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C O N T E N T S

List of Abbreviations vii

Introduction : Why Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Matters 1 B. Senem Ç evik and Philip Seib

One Turkey’s Public Diplomacy: Its Actors, Stakeholders, and Tools 13

Gaye Asl ı Sancar

Two Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era 43

Vedat Demir

Three Engaging with the Middle East: The Rise and Fall of Turkish Leadership in the 2000s 67

Ö zlem T ü r

Four Dominance in the Neighborhood: Turkey and Iran 85 Melody Mohebi

Five Elsewhere in the Neighborhood: Reaching Out to the Western Balkans 99

Marija Mitrović Bo š kovi ć , Dušan Reljić, and Alida Vra č i ć

Six The Benefactor: NGOs and Humanitarian Aid 121 B. Senem Ç evik

Seven Turkish Foreign Policy in a Transatlantic Context: A Case for Soft Power and Public Diplomacy 153

K ı van ç Ulusoy

Copyrighted material – 9781137466976


Contentsvi

Eight Addressing Controversy I: Public Diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia 173

Burcu G ü ltekin Punsmann

Nine Addressing Controversy II: Turkey and the Kurds 193 Galip Dalay

Ten Expanding Perspective: Reaching Out to China and the East 213

Ç a ğ da ş Ü ng ö r

Eleven Noor and Friends: Turkish Culture in the World 233 M. Selcan Kaynak

Notes on Contributors 255

Index 259



TURKEY’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Copyright © B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib, 2015.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2015 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN®in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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ISBN: 978–1–137–46697–6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Turkey's public diplomacy / edited by B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–1–137–46697–6— ISBN 1–137–46697–9 1. Turkey—Foreign relations—21st century. I. Çevik, B. Senem,

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First edition: September 2015

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



Introduction: Why Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Matters

B. Senem Ç ev ik and

Ph i l i p Se i b

As the global world order continues its evolution, we are witnessing the ascendance of middle powers such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, China, South Africa) and the MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey). This book has been written at a time when the broader Middle East has yet to resolve its internal issues, stabilize regional security, and sustain democratic principles. The Syrian civil war, political turmoil in Egypt, and the ongoing tension between Iran and the Western powers pose many questions for the future of the region in terms of security, democracy, economic stability, and broader regional inf luence.

Despite the incessant conf lict and violence in its neighborhood, Turkey remains a major power in the region, perhaps owing to decades of political and social progress. This is one of the key reasons why Turkey’s position in the region is so important. On a more global scale, Turkey has been proposing value-based policies, regional peace initia-tives and a broader understanding of the Middle East through what has been dubbed the “Turkish model,” although Turkey itself has had to deal with significant domestic turbulence.

Whether or not Turkey can serve as an inspiration and provide an impetus for changes in neighboring societies has long been discussed in the West as well as within the Middle East. The Arab revolts that began in 2011 and their aftershocks have yet to be played out. Nonetheless, Turkey has been engaging with international organizations more and



B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib2

more, trying to take an active role within the United Nations (UN) framework by proposing ways to deal with global crises.

Those who shape Turkey’s foreign policy are aware of the opportuni-ties and challenges that lie ahead. Turkey is not shy about its leadership aspirations; its only uncertainty is about finding the most effective way to exert its inf luence. Increasingly, public diplomacy appears the most desirable path—as Turkey’s ambitions make necessary and new com-munications, technologies make feasible the reaching out to regional and global publics.

Employing effective public diplomacy is intrinsically connected to Turkey’s realization of its own soft power attributes and capacity. The opportunity that lies ahead of Turkey’s public diplomacy is contingent upon the consolidation of a liberal democracy by Western standards. Turkey’s social and political development provides a venue for sharing this story.

Relying on public diplomacy conveys a message of maturity that is least likely to provoke worries among neighbors in a region that is always fraught with tensions. This approach enhances the perception of Turkey as an honest broker among contentious parties, a role that can win respect not only within the greater Middle East but also from other nations that watch the region nervously. Although some domes-tic issues at hand and various foreign policy miscalculations/decisions have swayed Turkey from that role in the short term, the long-term prospects remain more hopeful.

With its complex political history, strategic location, and determi-nation to take on a larger role in world affairs, Turkey is a significant player in the international arena and has been pursuing a more aggres-sive foreign policy. Key elements of Turkey’s foreign policy, however, have been little studied in the West, leaving significant gaps in aca-demic and diplomatic knowledge. This book is designed to fill some of those gaps by examining Turkey’s public diplomacy—its strategies, methods, and significance.

Turkey’s Public Diplomacy highlights a field that is demonstrating increased intellectual traction among scholars and policymakers. Public diplomacy—concisely defined as state-to-public rather than state-to-state diplomacy—has come of age in this era of pervasive new media tools that enable individuals to independently gather and disseminate information to an unprecedented degree. The mission of this book is not to define or analyze public diplomacy per se, but rather to exam-ine the varied ways it is put to use by a nation of growing geostrategic importance.



Introduction 3

Turkey overlooks the Middle East, and it is literally a bridge between Europe and Asia. Its population is almost entirely Muslim, and it is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is seen as a regional power capable of being a counterweight to Iran’s growing strength, and it has aspired to join the European Union (EU).

Although it has a long history, today’s Turkey is a relatively young republic with deep cultural roots that encompass the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans, and Asia. Turkey was established upon the ashes of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the Turco-Greek War. As a new nation that had sustained immense losses of human and capital resources, the Turkish republic in its early years concentrated on keeping its borders intact and building its national identity. In response to the traumas of past wars, Turkey kept the Anatolian plateau for set-tlement by Muslims exiled from the Balkans and the Caucasus. This policy was a response to the nation’s losses and its self-assertion as a modern state. It also shaped perceptions of Turkey’s international role and foreign policy framework.

For years, Turkish policymakers chose to remain as neutral as pos-sible during regional or global conf licts in order to sustain Turkey’s border integrity and national sovereignty. This neutrality was also a facet of Turkey’s determination to not allow external events to inter-fere with efforts to strengthen its economy. As Turkey matured into a modern, secular, and democratic nation, it became a valuable ally to the West as a NATO member and was a candidate for membership in the EU. During certain periods, such as the Cold War and the first Gulf War, Turkey’s westward tilt became particularly pronounced, and this has led to wariness on the part of many in the Muslim Middle East. Turkey has since been employing public diplomacy to try to offset such concerns.

Turkey’s economic development began to f lourish with industrializa-tion and participation in the world economic system. Perhaps the most significant period of change in economy and politics was the Ö zal era between 1983 and 1992, during which Turkey not only strengthened its commitment to its market economy and the international economic system but also strengthened its international alliances. The Ö zal era’s domestic industrialization and the expansion of Turkish businesses into foreign markets enhanced Turkish soft power in the Balkans, Middle East and the Caucasus. It was then that Turkish business organizations became more involved in foreign policy decisions.

Despite the devastating economic crises of the 1990s and the recur-ring debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by the turn of the




century and with the aggressive economic policies of the Justice and Development Party ( JDP, a.k.a. the AK Party) administration, Turkey was able to turn its fiscal situation around. The growing percentage of exports, increased GDP, decreased rate of inf lation, and strengthened Turkish lira demonstrated its ability to sustain a mature economy. In relative terms, the Turkish economy has remained stable even in the midst of global financial storms.

Turkey’s economic growth can partly be attributed to a conservative business community as well as intensive efforts to promote tourism and culture. It would not be an overstatement to point out that the Turkish economy has successfully maneuvered itself away from the global eco-nomic crisis through foreign investments and growing exports to new markets. The consolidation of a successful economy can be argued to depend on a stable political structure and a more mature democracy. The Turkish economy depends on the country’s political stability and freedom, as well as liberalizing its democracy to ensure that it includes not only the secular but also the most religiously orthodox Muslim, Kurdish, and Christian minorities (a process that some would argue leaves much to be desired). In turn, the stronger the economy, the more resources Turkey can devote to its public diplomacy.

Turkey and Israel have been called the only secular democracies in the Middle East. Turkish democracy is a work-in-progress that has struggled to maintain the modern and Western precepts of democ-racy. Issues related to Turkish identity dating back to the Ottoman modernization and nationalism were present in the young republic and created fault lines within the developing democratic system. In 1960, the decade-long rule of the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party), which began as a result of the first free multiparty elections, was ended by a military coup d’etat, resulting in death sentences for Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two other ministers. This traumatizing pause in the democratization process remains vivid in Turkish social and polit-ical memory.

Turkey has undergone two other military coups d’ é tat and one mil-itary edict, with another attempted military takeover in 2007. Despite these events, and although it usually takes generations to advance the democratic culture of a nation, Turkey has been working on rapidly improving its democratic credentials since the early 2000s. The deter-mination to continue with the EU accession process and the JDP’s confrontation with the military leadership, which has always seen itself as the ultimate guarantor of the secular state and thus has actively been involved in politics, have inf luenced the pace of democratization.



Introduction 5

Turkey’s soft power outreach relies on these variables of internal governance.

Despite several unsuccessful attempts to oust the current govern-ment, which has been perceived as Islamist and antisecular by the majority of the military cadres, the role of the military has gradually diminished. This is probably one of the major democratic advances in modern Turkish history. It differentiates the country from most of its neighbors in the sense that Turkey in the last decade or so has pushed for a more advanced civilian democracy. These democratic credentials provide another basis for Turkey’s soft power.

Turkey’s EU bid and the Copenhagen Criteria that were set forth by the EU as steps toward Turkey’s membership have been instrumental in efforts to introduce more civil rights and rights for religious minor-ities and the large Kurdish population. The stagnant Turkish-EU rela-tionship during the last several years has not stopped the government from offering further rights and proposing political opportunities for Turkey’s Kurds and Christians. Although much more work is necessary to build a system that is participatory and fully democratic in nature, these steps have indicated that Turkey is willing to deepen its demo-cratic process.

The May-June 2013 Gezi Park protests that began in Istanbul and spread to other parts of the country were caused by discontent with the tendency of the government to interfere with citizens’ personal lives and dictate social norms. The disproportionate use of force to crush the protests was widely viewed on international television broadcasts, cast-ing a shadow over Turkey’s soft power and raising doubts about Turkey’s democratization and the whole concept of the Turkish model. The sup-pression of these protests underscored the limits of Turkish democracy. Partly to offset negative domestic and international response to the use of force against protestors, the Turkish government introduced reforms in September 2013 that were designed to benefit the Kurdish popula-tion and expand civil rights generally. Turkey’s leadership seemed to recognize that the sustainability of the Turkish model is based on the actual democratic values that Turkey will support and the whether it can close the gap between its rhetoric and actions.

While sustaining a growing economy and stabilizing the political structure by reducing the inf luence of the military, Turkey has been slowly establishing state and nonstate institutions that serve as Turkey’s public diplomacy tools. One of the earliest public diplomacy agents cre-ated in Turkey is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), which was established in 1992. It works toward eradicating




poverty, and assists thirty countries to reach world standards in educa-tion, health, and employment. Besides TIKA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), Directorate of Religious Affairs, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), Turkish Red Crescent (K ı z ı lay), and the Anadolu News Agency (AA) are govern-mental public diplomacy tools.

On a nongovernmental level, NGOs have been highlighting a new instrument in the foreign policy toolkit. Since the late 1990s, NGOs with a predominantly Islamic outlook and some affiliated with the G ü len Movement—the Hizmet Movement—have been dominating the humanitarian aid arena. Among the most inf luential Turkish NGO’s are Cansuyu Derne ğ i (Cansuyu Charity and Solidarity Foundation), Kimse Yok Mu? Derne ğ i (Is Anybody There?), Deniz Feneri Derne ğ i (Lighthouse Association), and İ nsan Haklar ı ve Hizmet Derne ğ i ( İ HH or the Foundation for Human Rights and Humanitarian Relief ).

In 2010, the Directorate for Public Diplomacy was established under the Prime Minister’s Office to formulate and oversee Turkey’s offi-cial public diplomacy strategy. This innovation in Turkey’s state-pub-lic relations can be attributed to the changing dynamic and structure of the more assertive foreign policy. It is still too early to determine whether the Directorate for Public Diplomacy will prove effective in fostering respect for Turkey’s values and “brand,” but the fact that the institution is a fully functioning unit can be taken as a meaningful step toward building a more sophisticated public diplomacy strategy for the nation.

Turkey’s institutions that directly or indirectly work in establishing a public diplomacy strategy are interconnected so that the work of one inf luences the work of the others. In some cases the NGOs are the first to take action, while in other situations the governmental institutions take the first step. However, Turkey’s public diplomacy is still not sys-tematic and is yet to feature an overall strategy.

Today, Turkey’s foreign policy and soft power are highly dependent on visibly maintaining democracy, as well as economic and political stability, at home. Beyond domestic matters, Turkey’s public diplomacy is based on the country being seen as a trustworthy partner in finding solutions to disputes within the region by not becoming aligned with one or several states to the exclusion of others.

Turkish foreign policy gained significant momentum with the appointment of Ahmet Davuto ğ lu as the foreign policy adviser to the prime minister and then in 2009 as the foreign minister. (He has since



Introduction 7

become prime minister.) Davuto ğ lu devised the “zero-problems with neighbors”( kom ş ularla s ı f ı r sorun ) doctrine, a policy approach that draws from Turkey’s historical, geographic, and cultural ties to nearby states; in other words, policy that relies on soft power. As the zero-problems policy was put into action, Turkey gained substantial regional inf lu-ence, at least through the initial stages of the Arab Spring. Turkey’s political stance at that time posed an opportunity to bring change to the way regional relationships are created and maintained.

The zero-problems with neighbors policy may, however, be more a product of wishful thinking than of realistic regional strategy. It has been called into question both inside and outside Turkey because of the lack of diplomatic representation with Israel, Egypt, and Syria as well as political disputes with Iraq’s central government. In the post–Arab Spring Middle East, neighbors seem certain to have problems with each other, and so Turkey has had to find a more realistic foundation for its approach to regional issues. The conf lict that began in 2014 related to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) illustrated the fragility of the zero-problems concept.

Critics of Turkish policy in these matters point to the government’s following a sectarian path in response to strong political and emotional ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s JDP. The shifts in the Middle East and their repercussions have nearly isolated Turkey in the short term, where the zero-problems doctrine was supplanted by the “precious loneliness” ( de ğ erli yaln ı zl ı k ) approach. This was defined as Turkey adopting an uncompromising value-based political stance in a region where willingness to make deals is an essential element of diplomacy. Realizing that Turkey was becoming more isolated rather than more inf luential, the government, in late 2013, reassessed the zero-problems policy and reached out to Iraq, Russia, and Iran, and also started a mending process with Israel. This book is being written while Turkey is trying to reposition itself as a key player in regional politics by being as neutral as possible (except toward Syria) but still an active broker in the region’s complicated relationships. As it does so, public diplomacy will be a tool that it consistently uses.

Turkey has numerous public diplomacy mechanisms at its disposal. On the conventional, governmental side are the Prime Ministry’s Office of Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for EU Affairs, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Directorate General of Press and Information, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Undersecretary for Defence Industries, Anadolu Agency, and the Prime Ministry’s Disaster and Emergency Management




Presidency. Among nongovernmental tools are think tanks, NGOs, national brands, opinion leaders and celebrities, and international cul-tural and sports events. For Turkey, as for other countries, coordinating the work of all these is a daunting task, requiring commitment at the top of the government and sustained interest on the part of those who lead nongovernmental entities and projects.

The history of Turkish public diplomacy displays a mix of enthusi-asm and nonchalance. Turkey’s public diplomacy framework is rather oriented toward crisis management and is within the lines of reac-tive public diplomacy. The Ottoman Empire benefited from elements of soft power beyond its reliance on hard power. In the republic era, after 1925, a single ideology dominated the political atmosphere of the empire, which was broadly viewed as relying on authoritarian measures and with little of the “power of attraction” that is at the heart of soft power. Recognizing the importance of globalization during the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey widely opened its economic, political, and social practices to the world, and, by the time the new century began, was more reliant on using soft power and public diplomacy.

As part of its new assertiveness, Turkey worked to establish itself as a more inf luential power broker within the region, maintaining func-tional relationships with Arab states and Israel. This was encouraged by the United States and other countries that saw the value of having a local stabilizing power near the core of the always-tense situation in that part of the world. Predictably, Turkey has had its ups and downs in this role. The Gaza Flotilla incident in May 2010 did considerable damage to Turkish-Israeli relations, which were only partially repaired through the mediation of US president Barack Obama in 2013.

Yet another delicate balancing act can be seen in how Turkey main-tains its connections to the West and its socioeconomic ties to Iran. Turkey has been able to use Iran’s isolation from the West and strict domestic controls for its own economic advantage. Turkey is also a bridge to the West for Iranian citizens, through Iranian tourism to Turkey and the export of Turkish popular culture into Iran. But the impact and sustainability of this soft power diplomacy on Turkey’s security and economy is uncertain. Issues to consider include Turkey’s treatment of Iranians (particularly refugees), Iran’s apparent change of direction in foreign policy related to its nuclear capability, and Turkey’s own political dynamics related to balancing Islamism and secularism.

Turkey’s Ottoman past is another factor in the country’s modern public diplomacy, and this is particularly evident in the Balkans. After the end of the Cold War, many channels of political communication



Introduction 9

and economic cooperation reemerged between Turkey and south-east Europe. In addition, the disintegration of Yugoslavia triggered a regional geopolitical reset. To attain more inf luence in the Balkans, Turkey initiated bilateral meetings, took active part in regional ini-tiatives, and presented itself as a mediator in regional disputes and an advocate of the region’s interests. Turkey also fostered investments in the region involving state institutions, business interests, and religious and civil society organizations. The binding narrative for Turkey’s endeavors is the assertion of regional interconnectedness based on com-mon Ottoman history that is mostly presented in a positive light.

As a middle power, Turkey has demonstrated proactive policies in various areas—including humanitarian assistance—that are designed to bring change as well as exert inf luence. It has been pursuing a value-based policy in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East where NGOs play a major role in shaping Turkey’s image in the region. Through the NGOs, Turkey is not only trying to establish herself as a humanitarian assistance provider but also as a mediator in regional conf licts by grad-ually building trust. In many ways, Turkey is providing an example of niche diplomacy through its humanitarian, value-based policies.

Some of Turkey’s most delicate public diplomacy concerns its mem-bership in NATO and its aspiration to join the EU. As a NATO mem-ber in an exceptionally volatile region, Turkey must step carefully in dealings with Syria, Iraq, Iran, and other neighbors, all the while rec-ognizing that NATO’s other members, which are geographically more distant, can deal more dispassionately with some of the issues that keep unsettling the region.

Although NATO appreciates Turkey’s location and its military capa-bility, the same cannot be said of the EU. Concerns that are unspo-ken officially are nevertheless significant: principally, Turkey being a Muslim country with a large number of emigrants who have resettled throughout Europe. As numerous EU members endured economic hardship during the Eurozone crisis that began in late 2009, Turkey felt less pressure to gear its public diplomacy to winning support for joining the EU. When economic stability returns, it will be interesting to see if and how Turkey renews its quest for membership.

Closer home, Armenia is Turkey’s immediate neighbor, but there is minimal formal communication between them. Their common bor-der has been closed for two decades, and formal diplomatic relations do not exist. The lack of channels of communication has become all the more worrisome since dealing with the past and its legacy weighs heavily on bilateral relations. The tensions between the two countries




have drawn in other nations that have domestic constituencies with stakes in one or both countries. This situation provides an opening for public diplomacy, especially initiated by Turkish and Armenian civil society actors to help heal the broken relationship and rebuild trust. Such efforts could provide both governments with tools to commu-nicate bilaterally and internationally as they try to build positive and constructive relations.

An even more complicated relationship exists between the Turkish government and Kurdish people within and beyond Turkey’s bor-ders. Regional uprisings have complicated Turkey’s Kurdish question by feeding Kurdish national ambitions in the region and breaking the once-robust alliance between Turkey, Iran, and Syria against the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Capitalizing on the regional chaos and deteriorating relations between Ankara and Syria’s Assad regime, the PYD, the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, took de facto control of northeastern Syria. Turkey’s subsequent concern over the advance of the PYD toward its southern border was one of the major fac-tors that triggered the so-called “Imrali Process”—or the Solution Process—in which it held peace talks with the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan in an effort to solve the three-decade-old Kurdish problem. If the initiative eventually proves successful, it will have major domestic and regional implications. Part of the process, from Turkey’s standpoint, will involve public diplomacy outreach to its neighbors who are also trying to resolve Kurd-related issues, and to the larger community of nations to which Kurds have directed their own public diplomacy. By mid-2014, however, the rise of ISIL and its battles with Kurds in Syria and Iraq disrupted Turkey’s plans for a gradual solution to problems related to Kurdish self-governance, and as of this writing, the f ighting has threatened to spill across Turkey’s borders.

Farther afield, in the Asia-Pacific region, Turkey’s growing eco-nomic ties and military cooperation with China, and its willing-ness to participate in regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and ASEAN, are evidence of Turkey’s eagerness to extend its inf luence beyond its neighborhood. Public diplomacy activities include cultural and artistic exhibitions, academic and student exchanges, radio broadcasts, and other low-key projects. Problems remain; Turkey lacks the high-end educational facilities that would attract students and academics from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Further, Turkey’s “soft power” efforts have largely focused on the country’s Ottoman heritage, which resonates well with African,



Introduction 11

Balkan and Middle Eastern audiences, but has little appeal in the Asia-Pacific region.

Turkey is not lacking, however, in one soft power export: entertain-ment television, specifically the “soap opera” programs that have legions of devoted fans around the world. Shows such as Gumus ( Noor , 2008), Kurtlar Vadisi ( Valley of the Wolves , 2009), and Ask- ı Memnu ( Forbidden Love , 2008) became immensely popular, first in the Middle East, and then in wider markets, reaching as far as Latin America. Response to the shows has not been unanimously positive: they have stirred anger among some religious leaders for glorifying behavior some might consider unseemly. They have also been accused of pushing a neo-Ottomanist political agenda of trying to convince Arabs to buy into Turkish leadership in the region. Despite the criticism, the Turkish series remain enormously popular; they are embraced in diverse set-tings and their appeal may be partly linked to a “neo-Ottoman cool” that parallels Turkey’s foreign policy aims.

These are some of the many pieces of a fascinating case study of a nation with growing power and expanding public diplomacy. The chapters in this book discuss these and related matters, answering many questions—and raising many others—about Turkey’s public diplomacy, which is still in its very early stages, and has not mastered the method of timely communication with foreign publics prior to a crisis or dur-ing times of peace. Consolidating Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy would require Turkey to bring more sophistication to the intricate rela-tionship between domestic and foreign policy and how they inf luence one another.

As a result, Turkey’s dedication to political reforms lies at the heart of its soft power and will be essential in employing a grand public diplo-macy narrative and strategy. Nonetheless, Turkey’s more aggressive foreign policy stance and its involvement in the international system as a stable Muslim ally to the West have been invaluable in recogniz-ing the potential of rising regional powers. Turkey’s strategic inf luence must be taken seriously, and so must the ways that public diplomacy contributes to that inf luence.



I N D E X

Abdülhamid, Sultan, 49–53, 62, 63, 226, 228

Africa, 1, 3, 9, 10, 21–2, 30, 61, 69, 122, 126, 127, 135, 138–41, 143–4, 163, 217, 220, 224

Albania, 25, 29, 44, 52, 100, 102, 104–7, 111–16, 122, 216

Al-Nahda, 79Al-Sisi, Abdulfattah, 79–80, 217Alevis, 132–3Anadolu Agency, 6, 7, 26–7, 114Anadolu Kültür, 186Anatolian tigers, 68–9, 143–4Ankara, 10, 72, 79, 88, 91–4, 100–4,

108–10, 115–16, 129, 132, 161, 195, 204

Arab revolts, 1, 141Arab Spring, 7, 67, 75–6, 79, 81–2, 131,

162–3, 165, 198, 203, 213, 227Arabs, 11, 44, 129, 137, 216Aras, Bülent, 76, 82Arınç, Bülent, 80, 245–6Armenia (Republic of ), 9, 28, 91,

162–3, 173, 175–9, 187–8, 217Armenian diaspora, 177, 180, 184–9Armenians, 10, 33, 44, 46, 50, 132–3,

173–87, 189Army, 48, 77, 79, 159, 163ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian

Nations), 10, 214Assad, Bashar, 10, 73, 77–8, 137Asylum, 48, 92–3

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 14, 87, 113, 122, 160–1, 163, 194

Azerbaijan, 25, 58, 87, 101, 162, 163, 173

Baghdad, 73, 81Balkan Pact, 100Barzani, Massoud, 198BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 100–5,

109–13, 115Black Sea, 48, 56, 100, 106, 174Bosnia, 25, 27, 29, 44, 53, 100–2, 105,

107–16, 122, 129, 162–3, 216, 235branding, 6, 8, 13–15, 20, 24, 26, 28,

30, 32–3, 36–7, 44–5, 47, 129–31, 134, 139–40, 145–6, 166, 168, 194, 208, 214, 216–18, 222–3, 245

BRICS, 1broadcasting, 24–6, 37, 90, 187, 195,

207, 236–7, 239, 245Bulgaria, 25, 44–5, 50, 53, 59, 107, 111,

114–15, 122, 221business organizations, 3, 125, 139,

142, 144

Cairo, 75, 79–80caliphate, 52, 53, 63Cansuyu Relief Foundation, 6, 141, 220Caucasus, 3, 14, 25, 44, 58, 104, 107,

153, 161–2, 167, 177, 220celebrities, 8, 26, 31–3, 138, 179, 244China, 1, 10, 19, 29, 56, 101, 117, 144,

157, 162, 213–14, 216, 218, 220–6



Index260

Christians, 4–5, 21, 44, 46–7, 53, 105, 108, 131, 137

citizen diplomacy, 14, 16, 126, 135, 158civil organizations, 9, 16, 44, 55, 59, 226civilian democracy, 5Cold War, 3, 8, 14, 21, 53–8, 99, 102–3,

116, 153–5, 157, 160–7, 194, 215, 218conf lict, 1, 3, 7, 9, 28, 43, 55, 58–9, 62,

72–5, 77–8, 82–3, 94, 99, 100, 102, 105, 107, 109–11, 117, 121, 127–9, 131–2, 134–8, 141, 144, 146, 158, 162–3, 166, 173–4, 180, 182, 185–6, 194, 202–8, 217, 234, 245

conservative, 4, 61, 89, 116, 117, 123–4, 127, 134, 142–4, 154–5, 164, 198, 213, 215, 224, 234, 238, 241

Copenhagen Criteria, 5, 194coup d’etat, 4, 13, 79, 80, 95, 154, 236.

See also military coupscrisis, 4, 8, 9, 11, 24, 68, 73–4, 76–9, 81,

107, 135–6, 138, 141, 157, 161, 163, 165, 199, 203–4, 217, 220, 237

Croatia, 25, 27, 44, 100, 102, 109, 114–15

Cull, Nicholas J., 43cultural diplomacy, 10, 17–19, 21, 23–4,

29, 30, 33–5, 37, 113, 181, 220, 222, 224

cultural exchanges, 10, 14, 16, 23, 30, 104, 125, 156, 179, 181, 214, 219–20, 222–3, 237, 244

Cyprus, 13, 53, 159, 164, 217

DAESH, 131. See also ISISDamascus, 70, 75, 77Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 6–7, 29, 59–60,

69–73, 76–7, 83, 104–7, 109–10, 124, 128, 132, 136, 184–5, 196, 216, 225, 234, 243

Davutoğlu doctrine, 7, 60, 124–5, 128, 144. See also zero-problems policy

democracy, 1, 2, 4–6, 13, 56, 57, 60, 72, 77–9, 95, 102–3, 117, 129, 130, 134, 149, 154, 157, 165, 184, 187, 194, 208, 216–17, 248

democratization, 4, 5, 53, 59, 134–5, 155, 163, 164–6, 177, 186–7, 193, 201, 205–6, 257

Deniz Feneri Association, 6, 141–2Dervishes, 45dialogue, 16–18, 22–4, 28–9, 33, 37, 59,

72, 74, 82, 88, 107, 121, 135, 159, 174, 178–9, 181–3, 185, 198, 200, 204–6

diaspora, 23, 24, 174, 177–80, 182, 184–9, 239

diaspora organizations, 177, 180, 182, 184–9

digital diplomacy, 17, 20–1, 27, 224, 240, 244, 246

Directorate General of Press and Information (BYEGM), 7, 17, 22–3

Directorate of Religious Affairs (DIYANET), 6, 114, 140, 222

Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), 6–7, 24, 140–1

economy, 3–5, 8, 46, 67–8, 88, 90, 99, 112–13, 118, 123, 142–3, 145, 154, 161, 163, 165, 219, 236, 242–3, 245

educational exchanges, 10, 14, 16, 23, 30, 156, 159, 179, 181, 214, 219, 222–3, 244

Egypt, 1, 7, 24, 44, 53, 69, 75, 79–83, 90, 95, 122, 131, 137, 141, 167, 217, 237, 239, 243, 247

ethics, 122, 128–30, 132, 134, 145–6, 243Europe, 3, 9, 17, 21, 24, 32, 44–52, 57,

60, 62, 69–70, 91–3, 99–103, 105–6, 114, 144, 160, 162–3, 186, 194, 202, 219–20, 236, 256

European Union, 3, 5, 7, 9, 13–14, 19, 20, 30, 59, 61, 76, 99–102, 104, 109, 111, 115–17, 134, 154, 162, 163–8, 177, 179, 184, 194, 200, 213, 216–17, 243

Eurovision Song Contest, 34–5Erasmus, 30Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 60, 62, 68–71,

74, 79–80, 104, 107, 109–11, 117, 119, 136, 138, 164–5, 184, 188, 198, 200–1, 205, 213, 215–17, 225, 245



Index 261

faith-based organizations, 9, 45, 123, 139, 143, 219

football, 32–3foreign policy, 2, 3, 6, 8, 11, 13–16,

18–19, 22, 27–8, 35–6, 38, 43, 54–63, 67, 69, 71–2, 74–5, 77–81, 104, 107, 117, 121–5, 128–35, 139–40, 142, 143–6, 153–67, 174, 193, 198, 213–17, 220, 225, 234–6, 242–3, 247

Free Trade Agreement, 70, 111

G20 Presidency, 127Galatasary University, 30Gaza, 8, 62, 74, 122, 126, 129, 131, 133,

135, 136, 144, 152Gaza f lotilla, 8, 62, 74, 81, 136–7. See

also Mavi Marmarageopolitics, 9, 54, 99, 153, 194Germany, 19, 51, 91, 103, 117, 166Gezi Park protests, 5, 133, 217, 227global affairs, 2, 162globalization, 8, 165, 227, 238Greece, 28, 44, 58–9, 100, 105, 111, 115,

123–4, 159–60, 237–8Gül, Abdullah, 15, 29, 33, 175Gülen, Fethullah, 6, 115–16, 133, 144,

215, 217, 226Gulf War, 3, 57, 162

Hamas, 72, 136hard power, 8, 43–5, 49, 52, 62, 82, 102,

130, 145, 155, 157, 159, 163–4, 166–7, 196, 234, 247

Hizballah, 72human rights, 6, 46, 93, 103, 117, 128,

130–1, 133, 163, 184, 186, 194–5, 225humanitarian aid, 6, 9, 18, 24, 47, 51,

121–2, 125, 127, 129, 132, 134, 136–7, 140, 142, 144–6, 207, 215, 219, 244

identity, 3–4, 14, 17, 32, 36, 54–5, 58, 63, 82, 89, 90, 115, 123–4, 136, 143, 155, 158, 164–7, 185, 188, 197–9, 205, 215–16, 225, 235–6, 239, 243

IHH (IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation), 6, 126, 127, 141, 144, 220

image, 9, 13, 15, 20–1, 25, 28, 30–3, 36–7, 49–52, 59, 62, 63, 67, 86, 90, 103, 106, 108, 111, 117, 122, 128–9, 133–4, 140–1, 143, 145, 164–5, 167, 194, 203, 208, 213, 218, 242, 245, 247

immigrants, 46, 48, 91–2, 214, 236IMF (International Monetary Fund),

3, 161international organizations, 1, 18, 60,

61, 127international schools, 26, 30, 106–7,

113, 116, 126, 188, 217, 226investment, 4, 9, 67–70, 72, 78, 88,

104–5, 108, 111–13, 117, 126, 141, 143, 208, 225, 237

Iran, 1, 3, 7–10, 69, 71–2, 76–8, 81, 85–95, 99, 122, 135, 160, 200, 202, 244

Iraq, 7, 9, 10, 24, 44, 56, 58, 61, 62, 71–3, 76, 78, 81, 87, 159–60, 164, 167, 195, 198, 200, 202, 219, 247

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), 204, 206, 247

Islamic solidarity, 213, 217, 219, 225, 226–7

Islamophobia, 19Israel, 4, 7, 8, 44, 62, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74,

75, 76, 81, 82, 131, 133, 136, 137, 159, 167, 215, 216

Izetbegovic,́ Alija, 110

Japan, 10, 19, 24, 49, 59, 218, 221–3, 225–6, 240

Jews, 44, 46–7JDP ( Justice and Development Party),

4, 7, 58–62, 68–9, 79, 88, 103, 106–7, 111, 116, 123–4, 132–3, 136, 144–5, 154–5, 159, 164–5, 167, 177, 193, 195–201, 207, 209–11, 213–17, 222, 224–6, 243–6



Index262

Kalın, Ibrahim, 14, 15, 71, 74, 75, 80, 130, 216

Kemalism, 58Kirişçi, Kemal, 69, 243Kosovo, 29, 100–2, 104, 107, 109,

111–16, 122, 235KRG (Kurdish Regional Government),

198, 202–3, 207

Latin America, 11, 22, 217, 223–4, 239leadership, 2, 4, 5, 11, 53, 67, 68, 79, 80,

102, 136, 196, 203, 234Lebanon, 44, 71–3, 78, 90, 122, 237, 243

Mavi Marmara, 8, 62, 74, 81, 136–7mediation, 8, 59, 67, 72–4, 78, 81–2,

111, 125, 127, 132, 135, 137–9, 214, 225

Mediterranean, 56, 71, 93, 160, 176Menderes, Adnan, 4middle class, 86, 88, 221Middle East, 1–4, 7, 7, 9, 11, 14, 25, 28,

30, 45, 59–60, 67–71, 76–8, 80–3, 92, 95, 104, 106–7, 114, 122–3, 126, 128–9, 131, 135–7, 140–1, 143, 154, 159–67, 187, 195–6, 198, 202, 213, 216–17, 221, 223–6, 233–5, 237–45, 247

middle power, 1, 9, 124, 130military coups, 4, 13, 79, 80, 95, 154,

236military edict, 4military takeover, 4Ministry for European Union Affairs,

19–20, 184Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 6,

20–1, 88–9, 219–20, 236, 244, 246Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6–7, 18–19,

33, 35, 36, 58, 76, 88, 90, 138, 243MINTs, 1Montenegro, 44, 104, 111–12, 114–15,

122Morsi, Mohammed, 79, 80, 82, 137, 217Mosques, 8, 21, 52, 110, 115, 188multicultural, 106, 134, 208

multi-dimensional policy, 104, 124multi-party system, 4, 55MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists’

and Businessmen’s Association), 69, 142–4

Muslim brotherhood, 7, 79–80, 137Muslims, 3, 44–6, 53, 100, 105, 108–11,

116–17, 142, 220, 222, 225, 242

narrative, 9, 11, 36, 43, 63, 116, 196–7, 205, 207–8, 241

nationalism, 4, 87, 94, 196NATO (North Atlantic Treaty

Organization), 3, 9, 78, 100–2, 127, 159, 160–2, 167–8, 216

Neo-Ottomanism, 11, 108, 233nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), 6, 8–9, 15, 27–9, 36, 85, 121–8, 131–2, 135, 137–46, 178–80, 184, 218–20

nuclear deal, 86–8, 95, 135

Obama, Barack, 8, 76Öcalan, Abdullah, 10, 159, 195–6, 198,

200–1, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208Office of Public Diplomacy, 6, 7, 14–19,

35, 244–5Operation Cast Lead, 74opinion leaders, 8, 26, 31, 37, 135,

180–1Organization of Islamic Conference

(OIC), 61, 102, 127Ottoman Empire, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14,

21, 22, 43–55, 58, 60, 62–3, 87, 100, 101, 103–8, 112, 114, 116–17, 122–3, 131, 132, 136, 160, 161, 182, 184, 186–7, 213, 215–17, 222, 224, 226–7, 233–4, 238–43, 245

Özal, Turgut, 3, 56–9, 63, 123

Pahlavi, Reza, 87Palestine, 74, 87, 136–7, 223, 239Peres, Shimon, 74PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), 10, 57,

71, 195–8, 200–8



Index 263

popular culture, 8, 59, 238, 241, 242Presidency for Turks Abroad, 7, 23–4press, 17, 26, 50, 52propaganda, 155, 157–9, 215, 238public affairs, 17–18, 55public opinion, 13–15, 19–20, 27,

49–50, 52, 55, 63, 73, 87, 154, 156, 174, 187, 201, 218, 224–5, 234, 247

PYD (Kurdish Democratic Union Party), 10, 203–4

Qatar, 77

Rabia, 79–80reconciliation, 124, 132, 176–7, 179–80,

185–6, 189, 207refugees, 8, 46–8, 79, 86, 92–4, 137,

147, 173, 220, 240regional power, 3, 11, 27, 58, 60, 63, 63,

85, 105, 136, 162, 165religious organizations, 9, 45, 123,

139, 143, 219. See also faith-based organizations

reputation, 30, 32–4, 36, 49, 129, 132, 194, 217

rhetoric, 5, 43, 47, 53, 95, 108–9, 111–12, 122, 129–30, 133–4, 145, 183, 245

Rouhani, Hassan, 88Russia, 1, 7, 19, 25, 27, 46, 48, 49, 51–3,

99–101, 105, 112, 117, 123, 162–3, 202, 216, 221, 224

Saudi Arabia, 44, 69, 77, 99, 237sectarianism, 7, 25, 77–8, 81, 226, 246,

248secularism, 8, 62, 86, 198security, 1, 8, 54, 57–8, 60, 67, 78, 82,

86, 94, 100, 102, 128, 134, 139, 143, 157–60, 162–3, 166, 179, 195, 199–200, 202, 243, 255, 256

Seib, Philip, 141Serbia, 25, 27, 44, 50, 101, 104–5,

109–14, 116, 162, 235Sevres syndrome, 54single-party, 54–5

soap operas, 11, 59, 62, 80, 89, 95, 113–14, 233, 234–43, 246

soft power, 2–3, 5–8, 10–11, 13–16, 31, 37, 43–5, 49, 52–3, 58–9, 61–2, 68, 82, 85–7, 95, 99, 102–4, 106, 121–2, 124–5, 127, 130, 134, 140, 143–6, 153–5, 158–9, 163–4, 166–8, 196, 208, 214–19, 221–4, 226–7

Soviet Union, 55–6, 58, 99, 100, 102, 104, 123, 160–2, 174–5

strategic depth, 50, 59–60, 104, 124–5, 128, 234

Syria, 7, 9, 10, 17, 24, 44, 47, 58, 67–87, 90–2, 122, 129, 131, 134, 137, 141, 144–5, 150, 152, 159, 162, 167, 171, 198–201, 203–6, 208, 211, 217, 234, 237, 239, 244, 245, 247–9, 257

Syrian crisis, 78, 79, 81, 199, 203, 204, 217Syrian Kurds, 198, 206Syrian National Council (SNC), 77Syrian refugees, 137, 145

Tahrir Square, 75television, 5, 6, 11, 22, 24–5, 31, 59, 62,

80, 85–90, 94, 181, 187, 224, 231, 233–9, 241–7

TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), 28, 89, 95, 247

think tanks, 8, 16, 28–9, 36, 101, 166, 181

tolerance, 43, 45–7, 63, 107, 215tourism, 4, 8, 34, 62, 70, 86, 90–1,

93–4, 112, 114, 221, 228, 242, 243trade, 47, 57, 67–72, 88, 104, 111, 113,

117, 139, 143, 176, 202, 214, 224–5, 244

Truman Doctrine, 160, 169Turcology Project, 22, 221Turkic Republics, 56–8, 101, 123, 224,

236Turkish Airlines, 12, 32, 36, 91, 115,

139Turkish Cooperation and Coordination

Agency, 4–6, 20–2, 111–13, 125–6, 139–41, 218–20, 226



Index264

Turkish model, 1, 5, 79, 82, 95, 132, 165, 235, 247

Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, 6, 24–6, 114, 224, 236, 245

Turkish Red Crescent, 6, 52, 153, 140–1

Turkish-Armenian relations (please also see other items for Armenia), 133, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 187, 189

Turkish-Islamic synthesis, 123TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and

Businessmen’s Association), 27, 143–4TUSKON (Turkish Confederation

of Industrialists and Businessmen), 142–4, 226

Twitter, 17, 21, 27, 133, 217, 224, 231, 244, 246

UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), 33

UN (United Nations), 2, 61, 102, 127, 137, 188

UNHCR (United Nations Refugee Agency), 92, 131

United Kingdom, 91, 123

United States, 51, 55, 68, 91–2, 99, 129, 154, 157–9, 162, 164–6, 178, 182, 215, 236, 239

universities, 16, 22–3, 26, 30–1, 33, 36, 58, 110, 115, 116, 177, 181, 222–3, 244

USAID (United States Agency for International Development), 178

values-based policy, 1, 5–9, 75, 80, 121–2, 124, 125, 127–32, 138, 145

Western powers, 1, 50, 54–5, 76, 85–6, 132, 154, 162, 182, 208

Westernization, 49, 62, 159, 160–1World EXPO, 18, 51, 220, 222

Yerevan, 91, 174, 176, 183Yugoslavia, 9, 99–102, 104–6, 116–17,

160, 162Yunus Emre Centers, 29, 113, 207,

221–2, 226, 244

Zaharna, R. S., 126, 141zero-problems policy, 7, 60, 62, 69,

75–8, 88, 104, 124, 213, 216, 243



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