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draws our attention to is the context of Kant’s thesis as a key moment in the disengagement of aesthetic and economic value. This is a digression worth pursuing here as it informs the ongoing debate of the relationship between art and life, which returns at the moment of film’s emergence in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Viewed in the broader context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history, Kant’s work ironically returns us to issues of economy and social structure.If the late eighteenth century witnessed the increased separation of art and economy, it was a movement that claimed some autonomy for art from its affiliation with Church and State, a shift away from explicit ideological control through patronage. As part of the enlightenment project, art, and cultural ideas more generally,were resituated in civic society within and as facilitators of a discursive space (albeit a bourgeois forum), free from state control (Garnham, 2000). Kant’s thesis on judgement figured thus purports to a different set of principles based on rational discrimination and guaranteed by freedom from economic interest. The fact that such a disinterested position then becomes a new aesthetic ideology less apparent in its social affiliations and support (Eagleton, 1990) does not detract from this moment of social restructuring as progressively imagined. The implications of this freeing up of art from the sphere of economics are several-fold. First, the liberation of art from economics was simultaneously a process of increased social regulation, as spheres of economic and cultural mixity came under scrutiny and administration. Stallybrass and White offer a pertinent example of such a process in the late eighteenth-century reorganization of the fair as either commercial trade event or a site of pleasure: As the bourgeoisie laboured to produce the economic as a separate domain, partitioned off from its intimate and manifold interconnectedness with the festive calendar, so they laboured conceptually to re-form the fair as either a rational, commercial trading event or as a popular pleasure-ground. (1986: 30) The separation of a range of cultural practices from economic interest inculcated both a freeing up of the realm of artistic production, a movement reflected by Kant’s text, and the increased presence of state administration in all spheres of life. In a Foucauldian reading this movement of the social classification of space and practice is, of course, a less overt manifestation of power; the discrete entity of the fair as a site of pleasure removed it from the ‘real’ world, withdrawing any threat from social festivities, whilst the trade fair emerged as an instrument of modernization, clarified in intent and more productive in its service of trans- actions. A similar argument concerning the separation of art and economics is developed by John Giullory in a re-reading of Adam Smith’s writings on eighteenth-century laissez-faire economics (Giullory,1993).In Giullory’s account FILM CULTURES 20

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  • draws our attention to is the context of Kants thesis as a key moment in thedisengagement of aesthetic and economic value. This is a digression worthpursuing here as it informs the ongoing debate of the relationship between artand life, which returns at the moment of films emergence in the latter part ofthe nineteenth century.

    Viewed in the broader context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history,Kants work ironically returns us to issues of economy and social structure. If thelate eighteenth century witnessed the increased separation of art and economy,it was a movement that claimed some autonomy for art from its affiliation with Church and State, a shift away from explicit ideological control throughpatronage. As part of the enlightenment project, art, and cultural ideas moregenerally, were resituated in civic society within and as facilitators of a discursivespace (albeit a bourgeois forum), free from state control (Garnham, 2000). Kantsthesis on judgement figured thus purports to a different set of principles basedon rational discrimination and guaranteed by freedom from economic interest.The fact that such a disinterested position then becomes a new aesthetic ideologyless apparent in its social affiliations and support (Eagleton,1990) does not detractfrom this moment of social restructuring as progressively imagined.

    The implications of this freeing up of art from the sphere of economics areseveral-fold. First, the liberation of art from economics was simultaneously aprocess of increased social regulation, as spheres of economic and cultural mixitycame under scrutiny and administration. Stallybrass and White offer a pertinentexample of such a process in the late eighteenth-century reorganization of the fair as either commercial trade event or a site of pleasure:

    As the bourgeoisie laboured to produce the economic as a separate domain,partitioned off from its intimate and manifold interconnectedness with the festivecalendar, so they laboured conceptually to re-form the fair as either a rational,commercial trading event or as a popular pleasure-ground. (1986: 30)

    The separation of a range of cultural practices from economic interest inculcatedboth a freeing up of the realm of artistic production, a movement reflected byKants text, and the increased presence of state administration in all spheres oflife. In a Foucauldian reading this movement of the social classification of space and practice is, of course, a less overt manifestation of power; the discrete entityof the fair as a site of pleasure removed it from the real world, withdrawing any threat from social festivities, whilst the trade fair emerged as an instrumentof modernization, clarified in intent and more productive in its service of trans-actions. A similar argument concerning the separation of art and economics is developed by John Giullory in a re-reading of Adam Smiths writings oneighteenth-century laissez-faire economics (Giullory,1993). In Giullorys account

    FILM CULTURES

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