Hostile WatersThe Impacts of Personal WatercraftUse on Waterway Recreation

AmericanCanoeAssociationBy David Jenkins

Death, Injury in the Wake

Death on jet ski linked to teen’s inexperience

Windsurfer killed by an illegally speeding jet ski

Illinois woman killed in collision on water

Jet skis kicking up a lot of ill will

Increase in water scooters churns up safety concerns

Warning out for hoons on jet skis

PWCs: Unlicensed Mayhem

Riding a Wave of Pollution, Noise, and Danger

Time to silence the deaTime to silence the deaTime to silence the deaTime to silence the deaTime to silence the death rth rth rth rth raaaaattlettlettlettlettle

Jet skis are unsafe for people, a menace to the environment

Nature Versus Noise

Watercraft Operator Dies in High-SpeedCollision With a Flying Duck

Out of control on the water

Woman dies in water scooter crash

Personal Watercraft: The Noise that Annoys

Woman feared dead after boat, jetski crash

Big Lake collision hurts girl

Swatting Those Buzzing ‘Wet Bikes’

Turning the watercraft tide around

(actual newspaper headlines)

About the American Canoe Association

I. Introduction 1Sidebar: Personal Watercraft Defined

II. The Impacts 2Sidebar: The Numbers

Unsafe Waters 3

PWC Accident Types 4Collisions with VesselsCollisions with ObjectsCollisions with PeopleOther Accidents

PWC Accident Causes 7Inattention/InexperienceSidebar: Flawed By DesignExcessive SpeedReckless Operation/HarassmentDrug/Alcohol Impairment

Additional Risk Factors 11Crowded WaterwaysEnforcement DifficultyExposureEducation

Summary of Findings 16

Unenjoyable Waters 17

Disturbing DesignSpeed & ManeuverabilityNoiseShallow DraftVisible Pollution

Corrupting Influence?No EscapeSidebar: Conflicting Ideas of Fun

TABLE OF CONTENTS

7432 Alban Station Blvd.Suite B-232

Springfield, VA 22150703-451-0141www.acanet.org

Cover photo: PWC running whitewater rapidson Ottawa River. Photo by Dan Gavere P

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Damaged Waters 24

Water PollutionAir PollutionNear-Shore ImpactsImpacts on Wildlife

III. The Regulatory 30

EnvironmentState & Local Government 30

Federal Government 32

National Park ServiceUS Fish & Wildlife ServiceUnited States Coast GuardUSDA Forest Service & Bureau of Land

ManagementUS Army Corps of EngineersNational Oceanic and Atmospheric

AdministrationEnvironmental Protection AgencySidebar: The Political Landscape

Recommendations 37

IV. Conclusions 41

Appendix A: State PWC Regulations At A Glance 42Appendix B: National Level Stakeholder List 44References 45Acknowledgments Inside Back Cover

Mission: The American Canoe Association (ACA) is a national nonprofit membership organizationdedicated to promoting canoeing, kayaking and rafting as safe and enjoyable lifetime recreation,while working to protect and preserve the waterways on which those activities depend.

History: Founded in 1880 by a small group of avid outdoorsmen in the State of New York, today ACAis the nation’s oldest and largest nonprofit organization serving the paddlesport community. ACAalso holds the distinction of being the oldest recreation-based waterway conservation organizationin America and ranks among the country’s oldest sporting organizations.

Membership: ACA currently has more than 50,000 individual members enrolled in a variety ofmembership categories, with an additional 50,000 individuals affiliated through a nationwide networkof local ACA-affiliated paddling clubs. During the past decade, ACA experienced a tenfold increasein its membership base as the Association expanded its marketing and programs.

Program Areas: The primary mission-based programs and services provided by ACA include:waterway conservation and access; safety education and instruction; athletic competition, recreationand public education.

Waterway Conservation Activities: ACA is dedicated to the preservation and protection of America’snatural areas, focusing primarily on rivers, streams, lakes, coastal waterways and their surroundingenvironments. ACA is active in a wide variety of efforts from promoting stewardship to advocacy onissues important to paddlers. ACA weighs in on resource management plans, public land fundingand policy issues, water quality standards, pollution limits, user conflicts, and recreation relatedfee and access issues. Since 1995 ACA has been one of the nation’s leading enforcers of theFederal Clean Water Act through environmental litigation on behalf of its members.

Safety Education & Instruction Activities: Historically, ACA has been at the forefront of promotingboating safety, providing safety education and maintaining a nationally recognized program ofpaddlesport instruction and certification. Working in concert with the U.S. Coast Guard, AmericanRed Cross, National Safe Boating Council and others, ACA provides a comprehensive range ofprograms, publications and other materials toward this end. ACA currently certifies approximately4,000 ACA Instructors in various types of canoeing, kayaking and rafting. Each year ACA Instructorsdeliver the ACA program to an estimated 125,000 individuals participating at the student level.

Programs & Special Events: With the support of a full-time professional staff, ACA sanctions and/ordirectly produces more than 700 paddlesport events annually. ACA’s Programs and Special Eventsdepartment also recruits and services corporate sponsors associated with such events. ACA eventsrange from instructional clinics and other small local events to many of the largest, most visibleevent properties in paddlesport.

Publishing Activities: Working both independently and through its subsidiary, Paddlesport Publishing,Inc., ACA currently publishes a wide range of periodicals, books, videos and other paddlesport-related media. Its lead publication, bimonthly Paddler magazine, is published through PPI andcurrently has an estimated readership of 225,000 readers per issue. A full-color publication, Paddleris provided as a benefit to ACA members and is also sold on newsstands and to individual subscribers.PPI also publishes a quarterly trade magazine (Paddle Dealer) and an annual fly-fishing magazine(The Drake). In addition to the publications produced through PPI, ACA currently publishes 16 booktitles, 7 videos, a quarterly Association newsletter (The American Canoeist) and a variety of otherinformational and educational literature.

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nation’s waterways and the right of individuals toaccept risk in pursuit of recreational activities.

Even though this report represents an honest, fairand common sense analysis of factual information,ACA realizes PWC advocates may try to challengeits content and conclusions. ACA welcomes thisscrutiny and is confident the accuracy of theinformation presented and value of the report’sfindings will be validated by additional efforts.

Since first receiving complaints from its members in 1995, the American Canoe Association

(ACA) has worked to address the adverse impactsof personal watercraft (PWC) on other waterwayusers. ACA’s efforts evolved from initial negotiationswith the Personal Watercraft Industry Association(PWIA) to firm advocacy for stronger PWC lawsand common sense limitations on where PWC areallowed to operate.

In recent years the controversy surrounding PWCuse has grown. Numerous environmental andcommunity groups actively oppose PWC use.National groups such as the Bluewater Network,the Izaak Walton League of America, the NationalParks and Conservation Association, Friends of theEarth and the Natural Trails and Waters Coalitionhave all taken strong positions seeking to betterregulate PWC use. PWC advocates such as PWIA,the American Watercraft Association (AWA), theNational Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA),the American Recreation Coalition (ARC) and theBlue Ribbon Coalition respond vigorously withincreased lobbying efforts and counter everyassertion by their opponents.

In such a contentious environment, it is often difficultto find well-documented and accurate information onthe true impacts of PWC use. In this report, ACApresents evidence about PWC use, describes howPWC use is affecting other waterway recreation andreviews the current regulatory environment. Utilizingthese facts, ACA proposes a well-reasoned approachto making the nation’s waterways safer and balancingthe recreational needs of all waterway users.

ACA is not a neutral party when it comes to personalwatercraft. People who recreate in canoes andkayaks – including ACA’s 50,000 members — areheavily impacted by PWC use. The presence ofnearby PWC use is one of the most unnervingexperiences a canoeist or kayaker can have on thewater. Fear for personal safety is often cited, as isdisturbance by PWC noise, the smell of smoke andgas and the witnessed impacts of PWC use onwildlife. However, it is worth noting that ACA is aboating organization and places a high value onrecreational access, navigability rights on the

INTRODUCTION

1

The commonly used term personal watercraftand its definition are both products of thepersonal watercraft industry. Many people stillrefer to this type of craft as a jet ski. Jet Ski® isthe trademarked name of a particular model ofpersonal watercraft manufactured by Kawasaki.Since any vessel designed for use by one personcan be legitimately called a personal watercraft,ACA petitioned the USCG to adopt new, moredescriptive terminology to refer to water-jetpowered craft. ACA favors the adoption of termssuch as personal jet craft or personal water jetto identify these vessels. Since such terminologyis not yet widely recognized, this report will stillemploy the term personal watercraft and itsabbreviation, PWC.

The International Standards Organization (ISO)defines personal watercraft as “…an inboardvessel less than 4 meters (13 feet) in length whichuses an internal combustion engine powering awater jet pump as its primary source ofpropulsion, and is designed with no open loadcarrying area which would retain water. Thevessel is designed to be operated by a personor persons positioned on, rather than within theconfines of the hull.”

ACA views the ISO definition as too narrowbecause any water-jet powered craft 13 feet orlonger, or with an “open load carrying area” wouldfall outside the definition. This is a significantissue since the PWC manufacturers areconstantly modifying PWC and are now sellingwater-jet powered craft that confine the operatorand occupants within the hull, but which still retainthe speed, draft, and maneuverabilitycharacteristics of typical PWC.

Personal Watercraft Defined

The impacts of PWC use have been well documented through boating accident

statistics, law enforcement reports, newspaperarticles and eyewitness accounts. Still, there is asignificant amount of additional data collection andscientific research into PWC impacts that needsto be done.

THE IMPACTS

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Some question why PWC are singled out forscrutiny since all types of vessels can be involvedin accidents and any motorized vessel of sufficienthorsepower can put other waterway users at risk,adversely affect their enjoyment or cause harm tothe environment. PWC are singled out becausetheir use is disproportionately responsible for moreon-water accidents, more reports of nearaccidents, more claims of intentional harassmentand more complaints of disturbance due to noise,air and water pollution than any other vessel type.

PWC are also unique in design and purpose. Theyare neither designed for nor marketed as a methodof transportation from one place to another.Instead they are designed and marketed almostexclusively for a specific form of high-speedrecreation. The design of these craft gives them aunique ability to be operated at high speeds inshallow or confined areas, where they are morelikely to threaten the safety and enjoyment of otherwaterway users, especially those involved inactivities such as canoeing, kayaking, fishing,windsurfing and swimming.

The visible and audible pollution from PWC alsoimpact other recreational activities, wildlife andwaterway quality. PWC emit a large amount ofnoxious blue smoke that can hang in the air forlong periods of time. In their wake they leave aprominent oily sheen on the water. Thecharacteristic noise associated with PWC use hasprompted many complaints from waterway usersand waterfront property owners. While other typesof motorized watercraft also emit pollution,operational characteristics of PWC use — suchas staying in one area for long periods of time andthe frequent acceleration and deceleration —increase the impacts of PWC pollution.

How many PWC operate on U.S. waters?Nobody really knows for sure. Based on anassessment of all current estimates, ACAbelieves that PWC constitute less than 10percent of all vessels. However, what is not clearis how much less than 10 percent. The NationalMarine Manufacturer’s Association (NMMA)estimates that in 2001 only 6.2 percent of allvessels were PWC. The USCG, using salesfigures from PWIA, estimates that in 2000 therewere about 1.1 million registered PWC -- 8.6percent of all registered vessels.

However, the USCG can only verify 543,168registered PWC nationwide out of a total of12,782,143 registered vessels (4.2 percent).This is because 21 states do not treat PWC asa distinct type of vessel for the purpose ofreporting boat registrations. The USCGcompensates for this by relying solely on salesfigures reported by PWIA. PWIA estimates thatbetween 1987 and 2000, approximately 1.5million PWC were sold. If these estimates areaccurate, it is still impossible to know how manyof those are still in operation.

The other big unknown is the total number ofvessels on U.S. waters. Each state has differentrequirements for which types of vessels mustbe registered. For example, most states do notrequire the registration of human-poweredwatercraft such as canoes and kayaks. Sincethe total boating population is larger than theregistration numbers suggest, the percentagecomprised by PWC is almost certainly below 8percent.

ACA believes the NMMA estimate of 6.2 percentis the most accurate because it takes intoaccount at least some portion of unregisteredboats – although not unregistered canoes andkayaks. When evaluating accident rates, it ismisleading to simply cite the number ofregistered vessels. Doing so can hide thedisproportionate accident rates attributable tosome vessel types.

The Numbers

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Figure 1 compares PWC as a percentage of all registered vessels with the proportion of PWC involvementin all accidents and in vessel-on-vessel collisions. Source: USCG BARD and NMMA

Figure 1PWC involvement in Accidents and Collisions

1996-2000

% of

Vessels thatare PWC

PWC 6.5%

OtherVessels93.5%

% ofAccidents

InvolvingPWC

% of Vesselon Vessel

CollisionsInvolving

PWCOther

Vessels67.2%

OtherVessels44.4%

PWC 32.8% PWC 55.6%

While accounting for less than 10 percent ofall vessels in the United States (see sidebar:

The Numbers, page 2), the impact of PWC useon the safety of other waterway users is far greaterthan any other boating activity. Accident datareveal that PWC account for roughly one-third ofall on-water accidents nationwide and, in almostevery state, the accident rate of PWC is muchgreater than that of other types of watercraft.Research for this report reveals the full extent ofthe threat posed to other waterway users by PWC use.

When trying to assess the threat a particular on-water activity poses to others, the total number orpercentage of accidents does not reveal much.There are many different types of accidents, someof which only place the individual operator at risk.Falling overboard is one type of accident thatwould typically pose little or no risk to otherwaterway users. Accident factors such as notwearing a PFD or succumbing to hypothermia,while serious, are risk factors largely within thecontrol of the individual.

Recognizing this, ACA decided to conductresearch on those accident types and risk factorsthat clearly place other waterway users at risk.ACA examined accidents involving collisions andlooked at risk factors such as speed, recklessoperation, operator inattention and drug/alcoholuse. Once focus is limited to only that portion of

accidents likely to place others at risk, the truethreat PWC pose to public safety can bebetter understood.

The research involved reviews of publishedboating accident data, boating accident reports,existing boating studies, media coverage ofaccidents involving PWC, phone interviews withstate boating officials and an in-depth analysis ofthe USCG Boating Accident Report Database(BARD) for the years 1996-2000.

It should also be noted that the accident figurescontained in this report are exceedinglyconservative. The USCG’s Recreational BoatCasualty Reporting System is limited in scope andonly includes accidents that exceed $500 inproperty damage, that involve a bodily injury seriousenough to require medical treatment beyond firstaid or that result in a death.* Additionally, manyaccidents fail to get reported due to both ignoranceof the reporting requirement and difficulty enforcingit. The USCG readily acknowledges this, statingin its Boating Statistics reports, “we believe thatonly a small fraction of all nonfatal boatingaccidents occurring in the United States arereported to the Coast Guard, State or local lawenforcement agencies.”

*Note: As of 2002 the property damage amount required for federalreporting will increase to $2,000. This will likely result in fewerreported accidents, but will not necessarily reflect an actualreduction in the number of accidents.

Figure 2 shows that reportable accidents involving at least one PWC were much more likely to involvea collision with another vessel compared to reportable accidents not involving at least one PWC. Theaverage difference of 34 percentage points translates into a 150 percent higher frequency of collisionswith vessels among PWC-involved accidents.

UNSAFE WATERSSAFETY

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Figure 2Proportion of Reportable Accidents Classified as Collisions With Another Vessel

1996-2000

Source: USCG BARD

Accidents that did not involve a PWC Accidents involving at least one PWC

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

24%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

21%25%

61%61%60%

24%

47%

22%

56%

PWC Accident Types

A collision is the accident type most indicative of ageneral threat to all waterway users. Of particularinterest are vessel-on-vessel collisions, where atleast one of the operators involved in the accidentbehaved in a manner that places others at risk.Accident statistics have shown for some time thatPWC are involved in a disproportionate amount ofthe nation’s boating accidents, but the extent ofPWC involvement in collisions has not been asclear. Over the past five years hundreds ofcanoeists and kayakers have expressed to ACAtheir fear of being struck by a PWC. Eyewitnessaccounts provide strong anecdotal evidence thatthese fears are indeed justified. Researchconducted for this report examines the availableaccident data about PWC involvement in collisions.

Collisions with Vessels

Research conducted on the BARD databaserevealed a number of important findings. Between1996 and 2000, 12,218 PWC were involved incollisions with other vessels. Over that five-yearperiod, PWC - comprising less than 10 percent ofall vessels - have been involved in over 55 percentof all vessel-on-vessel collisions reported to USCG(see figure 1). For the past three years vessel-on-vessel collisions have accounted for 60 percentof all reported PWC accidents. For accidents thatdid not involve PWC, collisions with other vesselsnever accounted for more than 25 percent of thetotal. The average difference of 34 percentagepoints translates into a 150 percent higherfrequency of collisions with vessels among PWC-involved accidents (see figure 2).

Collisions with Fixed or

Floating Objects

ACA also examined collisions with fixed or floatingobjects. A collision with a fixed or floating objectalmost always indicates an operator acting in amanner that could place others at risk.Responsibility for such accidents typically accruesto the operator of the vessel involved. As withvessel-on-vessel collisions and accidents ingeneral, PWC are involved in a disproportionateshare of collisions with fixed or floating objects.

When collisions with a fixed or floating object andvessel-on-vessel collisions are combined,collisions consistently constitute about 70 percentof all PWC accidents. Over the five-year period

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Due to the inconsistent reporting of accident detailsand difficulty obtaining detailed accidentdescriptions, there is no reliable way to statisticallyassess responsibility for vessel-on-vesselcollisions nationwide. A sampling of accidentreport narratives indicated that the PWC operatorwas most often at fault. This conclusion is backedup by other research. According to a 1999 reportfrom the California Department of Boating andWaterways, “In collisions between personalwatercraft and vessels other than PWC, the PWCoperator was nearly 3 times as likely to beexclusively at fault.” A study by Chester A. Jones(2000) published in Accident Analysis andPrevention, found that 79 percent of PWCcollisions that occurred on Arkansas waterwaysbetween 1994 and 1997 involved at least one PWCand another moving vessel. This study, usingboating accident reports from the Arkansas Gameand Fish Commission, also found that in mostcases the operator of the PWC was responsible

UNSAFE WATERS SAFETY

Figure 3 shows the same comparison as Figure 2, but includes ALL collisions, including those withother vessels as well as fixed or floating objects. The pattern seen in this figure is very similar to thatseen in the previous figure. The difference of roughly 30 percentage points on average means thatthe proportion of reportable accidents among PWC-involved accidents that involve any type of collisionis eighty percent higher on average than that among non-PWC-involved accidents.

Figure 3Proportion of Reportable Accidents Classified as Collision With a Vessel

or Any Other Fixed or Floating Object 1996-2000

for the collision. The study also found that 48percent of all PWC collisions were between two PWC.

Source: USCG BARD

Accidents that did not involve a PWC Accidents involving at least one PWC

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

39%

33%

40%

70%70%68%

39%

53%

36%

62%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

UNSAFE WATERSSAFETY

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Figure 4 provides a comparison of the proportion of reportable accidents that involved reckless operation,operator inexperience or inattention, excessive speed, rules of the road infractions, drugs or alcohol.In all five study years, the difference in reportable accidents that involved at least one PWC is almost 80percent higher when compared to the proportion of similarly caused accidents among reportableaccidents that did not involve at least one PWC.

Collisions with People

Across all vessel types, a boat striking peopleswimming in the water (or otherwise outside of aboat) — identified in accident reports as “struckby boat” — was indicated as the accident type ina relatively small percentage of total accidentsduring the five years studied. However, the degreeof statistical difference between PWC and all othervessel types was greater than in any otheraccident category. Accidents involving at leastone PWC were more than three times as likely tobe described as “struck by boat” than wereaccidents not involving a PWC.

Accidents that did involve a PWCAccidents that did not involve a PWC

(1996-2000) collisions accounted for between 53percent and 70 percent of PWC accidents,averaging near 70 percent for the last three years(see figure 3). This unusually high proportion ofaccidents that are collisions appears unique toPWC, as no other vessel type has similar collision/accident ratios.

In accidents not involving PWC between 1996 and2000, “struck by boat” was cited in less than 2percent of all accidents. Over the same period,for accidents involving at least one PWC, “struckby boat” was cited in roughly 7 percent of allaccidents. For both 1999 and 2000, the mostrecent two years of data, 7.4 percent of allaccidents involving at least one PWC werecategorized as “struck by boat.” Over the five-year study period PWC were involved in more“struck by boat” incidences than all other vesseltypes combined. Although not termed a collisionby USCG, like other collisions this accident typeindicates a threat to other waterway users.

Other Accidents

After collisions, falls overboard was cited mostoften – sometimes in conjunction with a collision.Other non-collision accident types account for onlya small portion of PWC accidents. In each year

Figure 4Proportion of Reportable Accidents for Which Cause Involved Reckless

Operation, Operator Inexperience, Drugs or Alcohol 1996-2000

Source: USCG BARD

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

44%

81%

45%

80% 79%

45% 46%

78%

45%

80%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Operator Inattention/

Inexperience

ACA research found that operator inattention isfrequently cited as a cause by investigators whenreporting collisions involving PWC. This appearsto be the case even when careless/reckless andexcessive speed were also cited as contributingcauses. According to the Nevada Division ofWildlife (NDOW), the nature and purpose of PWCcontribute to accidents being caused by operatorinattention. David Pfiffner, supervising boatingofficer for NDOW, states, “Quite simply, one ofthe biggest problems we face with personalwatercraft is the operator’s search for a good time.They become so focused on what they are doing— spinning, jumping or just going fast — that theytune out everything and everyone else. The nextthing they know they’re in front of another boat orhave just run over somebody.”

ACA also found that operator inexperience wasoften cited as the primary accident cause whencareless/reckless and excessive speed were alsocited as contributing causes. Operator inexperienceappeared to be commonly cited in any accidentcircumstance where the operator had less than100 hours of experience, regardless of othercontributing causes. ACA research found anumber of cases where operator inexperience wascited as an accident cause even though theoperator had over 100 hours of experience or thelevel of experience was listed as unknown.

A 1998 National Transportation Safety Board(NTSB) study included a detailed examination ofPWC accidents from January to June 1997.Operator inattention was the most common causecited in those accidents, followed by operatorinexperience. According to state boating officials,both causes are likely to be cited in accidents wherethe PWC’s lack of off-throttle steering is acontributing factor. Off-throttle steering is the abilityof a vessel to maintain steerage when not underpower (see sidebar: Flawed by Design, page 8).

The problems with off-throttle steering becomeclear when specific details of PWC relatedaccidents are explored. On July 4, 1998, a typicalloss-of-steering accident took the life of DeborahBoles on Texas’ Lake Texoma. Ms. Boles, 16 yearsold, met a friend at the lake. The teenagers wentout for rides on two PWC. Deborah’s friend, whowas bearing down on her, let off the throttle in anattempt to avoid a collision and tried to turn away.Despite her desperate efforts to steer, the vessel

PWC Accident Causes

ACA found that certain behavior-related accidentcauses are significantly more prevalent inaccidents involving PWC than in accidents notinvolving PWC. During the past five years roughly80 percent of accidents involving at least one PWCwere reported to involve careless/recklessoperation, operator inexperience or inattention,excessive speed, rules of the road infractions, ordrug/alcohol use (see figure 4). This comparesto about 45 percent for all other vessel types.

NOTE: A number of factors are often involved inPWC accidents, and whether an investigatordecides to cite excessive speed or careless/reckless is often a subjective decision. In Figure 4ACA eliminates some of this subjectivity bycombining the common behavior-related accidentcauses that typically play a role in on-water collisions.

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studied, accident types such as “capsizing,” “fireor explosion,” “flooding,” “falls in boat,” “strucksubmerged object” and “sinking” all combinedrepresented less than 15 percent of all accidentsinvolving PWC.

The absence of off-throttle steeringand braking are well-knowncharacteristics of PWC. Once a PWCoperator lets off of the throttle (stopsaccelerating), the craft can no longerbe effectively steered or stopped.PWC do not have rudders to controlsteering. Instead, steering iscontrolled by turning the water jetnozzle that provides thrust for the craft.If no thrust is coming from the jet, thecraft cannot be steered. PWC alsohave no braking mechanism or otherdesign feature to slow momentum.

By failing to have off-throttle steeringcapability, PWC require operators toreact contrary to human nature. Whenpresented with an imminent collisionthe natural human instinct is to bothalter course and reduce speed. A PWCoperator in such a situation mustchoose only one. The absence of abraking mechanism on this high-speed craft means that PWC requirelonger distances to stop than manytraditional vessels, further increasingthe risk of collision.

Since the release of a 1998 NationalTransportation Safety Board (NTSB)study highlighting steering problemsas a significant factor in PWCaccidents, the PWC industry hascome under increasing publicpressure to make design changesthat will improve off-throttle steering.In conjunction with its study, NTSBrecommended that the USCG and thePWC manufacturers develop

appropriate standards for steeringand braking on jet-pump propelledvessels.

Manufacturers have made somemodest steps in that direction. Mostare working to incorporate “throttlereapplication” systems designed toprovide thrust when an operatorsimultaneously lets off of the throttleand turns the steering column. Theeffectiveness of throttle reapplication,or other systems such as the oneused on some Bombardier models,in avoiding collisions is not yet fullyknown.

In research to develop off-throttlesteering standards, sponsored byUSCG, Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.(UL) recently tested a variety of off-throttle steering systems that includedPWC manufacturer prototypes andsome aftermarket products. Theresearch indicated that ruddersystems perform better than throttlereapplication systems. Theeffectiveness of throttle reapplicationsystems was sporadic and fell offsignificantly at speeds above 30 mph.Kawasaki’s Smart Steering™ throttlereapplication system, for example,avoided the test obstacle 100% of thetime at 20 mph (as did many stockcraft), but the success rate quickly felloff to 50 percent of the time at 30 mph,13 percent of the time at 40 mph and 0percent of the time at 55 mph. A ruddersystem called Surftrax™ seemed toproduce the best results, missing the

FLAWED BY DESIGN PWC Off Throttle Steering & Braking

obstacle 80 percent of the time at 50mph — but none of the PWCmanufacturers plan to utilize it.

The USCG has no plans to developmandatory off-throttle steeringstandards (also called collisionavoidance performance standards),but through the UL research and thework of a Society of AutomotiveEngineers’ (SAE) PWCSubcommittee, the agency has beenpursuing voluntary standards. Thestandards proposed by UL – while notvery strong — represent a reasonablestarting point in the opinion of manysafety advocates. The work of the SAEPWC Subcommittee, comprisedlargely of PWC industryrepresentatives, has been sharplycriticized.

Non-industry members of the SAESubcommittee have been critical ofboth the process and the move towarda weak standard. One such member,Ron Simner of Ride Technology hasprotested the PWC industry’s“hijacking of the process.” Accordingto Simner, “The industry constantly hadits attorneys present and refused toprovide any test data for discussion.”The lax standard favored by the PWCindustry would not have any significantimpact in reducing the number of PWCoff-throttle steering collisions and itwould certainly not prevent any off-power accidents.”

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UNSAFE WATERSSAFETY

continued in a straight line and broad sidedDeborah at 30 miles per hour. Deborah sufferedmassive head injuries and died on the way to thehospital. According to a recounting of the accident inan article called Why PWC Kill by Paul Rockwell, awitness noted that Deborah’s friend, in shock, keptsaying: “It wouldn’t turn; it wouldn’t turn.” Deborah’smother, Nita Boles, cofounded a group called“Parents and Families for Personal Watercraft

Safety” made up of family members of PWCaccident victims seeking to improve PWC safety.

Another steering-related accident recounted in theRockwell article involved the son of the group’sother cofounders, Jim and Connie Hues. “Twenty-one-year-old Justin Hues was visiting LakeLewisville in Texas. When he and his friend rentedtwo jet skis from a Polaris outlet, they received no

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Excessive Speed

PWC are designed and marketed for speed. Itshould be no surprise that excessive speed isconsistently one of the most frequently reportedcauses of PWC accidents. In the 1998 NTSBstudy, excessive speed was the third most oftencited PWC accident cause. In California, a statewhere PWC accidents have been carefullyreviewed, excessive speed is the second mostoften cited cause for accidents involving PWC.

The ACA review of PWC accident data revealedthat excessive speed was a likely factor in wellover half of all PWC accidents. ACA found manyaccidents where excessive speed was clearlyindicated by the accident narrative, but not officiallycited as a cause of the accident. Other accidentcauses such as careless/reckless and operatorinattention were often officially cited as causes ofaccidents involving excessive speed.

The PWC accident data indicate that PWC aremore than twice as likely to be traveling in excessof 40 mph at the time of an accident than othervessel types. Injury data also point to speed as aprominent factor in PWC accidents. The injuriesmost often resulting from PWC accidents involveblunt-force trauma resulting from collisions.

The USCG accident data for the year 2000 showthat trauma accounted for over 90 percent of thereported injuries resulting from PWC accidents.The injury types -- amputation, broken bones, headinjury, internal injury, contusions, spinal/back injuryand laceration -- accounted for 1,214 of the 1,341PWC related injuries identified. An additional 239injuries were not identified. It should be noted that

the number of PWC related injuries is significantlyunderrepresented. The USCG has estimated thatonly about 10 percent of PWC related injuries arereported as required by law.

A 1997 study by the National Center for InjuryPrevention and Control confirmed that the vastmajority of PWC-related injuries are not reportedto boating or law enforcement officials. The study,entitled Personal Watercraft-Related Injuries, AGrowing Public Health Concern, found that PWC-Related injuries increased from an estimated2,860 in 1990 to more than 12, 000 in 1995. Bycomparison, the number of PWC-related injuriesreported by USCG for 1995 was 1,617. The studyalso found that the rate of Emergency Department-treated injuries related to PWC was about 8.5times higher than the rate for injuries frommotorboats.

Speed may be an even greater problem in thefuture as PWC manufacturers continue toincrease PWC power . In recent years 130-145horsepower engines have powered most PWC.These engines, which provide more horsepowerthan many car engines, power a craft that oftenweighs less than 600 pounds. The 2001 Sea-DooRXX has a 160 horsepower two-stroke engine, andthe 2002 Sea-Doo GTX 4-Tec has a 155horsepower four-stroke engine. Honda’smotorcycle division recently unveiled a new 165horsepower, turbocharged PWC called theAquaTrax F-12X.

instruction. PWC are known for sharp turns, burstsof speed and skittish maneuverability. SuddenlyJustin turned in front of his friend, who was ridingin the second vessel behind him. The young manquickly let up on the gas to slacken speed and turnaway. But without thrust, the water rocket wouldnot steer. He smashed into Justin, who died on lifesupport.”

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Harassment by PWC operatorsis a very serious problem forpeople in small craft such ascanoes and kayaks.

Careless/Reckless Operation &Harassment

During the past five years ACA has receivedhundreds of complaints from canoeists andkayakers about PWC use.The majority of thosecomplaints cite beingthreatened by recklessoperation or intentionalharassment. While suchcomplaints are anecdotal,their persistence – alongwith an absence of a pattern of similar complaintsabout other vessel types – bolsters the argumentthat PWC operators are more likely to engage insuch behavior than the operators of other vessels.

Careless/reckless operation is also one of themost frequently reported causes of PWCaccidents. Just as with excessive speed, a reviewof accident data found many accidents wherecareless/reckless was indicated by the accidentnarrative but not officially cited as a cause of theaccident. Careless/reckless was also a likelyfactor in well over half of all PWC accidents.

Accident data from Florida – the state with thehighest number of PWC accidents - for 2000 citescareless/reckless as the primary accident causein 226 of the state’s 382 reported PWC accidents.Careless/reckless was by far the leading causecited in Florida PWC accidents. The next highestcause was cited in only 35 accidents. For the sameyear California reported zero instances wherecareless/reckless was cited as a primary accidentcause. This disparity exists because Californiadoes not cite careless/reckless as an accidentcause. California officials view behaviors such asrecklessness or alcohol impairment as contributingfactors and do not report them as accident causes.They maintain that USCG should offer another wayto report these factors. Since California - the statewith the second highest number of PWC accidents– does not report incidents of reckless operation,the USCG data significantly under represents thisas an accident cause.

One form of reckless operation often associatedwith PWC use is intentional harassment.Harassment by PWC operators is a very seriousproblem for people in small craft such as canoesand kayaks. Kayakers often describe such

harassment as the mostdisturbing and frighteningexperience they have everencountered on the water.The vast majority of theseincidents do not result in areportable accident underUSCG guidelines and thus

are not reflected in accident data. A typicalscenario, based on the many incidents ACA isfamiliar with, involves a PWC operator riding incircles around a canoe or kayak in an effort tocapsize it. Once successful, the PWC operatorleaves and is long gone by the time the paddlergets back into his or her boat and travels to shore.

In 2000 there was a series of particularly disturbingincidents on the Hudson River in New Your City.An article in the Village Voice reported theseincidents and described one in vivid detail.

It was a bright Sunday afternoon when MichaelGlass paddled out of the 79th Street Boat Basinon the Hudson River for a solo kayak trip to theDowntown Boathouse on Pier 26 in Tribeca. Suchoutings, once an exotic treat for daredevils, havebecome routine pleasures as local waterways getcleaner. But the menace he encountered went waybeyond outdated fears about infection. “I wasopposite the Intrepid, heading south, and I saw twojet skis heading north toward me. They seemedto be coming perilously close. I raised my paddleto signal to them that I was there, in case theydidn’t see me,” Glass recalls. He might as wellhave raised a red flag to a bull. “They proceededto come at my boat one at a time. The first cameat me at about 35 miles per hour and then spunaway, maybe 10 or 12 feet from the boat,” he says.“Then the second one came, and he kept coming.He looked like he was going to hit. I dove off andactually heard a clunk, like the jet ski was grazingthe boat.” After he got back into his kayak, he

Drug/Alcohol Impairment

An examination of USCG accident data did notreveal a disproportionate correlation betweenaccidents involving PWC and accidents wheredrug or alcohol impairment was cited as a cause.However, a number of cases were found wheredrug or alcohol impairment was not cited as anofficial cause, but the narrative description of theaccident did indeed indicate that the operator waslikely under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Moreconsistent accident reporting would help betterevaluate this correlation in the future.

Drug and alcohol impairment is a serious problemacross all vessel types, including canoes andkayaks. In many impairment-related boatingaccidents the impaired individual is the primaryone placed at risk of injury or death. This is definitelynot the case when an impaired person is operatinga motorized vessel, or worse yet, a high-speedvessel such as a PWC. Just as with automobiles,driving while under the influence of drugs or alcoholplaces others at extreme risk.

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UNSAFE WATERS SAFETY

Additional Risk Factors

Crowded Waterways

A review of water body and location data foraccidents involving PWC, conversations withboating and law enforcement officials andnewspaper accounts of PWC accidents, hasconfirmed what seems obvious: overcrowdedwaters play a role in many PWC accidents –especially vessel-on-vessel collisions.

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paddled over to a sailboat and immediately calledthe police. Both the police and Coast Guard werethere literally “within minutes,” Glass says, but hisattackers were long gone.

That was September 2000. Little did Glass knowthat he’d witnessed the birth of a new extreme sport-- kayak hunting. But when he was attacked lastmonth in Inwood, battling rogue jet skiers becamea cause. “There have never been more than oneor two such incidents, if that, until this year,” saysRalph Diaz, a paddler who chairs the Human-Powered Boating Group. But this summer alone,he has counted over a dozen documented attacks,most against kayakers, but some against dinghiesin mooring fields. Glass thinks those numbers,culled largely from members of an email listservefor New York City kayakers, are hugelyconservative.

The “kayak hunting” incidents on the Hudson Riverwere nothing less than criminal assaults. ThePWC operators likely viewed these assaults asfun, but that “fun” was at the expense of thekayakers’ right to safety, security, peace of mindand enjoyment. Such incidents of intentionalharassment are not at all rare. While ACA learnsmostly of those that involve canoeists andkayakers, it is also aware of cases where PWCoperators have harassed divers, swimmers,sailors, windsurfers and fishermen. Althoughsome incidents of harassment are more severe

than others, all such incidents are assaults andinflict harm on the victims.

While intentional harassment is the most serious typeof reckless behavior from a standpoint of intent, anytype of reckless or careless behavior at high-speedsplaces others at serious risk. With PWC, simplehorseplay often proves more deadly than intentionalincidents of harassment.

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According to PWIA, the average PWC owner/operator isvery similar to the owner/operator of other vessel types.On its website PWIA states, “The typical personalwatercraft owner is a middle-aged, highly educated andsuccessful business person.” More specifically PWIAasserts the average age of PWC purchasers during thepast five years is 41 years old, 85 percent are male, 71percent are married, 69 percent have owned a powerboatprior to their most recent PWC purchase, 66 percenthave taken or completed college-level course work. PWIAalso maintains that 73 percent of the time the PWCowner is the operator of the craft and that PWC ownerstypically have “substantial boating experience.”

ACA has not conducted a demographic study of PWCowners and operators, but a review of the demographicinformation contained in the BARD database suggeststhat the average age of PWC operators involved inaccidents is much younger than the reported averageage of PWC purchasers. In the year 2000 (the mostrecent year available) the average age of PWC operatorsinvolved in accidents was 26. The average age ofoperators of other motorized vessel types involved inaccidents was 41.

The BARD data also shows that, when operatorexperience was reported, 75 percent of PWC operatorsinvolved in accidents had less than 100 hours ofexperience, and 33 percent had less than 10 hours ofexperience. For operators of other vessel types involvedin accidents, 25 percent had less than 100 hours ofexperience and only 10 percent had less than 10 hoursof experience.

The PWIA’s reported demographic profile for age andexperience of PWC owners is quite different from thePWC operator information reported in the USCG accidentdata. This disparity, combined with the higher averageage of operators of other types of motorized vesselsinvolved in accidents reported to USCG, suggests thatyounger PWC operators may be at greater risk for boatingaccidents than their same-age counterparts in othermotorized vessels.

PWC Demographics

problems. These include the capability and likelihoodof PWC to be operated at very high-speeds, the abilityof PWC - because of their shallow draft - to be morewidely disbursed and to more frequently mix with nearshore activities. The tendency of PWC operators toengage in activities such as wake jumping and chasingeach other at high speeds and the unusually highnumber of reports of waterway users being

Enforcement Difficulties

With approximately 80,000 square miles of surfacewater in the U.S., adequate boating enforcementpresents a massive challenge. Insufficient fundingof many marine law enforcement programs makesthis challenge even more difficult. In conversationswith ACA, a majority of state boating agenciesclaimed current funding levels were inadequate tomeet their enforcement needs. Most agenciesacknowledged that enforcement coverage wasseriously inadequate. A 2000 U.S. GeneralAccounting Office (GAO) report cites the sameenforcement problems regarding the managementof federally protected waters. This report (RCED-00-243) in a section on restrictions noted “…manyunit managers reported insufficient personnel toadequately enforce restrictions.”

This lack of enforcement coverage is particularlyproblematic when it comes to managing PWC use.PWC pose a number of unique enforcement

Each year the nation’s waterways become moreand more crowded. While crowded waterwaysincrease the risks associated with all types ofwaterway recreation, crowded waters becomemore dangerous when high-speed recreationmixes with other types of waterway use. PWCwith their unique high-speed design,maneuverability, and shallow draft, pose thegreatest threat of any vessel type because theyare the most likely vessel to be operated at high-speeds in shallow or confined waters. Thedisproportionate involvement of PWC in vessel-on-vessel collisions underscores this threat.

A congested waterway often resembles a busyhighway - except without lanes, markers, aconsistent direction of travel or a stable surface.Add to that a diverse selection of vehicles rangingfrom kayak to yacht. Then, to this already chaoticenvironment, add a high-speed craft free to engage instunts and horseplay, but only capable of being steeredwhile under acceleration. Despite the occasional buoyand boating’s “rules of the road,” this is the situationon many waterways.

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UNSAFE WATERS SAFETY

Exposure

Exposure is essentially the amount of time a vesseloperator spends operating a certain vessel. TheUSCG and the PWIA have supported studies toassess the safety risk associated with each vesseltype by comparing the number of accidents andfatalities with the total exposure (hours/days ofoperation). Two factors play a role in the exposureassociated with a particular vessel type. One is thetotal number of vessels of the type that are inoperation. The other is the amount of time operatorsof the vessel type spend operating the vessel.

PWIA maintains that PWC operators spend moretime on the water than the operators of othervessels. It has supported exposure studies in anattempt to confirm its long-standing claim that PWChave a higher accident rate because they have ahigher exposure rate and, when adjusted forexposure, PWC compare more favorably to othervessel types.

While it seems reasonable that a vessel with adisproportionate level of exposure could have adisproportionate accident rate, this appears to bea moot point for PWC. A 1999 study conducted byHeiden Associates, Inc. (using a PWC industrysponsored survey) found that in 1997 PWC hadless exposure than the other vessel-types studied,open motorboats and canoes/kayaks. The studyfound the total annual PWC riding time to beapproximately 291 million hours, the total annualcanoe/kayak riding time to be 318 million hours,and the total annual open motorboat riding time tobe 2.0 billion hours.

The Heiden Associates study also found theaverage annual riding time for PWC-owninghouseholds to be 112 hours, less than the 120hours annual riding time for open motorboat owninghouseholds. A 2000 study by JSI Research &Training Institute, Inc. found that in 1998 the meannumber of days of operation for PWC was 15.22days, less than open motorboats (22.95) and cabinmotorboats (24.88). Based on the results of thesetwo studies, there is no reason to believe that a

Inadequate enforcement coverage also reducesthe deterrent effect of laws and the penalties forviolating those laws. Leniency and the tendencyof some law enforcement officers to cite operatorsfor lesser violations likewise reduces deterrent. Inconversations with ACA, several state boatingofficials commented on reluctance by lawenforcement officers to cite violations such asreckless operation because of the stiff penalty sucha violation carries in those states.

These enforcement problems inevitably lead togreater danger on the nation’s waterways andmost likely bear some responsibility for accidentrates, deaths and injuries. Without adequateenforcement, responsible waterway users are leftwith little protection against the irresponsible orcriminal actions of others. Incidents ofharassment, reckless operation and speedingoccur with little chance of the perpetrators everbeing caught.

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harassed by PWC operators further increases thelaw enforcement burden.

Additionally, many of the current laws governingPWC use, such as minimum distancerequirements and speed limits, are difficult toenforce. From a distance it is difficult for a lawenforcement officer to determine whether a PWCis 50 feet from another vessel or 100 feet, orwhether a PWC is traveling at a speed of 30 or 40miles per hour. Zoning high-speed PWC use tospecific areas would be easier to enforce, but fewhave embraced this regulatory approach.

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PWC Industry-Sponsored Operator Education

operational characteristics of PWC. No one candispute the value of safety education. Propersafety education is important for all boaters, andACA works constantly to educate canoeists andkayakers in boating safety. However, it is less clearwhat number of PWC accidents are due to a lackof safe boating knowledge versus the number dueto irresponsible behavior and intentional disregardof safe boating knowledge. Education can onlywork if the operator willingly incorporates theknowledge into his or her boating practices. While

high exposure rate explains the disproportionatelyhigh PWC accident rate.

Note: It is acknowledged by both JSI Researchand Training Institute, Inc. and USCG that thesampling method used for the JSI study reliedheavily on registered boat owners and thus failedto accurately assess canoe and kayak exposuredata. Since only a small portion of canoes andkayaks are required to be registered, a survey ofregistered boat owners would primarily capturemotorized boat owners that also happen to own acanoe or kayak. These owners would probablyspend less time in a canoe or kayak than thosewho only own a canoe or kayak.

Education

Lack of education is often blamed for many boatingaccidents. This theory is based on the assumptionthat if operators are taught proper safe boatingpractices they will be less likely to have anaccident. It is argued that this is especially thecase for PWC operators due to the unique

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Hang on and keep telling yourself,

“It’s just a leisure activity.” (Kawasaki)Remember when your dad used to spin you around?Faster. Harder. Faster. Harder. And it was all you coulddo to just hold on. And even though you thought youwould fly away at any moment, you still wanted more.And he turned you faster and tighter. Until all youcould hear was the sound of your heart pounding?We did the same thing to our engineers before theydesigned our new RX™D1.

GREED(SEA-DOO)

Lust(SEA-DOO)

With this much poweryou could bring theDead Sea back to life.(Polaris)

W i t ht h i sm a n yhorsesy o umightn e e ds o m eh e l paroundt h eranch.(Kawasaki)

Compromise is such an ugly word. (Kawasaki)

If it could belch it would have otherwatercraft on its breath. (Kawasaki)

It’s enough to makewebbed toes curl.

(Polaris)

Suddenly the bats outof hell are gettingfitted for wetsuits.(Kawasaki)

Thumb your throttle atthe world. (Polaris)

T h i ssummer,hot dogsw i l lactuallyhave al i t t l em e a t .(Polaris)

…a sandwich in its cooler was clockedat record speed. (Kawasaki)

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UNSAFE WATERS SAFETY

Figure 5 shows the proportion of accidents by type and cause that involved at least one PWC. In allyears, 50% or more of all collisions with another vessel involved at least one PWC. PWC operatorsalso appear to account for a large share of all accidents attributed to reckless or negligent operation.

the PWC industry often cites its support ofeducational programs that teach safe boating andproper PWC operation, that same industry spendsmillions of dollars on advertising campaigns thatsend a very different message.

PWC industry ads also educate PWC operators.They teach that speed, power and attitude are thereasons to own and operate a PWC. A review ofPWC industry advertising over the past severalyears found many ads that send messagesseemingly at odds with efforts to teach responsibleriding. On the previous page are some samplesof text found in these ads.

This type of marketing is designed to appealprimarily to people seeking a high-speedexperience. An in-your-face attitude is a commoncharacteristic of PWC advertising. This attitudepromotion is not limited to the actual PWCmanufacturers; many after market equipment adsare more blatant in this regard. Even PWC

insurance ads choose to promote attitude oversafety. A McGraw Insurance ad reads “SARAHSLAMMED INTO A DOCK AT TOP SPEED.FORTUNATELY SHE KEPT HER HEAD ABOVEWATER. You know the story. Everyone’s heard one.She was looking the wrong way, the sun got intoher eyes, some guys whistled at her. And pow!Fortunately she had insurance from McGraw.”

Operator education is not limited to stateeducation programs, it consists of a variety ofmessages and influences. The messages sentby PWC industry advertising are at odds withmessages of safe, responsible operation. Bymarketing PWC with messages of speed,power and at t i tude, the PWC industrycompromises its own efforts to promote safeboating practices. Such marketing is likely tohave direct and adverse affects on PWCaccident rates and undermine the objectivesof other education efforts.

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Figure 5Proportion of Reportable Accidents that Involved at Least One PWC By

Type or Cause of Accident 1996-2000

Source: USCG BARD

Collision with Another VesselCollision with a Fixed or Floating Object or Another VesselReckless or Negligent Operation

61%

51% 51%

61%

52%56%

54%

46% 46%

52%

44%42%

52%

43% 44%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

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Summary of Findings

The PWC accident data and related informationexamined in this report provide clear andcompelling evidence that PWC operation posesa significantly greater threat to the safety ofother waterway usersthan does theoperat ion of othervessel types. Not onlyis the overall accidentinvolvement of PWCdispropor t ionate lyhigh, but for thoseaccident types thatput other waterwayusers at highest risk,the PWC role is evengreater.

This one vesseltype -- comprising less than 10 percent ofall vessels -- is involved in 55 percent ofall collisions between vessels. In addition,recent data indicates that 70 percent of all PWCaccidents are collisions with other vessels,f ixed objects or f loat ing objects. Whencombined with collisions with people swimmingor otherwise outside a boat (struck by boat)that percentage climbs even higher.

A careful examination of both the types andcauses of accidents involving PWC leads tothe conclusion that the unique operationalcharacteristics of PWC play a primary role inmost PWC accidents. The unusually highpercentage of PWC accidents that arecollisions points to the inherent speed andhandling characteristics of the craft as keyfactors. The 1998 NTSB study found thatoperator control problems due to the absenceof off-throttle steering and braking capabilitiescontribute to many PWC accidents. ACA foundthat narrative PWC accident accounts from1999, 2000 and 2001 also indicate that speed

and operator control problems play a key rolein many PWC accidents.

The most prominent causes cited in PWCaccidents are those directly tied to reckless andinattentive operation of the craft. Analysis of

USCG and stateaccident data foundthat PWC accidentsare much more likelyto be caused byoperator inattention,operator inexperience,excessive speed andc a r e l e s s / r e c k l e s soperation thanaccidents not involvingPWC. Whi le in noway exonerating theoperators involved,PWC accident dataand descr ipt ions

reveal a link between the speed and handlingcharacteristics of the craft and the operatorbehaviors cited as causing the majority of PWCaccidents.

Whether one looks at accident volume,accident rate, accident type, accident cause,nature of injuries or risks posed to others, thesafety record for PWC is disproportionatelypoor -- and unique among watercraft. No othervessel type has a similar record. In fact, theproportion of reported boating accidents thatinvolve PWC is higher than the proportion ofreported automobile accidents that involvedrunk driving.

The evidence clearly shows that PWC operationposes a serious safety risk to PWC operatorsand an unacceptable threat to all other waterwayusers. With more and more people flocking to thenation’s waterways, failure to adequately addressthese safety concerns will result in increased riskof injury and trauma to all waterway users.

The proportion of reportedboating accidents thatinvolve PWC is higher thanthe proportion of reportedautomobile accidents thatinvolve drunk driving.

The impact of PWC use on the ability of othersto enjoy recreational activities, especially non-

motorized activities, is a significant nationwideproblem. While the potential for user conflict existswith many activities, PWC use has becomenotorious for its conflicts with a wide variety ofother activities. In fact, PWC use often preventsother waterway users from enjoying the nation’srecreational waterways, thus monopolizing therecreational opportunity afforded by these waters.

The safety concerns raised earlier in this reportalso play a role in the propensity of PWC use toconflict with other activities. Based on theaccounts of canoeists, kayakers, windsurfers,fishermen, sailors, surfers and swimmers, manywaterway users feel threatened by high-speedPWC use. They feel threatened by the possibilityof being struck by a PWC, harassed by a PWCoperator or capsized by a PWC wake. Thisconcern for their own safety, because it isgenerated by a threat entirely beyond their control,is a preoccupation that greatly reduces theenjoyment and relaxation people can derive fromtheir preferred form of recreation.

The impacts of PWC use on other waterwayusers, however, go beyond safety concerns.Millions of people rely on water-related recreationto relieve stress, relax, and escape from the noiseand hassles of everyday life. The noisy, polluting,high-speed nature of PWC use is not compatiblewith such an escape, and is at odds with therecreational goals of many waterway users. Thefact that PWC have a unique ability to operate athigh speeds in shallow or confined waters greatlyincreases this incompatibility. Too often, PWCoperators are fueling their own enjoyment bysiphoning it away from those who enjoy other typesof activities.

The clearest evidence of this problem can be foundin the huge and disproportionate volume ofcomplaints about PWC use lodged by otherrecreational users. While ACA has receivedhundreds of complaints about PWC use in recentyears, it has received less than a dozen suchcomplaints about the use of other vessel types.

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Unsolicited PWC complaints from canoeists andkayakers prompted ACA’s initial involvement in thePWC issue. Other recreational groups haveexperienced similar complaints from theirmembers. Organizations such as U.S.Windsurfing, Izzak Walton League of America,Federation of Fly Fishers, Adirondack MountainClub and American Whitewater have all receivedcomplaints from members about PWC use.

Below are just a sample of the incidents broughtto ACA’s attention.• On a Boy Scout troop canoe outing, threePWC speeding around a blind bend in the riveralmost collided with each of the six canoes.• A PWC traveling at a high rate of speedcollided with two children kayaking on a river andcaused a broken collarbone.• A man on a morning lake paddle witnesseda PWC run over a loon nest - killing an adultfemale and a newborn loon.• A kayak teacher reports PWC drivingthrough the class and running in circles aroundthe students on numerous occasions.• A couple spent several thousand dollarsand two days paddling to reach a remote kayakingdestination only to discover that the once pristinewilderness was now frequented by noisy PWC.

This type of disruption by PWC use is not at alllimited to canoeists and kayakers. A vivid accountof PWC operators harassing a catamaran operatorappeared in the San Diego Union Tribune. The

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catamaran operator recalled, “We were headingout the Mission Bay Channel when five of themroared through the 5 mph zone at speeds well over50 mph. I stopped counting the number of CoastGuard regulations they violated, as they spreadout across the channel and bore down on us. Mywife screamed as two of them strafed us, passinginches away on either side, spraying water overus that reached six feet up my mast. I quicklytacked, set a course for home and will never againsail on Mission Bay between May and September.”A similarly disruptive PWC encounter is recalledby Ron Brooks, Saltwater Fishing Guide atAbout.com (http://saltfishing.about.com). AsBrooks fished on Florida’s Hairpin Creek - ashallow, narrow and twisting stream nearJacksonville - he first heard, and then saw, fourPWC heading up the creek toward him.

“As I watched in disbelief, these four idiots...cameat us wide open. The distance between my boatand the shallow bank we were fishing was abouttwenty feet. We could easily cast all the way intothe grass bank. Without slowing, smiling or evenlooking at us, they ran between my boat and thebank, taking one of our lines with them!” Thenrecounting the PWC pass on their way back outof the creek Brooks wrote “…the last one to go bysmiled as he turned and looked at us over hisshoulder – and then gave us a one finger salute!Needless to say, the fish left us. Even the deeperside of the creek was turned off.”

Waterfront residents have also experiencedwidespread disturbance from PWC operation.Waterfront residents experience PWC disruptionof both on-water recreation and the leisurelyenjoyment of the water from their homes or docks.Lakefront property owner associations haveadvocated for limits on PWC use in many states.In letters to state and local officials urging morePWC regulation, these associations and theirmembers typically cite noise and safety concerns.Below is a posting to a PWC Internet newsgroupby a PWC owner and new lakefront property ownerwhich illustrates the impacts PWC have onwaterfront residents.

“I am in the last stages of escrow on a house…andwent there for a walk through on Sunday…thehouse is right by a 5mph/no wake zone and isslightly sheltered by a point, which holds 2 housesin a semi-cove…During the whole time I was there,about 8 PWC’s went by and about 12-13 boats.Only 1 boat violated the no wake 5mph zone.EVERY PWC violated the no wake zone, manyusing the 5mph buoy as a turn buoy. Many of thePWC’s zoomed into the cove at speeds exceeding30 mph and came within 10' of the docks. It reallywas a bummer to see this through the eyes of aproperty owner for the first time. All I could thinkabout was how I was going to handle it when mykid was swimming in the cove. The people thatbuzzed the cove did it without a care in the world,a guy on a stand up did a heavy hairpin turn whichsent all the docks shaking. I was honestlydepressed after leaving there. I know this is goingto be an unpopular statement, but I really have tosay that if I had grown up with a lake house I wouldprobably be all over a PWC ban if this is the normalbehavior that goes on there.”

These types of PWC encounters are very commonamong a wide variety of water-related recreationalactivities. While it is impossible to know exactlyhow many people each year have disruptiveencounters with PWC operation, the sheer volumeof complaints alone indicates a widespreadproblem that adversely impacts many people.

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Noise

Noise pollution is one of the most frequentcomplaints lodged against PWC. The noise ofPWC alone can render a waterway unsuitable fora variety of recreational activities. PWC noisedestroys natural solitude and displaces wildlife(which hampers viewing opportunities), thuseliminating the ability of people to enjoy twodesirable natural qualities of waterways on whichactivities such as canoeing, kayaking rafting,fishing, hiking and camping depend.

While the PWC industry maintains that PWC emitless noise than other motorboats – even thoughstudy after study continues to show otherwise –the manufacturers also claim to be developingquieter watercraft. In postings to Internet newsgroups PWC riders have noted that the new four-stroke PWC models, when at or near full-throttle,make about the same amount of noise as PWCwith conventional two-stroke engines. Only timewill tell how much quieter future models become,but due to typical patterns of PWC operation suchas lingering in one area and the fact that the millionor so older PWC will continue to be operated formany years to come, the prospect of a significantchange on the water anytime soon is remote.

In a 1994 issue of LakeLine, Kenneth J. Wagner,Ph.D. reported in an article titled “Of Hammocksand Horsepower,” the findings of a noise study onRhode Island’s Watchaug Pond. The study foundthat PWC were 10 decibels louder on average thanother motorboats. He concluded “…jet skis are

Disturbing Design

Just as the unique design characteristics of PWCcontribute to a disproportionately poor safetyrecord, evidence suggests that thesecharacteristics also result in a greater degree ofPWC-related conflict with other recreationalactivities. Based on a review of actual complaintsand media accounts of PWC-related conflicts overthe past five years, ACA found that complaintsabout PWC use are most frequently related to thespeed, noise, pollution and typical operation of the craft.

Speed and Maneuverability

The primary purpose of PWC is high-speedrecreation. This is evidenced by the design andmarketing of PWC. Observations of PWC in use,as well as data on citations and PWC accidentcauses, indicate that PWC are frequently operatedat speeds in excess of 40 mph. A vessel operatingat high speeds in close proximity to other types ofrecreation is often disruptive.

Additionally, the exceptional maneuverability ofPWC — and the recreational objectives of theiroperators — encourages frequent andunpredictable changes in direction that is nottypical of other vessel types. Because of thismaneuverability, PWC users are more likely toperform stunts near other boaters and less likelyto confine high-speed operation to a center channelor other open water areas. This characteristicgreatly increases the likelihood of PWC toadversely impact other recreational activities.

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Visible Pollution

While water and air pollution emitted by jet skisimpact the natural environment, this pollution alsoimpacts the recreational experiences of otherwaterway users. Many of the canoeists andkayakers who have contacted ACA about PWCimpacts witnessed clouds of blue smoke, anintense smell of fuel and an oily sheen left on thewater in the wake of PWC. Based on thesepaddlers’ complaints, and similar complaints fromwindsurfers and fishermen, it is clear that pollutionassociated with PWC use can diminish theenjoyment of other waterway users.

The PWC industry has manufactured a fewcleaner burning four-stroke models; however, thiswill not significantly change PWC pollution impactsto other waterway users. Since the industry hasintroduced only a few such models, the majorityof PWC sold will continue to have two-strokeengines. In addition, PWIA estimates that there areover 1 million older-model PWC still in operation.

Regardless of whether a PWC has a two-strokeor four-stroke engine, the constant engine revving,acceleration and high-speed operation characteristic

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PWC Ad Encourages PWC Use on Whitewater

Shallow Draft

The hull and engine design of PWC gives them aunique ability to operate in shallow or confinedareas where they are more likely to threaten thesafety and enjoyment of other waterway users.This is a major reason PWC inflict a far greaterimpact on activities such as fishing, canoeing,kayaking and camping than traditional motorboats.The shallow draft of PWC allow them to operatein as little as one foot of water.

Most vessel types travel at higher speeds in openand deep-water areas such as a main waterwaychannel, avoiding areas where they couldaccidentally run aground or damage the boat onbarely submerged objects. This preference hastended to separate high-speed boating from near-shore activities easily disrupted by vessels travelingat high speeds. PWC operation, however, is rarelyconfined to deep and open waters. High-speedPWC use occurs near shore, next to docks, inshallow coves, narrow streams, small lakes,ponds, marshes, estuaries and even in whitewater rivers.

louder as a function of short hull length and greatertransfer of sound waves to the air than to thewater.” He also noted that one of the reasonsPWC annoy more people than other watercraft is“the changes in loudness and pitch for jetskis arefar greater than for most other watercraft.”

A study by the Noise Pollution Clearinghouseshowed that PWC noise reduces the value of abeachgoer’s experience by 25 percent, with anestimated nationwide cost to beachgoers of $908million annually. The study also concluded thecosts to canoeists and kayakers would be fargreater than the costs to beachgoers, stating “Theimpacts are clearly most severe for users ofhuman-powered craft…no one suffers jet ski noisemore keenly than a paddler whose exploration ofplacid coves and inlets is shattered by the roar ofjet skis.”

of PWC use increases the amount of visiblepollution emitted from these craft, as does thetendency of PWC operators to remain in one areafor long periods of time. These inherent operationalcharacteristics increase both the levels of pollutionemitted and the impacts of that pollution on otherforms of recreation.

Analyses conducted by both the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) and the National ParkService (NPS) indicate decreased visibility andincreased particulate matter in areas withconcentrations of two-stroke engines. PWCemissions can also have adverse health impactson other waterway users. PWC emissions containcarbon monoxide, formaldehyde, benzene andother harmful air pollutants. Exposure to theseemissions can result in carbon monoxide poisoning,the most common symptoms of which areheadaches, dizziness, nausea and impaired judgment.

Yellowstone National Park employees haveexperienced these symptoms after exposure tosimilar emissions from snowmobiles. Carbonmonoxide levels at Yellowstone’s entrance stationswere found to exceed the National Ambient AirQuality Standard (NAAQS) for carbon monoxideand the personnel who man these entrances havebeen given respirators to protect their health.

Corrupting Influence?

Some believe PWC operators buy or rent PWCsimply for the thrill factor and are more predisposedto engage in irresponsible behavior than otherboaters. In Trade Only, Marine Retailers Associationof America President Phil Keeter stated people “buythe personal watercraft as a thrill thing and they lovethat part of it…they are not a boat buyer at all.” Othersare convinced PWC operators are not predisposedto irresponsible behavior, but rather are drawn intosuch behavior by the craft’s design characteristics.Such is the opinion of Lieutenant Robbie Cox of theJackson County Mississippi Sheriff’s Department,who stated in the Clarion-Ledger newspaper, “Youcan put a Ph.D. on a personal watercraft and theybecome an instant idiot.”

Anecdotal evidence suggests the combination ofpower, speed, shallow draft and maneuverabilitydesigned into PWC influences operator behavior.Evidence of this ability to tempt responsible peopleinto behaving irresponsibly is found in the number ofinstances where otherwise responsible lawenforcement officials have been seen recklesslyoperating PWC. ACA is aware of such incidencesin New York, Texas, California and Oregon. In onesuch incident on the Columbia River a sheriff deputyon a PWC, who was supposed to be a safety boater,began performing stunts and almost capsized ACA’sDirector of Safety Education and Instruction who waspaddling nearby in a canoe.

Regardless of the mechanism by which it occurs,there is ample evidence that PWC operators aremore likely than other boaters to engage in recklessor harassing behaviors. Based on conversationsACA has had with marine law enforcement officialsfrom Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, NewHampshire, New York, Vermont, Washington andUtah, PWC use generates more complaints ofharassment and reckless behavior than theoperation of other vessel types. A four-year studyby NPS of warnings and tickets written for recklessoperation along the Mississippi portion of GulfIslands National Seashore showed that 59 percent

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UNENJOYABLE WATERSEXPERIENCEP

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No Escape

Based on surface water data from the UnitedStates Geological Survey (USGS) and a review offederal, state and local regulations, ACA estimatesthat over 98 percent of the nation’s surface watersare currently available to PWC use.

The United States has 79,481 square miles ofinland surface water. This is a conservative figurethat does not include rivers, streams or canalsunder one-eighth of a mile wide; lakes of less than40 acres; or lands partially covered by water. TheUnited States also has 12,383 miles of general

UNENJOYABLE WATERSEXPERIENCE

coastline with ocean waters used by motorizedrecreational vessels within one mile of shore andoften utilized much further from shore.

A review of all known surface waters with PWCprohibitions in place found that nationwide lessthan 1,000 of the more than 79,481 square milesof inland surface waters are off-limits to PWC use.Furthermore, a majority of those off-limit watersare in remote areas. Some are water supplyreservoirs and off limits to all boating. In additionto being allowed on over 78,500 of the 79,481square miles of inland waters, PWC are alsoallowed on well over 99 percent of U.S. oceanwaters. The exact ocean water percentagedepends on the distance from shore the totalsquare mileage is based on. The ACA estimate isbased on a calculation of only one mile out from shore.US territorial waters extend 12 miles out from shore.Combine these statistics with the ability of PWCto operate in shallow and/or confined areas, and itbecomes clear that high-speed PWC use has theability to dominate the vast majority of US surfacewater. Consequently, there are few areas whereother forms of waterway recreation — activitiessuch as canoeing, kayaking, fishing, sailing,windsurfing and wildlife viewing — can escape thepotential impacts of PWC use. PWC use hasalready rendered many waters across the nationunsuitable for these other activities.

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of them were issued to PWC riders, even thoughPWC comprise only 6.7 percent of the area’sregistered vessels.

The impacts of PWC use on thepublic’s ability to enjoy the nation’swaters is, in many ways, similarto the impacts of other types of off-highway vehicle (OHV) use on thepublic’s ability to enjoy the nation’spublic lands. All terrain vehicle(ATV) and off-road motorcycle usefrequently disrupts the recreationalexperiences of hikers andbackpackers. Cross-country skiersand other winter travelers arelikewise besieged by snowmobileuse.

These divergent recreationalactivities engage in a nationalstruggle over use of the nation’spublic lands and waters. At theheart of this struggle resideconflicting ideas of fun. Forcanoeists, kayakers, hikers,backpackers, cross-country skiersand other non-motorized travelers,enjoyment is often dependent onthe quality of the naturalenvironment and its wildness.Having clean air and water, seeingwildlife, listening to the sounds ofnature and escaping from the noiseof everyday life are essential partsof these activities. Those whoenjoy fishing and hunting oftenseek these environmental qualitiesalso. The presence of loud, high-speed, motorized recreation canentirely deny any of these outdoorenthusiasts the recreationalexperience he or she is seeking.

According to organizations thatrepresent hikers, backcountryskiers and fishermen, theirmembers’ complaints regardingmotorized use are almost identical

to those raised by canoeists andkayakers. Those complaintsinclude noise, speed, theintentional harassment of peopleand wildlife, air pollution, waterpollution and various other types ofresource destruction. Threeprimary issues of concern appearin these complaints: the individual’ssafety, damage to the environmentand the loss of the recreationalexperience being sought.

In general, the experiences soughtby motorized users are verydifferent from the experiencessought by non-motorized users.ACA recently reviewed dozens ofarticles on motorized recreationweb sites or in motorized recreationmagazines and monitored postingsto Internet groups dedicated toPWC, ATV and snowmobile use.The articles and postings indicatedthat the recreational enjoyment ofPWC, ATV, and snowmobile usersis mostly centered on the machineand its performance — not thenatural environment. In fact, of thearticles and postings reviewed, asignificant portion expresseddisdain for environmental protectionor enjoyment over theenvironmental damage caused bythemselves or others.

In newspaper articles andconversations with ACA, public landmanagers have cited majorproblems with intentional resourcedamage from motorized-users.Many of the complaints aboutintentional resource damageinvolve ATV users who ignore speedand route regulation, create illegal

A Broader Problem:

Conflicting Ideas of Fun

trails, drive through streambeds orlitter.

George Buckingham, ecosystemplanner for Colville National Forest,described such incidents in aSportsman Review article. “Off-roaders drove through the meadowsas well as through seasonalstreams. They did considerabledamage to the vegetation and soil.They left a lot of trash in themeadows and near the Middle Forkof the Calispell. It’s just a mess.”

The reports of intentional resourcedamage regarding snowmobile andPWC use typically involve wildlifeharassment and violations ofregulations designed to protectecologically sensitive areas.

These seemingly irreconcilablerecreational objectives anddisparate views on the proper useof the nation’s public lands andwaters will likely shape the struggleover these protected resources forthe foreseeable future. The view thatoff-highway motorized use isinappropriate is most oftenattributed to environmental groups.The conflict is portrayed as a battlebetween recreation and theenvironment or between those whowant to use the resource and thosewho want to “lock it up.” Thesecharacterizations of the conflict aremostly inaccurate and designed tobenefit the motorized-useadvocates. A huge part of thedispute regards incompatiblerecreational needs, very differentstewardship ethics and conflictingideas of fun.

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UNENJOYABLE WATERSEXPERIENCE

DAMAGED WATERSENVIRONMENT

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In addition to its impacts on safety and recreational enjoyment, PWC use also has

significant impacts on the environment. PWCcontribute unacceptable amounts of pollutants intothe water and air. They damage sensitive nearshore environments. And their use often displaces,disrupts or otherwise injures wildlife. While manyof these environmentalimpacts were mentionedpreviously in this report asrecreational impacts,such impacts also havea detrimental affect on thewaterways themselvesand on associatedecosystems.

The rhetoric employedby groups on both sidesof the debate regarding PWC use and theenvironment does not always lead to an accurateimpression of the facts. The PWC industry hasmade many erroneous claims that are intended todeflect criticism, including that PWC are lessthreatening to wildlife than canoes and kayaksbecause they make noise and cannot sneak upon animals. Some environmental advocates havestated that PWC and other two-stroke poweredvessels dump 15 times more fuel into America’swaters than did the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Whilethis statement appears reasonably accurate withrespect to volume of fuel, an unburned oil/gasolinemixture dispersed by many PWC over a wide areaand during the course of a year has significantlydifferent impacts than a 165 million gallon spill ofraw crude oil.

Water Pollution

The amount of water pollution generated by PWCuse is due, in part, to the inefficient two-strokeengines utilized in most of these craft. Bothconventional (carbureted) and newer direct-injected two-stroke engines run on a mixture of oiland gasoline, the conventional versions have beenshown by numerous studies and reports todischarge as much as one-third of this gas/oilmixture unburned into the water. BluewaterNetwork, an organization that has extensivelystudied two-stroke engine pollution, estimates thatan average two-hour ride on a PWC can dumpbetween 3 and 4 gallons of gas and oil into thewater. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)asserts that a typical PWC annually dischargesbetween 50 and 60 gallons of unburned gasolineinto the environment.

A 2002 National Research Council (NRC) report,noting that the two stroke engines found on manyPWC and other recreational boats were purposelydesigned to discharge gasoline and oil, found thatland runoff and recreational boating account fornearly three-quarters of the petroleum releasedinto the sea each year through human

The Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) asserts that atypical PWC dischargesbetween 50 and 60 gallons ofunburned gasoline into theenvironment annually.

After wading through the rhetoric, what remains issignificant and compelling evidence that PWChave specific environmental impacts, uniqueimpacts that degrade the nation’s waterways,reduce air quality and harm wildlife. In addition toan abundance of anecdotal evidence from peoplewho observe the visible and audible pollution

emitted by PWC, as wellas the impacts of theiruse on wildlife, a goodnumber of scientificstudies have beenconducted that confirmand provide insight intothe environmentalimpacts of PWC use.

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personal watercraft engines operated at the samepower level emit similar amounts of emissions.”

The adverse effects of fuel discharges intowaterways are significant. In its “MotorizedWatercraft Environmental Assessment” for Lake

Tahoe, the TahoeRegional PlanningAgency cited scientificstudies that found thatone-gallon of fuel iscapable of tainting onemillion gallons of seawater. According to EPA,the gasoline constituentsemitted by PWC into thewater include MTBE(methyl tertiary butyl

ether), benzene (a known human carcinogen),toluene, zylene, and acetone/hexane.

MTBE is a suspected carcinogen that is verysoluble and difficult to remove from water. Theother toxic chemicals, once released, float on thewater’s surface and eventually settle withinestuarine and shallow ecosystems where aquaticlife is often in developmental phases and mostvulnerable. EPA also believes that due tobioacummulation and biomagnification , thesepollutants can endanger recreationists as well asthreatened species of wildlife such as the Bald Eagle.

In 1999 the Water Operations Branch of the NationalPark Service (NPS) produced a report titled “WaterQuality Concerns Related to Personal WatercraftUsage.” The report found that concentrations ofMTBE and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH)are present in waters with heavy PWC usage. Thereport noted that PAHs are considered dangerousto aquatic organisms and may pose a risk to humanhealth in waters where fish are caught and eatenor in waters utilized as a drinking water source.

Perhaps the best case study regarding theimpacts of PWC use on water quality is LakeTahoe. The water quality of Lake Tahoe has beendeclining for years due to variety of causes.

The high-speed operation,constant acceleration andengine revving that is typical ofPWC operation also causesPWC to pollute more than mostother vessel types.

consumption. The report — titled “Oil in the Sea:Inputs, Fates, and Effects” — concluded that thesedischarges may inflict more damage thanpreviously thought, and that adverse effects onmarine species can occur at very lowconcentrations.

Due to pressure fromEPA, the PWC industryhas begun placing direct-injected two-stroke andfour-stroke engines insome PWC models.These new technologyengines pollute less thanthe widely usedcarbureted two-strokeengines; however,several factors raise doubts about the effectiveimpact of these newer engines at reducingPWC pollution.

One obvious factor is that the PWC industry isonly employing these newer engines on somePWC models and continues to produce and sellPWC with carbureted two-stroke engines. Anotheris that there are over 1 million PWC with oldertwo-stroke engines that will continue to operateon the nation’s waters for the foreseeable future.However, perhaps the biggest problem is that PWCpollution also results from the specific design andoperational characteristics of PWC.

With most PWC models having engines in the130-160 horsepower range, the amount of fuelburned and pollution created is greater than thatof most outboard marine motors, which aretypically not as powerful. The high-speed operation,constant acceleration and engine revving that istypical of PWC operation also causes PWC topollute more than most other vessel types. Withany currently-utilized engine technology, the uniquedesign and operation of PWC is likely tocompromise the environmental benefits. Whenanswering the question of whether PWC pollutemore than other existing technology two-strokes,PWIA’s only response is “outboard engines and

DAMAGED WATERSENVIRONMENT

DAMAGED WATERSENVIRONMENT

Near Shore Impacts

Because of their unique design, PWC are oftenoperated at high-speeds in very shallow watersclose to shore. As mentioned in the recreationalimpacts portion of this report, PWC can operatein as little a 1 foot of water. Near-shore areas areoften ecologically critical and are more sensitive

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Some of the adverse impacts caused by PWC-related air pollution were addressed in theUnenjoyable Waters section of this report. Thedisproportionately high emission rate of PWC alsomeans that PWC contribute more than most otherrecreational activities to broader pollution problemssuch as smog and the associated healthconsequences of poor air quality.

An EPA report to the United Nations entitled,Climate Action Report 2002, underscores thethreat posed by such emissions, finding that“Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth ‘satmosphere as a result of human activities,causingglobal mean surface air temperature andsubsurface ocean temperature to rise.” The reportwent on to predict future consequences thatinclude drought conditions, rising ocean levels,heat waves, wetland loss, floods, and reducedfarming output.

NOTE: Additional PWC air pollutionconsequences related to recreational enjoymentwere identified on page 20.

Elevated levels of MTBE and toluene werediscovered in the lake. The impacts of motorizedrecreation, namely two-stroke engines, wereidentified as the likely culprit. In its “MotorizedWatercraft Environmental Assessment” the TahoeRegional Planning Agency estimated that in 1994two-stroke engines discharged 775 gallons per dayof raw-fuel into Lake Tahoe, while four-strokeengines discharged 154 gallons per day.

In 1999, after pressure from groups such as TheLeague to Save Lake Tahoe, a ban on PWC andother boats with carbureted two-stroke engineswent into effect on the lake. The result has been ahuge drop in gasoline related pollution. One yearafter the ban went into effect, scientists from UCDavis, University of Nevada Reno, and USGeological Surveys sampled the waters of LakeTahoe for gasoline pollutants. They found MTBElevels had dropped by 95 percent and toluenelevels had dropped by 88 percent after only oneyear. The scientists concluded that the dramaticdrop in the levels of these toxic pollutants is directlyrelated to the ban on two-stroke engines.

Air Pollution

For many of the same reasons PWC emit largeamounts of water pollution, they also emit highlevels of air pollution. The inefficiency of two-strokeengines and the operational characteristics of thecraft remain the key factors. According to EPA,two-stroke engines are responsible for over 1.1billion pounds of hydrocarbon emissions each year.

According to the California Air Resources Board(CARB), an average one-hour ride on a PWCemits the same amount of smog-forming airpollution as driving a modern car for a year. Astudy conducted for CARB found that a typicalPWC produces 2,210 lbs. of emissions per 1,000gallons of fuel used. The disproportionately highemission rate of PWC means that PWCcontribute more than most other recreationalactivities to broader pollution problems such assmog and the associated health consequencesof poor air quality.

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to disturbance. The extreme thrust from a PWCoperating at even moderate speeds can violentlydisturb the bed of the waterbody and any flora orfauna that resides there. The EPA, in a letter tothe Superintendent of the Missouri NationalRecreation River commenting on a proposedPWC ban, drew connections between riverbankerosion and PWC use.

Lyle Raymond Jr., a water resources specialistfor 30 years, noted in his comments supporting aproposed statewide 5 mph zone extending 200feet from shore for New York, “A growing body ofscientific evidence clearly indicates that severeenvironmental impacts can occur in shallow near-shore areas from operation of high-poweredwatercraft at greater than 5 mph speeds.” He wenton to note that the state’s existing 100’ speed limitzone was inadequate and that “Increased turbidity,which adversely affects growing conditions forshallow aquatic plants and the ecosystemassociated with them, and the mixing of bottomsediments, which often contain substances thatreenter the food chain, are but two examples ofsuch impacts.”

Dr. Russell Long of Bluewater Network points outthat shallow and remote areas, which are criticalto a water body’s health, are the most sensitive toenvironmental pollution. He goes on to note, “Whenthe petrochemicals in gas and oil that are releasedfrom two-stroke motors settle within shallowecosystems they pose a significant threat to manyorganisms at the base of the food chain: fish eggs,algae, shellfish, and zooplankton. Many of thesetoxins are believed to bioaccumulate and scientificresearch has found that chromosomal damage,reduced growth, and high mortality rates in fishoccur at extremely low levels of hydrocarbon pollution.”

Impacts on Wildlife

In addition to the detrimental affects on wildlifecaused by the water pollution, air pollution anddisruption of near-shore aquatic environments thatis associated with PWC use, the noise and typicaloperation patterns of PWC have been found to

DAMAGED WATERSENVIRONMENT

PWC Industry Ad Acknowledges

Wildlife Impacts

disrupt and pose serious threats to a wide varietyof wildlife. A growing body of reliable scientificresearch and official determinations havedocumented these impacts.

•A 2001 study entitled “Short-Term Effects of BoatTraffic of Bottlenose Dolphins in Sarasota Bay”found changes in dolphin behavior are “more likelyto occur in response to a PWC than to anoutboard at slow and fast speeds.” The studyfound the erratic characteristics of typical PWCoperation, such as frequency of turns andlikelihood of changing engine speed, causegreater disturbance. It also points to the ability ofPWC to travel in extremely shallow water as agreater risk to dolphins by “invading” theirsafehavens from traditional boat traffic anddisturbing their use of shallow, protected watersto feed and calf rearing.

• Joanna Burger, author of a Rutgers UniversityPWC study, observed PWC impacts on CommonTerns in New Jersey’s Barnegat Bay. Burger’sstudy implicated PWC use as the likely cause ofan almost total nesting failure in 1996. The nesting

DAMAGED WATERSENVIRONMENT

• In California, biologists observed the separationof seal pups from their mothers as a result ofnearby PWC operation. Studies show that sealsare quite skittish, and marine mammal expertshave expressed concern that PWC activity nearseals and sea lions disturbs normal rest andsocial interaction on haul outs, causingstampedes into the water that can separate sealpups from adult mothers.

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• A paper entitled Impacts of Boats and PersonalWatercraft on Loons and other Waterbirds in NewHampshire, prepared by Harry Vogel, executivedirector of the Loon Preservation Committee ofthe Audubon Society of New Hampshire,concluded that the unique design of PWC “causesignificant damage because PWC closely

approach nests andshorelines at highspeed.” The paper citedpersonal observations,reports and studies thatdocumented the“adverse effects ofpersonal watercraft on

loons and other waterbirds” and noted thatsignificantly healthier loon populations have beenobserved on lakes where PWC are banned thanon lakes with significant PWC use. Judy McIntyre,researcher and director of the North AmericanLoon Fund, is convinced that PWC currentlyrepresent the greatest single threat to breedingloon populations. These findings coincide withthe more than a dozen eyewitness accounts ofloon disruption that have been reported to ACA.

• Dr. John Rogers, of the Florida Game andFreshwater Fish Commission, reports datashowing that Brown Pelicans, which oftenapproach other vessels, maintain a largedistance from PWC.

• Local officials in Alaska’s Matanuska-SusitnaBorough prohibited PWC use on local lakes afterfinding that such use had displaced the swanpopulation on several Borough lakes.

• Tom Wilmers, a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Biologistat Key Deer National Wildlife Refuge, hasobserved significant PWC impacts on nestingosprey. He observed a jet ski repeatedly flush anosprey from its nest site 11 times in less than onehour. Wilmers found that the tendency of PWC tooperate continuously in one location for extendedperiods of time exacerbates the disturbance factorby reducing opportunities for displaced birds toreturn to feeding or nesting areas.

PWC use presents a uniqueand significant threat to manyspecies of wildlife.

failure correlated with a more than 30 fold increasein PWC traffic. In her study, Burger found thatapproximately three times as many Terns wereflushed by PWC as were flushed by traditionalboats. In conducting her study she also witnessedPWC running over Tern nests containing eithereggs or chicks.

• A study of PWC alongWashington’s SanJuan Islands,conducted by theWoods HoleO c e a n o g r a p h i cInstitute, found thatPWC pose a unique threat to surfacing birds ormarine mammals. PWC lack the low-frequencylong distance sounds needed to adequatelysignal these birds or mammals of their presence,thus failing to warn the animals of theapproaching danger until they are almost on topof them, causing undue panic and disturbance.

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• Officials with both the U.S. Fish and WildlifeService (USFWS) in Alaska and the WashingtonState Department of Fish and Wildlife haveexpressed concernthat PWC operationhas adverse impactson spawning salmon.

Equally as compelling asscientific research andofficial observations arethe many accounts ofspecific incidences ofPWC impact on wildlife.Eyewitness accountsexist of PWC operators destroying loon and ternnests, stampeding seals and sea lions, collidingwith manatees, harassing sea otters, and collidingwith ducks and swans.

DAMAGED WATERSENVIRONMENT

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One such case, reported by Associated Press (AP)on 7/12/2001, illustrates the widespread problemof PWC operator harassment of wildlife. In this

case a Michigan manwas officially chargedwith “taking a protectedspecies” after threewitnesses observed himintentionally chase downand run over a belovedlocal swan known asElliot. The PWC operatorwas also cited forallowing his underagedaughter to drive the

PWC. The swan first arrived at Clifford Lake, nearStaunton seven years ago. A year after its arrivalthe swan was struck by another personalwatercraft but survived.

Another incident reported by AP on 11/20/01, thistime in Florida, illustrates the role speed can playin PWC encounters with wildlife. According to thearticle, “a man dashing across a lake on acustomized personal watercraft at about 55 mphwas killed in an apparent collision with a flyingduck.” Florida boating officials indicated that thePWC operator flushed the duck and, despite thefact that ducks are fast flyers, the bird could notavoid the speeding PWC. An owner of the PWCdealership where the watercraft operator wasemployed was quoted by AP as saying that at thespeed the man was traveling, the 10- to 15-poundduck “might as well have been a cinder block.”

The research, observations and reports citedabove, while in no way exhaustive on the matter,do present an abundance of evidence that PWCuse presents a unique and significant threat tomany species of wildlife. PWC-specificcharacteristics such as noise levels and pitch,shallow draft, high-speed design, maneuverabilityresult in disproportionate impacts, as does thepropensity of PWC operators to be inattentive,indifferent or malicious towards wildlife and its habitat.

A Michigan man was officiallycharged with “taking aprotected species” after threewitnesses observed himintentionally run over a belovedlocal swan known as Elliot.

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THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

The current regulatory environment regardingPWC use, while showing some signs of

positive change, does not adequately protectwaterway users from the safety threats posed byPWC use. Nor does it sufficiently safeguard thequality of the waterways and the recreationalexperiences of other waterway users. While ACAstrongly supports the right of individuals tochallenge themselves and take risks, and is in noway advocating for an overly burdensomeregulatory environment that strives to eliminate riskfrom outdoor activities, ACA is also convinced thatwhen one user group imposes a disproportionateamount of risk and disruption on other users andthe environment, additional regulation is needed.

The most obvious indication of regulatory failureis the PWC accident data. The level of PWCregulation has thus far proved insufficient toaddress the disproportionate accident rate ofPWC. In fact, the proportion of PWC accidentsthat are collisions has actually increased over thepast five years. Some PWC accident data haveshown slight improvement over time, as does mostboating accident data, but that progress is not veryconsequential given the scope of the problem.

Due to the sparse coverage of on-water lawenforcement and the reluctance of state and localboating officials to separate high-speed PWC usefrom other waterway recreation, much of the publicis left completely exposed to the whims of PWCoperators. In addition, the penalties for offensessuch as speeding, reckless operation, andintentional harassment are often not severeenough to significantly deter such behavior. On

most waterways, a PWC user can recklesslyspeed across the water, harass people or wildlife,and even intentionally ram a kayak, with littlechance of ever being caught and even lesslikelihood of being adequately punished.

State and Local

Government

State level PWC regulations have, for the mostpart, evolved in directions where PWC industryopposition is either weak or nonexistent. The mostprevalent regulations are minimum agerequirements, mandatory PFD wearage,restrictions on night operation, and limitations onwake jumping. Other types of regulation are notvery common. According to information availablefrom the National Association of State Boating LawAdministrators (NASBLA), 14 states have specificstatewide protections for swimming areas, 12states have PWC specific speed limits, 10 stateshave PWC speed/wake restrictions within a certaindistance of shore and eight have PWC distancerequirements from other vessels (see Appendix A).

The growing frustration with PWC-relatedproblems has in recent years prompted severalstate legislators to champion more significantPWC limitations. Hawaii, Maine, New Hampshire,New York and Vermont recently passed laws thatprotect certain waters from PWC use and/or givespecific PWC regulatory authority to localjurisdictions. New York also passed a lawestablishing noise limits for PWC. Each of theselaws passed over the strong objections of thePWC Industry.

State boating agencies have the strongestinfluence over state boating laws and this is wherethe PWC lobby has focused much of its attention.While there are many good and dedicated stateboating officials, much of the regulatory failure inmanaging PWC use can be traced to theseagencies. ACA has found a strong regulatory biasamong many state boating officials to treat allvessel types equally, irrespective of accident data

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sacrifice in ability to control the activities that aremost likely to place other boaters at risk. Fundingalso plays a significant role. State boating agenciesfrequently point to insufficient funding for marineenforcement, which results in fewer officers onthe water, as a critical problem.

Given the issues withenforcement coverageand the subjective natureof the legal system, ACAwas unable to determinethe extent to whichstatutory penalties forlegal infractions such asspeeding, recklessoperation, harassmentand boating under the

influence are severe enough to deter thoseactivities. It seems clear that there is not anadequate level of deterrence, but given thedifferences in law from state to state and variancesin the tendencies of judges and law enforcementofficers, it is difficult to assess exactly where thebreakdown is.

State law and the amount of authority given to stateboating agencies has a great impact on the abilityof local government to regulate PWC use. Statesthat currently allow the local regulation of PWCuse include California, Florida, Idaho, Maine, NewYork, North Carolina and Washington. Localitiessuch as San Juan County in Washington;Mendocino County, San Francisco County, and thecity of Malibu in California; Monroe and WaltonCounties in Florida; and the city of Raleigh in NorthCarolina have all adopted local ordinances that limitthe areas open to PWC use.

Most of these local ordinances strive to protectbeach goers and other water users by keepingPWC use far away (up to 1200 feet) from shore.In the case of Mendocino County, PWC areprohibited on all coastal estuaries, includingassociated bays and rivers for seven milesupstream from mouth. San Juan County has atotal prohibition on PWC use on waters within thecounty. Courts, for the most part, have upheld local

THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

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or impacts on other waterway users. This doctrineof equal treatment and access is the cornerstoneof the PWC industry’s position, and it results in aregulatory approach unwilling to segregateexclusively high-speed activities from other typesof waterway recreation.

ACA and otherorganizations haveencountered resistancefrom some states intrying to gather accuratePWC accident data. Inthese cases, stateboating officialsproffered excuses forthe nationwide PWCaccident record andrepeated the official arguments and policies ofPersonal Watercraft Industry Association (PWIA).A significant number of state boating lawadministrators, in conversations with ACA, refusedto acknowledge that PWC pose a unique safetythreat to other waterway users. This automaticdefense of PWC and reluctance to shareinformation on the part of the agencies most directlyresponsible for boating regulation raises significantconcerns about the level influence of the personalwatercraft industry lobby on state boating officials— and the toll that influence has on public safety.

Through ACA’s efforts to collect PWC accident datafrom states, ACA found that a majority of states donot adequately collect and study PWC accidentdata. Notable exceptions include Florida, Californiaand Nevada. These states collect significant PWCspecific accident information and are happy to shareit. Another shortcoming ACA discovered is that 20states fail to even report the number of registeredPWC to the USCG, choosing instead to simply lumpPWC into another vessel category.

Inadequate law enforcement coverage is anotherserious concern. Multiple factors conspire tocreate this enforcement problem. By failing torestrict high-speed activities to limited areas, statesallow the dispersal of those activities over all ormost of the state’s surface waters. The result is a

State boating agencies havethe strongest influence overstate boating laws and this iswhere the PWC lobby hasfocused much of its attention.

In the remaining 21 units, the policy left much ofthe decision making to the individual units. Underthe policy, PWC use was to be phased out in 11 ofthe remaining park units in April of 2002 unlessthese units adopt a special regulation specificallypermitting personal watercraft use. These unitswere primarily National Seashores or Lakeshores.In the other 10 park units, mostly NationalRecreation Areas, the policy allows PWC use tocontinue unless the units adopt a special regulationprohibiting PWC use.

When the April 2002 deadline passed, PWC usewas permanently prohibited in 5 of the 11 unitswhere use was to be phased out. The other 6 unitsin this category temporarily prohibited PWC use,but planned to make a final determination on PWCuse in the near future.

As a result of a lawsuit by the Bluewater Network,the 10 units where NPS envisioned PWC usewould be allowed now also must evaluate theappropriateness of PWC use. Bluewater broughtsuit against the NPS for not banning PWC use inall 87 park units, arguing that PWC operation inany NPS unit violated the Park Service’s legalmandate to leave park resources unimpaired. In asettlement finalized by the Bush Administration,NPS agreed to prohibit PWC use at all 21remaining park units unless the agency undertakesa park-specific rulemaking process for each thatcomplies with the National Environmental PolicyAct. The settlement stipulates that the processmust be completed no later than the fall of 2002.

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PWC restrictions. A PWC ban in Marin County,California that was overturned when a SuperiorCourt judge ruled the County had not adequatelyestablished cause was later upheld on appeal.

Due to legal threats from PWIA, some localitieshave been reluctant to prohibit PWC use onwaterways where federal dollars have been usedto create or maintain improved access facilities.The PWIA threats are based on its interpretationof language in the Federal Aid in Sport FishRestoration Act (FASFRA) which provides moniesfor boating access (see the discussion of FASFRAunder Federal Government). Despite thequestionable legal merits of these threats, thereare numerous ways for states and localities toconstruct regulations that steer clear of theFASFRA issue.

Federal Government

The federal regulatory treatment of PWC variesgreatly from agency to agency. The National ParkService (NPS) decision to prohibit PWC use inmost National Park Units is the single mostsignificant government action taken to date toprotect the public and the environment from theimpacts of PWC use. Individual resource units ofNPS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and theNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrationhave also enacted PWC prohibitions. Other federalland management agencies such as the U.S.D.A.Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management,the Bureau of Reclamation, and the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers have taken little, if any, actionto address the impacts of PWC use. Furthermore,the United States Coast Guard — the agency thatmost directly oversees boating activities — hasnot taken any significant regulatory action toaddress PWC accident rates or the impacts ofPWC on other waterway users.

National Park Service

On March 21, 2000, the National Park Service(NPS) adopted a landmark PWC policy thatprohibits PWC in 66 of the 87 national park units.

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funds must allow access to all craft within similargiven horsepower sizes, including PWC (PatrickBuckley; Personal Watercraft v. City of Redding,California: 66 F.3d 188; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS33286). However, in a more recent Florida case(1999), Kissimme River Valley SportsmanAssociation v. The City of Lakeland (60 F. Supp.2d 1289), the U.S. District Court in Florida ruledthat FASFRA language does not create a federalright for boats of common horsepower ratings tohave equal access at boat launch facilities thathave been constructed or maintained under the Act.

Despite its evolving legal interpretation, thisregulatory language — and/or the threat of legalaction by PWIA and NMMA — has made somestates and localities reluctant to prohibit PWC useon certain water bodies. While ACA agrees withinterpretation of the court in the Florida case andbelieves it more in keeping with the enactinglegislation, by changing the FASFRA languageUSFWS would create a more favorableatmosphere for addressing PWC impacts. In alllikelihood, PWC were not even contemplated inFASFRA.

United States Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) isresponsible for regulating PWC safety andestablishing appropriate safety standards. As isthe case with many state boating agencies, theUSCG approach to PWC regulation is influenced

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United States Fish & Wildlife Service

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service(USFWS) has prohibited PWC use in many wildliferefuges. According to a General Accounting Office(GAO) report (RCED-00-243) provided toCongress in September of 2000, PWC use isprohibited in approximately 183 USFWS units andallowed in approximately 167. In responding to theGAO survey, 109 USFWS units reported PWCuse. USFWS claims that 69 percent of theserefuges remain exposed to PWC impactsbecause USFWS lacks total jurisdiction to regulateuse. The GAO report also found that USFWS hadnot adequately assessed PWC impacts to refugesand that USFWS lacks the necessary personnelto sufficiently enforce the existing regulations onPWC use.

USFWS is also responsible for managing theFederal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act(FASFRA) monies, which are part of the Wallop-Breaux Trust Fund. Trust fund receipts consist ofFederal excise taxes attributable to motorboat andsmall-engine fuel use and on sport fishingequipment, along with import duties on fishingequipment, yachts and pleasure craft. In itsregulatory language for FASFRA, the USFWSbowed to marine industry pressure and includedwording not in the legislation. Wording formerlyinterpreted by some judges as limiting the abilityof states and localities to prohibit PWC use wherefederal Sport Fish Restoration monies have beenused. The wording states:

“Though a broad range of access facilities andassociated amenities can qualify for funding underthe 10 percent provision, power boats withcommon horsepower ratings must beaccommodated, and, in addition, the State mustmake reasonable efforts to accommodate boatswith larger horsepower ratings if they would notconflict with aquatic resources management.”

The legal interpretation of this wording has beenmixed. In 1995 a U.S. Appeals court ruled thatany public boat launch ramp built with FASFRA

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of a voluntary standard through a committeecomprised largely of personal watercraft industryrepresentatives and advocates.

The ACA research for this report on PWCaccidents revealed serious shortcomings in theUSCG accident reporting system. Simple facts,such as the number of registered PWC, theprimary cause of an accident or the vesselresponsible in a collision, were extremely difficultto ascertain. Many of these shortcomings appearto stem from USCG’s reluctance to require statesto report accidents in a uniform manner. Statesare afforded wide latitude in what they choose toreport and how they choose to categorizeaccidents.

USDA Forest Service and Bureau ofLand Management

The GAO (GAO Report RCED-00-243) found thatof the 111 Forest Service units reporting use(includes only those units that responded to GAOsurvey) only 29 reported prohibitions on PWC use.Of the 58 Bureau of Land Management (BLM) unitsreporting use, only 2 reported prohibitions. Mostof those prohibitions result from specific legislativemandates or state actions, not regulatory actionby the Forest Service or BLM.

In response to the GAO survey most ForestService and BLM units expressed the opinion that

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THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

greatly by the view that all vessel types should betreated equally. The problem with this one-size-fits-all approach is that PWC are very different fromother vessel types. So different in fact, that theUSCG decided to exempt PWC from a number ofthe safety standards required of most other vesseltypes. That decision prompted a rebuke from theNational Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) inits 1998 report on PWC safety.

In that report, NTSB recommended that USCGend its practice of simply exempting PWC fromthe safety standards designed for “conventional”vessels and adopt safety standards specific toPWC. NTSB noted, “…the exemption processdoes little in terms of evaluating possible safetyrisks that may be associated with the uniqueoperating characteristics of PWC.” It also pointedout, “the fact that PWC do not ‘fit’ existing standardsfor open hulled vessels does not release the CoastGuard from its responsibility to regulate the safetyof these vessels…”

In response to a formal petition for rulemaking fromPWIA asking that USCG end the exemptionprocess and adopt the personal watercraftindustry’s own manufacturing standards, USCGbegan addressing the exemption issue [USCG-1998-4734]. The ACA petition opposing the use ofthe term “personal watercraft” to describe thesejet-powered vessels and requesting the USCGadopt specific definitions for jet-powered vesselswas added to this petition action. On July 3, 2002USCG issued a request for comments on the ACApetition (Federal Register Vol. 67, No. 128, pp.44662-44665).

The 1998 NTSB report observed “some portion ofoperator control problems may be attributed to theoperating design of personal watercraft,” and calledon USCG to — within two years — “determine,through research, the feasibility of providing PWCoperators more control in off-throttle steeringsituations.” Four years have passed and USCGhas yet to adopt an off-throttle steerage standardfor PWC. As noted in the sidebar Flawed By Designon page 8, USCG is currently pursuing the creation

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To understand the politics of thePWC debate, one must realize aperson’s opinion on PWC regulationhas very little to do with partyaffiliation or political philosophy.Opinions on the need for greaterPWC regulation are primarily aproduct of a person’s ownexperience with PWC use.Evidence of this can be found insurvey results and though a reviewof comments submitted by thethousands of people who haveweighed in on this issue.

ACA has been copied on over1,000 letters sent by recreationalwaterway users to agencies andlawmakers urging stronger PWCregulations. A review of theseletters, as well as email andtelephone conversations, indicatesthat the senders represent verydiverse political philosophies, partyaffiliations, financial positions andrecreational interests. This shouldnot be surprising given that anyonewho recreates on or lives near thewater is subject to the impacts ofPWC use.

Political pressure from the proPWC lobby has never come fromany broad public support for PWCuse. It comes primarily from thePWC industry and rentaloperations claiming economic andemployment advantages arisingfrom PWC sales and use. Theseclaims, while rarely substantiatedwith independent research, areeffective with some lawmakers.PWC advocacy also relies on afew other assets. There is a smallbut vocal group of avid PWC riderswilling to write letters or attend

public meetings, and the PWClobby’s powerful political friendsinclude some state boat ingof f ic ia ls and a handful oflawmakers who are off-highwaymotorized use advocates.

The PWC industry has focused agreat deal of effort on influencingthe views of state boat ingregulators and the USCG. PWIAand i ts al l ies are constant lypromoting their agenda andphilosophy at the meetings ofboating related agencies andorganizat ions. PWCmanufacturers also donate PWCto state agencies and othermarine law enforcement entities.While not passing judgment on themotives behind such donations,the result is the establishment ofa popular perk that could possiblyinfluence the relationship betweenregulators and industry. Anobvious result of PWC donationsis that it turns law enforcementofficers into PWC operators.

The biggest disadvantage facingPWC advocates is that publicopinion is clearly against their pro-PWC position. Surveys conductedby Colorado State University, theNational Parks and ConservationAssociation, and the MinnesotaStar-Tribune all found that morethan 75 percent of the Americanpublic supports stronger PWCregulation and/or outright bans.Addit ionally, PWC operatorsrepresent a very small portion of therecreating public. PWIA reports thatin 2001 there were only about 1million (1,053,560) PWC owned inthe United States. By comparison,

The Political Waters

ACA estimates the number ofcanoes and kayaks owned to be atleast five times that of PWC.

This huge disadvantage inconstituency size is not lost onPWC advocates. They compensatefor this by attaching themselves tothe broader motorboatingcommunity. The most strongly heldposition of PWC advocates is thatPWC should not be singled out ortreated differently than othermotorized vessels, knowing thatseparation from the broader boatingcommunity would be politically fatal.An argument they frequently putforward in an attempt to draw otherboaters to their defense is thatregulation of PWC is only the tip ofthe iceberg, that everyone who hasconcerns about the impacts of PWCuse is conspiring to eliminate allmotorized boating.

The “tip of the iceberg” argument isa flawed one. It ignores the factsthat other types of boating do notshare the disproportionate accidentrate of PWC nor does their operationgenerate the same volume ofcomplaints. Equally bold is thepropensity of PWC advocates,particularly PWIA, to turn on the verymotorboat industry they depend onfor support. On the few occasionswhen PWIA discovers a safetystatistic about another type of boatingthat could potentially deflect criticismof PWC, it is quick to use it.

The political clout of PWC advocatesis very similar to PWC use on thenation’s waters – their numbers arerelatively small, but their impact isdisproportionately high.

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36

jurisdictional obstacles to addressing PWC useat Marine Sanctuaries in Florida.

Environmental Protection Agency

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hasthe authority to regulate PWC engine emissionsand to weigh in on federal agency decisions inaccordance with its responsibilities under theNational Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) andSection 309 of the Clean Air Act.

In 1996 EPA established new air emissionstandards for gasoline marine engines, includingthe engines utilized in PWC. This rulemaking wasin response to Section 213 of the Clean Air Act asamended in 1990. Those new standards require,over a nine-year phase-in period (1998-2006), a75 percent reduction in the sum of hydrocarbon(HC) and oxides of nitrogen (NO

X). While generally

positive, this is not as significant a change as it sounds.

The 75 percent reduction is to be achieved as acorporate-wide emission average. This means thatPWC manufacturers can continue to producesome models with carbureted two-stroke engines,as long as the total mix of vessels producedachieves the desired reduction. Bombardier, forexample, could reduce the number of four-strokePWC models it must produce by selling four-strokejet powered boats.

EPA responded directly to PWC impacts byproviding official comment on agency decisionsregarding the appropriateness of PWC use. In onesuch case, EPA submitted comments to the NPSregarding its proposed ban of PWC use on theMissouri National Recreation River. EPA supportedthe PWC ban, citing “adverse impacts from PWCto water quality, aquatic organisms and theirhabitat, and air quality.” EPA’s comments alsonoted “Personal watercraft use appears to conflictwith the anti-degradation goals of the National Wildand Scenic Rivers Act.”

the agency did not have clear authority to regulateuse of personal watercraft. GAO questioned thevalidity of that opinion. Both the Forest Service andBLM reported that they typically defer regulatoryaction on PWC to the state the unit resides in. Amajority of units in both agencies indicated thatthe number of law enforcement personnel is notadequate to enforce existing regulations.

GAO concluded that both the Forest Service andBLM have not adequately evaluated the impactsof PWC and are neither complying with federalregulations nor fulfilling their responsibility toprotect the lands and waters they manage.

Bureau of Reclamation

The Bureau of Reclamation manages 348reservoirs in the western U.S. ACA found noevidence that the Bureau of Reclamation has takenany action to study or address PWC use on thereservoirs it manages.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)manages 541 reservoirs throughout the nation.The Corps has initiated some efforts to educatePWC operators and try to improve PWC safety.ACA found no evidence that the Corps has takenany action to specifically regulate PWC use onCorps managed reservoirs.

National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration

The National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration (NOAA) has prohibited PWC useat the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary andthe Gulf of Farallones National Marine Sanctuary.Due to an oversight in writing the regulations, theprohibition at Monterey Bay does not include PWCdesigned for multiple riders. NOAA has cited

ACA proposes a regulatory approach to PWC use that it believes will greatly

reduce PWC impacts to other waterway usersand to the environment, while still providingample opportunity for the operation andenjoyment of PWC.

Recognizing the inherent problem of mixing a high-speed activity with a variety other recreational uses,ACA supports regulations that separate high-speedPWC play from other waterway uses. Doing sowill effectively manage safety risks, reduceopportunity for user conflicts and make lawenforcement easier. ACA recommendations alsoreflect the high priority ACA places on protectingpristine waters and sensitive wildlife habitat.

By any objective measure, the current regulatoryenvironment has failed to effectively diminish thevariety of impacts PWC use is having on otherwaterway users. The disproportionate involvementof PWC in collisions has not improved over thepast six years. As a result, the operation of thesecraft continues to pose a clear threat to all waterwayusers. The instances of PWC use diminishing ordenying other waterway users the opportunity toenjoy the nation’s waterways continue to increase,and PWC impacts on the environment and wildlifeare well documented.

This can only change when lawmakers andregulators recognize that PWC are unique craftwith very unique impacts and regulate themaccordingly. Strong and decisive action is neededin order to reduce PWC impacts to a morereasonable level. For many federal, state and localagencies, this will require a significant change intheir current regulatory approach to PWC use.Given the safety threat PWC use currentlypresents to other waterway users, agencies failingto take such action share responsibility for theresulting accidents.

The problems associated with PWC use willbecome even more severe as the number of PWCincrease. Some are projecting that PWC will

eventually comprise 30 percent of all vessels.Given the impacts of a PWC population thatrepresents less than 10 percent of all vessels, theACA believes the time for action is now.

State and Local

Government

Minimum Distance from Shore – PWCoperation be limited to no wake (or 5 mph) speedwithin at least 500 feet of shore on all waterways.

Minimum Distance from Motorized Vessels –PWC operation be limited to no wake (or 5 mph)speed within 200 feet of other motorized vessels.

Distance could be reduced within specific, well-demarcated, high-speed zones.

Minimum Distance from Anchored or Non-Motorized Vessels - PWC operation be limitedto no wake (or 5 mph) speed within 500 feet ofanchored or non-motorized vessels.

High-Speed Use Zones – On all waterwaysdetermined to be congested or to support a widevariety of uses, PWC play be restricted to specificHigh-Speed Use Zones in open water and clearlymarked by buoys.

This provides other waterway users the opportunityto avoid areas where high-speed use and erraticmaneuvering is permitted. The establishment of

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High-Speed Use Zones also improves theefficiency and ease of enforcement by limiting thearea where high-speed oriented activities occur.Currently these high-speed uses are allowedvirtually anywhere, which complicates effectiveenforcement considering that states have limitednumbers of marine law enforcement personnelavailable.

Small Waterway Restrictions – PWC operationbe prohibited on all lakes and reservoirs of lessthan 500 acres and either prohibited or limited tono wake speed on all river or stream segmentsless than 1,000 feet wide.

Sensitive Waters Restrictions – States shouldbe proactive at prohibiting PWC use and otherhigh-speed motorized activities from sensitivewaters where such use would likely endangercritical habitat and wildlife.

Age Restrictions – Prohibit PWC operation byany person less than 16 years of age.

Time Restrictions - PWC operation be prohibitedbetween the hours of sunset and sunrise.

Local Authority – Local jurisdictions that have awater body solely within their boundaries shouldhave the authority to prohibit PWC use byreferendum.

Enforcement/Penalties for Violations –Agencies should strictly enforce all PWCregulations and when necessary distribute finesand penalties for the illegal operation of PWCsufficient to deter irresponsible behavior.

For harassment or reckless/negligent operationthat places others at immediate risk, the offenseshould be considered a felony and the penaltiesshould include mandatory jail time. Additionalfunding or law enforcement is greatly needed. Inareas of known violations, undercover operationsshould be utilized to catch the offenders.

Federal Government

National Park Service

Use Restrictions - PWC use should be prohibitedon all waters within National Park, NationalSeashore, National Lakeshore boundaries and onall designated Wild and Scenic River segments.PWC use in National Recreation Areas should beprohibited unless the unit was specificallyestablished for motorized water recreation. Incases where the unit was specifically establishedfor motorized water recreation, PWC use shouldbe limited to well marked high-speed zones.

United States Fish and WildlifeService

Use Restrictions - PWC use be prohibited on allwaters within National Wildlife Refuges.

FASFRA – Rewrite FASFRA regulations to eliminatethe wording “power boats with common horsepowerratings must be accommodated, and, in addition,the State must make reasonable efforts toaccommodate boats with larger horsepower ratingsif they would not conflict with aquatic resourcesmanagement.” The ACA recommended wordingis “power boats should be accommodated if theydo not present an unacceptable safety hazard toother waterway users and do not conflict with theprotection and management of aquatic resources,including wildlife.”

United States Coast Guard

Safety Standards – Establish mandatorymanufacturing standards for off-throttle steeringcapability.

Such standards should be established usingindependent research of actual accidentscenarios. PWC industry involvement in thedevelopment or recommendation of thesestandards should be limited to an advisory,

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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

nonvoting role. An independent scientific bodycomprised of individuals without past or presentties to the PWC industry should make therecommendation of off-throttle steering standardsto USCG. ACA does not consider the SAE PWCSubcommittee an independent scientific body.Mandatory horsepower limits for PWC should alsobe considered.

Accident Reporting and Statistics – Requiremore information from states regarding the causeof PWC accidents (off-throttle steering difficultyshould be specifically noted).

Establish consistent and precise categories foraccident type and accident cause, including a morespecific breakdown within the careless/recklesscategory. Require all states to report the numberof registered PWC.

PWC Terminology and Definitions – Establishnew terminology to better identify and describe jetthrust powered watercraft.

The phrase “personal watercraft” can describe anysingle person watercraft, be it canoe, kayak,catamaran, rowboat, airboat or some other craft.It is confusing to limit the use of this terminologyas only specific to jet pump powered watercraft.ACA requests that the USCG phase out the useof the term “Personal Watercraft” to refer to aspecific type of jet pump powered watercraft andreplace it with a more descriptive term such as“Personal Water Jet” or “Personal Jet Craft.”USCG should also adopt specific terminology torefer to any jet-powered vessel that confines theoperator and occupants within the hull. ACArecommends terms such as “Jet Boat,” “Jet Craft,”or “Water Jet” to identify these watercraft.

USCG should establish formal definitions for thecraft currently referred to as “personal watercraft”and for other jet powered craft. ACA recommendsthat the definition for craft currently referred to as“personal watercraft” read as follows:

The term ________means any watercraft thatuses an engine powering a water-jet pump, orother form of jet thrust, as its primary source ofpropulsion, and which is designed to be operatedby a person/persons sitting or standing on orastride the craft, rather than within the confines ofthe hull. These craft are typically designedspecifically for high-speed use and performance,and are often capable of carrying multiplepassengers and gear. The term________encompasses but is not limited to suchtrade and brand names as: Sea-Doo, Kawasaki,Polaris, Yamaha, Arctic Cat, Jet Ski, JetBike,Waverunner, Tigershark, Wet Jet, etc.

ACA recommends that the definition for jet-poweredcraft that confine the operator and occupants withinthe hull read as follows:

The term _______ means any watercraft that usesan engine powering a water-jet pump, or other formof jet thrust, as its primary source of propulsion,and which is designed to be operated from withinthe confines of the hull or cockpit. These craft aretypically designed specifically for high-speed useand performance, and are often capable of carryingmultiple passengers and gear. The term________encompasses but is not limited to suchtrade and brand names as: Sea-Doo, Kawasaki,Polaris, Yamaha, Arctic Cat, Jet Ski, JetBike,Waverunner, Tigershark, Wet Jet, etc.

Use Restrictions – Establish a 5-year goal togreatly reduce PWC involvement in on-watercollisions. At the end of the 5-year period, if PWCare still involved in a disproportionate number ofcollisions (10 percent or more greater than thepercentage of registered vessels comprised byPWC), limit PWC use on all federally navigablewaters to areas specifically designated for their use.

USDA Forest Service

Research – Correct the research deficienciescited in GAO Report RCED-00-243 by evaluatingthe impacts of PWC use on visitors and naturalresources.

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Use Restrictions – Prohibit PWC use on allagency managed river segments designatedunder the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, on all lakesof 500 acres or less located within National Forestboundaries, and on any water body where theagency has determined that PWC use is havingdisproportionate and adverse impacts on visitorsand the resource.

Bureau of Land Management

Research – Correct the research deficienciescited in GAO Report RCED-00-243 by evaluatingthe impacts of PWC use on visitors and naturalresources.

Use Restrictions – Prohibit PWC use on allagency managed river segments designatedunder the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, on all lakesof 500 acres or less located within Bureau of LandManagement boundaries, and on any water bodywhere the agency has determined that PWC useis having disproportionate and adverse impactson visitors and the resource.

United States Army Corps of Engineers

Research – Study PWC use and its impacts onvisitors and natural resources, giving specialattention to visitor safety.

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Use Restrictions – Adopt use restrictionsrecommended for state waters.

Bureau of Reclamation

Research – Study PWC use and its impacts onvisitors and natural resources, giving specialattention to visitor safety and water quality.

Use Restrictions – Adopt use restrictionsrecommended for state waters.

Consider additional restrictions if needed to protectdrinking water supplies.

National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration

Use Restrictions – Prohibit PWC use on allwaters within National Marine Sanctuaries.

Environmental Protection Agency

Emissions Standards – Strengthen the airemission standards for gasoline marine enginesadopted in 1996 to completely phase out themanufacture of carbureted two-stroke marineengines by 2006.

Research the emissions of PWC during typicaloperation as compared to emissions from othervessel types and create additional PWC-specificstandards if needed. Such standards could includephasing out the use of direct injection two-strokeengines in PWC and/or requiring the use some typeof emission control device.

Establish water emission limits for gasoline marineengines protective of water quality.

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The information presented in this reportsupports a conclusion that PWC operation has

significant and adverse impacts on others whorecreate on the nation’s waters. These impactsinclude posing a serious safety threat to otherwaterway users, diminishing the enjoyment ofother forms of waterway recreation, and degradingthe quality of recreational waters. While manyactivities can have adverse impacts on other usersor on the environment, the amount and severity ofimpacts attributable to PWC use is bothdisproportionate and unacceptable.

ACA undertook the initial research for this reportin order to determine if the complaints, allegationsand fears that ACA members and others haveexpressed regarding PWC use were valid. Aftercarefully examining all available information, ACAconcludes that the many concerns raisedregarding PWC impacts are supported by factualdata, not just opinion and anecdotal evidence.Findings of fact contained in this report include:

• PWC are involved in 55 percent of all vessel-on-vessel collisions, even though theycomprise less than 10 percent (6.2 percent isbest estimate) of vessels.

• Collisions with vessels, people and otherobjects account for over 70 percent of PWCaccidents.

• PWC are more than 3 times as likely tohave accidents that involve striking a personswimming in the water than other vessel types.

• About 80 percent of PWC accidents areattributed to careless/reckless operation,excessive speed, operator inattention, oroperator inexperience – almost double the ratefor accidents not involving PWC (45 percent).

• PWC industry advertising promotes speed,power and attitude as the reasons to own and

CONCLUSIONS

operate a PWC, and is often at odds with thesafe and responsible operation messagespromoted in rider education programs.

• PWC use is currently allowed on over 98percent of U.S. surface waters.

• The acceleration tendencies and constanthigh-speed operation that characterize PWCuse increases the amount of visible andaudible pollution emitted from these craft, asdoes the tendency of the operators to stay inone place for long periods of time.

• A typical PWC discharges between 50 and 60gallons of unburned gasoline into theenvironment each year.

• PWC use presents a unique and significantthreat to many species of wildlife.

These facts alone reveal the unique anddestructive impacts of PWC use. Add to this thehuge volume of complaints from waterway usersabout incidents of harassment and otherthreatening or disrupting encounters with PWC,and the urgent need for better regulatory controlof PWC operation should be crystal clear. Toooften, however, calls to better regulate PWC useand protect other recreational opportunities arerejected or ignored.

ACA hopes this report will help lawmakers andother decision makers better understand andappreciate the problems and threats PWC useimposes on the vast majority of citizens who seekto enjoy America’s waterways, and on the naturalqualities that make these waters so appealing.The policy recommendations contained herein,although certain to draw protests from PWCadvocates, are common sense solutions that willprotect the safety and enjoyment of others whilecontinuing to allow PWC use on a majority of U.S. waters.

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State Minimum PWC Specific Statewide Waterway Restrictions on PWC OperationAge Speed Limit NOTE: Restrictions listed by some states are not PWC specific

AL 12 NO NONEAK NONE NO NONEAZ 12 NO NONEAR 14 Yes NONECA 16 NO NONE (Local Jurisdictions Can Restrict Use)CO 16 NO NONE (Use Can Be Restricted Through Lake Management Plans)CT 12 NO Restricted to 6 mph speed within 200 ft. of shore, dock, pier, float

or anchored vesselDE 14 Yes Use restricted within 100 ft. of docks, piers and boat ramps; 300

ft. from swimmers & ocean frontFL 14 NO NONE (Local Jurisdictions Can Restrict Use)GA 12 NO Use restricted within 100 ft. of people, structures, shoreline,

moored or anchored vesselsHI 15 NO Use prohibited in Ocean Recreation Management Areas and

restricted within 500 ft. of shore or fringing reefID NONE NO NONE (Local Jurisdictions Can Restrict Use)IL 12 NO NONEIN 15 NO Restricted to idle speed within 200 ft. of shoreIA 12 NO NONEKS 12 Yes NONEKY 12 NO NONELA 13 Yes NONEME 16 NO Banned on approximately 300 lakes classified by the Maine Land

Use Regulation CommissionMD 16 Yes Restricted to 6 mph speed within 100 ft. of shore, vessels, or people

in the waterMA 16 NO Use prohibited within 150 ft. of bathing areas; restricted to 6 mph

within 150 ft. of shoreMI 12 NO NONEMN 13 NO Restricted to no wake speed within 150 ft. of shore, swimmers,

docks and anchored vesselsMS 12 NO Use restricted in designated swimming zonesMO 14 NO NONEMT 12 NO Use restricted to no wake speed within 20 ft. of dock, swimmer,

swimming raft, non-motorized vessel, or anchored vesselNE 14 NO NONENV 12 Yes Use restricted to flat wake within 5 lengths of longest vesselNH 16 Yes Two-person PWC use prohibited on water bodies of 75 acres or lessNJ 16 NO Use of rental PWC confined to marked boundariesNM 13 NO NONENY 10 (w/ed.) Yes Use prohibited within 500 ft. of swimming areas; PWC noise limits

(Local Jurisdictions Can Restrict Use)NC 12 (w/ed) NO Use restricted to no wake speed within 100 ft. of anchored or

moored vessels, shoreline, dock, pier, swim float, marked swimarea, swimmers, surfers, persons engaged in angling, or anymanually propelled vessel (Local Jurisdictions Can Restrict Use)

ND 12 NO NONEOH 16 NO NONEOK 12 NO NONEOR 16 Yes Must maintain 200 ft. distance behind waterskiersPA 12 NO NONE

APPENDIX A

STATE RESTRICTIONS ON PWC OPERATION

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State Minimum PWC Specific Statewide Waterway Restrictions on PWC OperationAge Speed Limit NOTE: Restrictions listed by some states are not PWC specific

RI 16 Yes Use restricted to headway speed within 200 ft. of shore, mooredboats, swimmers and divers

SC NONE NO NONESD 14 Yes Restricted to no wake speed within 150 ft. of swimmers, docks and

non-motorized vesselsTN 12 NO NONETX 13 NO Use restricted to headway speed within 50 ft. of another vessel,

person, stationary platform, or shore.UT 12 (w/ed.) NO NONEVT 16 NO Use prohibited on most water bodies under 300 acresVA 14 (w/ed.) NO Use restricted within 50 ft. of swimmers, boat ramps, docks and

other vesselsWA 14 NO NONE (Local Jurisdictions Can Restrict UseWV 15 NO NONEWI 12 Yes Use restricted within 100 ft. of any other vessel; 200 ft. of any

shorelineWY 16 NO Use restricted within 100 ft. drifting boats or boats underway

Additional Regulations

Most states require PWC operators to wear personal flotation devices and prohibitPWC operation between sunset and sunrise. Many states have specific regulations

regarding wake jumping and the towing of skiers by PWC. Some states haveadopted specific PWC education requirements.

For a complete review of all state boating laws, consult the Reference Guide to StateBoating Laws, published by the National Association of State Boating Law

Administrators (NASBLA).

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APPENDIX B

NATIONAL LEVEL STAKEHOLDER LIST(Limited to National or Regional Organizations With Known Involvement In PWC Issues)

Non-PWC User Groups

American Canoe Association7432 Alban Station Blvd., B-232Springfield, VA 22150703-451-0141www.acanet.org

Izaak Walton League of America707 Conservation LaneGaithersburg, MD 20878301-548-0150800KE-LINE (453-5463)

US Windsurfing326 East Merritt Island CausewaySuite 300Merritt Island, FL 32952321-453-7765www.uswindsurfing.org

Federation of Fly FishersP.O. Box 1595Bozeman, MT 59771406-585-7592www.fedflyfishers.org

Adirondack Mountain Club814 Goggins RoadLake George, NY 12845518-668-4447www.adk.org

Surfrider FoundationP.O. Box 6010San Clemente, CA 92674-6010949-492-8170

Appalachian Mountain Club5 Joy StreetBoston, MA 02108617-523-0636www.outdoors.org

North American Lake Mngmnt SocietyPO Box 54434513 Vernon Blvd., Suite 100Madison, WI 53705-0443608-233-2836www.nalms.org

Natl Parks and Conservation Assn1300 19th Street, NW, Suite 300Washington, DC 20036800-628-7275www.npca.org

Environmental Organizations

Bluewater Network311 California, Suite 510San Francisco, CA 94104 415-544-0790www.bluewaternetwork.org

Natural Trails and Waters Coalitionc/o The Wilderness Society1615 M Street, NWWashington, DC 20036202-833-2300

Friends of the Earth1025 Vermont Ave., NWWashington, DC 20005 202-783-7400www.foe.org

Sierra Club85 Second St., Second FloorSan Francisco, CA 94105-3441415-977-5500

Wilderness Society1615 M St, NWWashington, DC 20036800-843-9453

Victims Advocacy Organizations

Coalition of Parents and Familiesfor Personal Watercraft SafetyP.O. Box 940553Plano, TX 75094214-906-8575www.pwcwatch.org

PWC User Groups

American Watercraft Assn (AWA)27142 BurbankFoothill Ranch, CA 92610 949-598 5860www.watercraftassociation.com

Blue Ribbon CoalitionPO Box 5449Pocatello, ID 83202208-524-3062www.sharetrails.com

PWC Industry Trade Associations

Personal Watercraft IndustryAssociation (PWIA)1819 L Street NW, Suite 700Washington, DC 20036202-721-1621

National Marine ManufacturersAssociation (NMMA)200 E. Randolph Dr. Suite 5100Chicago, IL. 60601 U.S.A.312-946-6200

American Recreation Coalition (ARC)1225 New York Avenue NW, Ste 450Washington, DC 20005202-682-9530www.funoutdoors.com

PWC Manufacturers

Bombardier Recreational Products(Sea-Doo)www.seadoo.com

Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A.(JET SKI)www.kawasaki.com

Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A.(WaveRunner)www.yamaha-motor.com

Polaris Industries Inc.(Genesis, Virage, Freedom, Octane)www.polarisindustries.com

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.(AquaTrax)www.hondamotorcycle.com/models

Quasi-Governmental BoatingSafety Organizations

National Safe Boating CouncilP.O. Box 1058Delaware, OH 43015740-666-3009www.safeboatingcouncil.org

National Association of StateBoating Law Administrators1500 Leestown Road, Ste 330Lexington KY 40511859.225.9487

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United States Coast Guard (USCG), Boating Accident Report Database (BARD) 1996-2001

United States Coast Guard (USCG), Boating Statistics: 1996 (COMDTPUB P16754.10), 1997 (COMDTPUB P16754.11),1998 (COMDTPUB P16754.12), 1999 (COMDTPUB P16754.13), 2000 (COMDTPUB P16754.14), 2001 (COMDTPUBP16754.15)

California Department of Boating and Waterways, 1999 California Boating Safety Report, 2000 California Boating Safety Report

Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission, Boating Accident Statistics 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Personal Watercraft Safety, Safety Study, May 1998 (NTSB/SS-98/01 PB98-917002)

Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife, Boating Accident Investigation Reportsfor 2001

Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife, website (www.nevadasafeboating.org/watercraft.html)

Jones, CS (2000). Epidemiology of personal watercraft-related injury on Arkansas waterways, 1994-1997: identifyingpriorities for prevention. Accident Analysis and Prevention. 32:373-6.

Colavecchio, Bill, and Will Moss. “Off Throttle Steering of Jet Pump Propelled Craft” Underwriters Laboratories, July, 2001.

Simner, Ron, Personal Communication, March 7, 2002.

Branche, Christine M., Judith M. Conn, and Joseph L. Annest. (1997). Personal Watercraft-Related Injuries: A GrowingPublic Health Concern. Journal of the American Medical Association. 278(8):663-5.

2002 Showroom, Sea-Doo (Bombardier, Inc.) Website, May 17, 2002 (http:// www.seadoo.com).

2002 Aqua Trax F-12X Homepage, Honda Motorcycle (American Honda Motor Company, Inc.) Website, June 3, 2002(www.hondamotorcycle.com).

National Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA), Boating Statistics 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 (www.nmma.org).

Schmidt, Bruce (USCG), Personal Communications, May 2001 – April 2002.

Personal Watercraft Background, Personal Watercraft Industry Association (PWIA) Website, May 27, 2002 (www.pwia.org/background.html).

Rockwell, Paul, “Why Jet Skis Kill,” In Motion Magazine, August, 2001

Coalition of Parents and Families for Personal Watercraft Safety, Website (www.pwcwatch.org)

Baard, Erik, “Collision Course,” Village Voice, September 11, 2001.

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) Report (RCED-00-243), September 2000.

Heiden Associates, Inc., “1997 Boating Exposure Survey Results”, October 1999.

JSI Research & Training Institute, Inc., “National Recreational Boating Survey” (1998), 2000.

Jet Sports: June, 1999, pp. 12-17; August, 1999, pp. 20-21; September, 1999, pp. 5;

September/October, 2000, pp. 12-13; January/February, 2001, pp. 10-11; March/April, 2001, pp. 14-15.

PWC Magazine: January/February, 1999, pp. 2-3; May/June, 1999, ad insert.

Traffic Safety Facts 2000 (DOT HS 809 323), US Department of Transportation National Highway Safety Administration,National Center for Statistics and Analysis, Website, April 2002 (http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2000/2000alcfacts.pdf).

Stats and Resources, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Website, April 2002 (http://www.madd.org/).

Smith, Gary. “A sailboat on a balmy spring day — then personal jet-craft and death” San Diego Union Tribune, Letters to theEditor, June 3, 2000.

Brooks, Ron. “Holiday Madness” Saltwater Fishing Guide at About.com, June 5, 2001 (http://saltfishing.about.com).

Frazier, S. “Losing my faith in PWC riders” rec.sport.jetski ( Internet Newsgroup), April 15, 2002.

Wagner, Kenneth J. “Of Hammocks and Horsepower: The Noise Issue at Lakes”, June, 1994, pp. 24-28.

REFERENCES

45

Komanoff, Charles, and Howard Shaw. Drowning In Noise, Noise Costs of Jet Skis In America Noise Pollution Clearinghouse,April 2000.

Flannery, Jim, and Gary Beckett. “Jacobs: No more sleeping with the enemy,” Trade Only, December, 1997, pp. 1,14.

Van Zandt, Franklin K., “Boundaries of the United States and the Several States,” Geological Survey Professional Paper909, United States Government Printing Office, 1976.

van der Leeden, Frits, Fred L. Troise, and David Keith Todd. The Water Encyclopedia, Second Edition, Lewis Publishers, 1990.

Maine State Bureau of Parks and Lands, 2001 Safe Boating Guide, pp. 9-15.

Landers, Rich. “Off-roaders tear through the Colville” Sportsman Review, June 10, 2001.

Mele, Andre. Polluting for Pleasure, Norton, New York, 1993.

Jetski Position Paper, Bluewater Network Website, April 4, 2002 (www.bluewaternetwork.org/jetskipos.shtml).

California Air Resources Board, “Fact Sheet: New regulations for gasoline marine engines,” February 1999.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Air Pollution Control; Gasoline Spark-Ignition Marine Engines; 40 CFR Parts 89, 90,91, Federal Register, October 4, 1996.

United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region 8, Campbell, Carol L. Letter to Paul Hedren, Superintendent,Missouri National Recreation River, September 29, 2000.

National Park Service (NPS), “Water Quality Concerns Related to Personal Watercraft Usage,” 1999.

Raymond, Lyle Jr. Letter to John Miller, President of New York State Federation of Lake Associations, July 5, 1997.

National Research Council, “Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects,” National Academy Press, 2002.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, Motorized Watercraft Environmental Assessment, June 1997.

League to Save Lake Tahoe, “Jet Ski Ban Proves Effective,” Keep Tahoe Blue, Winter, 2000 (www.keeptahoeblue.com/newsletters/NLWnt00.htm).

Williams, Ted “The Jet Set,” Audubon, July-August, 1998, pp. 34-39

Nowacek, Stephanie M., Randall S. Wells and Andrew R. Solow. “Short-Term Effects of Boat Traffic on Bottlenose Dolphins,Tursiops Truncatus, In Sarasota Bay, Florida,” Marine Mammal Science, 17(4):673-688 (October 2001).

Osborne, Richard, Curator of Science Services & Resident Scientist, Whale Museum, Friday Harbor, WA. “Testimony andExhibits Submitted to Board of County Commissioners Regarding Restrictions on Use of Jet Skis in San Juan County,”Superior Court of Washington for Whatcom County, Jan. 15, 1996. Study conducted with Dr. Johnson of Woods HoleOceanographic Institute

Vogel, Harry. “Impacts of Boats and Personal Watercraft on Loons and Other Waterbirds in New Hampshire” LoonPreservation Committee of the Audubon Society of New Hampshire.

Williams, Joanne, and Bob Bowlus. “Personal Watercraft Threaten Loons on Michigan Lakes,” Michigan Loon PreservationAssociation, Website.

Milius, Susan. “Oh, not those jet-ski things again!” Science News, Aug. 15, 1998, Vol. 154, No. 7, p.107.

Burks, Margaret, Executive Director, Marine Mammal Center. Letter to San Francisco, CA. Supervisor Gavin Newsom. March17, 1998; Jim Doyle. “Anger Over Plan to Limit Jet Ski Use,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 19, 1996

Rogers, J.A., and H.T. Smith. “Set-Back Distances to Protect Nest Bird Colonies from Human Disturbances in Florida,”Conservation Biology, February, 1995. 9:89-99;

Burger, Joanna. Effects of Motorboats and Personal Watercraft on Flight Behavior Over a Colony of Common Terns, NelsonBiological Laboratories, Rutgers University, 1998.

National Association of State Boating Law Administrators (NASBLA), Reference Guide To State Boating Laws, Sixth Edition,pp. 37-40.

National Park Service (NPS), Personal Watercraft Use Within the NPS System, Final Rule; 36 CFR Parts 1, 3 and 13,Federal Register, March 21, 2000.

REFERENCES

46

The American Canoe Association and the author wish to thank the followingindividuals for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this report.

Nita BolesEugene BuchananVirgil Chambers

Alison Snow JonesChad KirtlandKatherine Mull

Amy RigbyPaul RockwellBruce Schmidt

Ron SimnerSean Smith

Tanya WikstromLeslie Woodard

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Making the World a Better Place to Paddle