The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 333

8 Interrogations and contemporary assessments of the loss of HMAS SYDNEY

8.1 Contemporary assessments of the circumstances of the engagement between HMAS SYDNEY and HSK KORMORAN, the course of the battle and the ultimate loss of SYDNEY could not be made until survivors from KORMORAN were interviewed and their accounts of those events examined.

8.2 On 26 November 1941 five experienced Naval officers were the main interrogators.

• LCDR Rycroft RAN was despatched to Carnarvon in Western Australia to interrogate prisoners who had been brought there by the merchant vessel TROCAS.1

• CMDR Ramage RAN, an intelligence officer, questioned some prisoners in Fremantle before the arrival of CMDR Dechaineux and RADM Crace.2

• CMDR Dechaineux (with the Royal Dutch Navy’s CMDR Salm, who acted as a German interpreter) arrived in Fremantle on 28 November and interrogated prisoners who were sent there.3

• RADM Crace, who was then Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron, also took part in interrogations in Western Australia.4

• CAPT HB Farncomb RAN interrogated survivors rescued by the passenger ship AQUITANIA when they arrived in Sydney.5

Each of these officers formed a view about the accuracy of what they learnt from the interrogations. At various times the Naval Board issued progress reports in the form of signals to the Admiralty and others or in the form of reports to Navy Office for transmission to the Governor-General, the Prime Minister and the Minister for the Navy. It is not known who the authors of those progress reports were, but the reports

1 NAA.026.0436; NAA.026.0346 2 NAA.023.0165 3 NAA.026.0305 4 NAA.026.0251;NAA.026.0248 5 AWM.008.0019; AWM.008.0026 

334 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

were based on the information gained from the interrogations. Finally, in January 1942 Mr FB Eldridge6 examined all the interrogation reports and prepared a comprehensive report on the loss of SYDNEY.

Considerable weight should be given to the views expressed by the Naval officers who first inquired into this maritime loss: they had the advantage of seeing the survivors shortly after the events in question and were in a position to weigh up what they were told.

8.3 It is important to understand that the prisoners were segregated and interrogated by different officers. It has been alleged that the German survivors colluded in order to tell a common story. Those making this allegation contend that—knowing there were no Australian survivors to contradict their account—the German survivors all agreed to tell the same story of the engagement because they would then suffer no adverse consequences. The ‘adverse consequences’ they feared, so the argument runs, were that CAPT Detmers, and possibly others, might have been guilty of and should be tried for war crimes for two postulated reasons. The first postulated reason was that KORMORAN surrendered under a white flag to SYDNEY or was flying a neutral Norwegian flag, which led SYDNEY to approach close and parallel to KORMORAN, which then opened fire whilst still flying the white or neutral flag. Second, it was postulated that KORMORAN’s crew or an attendant Japanese submarine’s crew machine-gunned SYDNEY survivors in the water after the warship had been sunk.

These theories are greatly weakened if it is the case that the prisoners were separated before any collaboration was possible but nevertheless gave similar accounts of the encounter with SYDNEY. Such a circumstance would lend veracity to the account generally given by the survivors because it is highly unlikely that a number of different and isolated groups of prisoners could fabricate the same account.

8.4 Among the proponents of the German collusion theory are the following:

• Mr Michael Montgomery7

• LCDR Ean MacDonald8

• Mr John Samuels9

6 Mr FB Eldridge was the Senior Master on the teaching staff at the Royal Australian Naval College. 7 PUB.002.0001 at 0021 8 SUBM.004.0003_R at 0011_R 9 PUB.001.0001 at 0082 to 0083 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 335

• Mr John Montagu10

• Mr James Eagles.11

In a submission to the Inquiry Mr Montgomery asked that I give consideration to:

… referring the case to the International Court at The Hague for judgement on the allegations set out above that

A) Captain Detmers contravened the International Rules of Warfare by opening fire on Sydney under a false flag of surrender on the afternoon of November 19th 1941

B) That one or more persons of the Japanese Imperial Navy, of presently unknown identity, similarly murdered in cold blood the defenceless sailor from Sydney whose body was discovered on Christmas Island in October 2006, [sic] in the early hours of November 20th 1941 when Japan was outside a formal State of War with Australia.12

At sea

8.5 Before abandoning ship, CAPT Detmers gave no instruction to his officers or men on what to say about the battle if they were taken prisoner. This was established by the following evidence:

• LEUT Messerschmidt:

We had never made preparations to tell the men how to answer interrogations. I suppose that we the officers are at fault for that, but we had more pressing things to occupy us after the engine fire took hold of KORMORAN and our fire-fighting equipment was useless. The idea of interrogations had never really crossed my mind.13

• LS Hildenbrand:

Q: Before you got on that lifeboat, were the men of Kormoran ever gathered together, marshalled on deck, and did either Capt Detmers or von Gosseln address the men as a group?

A: No, no, no, there was no such thing.14

10 PINQ.SUBS.001.0057 at 0058 11 PINQ.SUBS.002.0082 at 0107 12 SUBM.006.0079_R at 0105_R 13 WIT.011.0183_R at 0220_R 14 TRAN.006.0042_R at 0089_R. See also Engelmann interview: ROI.001.0002_R at 0025_R; Rönchen: TRAN.008.0001_R at 0032_R. 

336 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• LS Schneider:

… they ask us about our occupation, about our address, and our duties. And I also was together in the … life boat together with Mr von Gösseln, and before we arrived on land, we asked Mr von Gösseln, ‘What are we allowed to say once these interrogations will take place?’ And he told us … you’re allowed to say your name, your rank, and your address, apart from that you shouldn’t say anything. But then, of course, during the interrogations, they had much more questions than just these three things.15

• AB König:

Q: Before you got into the lifeboat, were the men on KORMORAN addressed by either Capt Detmers or von Gösseln?

A: No, not as far as I know. I don’t think they have given any instructions. Only the order was given to abandon ship, that was all … no instructions.16

And later:

Q: At any stage while you were in the boat did you receive any instructions about how to answer interrogations?

A: No.17

• LS Schulte:

Q: During this period when KORMORAN was being abandoned, did Capt Detmers or von Gösseln or any of the other officers give any of the crew members instructions on how to answer interrogations that might take place in the future?

A: Well, no,18

• LS Wegfahrt:

Q: Before you got into the lifeboat, did von Gösseln or any of the other officers say what you should say if you’re given an interrogation?

A: No, no such thing was said. The only thing I can remember as an instruction was to stay together, because there were these four other lifeboats and a number of rubber boats and we tried to stay together, but it didn’t work, even shot our signal

15 ROI.001.0157_R at 0161_R. LEUT von Gösseln’s instruction accorded with international law: it was not an instruction to collude in telling a fabricated account of the battle. 16 TRAN.008.0001_R at 0026_R 17 TRAN.008.0001_R at 0028_R 18 TRAN.010.0052_R at 0091_R 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 337

rockets, but it didn’t work. In the morning, the next morning, we didn’t … we had become separated.

[German]: All that was said was to head East and 150 nautical miles to shore. That was all we got and then we got going.19

• CPO Karl, who was rescued by AQUITANIA:

Q: Just one final question: when you were picked up by the AQUITANIA—the men of KORMORAN who were picked up—did you talk about how you were going to respond to interrogations, what you may or may not say?

A: No, no, no, there was no reason to hide anything. Everybody just told what he was able to tell. There was no reason for hiding anything.20

• LS Kümmerer, who was in the lifeboat commanded by CAPT Detmers:

Q: Now, before you got in the lifeboat, was there ever an occasion where either von Gösseln or the captain got the crew together and addressed the crew?

A: No. No, there was no such thing, because the only thing we had on our minds at this point of time was how to save our lives, how to get rescued.

Q: And what about, Herr Kümmerer, when you were in the lifeboat—did Capt Detmers give you any instructions about how to answer questions if you were ever interrogated by the Allies?

A: No, I cannot remember anything like this.21

8.6 I am satisfied that no instruction about what account they should give of the engagement with SYDNEY was issued by CAPT Detmers, or any other officer, to the crew of KORMORAN before they abandoned ship.

8.7 Various groups of German survivors were rescued and questioned at different times:

• On 24 November at about 1614H TROCAS rescued 25 Germans.22 On 26 November an armed guard was put aboard the vessel. Some of the German prisoners were interviewed whilst at sea by

19 TRAN.011.0001_R at 0025_R 20 TRAN.006.0001_R at 0033_R 

21 TRAN.007.0001_R at 0032_R to 0033_R 22 NAA.074.0197 

338 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

Paymaster LEUT AC Baume, who prepared a report dated 28 November 1941.23

• On 25 November two lifeboats were found ashore 57 and 70 miles north of Geraldton. That evening, WGCDR Lightfoot and FLTLT Cook interrogated LS Linke, an English-speaking survivor.24 On 26 November, the 103 Germans were transported to Carnarvon, where some were interrogated by LCDR Rycroft.25

• On 26 November merchant vessel CENTAUR took in tow two lifeboats containing 62 Germans, including CAPT Detmers. CENTAUR proceeded to Carnarvon, arriving at 1500H26 on 27 November.27 The prisoners on CENTAUR were examined by LCDR Rycroft.

• On 26 November at 1950H SS KOOLINDA picked up a lifeboat containing 31 Germans at 24°07’S 112°46’E.28 KOOLINDA proceeded to Carnarvon, arriving on 27 November. It is not known if these prisoners were interrogated by LCDR Rycroft before being transferred to Fremantle. They were segregated when sent to the internment camp at Harvey29, south of Fremantle, and interrogated by CMDR Ramage.

• On 27 November a lifeboat was spotted from the air, and HMAS YANDRA was directed to it. The lifeboat contained 72 men. It was taken in tow at 1200H and arrived at Carnarvon 0145H on 28 November. Whilst at sea, some survivors were questioned by the commanding officer of YANDRA, who sent two reports of his interrogations.30

• On 23 November AQUITANIA picked up 26 German survivors but did not advise the Naval Board of that fact until 27 November. CAPT Farncomb interrogated those survivors after their arrival in Sydney on 28 November.31

It can thus be seen that accounts were obtained from various groups of survivors before they had an opportunity to discuss the circumstances

23 BATT.006.0061 24 NAA.018.0133 25 NAA.096.0051 26 Western Australian time is expressed with the letter ‘H’—for example, 2115H—as distinct from local (eastern Australian) time, which is expressed with the letter ‘K’. 27 SPC.001.0001 at 0003 to 0005; NAA.096.0055 at 0063 28 NAA.096.0089 29 No. 11 internment camp was located in Harvey, 80 kilometres south of Fremantle. 30 WAM.030.0089; NAA.096.0047 31 NAA.026.0031 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 339

of the engagement with members of other groups rescued by other ships or who came ashore north of Carnarvon.

8.8 In addition to the interrogations referred to, on 27 November the Naval Board directed that the Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron, RADM Crace, proceed by air to Fremantle to make a ‘complete investigation and report regarding HMAS SYDNEY’.32 It also ordered that he be assisted by CMDR Dechaineux, then Director of Operations in Navy Office, and CMDR Salm of the Royal Netherlands Navy, who was to interpret.33 CMDRs Dechaineux and Salm flew west on 27 November, arriving on the afternoon of 28 November34; RADM Crace arrived on 30 November.35

As well as interrogating the TROCAS prisoners, CMDR Dechaineux was coordinating the management of the other groups of prisoners, as illustrated by this message from the District Naval Officer Western Australia, CAPT Farquhar-Smith, to CMDR Dechaineux on the evening of 29 November, by which time the commander was at Harvey:

If you wish “CENTAUR” party to be interrogated before going to Harvey it will be necessary to do this on board in Gage Roads in this case it will be necessary for you to be in Fremantle by 0800H. Note- “CENTAUR” party will have been interrogated all or in part by Lt. Cdr Rycroft.

“YANDRA” party has not been interrogated at all but must leave ship immediately on arrival. I know of no suitable place under army control for interrogation here excepting detention quarters. recommend interrogation be carried out at Harvey.36

CMDR Dechaineux responded from Harvey on 29 November:

Consider interrogation of “CENTAUR” and “YANDRA” party should take place at Harvey. I intend to return from Perth to Harvey P.M. tomorrow Sunday. Purpose of my return A.M. tomorrow Sunday is to interrogate Captain and send brief report to Navy Office.37

32 SPC.006.0083 33 NAA.074.0230 34 NAA.096.0084 35 NAA.026.0237; NAA.026.0248 36 NAA.096.0077 37 NAA.096.0076 

340 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

8.9 On 29 November the Naval Board signalled the District Naval Officer Western Australia:

Captain and 1st Lieut. of raider are to be separated and not repetition not questioned pending the arrival of R.A.C.A.S.38

8.10 By 30 November the prisoners in Western Australia were dispersed as follows:

• The TROCAS prisoners were in the detention quarters of Fremantle prison.

• The 31 KOOLINDA prisoners were segregated at Harvey.

• The 130 prisoners who had come ashore north of Carnarvon and had been brought from Carnarvon on CENTAUR were segregated at Harvey.

• About 72 prisoners aboard YANDRA were still en route to Fremantle, due the following morning.

• All of the officers, including the captain and first lieutenant, were segregated at Swanbourne Barracks.39

The independent accounts

The Linke account

8.11 The first indication that SYDNEY might have been engaged in a battle with a German vessel came from TROCAS, which signalled at 1500H on 24 November that she had picked up ‘25 German Naval men’.40 The Naval Board considered these survivors might be ‘connected’ with SYDNEY, which was then overdue.41

8.12 At 0958H on 25 November the Naval Board signalled TROCAS:

Signal following details

(1) Date, time and duration of action

(2) Condition of cruiser after action42

38 NAA.040.0087 39 NAA.040.0087; NAA.010.0268 at 0269; WAM.035.0260 at 0262 40 SPC.006.0021 41 SPC.007.0006 42 NAA.040.0424 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 341

TROCAS responded at 0015H on 26 November: ‘German vessel sunk by gunfire 19 November action duration short vessel took fire immediately condition of cruiser not known’.43

8.13 The first report of what might have occurred is in a copy of a message from the District Naval Officer Western Australia to the Naval Board, dated 26 November at 0100H. The report was said to have been given by phone. It reads:

From Carnarvon. Survivors number about 110. Mostly 70 miles north of Carnarvon. Germans are from a raider commenced an engagement with a British ship “Perth” class which began 19th November 120 miles S.W. of Fremantle. At midnight raider blew up. Germans rowed towards lights of vessel which was in flames. Before they arrived British ship disappeared believed sunk. They turned and ran with the wind to land. Police are in charge of prisoners. One prisoner arriving midnight. Will report immediately. May they be transferred by vessel arriving Carnarvon 26th November.44

The information in the message must have been communicated by the Commanding Officer of 14 Squadron, WGCDR Lightfoot, to the District Naval Officer before the message was sent.

8.14 That day WGCDR Lightfoot, who had flown to Carnarvon with elements of his squadron in order to conduct search operations45, coordinated the picking up of the survivors found north of Carnarvon.46 On the evening of 25 November, he and a FLTLT Cook had travelled by vehicle from Carnarvon to the sheep station where the Germans had congregated.47 The intention was to identify an English-speaking German and interrogate him; they duly interrogated wireless operator Linke. At 0250H the next morning, 26 November, WGCDR Lightfoot reported the results of this interrogation of Linke by telephone to Headquarters, Western Command48, who passed the information on to the Central War Room. WGCDR Lightfoot also passed his message to the District Naval Officer49, who sent a signal to the Naval Board in the early hours (0335H) of 26 November:

Secret

From reporting officer Carnarvon summary report interrogation W/T operator on raider. Name of raider “KOMORAN” [sic] guns 6 inch and anti aircraft new ship crew 300 Captain Detmer in Indian Ocean 6

43 NAA.026.0400 44 SPC.006.0033 45 NAA.018.0210 46 NAA.018.0133; SPC.001.0001 at 0003 47 NAA.018.0188 at 0191 48 NAA.018.0133 49 NAA.096.0078 

342 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

months sank STRAITICOS EMBIRICOS? September. Met cruiser “Perth” Class escorting convoy 5 to 7 ships position 026° South 111° East 1730H/19. Cruiser closed thinking “KOMORAN” is convoy latter opened fire range ½? mile cruiser used flag not W/T. Gunfire ended 1900H/19 “KOMORAN” burning amidships and blown up by crew. Cruiser vanished rapidly believed sunk was burning amidships and aft.50

LS Linke was one of the W/T operators in KORMORAN.

8.15 The first report by the Naval Board to the Admiralty, at 0309H on 26 November, was based on the conversation with LS Linke. The signal read:

SECRET

N.B.s 1634Z/24 Following information is based on conversation with one English speaking German survivor. Report received at Navy Office by long distance telephone.

(1) “SYDNEY” encountered armed raider 1900H on 19th November. Exact position not yet established.

(2) In action which followed raider caught fire and abandoned by ship’s company.

(3) Raider blew up at about midnight.

(4) Survivors pulled towards cruiser which was on fire but before they closed “SYDNEY” she disappeared believed sunk.

(5) Survivors then made towards land. No information concerning torpedo fire or description of raider yet obtained but survivors will be questioned on Wednesday 26th.51

8.16 At 0354H on 26 November there was a further signal providing information gained in Carnarvon:

SECRET

From Carnarvon: Member of the “people” who landed in boat brought into harbour and interrogated. Interviewed one member of the crew W.T. Operator named Lincke [sic]. The ship “KOMORAN” 6000 tons armament 8 inch guns and A.A. guns number unspecified. Armed merchantman newly built number of crew about 300. Captain of ship Detlers [sic]. Been in Indian Ocean about six months. First ship they sank was “STOMATOS EMBIRICOS” [sic] about two months ago. A “Perth” class cruiser 7000 tons. Wednesday 19th November about 1730 hours position 26°S 111°E. Enemy vessel sighted a convoy of five to

50 NAA.026.0382  51 NAA.070.0008 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 343

seven ships escorted by this cruiser. The cruiser evidently thought that the enemy vessel belonged to the convoy and it approached within half a mile. “KOMORAN” opened fire at 1740 hours. “KOMORAN” first salvo silenced cruiser’s eight inch guns. Gunfire continued till 1900 hours. Cruiser did not use W.T. but signalled with flags. Raider was burning fiercely amidships and at midnight was blown up and the crew escaped in boats. Cruiser vanished over horizon burning amidships and astern and it is believed to have sunk. End of message.52

The reference to the enemy vessel sighting ‘a convoy of five to seven ships escorted by this cruiser’ appears to be a reference to the sighting by the lookout in KORMORAN, who initially thought the superstructure on SYDNEY was that of a number of vessels. LS Linke, who provided the information in the messages quoted, was not in the same lifeboat as CAPT Detmers and had no opportunity to discuss any account of the battle with him. CAPT Detmers was picked up by CENTAUR, which, at the time of the interview between WGCDR Lightfoot and LS Linke and the sending of the message just quoted, had not reached Carnarvon. The position given by LS Linke—26°S 111°E—is the approximate position of the engagement, as now known from the wreck site. This first account has the action between 1730H and 1900H, which is the approximate time of the battle, and has the two ships in close proximity of ‘half mile’ to each other when KORMORAN opened fire. The signals apparently set forth LS Linke’s view as to the reason why SYDNEY approached so close to KORMORAN—namely, that KORMORAN was part of a convoy SYDNEY was escorting, a view that could not be correct. This first account also has KORMORAN’s first salvo doing considerable damage to SYDNEY, although it is said to be to its guns, not the bridge. LS Linke maintained SYDNEY had signalled with flags.

It is noteworthy that in the record of the interrogation of LS Linke at Harvey on 8 December 1941 there is no account of the battle or mention of the manner in which signals were exchanged. On LS Linke’s first account, SYDNEY disappeared over the horizon burning amidships and astern, and his assessment was that she had sunk.

8.17 By a message timed at 2325H on 25 November but sent on 26 November the District Naval Officer Western Australia signalled the Navy Board the results of a message received by telephone from Carnarvon:

Message by direct phone from Carnarvon.

52 NAA.070.0236 

344 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

Survivors that were located not yet arrived Carnarvon numbering approximately 120 they state that an engagement between them and a raider and first class cruiser made Wednesday last at 1900 H. Their ship finally blew up at midnight. Engagement took place approximately 120 miles S.W. of ?Fremantle. They had three life boats and two rubber boats. When last seen first class cruiser was on fire. Have given instructions that one person who can speak English is to be brought to Carnarvon as soon as possible arriving at 1230 or 1A.M. for further questioning. Main body arrive 6 A.M. Will call again about 1 A.M.

Suggest that this person be brought to Pearce Aerodrome by aircraft.53

8.18 On the basis of this information, the Naval Board signalled the Commander-in-Chief Netherlands East Indies Naval Forces, the Commander-in-Chief China and the Commander-in-Chief East Indies at 0816H on 26 November:

SYDNEY was in action with German raider KOMORAN reputed 8 inch guns in position 026 degrees south. 111 degrees east at 1730 H/19. KOMORAN sank. Survivors of KOMORAN state SYDNEY last seen burning amidships and aft.54

All this quoted information came from LS Linke. Of critical importance in his account is his statement that the two ships came within half a mile of each other.

The beached survivors’ account

8.19 At 2330H on 26 November 1941 the District Naval Officer Western Australia signalled the Naval Board:

Evidence prisoners examined at Carnarvon indicates

(i) H.M.A.S. Sydney replied to raider fire with gunfire and torpedoes. 2 prisoners state no repetition no torpedoes from raider.

(ii) Position of engagement put by navigating officer at 027 South 111 East

…

(v) Attacked at 0830Z 19th

…

Captain of raider in one of two boats now approaching coast.55

53 SPC.006.0034 54 NAA.026.0378 55 NAA.026.0344 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 345

This information must have come from other prisoners who had come ashore north of Carnarvon and been delivered to Carnarvon by truck. The ‘navigating officer’ was LCDR H Meyer.56

8.20 Also in the District Naval Officer’s transmission to the Naval Board was the following information:

Position of raft picked up by “TROCAS” and life boat reported by R.A.A.F. do not give any guide to position of conflict but position given by navigator of raider when interrogated, namely 027° South 111° East, considered to be approximately correct.57

8.21 Thirty minutes later, at midnight, the District Naval Officer again signalled the Naval Board:

My 1530 26(?) Sydney torpedo reported not to have hit raider. Raider did not fire torpedo. Men are mostly young men with some old men in mercantile marine with knowledge of Australian ports. Dirk Harog report not found to refer to 19 November when U C O was in that position.58

8.22 At 1740H on 27 November, Airintel Western Australia signalled Airintel Melbourne: ‘Interrogation of second engineer of raider indicates vessel probably G repeat George number 41 “STEIERMARK”’.59

The TROCAS survivors’ account

8.23 Paymaster LEUT Baume led the armed guard put on board TROCAS at sea at 0730H on 26 November.60 Between that time and 0800H on 27 November, when TROCAS berthed at Fremantle, LEUT Baume questioned some of the 25 prisoners on board, two of whom were seriously ill. From this, he prepared three documents:

• a report, dated 28 November 1941, to the District Naval Officer Western Australia61

• a summary of information provided by the chief, second and third engineers on TROCAS and of information gained from WO Lensch, an engineer in KORMORAN62

56 NAA.096.0028 57 NAA.026.0346 58 NAA.026.0343 59 NAA.026.0299 60 BATT.006.0061 61 BATT.006.0061 62 NAA.096.0031 

346 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• notes for CMDR Dechaineux—‘re Survivors ex TROCAS’.63

8.24 The report is mainly based on conversations LEUT Baume had with a prisoner, LS HH Böhm, who spoke English, and WO F Noll, for whom LS Böhm translated. LS Böhm gave LEUT Baume an incomplete account of KORMORAN’s voyage and declined to provide information about the vessel’s captain. The report states:

He said that he could not give details of the action on the 19th November as he was in the engineroom. He said that it was a very quick action and he did not know what had happened to the opposing ship. At that stage I received no further information.64

Later, whilst LEUT Baume was speaking to senior engine room WO Noll, who had very limited English, LS Böhm joined the conversation. The report notes that, either on his own account or translating WO Noll, LS Böhm said:

… the least [sic] they had seen of the cruiser was at night or dusk when she was burning just forrard of amidships. The Komoran’s personnel. or those of them who had not been killed in the action, were then in the boats or rafts and their ship by that time had blown up.

…

The prisoners seemed to agree that their ship fired three torpedoes, one of which hit the cruiser about amidships and put her controls out of action. Some of the prisoners said that the cruiser fired only one salvo which set fire to the German ship …65

The report thus contained no detailed account of the engagement.

8.25 The second document recorded information three of TROCAS’ engineers obtained from WO Lensch, who was semi-conscious when brought aboard TROCAS. For that reason, the author thought he ‘possibly was speaking the truth, since most of the information was gathered whilst he was still semi-conscious’.66

The following account appears:

The Cruiser was first sighted 1600H on the 19th November, challenged their ship, to which they replied, and then they were asked for the secret reply. They were challenged half hour after Cruiser was sighted.

LENSCH stated that when they could not reply, they were ordered to stop. He was informed by someone else in the boat in which he left his

63 NAA.096.0085 64 BATT.006.0061 at 0062 65 BATT.006.0061 at 0062 66 NAA.096.0031 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 347

ship that the Cruiser had, lowered a boat, presumably to investigate their ship.

When LENSCH was interrogated later regarding this point, he stated that he did not remember saying anything about a boat being lowered. The action lasted for 50 minutes, during which the Raider fired 600 rounds and three torpedoes, one of which hit the Cruiser almost under the bridge. When last seen the Cruiser was steaming away on fire. The Raider was built as the STEIERMARK in 1938, but when taken over by the German Navy was called “KORMORAN”. Her armament comprised six torpedo tubes, six 5.9 inch guns, Her engines were four 9-cylinder Krupp Diesel Electric Drive, with a horse power of 14,400 developing a speed of 18 knots. (LENSCH in the second interview, stated that this type of engine was to be used in all vessels that were to be built in the future for the German Navy.) … One of the shells from cruiser hit and set on fire the tank of lubricating oil in the engine room. The burning oil put out of action the electrical controls, and prevented their using even their pumps … They left the raider at approximately 1900 - 2000 o’clock cruiser appeared to be still moving slowly. At 2100 steady glow of fire on cruiser was replaced by what he described as a white flash but he heard no sound of explosion.67

LEUT Baume’s notes for CMDR Dechaineux added nothing regarding the encounter.

8.26 On arrival in Fremantle at 0800H on 27 November, the prisoners were interrogated by CMDR Ramage. Those interrogated were:

• LS HH Böhm68

• WO F Noll69

• AB WPW Kriesel70

• LS EE Falk71

• LS A Ruf72

• LS G Schmagold73

• AB A Rolf74

67 NAA.096.0031 68 NAA.012.0376_BOHM 69 NAA.012.0377_NOLL 70 NAA.012.0378_KRIESEL 71 NAA.012.0378_FALK 72 NAA.012.0380_RUF 73 NAA.012.0380_SCHMAGOLD 74 NAA.012.0380_ROLF 

348 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• LS WJ Breuer75

• LS F Baltruschat76

• AB K König77

• LS K Schulte78

• LS JFW Möllendorf79

• LS A Luft80

• WO RJW Lensch.81

8.27 On 27 November 1941, having interviewed these German sailors, CMDR Ramage wrote a document marked ‘Secret: Raider Kormoran’. It read:

Summary of information obtained from “KORMORAN” survivors ex “TROCAS.”

(A) Description of action : “KORMORAN” steering North sighted on starboard bow ship steering South about 1600H/19th. Raider altered course to westward bringing cruiser on to starboard quarter. Cruiser altered course westward and closed rapidly challenging with daylight lamp. Raider made no reply but opened fire when cruiser was in comparatively short range. Estimated range varies from about one to five or six miles, one survivor stating he could see men on deck of cruiser. First shots from raider hit cruiser’s bridge and started fire, cruiser altered course to port, survivor’s stating that it appeared she intended to ram, passed close round stern of raider and proceeded on parallel course gradually drawing ahead, on port side of raider. Cruiser was now heavily on fire in bridge and midship sections. Raider also badly damaged and on fire in engine room area. Hit in engine room put Diesel Electric Control out of action, rendering all electrical equipment, including fire-fighting, inoperative. Action commenced about 1730H, lasting about an hour. Raider abandoned ship about 1900H for reason that fire could not be put out and it was certain that fire would reach ammunition stowage. Survivors state that Captain and Officers were on board when they abandoned ship about 1900H. At this time cruiser was seen to be still heavily on fire, and shortly afterwards disappeared. No violent explosions on cruiser were seen or heard by raider. They believe three torpedoes were fired by

75 NAA.012.0381_BREUER 76 NAA.012.0381_BALTRUSCHAT 77 NAA.012.0381_KONIG 78 NAA.012.0381_SCHULTE 79 NAA.012.0381_MOLLENDORF 80 NAA.012.0381_LUFT 81 NAA.012.0382_LENSCH 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 349

raider, one of which is thought to have hit. Raider blew up about midnight.

(B) Armament of Raider :

6 .. 15 centimetre guns. 4 .. 2 centimetre A.A. guns. Machine guns unmounted.

2 .. Above-water and 1 submerged torpedo tubes on each side.

One seaplane ARADA [sic] type stated to have been damaged and not flown for three months. Possibly more carried.

150 to 200 Mines were carried, but stated that none had been laid.

(C) Complement : About 400

(D) Activities : Left Gotenhafen, Danzig, December, 1940. Proceeded northabout into Atlantic and Indian Ocean via Good Hope. Ships sunk stated as ANTONIOS (May have had a second name), AFRIC STAR, AGNITA, CRAFTSMAN, BRITISH UNION, MAREEBA, VELEBIT, EURYLOCHUS, S.G. EMBIRICOS, NIKOLROS.

Survivors stated they had not sighted any land since leaving Norwegian coast. Two supply ships met with. Prisoners transferred to these, and also to CANADOLITE, which ship was despatched with a Prize Crew.

Supply ships stated to have been NORDMARK in Atlantic, and ALSTERUFER in Indian Ocean.

No prisoners on board at time of action. Four Chinese probably ex “AGNITA” became part complement of Raider as ‘dhobi boys.’

Raider stated to have been the “STEIERMARK” prior to conversion.

(E) Generally considered that with few exceptions survivors spoke the truth.82

8.28 The essential features CMDR Ramage distilled from his interrogations were as follows:

• SYDNEY was sighted about 1600H on 19 November.

• SYDNEY challenged by signal lamp but received no reply.

• The engagement began at about 1730H and lasted about an hour.

82 NAA.023.0165 

350 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• KORMORAN opened fire when SYDNEY was ‘in comparatively short range’, estimated at between 1 and 5 miles.

• Men could be seen on the deck of SYDNEY.

• KORMORAN’s first salvo hit SYDNEY’s bridge and started a fire in the bridge and midship sections.

• KORMORAN suffered a hit to her engine room, starting a fire and putting all equipment out of action.

• SYDNEY turned to port as though intending to ram KORMORAN but passed astern then proceeded on a parallel course on the port side of KORMORAN.

• The prisoners believed three torpedoes were fired by KORMORAN, one of them hitting SYDNEY.

• KORMORAN abandoned ship about 1900H, the captain and officers remaining on board, presumably when the boat containing survivors left the ship.

• SYDNEY was ‘heavily’ on fire and shortly afterwards disappeared.

• KORMORAN blew up about midnight.

8.29 Notably, CMDR Ramage’s assessment of the prisoners’ accounts was that ‘with few exceptions, survivors spoke the truth’.

8.30 There are in the interrogation notes a number of matters that do not appear in CMDR Ramage’s summary, no doubt because they were not then thought important:

• WO Noll’s interrogation notes record, ‘The Raider, as far as this man knew, was operating by herself and not in conjunction with any other Raider’.83

• AB Kriesel’s interrogation notes record, ‘The Raider used the German war flag only and then only in action’.84

• LS Ruf’s interrogation notes record, ‘During the action with the Cruiser he could see the men on the cruiser’s aircraft shot to pieces before it could take off’.85

83 NAA.012.0377_NOLL at 0378_NOLL 84 NAA.012.0378_KRIESEL 85 NAA.012.0380_RUF 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 351

• LS Schulte’s interrogation notes record, ‘The Cruiser approached from aft, then steamed parallel to the Raider on her (the Raider’s) starboard side’.86

• LS Böhm was in the engine room at the time of engagement, and his interrogation notes record:

The telephone reports came as follows:-

1. Cruiser is hit;

2. Cruiser is hit by torpedo;

3. Cruiser cannot move her main turrets.87

This evidence makes clear the sequence of damage to SYDNEY.

8.31 CMDR Ramage’s report was regarded as sufficiently reliable to be included in the following signal from the Secretary, Department of the Navy, to the Secretary of the Naval Board that was to be forwarded to the Governor-General, the Prime Minister, the Minister for the Navy and Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary to the War Cabinet, on 27 November 1941:

MOST SECRET

Following for His Excellency the Governor-General, the Prime Minister, the Minister for the Navy and Mr. Shedden.

Summary of information obtained from prisoners survivors ex “Trocas”.

(A). Description of Action:

“Kormorant”, steering north, sighted from starboard bow ship steering south at about 1600H 19th. Raider altered course to the westward, bringing cruiser on to starboard quarter. Cruiser altered course to the westward, closed rapidly, challenging with daylight lamp. Raider made no reply but opened fire when cruiser was within comparatively short range. Estimated range varies from about 1 to 5 or 6 miles. One survivor stated he could see men on deck of cruiser. First shot from raider hit cruiser’s bridge and started fire. Cruiser altered course to port. Survivors stated that it appeared that he intended to ram. Passed close round stern of raider and proceeded on parallel course, gradually drawing ahead on port side of the raider. Cruiser was now heavily on fire in bridge and midships section. Raider also badly damaged and on fire in engine room area. Hit in engine room, put electrical controls out of action. Literally all electrical equipment, including fire fighting,

86 NAA.012.0381_SCHULTE 87 NAA.012.0376_BOHM 

352 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

inoperative. Action commenced at about 1730 and lasted for about one hour.

Raider abandoned ship at about 1900H, her reason that fire could not be put out, and it was certain that fire would reach ammunition stowage. Survivors stated Captain and officers were on board when they abandoned ship at about 1900. At this time cruiser was seen still heavily on fire and shortly afterwards disappeared. No violent explosion was seen or heard. They believe she was torpedoed. Three torpedoes were fired by the raider, one of which thought to have hit. Raider blew up about midnight.

(B) Armament of raider:

6 – 15-centimetre guns;

4 – 2-centimetre A/A guns;

Machine guns not used.

2 – above water and 1 submarine torpedo tube besides.

One aeroplane of roda stated to have been damaged and not flown for three months, and possibly more were carried.

150/200 mines were carried, but stated that none had been laid.

(C) Complement:

About 400.

(D) Activity:

Left Dodhamausen near Danzig December, 1940. Proceeded north about to Atlantic and Indian Ocean via Cape of Good Hope. Ships sunk stated as –

“Antonios” “Africa Star” “Agnita” “Rafstan” “British Union” “Mareeba” “Belevit” “Embiricos” “Nikoklis”

Survivors stated they had not sighted any land since leaving Norwegian Coast. Two supply ships met with. Prisoners transferred to these, as also to “Radolite” which ship was despatched with a prize crew.

(E) Generally considered that, with few exceptions, survivors spoke the truth.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 353

Captain’s name Dettmer (Commander of destroyer prior to taking command of raider).

Message ends.88

This report represented the first attempt to describe in a comprehensive way the encounter between KORMORAN and SYDNEY and the loss of SYDNEY. The details were obtained from the survivors on TROCAS, who, it is to be remembered, were isolated from CAPT Detmers, who was on board CENTAUR. For the first time, it was learnt that SYDNEY signalled by lamp. Earlier information that the encounter occurred at close range was confirmed. Evidence was obtained that the ships were so close men could be seen on the deck of the cruiser. Importantly, information was obtained for the first time that KORMORAN’s first salvo had hit SYDNEY’s bridge and started a fire. The first account of SYDNEY turning to port and passing astern of KORMORAN was given, as was the description of SYDNEY being heavily on fire in her bridge and amidships. The timing and duration of the battle were approximately confirmed. Further information was obtained, for the first time, that KORMORAN had fired torpedoes, said to be three, one of which was thought to have hit SYDNEY. The information gained, including the assessment of the general veracity of the account obtained from the survivors on TROCAS, was forwarded to the Admiralty, Commander-in-Chief China, Commander-in-Chief East Indies, the Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron and the New Zealand Naval Board, as well as the Governor-General and the Prime Minister.89

8.32 It is to be further noted that the summary of information obtained from the survivors on TROCAS did not include a location for the battle. The signal to the Secretary, Department of the Navy, from the Naval Board was timed at 2310H on 27 November, but that would appear to be local (eastern Australian) time, ‘K’, which is, as noted earlier, two hours ahead of Western Australian time, ‘H’. The signal to the Naval Board giving CAPT Detmers’ report was forwarded at 2115H, which is 2315K. Accordingly, it was not received by the Naval Board until shortly after the Board had forwarded the summary of information obtained from the survivors on TROCAS. That explains why the report does not contain the location of the action as advised by CAPT Detmers.90 Thus by late on the evening of 27 November, three accounts of the battle had been obtained independently from groups of survivors: the first from LS Linke at Carnarvon, the second from the survivors rescued by TROCAS and the third from CAPT Detmers, who had been rescued by CENTAUR.

88 NAA.019.0357 89 SPC.006.0076 90 SPC.006.0071; NAA.026.0162; NAA.019.0357 

354 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

The YANDRA survivors’ account

8.33 On the morning of 27 November another lifeboat was spotted by an aircraft. YANDRA was directed to the lifeboat91, which contained 72 men. The lifeboat was secured at 1200H and taken to Carnarvon, arriving at 0145H on 28 November.92

8.34 The commanding officer of YANDRA, LEUT JA Taplin RAN, wrote two reports on the rescue and interrogation of survivors from KORMORAN. Both were forwarded to the District Naval Officer Western Australia. The first, dated 28 November, was compiled jointly with Surgeon LEUT Robertson.93 The second report, dated 30 November, although longer and more detailed, is not materially different from the first.94

8.35 In the lifeboat recovered by YANDRA were LEUT von Gösseln and SBLT W Bunjes. Among the ratings was the English-speaking CPO Jürgensen. LEUT von Gösseln was unwilling to give any information to LEUT Taplin, but SBLT Bunjes was willing. So too was laundryman Shu Ah Fah, who had been captured from the EURYLOCHUS in January 1941. LEUT Taplin’s 30 November report provides the following account:

NARRATIVE OF ACTION WITH BRITISH CRUISER OF “PERTH” CLASS, AS COMPILED FROM STORY OF SUB-LIEUTENANT WILHELM BUNJES.

Whilst in approximately latitude 26 degrees South and about 120 miles from the Coast of Western Australia, steaming about N.N.E. at about 14 knots, the masthead lookout reported a ship on the starboard bow steering about South. This was at first believed to be a sailing vessel, but very soon after identified as a Cruiser. Raider 41 immediately turned to 240 degrees and went to full speed, believing then that she had not been sighted by the Cruiser, but at that moment the Cruiser also turned to a similar course. The first sighting was at 1600 0/19 and at 1714 the Cruiser was just abaft the starboard beam distant about 1200 metres. When challened [sic] by the Cruiser, Raider 41 gave false name of Dutch Vessel “Straat Malacca”. After interchange of signals, which were fumbled in order to gain time, Raider 41 was given “proceed” and almost immediately afterwards was ordered to hoist her secret signal. This they were unable to do and the Raider Captain ordered “open fire”. During this time the two ships were proceeding on parallel courses about 1200 metres apart and all the Cruiser’s guns

91 WAM.030.0089. LEUT Taplin’s report is also in the file of the DNOWA, ‘HMAS SYDNEY‐KORMORAN action’, which is at NAA.096.0047, but the first page is missing from that file. 92 SPC.001.0001 at 0005 to 0006 and NAA.096.0055 at 0064 93 NAA.096.0025 94 NAA.096.0040; NAA.096.0042; NAA.096.0043; NAA.096.0045; NAA.096.0046; NAA.096.0047 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 355

and port torpedo tubes were trained on the Raider. At “Action” the German flag was broken out and all guns which would bear were fired, the Riader [sic] firing first, her first salvo striking the Cruiser at about “B” Turret and bridge structure and about “Y” Turret. Seconds after the Cruiser fired but missed “over”. All Raider’s salvos appeared to hit while Cruiser took considerable time to find gun hitting range. Soon after engaging, both ships turned to Port, the Raider slightly and the Cruiser hard over passing astern of the Raider about 1 mile distant. This manouvre [sic] appeared to the Raider crew to be an attempt to ram. The action continued on opening course, the Raider firing four gun salvos, and also when Cruiser was on her port quarter, fired a torpedo which struck the Cruiser forward causing a large fire and reducing her speed considerably. The Raider was first hit by the Cruiser at about the 4th or 5th salvo, which struck her engine room, completely wrecking it and causing uncontrollable fire. Torpedos were seen to be fired by the Cruiser but these did not hit the Raider.

The engagement terminated at about 1840, the Cruiser ceasing first, lying stopped directly astern about 10,000 metres distant and badly on fire. The Raider was then also burning fiercely and “abandon ship” was ordered. The Raider’s seaboats were either burned or otherwise damaged by gunfire and could not be used, and other boats which were stowed in No. 3 hold could not be lifted out because all power had failed, so that only the boats stowed on deck were used, these being badly damaged when pushed over the side into the water.

It appears that later on, one boat was lifted out and one small boat lowered also. Whilst abandoning the ship the glow from the Cruiser was clearly visible but disappeared about midnight. No explosion was heard.

NARRATIVE as compiled from story as told by Shu Ah Fah.

This conforms in general to that told by Sub-Lieut. Bunjes with regard to all events from the first sighting at 1600 to the time of opening fire, but differs considerably from that time onward. Shu Ah Fah states that the Raider fired three torpedos in quick succession when the Cruiser was on the Raider’s starboard quarter. These hit the Cruiser forward at about the same time as she was struck by the Raiders first salvo and a terrific explosion followed. It was then that the Cruiser turned to Port with only the forward turret firing. The Raider was maintaining a very rapid and accurate fire. He states that no boats or rafts left the cruiser and that none were seen at any later time.”95

8.36 This report, which records an account of the engagement prepared whilst the prisoners were at sea on YANDRA and without any contact with LS Linke, CAPT Detmers and others rescued by CENTAUR, TROCAS and KOOLINDA, was based on the account of SBLT Bunjes. It contains the following elements:

95 NAA.096.0047 at 0048 to 0049 

356 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• KORMORAN sighted SYDNEY at about 1600H on 19 November.

• SYDNEY was initially thought to be a sailing vessel but was soon identified as a cruiser.

• Then travelling north-north-east, KORMORAN turned to 240° and increased speed away from SYDNEY.

• SYDNEY turned to adopt a similar course.

• At 1714H (‘1740’ in the report of 28 November) SYDNEY was abaft the starboard beam about 1200 metres from KORMORAN.

• SYDNEY challenged KORMORAN.

• KORMORAN falsely identified herself as STRAAT MALAKKA.

• KORMORAN ‘fumbled’ signals to gain time.

• SYDNEY signalled KORMORAN to ‘proceed’ but immediately thereafter ordered KORMORAN to ‘hoist her secret signal’.

• KORMORAN was unable to respond, presumably because she did not know STRAAT MALAKKA’s secret signal.

• CAPT Detmers ordered ‘open fire’ (‘Action’ in the 28 November report).

• At that time SYDNEY and KORMORAN were proceeding on parallel courses about 1,200 metres apart.

• SYDNEY had all her guns and port torpedo tubes trained on KORMORAN.

• When ‘action’ or ‘open fire’ was ordered, the German flag was broken out.

• All KORMORAN’s guns that would bear were fired.

• KORMORAN fired first.

• KORMORAN’s first salvo hit SYDNEY ‘about “B” turret, the bridge, and “Y” turret’.

• SYDNEY then fired but missed, ‘passing over’ with her shots.

• KORMORAN hit SYDNEY with several salvos before SYDNEY found ‘hitting range’ after a ‘considerable time’.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 357

• SYDNEY’s fourth or fifth salvo hit KORMORAN’s engine room, causing serious damage and uncontrollable fires.

• KORMORAN turned slightly to port; SYDNEY turned hard to port and passed astern of KORMORAN by about 1 mile. This appeared to SBLT Bunjes to be an attempt to ram KORMORAN.

• KORMORAN continued to fire four-gun salvos at SYDNEY.

• When SYDNEY was on KORMORAN’s port quarter, KORMORAN fired a torpedo that struck forward, causing a large fire.

• The engagement ceased about 1840H, SYDNEY ceasing fire first and lying about 10,000 metres astern of KORMORAN, both ships being badly on fire.

• KORMORAN abandoned ship. The glow from SYDNEY was clearly visible at that time.

• The glow from SYDNEY disappeared about midnight.

8.37 This is the first account that KORMORAN fumbled her signals, identified herself as STRAAT MALAKKA, and when ordered to hoist her secret call sign was unable to do so. Notably, the account did not come from CAPT Detmers and was given without any input from him. It is also the only account suggesting that KORMORAN had fired her port side torpedo, striking SYDNEY after SYDNEY had passed astern of her. Of crucial importance, this account, which is based on the account of SBLT Bunjes, has SYDNEY on a course parallel to that of KORMORAN, the two being about 1,200 metres apart when the action began.

8.38 In contrast, Shu Ah Fah’s account has SYDNEY hit by three torpedoes fired from KORMORAN’s starboard tubes. Photographs of the wreckage of SYDNEY and analysis by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation show this was not the case.

The CENTAUR survivors’ account

8.39 At about 2230H on 26 November CENTAUR took in tow two lifeboats containing 62 Germans, including CAPT Detmers, and proceeded to Carnarvon at 4 knots, arriving at 1500H on 27 November.96 YANDRA was ordered to close CENTAUR and take charge. According to the notes of the District Naval Officer Western Australia, YANDRA was

96 SPC.001.0001 at 0003 to 0004; NAA.096.0055 at 0063 

358 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

given instructions for the ‘segregation of survivors’.97 What this meant in practice is not clear.

8.40 After CENTAUR’s arrival at Carnarvon at 1500H on 27 November LCDR Rycroft interrogated CAPT Detmers. LCDR Rycroft sent an account of CAPT Detmers by signal to the District Naval Officer at 2115H on 27 November:

Raider Captain can confirm previous report with addition [a]ction took place latitude 26 32’ longitude 111 deg. H.M.A.S. SYDNEY 2 torpedoes missed. Raider torpedo hit forward and salvo amidships. H.M.A.S. SYDNEY badly on fire Action began 19th at 1600 broke off 1830. Raider struck in Engine room and on fire. H.M.A.S. SYDNEY last seen turning behind smoke screen bearing 153 degrees 5 miles from raider and steering South 5 knots. Raider had 25 killed remainder of 400 in boats and rafts experienced bad weather. Endeavouring obtain further information.98

The notes of the District Naval Officer Western Australia record at 2159H ‘S.O.(I) reports Raider Captain puts position of action at 20°38’S 111°East. HMAS “SYDNEY” last seen on fire steering south five notes’.99

8.41 On 30 November LCDR Rycroft prepared a report entitled ‘Interrogation of survivors ex Kormoran’.100 He referred to the ‘first account of the action’ given by LS Linke and recited the substance of that account. He then set out notes of his interrogation of LCDR H Meyer and Dr S Habben, certain extracts said to be translations of entries in diaries kept by Dr List and CPO W Grün, and notes on the interrogation of CAPT Detmers. It is not clear where or when he interrogated these people.

The notes of the interrogation of LCDR Meyer disclose little about the engagement:

… he gave position of action as 26 degrees 30 minutes South 111 degrees East. Time about 1700. The raider attack “was a surprise”. Raider was hit in engine room and was on fire; Cruiser also on fire and steaming away. He saw the cruiser a good distance away still on fire but moving; raider blew up about midnight. They left the ship in boats that were lying on deck and which had to be thrown overboard.101

97 NAA.096.0055 at 0061 98 NAA.096.0079 99 NAA.096.0055 at 0063 100 NAA.096.0028 101 NAA.096.0028 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 359

The notes of the interrogation of Dr Habben disclose nothing. LCDR Rycroft also wrote:

Machinist and Seamen all questioned thro’ interpreter.

These men and all others had obviously been carefully instructed by their Officers to give incorrect answers to all questions regardless of their nature.102

It is not known who the ‘machinist and seamen’ were or the basis for LCDR Rycroft’s comment about officers’ instructions. His notes on interrogation of CAPT Detmers read as follows:

Capt. Dettmers stated that he sighted Cruiser of Perth Class at 1600. Action began 26 degrees 32 minutes South 111 East. We signalled by flags and the cruiser came close. He had bad luck, fired two torpedos and missed, we had good luck our torpedo hit him forrard. Raiders first salvo hit cruiser amidships and he burst into flames. Cruiser hit Raider in the engine room and smashed up the machinery and engines. Also caused a fire which could not be controlled on account of the water supply being destroyed. Cruiser last seen turning behind smoke screen bearing 150 degrees from Raider, steering South, speed about 5 knots. After sending away all boats I destroyed my ship because I could not save her. I lost 25 men killed in the action.

Capt. Dettmers story agreed with other statements and appeared to confirm various details. When asked whether he had carried any seaplanes he replied no. He would not talk about the ships sunk.

When cruiser was closing with K. Capt. Dettmer is reported as having turned to the Chief Officer and asked him “Shall we scuttle or fight”, to which Chief Officer replied “We can only die once Captain”.103

8.42 The elements emerging from CAPT Detmers’ account are as follows:

• SYDNEY was sighted by KORMORAN at about 1600H.

• KORMORAN signalled by flags.

• SYDNEY came ‘close’.

• KORMORAN’s torpedo hit SYDNEY ‘forrard’.

• SYDNEY’s torpedoes missed.

• KORMORAN’s first salvo hit SYDNEY amidships and caused fires.

102 NAA.096.0028 at 0029 103 NAA.096.0028 at 0029 

360 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• SYDNEY hit KORMORAN in her engine room, ‘smashing’ engines and machinery and causing uncontrollable fires.

• SYDNEY was last seen travelling at 5 knots, steering south.

• KORMORAN was blown up after ‘all boats away’.

Although not as detailed an account as that derived by CMDR Ramage from the survivors on TROCAS, CAPT Detmers’ account is consistent with that account and with the account LCDR Rycroft had previously obtained from LS Linke.

8.43 It was apparently LCDR Rycroft’s assessment that CAPT Detmers’ account confirmed those of LS Linke and others he had interrogated.

The KOOLINDA survivors’ account

8.44 At 1950H on 26 November KOOLINDA picked up a lifeboat containing 31 men at 24°07’S 112°46’E.104 At 2235H KOOLINDA turned and proceeded to Carnarvon. The master does not say when he arrived in Carnarvon, but the distance was about 80 nautical miles, which, at 10 knots, would have been covered in eight hours. KOOLINDA would therefore have arrived in Carnarvon early on the morning of 27 November.

8.45 The 31 men rescued were ‘all young, and had no Officer in charge’.105 The Master of KOOLINDA, CAPT J Airey, reported on 29 November:

The following is a statement made by one of the survivors:- On Wednesday evening 19th November 1941 my ship “Cormoran” was challenged by a British cruiser. The cruiser opened fire first and we retaliated. After a fight lasting about 1½ hours my ship caught fire. We took to the life-boats at 7.20 p.m. approx; and both ships were then seen to be blazing. About midnight both ships sank. We looked round for survivors off both ships but none could be found.106

The men’s description of both SYDNEY and KORMORAN was roughly accurate.

8.46 The brief description of the engagement differs from earlier accounts in that it asserts that SYDNEY fired first.

104 NAA.096.0089 105 NAA.096.0089 106 NAA.096.0089 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 361

The AQUITANIA survivors’ account

8.47 A fifth independent account, derived from survivors rescued by AQUITANIA, was obtained by CAPT Farncomb after AQUITANIA arrived in Sydney on 28 November. Some of the prisoners had been questioned on board the vessel on 23 November107, but those accounts provided no relevant information. CAPT Farncomb questioned the prisoners twice, once on 28 November and again on 1 December. It appears 19 survivors were interrogated before the first report of 29 November.108 Material in the second report was said to be based on the account of LS Treber, who was deemed ‘fairly intelligent’ and ‘was at one of the 15 c.m. guns during the action and had a clear view of what occurred’.109

8.48 CAPT Farncomb’s report of 29 November gave the following account of the engagement:

ACTION WITH H.M.A.S. “SYDNEY”

3. The action with H.M.A.S. “SYDNEY” commenced about 1605 H on 19th November. H.M.A.S. “SYDNEY” approached signalling with a daylight lamp and when the range had come down to about 3000 yards the raider opened fire. She appears to have hit “SYDNEY” near the bridge with the first salvo. One or two of the ratings even estimated the range, shortly after the action had started, at about 1500 yards. It was stated that the raider obtained at least one hit with a torpedo under “SYDNEY”s forecastle and after that she was firing at least three salvoes to “SYDNEY’s” one. After about the raider’s 15th salvo, “SYDNEY” ceased fire, but opened fire again shortly afterwards, apparently firing one or two salvoes. The action with “SYDNEY” lasted about one hour.

4. When last seen “SYDNEY” was badly on fire amidships having sustained several hits. She appeared to be down by the bows and two of the survivors stated that they could see flames just abaft her funnels.

5. The raider was badly hit in the engine room and at about 1900 H her magazines were flooded. The ship was scuttled and subsequently abandoned.

6. None of the prisoners knew what had happened to the “SYDNEY. While they were in their boats, about 1930, they stated that they could still see “SYDNEY” burning some miles away, but owing to being in the boats they did not have a good view. One rating said that

107 AWM.008.0022 at 0023 to 0025; AWM.008.0019 at 0020 108 AWM.008.0022; AWM.008.0019 at 0019 to 0021 109 AWM.008.0026 

362 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

“SYDNEY” was last seen at 2100, but this information is open to doubt.110

8.49 In his second report, of 1 December, the account of the engagement was as follows:

3. “SYDNEY” was sighted hull down about 1600 (H?) on 19th November, 1941 and shortly afterwards identified as a cruiser. No. 41’s hands were at once sent to Action Stations. The initial course of the raider was not stated, but the Quartermaster on watch agreed that the action was fought on a Westerly course. “SYDNEY” approached on No. 41 starboard quarter with main armament trained (on this point Treber was definite) and signalling continuously by lamp. No. 41 made no reply. On “SYDNEY’S” closing to a range estimated by several men as about 1000 - 1500 metres, the latter the maximum, No. 41, about 1700, opened fire, hoisting the German ensign at the same time. “SYDNEY” opened fire about 15 seconds later, possibly after No. 41’s second salvo, although there was some doubt on this latter point.

4. “SYDNEY” was hit on the bridge by the first salvo, the bridge was wrecked and a fire started; her foremast was shot down shortly afterwards and one of the first rounds hit the port torpedo tubes and started a bad fire which destroyed the aircraft. Two prisoners stated that faces of men near the tubes and aircraft were distinguishable, that tubes and catapult were trained outboard and that the aircraft’s propellor [sic] was revolving; she was apparently about to fly off.

5. No. 41 fired three torpedoes (according to one report) of which one hit forward. At the same time “SYDNEY” was being frequently hit near the waterline and about the upper deck. No. 41 fired in all about 100 rounds. After receiving considerable damage, “SYDNEY” began to drop astern, firing at a slow rate and burning forward and aft; flames also coming from funnels.

6. By this time No. 41 had been hit five or six times. One hit in an oil fuel tank started a bad fire which could not be extinguished. There was another serious hit in the engine room which eventually put the main engines out of action, causing the ship to lose way and then stop. Her foremost gun was also hit. She had meanwhile forged ahead of “SYDNEY” and after receiving the hit in the Engine Room turned slowly to port.

7. Both ships ceased firing about this time (approximately 1720), both being on fire, with “SYDNEY” badly down by the bows, the focsle-head being only about six feet out of water. It was stated that occasionally her propellors could be seen coming out of the swell.

8. After about 20 minutes pause, “SYDNEY” fired another round which missed. No. 41 replied with her port battery and claimed a hit. (I

110 AWM.008.0019 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 363

believe that Treber’s relative hitting claims are boastful exaggeration). Firing then ceased (about 1745). “SYDNEY” was not seen to fire torpedoes.

9. At about 1815-1830, finding the fire out of control and her main engines disabled, No. 41 abandoned ship into boats and rafts and scuttled. She blew up, though apparently not with a particularly severe explosion, about three hours later. Her crew abandoned ship on her port (or weather) aide [sic] as flames and smoke prevented starboard boats from being used. “SYDNEY” could now be seen about four miles away burning fiercely and “glowing” in the gathering darkness. No rating claimed to have seen her sink, but most men stated that she was last seen about 2100. Times have been difficult to determine, particularly after No. 41 abandoned ship, when prisoners were mainly guessing.

10. No boast [sic] were seen to leave “SYDNEY”, but it was thought that they would have been destroyed. One boat was seen to be badly hit early in the action.

11. No. 41 had several killed and wounded, but estimates of the number varied owing to none of these survivors being able to compare notes with the rest of the Ship’s Company.

12. The boats and rafts became separated during the night and these survivors do not know how many of the Ship’s Company got away.

13. An attempt has been made at a sketch of the movements of the two ships during the action … from rough sketches supplied by Treber and another rating. It was stated that the weather was fairly good, with a moderate swell. Wind was probably S.E. or E.S.E.111

Figure 8.1 shows the sketch based on the sketches LS Treber made.112

8.50 The elements emerging from this account are as follows:

• KORMORAN sighted SYDNEY at about 1600H on 19 November.

• KORMORAN turned to the west, with SYDNEY approaching her on that course.

• SYDNEY approached KORMORAN on her starboard quarter.

• SYDNEY had her ‘main armament’ trained.

• SYDNEY signalled KORMORAN continuously by lamp.

• KORMORAN made no reply.

111 AWM.008.0026 112 AWM.008.0032 

364 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

 Figure 8.1  The battle action, based on sketches drawn by LS Treber113 

113 NAA.026.0035 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 365

• SYDNEY closed on KORMORAN to a range of between 1,000 and 1,500 metres.

• At about 1700H KORMORAN opened fire.

• KORMORAN hoisted the German ensign at the time of opening fire.

• SYDNEY opened fire about 15 seconds later, possibly after KORMORAN’s second salvo.

• KORMORAN’s first salvo hit SYDNEY’s bridge, wrecking it and starting a fire.

• Early in the battle SYDNEY’s foremast was shot down, her port torpedo tubes were hit, and a fire that destroyed her aircraft started.

• When that occurred the port tubes were pointing outboard and the aircraft’s propeller was turning, apparently preparatory to flying off.

• KORMORAN fired possibly three torpedoes, one of which hit.

• At that time SYDNEY was being frequently hit near the waterline and about the upper deck.

• KORMORAN fired about 100 rounds.

• After suffering ‘considerable damage’ SYDNEY dropped astern burning fore and aft, with flames coming from the funnels. She was firing slowly.

• KORMORAN was hit five or six times, one hit causing a serious fire and another incapacitating the engine room. The foremost gun was also hit.

• KORMORAN turned slowly to port.

• When both ships ceased firing, both were on fire and SYDNEY was down by the bows.

• About 20 minutes later SYDNEY again opened fire but missed. KORMORAN replied with her port battery, claiming a hit. Firing ceased at about 1745H.

• SYDNEY ‘was not seen’ to fire torpedoes.

• KORMORAN abandoned ship about 1830H.

366 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• SYDNEY was at that time about 4 miles away, burning fiercely and ‘glowing’ in the dark.

• It was thought SYDNEY’s boats were destroyed in the action.

8.51 This account makes no mention of KORMORAN identifying herself as STRAAT MALAKKA, but that would not be something LS Treber, on a forward gun, would be aware of. Nor does the account mention SYDNEY turning hard to port and passing astern of KORMORAN, although—crucially—it does have the vessels on parallel course about 1,200 metres apart when KORMORAN opened fire, with SYDNEY sustaining severe damage to the bridge and attendant fires early in the encounter.

The independent accounts: a summary

8.52 There are thus the accounts obtained from separated groups of German survivors in circumstances where there was no possibility of collusion between them. There were six groups:

• survivors who landed on the beach north of Carnarvon

• survivors rescued by TROCAS

• survivors rescued by CENTAUR

• survivors rescued by YANDRA

• survivors rescued by KOOLINDA

• survivors rescued by AQUITANIA.

8.53 As one would expect, there are differences in the accounts. Some survivors were more thoroughly interrogated than survivors in other groups. The account ‘one of the survivors’ gave to CAPT Airey on KOOLINDA is so brief as not to be a useful description of the engagement. The remaining five independent accounts, however, have in common a number of critical elements, apart from approximate agreement on the time and duration of the engagement:

• SYDNEY approached KORMORAN on a course resulting in her being positioned parallel and abeam to KORMORAN and at a close distance of between 1,000 and 1,500 metres.

• Very early in the engagement SYDNEY suffered the destruction of her bridge, with accompanying severe fires.

• SYDNEY was struck by a torpedo from KORMORAN, in consequence suffering severe damage.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 367

• The glow from SYDNEY’s fires disappeared some hours after the engagement.

These elements are crucial to establishing the reason for the loss of SYDNEY and her crew. There is no possibility that six groups who travelled in six separate lifeboats until rescued and had no intermediate contact could have fabricated the elements in the accounts they each gave of the engagement. That those circumstances occurred is indisputable.

It is necessary to consider the detail of evidence on the circumstances in which SYDNEY came to be in the position she was in when fire was opened and why she suffered such damage. But once it is established—and the accounts do establish it—that she was in a close and parallel position to KORMORAN and not at action stations, her fate was sealed.

RADM Crace’s interrogations

8.54 The Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron, RADM Crace, had gone to Perth to interrogate KORMORAN survivors. It is not clear which survivors he spoke to. At 2142H on 28 November, however, before arriving in Fremantle, he sent a signal to the Naval Board, the Naval Officer Commanding (Sydney) and the District Naval Officer Western Australia reporting on CMDR Dechaineux’s ‘preliminary interrogation’:

Following report from preliminary interrogation. (i) Raider was number 41 with 6 15 centimetre guns and 2 torpedo tubes. (ii) Carried mines but none repetition none believed to have been laid. (iii) No British prisoners on board when sunk these stated to have been transferred to German merchant ship some months ago. (iv) No captures within last 2 months. (v) Regarding action with “Sydney” majority of survivors were between decks at time and their evidence which in general agrees is probably the result of discussion minority before(?) being picked up by(?) “Aquitania”. (vi) Action lasted about 1 hour raider received bad hit in engine room and was scuttled and abandoned. (vii) Survivors know nothing of “Sydney’s” fate but stated ship badly on fire and had been hit forward by torpedo early in action. (viii) Lowest range reported as 1,500 yards.114

It would seem from this signal that RADM Crace was of the view that the evidence taken from survivors in Fremantle, which was apparently consistent, could have resulted from discussions between those interviewed and other survivors before they were picked up by AQUITANIA. There does not appear to be any basis for that

114 NAA.026.0124 

368 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

supposition. The evidence in the statements obtained on interrogation, coupled with the location at which the various survivors were picked up by differing ships and landed on shore, is not consistent with groups of survivors in differing boats remaining together. Further, even if they did, their attention would have been focused on surviving in overloaded boats—not on agreeing a common story to be told to interrogators were they to survive.

The following also emerges from RADM Crace’s preliminary assessment:

• SYDNEY was badly on fire.

• SYDNEY was hit forward by a torpedo early in the action.

• SYDNEY and KORMORAN were close to each other during the battle, the lowest range being estimated at 1,500 yards.

8.55 At 1759H on 30 November 1941 RADM Crace sent a further signal to the Naval Board, the Naval Officer Commanding (Sydney) and the District Naval Officer Western Australia after further interrogation during that day:

My 1342/28 Further interrogation carried out today Sunday. Except regarding action prisoners not repetition not communicative especially concerning technical equipment and previous movements of raider. Examination concluded.

(2) Details action. Survivor first sighted “Sydney” hull down and signalling about 1600 H on raider starboard quarter. Raider then at action stations course approximately west. “Sydney” at action stations and guns trained overhauled raider. Catapult trained and aircraft engine running.

(3) About 1700 H when range about 1200 yards and ship on parallel course. Raider opened fire with starboard broadside hit “Sydney” on bridge and started fire forward. Another early round hit torpedo tubes started a bad fire which immediately destroyed aircraft. My 0959/30 part II follows.

Part 2.

Men could be plainly seen in vicinity of “Sydney’s” tubes at this stage and estimate of close range is confirmed by several survivors.

Sydney opened fire possibly after raider’s second salvo. Raider did not use her aircraft. It was stated by W/T rating that raider did not make any signal (Graded B 3).

(4) Raider believed to have fired three torpedoes one of which hit under Sydney forecastle and together hit’s on water line caused

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 369

Sydney to slow down. Sydney dropped astern and bow fell off to starboard. Her gun fire was also slow.

(5) Raider was hit shortly after in engine room slowed down and turned slowly to port eventually stopping.

Part 3 follows

My 0959 30 Part 3

(6) Raider fired about 15 salvoes and Sydney hit her about 6 times. Firing ceased mutually after nearly an hour when both ships on fire. “Sydney” burning fiercely and down by bows with screws visible at times.

(7) After 15 minutes H.M.A.S. Sydney fired further round and missed; raider replied and hit.

(8) When raider abandoned ship about 1815 H and scuttled later. H.M.A.S. Sydney then about 4 miles away and burning all over including flames from funnels and with foremast destroyed. Ship reported glowing. Time H.M.A.S. Sydney last seen difficult to ascertain but probably 2000 H to 2100 H. No explosion heard.

Part 4 follows.

My 0959 30th Part 4 and final.

(9) No boats seen to leave H.M.A.S. Sydney and 1 survivor states doubtful if boats could float. 1 seen to be destroyed early on.

(10) One rating of propaganda service states he had taken film of action(?) and given it to an officer. Film of previous sinkings had been sent to Germany.

(11) Consider it most unlikely supply ship had been met in recent week but prisoners mostly uncommunicative on this point. State last prisoners sent off in German merchant ship probably ex Japanese port about 4 weeks ago.115

8.56 This report is obviously taken from the reports prepared by CMDR Dechaineux the same day, it being in many instances a verbatim restatement of those reports.

8.57 The following elements emerge from this assessment of the survivors’ accounts of the action:

• SYDNEY was first sighted at about 1600H, on the raider’s starboard quarter.

115 NAA.026.0076 

370 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• The raider was on a westerly course and at action stations.

• SYDNEY overhauled the raider, reaching a position on a parallel course with KORMORAN by about 1700H.

• The vessels were close to each other, about 1,200 yards apart.

• SYDNEY was at action stations with her guns trained.

• SYDNEY’s aircraft was on the catapult and its engines were running.

• An early KORMORAN broadside hit SYDNEY’s bridge and started a fire forward.

• Another early round hit SYDNEY’s port torpedo tubes, started a fire and destroyed the aircraft.

• The range was so close men could clearly be seen on SYDNEY.

• SYDNEY did not open fire until KORMORAN had fired possibly two salvos. SYDNEY’s gunfire throughout the battle was slow.

• KORMORAN fired three torpedoes, one of which hit under SYDNEY’s forecastle.

• SYDNEY suffered waterline hits from KORMORAN’s guns.

• KORMORAN was hit in the engine room and ultimately came to a halt.

• KORMORAN fired about 15 salvos, hitting SYDNEY frequently.

• The engagement lasted about an hour.

• SYDNEY was last seen about 4 miles away, burning all over, with flames coming out of the funnels and the foremast destroyed.

• SYDNEY was last seen at about 2000 to 2100H.

• At least one of SYDNEY’s boats had been destroyed, and it was doubtful if others could float. None was seen to leave SYDNEY.

The elements of the description of the battle found in this assessment of the evidence of survivors examined by CMDR Dechaineux and RADM Crace are in major respects consistent with the accounts other interrogators obtained independently from other prisoners, on AQUITANIA in Sydney and on TROCAS in Carnarvon, and from CAPT Detmers.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 371

8.58 The following is a summary of the notes of the interrogation in Perth of the officers on 1 December116:

• CAPT Detmers. At 4 p.m. ship’s time (1700H) on the 19th, KORMORAN sighted the cruiser and altered course, from north to south-west, and increased to full speed. As the cruiser approached, all her guns and torpedo tubes were trained on the raider, and the aircraft was ‘warming up’. The cruiser made ‘NNP’, but KORMORAN did not understand or answer. The cruiser signalled ‘stop’ and ordered the raider to give the secret call. The raider did not know it, and so Detmers knew he had to fight. The range was ‘somewhat more than one mile’. Detmers thought both ships opened fire simultaneously, the cruiser’s first salvo going over but the raider’s first salvo hitting the cruiser’s ‘conning tower’. He said the cruiser tried to launch her aircraft, but it was hit. There was then some delay; the cruiser fired two torpedoes, one of which missed and the other hitting ‘about 20 metres from the bow’. The fore turrets then stopped firing while the third turret hit the raider. Detmers thought the cruiser was going to ram but it passed astern of the raider and fired four torpedoes; the raider turned towards them and they straddled the vessel. The cruiser turned away behind a smoke screen and later her second funnel was seen to be burning. He said that at the end of the action the range was 9 to 10 kilometres. The raider was badly on fire. It took three hours to get some of her boats out of a hatch. He sent all but 100 of the raider’s company away from the ship at this time. At 2300 he gave the order to abandon ship, and he blew up the ship at midnight.

CAPT Detmers said the raider was disguised as the Dutch ship STRAAT MALAKKA, with a black hull, black funnel and buff superstructure and flying the Dutch flag. He gave an account of KORMORAN’s cruise but would not reveal whether or not she used neutral bases.

• Dr Wagner. A meteorologist from the German Naval Meteorological Service, Dr Wagner advised CAPT Detmers on meteorological matters, including use of the aircraft. On the questions of KORMORAN’s use of the aircraft and the sea conditions on 19 November, the notes say, ‘… in the last day near Australian coast, the ‘plane had not been used because of the swell’.

Dr Wagner said he was below decks helping the doctor at the time of the action and saw nothing of it. He said the alarm was given at 1700H. Three sailors were wounded by shell splinters, ‘one having

116 NAA.012.0324 at 0330 

372 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

been dangerously wounded when going aft from the bridge’. When Dr Wagner went on deck it was dark and the cruiser was astern and on fire at the bridge and directly behind one of the funnels. He heard that the cruiser tried to launch her aircraft but it was on fire and exploded.

• SBLT Bunjes.117 A prize officer, SBLT Bunjes had been interrogated by LEUT Taplin aboard TROCAS on 27 November. He said his battle station was at the after end of the ship. He had no special job—‘just to be ready for an emergency’. In relation to pre-battle events, SBLT Bunjes gave an account that is substantially the same as the account he gave to LEUT Taplin on 27 November but added a few details. When first sighted, SYDNEY was 20 to 25 miles away; when she began flashing she was at a range of 7 miles. He also added that KORMORAN flew the Dutch flag. The only omission in his second account is that he did not repeat his earlier assertion that, after KORMORAN signalled STRAAT MALAKKA, SYDNEY signalled ‘proceed’ before asking for the secret call sign.

As to the battle, SBLT Bunjes’ account is somewhat inconsistent with his 27 November account. Whereas earlier he had said SYDNEY took some time finding gun range and did not hit KORMORAN until about the fourth of fifth salvo, in his second account he said SYDNEY’s first salvo hit the raider amidships. He also said the action lasted about 20 minutes, that being different from the accounts of most others. He did not mention the torpedo hit he had earlier referred to. Otherwise, his accounts are similar.

• SBLT Hrich. A filmmaker, SBLT Hrich would reveal nothing to ‘the enemy’. All he is quoted as saying is that he filmed all the prizes taken except those taken at night.

• LEUT von Gösseln. Divisional officer and officer of the watch LEUT von Gösseln was on the bridge during the action. The note of his interrogation states:

… was on the bridge during the action – the bridge was not hit, but the funnel directly behind the bridge was. Distance between ships at the start of the action about 1200 metres. Raider had signalled that she was “STRAAT MALAKKA” and flew Dutch flag. Before first salvo Dutch flag down, German flag up. Torpedoes were fired by both ships, but cannot give information about torpedoes. Distance between ships was about 10,000 metres when cruiser finished firing. She was under way till then. Raider was ready to be blown up and the flames were very high. There

117 A more legible copy of the notes for the interrogation of officers on 1 December is at BATT.010.0091. 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 373

had been no aeroplane reconnaissance near Western Australia …118

• LCDR Foerster. LCDR Foerster was a permanent Naval officer and had risen through the ranks. The note of his interrogation, insofar as it concerns the lead-up to the action and the action itself, stated:

He was very astonished that the cruiser came so near to the raider. After the first salvo there was no fire fighting equipment left in the Raider. He tried to make an emergency gear. Hit in the engine room, Raider stopped, then fire in the engine room. Action lasted about 20 minutes.119

• LEUT Messerschmidt. A ‘specialist in under water things’,120 LEUT Messerschmidt was adjutant to CAPT Detmers. The interrogation notes stated that he ‘looks after the gunnery at battle stations’. The note of his 1 December interrogation contains nothing about the approach of SYDNEY. In relation to the battle, it stated:

First salvo fired at 1500 metres. He had made the arrangements to blow the ship up and had taken into account the mines carried on board – arrangements made so that mines would blow the ship up. They could not have scuttled the ship, because it was a war ship – they had to fight.121

8.59 On 2 December RADM Crace issued the ‘Instructions for interrogating prisoners of war ex no. 41’. The stated ‘Objective’ and the ‘Information required’ in these instructions show that the focus of the interrogation was now on KORMORAN’s recent movements and raider activity generally—for example, details of the supply organisation, strategic policy, tactics used against merchant vessels, ports visited and where mines had been laid—rather than the engagement with SYDNEY. The only instruction that relates to the action with SYDNEY was to seek ‘confirmation of what we know at present’. The objective of the instructions was stated to be: ‘To obtain as much information as possible on No. 41 and other raider and supply ship activities’.122

118 NAA.012.0324 at 0326 119 NAA.012.0324 at 0327 120 NAA.012.0767_MESSERSCHMIDT 121 NAA.012.0324 at 0327 122 NAA.012.0318

374 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

CMDR Dechaineux’s interrogations and assessment

8.60 On 30 November 1941 CMDR Dechaineux reported on the progress of his interrogations:

Ratings ex TROCAS – located in detention quarters, Fremantle No. 26. This party is led by a truculent Gestapo agent and little more can be got from them.

Ratings ex KOOLINDA – these (31) were recovered from a boat. I have interrogated five of them and most of this report is compiled from their evidence. They are segregated at Harvey.

Ratings ex CENTAUR – number 130, have been interrogated by Lieut. Commander Rycroft, who is making a separate report. They are segregated at Harvey. These ratings are from the boats which landed North of Carnarvon.

About 72 ratings who have not yet been interrogated arrive in the Yandra, a.m. tomorrow Monday. They were picked up from boats and rafts.

All the officers are segregated at Swanbourne, including the Captain and First Lieut …123

CMDR Dechaineux’s report, based, as he said, on the evidence of the five survivors picked up by KOOLINDA, was as follows:

The Action:

1. The alarm was sounded in the Kormoran at 1600/19. At that time the Sydney appeared on the Northern horizon, distant about 15 miles. The Kormoran then turned to the Westward, and increased to full speed. The Sydney gave chase, ordering the K. to stop. The K. on purpose made a great display of endeavouring to reply and also to comply with the instructions from the “Sydney.” It is reasonable to suppose that this apparent inefficiency in signalling by the K. was a ruse de guerre, in the hope that the Sydney would close to investigate.

2. The Sydney came up on the starboard quarter of K to a distance of about 1500 metres when the K. opened fire, the first salvo hitting the Sydney’s bridge. K’s second salvo hit the superstructure amidships and set the Cruiser on fire. Shortly after the first salvo K. fired two torpedos from her starboard tubes. It is believed one of these torpedos hit.

3. Sydney’s first salvo, fired after she was hit missed the Kormoran. The second salvo hit the Kormoran’s bridge. One subsequent salvo at least hit the K’s engine room, setting a lubricating oil tank on fire and paralysing the fire fighting equipment.

123 WAM.035.0260 at 0262 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 375

4. The action was joined at about 1700 and lasted until 1750. The relative course of the Sydney took her from fine on the starboard quarter, across K’s stern and, on a parallel course up the K’s port side. A third torpedo was fired when Sydney was on K’s port beam. The trend of the action was to the westward. After action was broken off the Sydney turned away and steamed to the South East, heavily on fire.

5. Most evidence seems to show that the cruiser disappeared suddenly and most prisoners believe that she sank before midnight.

6. The first order to abandon ship in Kormoran was given about 1810, when the engine room personnel got away. It appears that the personnel had ample time to equip the boats very thoroughly. The Captain and Officers did not leave the ship until much later. It is believed that K. blew up at midnight.

7. The first hit on K. destroyed the radio and no signal was sent to any German authority.124

It is not known who were the five survivors on KOOLINDA that CMDR Dechaineux interrogated. His assessment that the supposed inefficiency in signalling was a ruse de guerre is supported by the statements of CAPT Detmers.

8.61 The account given by the five survivors, as distilled by CMDR Dechaineux, contains elements in common with those in the other accounts to which I refer:

• KORMORAN sighted SYDNEY at about 1600H on 19 November, at a distance of about 15 miles.

• KORMORAN turned westward.

• SYDNEY reached a position on KORMORAN’s starboard quarter, at a distance of about 1,500 metres.

• KORMORAN’s first salvo hit SYDNEY’s bridge.

• KORMORAN’s second salvo hit the superstructure amidships, setting SYDNEY on fire.

• KORMORAN fired two torpedoes from her starboard tubes; one of the torpedoes hit SYDNEY.

• SYDNEY’s first salvo missed but her second salvo hit KORMORAN’s bridge. Subsequent salvos hit KORMORAN’s engine room, setting her on fire.

124 NAA.096.0038 

376 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• Action was joined about 1700H and lasted about an hour.

• SYDNEY passed astern of KORMORAN.

• KORMORAN fired a third torpedo, which missed.

• It was believed SYDNEY sank before midnight.

The new element in this account is a statement—for the first time—that SYDNEY ordered KORMORAN to stop. The notes of the interrogation of CAPT Detmers of 1 December 1941 contain a similar statement.125

8.62 One crucial question is why SYDNEY approached so close to KORMORAN, reaching a position parallel to the raider, abeam of her and between 1,000 and 1,500 yards away. The view CMDR Dechaineux reached is set out in a 4 December 1941 minute he wrote to the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff about a proposed letter to all owners of merchant ships concerning compliance with recognition procedures between merchant ships and warships. The letter he proposed was in the following terms, although the relevant paragraph (the second one) was not included in the letter ultimately sent. The proposed letter was as follows:

Since the Naval Board’s letter of ________ [sic] still further incidents of non-compliance by Masters with the regulations issued by the Admiralty on challenge and reply procedure have occurred.

2. One direct lesson from the loss of H.M.A.S. ‘SYDNEY’ is that the Commanding Officer of the ‘SYDNEY’ having had previous experience of the inefficiency of Masters in this respect, closed the disguised raider in order to establish identity, with the result that he placed himself in an unsound tactical position. This situation would never have occurred had the Captain of the ‘SYDNEY’ been quite confident that all friendly ships would, without delay reply correctly to his request for secret signal letters. He would then be able to establish identity at a distance, which would not put him at a tactical disadvantage. This desirable state of affairs does not exist. The Captain of the “SYDNEY” acting on previous examples of friendly ships failing to comply with challenge and reply procedure, closed the apparently friendly ship, with the result which you all know.

3. It is therefore requested that you will again emphasize to your Masters that non-compliance with challenge and reply procedure renders them liable to be engaged by British ships without further endeavour to establish identity. The Naval Board have issued instructions accordingly.

125 NAA.012.0328 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 377

4. Moreover, legislation is being sought rendering the Master liable to a heavy punishment should he fail to comply with instructions in respect of this which may have been received from Naval authorities.126

No doubt paragraph 2 was omitted because it attributed responsibility for the loss of SYDNEY to the failure of merchant marine ships to adhere to recognition procedures. The paragraph does, however, record CMDR Dechaineux’s knowledge that around the Australian coastline there was inadequate adherence to recognition procedures by merchant vessels, resulting in warships—which did not know but expected such vessels to be friendly—approaching closely to confirm the friendly status of the merchant vessel. As the analysis in Chapter 5 shows, it was the practice of Australian warships when seeking to identify merchant vessels around the Australian coastline to do so by approaching closely to the merchant vessel—certainly within armament range—and doing so when not at action stations.

LCDR Rycroft’s reports on interrogations

8.63 As CMDR Dechaineux stated in his report of 30 November 1941, LCDR Rycroft was interrogating the 130 or so ratings rescued by CENTAUR. These were the people from the boats that landed north of Carnarvon, and they had been ‘segregated at Harvey’.127 In due course LCDR Rycroft made a separate report, which is undated but is headed ‘Brief summary of deductions from interrogation of survivors ex-KORMORAN up to 6 December 1941’. The report reads:

A. SYDNEY-KORMORAN Action:

It appears to be certain that SYDNEY came up close on starboard quarter of KORMORAN endeavouring to identify ship, and that when approximately abeam KORMORAN “dropped screens” and opened fire. Which ship actually fired first cannot be determined, but it is probable that KORMORAN fired a moment or so before SYDNEY, as her guns were prepared and crews knew they would fire immediately after order to “drop screens.”

Previous general description of action remains unaltered.

Some survivors whose action stations were at A.A. and Machine Guns stated that they did not fire on account of range being too great. On other hand, Lieutenant SKERRIES stated that A.A. guns and smaller armament were concentrated on torpedo and “1-inch” guns positions of SYDNEY, which were easily visible. The Carley Float ex SYDNEY

126 NAA.074.0040 127 WAM.035.0260 at 0262 

378 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

recovered from the sea by HEROS has a number of holes caused by shells of small calibre (3.7 cms. and under.)

From all accounts it appears that SYDNEY was severely damaged by gunfire and torpedo at beginning of action. According to AHLBACH (Yeoman of Signals), who was on bridge of KORMORAN, she turned about 90 degrees to Port, passed close under stern of KORMORAN, and maintained course in Southerly direction. KORMORAN altered course to Port after SYDNEY had passed astern. SYDNEY appeared to draw ahead on PORT side of KORMORAN. KORMORAN became unnavigable and last shots were fired when SYDNEY was on a relative bearing of 225° (Red 135°.)

Approximate tracks:

B. SIGNALS EXCHANGED BEFORE ACTION:

Ahlbach’s (Yeo. Of Sigs.) evidence coupled with LINKE’s (P.O. Telegraphist, KORMORAN) is fairly conclusive.

Some time before action was joined KORMORAN broadcast “QQQQ 26 S. 111 E. “STRAAT MALAKKA” and repeated it once. (Note: A “QQ” message was picked up by Tug UCO at about 1000 GMT on 19th November, but position and ship’s name could not be read by P.O. Telegraphist in UCO. Geraldton also read mutilated position and time of message.)

SYDNEY ordered by flashing “Hoist your Signal letters” when about 7 miles distant. KORMORAN hoisted PKQI (STRAAT MALAKKA) on triatic stay between foremast and funnel. Funnel prevented this signal being seen clearly by SYDNEY.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 379

SYDNEY made “Hoist your signal letters clear”. Ahlbach stated that after receiving this signal he lengthened the halyard and drew it towards the starboard side.

When SYDNEY was approximately abeam she asked by flags and flashing “Where bound.” Ahlbach stated that this was spelt in English by flashing. KORMORAN answered “Batavia”. SYDNEY then apparently made I K which KORMORAN could not understand, as in International Code this means “You should prepare for a cyclone, hurricane or typhoon.”

(Note: Secret call sign “STRAAT MALAKKA” was IIKP.)

KORMORAN made no reply.

SYDNEY made by flashing “Show your secret sign.” KORMORAN did not answer.

Captain, KORMORAN, then ordered “Drop screens”, fire was opened and German Ensign run up to mainmast masthead.”128

This account does not depart from the general description previously given by LCDR Rycroft. For the first time, however, it goes into greater detail in relation to KORMORAN’s use of her lighter armaments and gives a more detailed account of the signals exchanged before action. It seeks to draw together the material obtained on interrogation from CPO Ahlbach (the Yeoman of Signals) and LS Linke (one of the telegraphists). It also sets out the course of the two vessels, apparently derived from the statements of CPO Ahlbach, who was in a position to see. It is to be noted that the report makes no reference to any interrogation of or statements by CAPT Detmers.

8.64 A number of matters emerge from this report:

• The action began when the ships were close to each other, on parallel course and abeam. The distance is shown as ‘1 mile’.

• SYDNEY was severely damaged by both gunfire and torpedo early in the action.

• SYDNEY passed astern of KORMORAN, having slowed as a result of damage.

• There was uncertainty about KORMORAN’s use of her anti-aircraft machine guns.

• LCDR Rycroft asserted, wrongly, that the Carley float recovered by HMAS HEROS had a number of holes caused by shells of ‘small

128 NAA.010.0294 

380 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

calibre’. (This statement is advanced apparently in support of a view that the anti-aircraft and machine guns were used. In fact, the damage to the HEROS Carley float was caused by shrapnel pieces.)

• The account of the signal exchange comes from CPO Ahlbach and LS Linke, not from CAPT Detmers.

• SYDNEY began the recognition procedure when the vessels were about 7 miles apart. KORMORAN knew STRAAT MALAKKA’s signal letters and hoisted them by flag. KORMORAN thus gave the correct response but not in a form that could be read at distance. This caused SYDNEY to approach more closely.

• The German ensign was flown at the time of opening fire.

8.65 One matter of vital importance emerges from LCDR Rycroft’s report. It must be the case, from that report, that CPO Ahlbach or LS Linke told LCDR Rycroft that KORMORAN hoisted ‘PKQI’, identifying her as STRAAT MALAKKA. It must also be the case that CPO Ahlbach or LS Linke told LCDR Rycroft that SYDNEY made the signal ‘IK’. If SYDNEY made the signal IK it means that at some point SYDNEY understood the letters PKQI, consulted the books of reference, determined that the signal related to STRAAT MALAKKA, and consulted SP 02182 to learn that the war call sign for STRAAT MALAKKA was IIKP. Had SYDNEY not done so, she would not have known that I and K were the central two letters of STRAAT MALAKKA’s war call sign. There is no possibility that either CPO Ahlbach or LS Linke could have manufactured the account that SYDNEY signalled IK to KORMORAN: that information was known only to the true STRAAT MALAKKA and to warships holding SP 02182. Had KORMORAN known STRAAT MALAKKA’s secret war call sign of IIKP she would have responded to SYDNEY’s IK with the signal IP. She did not do so because she did not know that secret war call sign.

8.66 LCDR Rycroft’s report is undated but is said to be ‘up to 6 December 1941’. There were further interrogation notes relating to CPO Ahlbach when he was recalled on 9 December 1941. There it is recorded, ‘Hoisted “Straat Malakka” above the bridge – 4 flags’. And later:

Cruiser gave a two flag signal they did not understand – it meant “Have you suffered damage” from cyclone, typhoon or tempest”? The Captain thought it must be a mistake and checked it himself.129

Hoisting STRAAT MALAKKA with four flags must mean KORMORAN hoisted PKQI. The two-flag hoist described is the

129 NAA.012.0093_AHLBACH 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 381

international signal IK—‘You should prepare for a cyclone, hurricane, typhoon’.

It is thus clear that the information about the flag hoists came from CPO Ahlbach and equally clear that neither he nor CAPT Detmers knew the secret war call sign for STRAAT MALAKKA.

8.67 It is not known from this account where SYDNEY was positioned when she signalled IK, but it is likely that she had closed in on KORMORAN. If, having received the signal letters PKQI, and having identified those letters to be those of STRAAT MALAKKA, SYDNEY had consulted the VAI (vessels in area indicated) she would have realised that STRAAT MALAKKA was not expected in the area, although she already knew that no vessels were expected in that area. Similarly, if SYDNEY had then consulted Talbot-Booth concerning the tonnage, length, stem, stern and superstructure of STRAAT MALAKKA, once her signal letters supposedly identified the vessel as STRAAT MALAKKA she would have realised the ship she was approaching was not STRAAT MALAKKA. It seems probable, however, that at the time the signal exchanges occurred and the process of recognition was taking place, SYDNEY was within 1,500 yards of KORMORAN abeam and on a parallel course. Not having completed the recognition process at distance, mainly because of an inability to read the flag hoist, SYDNEY had closed on KORMORAN before signalling IK and then flashed, ‘Show your secret sign’.

8.68 On 11 December 1941 LCDR Rycroft wrote a personal letter to RADM Crace. He enclosed a document described as a ‘brief summary of deductions from interrogations’, which contained his conclusions in respect of interrogations conducted up until 6 December 1941. In the letter, however, he said the interrogations ‘were concluded yesterday’130 and that a copy of the interrogation notes had been forwarded to the Naval Board. He offered RADM Crace copies of those notes and also said:

Am writing to you personally as I think it desirable that though most N.O’s [naval officers] probably realise that SYDNEY was taken by surprise, the details should be confined to as few as possible.131

This makes it clear that LCDR Rycroft’s view was that SYDNEY was surprised to discover a disguised raider at a time when she was close to it. This accords with CMDR Dechaineux’s view that, in accordance with apparently common practice, SYDNEY closed on an unidentified merchant vessel to implement the identification procedure, it being

130 NAA.096.0021 131 NAA.096.0021 

382 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

accepted that merchant vessels did not always ‘efficiently’ perform identification procedures.

8.69 LCDR Rycroft also wrote:

Unfortunately no light has been thrown on what the final fate of SYDNEY was. My own view is that she sank in flames about 2300H, or earlier, and that much of her gallant crew who were alive at this time were swallowed up by the sea. The action ended in daylight. If there was any attempt by SYDNEY to abandon ship before dark, and if they had any boats in which to do this, I can only assume that the ruthless Hun shot them up. The remark in REIZER’s diary that “we should remember the words of the Captain, ‘For every German we shall kill a thousand Englishmen’” indicates that they would not be beyond such brutality.132

There was no basis for LCDR Rycroft’s view that many of SYDNEY’s crew were alive after the battle, took to the sea or were shot by the Germans in KORMORAN. His views were pure speculation based on unfounded assumptions.

The Australia Station intelligence summary

8.70 The 18 December 1941 ‘Australia Station intelligence summary’ prepared by the Naval Intelligence Division in Navy Office, Melbourne, gave a summary of the loss of SYDNEY and the encounter with KORMORAN. It is not known who prepared the summary, which stated:

Reports by survivors regarding the actual conduct of the engagement differ very materially, so that it is impossible to give a narrative. The main facts, however, appear to be as follows:-

The engagement took place in position 25° South 111° East on 19th November. H.M.A.S. “SYDNEY” on a bearing S.W. from the raider, made the first sighting at a range of 15 miles. The raider altered course from 000° to 250° and made no reply. At closer range the raider, which was flying the Dutch Flag, made ‘STRAAD MALAKKA’ by light.

At 1650H the ships were on a parallel course, speed 15 knots. “SYDNEY” which was abaft the raider’s beam, distant less than two miles, was at action stations and made “Make your signal letters”. “STEIERMARK” immediately opened fire with guns and torpedoes, her first salvo hitting “SYDNEY”’s bridge and starting a fire forward. “SYDNEY” opened fire simultaneously but her first salvo was over. Early in the action the cruiser was hit by a torpedo under A turret, resulting in A and B turrets being jammed. “SYDNEY”’s torpedo tubes

132 NAA.096.0021 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 383

were hit by a further salvo, and a bad fire was started resulting in the destruction of her aircraft.

The action was broken off after about half an hour, and “SYDNEY”, burning fiercely and down by the bows, proceeded at 5 knots. The raider, which had received a vital hit, was now on fire amidships, with her engine room out of action. At about 1315H the raider’s crew abandoned ship, and at midnight the vessel, which was scuttled, blew up.

It is believed that “SYDNEY” sank at 2300H/19.133

That account is plainly based on the Naval Board’s signal at 1500H on 7 December 1941. It wrongly gave the longitude at 25° rather than 26°.

The Naval Board’s assessment

8.71 At 1500H on 7 December 1941 the Naval Board signalled the Admiralty, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, Commander-in-Chief China, Commander-in-Chief Netherlands East Indies Naval Forces, the New Zealand Naval Board and the Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron with what was described as an ‘interim report of an interrogation of survivors from raider no. 41’. The signal said the ‘interrogation continues’. The report of the action read:

… visibility good, wind south, 5 sea moderate.

1. THE APPROACH. First sighting range 15 miles. Raider speed 15 knots altered course from 000 degrees to 250 degrees. Sydney bore north from No. 41. Sydney chased and apparently made no other signal than N.N.J. repeat N.N.J. Raider did not reply or hoist signal letters. No stop signal was received by enemy. When Sydney was at close range raider made Straad [sic] Malakka by light which ship she was impersonating Dutch flag flown.

PART 2 OF MY 0700Z/7. At 1650H/19 SYDNEY was just abaft No. 41 beam distant 1.25 miles, both ships 15 knots, course 250 degrees. Cruiser now made “make your secret letters” in plain language.

2. THE ACTION. Raider immediately dropped concealing gun ports and opened gun and torpedo fire. Sydney was at action stations and armament trained. She opened fire simultaneously. Steiermarks first salvo hit cruisers bridge. Sydneys first salvo over. Very early in action torpedo hit cruiser under A. turret jambing A and B turrets. Action lasted 25 minutes and was broken off at range of 4 miles.

PART 3 OF MY 0700Z/7. No. 41 stopped. SYDNEY proceeding 5 knots. Believed Sydney sank due to shell and torpedo fire damage at

133 NAA.069.0105 at 0106 to 0107 

384 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

2300H/19 raider scuttled at 2359H/19. Position of action 25° South 111° East.

3. Identity confirmed No. 41 Steiermark alais [sic] Kormorant [sic] …134

8.72 It is not known who drafted this signal. It contains statements not referred to in previous summaries by RADM Crace, CAPT Farncomb, CMDR Dechaineux and LCDR Rycroft. There is nothing in those earlier summaries indicating ‘raider speed 15 knots’ or an alteration of course by KORMORAN from 000° to 250°. The statement that SYDNEY apparently made no other signal than ‘NNJ repeat NNJ’ does not accord with LCDR Rycroft’s report up to 6 December 1941, if that report had been written by 7 December. There is no other report that gave details of signals. Similarly, the statement that the raider did not reply or hoist signal letters is inconsistent with LCDR Rycroft’s report. So too is the statement that the raider made STRAAT MALAKKA by ‘light’. According to LCDR Rycroft’s report, those signals were made by flag. There was evidence that SYDNEY had her main armaments trained but not that she was at action stations. There was little or no evidence that SYDNEY opened fire simultaneously. Whilst the earlier reports noted that a KORMORAN torpedo hit SYDNEY under A turret, they did not say it jammed A and B turrets. Additionally, the position of the action should have been 26° south, not 25° south.

8.73 On 23 December 1941 the Naval Board signalled the Admiralty, the Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Netherlands East Indies Naval Forces, the New Zealand Naval Board and Commander-in-Chief East Indies. It expanded on the information conveyed in earlier signals covering the loss of SYDNEY. In relation to the approach it said:

1. The approach. Just before tha ction [sic] started, No. 41 broadcast on 500 KC/S Q Q Q Q 26 south 111 east Straat Malakka and repeated it once. When “SYDNEY” was approximately a beam of No. 41, she made ‘Where bound?’ – reply ‘Batavia’. “SYDNEY” then made IK, the centre letters of IIKP, STRAAT MALAKKA’S secret call sign.135

The signal contained the Naval Board’s assessment of the action and of lessons to be learnt from it:

1. Captain of “SYDNEY” was deceived and placed himself in tactically unsound position.

2. The fundamental importance of good challenge and reply procedure by merchant ships. Desirable to make it compulsory for independently routed merchant ships to carry daylight lamp range 10 miles. Some

134 NAA.026.0199 135 NAA.010.0263 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 385

merchant ships of Allied nations do not carry secret call signs. All ships trading in Allied interests should possess these. Admiralty 1223/20 refers.

3. The necessity of commanding officers to regard all ships as suspicious. …

The necessity for being ready to open fire at a moment’s notice when approaching a merchant vessel and for keeping a close watch for the fropping [sic] of screens or other devices for concealing guns.

There will usually be a delay of 20 to 25 seconds whilst the guns of the M.V. are being trained on to the correct object.

5. Apparently the fires could not be fought due probably to fire amidships. Consider the wide separation of fire pumps desirable.136

The Naval Board’s view, therefore, was that SYDNEY had placed herself in a tactically unsound position by approaching closely to carry out a recognition procedure that ought to have been carried out at distance. The Naval Board accepted the crucial importance of there being in practice a good challenge-recognition procedure capable of being implemented at distance, beyond raider armament range. That involved the use of signal lamps, not flags. The Naval Board also accepted that all merchant ships should be regarded as suspicious and so not be approached closely until the recognition procedure had been complied with.

CAPT Detmers’ account in interrogations

8.74 CAPT Detmers was interrogated on four occasions:

• on 27 November 1941 by LCDR Rycroft137

• on 1 and 2 December 1941 by RADM Crace138

• on 7 January 1942 by Major McQuil in company with Capt Hehir, an Army intelligence officer.139

8.75 As discussed, the notes of the interrogation of 27 November 1941 are recorded in LCDR Rycroft’s report dated 30 November 1941:

Capt. Dettmers [sic] stated that he sighted Cruiser of Perth Class at 1600. Action began 26 degrees 32 minutes South 111 East. We signalled by flags and the cruiser came close. He had bad luck, fired two

136 NAA.010.0263 137 NAA.096.0028 at 0029 138 NAA.012.0766_DETMERS and 0767_DETMERS 139 NAA.012.0602 

386 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

torpedoes and missed, we had good luck our torpedo hit him forrard. Raiders first salvo hit cruiser amidships and he burst into flames. Cruiser hit Raider in the engine room and smashed up the machinery and engines. Also caused a fire which could not be controlled on account of the water supply being destroyed. Cruiser last seen turning behind smoke screen bearing 150 degrees from Raider, steering South, speed about 5 knots. After sending away all boats I destroyed my ship because I could not save her. I lost 25 men killed in the action.

Capt. Dettmers story agreed with other statements and appeared to confirm various details. When asked whether he had carried any seaplanes he replied no. He would not talk about the ships sunk.

When cruiser was closing with K. Capt. Dettmer is reported as having turned to the Chief Officer and asked him “Shall we scuttle or fight”, to which Chief Officer replied “We can only die once Captain”.140

8.76 The interrogation notes of 1 December 1941 record:

At four o’clock ship’s time (1700H) on the 19th, sighted Cruiser and altered course from North to South West (250degrees) increased to full speed – not allowed to tell speed. Cruiser “Perth” Class. Cruiser made signal “NNP” – did’nt [sic] understand, did’nt answer. Cruiser signalled “stop”, and ordered raider by searchlight in plain language to give secret call. Did’nt know so had to fight, although his orders were to take prizes and his ship was not equipped to fight warships. Range was somewhat more than 1 mile. First salvo of the Cruiser was over the Raider – Raider’s first Salvo hit the conning tower of the Cruiser. There was then some delay. Raider fired two torpedos, one of which missed and one hit, about 20 metres from the bow. The fore turrets then stopped firing. The third turret of the Cruiser hit the raider. He thought the Cruiser was going to ram him, but it passed astern of the Raider and then fired four torpedos. Raider turned towards the torpedos, and they passed ahead and astern of him. Cruiser then turned away behind a smoke screen – when seen later the second funnel was burning. Raider badly on fire, and fire fighting apparatus was badly damaged. At midnight he sank his ship, having at 11 o’clock given orders to leave ship. Had earlier sent all away except a hundred. There were some boats in a hatch which took three hours to get out because of low power, then the rest left.

Thinks both ships opened fire at the same moment – perhaps Cruiser half a second earlier. All guns and torpedo tubes of the Cruiser were trained on Raider as she approached. As the Cruiser approached, aircraft was warming up on the catapult, and she tried to launch it but aeroplane was hit.141

140 NAA.096.0028 at 0029 141 NAA.012.0766_DETMERS 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 387

8.77 The interrogation notes of 2 December 1941 record:

Cruiser made the signal “NNP” Raider definitely received no wireless signal. Ahlbach will know which searchlight signal was received. uninterrupted for half an hour Raider did’nt [sic] answer. Raider had no searchlight or signal lamps. Could’nt use biggest lamps because he was disguised as merchantman, which don’t have them. When Raider saw Cruiser their yard arms were well over the horizon, so look-out of Cruiser must have seen the Raider haul across. Visibility good, but some haze close to the water.142

8.78 The interrogation notes of 7 January 1942 record:

SINKING OF SYDNEY

The KORMORAN was armed with 8 in. guns. When I first saw “SYDNEY”, I did not know what ship she was. When she turned broadside on, I realised she was a first class cruiser, and I quite expected to be sunk as I could not escape her. She was too fast, 32.5 knots, so I decided to fight it out. I opened fire at approximately 1100 metres and my first broadside badly damaged SYDNEY, carrying away most of her superstructure. I again fired a broadside, which did further extensive damage. I then torpedoed her, one of my torpedoes struck her near the forrard funnel. Her bows immediately dipped and she turned and tried to ram me. I avoided this by turning quickly and let her have a further broadside. As she swung past so closely, she could, apparently, fire no more, and she was blazing fiercely, particularly near the after funnel. The action then broke off. I had been badly hit and was making preparations to abandon my ship. Before leaving, I looked around and in the darkness, I could see SYDNEY still blazing fiercely. Then, just before I abandoned ship. I looked for SYDNEY but she had gone. All was blackness. I could do nothing to save them. There was a very rough sea. It had been so for two days, and the saving of my own ship’s company was causing me anxiety. My opinion is that SYDNEY had been hit by us at a vital spot, and that the fire reached the magazine and she blew up and sank. I do not think there could have been any survivors.143

8.79 These accounts of the engagement are sparse, but together they contain the essential elements of the encounter:

• the sighting of SYDNEY at about 1700H

• KORMORAN turning westward, seeking to avoid SYDNEY

• KORMORAN being called on to give her secret call sign and being unable to do so

142 NAA.012.0766_DETMERS at 0768_DETMERS 143 NAA.012.0602 

388 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• SYDNEY approaching close in to KORMORAN on her starboard side

• KORMORAN opening fire first, with her first and later salvos destroying SYDNEY’s bridge and causing serious fires

• SYDNEY being hit forward early in the battle by a torpedo from KORMORAN

• SYDNEY turning to port and passing astern of KORMORAN

• SYDNEY causing severe damage to KORMORAN, the hits to her engine room causing uncontrollable fires

• SYDNEY firing torpedoes that missed KORMORAN

• SYDNEY being last observed at a distance from KORMORAN and aglow and subsequently the glow ceasing.

8.80 It was the assessment of Capt Hehir that CAPT Detmers was telling the truth. Capt Hehir wrote in his private diary, ‘7th Jan: Major McQuie today made a major interrogation of Cdr Dettmers who told him the full story of the sinking and the action and I, for my part, believe he told the truth’.144

Mr Eldridge’s report

8.81 The final report produced shortly after the sinking of SYDNEY was that of Mr FB Eldridge MA. He had available to him all the material gathered to date.145 His report was forwarded to the Admiralty on 12 February 1942 and was said to have been compiled ‘from a mass of material containing the results of interrogation of Prisoners of War ex “KORMORAN”’.146

The account of the action summarised by Mr Eldridge, and apparently accepted by the Naval Board, was as follows:

8. The Action.

The story of the action between the “Sydney” and the Raider was frankly told by the Captain, Fregatten Kapitan Detmers and other prisoners, and the story as told seems to ring true, though there is no explanation on the surface as to why the “Sydney” came so close, or why she came so close before attempting to launch her aircraft.

144 PINQ.SUBS.006.0004 at 0005 145 SPC.002.0233 146 NAA.010.0304 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 389

At about 1600G/19 the raider in position approximately 26°S 111°E. was proceeding northward at a speed of about ten knots, (14 knots according to Sub-Lieutenant Bunjes) when what at first appeared to be a sail was sighted by the lookout to the north on the starboard bow. (About N.N.E. according to Sub-Lieutenant Bunjes). The stranger was soon identified as a cruiser and Commander Detmers immediately turned away into the sun (250°) and increased to full speed which he estimated at 15 knots. The cruiser had obviously sighted them for she too turned and came up on the starboard quarter at high speed, repeatedly making the signal by daylight lamp NNJ, for about half an hour, no reply being made by the “Kormoran” as the Commander was of the opinion that the use of a powerful signalling lamp would have betrayed his identity as he was at the time posing as the Dutch ship “Straat Malakka”, and merchant ships did not carry such lamps. In addition, he said, he did not understand what the signal NNJ meant.

Some time before the action was joined, “Kormoran” broadcast QQQQ 26 S, 111 E, “Straat Malakka”, and repeated it once. Pachmann, an operator, stated that this message was given twice, about ten minutes before the action began. It is worthy of note that a QQ message was picked up by Tug “Uco”, at about 1000 G.M.T. on 19th November, but the position and ship’s name could not be read by the P.O. Telegraphist in “Uco.” Geraldton also read a mutilated time and position message at 1005Z/19. No Q’s were distinguished and when after ten minutes there was no repetition, a message was sent out to ships asking if there was anything to report, but no reply was received.

At a distance of about 7 miles “Sydney” made the signal by flashing “Hoist your signal letters.” In reply “Kormoran” hoisted PKQI (“Straat Malakka”) on the triatic stay between the foremast and the funnel, but the funnel prevented the message being clearly seen aboard the “Sydney”. When “Sydney” made the signal “Hoist your signal letters clear”, Ahlbach the Yeoman of Signals stated that he lengthened the halyard and drew it towards the starboard side. It is reasonable to suppose that this apparent inefficiency in signalling by the “Kormoran” was a “ruse de guerre” in the hope that “Sydney” would close to investigate, for “Sydney’s” signal had to be repeated continuously before it was complied with.

“Sydney” came up with the “Kormoran” with all guns and torpedo tubes bearing, and when she was approximately abeam of the Raider she asked by flags and flashing “Where bound?” According to Ahlbach this was spelt in English by flashing. “Kormoran” answered “Batavia”, and “Sydney” apparently made “IK” which “Kormoran” could not understand as in the International Code this means “You should prepare for a cyclone, hurricane or typhoon,” but which was in fact the two interior letters of the secret call sign “Straat Malakka” (IIKP). To this “Kormoran” made no reply.

“Sydney” then made by flashing “Show your secret sign”. Having no reply to this the raider captain decided to fight, which up to this time he had tried to avoid doing. According to Ahlbach “Sydney” did not

390 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

order the raider to stop, and this statement is made by other prisoners, but Captain Detmers mentions an order to stop immediately before the signal by searchlight in plain language to give the secret call.

At about 1700G/19 when the two ships were proceeding on parallel courses in a westerly direction at approximately 15 knots, the “Sydney” being on the “Kormoran’s” starboard beam at a distance of “somewhat more than a mile” (Commander Dettmers) (or at a distance of 1200 or 1500 metres according to other prisoners of war), “Kormoran” dropping her gun-concealing plates and hoisting the German flag, opened fire with four of her six fifteen-centimetre guns. (The particulars obtained by the Military authorities upon further enquiry would reduce the range still further to about 1100 metres). The first salvo hit the “Sydney’s” bridge. Almost simultaneously, but probably just afterwards, “Sydney’s” first salvo went over, though Sub-Lieutenant Bunjes states that “Sydney’s” first salvo hit the raider amidships. Her second salvo found the raider’s engine-room and fuel tanks and caused a fire. In the meantime the raider had fired two torpedoes, one of which struck the “Sydney” forward (about 20 metres from the bow according to Commander Detmers), at the same time that a salvo struck her amidships.

The “Sydney’s” forward tureets [sic] were apparently put out of action by the explosion caused by the torpedo, and the “Sydney’s” aircraft, which is reported to have been warming up at the time that the engagement began, was shot to pieces. The range was so close that prisoners stated that they could see men about the plane and an anti-aircraft gunner stated that the A.A. guns were used against the cruiser so that her A.A. guns and torpedoes might not be used.

“Sydney” now altered course to port across stern of the raider and continued on a slightly diverging course from the raider. She must have been very close as some of the raider’s crew thought that she was going to ram. According to Ahlbach (Yeoman of Signals) who was on the bridge of the “Kormoran”, “Sydney” turned about 90° to port, passed close under the stern of the “Kormoran” and maintained her course in a southerly direction. At this stage apparently, though a fire was raging and could not be put out because all fire-fighting appliances had been destroyed, “Kormoran’s” guns were all in action and one of her guns is stated to have fired fifty rounds while all guns fired a total of about 450 rounds.

“Sydney’s” X and Y turrets were still in action. “Sydney” now fired four torpedoes which “Kormoran” turned to meet, and three passed ahead and one astern. A torpedo fired by the raider about the same time also missed its mark. Both ships were now on fire, “Sydney” being heavily afire amidships and on the bridge, and down by the bows about six feet. The raider’s bridge had been hit but not put out of action, “Sydney’s” first hit had destroyed the radio and a large fire was burning in the engine room. Approximately half an hour after fire opened the action was over, “Kormoran” was stopped, “Sydney” proceeding in a south easterly direction at a speed of about five knots,

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 391

and throwing out a dense cloud of smoke which some of the prisoners interrogated thought was a smoke screen, but which was probably simply result of fire. At about 1900 the Captain of the raider ordered his engine-room personnel and those of ship’s company who were not required, to abandon ship, retaining aboard about 100 men and all his officers. At about 2300/19 Captain Detmers decided to abandon his ship, which was blown up about midnight. The cruiser was still in sight distant about 10 km. when the first boats left the “Kormoran”, and for some time the glow of the fire could be seen. Before midnight it had disappeared. No explosion was heard. According to Bohm (one of the survivors picked up by “Trocas) three wooden lifeboats and three rubber rafts were launched first leaving one boat for those still on board. Commander Detmers mentioned that it took three hours to get lifeboats out of a hatch because of the lack of power. The motor-boats had been destroyed and even if the big boat which was carried had not been destroyed, there was no power available to move it. One of the floats collapsed; men jumped overboard and though a number of these were picked up by the life-boats that had been launched it would appear that about eighty were lost.

Commander Detmers expressed the opinion that “Sydney” sank as the result of the punishment she had received, and that there could be no survivors as the whole superstructure had been so smashed, boats on deck must have been destroyed, while any boats stowed below must have been burned by the fires which were raging. At the time that Commander Detmers was preparing to abandon ship the blaze from “Sydney” was still to be seen, but when he looked around before leaving the ship it had disappeared. This evidence is supported by other statements which go to show that “Sydney” disappeared somewhat before midnight, and that “Kormoran’s” sinking was hastened by an explosion after midnight. The weather at the time was rough, as it had been for two or three days before the encounter.

The first definite information to the outside world was received at 0816Z/24th when the Tanker “Trocas” reported by W/T that twenty-five German Naval men on a floating raft had been picked up in position 26° 06’ S, 111° 40’ E.147

8.82 There are no new elements in this account, although there is controversy about whether an order to stop was given immediately before the signal in plain language to give the secret call sign. The essential elements of the account—that, whilst engaging in the merchant ship recognition procedure, SYDNEY closed rapidly on KORMORAN until she reached a position close to KORMORAN, on her starboard bow and abeam of her, at which point the recognition procedure had not been completed—are similar to earlier descriptions. The account also accepts the following:

147 SPC.002.0233 at 0246 to 0248 

392 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

• SYDNEY’s bridge was hit in the first salvo.

• KORMORAN fired two torpedoes, one of which struck SYDNEY forward.

• At an early point SYDNEY was struck amidships by a KORMORAN salvo, causing fire.

• SYDNEY’s aircraft, which was warming up, was destroyed.

• KORMORAN used anti-aircraft guns to prevent SYDNEY using her port torpedoes and light armaments.

• SYDNEY turned to port, passing astern of KORMORAN.

• KORMORAN suffered hits to the bridge and engine room.

• SYDNEY disappeared from sight after being observable at distance badly on fire.

CAPT Detmers expressed the view that there could be no survivors from SYDNEY because of the destruction of her boats by shelling and fire and the damage to the superstructure of the ship. As will emerge, he was correct.

The Chief of Naval Staff

8.83 The final contemporaneous statement was that of the Chief of Naval Staff, who informed the Advisory War Council on 18 March 1942:

The ‘Sydney’ had worked into a position approximately 1500 yards from the raider. The raider opened fire and launched two torpedoes, one of which hit the ‘Sydney’. The raider had given a wrong name and was not on the daily list. The Captain of the ‘Sydney’ was 24 hours late in arriving at his rendezvous and had taken a risk in getting so close to the raider. In doing so he had not followed his orders.

Further, the Gunnery Officer of the ‘Sydney’ was not ready. He should have been able to fire first and get in two salvoes before the raider attacked.148

148 NAA.022.0306 at 0309 

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 393

Conclusion

8.84 Each of RADM Crace, CAPT Farncomb, CMDR Dechaineux, CMDR Ramage, LCDR Rycroft and Capt Hehir conducted separate interrogations of segregated groups of survivors from KORMORAN. These groups of survivors had no chance, after leaving their ship, to confer and agree on an account of the engagement. In their essential elements, the survivors’ accounts accorded with the account of CAPT Detmers. Each of the interrogators, who wrote their own independent reports, accepted the essential truthfulness of the accounts, and so did the Naval Board.

8.85 There is no basis for doubting the essential elements of the account the German survivors gave of the engagement and the sinking of SYDNEY.

8.86 It is apparent from the survivors’ accounts that SYDNEY closed on KORMORAN to a position on parallel course abeam at a distance of between 1,000 and 1,500 yards before completion of the merchant ship recognition procedure laid down in Naval Control Service Instruction 371. SYDNEY obviously thought the ship was friendly and was taken by surprise when, after she asked what she believed to be STRAAT MALAKKA to give her secret call sign, the response was a number of salvos that destroyed SYDNEY’s bridge and amidships superstructure and a torpedo strike that crippled the ship and her forward guns.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 395

Glossary

Abaft Nearer to the stern of the ship or to the rear of the ship.

Abeam Directly at right angles to the fore and aft line; also referred to as ‘on the beam’.

Abreast Two vessels at sea, steaming along close to one another and on parallel courses, with stems in line or nearly in line.

Abwehr German military intelligence organisation from 1921 to 1944.

Action stations The highest degree of readiness in a warship, in which all crew members are at a state of alert, weapons are manned and all major watertight doors are shut.

Admiralty A British department of state. The ministerial head was known as the First Lord of the Admiralty.

Aft Near the stern; toward the stern. Also referred to as after, as in ‘after-steering’ a steering compartment at the aft end of the ship.

Ahead Directly in advance.

Amidships Halfway between the stem and stern of a ship; the middle of the breadth of a ship anywhere in her length; an order to the helmsman. Often abbreviated to ‘midships’.

ASDIC Radio device for detecting underwater objects, particularly submarines; precursor to sonar.

Astern Directly in rear. Also used with reference to the movement of a ship’s main engines when required to reverse from going ahead.

Athwart Across the ship; from side to side.

Athwartships At right angles to the fore and aft line.

Australia Station A Naval command area, consisting of the waters around the Australian continent and established in 1859, after the Crimean War. The Australia Station became the responsibility of the Commonwealth of Australia from the foundation of the Royal Australian Navy in 1913.

Australian Commonwealth Naval Board

The Australian counterpart of the Board of Admiralty, established in 1905, charged with the administration of all matters relating to the Australian Navy, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Australian Government and directed by the minister responsible for the Navy. Disbanded in 1976.

396 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

Avast To stop; hold fast. The order to stop pulling or heaving on a rope.

Awash Level with the surface of the water. The decks of a ship are awash when seas break onto them.

Beam That part of the ship’s side that lies between bow and quarter; can also denote the breadth of a ship.

Bearing A relative direction from the source. ‘Bearing green 45’ means 45 degrees on the starboard (right) side from the source.

Belay To secure (as a rope) by turns around a cleat; also to stop, to case, ignore the last instruction.

Bilge That part of the ship near the keel. If a ship’s bottom is stove in, she is said to be ‘bilged’.

Board of Admiralty An internal unit of administration of the Admiralty, charged with the control and administration of all matters relating to the British Navy, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Government and directed by the First Lord.

Boatswain The boatswain, or bosun, was traditionally responsible for the rigging, sails and sailing equipment in a ship. Now the boatswain looks after the general working of the ship, especially with regard to maintenance and cleanliness of the ship’s hull, superstructure, decks and holds. (Pronounced bo’sun)

Bollard Circular metal or stone posts around which ropes are belayed.

Bow The front part, or fore end, of the ship, immediately abaft the stem.

Bulkheads Vertical partitions going across the ship or fore and aft.

Cable length A nautical unit of measure equal to one-tenth of a nautical mile.

Carvel built A boat built with its side planks meeting flush and not overlapping, giving smooth sides.

Cleats A metal or wood fitting on a base with a projecting horn on each side of the centre for making ropes ‘fast’ by wrapping them under the horns.

Clinker built A boat built with its side planks overlapping at their edge.

Coamings The vertical plates built around a hatchway.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 397

Compass points Compass point Abbreviation True heading North N 0.00° or 360.00 North by east NbE 11.25° North-north-east NNE 22.50° North-east by north NEbN 33.75° North-east NE 45.00° North-east by east NEbE 56.25° East-north-east ENE 67.50° East by north EbN 78.75° East E 90.00° East by south EbS 101.25° East-south-east ESE 112.50° South-east by east SEbE 123.75° South-east SE 135.00° South-east by south SEbS 146.25° South-south-east SSE 157.50° South by east SbE 168.75° South S 180.00° South by west SbW 191.25° South-south-west SSW 202.50° South-west by south SWbS 213.75° South-west SW 225.00° South-west by west SWbW 236.25° West-south-west WSW 247.50° West by south WbS 258.75° West W 270.00° West by north WbN 281.25° West-north-west WNW 292.50° North-west by west NWbW 303.75° North-west NW 315.00° North-west by north NWbN 326.25° North-north-west NNW 337.50° North by west NbW 348.75°

Counter stern A cut-away or elliptical type of stern in which the underside

overhangs the rudder.

Course A compass direction steered by the helmsman of a ship; the angle in degrees between the north–south line of the compass.

Crew Although it is usual to refer to ratings as the crew, officers are also members of a ship’s crew.

Crow’s nest A small steel hut built high in a ship’s superstructure and from which a seaman keeps his lookout.

398 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

Cruiser Best defined as the largest warship-type ship that could be built in numbers. It was in some ways a general-purpose warship designed to escort and assist battleships, protect merchant shipping and support destroyers, as well as bearing a part of the normal Naval burdens of shore bombardment, patrolling and scouting. The term originated in the 18th century, when a cruiser was any warship on detached duty. By 1939 international treaties had defined two separate types—the 10,000-ton (maximum) ‘heavy’ cruiser, which was armed with 8-inch guns, and the ‘light’ cruiser, which could equal the heavy cruiser in tonnage but had guns not larger than 6 inches.

Cruiser stern A rounded stern; a much fuller underwater section compared with a counter stern.

Cutter A small boat used by ships of war. A ship’s cutters are broader, deeper and shorter than the pinnaces; they are fitter for sailing and are commonly used for carrying stores, provisions, passengers, and so on, to and from the ship.

Damage control The term used to describe the emergency control of situations that might cause the sinking of a ship. A common example is the isolation, by means of securing all hatches and openings, of a damaged compartment to prevent flooding into other compartments.

Davit A curved steel column with a tackle fitted at its head and used in pairs for lifting lifeboats and swinging them over the side for lowering into the water.

Dead lights A round steel cover that can be screwed down over a porthole to protect the glass from being broken by the force of heavy seas in a gale.

Dead water The water in a vessel’s wake, close to her stern.

Department of Defence

A Commonwealth department continuously in existence since 1901. It was named the Department of Defence Co-ordination from 1939 to 1942. Its minister was president of the Naval Board from 1905 to 1915 and from 1921 to 1939. During these periods the department was responsible for Naval administration through the agency of Navy Office.

Department of the Navy

A Commonwealth department in the years 1915 to 1921 and 1939 to 1973, responsible for Naval defence. Its minister was president of the Naval Board at those times.

Derrick A steel or wooden boom fitted to the lower end of a ship’s mast or to the deck for hoisting cargo into or out of the hold.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 399

Draught The depth of the lowest point of a ship below her water line.

Drift The direction and distance an object is carried by current at sea.

Engine-room log A book in which a watch-keeping engineer records particulars relating to the ship’s engines during his watch.

Fathom see Units of measure

Fend To fend a boat is to prevent it striking against anything that might endanger it.

Fender An object used to provide protection to the ship’s side when berthing at a wharf or to another ship.

Flare A long-lasting light used to attract attention.

Fleet In Australia ‘the Fleet’ means the main seagoing force of ships and aircraft under the command of the senior Naval officer afloat.

Flotsam The cargo of a wreck that is floating about or freed from the wreck.

Flush deck When the deck has no raised or sunken part.

Fore and aft line The line between stem and stern (that is, in line with the keel); in the direction of the length of the ship.

Forecastle Also called fo’c’sle, the fore part of the upper deck; the deck right forward, just abaft the bow. (Pronounced foe’ksle)

Founder A vessel founders if a leak or leaks cannot be controlled by pumps.

Galley A ship’s kitchen.

Gunwales or gunwhales

The top or upper edge of a boat’s side planking. (Pronounced gunnels)

Halyards Ropes used for hoisting flags, sails, pennants, and so on. Also spelt halliards.

Handelsschutzkreuzer Merchant navy protection cruiser

Handelsstörkreuzer Merchant shipping disruption cruiser

400 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

HAPAG The Hamburg–Amerikanische Packetfahrt Actien-Gesellschaft for shipping across the Atlantic Ocean was founded in Hamburg. In 1912 HAPAG built the first of the ‘big three’ ocean liners—the IMPERATOR. She was followed by her sisters VATERLAND and BISMARCK. BISMARCK was under construction at the outbreak of World War 1 and was completed after the war for the White Star Line as the MAJESTIC. These were the first liners to exceed 50,000 gross tons and 900 feet in length.

During World War 1 the majority of HAPAG’s fleet of 175 ships were destroyed, and most of the surviving ships (including the big three) had to be turned over to the winning side as war reparations. HAPAG rebuilt its fleet with much smaller ships, but the fleet was again mostly destroyed during World War 2, and the surviving ships were turned over to the Allied powers.

Hatches Covers of hatchways that rest on the hatch beams.

Hectometre The unit of distance used by the Kriegsmarine in World War 2 for the ranging of artillery weapons. Equal to 100 metres.

Helm Steering gear, including the wheel of a ship; the place a ship is steered from.

Helmsman The seaman steering the ship.

Hoist To haul anything up by means of a rope. A string of flags making a signal is also known as a hoist.

HSK 8 The German Navy’s official designation for KORMORAN, used for administrative purposes.

Hull The complete outside plating of a ship up to the level of the upper deck.

International Signal Code

A flag code used by vessels of all maritime nations for signalling.

Jury rig A makeshift rig fitted temporarily to a ship to replace a damaged or broken rig—for example, jury mast, jury rudder.

Keel A continuous line of steeling plating lying fore and aft along the bottom middle line of a ship. The ship is built up from the keel.

Knots A measure of speed representing nautical distance over time.

Kriegsmarine The German Navy.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 401

Lee In the lee means sheltered from the wind. The lee side of a ship is the side other than that onto which the wind is blowing directly.

Listing The leaning of a vessel to port or to starboard.

Maierform A form of ship body construction featuring a raked stem, a cruiser stern and large cargo capacity; named after Austrian Naval engineer Fritz Maier (1844–1926).

Master The captain of a merchant vessel; the navigator in the old sailing men-of-war.

Midships see Amidships

Naval Board see Australian Commonwealth Naval Board

Naval Staff At Navy Office, responsible for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence, the preparation and negotiation of plans, the conduct of operations, the study of the principles of Naval warfare, and the promulgation of tactical doctrine.

Navigator The officer responsible for the safe passage of a vessel, pilotage in and out of port and through difficult navigational waters (with or without electronic navigation aids), and provision of specialist advice to the commanding officer in relation to technical ship-handling and tactical ship-routing scenarios. Also responsible for the maintenance of navigation equipment and charts.

Navy Office The head office of Australia’s Naval administration from 1905. It was the central administration of the Department of the Navy from 1915 to 1921 and from 1939 to 1973 and the head office of the Naval Branch of the Department of Defence from 1905 to 1915, from 1921 to 1939, and since 1973.

On the bow A bearing midway between ahead and abeam.

On the quarter A bearing midway between astern and abeam.

Parliamentary Inquiry

The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade inquiry into the sinking of HMAS SYDNEY.

Pinnace A large rowing boat, more often a steam or motor launch 35 to 40 feet long.

402 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

Peildeck Signal deck (German).

Pendant A long flag, wider at the head (next to the mast) and tapering to a point. Also called a pennant.

Poop The aftermast and the highest point of a large ship’s hull. A poop deck is an exposed portal weather deck on the stern superstructure.

Port side The left-hand side of the ship, looking forward.

Prize A ship is seized as a prize when the officer in command is satisfied that the ship is an enemy ship and is liable to capture.

Prize officer The prize officer is appointed to take charge of a ship seized as a prize, to navigate her to the port selected by the officer in command and to take charge of all papers and cargo on the seized ship.

Q message A distress message, made by W/T, used by merchant ships to alert the Admiralty to the sighting of or upon being attacked by an armed merchant ship.

Quarter A sector of the ship or the horizon from almost after to 45 degrees round on each side.

Quarterdeck The after part of the upper deck.

R message A wireless telegraphy message sent by a merchant ship and warning of attack by a raider or enemy surface vessel.

Rating A sailor or seaman, as distinct from an officer.

Samson post A strong vertical post or stump mast to which lines are attached for bearing loads.

Scuttle To cause a vessel to sink.

Sea state A summary description of the height, period, direction and swell of the ocean’s surface waves at a given time and place.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 403

Shipboard directions

Degrees from the bow

0° 11°15’ 22°30’ 33°45’

45° 56°15’ 67°30’ 78°45’

90° 101°15’ 112°30’ 123°45’

135° 146°15’ 157°30’ 168°45’

180° 191°15’ 202°30’ 213°45’

225° 236°15’ 247°30’ 258°45’

270° 281°15’ 292°30’ 303°45’

315° 326°15’ 337°30’ 348°45’

360°

Bearing Dead ahead 1 point on starboard bow 2 points on starboard bow 3 points on starboard bow Broad on starboard bow 3 points forward of starboard beam 2 points forward of starboard beam 1 point forward of starboard beam On starboard beam 1 point abaft starboard beam 2 points abaft starboard beam 3 points abaft starboard beam Broad on starboard quarter 3 points on starboard quarter 2 points on starboard quarter 1 point on starboard quarter Astern 1 point on port quarter 2 points on port quarter 3 points on port quarter Broad on port quarter 3 points abaft port beam 2 points abaft port beam 1 point abaft port beam On port beam 1 point forward of port beam 2 points forward of port beam 3 points forward of port beam Broad on port bow 3 points on port bow 2 points on port bow 1 point on port bow Dead ahead

404 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

Spallation A process in which fragments (spall) are ejected from a body as a result of impact or stress. Spallation as a result of impact can occur with or without penetration of the object creating the impact.

Stability A ship’s ability to return to the upright position when the force that heeled her over has been removed.

Starboard side The right-hand side of a ship, looking forward.

Stem The extreme forward part of a vessel.

Stern The extreme rear part of a vessel.

Stove in Broken by an external force.

Superstructure Cabins, navigating rooms, masts, and so on, built above the top continuous deck of a ship.

Swell Long, undulating movements on the sea’s surface.

Tackle A rope or line run through a number of blocks and forming a purchase, or tackle. This gives additional power when pulling by hand or mechanically.

Trim The position in which a ship floats, either perfectly horizontal (on an even keel) or down by the stern (deeper after) or bow (deeper forward).

Units of measure 1 nautical mile = 1.852 kilometres = 18.52 hectometres 1 kilometre = 10 hectometres = 0.53 nautical mile 1 fathom = 1/1000 nautical mile = 2 yards = 6 feet = 1.82 metres 1 yard = 3 feet = 36 inches = 0.91 metres = 91.4 centimetres 1 inch = 2.54 centimetres = 25.4 millimetres

Waist The midship part of the upper deck aft in the stern.

Watches Periods of duty at sea, each traditionally four hours long.

Watertight Having the strength and ability to keep out water.

Wave length The distance between the summits of two adjacent waves.

Welin gear AB Welin, a Swedish company founded in 1901, supplies safety equipment to ships, including davits, embarkation ladders, winches and lifeboat hooks.

Well decks The lengths of deck between and below raised decks.

Whaler A long, double-ended rowing boat.

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 405

Abbreviations

1st NM 1st Naval Member AA anti-aircraft AB Able Seaman AC Companion of the Order of Australia ACB Australian Confidential Book ACH Area Combined Headquarters ACNB Australian Commonwealth Naval Board ACNS Assistant Chief of Naval Staff ADFA Australian Defence Force Academy ADM Admiral AFC Air Force Cross AFO Admiralty Fleet Order AM Member of the Order of Australia AMC Armed Merchant Cruiser AMS Australian Minesweeper AMSI Admiralty Merchant Shipping Instruction ANMM Australian National Maritime Museum AO Officer of the Order of Australia; area of operations AOC Air Officer Commanding AP armour-piercing A/S anti-submarine ASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation AVM Air Vice Marshall AWAS Australian Women’s Army Service AWM Australian War Memorial B-Dienst Beobachtungsdienst—radio monitoring service (German signals

intelligence) BPT battle practice target BS Battle Squadron C/S call sign CAFO Confidential Admiralty Fleet Order CAMSI Confidential Admiralty Merchant Shipping Instruction CAPT, Capt Captain CB Confidential Book; Companion of the Order of the Bath CCAS Commodore Commanding the Australian Squadron CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff CDF Chief of the Defence Force, Australia

406 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

CDRE Commodore CGS Chief of General Staff C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CMDR Commander CDRE Commodore CMG Companion the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George CNO Chief of Naval Operations; Commonwealth Naval Order CNS Chief of Naval Staff CO Commanding Officer COIC Combined Operational Intelligence Centre COIS Chief of Intelligence Staff COS Chief of Staff CPBC common pointed ballistic capped CPO Chief Petty Officer CS Cruiser Squadron CSC Conspicuous Service Cross CTF Commander Task Force CTG Commander Task Group CTU Commander Task Unit CWR Central War Room CZM Commander-in-Chief Netherlands East Indies Naval Forces DCA Department of Civil Aviation DCNS Deputy Chief of Naval Staff DCT director control tower DEMS defensively equipped merchant ship DF direction finding DFC Distinguished Flying Cross DNC Director Naval Construction DNI Director Naval Intelligence DNO District Naval Officer; Director Naval Operations DNOWA District Naval Officer Western Australia DOD Department of Defence DSC Director of Signal Communications; Distinguished Service Cross DSD Defence Signals Directorate DSO Director of Signal Organisation; Distinguished Service Order DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation EMC Einheitsmine Typ C (Ankertaumine)—moored contact mines ERA engine room artificer EST Eastern Standard Time ETA estimated time of arrival ETD estimated time of departure

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 407

FAA Fleet Air Arm FELO Far Eastern Liaison Officer FLGOFF Flying Officer FLTLT Flight Lieutenant FOCAS Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Squadron FRUMEL Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne FSF Finding Sydney Foundation G ‘Golf’ time—GMT plus seven hours GMT Greenwich Mean Time (also ‘Zulu’ time) GNR Gunner GOC General Officer Commanding GPCAPT Group Captain GSO General Staff Officer GWS guided weapons system h hours H ‘Hotel’ time—GMT plus eight hours HA high-angle HACP high-angle calculating position HACS high-angle control station HE high-explosive HF/DF high-frequency direction finding hm hectometre HMAS His (Her) Majesty’s Australian Ship HMAT His (Her) Majesty’s Australian Transport HMCS His (Her) Majesty’s Canadian Ship HMNZS His (Her) Majesty’s New Zealand Ship HMS His (Her) Majesty’s Ship HMT His (Her) Majesty’s Transport hp horsepower HQ headquarters HQWA Headquarters Western Area HSK Handelsschutzkreuzer; Handelsstörkreuzer HT Hired Transport IJN Imperial Japanese Navy IWM Imperial War Museum JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff K ‘Kilo’ time—GMT plus 10 hours KBE Knight of the British Empire kc kilocycle KTB Kriegstagebuch (war diary) LA low-angle

408 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

LCDR Lieutenant Commander LCS Light Cruiser Squadron LEUT Lieutenant LF low-frequency LS Leading Seaman LS 3 Light Speedboat No. 3 Lt Lieutenant LtCdr Lieutenant Commander MBE Member of the British Empire MID Mentioned in Dispatches MIDN Midshipman MLS Mine Layer Squadron MMS Mercantile Movements Section MS Merchant Ship MTB Motor Torpedo Boat MV Motor Vessel NAA National Archives of Australia NARA National Archive and Records Administration (United States) NB Naval Board NCS Naval Control Service NCSI Naval Control Service Instruction NCSO Naval Control Service Officer NEACH North Eastern Area Combined Headquarters NEI Netherlands East Indies NHB Naval Historical Branch, United Kingdom NHC Naval Historical Centre, Washington DC NHS Naval Historical Section, Australia NID Naval Intelligence Directorate NIDS National Institute of Defense Studies, Japan NLA National Library of Australia nm nautical mile NOCS Naval Officer Commanding (Sydney) NOIC Naval Officer-in-Charge NWACH North Western Area Combined Headquarters NZNB New Zealand Naval Board OAM Medal of the Order of Australia OBE Order of the British Empire OIC Operational Intelligence Centre; Officer-in-Charge ONI Office of Naval Intelligence OS Ordinary Seaman PNF Permanent Naval Forces

The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II 409

PO Petty Officer POW prisoner of war PRO Public Records Office PWSS Port War Signal Station QC Queen’s counsel RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RACAS Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron RADM Rear Admiral RAF Royal Air Force RAN Royal Australian Navy RANC Royal Australian Naval College RANR Royal Australian Navy Reserve RANVR Royal Australian Navy Volunteer Reserve RCN Royal Canadian Navy RCNC Royal Corps of Naval Constructors RDF radio direction finding (radar) Retd retired RFA Royal Fleet Auxillary RFD Reserve Forces Decoration RINA Royal Institution of Naval Architects RMS Royal Mail Ship RN Royal Navy RNVR Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve RNZN Royal New Zealand Navy ROP report of proceedings ROV remotely operated vehicle R/T radio telephony Rtd retired SAG Surface Action Group SAP semi–armour piercing SAR search and rescue SBLT Sub Lieutenant SEACH South Eastern Area Combined Headquarters SFTS Service Flying Training School shp shaft horsepower SIGINT Signals Intelligence SIM shipping intelligence message SkL Seekriegsleitung (German Naval War Staff) SMN Seaman SMS Seine Majestäts Schiff (His Majesty’s Ship)—World War 1 SNOWA Senior Naval Officer Western Australia

410 The Loss of HMAS SYDNEY II

SP signal publication SPC-A Sea Power Centre, Australia SS Steamship SV Survey Vessel SWACH South Western Area Combined Headquarters SWPA South West Pacific Area TB Torpedo Boat TBS talk between ships TC torpedo carriage TMB Torpedomine B—torpedo-launched ground mine, type B TS transmitting station TT torpedo tubes UHF ultra-high frequency UKHO United Kingdom Hydrographic Office USS United States Ship UT Universal Time VADM Vice Admiral VAI vessels in area indicated VC vertical compound VDC Volunteer Defence Corps VHF very high frequency VS visual signalling W/A Western Area Headquarters (Army) WAMM Western Australian Maritime Museum WGCDR Wing Commander WIR Weekly Intelligence Report WO Warrant Officer WO-N Warrant Officer of the Navy WRANS Women’s Royal Australian Naval Service WRENS Women’s Reserve Emergency Naval Service W/T wireless telegraphy Z Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)