necessarily static end states; it

is possible to have goals relating to qualities of behavior. For

example, Carver and Scheier (1990) have proposed the existence of a

"meta-loop," in which the goal is the rate of change of the discrepancy.

In this case, the rate of progress is the main goal rather than the end

product of the behavior sequence. Discrepancies between actual and

desired states may result in both affective and behavioral reactions

(Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1987). Obviously, people can be

self-regulating in relationship to several different goals at any one

time, and when there are competing goals the one that takes precedence

attentionally is the one that is most salient (Karoly, 1993). Salience

is determined by situational cues, goal valence, and the magnitude of

perceived discrepancies (Karoly, 1993; Klein, 1989). Several researchers

have found that conflict between goals leads to behavioral and emotional

consequences (see Karoly, 1993, for a review).

Self-regulatory models have most often been used to understand behavior

in an individual context, but they have also proved useful for

understanding the behavior of individuals in groups (Abrams & Brown,

1989; Diener, 1980; Mullen, 1983; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). The

primary goal of these studies focused on the role of self-attention.

Self-attention, which is also referred to as self-focus, has been shown

to be one of the most important moderators of the self-regulatory

process (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1983; Diener, 1979). Group phenomena

that these theorists have attempted to explain by examining the

self-regulation of individuals include social facilitation,

deindividuation, diffusion of responsibility, and social loafing. In

contrast to the previous approaches, which relied solely on the role of

self-attention, the present approach that applies self-regulatory models

of motivation to groupthink entails focusing on the combined effects of

several different factors on the self-regulatory systems of the

individual group members.

A SELF-REGULATORY VIEW OF GROUPTHINK

According to self-regulatory models, the key to understanding an

individual's behavior is understanding what is the goal toward which

they are striving and the feedback they are receiving about their

progress. This raises the question of what motivates the individuals in

a group that is engaging in groupthink? Are they ignoring their own

beliefs because they are concerned with violating a group norm, or are

they striving for a quality decision but have been convinced of the

validity of the group's position? Janis's formulation would suggest that

members of such a group are indeed convinced of the validity of the

group's position, but work by McCauley (1989) suggests that this might

not always be the case.

McCauley (1989) analyzed the groupthink case studies used by Janis in

terms of Kelman's (1958) attitude change processes of internalization

and identification. In Kelman's (1958) framework, compliance occurs when

the individual privately retains their previous opinion but publicly

espouses an attitude change to "achieve a favorable reaction from

another person or group" (p. 218). Internalization occurs when the

individual is really convinced, both privately and publicly. Although

Janis seems to downplay the occurrence of compliance and concentrates

mostly on internalization, McCauley (1989) found examples of both

compliance and internalization in the actions and words of the group

members in the Janis case studies. McCauley concludes, "Groupthink is

properly understood as premature consensus that includes both

internalized consensus and compliance without private acceptance" (p.

260). An important implication of McCauley's work is that although the

outward behaviors of group members in a group undergoing groupthink may

appear to be similar, the underlying causes may be quite different.

By examining both the goals of group members and the feedback they are

receiving regarding the discrepancy between the groups' goals and its

performance, it is possible to understand how factors of the situation

and group process can combine with differing initial motivations of

group members to cause both the compliance and internalization that

result in groupthink. These effects combine at each stage of the group's

decision-making process with the ultimate result being a group that

exhibits the characteristically apparent consensus of groupthink.

There are two occurrences that must happen for groupthink to occur. The

first is that a solution must be selected prematurely without adequate

consideration of the other possible alternatives. The second event is

that this solution must be accepted by the group without adequate

evaluation of its advantages and disadvantages. Both of these events can

be seen to be the result of the antecedents of groupthink acting on the

individual group member's self-regulatory systems.

The specified goal of a problem-solving group is to find the best

possible solution to the problem they are considering. During the early

stages of group problem solving, an initial subgoal of the group is

usually to generate all of the possible alternative solutions prior to

selecting the best one. For the group as a whole to generate a large

number of solutions, each individual member must think of and suggest

solutions different from those already proposed. Several of Janis's

antecedent factors can combine to decrease the likelihood of many

solutions being generated by the individual members and examined by the

group as a whole.

Insulation of the group may limit the amount of information available to

group members and therefore limit the number of different solutions they

can generate. In self-regulatory terms, this would be a system

constraint (Wood & Bandura, 1989). Homogeneity of group members'

backgrounds would also limit the pool of information and past experience

available to the group, again acting as a system constraint on the

ability of group members to generate many different solutions. A

solution heavily promoted by a leader will usually have greater weight

to the group than one equally heavily promoted by a group member of

lesser status (Hackman & Morris, 1975; Shaw, 1981).

Status characteristics theory is concerned with the dynamics surrounding

perceived status and interpersonal influence in groups. Status

characteristics theory maintains that an individual's expectations about

the quality of another group member's future performance on the task at

hand may depend on the status characteristics of that person (Foschi,

1997). According to Foschi, "A status characteristic is any valued

attribute implying task competence" (p. 539), and higher status

individuals are less likely to accept influence from lower status

individuals. In addition, as Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997) describe,

status characteristics theory also predicts that the standards of

ability are such that low status members may be required to show more

evidence of ability than high status members to be perceived as

influential. In a group undergoing groupthink, if the leader of the

group has high perceived competence, he or she will accordingly be very

influential.

Promotional leadership was found to be an antecedent of groupthink

(Flowers, 1977; Mullen et al., 1994). Furthermore, it is possible that

having one solution gain early weight might inhibit group members from

generating and then proposing their own solutions unless they have

enough self-efficacy to believe that theirs is a better solution and the

expectancy that even if it is, that they could convince the group to

listen to it. Adequate self-efficacy and sufficiently high expectancies

are important moderators of self-regulation and not having them may lead

to goal abandonment, due to the individual's failure to believe he or

she has any chance of achieving the goal (Bandura & Cervone, 1986;

Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1982a). In addition, for some

group members, currying favor from the leader may be a more important

goal than the goal of reaching the best decision, and once the leader

has promoted one solution, these members may refrain from further

suggestions due to a reluctance to have their own suggestion gain more

acceptance or attention than the leader's.

Of course, a question that arises at this point is why the leader would

heavily promote a solution given that it may be detrimental to the

group. There are at least two possibilities. The first is that the

leader indeed has the goal of effective group decision making in mind

and mistakenly believes that taking a firm stance is exhibiting good

leadership. The other, perhaps more sinister, explanation is that the

leader has an agenda that includes having his or her idea selected and

that this goal has higher precedence for this leader than does the goal

of effective group performance. In either case, the behavior of the

leader would appear the same but the ultimate motivation of that

behavior would be different.

Fodor and Smith (1982), in their discussion of the relationship between

power and groupthink, argue that one of the factors underlying directive

leadership behaviors may be a high need for power on the part of the

leader. They assert that "from all that is known about need for power,

probably persons who score high and are assigned to the authority role

would have a strong desire to see their point of view prevail in group

discussion" (p. 180). Fodor and Smith (1982) also cite the results of

Winter's 1973 study, which found that the presidents involved in the Bay

of Pigs and the escalation of the Korean and Vietnam wars all had a high

need for power, possibly indicating the role this may have played in

several of the Janis cases. Although this is an interesting speculation,

it must be cautioned that Winter's study involved a content analysis of

the inaugural addresses of the presidents in question and should not be

viewed as a definitive assessment of their need for power. An important

point to consider is that as several theorists, including Arrow

(1951,described in Edney, 1980) and Vroom and Yetton (1973), point out,

there may be times, such as Vroom and Yetton's conditions of high need

for decision quality and low need for decision acceptance, when a

solution imposed by a dictatorial or authoritarian leader may be the one

with the best chance for a satisfactory solution. One characteristic of

groupthink, however, is that the group has at least the appearance of

supporting such a solution wholeheartedly rather than agreeing to it

under protest, which may have different implications and consequences.

Once one solution has gained enough weight over the others, the goal of

the group then switches from idea generation to idea evaluation. The

group now begins consensus seeking and tries to obtain agreement from

the individual group members (Whyte, 1989). At this stage, although the

idea under consideration may not be optimal, each individual still has

the ability to realize this and try to convince the group to reject it.

In groupthink, however, the members agree on a position quickly, with

little discussion of its merit. The ideal group goal at this stage is

thorough evaluation of the proposed solution. This should also be the

goal of the individual members. Based on the information available to

them, each member must seek information about the quality of the

solution and formulate an opinion. The group then begins to seek

consensus from the individual members about whether the solution is

suitable or not.

At the stage when the group begins to seek consensus, there are three

possible opinions that group members may hold, although the degree of

commitment to their opinion may vary. These positions are in favor,

opposed, and undecided. It does not seem likely that every member of a

group would initially hold the same favorable opinion. What happens

during the group discussions to convince all members, even those

initially opposed or undecided, to accept the proposed solution without

a thorough evaluation?

Conformity to group norms is often blamed as the cause of groupthink,

but conformity is a result, not a cause. As Shaw (1981) points out about

the study of conformity, most investigators of social influence "have

simply ignored the person's reasons for the behavior" (p. 280). Knowing

why a person is conforming is important, for without that knowledge it

would be impossible to effectively intervene. There are several factors

influencing when people will conform to a group, but the two most

powerful are when people feel a need to maintain a good relationship

with others and when there is uncertainty about the correct response

(Whyte, 1989). These two factors correspond to two types of group

influence: normative and informational (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).

Normative social influence is influence to conform with the positive

expectations of another, whereas informational social influence is

influence to accept information obtained from another as information

about reality.

Some group members who have doubts about the group's proposal may give

the appearance of conformity by refraining from raising those doubts

publicly due to low self-efficacy about their ability to effectively

participate in group discussions. A study by Callaway et al. (1985)

found that groups composed of people high in the trait of dominance,

defined as "the predisposition to argue, persuade, and influence others

to one's position and to lead, direct others, and make group decisions,"

had significantly fewer instances of groupthink than did control groups.

This shows that ability to participate actively in group discussions is

related to reduced groupthink. Perhaps some people may doubt their

ability to affect the group and may feel that voicing a contradictory

opinion would serve no purpose as no one would listen to them. In this

case, low expectancy of having any impact on the group due to low

self-efficacy about the needed skills could cause withdrawal from the

effort of achieving the group goal.

A related factor, which might inhibit some group members from

confidently criticizing a proposal, is lack of confidence in their

knowledge of the subject matter, especially if the group comprises more

and less knowledgeable members. In this case, it is not lack of

confidence in their persuasive abilities that inhibits them but lack of

confidence in the validity of their doubts. This lack of confidence

could only be exacerbated by witnessing a respected leader confidently

supporting a proposal. One implication of status characteristics theory

is the effects that an individual's self-perceptions of their status may

have on their behavior. It may be that group members who believe that

their own status (or competence) is perceived by others to be low, due

to their perceived lack of competence in the subject area, have little

expectation of having any influence over higher status individuals

although they might have confidence in their opinions and their ability

to influence others in other group situations.

Another factor that may play into the compliance scenario is the role of

perceptions of power. Typologies of power usually identify five major

sources of power: reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, and referent

(Muchinsky, 1997). According to Muchinsky (1997), of those five types,

three (reward, coercive, and legitimate) are likely to lead to

compliance. Shaw (1981) also illustrates the existence of reward and

coercive power in groups when he states that powerful group members are

often seen as having the capacity to either help or hinder others with

respect to their goals. As previously stated, some group members may

have a large stake in maintaining a good relationship with the group and

its leader thus giving the leader a great deal of power over them. Those

group members may have serious doubts about the position of the leader

and his supporters but publicly accept that position because they either

would like rewards from them or fear sanctions. This is an example of

the normative influence of the group, and what has occurred is simply

that these people have decided that the valence of the group goal of

thoroughly evaluating the proposed solution is less important to them

than the conflicting individual goal of maintaining a good relationship

with the leader and other group members by publicly conforming to the

leader's position. Status characteristics theory maintains that

individuals whose perceived competence (status) is high will be more

influential but only under certain conditions, such as being motivated

to do well on the task (Foschi, 1997). Presumed knowledge and competence

may be the basis for expert power (Muchinsky, 1997), but some

individuals may be more influenced by reward or coercive power

especially if success at this particular task is not their primary goal.

In addition, Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, and Leve (1992) found that

inducing groups to believe that there was a high likelihood they would

exhibit dysfunctional process contributed to the appearance of

groupthink. It is possible, although not addressed by the authors, that

this may have inhibited group members from actively disagreeing with

other members due to a fear of appearing to contribute to dysfunctional

conditions within the group and thus incurring the displeasure of the

group. In the self-regulatory model, insufficient goal valence will

often lead to goal abandonment, especially when there are conflicting

goals (Carver & Scheier, 1982b, 1990). The highly dominant participants

in the Callaway et al. (1985) study may have been less concerned with

gaining approval from others and more concerned with influencing others

to their own point of view, thus being more likely to contribute to

group discussions.

In each of these examples of possible compliance scenarios, individual

group members have abandoned working on the group goal of thoroughly

evaluating the proposal. Some members have withdrawn due to low

self-efficacy, whereas others have decided that the conflicting goal of

gaining approval from others is more important. Judging by McCauley's

(1989) analysis, however, compliance does not appear to be the only

process of attitude change that is occurring. There also seem to be many

instances of people who have really become convinced of the validity of

the group's position even in the face of contradictory information.

Group members who have not abandoned the group goal are still working

toward their subgoal of evaluating the proposed solution by attempting

to compare the group's performance (the solution generated) to the ideal

performance (solution). To do this, they must gather feedback about the

group's performance. This feedback may come from several sources. Group

members often try look to other group members for information, both by

directly soliciting their opinion and by "observing other group members

in action" (Hackman, 1976, p. 1480). However, due to the aforementioned

effects of compliance, some group members who could possibly provide

contradictory information will not say anything. People who are

undecided may therefore only be hearing from those group members who

fully support the proposal. If those group members are also of high

perceived competence, in accordance with status characteristics theory

they will be that much more influential.

Due to a phenomenon that Shaw (1981) refers to as "pluralistic

ignorance," there is a tendency to equate silence with agreement. If a

group member fails to voice any dissent, then the other members will

assume that he or she agrees. Although many of the group members could

be unsure about the quality of the solution, due to the silence of the

compliant members the group will have the appearance of unanimity. Each

member may then feel as if they are the only ones feeling doubts, which

may cause them to believe their opinions are mistaken, as they succumb

to the informational influence of the group. As demonstrated in the

classic conformity paradigms of Asch and Sherif (described in Hackman,

1976) in a situation with ambiguous stimuli, people will often accept

the group's judgment as information about reality.

In most of the decisions being made by groups vulnerable to groupthink,

knowing which is the best solution to a problem will of necessity have a

large subjective component, causing individuals to both look to other

group members for information and to have doubts about the certainty of

their own positions. The feedback that individuals are receiving from

the group in this case, however, does not reflect the reality of

uncertainty among the group; rather, it indicates that the rest of the

group is in agreement about the value of the proposed solution. Based on

the information available to them, individual group members have no

reason to believe the proposed solution is not an ideal one as the

available feedback indicates that no one else in the group has found any

problems with it. At this point, the individuals are receiving feedback

that the discrepancy between the group's performance and the group's

goal is small instead of large. They have no reason to try to convince

the group to look for another solution.

Even if there does not appear to be any contradictory feedback from

sources within the group, there may be information from sources outside

of the group that could indicate problems with the solution the group is

considering. When groups are undergoing groupthink, this information is

often ignored. Why does this happen? There are several factors that

might contribute to this phenomenon. One relevant factor is that

feedback that is not from a source close to the individual is usually

given less attention, as is feedback that contradicts the person's

position (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Based on the feedback people

have already received from the group, they may have formed a hypotheses

that the solution under consideration is indeed good and will therefore

tend to ignore contradictory feedback. However, these factors are not

unique to groups that undergo groupthink. Although they might contribute

to the tendency to ignore contradictory feedback, it seems likely that

there is another factor at work in the groupthink situations.

An antecedent condition that was present in all of the groupthink cases

and studies reviewed here was external threat. This threat was social in

that it was caused by other human beings. Research by Flippen et al.

(1996) found perceptions of social threat to be a direct cause of

in-group bias. Once an in-group has formed, in-group bias, in which

in-group members derogate and stereotype out-group members, often

occurs. Indeed, one of the symptoms of groupthink identified by Janis is

stereotyping of out-groups (Janis, 1982, p. 174). Because of this bias,

information not emanating from within the group may be seen as coming

from unreliable sources and therefore not taken seriously by the group

members in their assessment of the situation. Mackie, Worth, and

Asuncion (1990) found in their research that messages from out-group

members are indeed seen as less persuasive than messages from in-group

members.

Because any feedback from an out-group source that indicates a problem

with the solution they are looking at will be ignored, the individual is

still perceiving a small discrepancy between the group's performance

(the solution it has generated) and the group's goal (the optimal

solution), regardless of the reality. In the same manner, it is even

possible that a single group member who dissents could be characterized

as sympathizing with the out-group and his or her opinion could thus be

devalued. Indeed, groups undergoing groupthink often pressure deviant

members of their group to conform in order to be loyal group members

(Janis, 1982). In addition, a recent study by Flippen (1998) found that

when participants believed that a member of their own group had

motivations in sympathy with a threatening out-group, participants

treated that in-group member equivalently to how they treated members of

the out-group, further supporting the idea that a "deviant" group

member's opinion would probably not carry much weight.

One factor that may determine whether nongroup members will be

classified as in-group or out-group may be the behavior of the group

leader. Although there was social threat present in all of the cases

described by Janis, whether groupthink was present or not, in the

non-groupthink cases the leader actively encouraged seeking expert

advice from outside the group. This active endorsement from the leader

may have prevented these outsiders from being perceived as out-group

members by giving group members the impression that these were credible

experts who were somehow affiliated with the group. In the Flippen

(1998) study, out-group members who were known to have motives that

sympathized with the in-group were indeed treated as in-group members.

It can be seen then that through in-group bias, external sources of

contradictory information will be discounted, and due to the conformity

of some group members and the low self-efficacy of others internal

sources of contradictory information will be inhibited. Compounding this

lack of contradictory information is pluralistic ignorance, which

provides overestimates of supporting information. These factors combine

to convince people that all of the available information indicates that

the solution proposed by the leader is indeed a good solution because

they are either not hearing or are discounting contradictory

information.

People who internalize have not abandoned the goal of evaluating the

proposed solution, but due to inadequate and inaccurate feedback they

believe the group has indeed considered all of the available information

when in fact it has not. In self-regulatory terms, they have failed to

perceive an existing discrepancy. Believing the group has achieved its

goal, the members have no reason to continue searching for a better

solution.

THE BAY OF PIGS

A reexamination of the case studies used by Janis in formulating his

original theory can illustrate how the present approach can provide a

new understanding of the events that led to the negative outcomes he

described.( n1) Although a historical reanalysis can by no means be used

to "prove" the correctness of this or any approach, it can certainly

illustrate how the processes described above may have played out in an

actual group setting. Perhaps the most interesting case Janis examined

was the ill-fated decision by the Kennedy administration to sanction the

CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles. The invasion failed, and

it was obvious in hindsight that it was doomed from the start. This

fiasco became known as the Bay of Pigs.

The first step in applying a self-regulatory model to the events

surrounding the Bay of Pigs is to examine the initial goals of the group

members. The nominal leader of the group was President John F. Kennedy.

Kennedy had taken office just two days before the initial meeting of the

policy group, and the proposal to invade Cuba using dissidents had

already been formulated by the previous administration (Janis, 1972).

Although Kennedy's primary goal was to make a decision that was in the

best interests of the United States, an additional desire of Kennedy's

was to avoid appearing "softer" on communism than his Republican

opponents (Janis, 1972).

Two other influential members of the committee were Allen Dulles and

Richard Bissell, the director and deputy director of the CIA. Dulles and

Bissell were the ones who advocated the plan to Kennedy and the others,

having been instructed to prepare it by outgoing President Eisenhower

(Janis, 1972). Although they ostensibly had the best interests of the

country at heart, there were other factors that may have played into

their advocacy of the project. They had been working on this project for

quite some time--the brigade of Cuban exiles had already begun training

(Janis, 1972)--and the CIA had already invested time and resources into

the project, which may have increased commitment to the project.

Although not directly addressed by Janis, it can be assumed that with a

new president, it was important to the CIA leadership that the agency be

viewed as competent and valuable, so that it would not risk losing any

of the influence, power, and resources that were then available to it.

Admitting that the plan Dulles and Bissell had developed and begun to

implement could fail would be tantamount to admitting that they and the

agency they controlled were incompetent. In addition, as Janis (1972)

discusses, Bissell may have had the additional desire to impress Kennedy

with his competence and leadership so that when Dulles retired, Kennedy

would appoint Bissell as his successor.

Although less information is available about the motivations of the

other members of the committee, one member, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,

viewed the main job of the White House staff as "protecting the

President," whereas he saw the job of the representatives of the State

Department being to "defend the diplomatic interests of the nation"

(Janis, 1972, p. 31). It can also be assumed that all of these men were

additionally concerned to some degree with their professional

reputations among their peers and colleagues. It can be seen then that

there were multiple goals at work in the minds of the committee members,

some of which had the potential to become incompatible.

Rather than considering what should be done about Cuba in a general

sense, this policy group was formed in response to a single proposal.

The nature of the group's formation certainly explains much of why the

group only evaluated one idea, but it can still be questioned why the

group members did not decide that perhaps other plans should be

formulated and compared with the present one. One answer seems to lie

with the leadership of the committee. Although Kennedy was the nominal

leader, from the descriptions of the group members it seems as if he

ceded leadership to Dulles and Bissel at least to some degree; as Janis

describes, "at each meeting, instead of opening up the agenda to permit

a full airing of the opposing considerations, he allowed the CIA

representatives to dominate the entire discussion" (Janis, 1972, p. 43).

Janis (1972) goes on to describe how "the President permitted [the CIA

representatives] to refute immediately each tentative doubt that the

others might express, instead of asking whether anyone else had the same

doubt" (p. 43). As previously discussed, Dulles and Bissell had strong

reasons for promoting the proposal and for discouraging criticism of it.

Indeed, Janis (1972) describes Bissell as "the most active advocate of

the CIA plan; his eloquent presentations did the main job of convincing

the conferees to accept it" (p. 19).

Kennedy probably ceded control to Dulles and Bissell for fairly benign

reasons. He had just become president and did not know the strengths and

weaknesses of his people and had misplaced confidence in the abilities

of his advisors, believing "that the military and intelligence people

have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals" (Janis, 1972,

p. 32). In status characteristics theory terms, they had high perceived

status. Although Kennedy's actions were grounded in good intentions,

they almost certainly had a strong impact on the rest of the committee

members, who still saw Kennedy as the leader. Group members who did

indeed have doubts about the proposal may have been uncomfortable

criticizing it because of the perception that Kennedy supported it. It

is one thing to criticize the director of the CIA but yet another to

criticize the president of the United States, even if in reality Kennedy

might have welcomed the input. This fear of losing face could only have

been enhanced by the esteem in which Kennedy was held.

There were other pressures toward compliance as well, which may have

caused some group members to abandon attempts to critically evaluate the

proposal. Dulles and Bissell shrewdly framed the proposal so that

opposition to it would appear to support communism (Janis, 1972),

something that every member of the committee would wish to avoid. This

would be particularly true for Kennedy, who would be vulnerable to being

seen as weaker on the issue than his Republican opponents who had

formulated the proposal. The CIA representatives, along with the

military representatives on the committee, also used what Schlesinger

later referred to as "virile poses" when discussing the plan (Janis,

1972, p. 41). Because of this, raising opposition to the plan would have

the effect of making participants seem soft and weak, again threatening

them with loss of face and reputation. These factors placed the

participants' goals of doing a good job in direct opposition to the goal

of maintaining their personal and professional reputations. In addition,

because of the way the situation was framed, any group member who

dissented ran the risk of being ostracized from the group. Schlesinger

later reported feeling that although he should have raised his

objections at the time, it would probably have had little effect other

than "to gain me a name as a nuisance" (Janis, 1972, p. 40).

Kennedy's election was surrounded by feelings of optimism and

confidence, and there was a perception within the group that anything he

took on would be successful (Janis, 1972). Group members who did not

have a particular opinion or perhaps only mild doubts about the proposal

and who saw Kennedy supporting Dulles and Bissell may have been

receiving the feedback that the proposal Kennedy apparently supported

would indeed be as successful as the rest of the "Camelot" endeavors.

What had happened at this point is that group members who were initially

undecided have heard the arguments in favor of the proposal, seen that

the president seemed to support the idea, and they have not heard the

doubts and criticisms of the members who were afraid to speak up.

Potential useful information from people outside the group was not

requested or received due to the bureaucratic requirements of secrecy

(Janis, 1972), which had been formulated in response to the threat of

treachery from disloyal forces. This had the effect of both excluding

relevant information from other groups in the government and allowing

the proposal's supporters to frame any opposition in terms of communist

betrayal. As previously discussed, perceptions of external threat can

act as a trigger toward in-group bias and a consequent fear of outsiders

(Flippen et al., 1996). Schlesinger discusses the situation as "idiotic"

in that the same people were both planning and evaluating the proposal

excluding "much of the expertise of government" (Janis, 1972, p. 33). As

a result, the information available to the group seemed to indicate that

the proposal was acceptable and had little chance of failure rather than

dangerous and misadvised as in reality.

In summary, members of the committee that approved the Bay of Pigs

fiasco started out with multiple competing goals, including both the

good of the nation and the protection of their own reputations. Because

of Kennedy's support of Dulles and Bissell (who had their own reasons

for supporting the proposal other than the good of the nation), as well

as the framing of opposition to the proposal as communist and weak, some

members who had doubts about the viability of the proposal abandoned the

group's goal of thorough evaluation in favor of the goal of protecting

their own reputations. The failure of each of these members to speak up,

along with the exclusion of relevant information that could have come

from other government experts caused members who were undecided to feel

that not only did all of the available information support the proposal

but so did the rest of the group. These members did not abandon their

goal; they thought they had reached it. This is a different

interpretation of the same events than that of Janis, who believed that

the single most important cause of the observed groupthink was the

striving for consensus of a highly cohesive group.

CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS

Groupthink is not limited to high-level foreign policy committees, such

as the ones Janis (1972) discussed, but can occur in almost any type of

group, from therapy groups (Janis, 1982) to organizational work teams

(Manz & Sims, 1982). Understanding what factors can lead to groupthink,

along with the specific effects of those factors, provides the

opportunity for interventions designed to prevent this syndrome and

improve group functioning. Typical interventions that have been

suggested include ensuring the group has access to all of the necessary

information, training group leaders to avoid promoting their ideas early

on and to encourage discussion and dissent, and training group members

to be better able to express their views to the group (Steers & Black,

1994).

The factor these interventions have in common is the assumption that the

group and its leader are indeed motivated to find the best solution to

the problem and are just having trouble doing so. The present

conceptualization would suggest, however, that this is not always the

case. Promotional leadership has been shown to be one of the strongest

contributing factors to groupthink (Mullen et al., 1994; Park, 1990),

but the motives of these leaders have not been investigated. Do they act

in this manner because they believe that this is the best way of leading

the group or are they trying to promote their own agenda? If they do

have the best interests of the group in mind, then training them not to

promote their own ideas too early may indeed be effective, but if their

main goal is the acceptance of their ideas and the increase of their

power then all the training in the world may not change their behavior.

In this situation, it would perhaps be better to focus on making them

accountable both for the end product of the group and for the amount of

participation on the part of group members. In other words, create a

system that sets a goal of encouraging group participation and rewards

the group if the group members reach the goal so that effective group

process becomes the primary goal that directs the members'

self-regulation. Although as previously mentioned there are formal

models of decision making (e.g., Arrow's impossibility theorem, Vroom

and Yetton's normative decision theory) that maintain that under certain

conditions a solution imposed by an autocratic leader may be the most

satisfactory solution, in most of the groupthink situations cited in the

literature it seems that there were reasons for specifically choosing

groups and thus every effort should be made to ensure that the decisions

made by these groups should be a product of the group's collective

effort.

Similarly, training group members how to speak up will not be effective

if they are self-regulating in terms of whether they have the approval

of the leader or other members, rather than in terms of whether the

group has arrived at a quality solution. In this case, they are not

speaking up because they do not wish to, not because they do not know

how to. If this is the case, a twofold approach may be in order. First,

to the extent that it is possible, groups should be constructed so that

all participants are relatively independent of each other and are not

likely to be in future situations where favors might be needed or

retaliatory power exercised, although this is realistically quite

difficult in most situations. If this is impossible, as it would be in

many organizations, the use of "virtual meeting" technology, which

allows for anonymous contributions of group members, may be of some use

because it would provide protection from retribution and inhibit

attempts to curry favor. This approach might also counteract some of the

effects of status characteristics because contributions would have to be

judged on their own merits and not according to the perceived status of

the contributor.

In addition, making group members individually accountable for the final

group product may be of some use in attaching more importance to goals

relating to group performance. Kroon, Kreveld, and Rabbie (1992) discuss

the idea that although the effects of accountability on decision making

are generally beneficial, there are some limitations. If the group knows

what the people they are accountable to prefer, then the safest strategy

is to conform to that position regardless of its quality (Kroon et al.,

1992). This suggests that the group leader should not be the one

determining group rewards or sanctions because that gives group members

an incentive to conform to the leader's position. In addition, when the

group feels a low hope of finding a better solution than that proposed

by the leader, accountability may cause members to withdraw from the

decision-making process as a means of disassociating themselves from the

final product (Kroon et al., 1992). This makes it that much more

imperative that the leader refrain from suggesting solutions too early

or too strongly. Kroon et al. speculate that being accountable only for

group participation, rather than for group product may cause members to

work toward enhancing status within the group rather than working toward

achieving the best group outcome, making it important that members be

held accountable for the final product and not just for their part in

it.

In summary, this approach to understanding and preventing groupthink

suggests that prevention must begin with motivation and then be

supported by skills. Leaders must be made accountable for the

functioning of their group. Rewards and sanctions for leaders should be

based on group process. To support the goal of good process, leaders

should be given training in such topics as facilitation skills and how

to maintain a nondirective approach. Group members need to have as their

primary motivation the quality of the group product. Factors that could

interfere with that goal, such as a future dependence on the approval of

the leader or other members, should be minimized if not eliminated.

Group members should also be made directly accountable for the end

product so that rewards and or sanctions are dependent on how well the

group does. To supplement this, formal processes could be implemented

such as appointing a devil's advocate and training group members in how

to voice opinions and listen to others. The important point here is that

these processes will not work if the group members are not motivated to

use them.

If the leader and all group members are properly motivated toward

effective group performance, then the factors that contribute to

groupthink should be lessened or eliminated. With all group members

speaking up regarding the pros and cons of suggested solutions, members

who are undecided will have the opportunity to consider all points of

view in forming their opinion rather than relying on spoken support and

interpreting silence as agreement rather than concealed criticism.

This conceptualization of groupthink would be difficult to

experimentally test because it would require being able to control and

manipulate many different variables at once. In addition, the present

conceptualization, as is consistent with the view Mohamed and Wiebe

present in their 1996 article, is a process model of groupthink that

focuses "on the necessary but not sufficient states or events which lead

to the development of the phenomenon" (p. 420). In other words,

according to this view of groupthink, all of the necessary motivational

and situational components must be present for groupthink to occur, but

they do not guarantee it. One way to address this issue is by

considering the role of scope conditions (Foschi, 1997), which are

"circumstances under which the relationship expressed by the hypothesis

is expected to hold true" (p. 537). Any attempt to experimentally assess

this conceptualization would have to operationalize and manipulate each

of the conditions described in this article to determine which

conditions or combinations of conditions are more or less likely to lead

to symptoms of groupthink.

Despite the difficulty, possible ways of investigating this view of

groupthink include manipulating the motivational states of members and

leaders combined with the situational factors and seeing which groups

would be more or less likely to develop problems. In addition, group

meetings could be videotaped and the amount and content of members'

contributions could be analyzed to see if they matched the predictions

of the model. Survey research of actual participants in groups that fell

victim to groupthink could be used to assess motivational states,

perceptions of the amount of support/ disagreement of other members, and

the amount of in-group bias showed by group members. Although these

techniques would not be able to definitively prove whether this view of

groupthink is correct, they would certainly shed some light on this

fascinating but underinvestigated topic.

NOTE

(n1.) Although Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and Feld (1992) did

not find support for the causal assertions of Janis's model, they did

conclude that there was a strong agreement between Janis's work and

other historical texts, indicating the acceptability for the purposes of

this article of relying solely on Janis's reports as to the events that

occurred in each of the case studies.

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~~~~~~~~

By Annette R. Flippen, New York University

Annette R. Flippen received a Ph.D. in organizational psychology in 1996

from Teachers College, Columbia University, and is currently on the

faculty of the industrial/organizational psychology program at New York

University. Her research interests include self-regulation in social

settings and the study of social cognitions relating to in-group

formation and bias.

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Source: Small Group Research, Apr99, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p139, 27p

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Record: 10

Title: Relating Cohesion to Stress, Strain, Disintegration, and

Performance: An Organizing Framework.

Subject(s): UNIT cohesion (Military science); PSYCHOLOGY, Military;

SOCIAL psychology -- United States

Source: Military Psychology, 1999, Vol. 11 Issue 1, p27, 29p, 2 charts,

2 diagrams

Author(s): Griffith, James; Vaitkus, Mark

Abstract: Proposes directions for group cohesion research for

military psychology and social psychology in the United States.

Parallelism between cohesion and social support; Information on the

applicability of social support models; Components of the proposed

framework; Reaction of human groups to external threats by internal

coherence.

AN: 3357001

ISSN: 0899-5605

Full Text Word Count: 12075

Database: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection

RELATING COHESION TO STRESS, STRAIN, DISINTEGRATION, AND PERFORMANCE: AN

ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK

Contents

EARLY MILITARY SOCIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF COHESION

CONCEPTUAL PARALLELS BETWEEN COHESION AND SOCIAL SUPPORT

THE APPLICABILITY OF SOCIAL SUPPORT MODELS TO THE STUDY OF COHESION

CONCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

TABLE 1 Variables Often Related to Cohesion in Military Studies

TABLE 2 Parallels Between the Concepts of Cohesion and Social Support

REFERENCES

Stress

Cohesion

Strain

Disintegration

Performance

Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses

Level of Analysis

Need for Longitudinal Studies

The purpose of this article is to propose new directions for group

cohesion research, specifically for military psychology, and more

broadly, for social psychology. In addition to group members' provision

of mutual support, military studies of cohesion often include

descriptions of stressful events, individual experiences of stress or

strain, group members' departure from the group, and individual and

group performance of assigned tasks or mission. Yet, conspicuously

absent is an organizing framework that ties together these variables,

indicates their interrelations, and specifies hypotheses to be tested.

By drawing on early sociological definitions of cohesion and by linking

evidence regarding the parallel relation of social support to both

stress and individual functioning, we propose a conceptual framework

incorporating stress, strain, group disintegration, and performance as

important and relevant concepts in studying cohesion. The framework

offers specific directions for theory, analysis, and practice in future

cohesion studies.

Military leaders, policymakers, and social scientists have considered

cohesion to be an important ingredient for combat effectiveness and

performance (Henderson, 1985; Kellett, 1982; Little, 1964; Marshall,

1966). As a result, many military studies of cohesion have focused on

the relation of cohesion to both individual and group performance (see

Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Hayes, & Pandhi, 1999/this issue). Military

studies of cohesion have also frequently included various stressors,

group members' provision of mutual support, group members' choice about

remaining in the group, measures of individual adjustment, and

perceptions regarding how well soldiers would perform under stressful

conditions. Table 1 provides a summary of such variables examined in

several military studies.

Most of these studies have examined one variable in relation to another,

for example, the relation of cohesion to performance (Mael & Alderks,

1993; Oliver et al., 1999/this issue; Siebold, 1993) and the relation of

cohesion to personal adjustment and psychiatric symptoms (or strain;

Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll, 1986; Steiner & Neumann, 1978). Few

studies have examined the effects of specific combat stressors on either

the cohesion-performance relation or the cohesion-strain relation (for a

recent notable exception, see Wolfe, Brown, & Kelley, 1993). Many

examples of "proxy" measures of stress experienced by combat soldiers

are found in the traditional neuropsychiatric literature, such as

duration and intensity of combat exposure (Beebe & Apple, 1951; Glass,

1973; Noy, 1987). Despite this literature, few studies examining group

cohesion have used any measure of combat stress, and those studies that

have employed such measures usually center on postcombat adjustment and

clinical treatment (Foy, Sipprelle, Rueger, & Carroll, 1984; Solomon et

al., 1986; Steiner & Neumann, 1978). In addition, few studies, if any,

have examined disintegration as a consequence of stress and the relation

of group cohesion to disintegration, even though historical analyses

draw clear linkages among stress, cohesion, and group disintegration

(Savage & Gabriel, 1976; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Watson 1997).

In sum, the situation calls for a framework to organize these variables

in a context of causal ordering. Such a framework, by specifying

interrelations among concepts, would offer a better understanding of how

cohesion operates and, in particular, under what conditions and on what

outcomes. Drawing on early descriptions of cohesion and structural

parallels in the social support literature, we propose an organizing

framework that incorporates stress, strain, and group disintegration as

important and relevant concepts in studying the relation of cohesion to

performance. Our framework offers specific directions for theory,

analysis, and practice in future cohesion studies.

EARLY MILITARY SOCIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF COHESION

Shils and Janowitz (1948), in their classic study of the German

Wehrmacht, concluded that the army' s continued resistance in the face

of overwhelming odds was attributable primarily to the solidarity among

members of small groups of soldiers:

When the individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations,

met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both

officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately

regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in

battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of

his primary group, was minimized. (p. 281)

Shils (1950) made similar observations for the American Army in World

War II in which he reported that the cohesive primary group "served two

principle functions in combat motivation: it set and emphasized group

standards of behavior and it supported and sustained the individual in

stresses he would otherwise not have been able to withstand" (p. 25).

For Shils and Janowitz, therefore, cohesion was related to the

integrative quality of relationships within the primary group that

functioned to buffer the negative effects of stress, to keep the group

intact, and to enable the group to carry on its assigned tasks and

mission.

Similar descriptions of the relation of cohesion to stress,

disintegration, and performance are found in mainstream sociology and in

more recent military training documents. For example, by defining

cohesion as "the resistance of a group to disruptive forces," Gross and

Martin (1952,p. 553) emphasized the strength of relationships or bonds

among members during periods of crisis. Likewise, Coser (1956) stressed

how conflicts increased group members' social integration. External

threats were conceived as "leading to the mobilization of the energies

of the members of the group" (Stein, 1976, p. 145), thus intensifying

solidarity among group members. Marlowe (1979) argued that cohesion can

be best seen during stressful times (e.g., battle), and he

differentiated cohesion, performance, and group maintenance: "While

cohesion and morale do not correlate with technical performance ... they

do correlate with military performance by maintaining the organized

group at its tasks even in the face of severe stresses of battle" (p.

47). This perspective is repeated in Army guidance to unit leaders and

soldiers:

One of the most significant contributions of World War II and modem

warfare was the recognition of the sustaining influence of the small

combat unit on the individual member.... Interpersonal relationships

develop among soldiers and between them and their leaders.... It is

these relationships which, during times of stress, provide a spirit or

force which sustains the members as individuals and the individuals as a

working, effective unit. (Department of the Army, 1982, p. 1-1)

In summary, although it certainly may be more noticeable in times of

stress, group resistance to disintegration and individual resistance to

strain must be part of any complete framework of how cohesion functions

in group life.

CONCEPTUAL PARALLELS BETWEEN COHESION AND SOCIAL SUPPORT

In many ways, social support research in health psychology not only

captures the meaning of early sociological descriptions of cohesion but

provides a basis for developing an organizing framework for cohesion and

related constructs, such as stress, strain, and disintegration.

Theoretical commonalties are evident in discussions of the constructs of

cohesion and social support. Table 2 organizes these commonalties in six

broad categories: content, function, commonly emphasized antecedents,

consequences, type of effects investigated (i.e., main or direct,

moderating, and mediating or indirect effects), and level of analysis.

Both cohesion and social support are typically conceived of as

multidimensional, and the dimensions of each construct overlap

considerably. The construct of cohesion, for example, often includes the

characteristic of "commitment to task" (Mullen & Cooper, 1994) or "task

cohesion" (Cota, Dion, Evans, Kilik, & Longman, 1995) and an "action

component" seen in terms of communication, teamwork, and collective

action (Siebold, 1993). Each describes the extent to which group members

provide instrumental support to one another so that group members

maintain individual task roles and work toward achieving group tasks and

goals. Similarly, social support involves significant others giving

tangible support in the form of material assistance or information,

advice, and guidance that help the individual function effectively in

daily life (Cutrona, 1990).

Both cohesion and social support also incorporate expressive aspects of

a social group. Cohesion dimensions include not only group-task cohesion

but group-social cohesion (Cota et al., 1995), attraction to the group

(Widmeyer, Brawley, & Carron, 1985), and an "emotional component"

indicated by degree of trusting, caring, and liking or interpersonal

support (cf. Siebold, 1993). In the same way, social support includes

characteristics emphasizing the individual in the context of a broader

social group, namely, "social integration" (Cutrona, 1990), "social

companionship" (Flannery, 1990), and "interpersonal connectedness"

(Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). Furthermore, the functions of

cohesion and social support are comparable, albeit at different levels

of analysis. Cohesion facilitates the productivity of the group member

and successful interaction within the group as a whole. In a similar

way, social support enables individual adjustment and effective

interpersonal relationships.

Important antecedents to group cohesiveness have been group composition

and structure (see Table 2). In contrast, social support studies have

primarily investigated stressful conditions as the antecedents to social

support. This difference in focus is largely explained by differences in

the presumed consequences of each construct. Typically, social support

is conceived as helping the individual cope with stressful life

circumstances (as a moderating or buffering effect), whereas cohesion is

seen as improving group performance (as a main or direct effect).

Nevertheless, cohesion researchers have been occasionally interested in

the effects of stress on group structure and functioning as well as on

group member adjustment (Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Torrance, 1954, 1957).

These researchers have usually studied military populations that have

experienced traumatic stress and generally have found that cohesion

helps maintain group and individual adjustment and performance (Savage &

Gabriel, 1976; Shils, 1950; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Solomon et al.,

1986; Steiner & Neumann, 1978; Stouffer et al., 1949). Social support in

itself has also been associated with positive personal adjustment and

physical health (as a main or direct effect; Cohen & Wills, 1985). Thus,

the consequence of successful social support is similar to that in

cohesion studies, namely, effective and productive functioning.

Finally, both cohesion and social support assessments almost always rely

on measurements obtained from individuals. Although the level of

analysis for cohesion is the group, individual measurements are usually

merely aggregated at the particular group level of interest,

notwithstanding methodological problems associated with data aggregation

(see Gully, Devine, & Whitney, 1995). Interestingly, there has been more

recent attention paid to the broader social context of social supports.

For example, a conceptual improvement for social support studies has

been the introduction of "social connectedness" or social networks of

individuals, requiring a group-level measurement and analysis through

sociometric analysis of networks (Sarason et al., 1990).

To sum up, parallels between studies of cohesion and social support make

conceptual and analytic approaches used in social support research

logical and appropriate choices for studying the broader context of

cohesion's relation to performance. Social support research includes

analytic approaches to the study of the effects of stressful life events

and social support on individual strain or well-being. These analytic

approaches can be adopted by cohesion researchers to study the relation

of stress and cohesion on individual functioning as well as on group

functioning. Thus, the social support literature provides an organizing

framework for understanding the effects of cohesion on the relation of

stress to performance, group maintenance, and individual well-being.

THE APPLICABILITY OF SOCIAL SUPPORT MODELS TO THE STUDY OF COHESION

The relation of social support to individual strain is captured by two

prevailing models (described in Cohen & Wills, 1985). The first model

proposes that social resources benefit the individual, regardless of

whether the individual is under stress. This model is labeled additive

because it is tested by the main or direct effects in a regression

equation. The second model proposes that support is beneficial primarily

for individuals who are under stress. Because support is presumed to

primarily protect the individual from the negative effects of stressful

events, the model is called a buffering one. The buffering effect of

social support on the relation between stress and individual strain is

often analyzed as a moderating effect. Statistically, this effect is

tested by the interaction term of Stress x Social Support, hence, the

term multiplicative model (Cohen & Wills, 1985).

Analytically, it is useful to distinguish between moderating and

mediating effects of variables. A moderating effect of a variable refers

to differences in the relation between two variables, such as stress and

strain, when considering a third variable, such as social support. For

example, the effects of stress on strain might be expected to be more

debilitating when social support is lacking than when social support is

present. Interaction terms in regression analyses are used to test for

these moderating effects. A mediating effect refers to an intervening

variable or a variable that contributes an indirect effect to some

outcome. Stress, for example, may contribute directly to experienced

strain and, at the same time, may contribute indirectly through the

group's experience and interpretation of the stress depending on a group

property, such as group norms, group cognitive schema, and so forth (see

Gal & Jones, 1995). Path coefficients are used to test for mediating

effects. It would appear that both effects are important considerations

for future military studies of group cohesion as well (discussed in more

detail later in this article). As an example, Solomon et al. (1986)

observed both direct effects and indirect effects (through leadership)

of stress and lack of interpersonal support on combat stress reactions

in two groups of combatants. More recently, Spink (1998) reported the

mediational effects of social cohesion on the relation between the

perceived quality of leadership and the intent of group members to

rejoin their groups.

If cohesion indeed functions structurally like social support, then we

may speculate on interrelations among stress, strain, cohesion,

disintegration, and performance as shown in Figure 1. There are several

noteworthy characteristics of the figure. The first implies a distinct

sequence of events. Events to the left occur earlier than events to the

right. Second, the figure implies main or direct effects, moderating

effects, and mediating or indirect effects. For example, strain or the

amount of psychological distress and psychosomatic symptoms experienced

by the individual is dependent on both the intensity of stressful events

and on the amount of cohesion (social support) available to the

individual. Third, a distinction is made between strain and

disintegration and their presumed effects on individual and group

performance. Strain represents the experience of stress at the

individual level, whereas disintegration represents group-level

experience of stress. Intense stress in combination with low levels of

cohesion and, hence, theoretically high strain results in diminished

individual performance. That is, because of psychological distress and

psychosomatic symptoms (too much strain), the person is unable to

perform individual daily tasks. Similarly, intense stress in combination

with low levels of cohesion results in diminished group performance.

That is, lack of emotional support combined with hypothesized

preoccupation with psychological distress and psychosomatic symptoms

disrupt group structure and integration (too much disintegration), and

group members become unable to perform their group tasks. Thus, stress

as moderated and mediated by cohesion, strain, and disintegration

affects individual and group performance. The next section describes in

greater detail each concept represented in Figure 1.

CONCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

The five components that should comprise a minimally complete model of

the function of cohesion in group life are as follows: (a) degree or

type of stress, (b) group cohesion itself, (c) individual strain, (d)

group disinteg