9th Circuit Appellant Response to Amici Curiae of Cities Palo Alto Menlo Park Atherton

8/2/2019 9th Circuit Appellant Response to Amici Curiae of Cities Palo Alto Menlo Park Atherton

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FARROH, SCHILDI-Ll\USE, VHLSO;:J & RAINSInc lud ing A Pro fess i ona l Corpora t ionHarold R. FarrowOrner L. RainsRober t M. BramsonSena tor Off ice Bui ld ing1121 "L" S t r e e t , Sui te 808Sacramento, Ca l i fo rn i a 95814(916) 447-2000Attorneys fo r Appe l l an t

IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PREFERRED COMH.UNICATIONS, INC., )a Cal i fo rn ia co rpo ra t i on , ))Appe l l an t , )

)v. ))CITY OF LOS Al:rGELES, CALI FOfu"1 lA, )a munic ipa l co rpo ra t ion r and )DEPARTMENT OF \ ~ A T E R AND P O \ ~ E R , )a munic ipa l u t i l i t y , )

)Appe l l ees . )---------------------------------)

No. 84-5541

A P P E L L M ~ T ' S RESPONSETO BRIEF OF MlICI CURIAEOF THE CITIES OF PALO ALTO,M E ~ L O PARK f u ~ D ATHERTON


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I . IW;:'RODUCT IONA. F ~ c t s Assumed By Palo Alto Are ~ o n t r a r y

To Those Pled Below And Are I n c o r r e c tB. Acceptance o f Palo A l t o ' s Lega l ArgumentsHould Requi re A Rad ica l Reorder ing Of

Const i t u t i o n a l Right s , And \'lould Requi reA Rewri t ing Of The F i r s t AmendmentI I . Pl\LO ALTO ['4ISUNDERSTANDS AND :v1ISCHARACTERIZES THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE

I I I . PALO ALTO'S A T T E ~ P T TO DEVALUE P ~ E F E R R E D ' S FIRST A..'1ENDt


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r;:'AB LS () F . ~ v r r S \ l " T S Continued

PAGES

4. Access Channels 34 5 . Cornputer-to-Computer Data Transmission 35 6. Disrupt ion of Rights-of-Way 37

VI. CONCLUSION 42

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TABLE OF A ~ T H O R I T I E S

CASE PAGE(S)

Adderley v. Fl or i da , 385 U.S. 39 (1966)Associa ted Film Dis t r ibu t ion Corp. v Thornburgh, 520 F.Supp. 971 (E.D. ?a . 1981) Bantam Books, Inc . v. Sul l ivan372 U.S. 58 (1963)Bol e r v. Youn ' s Drug Products Corp.u.S. , 77 L.Ed.2d 469 1983) Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , (1976)Capi to l v. Mitchel lF.Supp.Cata l ina Cablevi3ion Assoc ia te s v. City of Tucson745 F.2d 1266 (9 th ei re 1984)Century Federa l , Inc . v. Palo Al to579 F.Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal . 1984)Cinev is ion Corp. v. City o f Burbank745 F.2d 560 (9 th C i r . 1984)C it Counci l of Los Angeles v. Taxpavers For Vincen t

U.S. , 52 U.S.L.W. 4594 May 15, 1384Clark v. Community F.or Crea t ive ' J 0 : 1 - \ ' i O : ' . - ' ~ : 1 : : ~ U.S. , 52 U.S.L.W. 4986 (June 29, 1984) Community Communications Co. v. City+ of Boulder630 F.2d 704 (10th C i r . 1980), rev 'd 455 U.S. 40 (1982)C o ~ ~ u ~ i t y ~ o ~ ~ u ~ i c a t i o ~ s Co. v. City of Soulder485 F.Supp. 1035 (D.Colo. ) rev 'd 630 F.2d704 (10th Ci r . 1980) r e in s t a t ed 455 U.S. 40 (1982)Community Communicat ions Co. v. Boulder660 F.2d 1370 ( lO t , e i re 1981)Cox C1.ble CommunicClti'):13, Inc. v . Si-:l;?ST1569 F.2d 507 (D.Neb. 1983)Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)

38 12

15

19

24

17 5

1-5

1 6 , 3 7 - 4 0

29

28

4 , 42

9

34

32, 37

7

l


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CASE PAGE S

FCC v . League of Women Voters ,52 U.S.L.H. 5008 5020 ( Ju ly 2, U.S.1984) 25

FCC v . Midwest Video440 U.S. 689 (1979) C ~ r ~ . 18

United A r t i s t s T e 1 e v i s i ~ n Inc . 14

Fros t v.27 1 U.S. Rai l road Commission573 (1926) of Cal i f0 rn i a 32, 37

Grayned v. City Qf408 U.S. 104 (1972) Rock fo r i 39

Grosjean297 U.S.

v. American293 (1936)

Press Co. 15, 20, 35

Home Box Off ice .567 F.2d 9 (D.C.c e r t . d e n i e ~ 434Inc . v. F.C.C.eir.),U.S. 829 (1977)

14

I n t e r s t a t e C i r cu i t v .390 U.S. 676 (1968) Da: las1 -.::J

Kash Ente rp r i se s , Inc .19 Cal .3d 294 (1977) v. City o f Los Angeles 12

Metromedia, Inc . v.453 U.S. 490 (L981)

San Diego 28, 31

Miami Herald PUb. Co. v. Hal landale734 F.2d 666 (11th C i r . 1984) 12

Hiami Herald Publ i sh ing18 U.S. 24 1 (1974) Co. v . T o rn i l l o , 15, 18, 24,

Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d1978) a f f ' d on other grounds440 U.S. 689-(1979)1025 21,34, 25,37 32,

" ' l inneapolisU.S. St:"lr v. i1in"1esot,:'i C o m T 1 1 i ' 3 s i : : n , ~ - r . ,75 B L.Ed.dd 295 (1983) :)f Revenue 35

Moffe t t v.228 (D. Conn. 11ian ,1973) 360 F.Supp. 20

~ u i r v. Alabama Educa t iona l Telev is ion688 F.2d 1033 (3t '1 e i re 1982) -- C 0 ~ m i s s i o n 15

MurJ0ck V. sy lvan ia ,~ ( ~ 1 ~ 9 4 ~ _ ~ j ) ' , - - - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ 319 U.S. 105

ii.


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Pl\GE (S )

Per ry Educat ion Assn. v. Per ry Local Educa tor s ' Assn. 37 , 96460 U.S. 37 (1983)For B e t t e r SDvironnent 20

Sec . o f . s t ' l : : ~ '1:).(:;1,'1.11 v . T . H . ' I l lS) ' '.I.S. 52 U.S.L. l l . 4875 (June 26, 1984)

Southern New Je r s ey Newspapers v . St a t e of New Je r sey 54 2 F . S upp. 1 7 3 (D. 1-1 J . 1982 ) St romberg v . 28 3 U.S. 359 (1 '331)T e 1 e p ~ 0 ~ p t e r Ca r r . v. C3S415 U. S . 394 (1 J 74- )T'21'3vi.3i:::):1 Trans:n iss ion v. Pub. U t i 1 . c:':')'1l.47 Cal .2d 82 (1956)U.S. Po s ta l Serv ice v. Counci l of Greenbur hCivic ~ s s Q c i a t i o n s , 453 U.S. 114 1981)United St-".te:3 \ l. " I c F ) { ~ r - : > i l i , 710 F . 2 d 1 4 1 )(9 th Ci r . 1933)United St a t e s v. 'Hr1',,.,est Video Sorp .406 U.S. 649 (1972)United St a t e s v . O'Br ien , 391 U.S. 367 (1968)

20

12-13

2914

32

20

14

26-30I: lc . 17

Youn v. A.r:1e r i C3 . 1 ~ ' 1 in i ' rhea : : . , ~ ~ - : ; 17427 U.S. 50 \1976Weaver v. Jordan , 64 Cal .2d 235 (1966) 12Wollan v. Ci ty of Palm Spr ings 1259 Cal .2d 276 (1963)

OTHER A ~ T H O R I T I E S

Cable Communicat ions Pol icy Act of 1984 10C a l . Pub. U t i l . Code, Sect ion 767.5 39T r ib e , American C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L ~ w 28

iii.
http:///reader/full/1:).(:;1,'1.11http:///reader/full/U.S.L.llhttp:///reader/full/1:).(:;1,'1.11http:///reader/full/U.S.L.ll


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I . INTRODUCTION

The C i t i e s of Palo Alto , Menlo Park, and the Town o fAtherton (here inaf te r r e fe r red to co l l ec t ive ly as "Palo Alto") ,have f i l ed a br i e f amici cur i ae , urging t h i s Court to a f f i rm thedec i s ion en te red below. However, th e arguments made by Palo Altoa re n ot only l ega l ly inaccura te , b ut a lso improperly assume f ac t swhich a re con t ra ry to those pleaded below and which have in c tbeen proven to be f a l s e in the con tex t o f the very case in whichPalo Alto i s a defendant .

A. Facts Assumed Bv Palo Alto Are ContrarYTo Those Pled B ~ l o ' N &'ld Are I n c o r r e c t "

Counsel fo r Prefe rred i s uniquely fami l ia r with thearguments con ta ined in Palo Al to ' s b r i e f . Those arguments a retaken almost verbat im from Palo Al to ' s " ~ 1 e m o r a n d u m o f Points anilAuthor i t ies in Support of Motion fo r Summary Jujgment" in CenturyFedera l , Inc . v. City o f Palo Alto , e t a l . , No. C-83-4231-EFL

1(N.D. C al . ) . Counsel fo r Pre fe r red i s a lso counse l fo rp l a i n t i f f Century Federa l , Inc . in tha t case . As might beexpected in a summary judgment motion, Palo Alto re l i ed upon alengthy list of (purportedly) undisputed fac ts in reques t ing the

1 See, Century Federal v. City of Palo Alto , 579 F.Supp. 1553(N.D. Cal . 1984) . By o rd e r dated November 21, 1984, D is t r i c tJudge Lynch on h is own motion removed from ca lendar both theCi t i e s ' Motion for Summary Judgment and the P l a i n t i f f ' sCross-mot ion for Pa r t i a l Summary Judgment.

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Century Federa l D is t r i c t Judge to gran t i t s motion. Palo Altonow presents the same arguments to t h i s Court , but asks it toassume - - i n ru l ing upon an appeal of grant of a Rule 12(b)(6 )motion-- the t ru th o f those fac t s . Yet those f ac t s a re d i r e c t lycont ra ry to the f ac t s pled in the compla int below, and have infac t been demonst ra ted to be unt rue by the p l a i n t i f f in CenturFedera l .

As did the complain t in the i n s t an t case , the complain tin the Century Federal case a l leged t ha t no phys i ca l o r economicsc a rc i t y charac te r ized the prov i s i on of cable t e l ev i s i o n se rv ice sin the market a t i s sue . S imi l a r ly , both complain ts a l leged t ha tthe re was no s i g n i f i c a n t d is rup t ion from having mul t ip l e , asopposed to one, cab le t e l ev i s ion systems in publ ic r ights -of-wayin th e same c i t y . As d id the defendants below, Palo Alto inCentury Federal a t tempted simply to dis regard those a l l e g a t i o n s ,or to assume t he i r f a l s i t y . However, unl ike the cour t below, thecour t in Century Federa l cor rec t ly held t h a t the p l a i n t i f f mustbe af forded the oppor tuni ty to prove the t ru th of thosea l l ega t ions . Century Federa l , Inc . v. Palo Alto , 57 9 F.Supp. a t1562 e t Yet, in i t s Hotion fo r Summary Judgment (and,hence, in i t s amici b r i e f ) , Palo Alto again a t tempts to "assume"f ac t s which it be l i eves suppor t i t s p o s i t i o n .

However, in the Century Federa l l i t i g a t i o n , thep l a i n t i f f has now proven t ha t i t s a l lega t ions were cor rec t , andt h a t Palo Alto ' s "assumed fac ts" a re fa l se . See, "Statement o fUndisputed Facts" (Exhibi t 1) excerp ted from Century Federa l ' scross-mot ion fo r p a r t i a l summary judgment . Submitted to theCentury Federa l D is t r i c t Court were the Declara t ion of John

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Biggins ( the au thor of Pac i f i c Telephone ' s cab le t e l e v i s i 0 ncons t ruc t ion manual) (Exh ib i t 2), the Declara t ion of Wayne Lagger( the pre sen t "CATV Coordinator" fo r Pac i f i c Bel l ) (Exh ib i t 3 ) ,and the Declara t ion o f Kenneth Thomas (Exh ib i t 4 ) , pres iden t o f amajor eng inee r ing /consu l t ing f irm ( toge ther with t ha t f i rm ' seX'!1austive s tudy) , to prove t ha t the re i s no p h y s i ca l l i cn i ta t ionon the number of cable t e l ev i s ion compani es \"hi ch ::lay beaccomodated in th e C i t i e s of Palo Alto , Menlo Park and Ather ton .These dec la ra t i ons a l so show t h a t with modern cable t e l e v i s i onsystem cons t ruc t ion methods, t he re i s no s i gn i f i c a n t addedinconvenience or d i s rup t ion from having two, as opposed to one ,cab le t e l ev i s ion companies cons t ruc t t he i r sys tems a t the samet ime .

There i s a l so submi t t ed in thel i t i g a t i o n the Dec la ra t i o n o f Dr. Leonard Tow (Exh ib i t 5) ,2 aneconomist and former un iver s i t y p r o f e s s o ~ , and the p r e s i d e n t o fone of th e l a r g e s t cable t e l e v i s i o n c0mpanies in the UnitedSt a t e s . Dr. Tow has 20 years o f exper ience in t'!1e cablet e l e v i s i on i ndus t ry . His d e c l a r a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t cablet e l e v i s i o n i s not charac t e r i zed by economic s c a r c i t y , i.e., t ha tcab le t e l e v i s i o n i s no t a n a t u r a l monopoly in Palo A l ~ o . This i sa f a c t we be l i eve we could a l so prove to be t rue in Los Angeles .

2 The a t t achment s to Dr. Tow's Decla ra t ion , amounting toapprox imate ly 1000 pages , have no t been suppl ied - - in an a t temptto keep th e C our t ' s f i l e down to manageable s i z e . Pre fe r r edw i l l , o f course , immedia te ly prov ide these documents if th e Cour tso de s i r e s .

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The Declara t ion o f Dr. William Lee (Exhib i t 6 ), a profe ssor ofjourna l i sm, no tes t h a t , in any case , th e l a rge number o f c i t i e swith only one newspaper prov ides no occasion fo r f ranchi s ingnewspapers , and t h a t , accordingly , there is no need to" f r anch i se" cab le t e l ev i s i o n ope ra to r s . F ina l ly , Dr. Lee "llsoexpla ins in d e t a i l th e ex t r aord i na ry in jury to j o u rn a l i s t i cfreedom pre sen t ly caused by the (o f ten success fUl ) a t t emp t s o fl o ca l governments to c o n t r o l numerous asp ec t s o f cable t e lev i s ion

' , , 3d l ssemlna t lon .P re fe r r ed be l i eves t h a t it i s c r u c i a l for the Court to

be aware o f t h i s ev iden t i a ry background in the Century Federa lcase when it assesse s the arguments made by Palo Al to he re in .This i s t rue because o f the p reva lence o f cert"l in widespread"myths" about cab le t e l ev i s ion which, though having a ce r t a inamount o f i n t u i t i v e appea l , turn ou t to be comple te ly wi thoutb as i s in f ac t . ~ n f o r t u n a t e l y , some o f these nyths ( ~ a n y o f whichmay have been accura te when appl ied to the ear ly days o fcommunity antenna t e l ev i s i o n , b u t which have no re levance tomodern day cable t e l e v i s i o n ) , have appeared to form th e b a s i s fo r

3 This " t o t a l con t ro l " , and its a t t endan t c h i l l , o fcab lecas t e r s by l oca l government i s no t specu l a t i ve o rhypo the t i ca l , as a case p r e s e n t l y pending before t h i s Courtdemons t ra tes . See Pac i f i c West Cable Co. v. Ci ty o f Sacramento ,e t a l . , No. 84-2373, Appe l l an t ' s Opening Br ie f a t 10 . Thef a c t u a l record before t h i s Court in t h a t case co n s t i t u t e s a l i v i dexample of the ex t r aord i na ry burdens on j o u rn a l i s t i c freedomwhich are born of th e f r anch i se auc t i on p rocess . See a l s o ,Community Communications Co. v . City o f Boulder , 630 F.2d 704,712, n .8 , 713, 719-20 (10th C i r . 1980) (Markey, C . J . ,d i s s en t i n g ) , pane l major i ty r e v ' d , 455 U.S. 40 (1982) .

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some pas t j ud i c i a l dec i s ions - - p a r t i c u l a r l y dec i s ions innon-cons t i t u t i ona l con tex t s , where the cour ts O f '-en need n o t anddo no t sc r u t i z e the pa r t i c u l a r f ac tua l asse r t ions presented tothem. See, e . g . , Cata l ina Cablevis ion Assoc ia tes v. City o fTucson, 745 F.2d 1266 (9th Ci r . 1984) . Prefe r red be l i eves t h a tthe record in Century Federa l e s t a b l i sh e s an i ~ p o r t a n t po in t :Though th e fac t s a l l eged in the compla int in t h i s case may becon t ra ry to ce r t a in widely accepted be l i e f s , t h i s by no meansind ica tes tha t those a l l eged fac t s cannot be proven - - r a t he r , iti s the "myths" which wi l l be proven to be without bas i s in f a c t .As the Century Federa l record i n d i c a t e s , the ru l e t h a t a l lwel l -p leaded a l l e g a t i o n s must be accepted as t rue , i s a wiseone. The cour t below f a i l ed to follow t h i s r u l e , and i t sjudgment must be r eve r sed .

B. Acceptance of Palo Al to ' s Legal ArgumentsWould Reauire A Radical Reordering OfConsti tuti : : :mal Rights , AJ1d "dould RequireA Rewri t ing Of The F i r s t A m e n d ~ e n t

Palo Alto makes two sepa ra te arguments . F i r s t , itclaims t h a t p l a i n t i f f has no Fi r s t A m e n d ~ e n t r igh t s except whenengaging in one very narrm'J a c t i v i ty , and t h a t Los Angeles hasno t s topped Prefe r red from engaging in t h a t a c t i v i t y . Second,Palo Alto c la ims t h a t Los ~ ~ g e l e s t exc lus ion of Prefe r red i s" ju s t i f i ed" because of the r e su l t i n g con t ro l which Los Angeleshas gained over i t s se l ec t ed cable t e l e v i s i o n opera to r . As i sshown below, both o f these arguments a re l ega l ly er roneous .However, some pre l im ina ry obse rva t ions a re he l p fu l .

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As it must , given the a l l eg a t i o n s of th e compla in t , PaloAlto does not purpor t to base i t s arguments upon any "u:1ique"c h a ra c t e r i s t i c s of cab le t e l ev i s io n which might Cl.rguably providesome bas i s fo r di s t ingu i sh ing cases i :1volving othe r F i r s tAmendment speakers . Rather , Palo Alto presen t s a theory o f th eCons t i tu t ion which it must (and appare:1tly does) contend app l i e sacross the board to a l l Fi r s t & ~ e n d ~ e n t sp eak e r s . I f Palo Alto ' st heor i e s a re c o r r e c t as appl ied to Pre fe r red , then they must a l sobe cor rec t as app l ied to newspapers , movie t h ea t e r s , and a l lothe r Fi r s t Amendment speakers . Converse ly , i f - - as i s in fac tthe cas e - - innumerable d ec i s i o n s have a l ready e x p l i c i t l y orimp l i c i t l y re jec ted those theor ies as app l ied to newspapers,e t c . , then they must a l so be re j ec t ed in the con tex t o f t h i s case .

One of Palo Alto ' s fundamental b e l i e f s i s apparen t lyt h a t a l l it (or r a the r Los Angeles) need demonstra te to t h i sCourt i s t h a t some "publ ic good" has been gained by Pre fe r r e d ' sexclus ion from access to wi l l ing l i s t e n e r s . Palo Alto apparen t lybe l i eves t h a t the means used to obtain the "governmentali n t e r e s t s " a re complete ly i r r e l e v a n t . Thus, Palo Alto recognizest h a t i t s suggested " i n t e re s t s " could not cons t i tu t iona l ly beobta ined through the use of proper pol i ce power regu la t ion - t h a t i s , n eu t r a l , narrowly t a i lo red enactments appl icable to a l lon a non-d i scr imina to ry ba s i s . Rather , Palo Alto bold ly exp la inst h a t i f Los Angeles does not exclude Prefer red from th e market ,and provide a d i f f e r e n t o p e ra t o r with a government-protec tedmonopoly, then it w i l l lose the power to ex t r ac t "concess ions . "As Palo Alto puts it, without a f ranch i se auc t ion p rocess , "ac i ty fo r f e i t s th e l everage necessary to obtain such concess ions

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from a ... cab le ope ra to r . Put s imply, an opera to r wi l l have noreason to a ee [ to prov ide f ree b en e f i t s to t ~ e publ ic ] i f th emunic ipa l i ty cannot exac t those concess ions as th e pr ice ofadmiss ion ." (Amici Br. a t 29) . However, by acknowledging thef ac t t h a t the a t t a in men t o f i t s " in t e r e s t s " i s beyond properpol i ce power, Palo Alto ~ e r e l y underscores t ~ e f ac t t h a t themunicipal ac t i o n s involved are u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . A governmentalbody i s forbidden from using the power to g ran t or deny a b e n e f i tor au thor i za t ion in such a way as to a t teQpt to obta in"agreeQent II to inproper requ i rements . "The den i 3.1 0 f a publ i cb en e f i t may not be used by th e governnent for the purpose o fc rea t ing an incen t ive enab l ing it to achieve what it may notcommand d i r e c t ly . " Elrod v . Burns, 427 U.S . 347, 361 (1976). Ina n u t s h e l l , Palo Alto urges as j u s t i f i c a t i on for Los Angeles 'u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l exclus ion o f Pre fe r r ed from i t s audience t h a tLos Angeles has been su ccess fu l in achjeving "What it [cou ld] no tcommand d i r e c t l y " . Palo A l t o ' s " j u s t i f i c a t i o n s" a re themselvesadmissions about the uncons t i t u t iona l and cor rup t ive n a tu re of aprocess amounting to nothing more nor l e s s than an auct ion ing o f fto the h i g h es t bidder o f th e r i g h t to engage in f ree speech .

In i t s b r i e f , Palo Alto se r ious ly misunder s tands whati s su es it is necessary fo r t h i s Court to reso lve a t the p resen tt ime . Palo Alto cha rac te r i ze s Pre fe r r ed as seeking " the abso lu ter i g h t to cons t ruc t and opera te" a cable t e lev i s ion sys tem, ands t a t e s t h a t " [ t Jhe ques t ion i s simply whether cab le f ranch i s ing

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as an i n s t i t u t i o n is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y sound." (Amici Br. a t3-4) Palo Alto claims tha t ? re fe r red must lose t h i s appeal solong as Los Angeles and /or Palo Alto can desc r i be any conceivab le"f ranchis ing process" which would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Theses ta tements a re erroneous for seve ra l reasons .

Fi r s t of a l l , t h i s appeal involves a l 2 (b ) (6 )d ismis sa l . I t i s t ~ e c t s a l leged in the complaint , not someimaginary c ts suggested by Palo Alto o r Los Angeles, which wi l lform the bas i s fo r t h i s Cour t ' s dec i s ion . Contrary to PaloAlto ' s a s se r t ion tha t Prefe rred has not "at tacked the de ta i l s ofLos Angeles ' p a r t i c u l a r f ranchis ing process" , the complaintconta ins almost three pages of such "de ta i l s " which Los Angelesimposed as pr io r r e s t r a i n t s even to p a r t i c i p a t e in i t s auc t ion(a t l e a s t with the chance of "winning") . (CT 1 a t 8-11) . At aminimum, each of those ? r i o r r e s t r a i n t s would have to bej u s t i f i e d (ba upon c t s ) before Los Angeles can p r ev a i l as amat ter o f law. Palo A l to ' s a t tempt to defend some paradigm"f ranchise process" must be r e jec ted unless it i s concluded t ha tthe re i s no conceivable municipal ac t ion which could v io la t e acab le t e l ev i s ion opera to r ' s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s .

More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , th e complaint a l so a l l eg e s " tha t thec i t y w i l l not permit p l a i n t i f f to opera te a cable t e l ev i s ionsystem within the South Cent r a l area under any circumstances oron any terms and cond i t ions . " (CT 1 a t 11-12). Thus, it i s Los~ ~ g e l e s ' exclus ion of Prefe rred which must be defended in t h i scase . In the second ha l f of i t s br i e f , Palo Alto sugges t s somepurpor ted "governmental i n t e r e s t " in the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f c e r t a i ncable se rv ices (such as access channe l s ) . However, Palo Alto

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f a i l s to exp la in how those " i n t e re s t s " could suppor t Los Ange les 't o t a l exclus ion of p l a i n t i f f .

Assuming a r endo the l eg i t imacy o f the i n t e r e s t sproposed by Palo Alto, the ap p ro p r i a t e method o f f u l f i l l i n g thosei n t e r e s t s would be to enac t a l e g i s l a t i ve ordinance r eq u i r i n g t h ere l ev an t se rv ice s , and then to i n v i t e in a l l persons wi l l ing toopera te sub jec t to such requ i rements . Had Los Angeles taken t ~ a t a c t i o n , imposing narrow, ca r e f u l l y t a i lo red requi rements in an o n -d i s c r imin a to ry sh ion , Palo Alto ' s discuss ion might be ofmore r e l ev an ce . Perhaps , in t h a t case , ce r t a in of t hoserequi rements would be upheld - - perhaps not . The Court no p notdec ide those q u es t io n s because Los & ~ g e l e s did not proceed int h a t fash ion . This Court has no way to know what requi rementsLos Angel es l'Y'ould in fac t impose were it to proceed proper ly , ina normal l e g i s l a t i v e manner . Regardless of th e opr i e ty o f th easse r t ed i n t e r e s t s , the auct ioning o ff o f a Fi r s t Amendmentr i g h t , and the tot3.1 and permanent exclus ion of the " losers" and"non-par t i c ipar l t s , " i s an improper method of seekir lg to ach ievethose i n t e r e s t s . As the D i s t r i c t Judge in the Boulder caserecognized :

Assuming t h a t Boul r does have the cla imedau thor i ty to regu la te cab le t e l ev i s io n with in theCi ty in the manner which [it d e s i r e s ] , th eapproach taken i s not an appropr ia te exe rc i se anda r t i c u l a t i on of a pol i cy of regu la t ion ... I tmight wel l be a d i f f e r e n t case i f Boulder hadenac ted an ord inance a r t i c u l a t i ng qual i fy ingc r i t e r i a fo r cab le companies to do bus iness inthe Ci ty , with such other regu la t ions as the Ci tygovernment might be l i eve to be ne essa ry andproper in the ex e rc i se of p o l i ce power . .

Community Communications Co. v. Ci ty of Boulder, 485 F.Supp.

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1035 (D.Colo . ) , r ev ' d 630 F.2d 704 (10th C i r . 1980) , r e in s t a t ed455 U.S. 40 (1982) .

F i n a l l y , t h i s case does not t u rn , as Palo Altocon tends , upon " the r i g h t to ope ra t e a cab le t e l ev i s i o n sys temwi thou t a f ranch i se" . Rather , th e key ques t ion i s : "Underwhat c i rcumstances and fo r what reasons may Los ~ ~ g e l e s withhold such a f ranch ise?" Pref '2rred i s qui t e wi l l ing toobtai:"! a "f ranchi se" (o r " l i cense" , "pe rmi t " , e t c . ) from LosAngeles , so long as Los l-1....'1geles i ssues it in cOElpliance with

4th e requi rements of th e C o n s t i t u t i o n . For exanple , a c ican c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r equ i r e a parade permi t from would-bedemons t ra to rs , bu t th e F i r s t Anendr:1e!1t r equ i r e s t h a t suchpermi ts be i ssued in a manner consonant with i t s d i c t a t e s . Thesame i s t rue fo r cab le t e l ev i s i o n "per .n i t s . "

I I I . PALO ALTO'S .!;TTE>lPT TO DEVALUE PREFERRED'S FIRST l \ : ' 1 E N D ~ E ~ T RIGHTS, A!:'l"D THUS TO AV'JE) CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTIJY OF ITS EXCLUSION, MUST FAIL

Palo Al to contends (1) t h a t a p ro h i b i t i o n upon thee rec t ion o f a cab le t e l ev i s i o n system does not r a i s e r s tAmendment ques t i ons because th e ac tua l l ay ing o f wires does not

4 The recen t ly enacted Cable Act d ef in es th e term"f ranchi se" as meaning any "au t hor i za t i on . whether suchau thor i za t ion i s des ignated as a f r anch i se , permi t , l i c e n s e ,re so lu t ion , con t rac t , c e r t i f i c a t e , agreement , o r ot he rwi se" .(Sec t ion 6 0 2 ( 8 . This d e f in i t i o n undercuts Pa lo Al to ' s cla imo f su p p o r t from the Act ' s e x p l i c i t a u t h o r i t y to i s sue" f ranch i se s" .

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involve express ion ; (2) t h a t th e r s t Amendment p r o t e c t s onlyn e w l y - o r i g i ~ a t e d mater i a l , t ha t the p u b l i c a t i o n andt ransmiss ion of express ion c rea ted by anyone o th e r than anemployee of Prefe r red i s comple te ly unpro tec te5 ; and (3) t ha t ,as a r e s u l t o f th e prev ious two con ten t ions , Pr e f e r r e d ' s only" t rue" F i r s t Amendnent a c t i v i t y (i.e., t ransmiss ion o fnewly-crea ted m::lo::erial) cou ld be "adequate ly" d issemina tedthrough use o f th e " leased access" channels to be provided byLos Angeles ' se l ec t ed cab le o p e r a t o ~ .

These c o n t e n t i o ~ s ::lore e r r o ~ e o u s . The f i r s t , becauseit r e l i e s upon an unacce ab ly narrow view o f th e F i r s tAmendment; the second, because it r ep re sen t s a e t e l yimproper and unprecedented view o f w"'nat i s "express ivea c t i v i t y " ; and the t h i rd , because it depends upon t he accuracyo f th e f i r s t two. In a d d i t i o n , th e th i rd propos i t ion i ser roneous for i ~ d e p e n d e n t reaS0ns.

A. The C o n s t i t u t i o n Pro tec t s The MeansOf Qisse ;nina t ion .;'s h 'e l l As TheDisse;n inat ion I t s e l f

Palo Al to argues t h a t th e cons t ruc t ion o f a cab let e l e v i s i o n system " i t s e l f i nvo lves no communication pro tec tedby th e F i r s t Amendmert ... [The] a c t i v i t i e s [ invo lved inerec t ion o f a cab le system] a re no more protec ted by th e F i r s tAmendment than a re cons t ruc t ion o f water , e l e c t r i c a l , or gasd i s t r i bu t i on systems, or fo r t h a t m::lotter t e l eg rap h or t e l ephonesys tems ." (Amici Br. a t 7 ) . This argument i s er roneous .

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Palo Alto i s f u n d a ~ e n t a l l y i n c o r r e c t when it s t a t e stha t placement of the means of conmunication ( i . e . cab les andwires) upon publ ic r ights -of -way i s unprotected under the F i r s tA:nendment. Rather , when a person seeks to take some act ion fo rth e purpose of subsequent express ion , such act ion is p ro t ec t edunder the Fi r s t Amendment. The Cons t i t u t i on p ro t ec t s the meansof d issemina t ion as well as the d i s semina t ion i t s e l f .Associa ted Film Dis t r ibu t ion Corp. v . Thornburgh, 520 F.Supp.971, 982 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ; "'leaver v. Jordan, 64 Ca1.2d 235(1966) As the Cal i fo rn i a Supreme Court s t a t e d in Wollam v.City of Palm Spr ings , 59 Ca1.2d 276, 284 (1963):

The r i gh t of f ree speech necessa r i lyembodies the means used fo r i t s d issemina t ionbecause the r i gh t i s worth less in the absence ofa meaningful method of i t s express ion . To takethe [ con t ra ry ] pos i t i on ... would, i f ca r r i ed toi t s log ica l conc lus ion , e l im ina te the r i g h ten t i r e ly .

As Prefe r red has prev ious ly noted (Appe l lan t ' s Opening B r. a t13-15) , t h i s p o i n t was recognized and s pe c i f i c a l l y app l i ed tothe erec t ion of a cable t e l e v i s i o n system in the Boulderl i t i g a t i o n .

This po in t i s also c lea r ly evidenced by the "newspaperbox" cases . See, e . g . , Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ci ty o fHal landa le , 734 F.2d 666 (11th Ci r . 1984) ; Southern New JerseyNewspapers v. Sta t e of ~ e w Je r sey , 542 F.Supp. 173 (D.N.J .1982) ; Kash Ente rp r i s es , Inc . v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal .3d294 (1977) . These cases c l e a r l y hold tha t the placement o fnewspaper boxes in pub l i c forums i s ac t i v i t y pro tec ted under

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the r s t Amend::aent. As was s t a t ed in Southern New Je r seyNewspapers , supra :

In t h a t [newspaper] boxes p l a y a ro l e in thed i s t r i b u t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f s ' ~ e w s p 3 p e r s , t h i sco u r t agrees with the p o s i t i o n t h a t such devicesa re e n t i t l e d to f u l l co n s t i t u t i o n a l p ro t e c t i o n .

S542 F.Supp. a t 183. Were Palo Al to ' s con ten t ion co r r ec t , ac i ty would be permi t ted to ban a newspaper 's boxes from i t ss t r e e t s because "they a re nere ly meta l and p l a s t i c s t r u c tu r e swhose placement is u n re l a t ed to ac t u a l d i ssemina t ion ."

B. The Re-Publ icat io !1 Of . ; r lOther 's Views I sE n t i t l e d To Fu l l Cons t i tu t iona l Pro t ec t i o n

Palo Alto urges upon t h i s Cour t the novel p ro p o s i t i o nt h a t a person who "merely" r e -p u b l i sh es ( i . e . r e - t r a n s m i t s ) th emessages of ano the r i s not e n t i t l e d to any r s t .:;"-c1ewJ.mentr i g h t s . However, s c ru t i n y o f t h i s t heory r ev ea l s i t s untenab len a tu re - - it r ep re sen t s on what Palo Al to wishes th e law tobe, no t what it i s .

No case of which Pre fe r r ed i s aware has everi d e n t i f i e d any such d i f f e r i n g F i r s t Amendment pro tec t ion fo r

5 Of course , va l id t ime, p lace and manner r eg u l a t i o n s a repermiss ib le when a speaker seeks to ce i t s means o fdisseminat ion upon p u b l i c p ro p e r t y . P l a i n t i f f has always beenwi l l ing to comply with such reasonab le r eg u l a t i o n o f the mannerin which it e re c t s i t s sys tem. (CT 1 a t Par . 9 ) .

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. . d . . 6or lg lna te - -as opposed to o t he r - - c o n ~ u n l c a t l o n s . Rather ,the case law makes c lea r t ha t r epub l i ca t ion is fu l ly aspro tec t ed as or i g i na l express ion . Thus, fo r example, motion

6 Palo Alto suppor ts i t s theory with a hodge-podge ofinappos i te cases . None of those cases recognize thec ons t i t u t i ona l d i s t i nc t i on I",hich Pal!) Alto urges upon t"!1isCour t .Two of the cases , For tn iqh t lv Corn. v. United Ar t i s t sTelevis ion Inc . , 392 U.S. 3 9 0 ~ ( 1 9 6 8 ) , ~ n d Teleprompter Corp. v.CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974) , are t3ken out of contex t : they arecopyr ight cases , which so le ly addressed the i s sue whether there t ransmiss ion of broadcas t programs f e l l with in the l e g a lde f in i t i on of "per fornances" under th e Copyr i ght Act. Ne i the rmentions th e F i r s t Amendment.

The c i t a t i on to United Sta tes v. Midwest V 0 Corp. , 406U.S. 649 1 680 (1972), is to the d i s sen t ing opin ion . ~ h e p l u r a l i t y and concurr ing opin ions in the case draw no suchd i s t i nc t i on . More impor tan t ly , none o f the opin ions addressedF i r s t Amendment i s su e s . In Home Box Off ice , Inc . v. F.C.C. ,567 F.2d 9, 45 n.80 (D.C. ei re ) , ce r t . denied 434 U.S, 82 9(1977), the cour t does not the dis t inc t ion claimed by PaloAlto , bu t merely to show t ha t any permiss ib le s t a t u t o ry FCCau thor i ty over "broadcast" s igna l s could not be used to j u s t i fycon t ro l over non-broadcas t programming. Moreover, the footnotei s to a paragrap'1 which ccmcl udes tha t " there i s nothing ... tosugges t a cons t i t u t iona l d i s t i nc t i on between cable t e l ev i s ionand newspapers . . . . . . I d . , a t 46.Fina l ly , Palo Al t o ' s r e l i ance upon the s ix FCC casesdecided between 1965 and 1969 i s un j us t i f i e d . ( k ~ i c i Br. a t10) . Each of those cases involved the FCC's au tho r i ty tocon t ro l communications disseminated over the broadcas tspec t rum. Those cases simply held t ha t the FCC could r egu la t ethe uses made of such communicat ions by cable companies - -andby any o ther persons .Not one of these cases even arguably s tands for thepropos i t i on t h a t or i g i na l and re -publ ished messages received i f f e r i ng F i r s t Amendment p r o t e c t i o n . Most of them did noteven mention or cons ider any Fi r s t Amendment i s sues .However, Palo A l t o ' s r e l i ance on these cases simplyunderscores i t s fa i lu re to recognize the cons t i t u t i ona l l ys ign i f i can t changes which have occurred in the cable t e l ev i s ionmedium, and which make modern cable t e l ev i s ion opera to r sd i rec t ly analogous to newspaper pub l i she r s . In the 1950 ' s and60 ' s , community antenna t e l ev i s ion was genera l ly l imi t ed tore- t ransmiss ion of broadcas t s i gna l S : - Today, t ha t simply i sno t the case . See, Appel l an t ' s Opening Br ie f a t 5-7.

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p ic tu re thea te r owners, who s e l d o ~ i f ever c rea te or e d i t f i lmst ha t they exh ib i t , possess fu l l Fi r s t Ajnendment r i g h t s .I n t e r s t a t e Circu i t v. Dal las , 390 U.S. 676 (1968). Simi l a r ly ,book pub l i she r s and l oca l broadcas t t e l ev i s ion s t a t i ons , whichgenera l ly or exclus ively "republ ish" or "d i s t r ibu te" contentc rea t ed by o the r s , enjoy Fi r s t Amendment pro tec t ion . BantamBooks, Inc . v. Sul l ivan , 372 U.S. 58 (1963), ~ u i r v. ~ l a b a m a _E_d_u_c_a_t_i_o;;..;n'-'..-a_1C-T_eC-l....._v_l_s.:....;;.i..:;.o n ' - C . . . . . : : . o . : . : . m : . ; ; ; m . : . . : l ~ = - = . - = i ~ o : . . . : : . . : : . n , 688 F. 2 d lO 3 3 (5 t h.... C i r .1982)

Newspapers are a l so pr imar i ly composed of content notor ig ina ted by t he i r employees. Such typ ica l content wouldinclude na t iona l wire se rv i ce s t o r i e s and photos ; syndica tednews, opinion and/or ente r ta inment columns; adve r t i s em en t s ;want ads , c s t r i p s ; f inanc ia l / s tock market data ; spo r t s boxscores and averages ; and thea te r and t e l ev i s ion schedules . Yetthese same major newspapers enjoy F i r s t Amendment p r o t e c t i o n .See, e . g . , r-1iami Herald Publ ish ing Co. v. Torn i l l o , 418 U.S.241 (1974), Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 293(1936) .7

7 Palo Alto might argue t ha t newspapers l i sh "more"se l f -c rea t ed mater ia l than do cable t e l ev s ion opera to r s .However, acceptance of such a tenuous foundat ion fo r ac ons t i t u t i ona l pr inc i e would not only e f f e c t a r a d i c a lr e -o rder ing of r i gh t s , bu t would a l so open a v i r t u a l wonderlandof i s sues : Hhich newspapers c rea te more mater ia l than whichcable t e l ev i s ion opera tors? What i f a pa r t i cu l a r cablet e l ev i s ion ope ra to r c rea tes more new mater ia l than a pa r t i cu l a rnewspaper publ isher? How much newly-created mater i a l i s(Footnote cont inued on next page)

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This Court ' s recent dec i s ion in Cinevis ion C o r . v.Ci ty of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9 th Cir . 1984) complete lyrepudia tes Palo Alto ' s theory . The p l a i n t i f f in Cinevi s ion wasa concer t promoter who did nothing more then ar range fo rperformances by var ious musical groups .

~ n e City sugges t s tha t because Cinev is iondoes not seek to "express" i t s views, it has noFi r s t Amendment r i g h t to promote concer t s fo rp r o f i t . However, ... [a ]s a promoter ofprotec ted musical express ion , Cinevis ion enjoysF i r s t ~ ~ e n d m e n t r i gh t s .* * *[A] concer t promoter , l i ke a book s e l l e r orthea te r owner, i s a type "clearinghouse" fo rexpress i on .

745 F.2d a t 567-68 (emphasis a l t e r ) . One who ac ts as a"c lear inghouse express ion" ne not even be fami l i a r withthe content of t ha t express ion ln order to be af forded fu l lF i r s t Amendment pro tec t ion . ld . a t 568. Even accept ing a tface value Pa lo Alto ' s desc r ip t ion the func t ions of a cablet e l ev i s i o n ope ra to r , such a ~ e s c r i p t i o n would exac t ly f i t abook s e l l e r , who ne i the r c rea tes nor ed i t s books, norneces sa r i ly prov ides books unavai l able through a competing

Footnote Continued"enough"? Who decides? Hould a newspaper publ i sher lose i t sFi r s t Amendment pro tec t ion i f it or ig ina no mater ia l? Mighta newspaper publ i sher be e n t i t l e d to r s t & ~ e n d m e n t pro tec t ionon some days b u t not on o the rs ( e .g . , on Sundays, whensyndicated fea tures and columns, puzz l e s , comic s t r i p s ,adver t i sements and want ads amount to a higher percen tage ofthe newspaper ' s content )?

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In any even t , Palo Alto ' s charac te r iza t ion o f a moderncab le t e l ev i s io n o p e ra t o r as nothing more than a pass iver e - t r an s mi t t e r of o t ~ e r s ' messages i s simply i ncor rec t as afac tua l mat te r . As the Supreme Court recognized more than f iveyears ago:

Cable o p e ra t o r s now share with b ro ad cas t e r s as i g n i f i c a n t amount o f e d i t o r i a l d i s c r e t i o n regard ingwhat t h e i r programming w i l l include. As th eCommission, i t s e l f , has observed, "both in t h e i rs igna l ca r r i age dec i s ion and in connect ion with t ~ e i r or ig ina t ion func t ion , cab le t e l ev i s io n systems areaf fo rded considerab le con t ro l over the con ten t o f theprogranming they prov ide . "

FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. , 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979) (emphasisadded) . This exerc ise of e d i t o r i a l d isc re t ion i s fu l lypro tec t ed by the Fi r s t ~ ~ e n d m e n t . Miami Herald Publ i sh ing Co.,supra , 418 U.S. a t 258.

C. P-3.lo Alt : ) ' s Reli-3.nce Upon "Leased.Access" Is MisplacedIn an argument predica ted upon th i s Cour t ' s acceptance

o f i t s ex t raord inary " repub l i ca t ion" theory, Palo Al to c la imst h a t P r e f e r r ed ' s unquest ioned F i r s t Amendment -3.ctivity ( i . e .disseminat ion of newly-crea ted mater ia l ) can be fu l ly met byus ing space purchased from ar ' .other cab le company. Therefore ,Palo Alto argues , Los Angeles is f ree to p rec lude Prefe rredfrom e rec t ing i t s own sys tem. Since, as Pre fe r r ed has a l readyshown, a l l of Pre fe r r e d ' s programming would be pro tec tedspeech, and Palo Alto concedes t h a t t he re w i l l never bes u f f i c i e n t space on the "f ranch i sed" cab le o p e ra t o r ' s system

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av a i l ab l e fo r P r e f e r r e d to provide a l l such programming, th eCour t should r e j e c t Palo A l t o ' s a r g ~ ~ e n t on t h a t b a s i s a lo n e .However, even were t h i s no t t he case , Palo A l t a ' s cla im t h a t" leased access" i s "adequa te" fo r P r e f e r r e d i s comple te lye r r one ous .

F i r s t of : : i l l , th e ex i s t en ce of some " a l t e rn a t i v e "method o f communicat ing o n e ' s message does no t in and of i t s e l fe n t i t l e government to p r o h i b i t the p a r t i c u l a r ~ e a n s p re fe r r edby th e speaker . Palo A l t o ' s cla im i s s i m i l a r to the cla im ofthe government in Bolger v . Young's Drug Products Corp . , ___u.s. 77 L . : j . 2 d 469 (1983). In t h a t c a se , the f ed e ra lgovernment su ccess fu l l y a t t e m p te d to s uppor t a ban upon theu n s o l i c i t e d mai l ing o f c o n t r a c e p t i v e a d v e r t i s i n g . The SupremeCourt s t a t e d :

The GovernJClent argues t h a t sec t io n3 0 0 l (e ) (2 ) does n a t i n t e r f e r e " s i g n i f i c a n t l y "wi th f ree speech because the s t a t u t e a p p l i e s onlyto u n so l i c i t ed mai l ings and does no t bar o t h e rchanne ls of communication .... However, t h i sCour t has p rev io u s ly de c l a r e d t h a t "one i s no t tohave the ex e rc i s e of h is l i b e r t y of express ion inap p ro p r i a t e p l aces abr idged on the plea t h a t itmay be ex e rc i s ed in some o th e r p l ace" .

77 L.Ed.2d a t 479 n.1B ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .Secondly , th e " a l t e rn a t i v e " su g g es t e j by Palo Alta

would be woefu l ly inadequa te to meet P re fe r r e d ' s F i r s tAmendment i n t e r e s t s . J u s t as the F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s of anewspaper p u b l i sh e r would be v i o l a t ed by a r equ i r ement t h a t itpurchase space from a r i v a l newspaper in orde r to d i s semin a te ,P r e f e r r e d ' s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s would be sev e re ly in f r in g edwere it r e l e 9 a t e d the "second c l a s s c i t i z e n s h i p " urged by Palo

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Alto . The use of channel space on the system o f ano ther i s avas t ly i n f e r i o r m e t h ~ d of communicating to cable t e l ev i s ionsubsc r ibe rs . Such a method o speech would ma 1


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j o u rn a l i s t i c endeavors . "Le3.sed access" on ano the r ' s systemw i l l never be adequa te from t ~ i s s t an jp o in t , both because ofthe l i mi t ed ava i l ab le sp3.ce and because p ro sp ec t iv e l i s t e n e r sto P r e f e r r ed ' s speech would a l ready have h3.d to subscr ibe toth e o th e r cab le comp3.ny's se rv i ces in orde r to o b t ~ i n thea b i l i t y to rece ive P r e f e r r ed ' s c o ~ m u n i c a t i o n . Fina l ly ,Pre fe r r ed would have nO o p p o r tu n i ty to communicate to re s iden t swho chose not to subscr ibe to the o t h e r company's s e rv i c e s . Insum, " leased access" might be adequate fo r a "backY3.rd vincoamateur" , but i s ce r t a in ly not adequate for the q u a l i t y andsca l e of p roduc t ion which ? re f e r r e d d e s i r e s to d i s semin a te .

In ad d i t i o n , the inadequacy o f the " leased access"a l t e rn a t i v e i s exace rba ted by the q u es t io n ab le n a tu re of i t sa v a i l a b i l i t y . At b es t , s u c ~ a v a i l a b i l i t y is l imi ted to thet o t a l number of channels s e t as id e r such use by th e ex i s t ing

lCJcab le o p e ra t o r . An un'knQlvn nU'lber of persons other t ' lanPre fe r r ed w i l l a lso de s i re to use some or a l l o f t h i s space .Pre fe r r ed may wel l be l e f t with no access a t a l l , o r accessonly a t undes i rab le or ev e r - s h i f t i n g t ime s l o t s . Moreover,s ince Prefer red des i re s to compete in a s u b s t an t i a l way with

10 Palo Alto r e l i e s h eav i l y upon the r ecen t l y enacted CableCommunicat ions Pol icy Act o f 1984 ("Cable Act " ) , which itcla ims w i l l requ i re p ro v i s io n of f ive channels fo r such use .However, it i s unclear whether t h i s requi rement i senforceab le . A s imi l a r r equ i r ement imposed by the FCC uponcab le t e l ev i s io n o p e ra t o r s was found to be v io l a t i v e o f theF i r s t ~ m e n d m e n t . Midwest Video Corn. v . FCC, 571 F.2d 1025(8 th C i r . 1978) a 'd on o t h e r grou ;ds 440 U.S. 689 (1979) .

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any ex is t ing cab le ope ra to r , Pre fe r r ed w i l l undoubtedlyconfron t d i sc r imina t ion a g a i n s t it in g a i ~ i n g access to andbeing charged fo r such channel t ime. The recen t ly enacted

Cable Act sp e c i f i c a l l y permi t s , and in fac t env i s i ons , suchd i sc r imina t ion . Sect ion 6 l2 ( c ) . As explained in the repor t ofth e Committee on Energy and Commerce, H.R. Rep. 98-934 (August1 , 1984) (Appendix B to A.-nici Br ie f ) , Sect ion 612 i n t en t iona l lypermi ts such d i sc r imina t ion , inc lud ing pr i ce d i sc r imina t ionbased upon the proposed content of th e speech and i t s es t imatedimpact upon the ex is t ing cab le sys tem's revenue .

[ T J ~ i s sec t ion does contempla te permi t t ingthe cable ope ra to r to e s t a b l i sh r a t e s , terms andcondi t ions whic:1 a re d i sc r imina to ry . T ~ a t i s ,nothing in these provi s ions i s intended to imposea requi rement on a cab le ope ra t o r t h a t he makeava i l ab le on a non-di scr imina tory b as i s , channelcapac i ty se t as ide r commercial use byunaf f i l i a t ed persons ... Thus, in es tab l i sh ingp r i ce , terms and condi t ions pursuan t to t h i ssec t ion , it i s appropr i a t e for a cable ope ra t o rto look to t ~ e nature (but not the s p ec i f i ce d i t o r i a l content ) of the se rv ice being proposed,how it wil l a f f e c t th e market ing of th e mix ofex is t ing se rv ice s being of fe red by the cab leope ra t o r to subsc r ibe rs , as wel l as p o ten t i a lmarket fragmentat ion t ha t might be crea ted andany r esu l t ing impact t h a t might have onsubsc r i be r or adver t i s ing revenues .

11. a t 51.Palo Alto asks t h i s Court simply to assume t h a t

" leased access" i s adequate to meet Pre fe r r e d ' s F i r s t Amendmentneeds . I t does so without the Court knowing anything abou tPre fe r r e d ' s plans and d e s i r e s . In essence, Palo Alto asks theCour t to ru le , as a mat ter of law, t h a t it i s imposs ib le fo rPre fe r red to in tend any quan t i ty and q u a l i t y o f speech which

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could n o t be adequate ly c a r r i e d over s ev e re ly l im i ted space ona " leased access" channel . The fo l ly in such a cla im wasr ev ea l ed in th e evidence prov ided t J th e D i s t r i c t Cour t i n t h eCentury Federa l c a s e . (See Tow Decl . [Ex h ib i t 5J a t Par .27-33) .

In s u ~ , th e c o ~ p l a i n t a l l e g e s a cQgnizable v i o l a t i o no f P r e f e r r e d ' s F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s . The poss ib le ex i s t enceof " leased acces s " does n o t a l t e r th i s f a c t .

IV. PALO ALTO 'S CLJ\!'iED I ~ T E R E S T IN " E ~ m } \ __"1CI:W FIRST P....'1END:1E'IT V.J\L1JES" IS ',mOLLY 'dITHOUT '1ERIT

In an argument exempl i fy ing Palo A l t o ' s lack o funders t and ing o f th e F i r s t fuJendment, it a rgues to t h i s Cour tt h a t Los Angeles ' ::lonopoly f r an ch i s in g scheme should be uphe ldbecause it "enhances II F i r s t A:'"lendment values . (kn ic i Br. a t1 5 -1 8 ) . Pa 10 Al tJ arg. les t h a t the ex i s t ence o f "1 eased access"requ i rements S0r:1e:'10'd : : 1 a ~ e s it "wor t:1 i t " to r e s t r i c tP r e f e r r e d ' s F i r s t A ~ e n d m e n t r i g h t s . Thi s i s p u rp o r t ed lybecause l eased access permi t s d i s s emi n a t i o n over a cab l et e l e v i s i o n syster:1 a t a lower c o s t to some i n d iv id u a l members o fth e pub l i c than th e a c t u a l c o s t to s o c i e t y o f doing so . ( Ino t h e r words, t h a t the " f r an ch i s ed " cab l e sys tem 's s u b s c r i b e r s

a re s u b s id i z in g speech over t he access channe ls ) . InP r e f e r r e d ' s o p i n i o n , it i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine a more wrongheaded view o f th e F i r s t Al'"lendment.

The fundamenta l d o c t r i n e o f th e F i r s t Amendment i st h a t it i s not government ' s ro le to manage th e marke tp lace o fi dea s , nor to impose its op in ion about the "bes t" manner ,

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method or f requency of speech, nor to make judgments based uponfears or a s s u ~ p t i o n s t h a t ce r t a in ins tances o f speech w i l l no tbe " in the publ ic i n t e r e s t " . In essence , Palo Alto argues t h a tgovernment i s permi t ted to s top one c la s s o f soc ie ty fromspeaking ( i . e . t h a t se t of persons with the resources andab i l i t y t o e rec t t h e i r own cab le t e l ev i s io n sys tems) in o rd e rto make speech by another segment of soc ie ty ( i . e . thosewi thou t the resources - -o r d e s i r e - - to own t he i r own system)l e ss expensive. Needless to say, Palo Alto has th ingsbackwards .

[TJhe concept t h a t g o v e r n ~ e n t may r e s t r i c tth e speech o f some elements o f our soc ie ty inorder to e ~ h a n c e the r e l a t i ve voice of othe rs i swholly fo re ign to the Fi r s t Amendment.Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) .

Palo A l to ' s a r g u ~ e n t f l i e s fu l l in the face of theSupreme Cour t ' s opinion in Miami Herald Publ i sh ing Co. v.Torn i l lo , 418 U.S. 241 (1974) . In Torn i l lo , the Supreme Courtsquare ly re j ec t ed the concept t h a t government could requ i renewspapers to provide access to the publ ic fo r a " r i g h t toreply" The Court h e l j t h a t the goals of broad access andbalanced coverage o f i s sues , however des i rab le , were simplyi r r e l e v a n t : the F i r s t ~ ~ e n d m e n t prec ludes government fromach iev ing such goals by burdening the speech of o th e r s . 418U.S. a t 254. The Court r e jec ted the claim t h a t there i s anexcep t ion to t h i s ru le \vhen a "na tu ra l monopoly" i s p resen t .

In t h i s case , Palo Alto does not even p o s i t anyexcep t ion to the ru l e exp la ined in T o rn i l l o . I t simply ignores

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the ru le and bold ly argues t ha t "good goals" provide government11with car te blanche to take unl imi ted ac t ion .

But the list of good "object ives" conceivable byth e numerous regula tory agencies of the Federa lgovernment and perhaps achievable i f they had car teblanche, i s endless . And every ac t o f every agencywould be j u s t i f i e d , j u r i s d i c t i ona l l y sound, andj ud i c i a l l y approved, i f values sought were the so lec r i t e r i a .Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1042 (8th C i r .1978) , a f f ' d 440 U.S. 689 (1979).

In any event , Palo Alto wholly f a i l s to connect i t s" in te res t " to the r e s t r i c t i on a t i s sue : The exc lus ion o fPrefer red from wil l ing l i s t e n e r s . Prefer red des i r e s to expandthe number of speakers . I t des i r e s to and in tends to providespeech d i f f e r en t than t ha t of any other cable t e l ev i s iono p e r a t o r ~ economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t provides an incent ive for suchd i f f e ren t i a t ion . As noted supra , the City of Los Angeles isfree to pass a gener ic law requir ing the provis ion of leased

11 As was demonstrated to the Dis t r i c t Court in the CenturyFedera l case , the auct ion ing o f f to a monopolist of theoppor tuni ty to speak se r ious ly in ju res F i r s t Amendment va lues ,no t enhances them. (Lee Decl . [Exhib i t 6 J ) . The lacrc of pres sfreedom re su l t i ng from the se lec t ion and subsequent contro lover a member of the press makes it imposs ib le for the press tof u l f i l l i t s ro le as watchdogs over government. As Jus t i ceStevens commented in a recent Fi r s t Amendment case:The cour t j e s t e r who mocks the King must choose ~ i s words with grea t care . An a r t i s t i s l i ke ly to pa in t af l a t t e r ing p o r t r a i t of h is pa t ron . The ch i ld whowants a new toy does not preface h is reques t with a

comment on how fa t h is mother i s .FCC v. League of ivor:1en Voters , U.S. 52 U.S.L.H. 5008,5020 (July 2, 1984) (d issen t ing op in ion ) .

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access channels by cable t e l ev i s ion opera tors and then topermi t Pre fe r red , and o ther s , to opera te sub jec t to suchrequi rements . Such non-di scr imina tory , gener ic r egu la t ionscould then be sc ru t in ized by a court to t e s t t he i rc ons t i t u t i ona l i t y . I t i s only a t t ha t poi n t t h a t Palo Al to ' sarguments about "enhancement" woul] be proper ly before theCourt and r ipe for assessment .

V. Pl".LO ALTO ~ H S U N D E R S T A N ' D S AND~ I S A P P L I E S THE O'BRIEN TEST

In the second ha l f of i t s br ie f , Palo Alto argues t ha tLos Angeles ' ac t ions , even i f they do in f r inge upon Pre fe r r e d ' sFi r s t Amendment i n t e re s t s , are j u s t i f i ed under the balanc ingt e s t se t for th in United Sta tes v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367(1968). However, Palo Alto i s wrong - - the O'Brien t e s t doesnot apply in the context of t h i s case . Furthermore, even werethe F i r s t Amendment infr ingements a t i s sue here assessed underthe O'Brien s tandards , they would f a i l to meet thoserequi rements .

A. The O'Brien Test Does Not ApplyTo The Facts At I ssue

Palo Alto summarily a s s e r t s "[bJecause the f ranchiseprocess i s content neu t ra l , the ' t rack two' t e s t [o f ProfessorTribeJ , der ived from United Sta tes v. O'Brien ... app l i e s . "(Amici Br. a t 21) . However, even assuming Palo Alto werecor rec t t h a t Los Angeles ' f ranchis ing process had been content

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12neu t ra l , tha t i s not th e cor rec t t e s t for determiningwhether O'Brien app l ies . Rather, the O'Brien t e s t app l i e s onlywhere "speech" and "non-speech" elements are combined in thesame course o f conduct and government wishes to regula te t ~ e "non-speech" aspec t s fo r a purpose unre la ted to communicat ion.u.s. v . O'Brien , 391 U.S. a t 376-77. Unless the governmentalregu la t ion in ques t ion i s aimed a t th e non-communicat iveaspec t s o f an ac t ion , it is uncons t i t u t iona l absent a showingof a "c l ea r and present danger" or equiva lent concern . PaloAlto ' s own quota t ion from Professor Tribe es tab l i shes t h i s

12 Prefe rred vigorously contends t h a t Los & ~ g e l e s ' auc t ionprocess was in fac t content -based. A review of Los Angeles 'RFP documents (which, of course , Prefe r red was not evenpermi t t ed the oppo r tuni ty to br ing before the D i s t r i c t Courtbecause i tR case was dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6 ) motion) wouldrevea l a whole hos t of ques t ions and reques t s for informat ionabout the "proposed programming" of the b idde rs . In fac t , th ef ina l "f ranchi se ordinance" conta ins spec i f i c requirements t h a tLos Angeles ' se l ec t ed ope ra to r provide p a r t i c u l a r 9rO]rammingon p a r t i c u l a r channels . (Exhibi t D to Palo Alto ' s Br i e f a t9-10) . By the very nature of a process which places governmentin the ro l e o f deciding who sh a l l speak, con ten t -baseddec is ions are almost i nev i t ab le . The RFP process ac t s in p a r tas a screening dev ice , permi t t ing government to make sub jec t iveand unreviewable dec is ions based upon phi losophy andviewpoint . For example, it i s not l i ke ly t ha t Los Angeleswould have u l t imate ly s e lec ted a company owned by i nd iv idua l s~ I h o had long publ i c ly demanded the ous t e r o f the Hayor and theCity Council members (or an i nd iv idua l who bel i eved t ha t spor t sshould be seen in person and not on t e l ev i s i o n , or one whobel i eved in l imi t ing t e l ev i s ion to non-violent programming).By pu t t ing i t s e l f in the pos i t i on o f asking about and se lec t ingbetween programming proposa l s , Los Angeles insured t ha t itwould make a con ten t -based cho ice . The problem i s fundamental--government should not be choosing a t a l l . Tow Decl .[Appendix 5J a t par . 34-447 Lee Decl . [Appendix 6J a t pa r .30-49.

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p o i n t . ( i\i1 Lei B r . ; ~ . t 1


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pos t ing of s igns on non-public forum u t i l i t y poles (Ci tyCounci l of Los Angeles v . Taxpayers For Vincent , u.s.52 U.S.L.N. 4594 (.'-1ay 15, 1984)) . Those were a l l ac t s which noone was al lowed to do. In each of those cases , the conduct inques t ion was i l l e g a l for anyone and everyone . In c on t r a s t , th eplacement of wires in publ ic r ights -of -way i s not i l l e g a l fo reveryone: publ ic u t i l i t i e s do i t , the c i t y ' s "f ranchised"cable company does it, and very probably many o ther s do ita f t e r they secure the normal encroachment permi t s whichPrefe r red has reques ted bu t been denied . Put simply, LosAngeles has made the "conduct" in which Prefer red wishes toengage ( the placement of wires in publ ic r ights -of -way) i l l e g a lbeca use and only because Pre fer red 'II i shes to d i s semina te

'h . 13througn t ose WIres.The opinion in O'Brien i t s e l f es t ab l i shes tha t t h i s

case i s not a proper one for app l ica t ion of the balarc ing t e s t ,and t ha t Los Angeles ' ac t ions a re uncons t i tu t iona l .

The case a t bar i s therefore unl ike onewhere the a l l eged governmenta l i n t e r e s t inregula t ing conduct a r i se s in some measure becausethe communication a l l eged ly i n t e g ra l to theconduct i s i t s e l f thought to be harmful .was 391 U.S. a t 382. The Cour t then d i s t i ngu i shed Stromberg v .

13 This f ac t i s evidenced e f f ec t i ve ly by Palo Alto ' s list of" i n t e r e s t s " which it presen t s on behal f of Los Angeles . Exceptfo r in t e re s t "No. 5", each of those II in t e re s t s I re l a ta sd i r ec t l y to the quant i ty and/or qua l i ty of speech provided bycable companies . Only N o . 5 has anyth ing to do with thenon-communicat ive aspects o f the conduct in ques t ion .

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Cal i fo rn ia , 283 U.S. 359 (1931) , "s ince the s t a tu t e there wasa i ~ e d a t suppress ing communicat ion, it could not be su s t a i n edas a regula t ion of non-communicat i ve conduct . " As a r e v i e ~ ' J ofPalo Alto ' s " i n t e re s t s " es t ab l i s h e s , a t l e a s t in i t s opin ionLos Angeles t ry ing to "suppress" communicat ion because thecommunicat ion would be "harmful" ( i . e . by adverse ly a f f ec t i n gLos Angeles ' a b i l i t y to ex t r ac t concess ions from i t s se l ec t edmonopol i s t ) .

In summary, tn e b a l a n c i ~ g t e s t u t i l i z e d fo r i n c i d e n t a li n f r ingements upon F i r s t Amendment sp eech - - unre la ted to f reeex p ress i o n - - does not apply to t h i s case . Absent some reasonfor a l t e r i n g F i r s t Amendment s t an d a rd s - - such as ap p l i e s in th eb ro ad cas t in g a r e a - - Los Ange les ' ac t ions towards Pre fe r r edcannot be j u s t i f i e d any more than they could be i f app l ied to anewspaper publ i she r . Ne i t he r Los A!1gel es nor !?alo Al t'J prov ideany reason for a l t e r i n g those s t an d a rd s .

B. The R e q u i r e m e ~ t s of th e O'BrienTes t Are Not ~ 1 e t

Even i f th e O'Brien t e s t did represen t t ~ e c o r r e c ts tandard under which to assess Los Angeles ' r e s t r i c t i o n s uponP r e f e r r ed ' s F i r s t k ~ e n d m e n t r i g h t s , those s tandards have no tbeen met.

1 . I t Is Los Angeles ' In t e r e s tNot Palo Alto ' s Guesses AboutThem, '.f'lic'1 ' .lust he I j e n t i f i ed

Palo Alto lists f ive "governmental i n t e r e s t s " , which

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it argues a re served by "franchis ing" . However, t he re i snothing in the record before t h i s Court , or before the co u r tbelow, to indica te whether any o r a l l of these " i n t e re s t s " weresought to be fu r thered by Los e les in taking the a l leged- - - ~ ' - - - -ac t ions . In t e r e s t s asse r t ed as j u s t i f i c a t i ons fo rin f r ingements upon speech must be "ca re fu l ly sc ru t in ized todetermine i f they a re only a publ ic ra t iona l i za t ion o f animpermiss ib le purpose ." Metromedia, Inc . v. San Diego, supra ,453 U.S. a t 510. In t h i s case , th e Court obviously has no wayto know what re levance , i f any, Palo Alto ' s asse r t ed i n t e r e s t shave in the context of t h i s case . To accep t such an i n t e r e s twithout any i nd ica t ion t h a t it i s in fac t an i n t e r e s t of LosAngeles , would be to i n v i t e acceptance o f mere "publ icra t iona l i za t ions ." Since Los Angeles , i t s e l f , has neverpresen ted th e Court with i t s proposed j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , Prefer redsubmits t h a t th e Court has no re l evan t i n t e r e s t before it toasse ss .

2. Palo Alto ' s Suggested " I n t e r e s t s "Are Improper

One of the requi rements of th e O'Brien t e s t i s t ha t" the governmental i n t e r e s t [be] unre la ted to the suppress ion o ff ree express ion ." 391 U.S. a t 377. As noted above, four outo f the f ive i n t e r e s t s sugges ted by Palo Alto are d i r e c t lyr e l a t ed to express ion , and hence a re improper i n t e r e s t in th ef i r s t place . Despi te Palo Alto ' s (and presumably Los Angeles 'in s i s tence t h a t it cr)uld "do b e t t e r " than the f ree marketplaceof ideas , the F i r s t Amendment fo rb ids t h i s kind o f

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in te r fe rence . I t i s no t a proper governmental goal to t ry to"do b e t t e r " . Attempts to "manage" a medium of expression are ,qui t e s imply , beyond th e proper pol ice power of a munic ipa l i ty .

3. "Cream Skimming II

Palo Alto contends t h a t t he re i s some s i g n i f i c ~ n t governmental i n t e r e s t in insur ing tha t a cable t e l ev i s ioncompany which offe rs to serve any customer with in a ce r t a inarea (as determined by Los Angeles) wil l o f fe r to serve everyr es iden t with in t h a t a re a . There are severa l problems witht h i s sugges t ion . Fi r s t , Palo Alto simply assumes t h a t byterming a goal a "po l icy objec t ive" it i s e n t i t l e d to obta init. Yet cable t e l ev i s ion i s not a publ ic u t i l i t y and does no tprovide an e s se n t i a l s e r v i ce . Telev i s ion Transmiss ion v . Pub.U t i l . Com., 47 Cal .2d 82 (1956) . An a t tempt to compel se rv iceto a l l areas , regardless o f cos t , i s t he re fo reuncons t i tu t iona l . F ro s t v. Rail road Commission of C al i f o r n i a ,271 U.S. 573, 583 (1926) ; ~ i d w e s t Video Corp. v . F.C.C. , supra ,571 F.2d a t 1051. See, Cox Cable Communicatio:1s, Inc . v.Simpson, 56 9 F.2d 507, 518-519 (D.Neb. 1983) . To the ex ten t( i f any) t h a t such a requirement could be upheld as areasonab le regula t ion of a monopol is t , Palo Alto impl i c i t lyr e l i e s upon the na tu ra l monopoly theory which it admits i sunproven.

Second, even assuming arguendo t h a t such a requirementis otherwise wi th in Los Angeles ' power, Palo Alto suggests noreason why a l e s s onerous a l t e rn a t i v e i s not ava i l ab le . Los

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Angeles could simply pass an ordinance requ i r ing un ive rsa lse rv ice . By so doing, Los Angeles would insure t h a t any cablet e l ev i s ion c o ~ p a n y opera t ing with in the South Cent ra l a reawould o f fe r se rvice to a l l r es iden t s t he reof . This procedure\vould f u l f i l l t h i s purpor ted i n t e r e s t even b e t t e r than amonopol is t ic f ranch i s ing p rocess , because c u s t o ~ e r s would beprovided a choice between d i f f e re n t companies .

Third , the re i s no i nd ica t ion on t h i s record t h a tPrefe rred would be unwil l ing to o f fe r se rvice to every r es iden twithin the South Cent ra l area . Pre fe rred i s , in f ac t , not onlywil l ing but anxious to do so , and would a l ready be prov id ingsuch se rv ice were it not for Los Angeles ' r e fusa l to permitit. Even accept ing Palo Alto ' s su p e r f i c i a l descr ip t ion ofcab le t e l ev i s ion economics (Amici B r. a t 22-24) , any reasonab leana lys i s o f th e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t "cream skimming" would occurmust o f neces s i ty include the p a r t i c u l a r c h a ra c t e r i s t i c s of themarket a t i s sue . A s i n i l a r argument made by Palo Alto in theCentury Federal case was t o t a l l y repudiated based upon th ef ac t s in t ha t market . Tow Decl . [Appendix 5J a t Par . 13-19.

Fina l ly , Palo Alto i n su f f i c i e n t l y i de n t i f i e s any nexusbetween t h i s pol icy " i n t e re s t " and the exclusion of Pre fe r red .Los Angeles a l ready has a commitment from a cable company toprovide se rvice throughout the re l evan t a rea . Therefore , eveni f Pre fe r red d id not serve a l l a reas , every r es iden t would haveaccess to a t l e a s t one company. Palo Al to ' s only suggest ionotherwise i s a re tu rn to the na tu ra l monopoly theory which itc la ims not to r e ly on. (Amici Br. a t 28) .

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4. Access Channels

process as r e la ted a g o v e r n ~ e n t 3 1 i n t e r e s t in obta in ingaccess channels . Again, th e only asse r t ed nexus between t h i sin t e r e s t and P r e f e r r ed ' s exc lus ion i s the unproven sugges t iont h a t cab le t e l ev i s io n is a n a t u r a l monopoly. Los Angeles hasa l ready obta ined access channels from one cab le t e l ev i s ionope ra to r . Therefore , Los Angeles ' i n t e r e s t in t h i s regard hasa l ready been f u l f i l l e d .

As in th e case of "cream skimming", the proper methodfo r Los Arlgeles t:') fur t : ler an i n t e r e s t in obta in ing accesschannels would be to pass a g ~ n e r i c : ')rdinance requ i r ing t11em.

Prefe rred be l i eves t h a t any such requi rement would be f O l l ~ J uncons t i tu t iona l . Hiami Herald Publis 'Ling Co. v . '1'0 1:: "1 i 110, 418u.s. 241 (1974) 7 Midwest Video Corp, v . F.C.C. , supra , 571 F.2d

14a t 1052-57. As discussed above in Sect ion IV, i:1j'-1ry toP r e f e r r e i ' s ric) ' l ts Cd '1 f1 . ) t be j c l s t i f ied by th e expansion o fsomeone e1 ~ , e I s

14 ~ ~ 1 , 3 ' ) ~ 1 1 . i ~ J ~ 1 ~ t , : ; ~ / ~ l ' ~ . " ~ ~ 1 : 1 { l 1 ' ~ L.:11icated some wi l l ingnes s(e r roneous ly , Pre fe r red submits) to accep t such con t ro l overprogrammi:1g (see , e . g . , Community Communications Co. v.Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th C i r . 1981)) , have requiredgovernment to f i r s t e s t a b l i sh t h a t economic sca rc i ty made suchcon t ro l a nec2ss i ty . Here , h o ~ e v e r , Palo Alto does not r e ly oneconomic s c a r c i t J .

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requi re t h i s Court to hold t ha t the Los ~ D g e l e s Times couldc ons t i t u t i ona l l y be given a government-guaranteed monopolywith in Los Angeles County so long as it agreed to permi t thepubl ic f ree access to a few pages of th e paper .

Fina l ly , even assuming t h a t th e ob ta in ing of accessc h a ~ ~ e l s i s a proper governmenta l goa l , the obvious ly l e s sonerous a l t e rna t i ve ava i l ab le to Las A ~ g e l e s would be to spend

15publ ic money in order ob ta in t h a t "publ ic good." Thoughthe City may have a va l id i n t e r e s t in r a i s ing revenue (orreducing expend i tu r e s ) , it may not do so by i no rd ina t e lyburdening Fi r s t Amendment speakers . Minneapol is S ta r v.Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, U.S. , 75 L . Ed 2d 295(1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) .In essence , Palo Alto argues t ha t P refe r red should be excludedin order to f inance publ ic access channels tha t ne i the r theCity nor the pub l i c a re wil l ing to pay fo r .

6. Computer- to-Computer Data T r a n s m i s s i o ~

Palo Alto sugges t s t h a t P r e f e r r e d ' s exc lus ion could bej u s t i f i e d by the "perc ieved r i sk" t h a t ce r t a in computer - to-

Palo Alto ' s argument e s s e n t i a l l y b o i l s down tothe fo l lo ' ,dng: "By excluding Pre fe r r ed and a l l o thercable t e l e v i s i o n opera to r s , Los ~ D g e l e s can guarantee amonopoly to one se l ec t ed person . Since t ha t person w i l lthen make monopoly p r o f i t s , he w i l l agree to g ive some ofthose p r o f i t s to the City or to the pub l i c in exchange fo rpro tec t ion from compet i t ion . This wi l l save the Ci tymoney. "

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computer data t ransmiss ion se rv ice s w i l l not develop "qu ick lyenough." (Amici Br. a t 26). Prefer red could ha rd l y haveimagined a be t t e r i l l u s t r a t i o n o f Palo Al to ' s misunderstandingo f the F i r s t Amendment. Palo Alto simply i de n t i f i e s somethingit th inks would be "nice" , s t a t e s tha t a c i ty w i l l " f o r f e i t thenecessary to obta in" ( ld . a t 29) t h i s nice th ing unless itprovides a government pro t ec t ed monopoly to one se l ec t edspeaker , and then argues t h a t the F i r s t ~ ~ e n d m e n t permi ts theexclus ion of a l l speakers but one because of the pol i cyob jec t ive of "ge t t ing something n ice" . This exac t argumentcould be made in support of the monopolizat ion of any medium ofspeech . A g o v e r n m e n t - s a n 2 t i o ~ e d m o n ~ p o l y bookse l l e r might wel lbe wi l l ing to subs id ize a f ree l end ing l i b r a ry fo r the poor ; agovernment-sanct ioned monopoly movie t hea t e r might wel l admitsenior c i t i z e n s a t 75% o f f regu la r t i c k e t pr ices ; and agovernment-f ranchised newspaper would c e r t a i n l y be wi l l ing toprovide f ree gues t column space fo r the Mayor and CityCounci lmembers. Under Palo Alto ' s theory o f the F i r s tAmendment, no con ten t -neu t ra l burden upon f ree speech wouldever be held uncons t i t u t iona l unless it was complete lyi r r a t i o n a l and a r b i t r a r y .

Each o f th e objec t ions descr ibed in the p receed ing twosubsec t ions a l so apply with f u l l for2e to Palo A l to ' s cla imedi n t e r e s t in data t r ansmi ss i on . There i s no proper nexusbetween P r e f e r r ed ' s exclus ion and the i n t e r e s t sought ; there i sno reason why a gener ic , non-di sc r imina tory ordinance could notf u l f i l l the purpor ted i n t e r e s t ; and th i s i n t e r e s t couldprope r l y be met in a l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e fashion by the d i r e c t

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purchase or su b s i d i za t i o n of such s e r v i c e s . Fur thermore , th ep ro v i s io n o f most da ta t ransmiss ion se rv i ces by a cab let e l ev i s io n op,=r3.t)( i.s ' - ~ _ l ~ J 1 . l \v i th in the Sta t e of C a l i fo rn i a .

Cal . Publ i c U t i l i t y Commission Decis ion No . 84-06-113 (June 13,1984) In ad d i t i o n , a mu n i c i p a l i t y ' s a t t empts to fo rce upon acab le t e l e v i s i o n o p e r a t o r the p ro v i s io n o f such common c a r r i e rf unc t i ons amounts to an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t ak ing v i o l a t i v e o fthe F i f th Amendment. Fro s t , M i d ~ e s t Video, Cox Cable , a l lsu p ra .

7 . Disrupt lQn o f ~ i f 1 ; : 5-")f-;lay

L as t ly , Palo Alto a s s e r t s t h a t Los Angeles has ani n t e r e s t in minimizing d i s ru p t i o n of its r i g h t s -o f -way . Thisi s undoubted ly t r u e , and in f a c t amounts to the on lynon-express ion re l a t ed i n t e r e s t proposed by Palo Al to .H042ver, Palo Al to s e r i o u s l y misunder s tands the s i g n i f i c a n c e oft h i s i n t e r e s t :tn1 r : . ~ 1 ' ' ! ,-=xtent to whic''1 t ~ l e Pi r s t A:nendmentpermi t s r e l i a n c e upon it to b'-.lxden f r ee speech . Hhat Palo Altof a i l s to a p p r 2 c i a t ' ~ ~ _ : ; ,:'L1:: ' : ' 1 ~ .1, l ' ) i , - i , , ; ' r ' ~ f ' , > - ) ~ - n y ' : ) ,,'11:::'1P r e f e r r e d d e s i r e s access a re a "publ i c orc1u fo rcommunica t ion" . Cinevi s ion Corp . , supra , 745 F.2d a t 569-71.

In Per ry Educat ion Assn. v . Perry Local Educa tors 'Assn . , 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) , th e Supreme Court d esc r ib edth ree t ypes o f pub l i c forums, with accompanying p u b l i c a c c e s sr i g h t s t i1at vary "depending on the c h a r a c t e r of th e p ro p e r ty a ti s sue . " The f i r s t c a t e go r y i nc l ude s a reas such as s t r e e t s andp ark s , "which by long t r a d i t i o n or by government f i a t have been

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devoted to assembly and debate . " ld . a t 45. The secondca tegory inc ludes publ ic p ro p e r ty , such as munic ipa laud i to r iums , which, though not t r a d i t i o n a l l y used r ap a r t i c u l a r type of communicat ive a c t i v i t y , have been " o p e n c ~ d " fo r use by the publ ic as a place for SUC:1 "tel: -.Ii ty .44-45; Cinev is ion Corp. , supra , 745 F.2d a t 569-71. The th i rdca tegory of pub l ic proper ty i s t h a t "Hhich i s not by t r a d i t i o nor des igna t ion a forum fo r publ ic communicat ion ." ld . Thei d en t i c a l broad f ree speech r i g h t s apply to communicat ion ine i t h e r o f the f i r s t tHO ca t eg o r i e s , Cinev is ion Corp. a t

16570_71.

p ro p e r ty wi th in e i t h e r the f i r s t or second ca t eg o r i e s of publ icforums, t h i s Court need not dec ide cv111c:h ~ ' l t ' ~ ' J J r y 1:1c1udes t:1epubl ic r igh t s-o f -way a t i ssue in th i s case . There can be nor e a l doubt the Los fu:1geles has des ignated t hose r igh t s-o f -wayfo r use by cab le t e l ev i s io n communicators ; it has a l ready gone

. 17so fa r as to g ran t permiss ion to one such communlcator ,

16 EV2 a in thO'! t h i rd ca te9 : Jry ,vh ic : l i nc ludes SUC 11p ro p e r ty as county j a i l s ( A l ~ e r l e y v. Flor ida , 385 U.S. 39(1966)) and mi l i t a r y bases (Unit3d S t a ~ e s v. ~ l h e r ~ l , i , 710F.2d 1410 (9 th C i r . 1983)) the government i s l i mi t ed t o" reasonab le" r eg u l a t i o n s des igned to reserve th e proper ty fo ri t s in tended use . Cinev is ion Corp . , supra a t 569-70 n . 8 .17 I t i s i r r e l ev an t t h a t L:::>s ~ t 1 g e l e s may 11ave " in tended( L e . d es i r e1 ) t:1d.t the publ ic r igh ts -o : -v fay be us by o:11yone cab le t e lev i s ion ope ra to r . Cinevi s ion Corp . , supra a t570. (Ci ty permiss ion , even though only to a s i n g l e e n t i t y , to(Footnote cont inued on next page)

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thus a c k n o w l e d g i ~ g th e co mp a t i b i l i t y o f such use . Grayned v.Ci ty o f Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). In a d d i t i o n , theCal i fo rn i a Legi s l a t u r e has "opened" th e forul l 0 f pub l ic u t i 1 i ty

b . c i l i t i e s fo r ;13e by ca1;le t e l e v i s i o n o p e r a t o r s allover theS t a t e , by e n a c t i ~ g C a l . P u b . U t i l . Code Sec t ion 767.5 , whichd ec la res t h a t such use i s the consumption o f a "publ i c utility

C a l i f o r n i a " . ( S ubd . (b) ) In s h o r t , a t l e a s t u n t i l LosAngeles and th e S t a t e of Cal i fo rn i a withdraw thoser i g h t s -o f -way from use by the p u b l i c , they remain a p u b l i cforum fo r use by cab le t e l e v i s i o n o p e r a t o r s .

The ru l e s govern ing access t o pub l i c forums i s t h a t :

II [G]overnment fnay '10: ' p r o h i b i t allcommunicat ive a c t i v i t y . For the s t a t e to enforce3. c o n t e n t - b a s e i 8xc l :..13iYl it , , ' lS! : 3 ~ l O ' : J : ' ~ n . ~ i t ' lr eg u l a t i o n i s f18c' ' ! ' ) ?1. ... I t: ) :';'3rve a compel l ings t a t e i n t e r e s t and t h a t it Ls narrowly i rawn toa c h i e ve t h a t end . The s t a t e may a l soenforce r eg u l a t i o n s of th e t ime , p l a c e , and,Ud:lrlf3C ;)f e xp r e s s i on \-Jhich a re C O ~ l t e n t - n e ' J t r a l , 1X e narrc:Mly t'3.il')"Ce"1 :: ) - e ; ~ " . / .. ';_]"'1: ~ ' , - C l l ' " government i n t e r e s t , and l eave open a m p l ~ a l t e r n a t i v e channe ls of communicat ion ."Moreover , in fo rmula t ing a c on t e n t - ba se d or at ime , p l a c e , and manner r eg u l a t i o n , governmentmust s e l e c t th e means o f fu r th e r in g its i n t e r e s tt h a t i s l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e of F i r s t f u ~ e n d m e n t r i g h t s .

Footnote cont inued)communicate to tiV3 p u b l i c , t r ans formed p u b l i c r ty int ;) .3.publ ic forum fo r .:;!CprI3ssive , '3 .ct ivi ty) . The t h r u s t o f th ep u b l i c forum d o c t r i n e i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t governments a re no tpe r m i t t e d tG d i f f e r e n t i a t e between d i f f e r e n t members rJ:(segments of: : : " ' 1 1 ~ t ' ) U _ , ~ .

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i n c lu d in g th e p u b l i c r i g h t s -o f -way , than t hose imposed by o t h e rF i r s t Amendment sp eak e r s . It (CT 1 a t Par . 6) .19 Thisa l l e g a t i o n must be accep ted as t r ue a t t h i s s t ag e in th ep l e a d i n g s . Moreover, such a concept makes i n t u i t i v ~ s ~ n s e . P 1 ~ I : e m e o t newspaper vending boxes on p u b l i c r ig h t s -a f -waypermanent ly r e s t r i c t s p 3 1 es t r i an t r a f f i c , i n v i t e s litterproblems and e n t a i l s repea ted t r a f f i c d i s r u p t i o n every morningwhen a truc'


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apparen t from the four other " in t e r e s t s " proposed by Palo Al to ,the rea l purpose in conduct ing a "franchis ing process" , an dproh ib i t ing speech by the " losers" and "non-par t i c ipan t s , " i sto provide a rneDlod for a c i ty to use i t s p ra c t i c a l con t ro lover publ ic rig"':1ts-of-way :l.S a '''.Je'1p:)n'' '",ith 'tThich to (J':d'1con t ro l over aspec ts of speech complete ly u ~ r e l a t e d to the U 39of those r ights -of-way. Community C.").n"1u'1ic'3.tions 2'1. v.Boulder , supra , 630 F.2d a t 719 (Markey. C.J . d i ssen t ing ) . I ti s prec i se ly such a process t h a t the "publ ic forum" doc t r ineprec ludes .

VI. C O N C L l J S I 0 ~

Palo Alto suggests two reasons why t h i s Cour t should, f the cour t helo,,",. nas merll...

Palo Alto enunciates i t s novel view o f the:! Fi r s t rlJ.'":lendment, butprovides no reason for applying i t s s,lg99S t ions to Prefen:', ':!lbut not to any othe r Fi r s t Amendment spea"8c.I I I I111/1/1111//111/I I I I111/11//1/11/1/1

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P a l ~ Al to ' s ar3uments, suppor ted ~ n l y ~ y hodge-podgeof inappos i te cases , are reduc t io ad absurdun: i t s theor iesa re wrong when app l ied to newspapers, to book-se l l e r s , todemonst ra tor s , and to every othe r type of speaker . They areequa l ly ~ r o ~ g when ~ p p l i e d to the fac ts of t h i s case .

Respec t fu l ly submit ted ,

/ /1/ (" / ; ? Dated: / ' Robet't ',1. Br CifJSOn~ - - ~ - - ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - 1121 "L" St ree t , Sui te 803Sacramento, Cal i fo rn ia 95814(916) 447-2000Attorneys for Appel lant

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9th Circuit Appellant Response to Amici Curiae of Cities Palo Alto Menlo Park Atherton

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Transcript of 9th Circuit Appellant Response to Amici Curiae of Cities Palo Alto Menlo Park Atherton