7353395 Interpreting Chinas Grand Strategy

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PREFACE

This study identifies and analyzes the major factors determining China’s grand strategy—past, present, and future—to better under-stand the motivations behind Chinese strategic behavior and to as-sess how such behavior might evolve in the future, over both the nearand long term. The ultimate purpose of such analysis is to moreclearly understand whether, and in what manner, China’s grandstrategy might pose fundamental challenges to U.S. strategic inter-ests.

The study was conducted as part of a larger, multiyear project on“Chinese Defense Modernization and Its Implications for the U.S. AirForce.” Other RAND reports from this project include:

Mark Burles, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central AsianRepublic s, MR-1045-AF, 1999.

Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L. Byman, RogerCliff, David T. Orletsky, David Shlapak, and Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications, MR-1082-AF, 1999.

Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings, MR-1160-

AF, 2000.

This project is conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE and was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (AF/XO),and the Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,



iv Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (AF/XOI). Comments are welcome andmay be directed to the authors or to the project leader, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad.

PROJECT AIR FORCE

Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies andanalysis. It provides the Air Force with independent analyses of pol-icy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combatreadiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Re-search is performed in four programs: Aerospace Force Develop-

ment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management;and Strategy and Doctrine.



ix

SUMMARY

Accurately understanding and effectively responding to the rise of China constitutes one of the most important challenges facing theUnited States in the early 21st century. China has always been animportant state in the international system, thanks to its greatpotential power: large territory, vast resources, and a largepopulation. But its significance for international politics hasdramatically increased since 1978 when the market reforms initiatedby Deng Xiaoping placed China on a course of action that couldrapidly transform its latent potential into actual power. This processis significant not only because it promises the internal transforma-tion of one of the world’s oldest civilizations but also because, if concluded successfully, it could result in a dramatic power transition

within the international system. The rise of China, consequently,

embodies great analytical and policy interest and examining thedeterminants of China’s basic approach to political-military security (i.e., its grand strategy) is critical to any assessment of current andfuture Chinese security behavior, especially Chinese behavior towardthe United States and its allies.

This study examines China’s grand strategy from historical and con-ceptual perspectives, identifies the major features of the strategy andthe major factors driving it, and assesses how the strategy will likely evolve in the future.

Despite the fact that China’s grand strategy has never been explicitly presented in any comprehensive manner by its rulers, there is little

doubt that China, like any other state, has pursued a grand strategy conditioned substantially by its historical experience, its political in-



x Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

terests, and its geostrategic environment. China’s grand strategy iskeyed to the attainment of three interrelated objectives: first andforemost, the preservation of domestic order and well-being in theface of different forms of social strife; second, the defense againstpersistent external threats to national sovereignty and territory; andthird, the attainment and maintenance of geopolitical influence as amajor, and perhaps primary, state.

For most of Chinese history, the efforts to attain these objectiveshave produced a security strategy oriented toward the maintenance,as a first priority, of internal stability and prosperity and theattainment of Chinese preeminence, if not control, along a far-flung and vulnerable geographic periphery. To carry out this strategy,

China has relied upon a strong, authoritarian government employing a monolithic, hierarchical value system, the frequent and at timesintense application of coercive force, a wide range of diplomaticstratagems of balance and maneuver, and the numerous advantagesresulting from the maintenance for centuries of a dominant culturaland economic system throughout most of Central and East Asia. Ingeneral, strong, unified Chinese states have sought to control theirstrategic periphery and assert Chinese primacy by eliciting variousforms of deference from periphery peoples, preferably through theestablishment of unambiguous suzerainty relations backed, if possible, by superior military force. When faced with variousinternal and external obstacles to such methods (including domesticresistance to a prolonged, intensive use of force), strong Chinesestates have relied upon a variety of noncoercive, suboptimal externalsecurity strategies, including appeasement, alliances, culturally based sinocentric patterns of interaction, and various types of personal understandings among rulers, as well as a heavy reliance onstatic defenses. Weak or declining Chinese states have reliedprimarily on noncoercive tactics to stave off foreign attacks ormaintain stability along the periphery.

During the modern era (from roughly 1850 to the present), China’sbasic security objectives have remained unchanged. However, sig-nificant changes have occurred in China’s threat perceptions, defini-tion of the periphery, requisites for periphery control, and internaland external requirements of domestic order and well-being that to-gether have implications for the specific type of security strategiespursued by the Chinese state. The modern era has witnessed the



Summary xi

emergence of a hybrid “weak-strong” state security strategy thatcombines elements of traditional “strong-state” efforts to control thestrategic periphery through military and political means with ele-ments of a “weak-state” approach employing a primarily territorial-defense-oriented force structure and a relatively high level of in-volvement in diplomatic balance and maneuver.

In recent decades, following both the absorption of many former pe-riphery areas into the Chinese state and the emergence of strong in-dustrial powers along China’s periphery, China’s weak-strong statesecurity approach has produced a “calculative” strategy, character-ized by (a) a nonideological policy approach keyed to market-ledeconomic growth and the maintenance of amicable international

political relations with all states, especially the major powers; (b) adeliberate restraint in the use of force, whether toward the periphery or against other more distant powers, combined with efforts tomodernize and incrementally streamline the Chinese military; and(c) an expanded involvement in regional and global interstate poli-tics and various international, multilateral fora, with an emphasis,through such interactions, on attaining asymmetric gains. UnderChina’s calculative strategy, confrontation or conflict with the UnitedStates or its allies in Asia would most likely occur as a result of “normal” disputes between states—especially those disputes arising from perceived threats to China’s domestic order and well-being andChina’s territorial integrity—and not from explicit or implicit greatpower struggles over control of the international system.

Assuming that no catastrophic revisions of the calculative strategy are forced in the near to mid term, the natural longevity of this strat-egy then becomes largely a function of long-term economic, military,and domestic political developments. If present trends in these areashold, it is only by the period 2015–2020 at the very earliest—andmore likely 2020–2025—that China might begin an extendedtransition phase to a new security strategy. This transition phasecould last for one or two decades, and its span will be determinedlargely by how quickly and durably Beijing can consolidate its powercapacities relative to other great powers in the international system,including the United States.

Although certainly possible, it is on balance unlikely that China’spolitical, economic, and social order will disintegrate into chaos



xii Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

either during the period of the calculative strategy or during thetransition beyond that strategy. It is also unlikely that a morecooperative China will emerge during this period if Beijing’s relativepower grows to the point where a systemic power transition becomesplausible. Instead, growing Chinese power will most likely result,over the very long term, in a more assertive China. As part of thisprocess, China could reasonably be expected to pursue most, if notall, of the core elements of those assertive grand strategies pursuedby major powers in the past. These elements include efforts toaugment its military capabilities in a manner commensurate with itsincreased power; develop a sphere of influence by acquiring new allies and underwriting the protection of others; acquire new orreclaim old territory for China’s resources or for symbolic reasons by penalizing, if necessary, any opponents or bystanders who resistsuch claims; prepare to redress past wrongs it believes it may havesuffered; attempt to rewrite the prevailing international “rules of thegame” to better reflect its own interests; and, in the most extremepolicy choice imaginable, even perhaps ready itself to thwartpreventive war or to launch predatory attacks on its foes.

Even if the rise of Chinese power and its associated assertiveness oc-cur, however, both preemptive containment and preemptive ap-peasement strategies toward a rising China would be counterpro-ductive, for two reasons. First, so long as there is some chance thatthe predicted outcome of assertiveness may not occur, U.S. strategy ought to neither create the preconditions for its occurrence nor re-treat in the expectation that its occurrence is inevitable. Second, if there exists some hope that the worst ravages of future security com-petition between the United States and China can be avoided, U.S.grand strategists are bound both by the dictates of prudence and by moral sensibility to explore every possibility that reduces theprospects of international turmoil. Hence, a policy that assumes theneed to realistically engage China over the course of the calculativestrategy is the most optimal approach.

To maximize the desired effects of such engagement however, U.S.policy must

• Orient the concept of engagement to include three related

strands of policy: to pursue , whenever feasible, the possibilitiesof cooperation with China aimed at attaining deeper levels of en-



Summary xiii

counter, stronger degrees of mutual trust and confidence, moreclearly defined notions of reciprocity or equity, and greater levelsof Chinese integration into the international system, and to usethe resulting expanded level of cooperation and integration toencourage movement by China toward a democratic form of government; to discourage or, if ultimately necessary, prevent acquisition by China of capabilities that could unambiguously threaten the most fundamental core national security interests of the United States in Asia and beyond; and to remain prepared , if necessary, to cope with—by means of diplomacy, economic re-lations, and military instruments—the consequences of a moreassertive and militant China with greater capabilities in a variety of political, strategic, and economic issue-areas;

• Clearly appraise the multiple instruments available to supportthe three central strands of engagement described in theparagraph above and assess the tradeoffs inherent in the use of these instruments;

• Maintain a clear understanding of the ends to which engagementis pursued, by developing a very short list of objectives, prefer-ably centered on China’s external security behavior, particularly as manifested in key issue-areas of interest to the United States,such as the U.S. presence and alliance structure in Asia, the openeconomic order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass de-struction;

• Evaluate the range and types of hedging strategies required of theUnited States and assess how the pursuit of some hedging strategies could either undermine or enhance the success of en-gagement to begin with. Overall, the development of a moreeffective engagement policy requires a more thorough under-standing of how the operational elements of China’s calculativestrategy might evolve over time, as China’s capabilities change.

Even as this sharper reassessment of engagement is developed, how-ever, it is important to clarify U.S. grand strategy and the objectivesto which it aspires: The engagement of China should not be a policy prescription designed to assist the growth of Chinese power so that itmay eventually eclipse the United States, even if peacefully. Rather,engagement must be oriented toward encouraging a more coopera-tive China, whether strong or weak, while also preserving U.S. pri-



xiv Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

macy in geopolitical terms, including in critical military and eco-nomic arenas, given the fact that such primacy has provided theconditions for both regional and global order and economic pros-perity. Together, the predicates of engagement should also focus onassisting Beijing to recognize that challenging existing U.S. leader-ship would be both arduous and costly and, hence, not in China’slong-term interest.

The U.S. effort in this regard arguably will be facilitated if China be-comes a democratic state that is more fully integrated into the inter-national order and less inclined to employ military means. In gen-eral, so long as Beijing eschews the use of force and works peacefully to both adjust to and shape the future international system, the most

destabilizing consequences of growing Chinese power will be mini-mized and, if the advocates of the democratic peace are correct, aU.S.-led international order of democratic states of which China is apart might even be able to avoid the worst ravages of security compe-tition. Yet one must also keep in mind that the historical recordsuggests that the challenges to the attainment of this goal are likely toprove enormous because the structural constraints imposed by competitive international politics will interact with the chaoticdomestic processes in both the United States and China to mostlikely produce pressures toward an antagonistic interaction betweenthese entities at the core of the global system.



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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study has benefited greatly from the comments, suggestions,and corrections provided by several friends and colleagues over thecourse of its development. It was formally reviewed by ProfessorEdward Dreyer of the University of Miami and Professors RichardBetts and Samuel Kim of Columbia University. We have incorpo-rated as many of their excellent suggestions and comments as pos-sible into the text. Valuable informal written reactions to all or partof various drafts were also provided by Iain Johnston, Lyman Miller,Chas. F. Freeman, Doug Paal, Michel Oksenberg, and Jonathan D.Pollack. James Mulvenon provided essential assistance in tracking down footnotes and composed several of the graphics. MadelineTaylor pulled together the final version of the manuscript and pro-vided all manner of logistical support. Pamela Thompson assisted in

drawing the maps. Patricia Bedrosian contributed her excellent edi-torial expertise.

In the final analysis, however, the information, judgments, and as-sessments contained in this study are entirely the responsibility of the authors.



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ACRONYMS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASM Air-to-Surface Missile

ASW Antisubmarine Warfare

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

CFC Chlorofluorocarbons

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

EW Electronic Warfare

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCI Ground Control Intercept

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IMF International Monetary Fund

JSOF Japanese Self-Defense Force

MFN Most Favored Nation

MTCR Missile Technology Control RegimeMTR Military-Technical Revolutions



xviii Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

OED Office of Economic Development

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PPP Purchasing Power Parity

PRC People’s Republic of China

ROC Republic of China

SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile

UN United Nations

WTO World Trade Organization



xix

CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE HISTORY 1

Shang Dynasty, 16th to 11th century B.C.

Zhou Dynasty, 11th to 3rd century B.C.

Western Zhou Dynasty, 11th century to 771 B.C.

Eastern Zhou Dynasty, 770 to 256 B.C.

Spring and Autumn period, 770 to 476 B.C.

Warring States period, 475 to 221 B.C.

Qin Dynasty, 221 to 207 B.C.

Han Dynasty, 3rd century B.C. to 3rd century A.D.

Former (or Western) Han Dynasty, 206 B.C. to 24 A.D.

Later (or Eastern) Han Dynasty, 25 to 220

Three Kingdoms era, 220 to 280

Wei Dynasty, 220 to 265

Shu Han Dynasty, 221 to 263

Wu Dynasty, 222 to 280

Western Jin Dynasty, 265 to 316

Eastern Jin Dynasty, 317 to 420

______________1 Adapted from A Chinese-English Dictionary (1992), p. 972.



xx Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

Era of North-South Division, 420 to 589

Sui Dynasty, 581 to 618

Tang Dynasty, 618 to 907

Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms era, 907 to 960

Song Dynasty, 960 to 1279

Northern Song Dynasty, 960 to 1127

Southern Song Dynasty, 1127 to 1279

Liao Dynasty, 916 to 1125

Jin Dynasty, 1115 to 1234

Yuan Dynasty (Mongols), 1271 to 1368

Ming Dynasty, 1368 to 1644

Qing Dynasty (Manchus), 1644 to 1911

Republic of China, 1912 to 1949

People’s Republic of China, 1949 to present



1

Chapter One

CHINA AS A NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN

Managing the rise of China constitutes one of the most importantchallenges facing the United States in the early 21st century. Chinahas always been one of the most important states in the internationalsystem, primarily because of its large territory, vast resources, andlarge population. Although a relatively weak power throughout themodern era, China’s significance for international politics has beendramatically increasing since 1978, when the market reforms initi-ated by Deng Xiaoping placed it on a course of action that could leadto a rapid transformation of its latent potential into actual power,both within Asia and in the global arena. This process is significantnot only because it promises the internal transformation of one of the world’s oldest civilizations but also because if concluded success-

fully it could result in a dramatic power transition within the inter-

national system. Such power transitions, if the long-cycle theorists of international relations are correct, come about once every 100 yearsand involve fundamental shifts in the relative power relationshipsprevailing among the major states of the system. More important,most such shifts have often resulted in “global wars” between thosedominant states that provide the vital function of order-maintenancefor the international system and rising states that seek to challenge,directly or indirectly, the authority and rules of the system. Such

wars usually lead to the emergence of a new pattern of dominantstates that control the function of order-maintenance during thefollowing century.1

______________1The most systematic exposition of this phenomenon can be found in Thompson(1988).



2 Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

Given these considerations, the rise of China generates great analyti-cal and policy interest, especially for the United States—the primary provider of order-maintenance for the international system since theSecond World War. More specifically, China is seen to present a po-tential national security concern for the United States, for three rea-sons:

• Its general geostrategic significance and growing national capa-bilities,

• Its expanding involvement in and influence over the interna-tional community, and

• Unique historical and cultural factors that could exacerbateSino-U.S. tensions over the long term.

China’s huge size and geographic position as the only Eurasian con-tinental power directly bordering on Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia,South Asia, Central Asia, and Russia mark it as a major geostrategicplayer able to critically affect U.S. global and regional interests. Bei-

jing’s ability to influence events across Eurasia has increased greatly during the past two decades as a result of booming economic growthand an expanding involvement in the global economic and politicalorder. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has tripled in less thantwo decades, leading some analysts to conclude that with averagegrowth rates of approximately 8–9 percent per annum over the next20 years, China’s GDP could surpass that of the United States within10–15 years.2 The time frame governing such an outcome seemsexceedingly optimistic, given recent drops in China’s growth rate andthe likely long-term adverse consequences of such current events asthe Asian financial crisis and China’s domestic banking crisis.However, even appreciably lower growth rates, if sustained for many

years and higher than those of the United States and other Westerncountries, would merely delay, rather than eliminate, the possibility of China’s GDP overtaking that of the United States in the nextcentury.

China’s high growth rate is increasingly driven by rapidly expanding economic and technological links with the outside, especially with

______________2For example, see Wolf et al. (1995).



China as a National Security Concern 3

the United States, and with the highly foreign-trade-orientedeconomies of South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia.Largely because of these trends, China is seeking greater influencebeyond its borders; it is becoming an active participant in a wide va-riety of international diplomatic and economic institutions and foraand is increasingly emphasizing maritime Asia in its economic andgeostrategic calculations. Such developments pose obvious implica-tions for U.S. global and regional economic and political access andinfluence.

In addition, China’s abandonment in the 1980s of the failed autarkicand centrally planned economic system of the Maoist period andsubsequent adoption of a successful, market-driven and outward-

oriented reform strategy have permitted significant, albeit largely in-cremental, increases in aggregate Chinese military power. Of par-ticular significance to the United States is China’s nuclear weaponsand ballistic missile modernization, its growing capabilities in the ar-eas of space and information operations, and its development of airand naval battlespace denial capabilities along its eastern and south-ern coastlines. Continued increases in China’s GDP will almost cer-tainly translate into further improvements in Chinese military ca-pabilities and a growing maritime strategic orientation, with directimplications for the security position and capabilities of the UnitedStates and its allies in East Asia.

The potential negative implications for U.S. security interests of a

possible fundamental structural shift in the distribution of economicand military power across Eurasia are increased by several specifichistorical and cultural features of China’s strategic outlook, experi-ence, and behavior. First, throughout most of its long imperial his-tory, China was the predominant political, economic, cultural, andmilitary power of East Asia. Such predominance created a deep-rooted belief in the geopolitical centrality of China to the region. AsChina’s relative power grows, this belief could eventually predisposeBeijing to seek to displace the United States as the preeminent powerand central provider of security across much of the Asia-Pacific.

Second, China’s modern history of defeat, subjugation, and humilia-tion at the hands of the West and Japan has produced an acute




Chinese desire for international respect as a great power, as well asan enduring commitment to an independent foreign policy separatefrom the formal collaborative or alliance structures of other majorpowers, especially the United States. This impulse is exacerbated by a deeply rooted strain of xenophobia in Chinese culture. These fea-tures, when combined with the current Chinese government’s long-standing and deeply felt suspicion toward the United States, suggestthat reaching mutual strategic understanding and accommodation

with Beijing as China’s capabilities increase could prove to be very difficult.

Third, China holds strong claims to contested territories along itscontinental borders and its maritime periphery, the most important

of which are Taiwan and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.These claims, some of which offer potentially enormous economicbenefits to Beijing, receive wide support within China because boththe elite and an apparently growing segment of the populace favor astate-centric nationalist ideology dedicated to national reunificationand the creation of a strong and wealthy state. The usefulness of thisnationalist ideology as a means of providing popular legitimacy toChina’s ideologically discredited communist government, reinforcedby the general national pride engendered by China’s impressive eco-nomic accomplishments, suggests that Beijing could become moreassertive in pressing many of its irredentist claims as its overall ca-pabilities increase. Efforts by China to employ military force in thiseffort would clearly challenge a vital U.S. interest in the continuedpeace and stability of Asia.

The continued increase in China’s relative economic and military capabilities, combined with its growing maritime strategic orienta-tion, if sustained over many years, will almost certainly produce botha redefinition of Beijing’s strategic interests and increased efforts toimprove Beijing’s ability to protect those interests in ways that di-rectly or indirectly challenge many of the existing equities of theUnited States and its allies. Although this process of geopoliticaltransformation will inevitably be part of a larger Chinese effort tocarve a new place for itself in the international system—an effort thatcould eventually involve “a transformation of the existing hierarchy of states in the system and the patterns of relations dependent on




that hierarchy”3—the direct and specific challenges to existing U.S.strategic interests would likely occur in four key areas:

• The U.S. military’s freedom of action throughout East Asia,

• U.S. economic access to East Asia and beyond,

• The privileged political relations with most Asian powers enjoyedby the United States, and

• The overall U.S. emphasis on specific formal and informal al-liances as a way to ensure peaceful and stable development in

Asia.

Alternatively, the reversal or collapse of China’s dynamic reform pro-cess could lead to growing domestic social and political conflict andthe emergence of a weak, insecure, and defensive Chinese regimethat would also present major adverse challenges to the interests of the United States and its allies. Although almost certainly less able tochallenge the prevailing freedom of action and predominant influ-ence and access of the United States in Asia, such a Chinese regimecould become more belligerent and assertive over critical nationalistissues such as Taiwan and less cooperative toward a variety of re-gional and global issues of concern to the United States, such as armsproliferation, free trade, human rights, and the peaceful resolution of the situation on the Korean peninsula.4

To assess China’s ability and willingness to pose such fundamentalchallenges to U.S. strategic interests over the long term, this study systematically identifies and examines a range of critical domesticand international factors influencing Chinese security outlook andbehavior. Chapter Two assesses China’s basic and longstanding se-curity problem and its resulting general security strategy, derivedfrom both its geopolitical security interests as a continental Asianpower and its general historical and cultural approach to security.This leads in Chapter Three to an assessment of China’s security be-havior historically, especially with respect to the use of force versusdiplomacy. This is followed in Chapter Four by a detailed analysis of

______________3

Gilpin (1988), p. 596.4For a more detailed examination of the likely security stance of a weak, insecureChinese regime, see Swaine (1995b), pp. 104–109.




China’s current “calculative” approach to security, its genesis, itslogic, and its manifestations in various issue-areas of internationalpolitics. Chapter Five assesses both the natural longevity of the cur-rent calculative strategy and the long-term alternatives to that strat-egy, using theoretical and empirical arguments to speculate aboutChina’s future grand strategic trajectories as a rising power in inter-national politics. Finally, Chapter Six presents several concluding comments about the eventual likely emergence of an assertive China,along with several general policy recommendations.

Throughout this study, China’s grand strategy is assessed primarily from a power-political perspective, using elements of a realist ap-proach to international relations. Adopting this approach implies

that the focus of analysis rests principally on the state as a politicalentity dedicated to ensuring the internal and external security (i.e.,survival and prosperity) of both elite and populace. Material factorssuch as the country’s geographical position, resource endowment,economic size and structure, and military power, as well as thepower wielded by senior political leaders, are emphasized as criticaldeterminants of a regime’s capability to provide for its security.Moreover, external and internal power relationships and power-oriented behavior among major international entities and key leaders, as measured primarily by such material factors, are stressedas basic elements determining threat perceptions and overallsecurity calculations and actions. Hence, the international system isviewed primarily as a set of interactions among competitive, power-oriented states. At the same time, the approach used in this study acknowledges that various social and elite values and beliefs and theinfluence of different political systems (e.g., centralized authoritarianversus pluralist or democratic regimes) significantly condition, attimes in critical ways, the perceptions of security issues held by political elites, their preferences, and their actions to ensure thesecurity of the state. Indeed, the analysis attempts to assess themanner and degree to which such nonmaterial factors combine withstructural factors to shape the formulation and implementation of China’s grand strategy.

Although the analysis presented in Chapters Two through Four in-cludes an assessment of both the subjective intentions and the ob-

jective structural conditions influencing Chinese security behavior inthe past, the assessment of possible future Chinese behavior pre-




sented in Chapter Five does not assume that any particular set of Chinese intentions will shape China’s future security strategy, otherthan a continued, general desire to strengthen and preserve eco-nomic power and regain geopolitical prominence. The attempt toidentify and assess the likelihood of alternative future Chinese grandstrategies is based mainly on a discussion of material elements thataffect possible changes in Chinese state and national capabilities, as

well as inferences drawn from China’s historical experience as a uni-fied state over many centuries and the experience of other rising states. In other words, the analysis of future Chinese security behav-ior presented in this study does not assume the existence or emer-gence of either malevolent or benevolent intentions on the part of China’s leaders or populace. Rather, China’s future security stance isseen to arise from primarily structural, systemic, and historical fac-tors. Where historical evidence is available, the analysis incorporatesit as appropriate; where historical evidence is inappropriate—as, forexample, in the discussion of future Chinese strategic behavior—theanalysis uses a mixture of deductive argument supplemented by his-torical insights relating to the behavior of other great powers.

Any examination of China’s grand strategy, such as this, faces par-ticular methodological problems. Clearly, many objections can beleveled against attempts to generalize about the security behavior of the Chinese state across the imperial and modern eras. For example,some China historians argue that each Chinese regime or dynasty possessed a unique set of political, social, and intellectual character-istics that prevent the drawing of any meaningful generalizationsabout state behavior. Other scholars question the very notion that aChinese state (as a political and institutional, as opposed to culturaland ideological entity) existed before the modern era. Although it isextremely important to recognize (and incorporate into the analysis)differences in individual regime characteristics and structures, thereare arguably sufficient similarities and continuities in the geographiclocation, ethnic make-up, and political structures and beliefs of theChinese state to justify attempts to generalize about its security be-havior throughout both pre-modern and modern times.

Other objections can be raised against the basic subject of this study,as well as its conceptual approach. Some analysts of China’s currentand historical approach to security argue that the Chinese state hasnever consciously and deliberately pursued a grand strategy, of




whatever type. Others argue that the imperial Chinese regime wasless concerned with protecting its territory and asserting its materialpower over other political entities than with ensuring its cultural andideological preeminence through proper ritual and right conduct,and that the modern Chinese nation-state similarly emphasizesstatus and prestige over state power. Despite the fact that China’sgrand strategy has never been explicitly presented in any comprehensive manner by its rulers, the historical and contempora-neous analysis presented in this study indicates that China, like any other state, has indeed pursued a grand strategy conditioned sub-stantially by its historical experience, its political interests, and itsgeostrategic environment. Moreover, although there is no questionthat a concern with cultural or ideological preeminence has often in-fluenced Chinese security behavior, China’s historical record, as wellas deductive analysis relating to the behavior of other great powers,together suggest that the ability of the Chinese state to sustain suchpreeminence ultimately relies greatly on both internal and externalmaterial conditions and power relationships.



9

Chapter Two

CHINA’S SECURITY PROBLEM

China’s security strategy is heavily conditioned by four fundamentalfeatures of its security environment.

• A long and in many places geographically vulnerable border,

• The presence of many potential threats, both nearby and distant,

• A domestic political system marked by high levels of elite in-ternecine conflict at the apex and weak institutions or processesfor mediating and resolving such conflict, and

• A great power self-image.

Even though the total geographic expanse of the areas under thecontrol of the unified Chinese state has repeatedly expanded andcontracted throughout China’s long history (as discussed in detail inthe next chapter), its territorial borders or frontiers have extended, ata minimum, over many thousands of miles. For example, China’spresent-day land borders extend for well over 10,000 miles. 1 Incomparison, the northern boundaries of the Roman Empire at thetime of Augustus—from the northwestern tip of Spain in the west toJerusalem in the east—measured roughly 5,500 miles. Much of theChinese border crosses relatively open and flat grass and scrublands,deserts, and dry steppes. To the east and south, China’s ocean bor-ders abut the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South ChinaSea. Such a long, open, and exposed border has presented a major

______________1See Map 1.




RANDMR1121.M1

Xinjiang

Qinghai

Xizang

Yunnan

Sichuan

Gansu Shaanxi

Shanxi

Henan

Hubei

Guizhou

Guangxi Guangdong

Jiangxi

Fujian

Shandong

Zhejiang

Anhui

Hebei Nei Mongol

Liaoning

Jilin

Heilongjiang

Hunan

PAK

AFG

KYRGYZSTAN

Hong Kong

TAIWAN

KOREA

SOUTH

KOREA

NEPAL

BHUTAN

BANGLADESH

CAMBODIA

INDIA

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

MONGOLIA

PHILIPPINES

MYANMAR

THAILAND

LAOS

VIETNAM

Yellow

Sea

East China

Sea

South China

Sea

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Baikal

NORTH

Hainan

Beijing

Jiangsu

Ningxia

National capital

International boundary

Provincial boundary

Disputed boundary

0 500Miles

Map 1—China and Its Surrounding Areas

challenge to every Chinese government’s efforts to maintain anadequate defense against external attack.

The presence, during various periods of Chinese history, of signifi-cant numbers of potentially threatening nearby tribes, kingdoms,and states further exacerbates the challenges to territorial defenseposed by a long, vulnerable border. During the imperial era, theprimary security threat to Chinese territory was posed by an array of

nearby nomadic tribes located along China’s northern and northwestern continental borders. These peoples, skilled in the tactics



China’s Security Problem 11

and techniques of mounted warfare and desiring Chinese resourcesto enrich and strengthen their local political and social positions,constantly raided and harassed the Chinese state and frequently formed confederations that challenged and at times overthrew Chi-nese imperial regimes. A secondary but nonetheless significantthreat to Chinese territory was posed, between the 7th and 9th cen-turies, by a large and expansionist, nonnomadic Tibetan kingdom lo-cated along China’s western border.2 Other political entities locatedin present-day Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia also at times posedsecurity threats to imperial China. Moreover, during the first two-thirds of the modern period (i.e., between approximately 1850 and1945),3 major threats or security concerns to China’s continental andmaritime borders were posed by aggressive imperialist powers suchas Russia, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, and France. Since the endof the Second World War, a variety of militarily strong or highly industrialized nation-states such as India, Russia, Japan, and theUnited States have posed a variety of security threats or concerns toChinese leaders, including the threat of invasion.

Historically, the Chinese political system has been marked by ahighly personalistic pattern of rule at the top in which ultimate au-thority derives primarily from the power and beliefs of individualleaders, not legal or organizational norms and processes.4 In such apolitical structure, senior leadership conflict and succession are re-solved and critical policy issues are decided through a largely informal process of contention among complex patron-clientalliance networks organized along familial, power, and policy lines5

and often reinforced by more formal bureaucratic structures. During

______________2Tibetans captured the Tang Dynasty capital of Ch’ang-an in 763.

3The modern era overlaps slightly with the imperial era, which ended with the col-lapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.

4This is not to say that the Chinese polity is not highly bureaucratized. Chineseregimes from imperial times to the modern era have invariably contained complex and intricate bureaucratic organizations and procedures, many of which served to fa-cilitate, constrain, and generally channel a wide range of leadership interactions.However, at the apex of the Chinese political system, such structures and processesserved more to support, rather than to define and determine, elite power relations andpolicy decisions. More important, they did not authoritatively mediate conflict or en-

sure peaceful leadership succession.5Chapter Three discusses the major policy issues that have historically divided Chi-nese political leadership groups.




the imperial era, contending political leadership groups consisted of the emperor; related members of the imperial household; imperialretainers or servants such as eunuchs, concubines, and personaladvisors; military officers; and an array of Confucian scholar-officialsand bureaucrats. During the modern period, dominant party leaders, subordinate contenders for party leadership, military officers, advisors and secretaries, and bureaucratic officials haveformed the core of most personal political groupings.

Within such a highly personalized political system, policy contentand behavior, including external policy, often become a tool in thedomestic power struggle among the senior leadership. As a result,basic shifts in the state’s policy content and direction can at times

derive from the power calculations of a particular leadership groupor may occur because of changes in the balance of power among contending groups or because of the rise or fall of a particular leader.

Also, for such a system, periods of internal order and stability oftenresult from the victory of a leadership group or coalition led by asingle “strong man” or dominant clique in command of the maincoercive instruments of rule (i.e., the military and internal security apparatus). Conversely, political and social disorder and, at times,regime collapse and civil war, can result from prolonged elite strife,corrupt and repressive leadership actions, and the arbitrary,unchecked exercise of power.

Once in power, Chinese leaders have historically sought to retain

legitimacy, diffuse internal and external threats, maintain control,and thereby reduce internecine political conflict by frequently invok-ing widely accepted ethical or ideological norms, beliefs, and pro-cesses formulated to justify the authority of the Chinese state and topeacefully regulate state-society relations. Such concepts are con-tained, to varying degrees, in the traditional corpus of thought asso-ciated with Chinese state Confucianism and more recently in thehighly state-centric variants of nationalism and communism es-poused by the modern Chinese regime.

Despite such stabilizing efforts, China’s personality-based pattern of rule has remained highly prone to internecine political conflict, oftenexacerbated by economic and political corruption, and to broader

challenges from both Chinese society and omnipresent foreignthreats.

Because of these and other factors, the Chinese state has of-




ten been plagued by internal political strife, extended periods of dis-unity, and open internal warfare. Indeed, the Chinese state has beenunited as a single entity under Chinese rule for only approximately one-half of the period since the end of the Han Dynasty in 220 A.D.During the other half of this period, China has been embroiled indomestic conflict, divided between Chinese and non-Chineseregimes, or entirely ruled by non-Han Chinese invaders. Moreover,throughout Chinese history, periods of domestic weakness and disar-ray have often been accompanied by instances of foreign invasionand occupation. As a result, China’s vulnerable borders and history of repeated foreign incursions have established a strong connection,in the minds of most Chinese, between internal political and social

weakness and foreign aggression.

The combination of China’s long-standing geopolitical centrality in Asia, its high level of economic self-sufficiency, and its past eco-nomic, cultural, and political influence over the many smaller states,tribes, and kingdoms along its periphery have produced a deep-seated belief in China’s political, social, and cultural preeminence in

Asia. Indeed, throughout most of its long history, the Chinese state,as an organized bureaucratic, political-military institution, con-fronted no peer competitors. Although confederations of nomadicand semi-nomadic tribes from Inner Asia and Manchuria at timesoverthrew and displaced the Chinese state, these entities were inca-pable, organizationally and conceptually, of providing an alternativesystem of political and military control and social order. Almostinvariably during the imperial era, alien occupiers were compelled,to differing degrees, to adopt Chinese administrative structures andprocedures to govern the much larger Han Chinese population.6

During late imperial times (i.e., since at least the Song Dynasty of 960–1279), the belief in Chinese preeminence among the states andconfederations of East Asia was greatly reinforced by the hierarchicaland universalistic political-ethical values of Song Neo-Confucianism.

______________6This is not to deny that several classic features of the imperial Chinese state and soci-ety emerged in part as a result of extensive contact with nomadic peoples. For exam-ple, many of the more militant, totalitarian, and coercive aspects of imperial rule, mostclearly exemplified in the autocratic and at times despotic power of the emperor (incontrast to the bureaucratic and ideological authority of Confucian civil administra-tors), derived in large part from nomadic practices. See Fairbank (1992), pp. 110–112.




This belief system asserted that peace and stability within societiesand among states resulted from the maintenance of a set of superior-inferior relationships in which each individual or political entity clearly understood and performed its proper role relative to others.

Within such a system, proper conduct ideally resulted from self-edu-cation in the Confucian classics or the emulation of a virtuous leader

who commanded respect and authority through his moral, uprightbehavior in upholding correct, hierarchical, patterns of human rela-tions. In society, this leadership figure was usually the father or pa-triarch of an extended lineage-based clan; within the political realm,it was the emperor.7

Within the cosmology of imperial interstate relations, China stood at

the top of the pecking order, providing an intellectual and bureau-cratic model of proper governance for Chinese and non-Chinesealike. Other states or kingdoms beyond the realm of imperial China

were normally expected to acknowledge, and thereby validate, thesuperior position of the emperor in this sinocentric world order.Deference to the authority of the Chinese ruler thus not only af-firmed, conceptually, the proper ethical relations among states butalso, in the Chinese view, ensured peace and tranquillity in the Chi-nese world order by removing any ideological challenges to the supe-rior position of the Chinese state. However, the imperial Chinesebelief in the virtues of a hierarchical world order does not imply thatChina’s political leaders always treated other political entities as in-feriors. Chinese imperial rulers were often highly practical in theirapproach to statecraft. When confronted with relatively strong po-tential or actual foes, they at times adopted far less hierarchical prac-tices.8 Yet the traditional preference was clearly for a sinocentric or-der.

On the material level, China’s great power self-image was alsostrengthened, throughout most of Chinese history, by the high levelof economic self-sufficiency and abundance of resources enjoyed by the imperial state and the resulting significant level of economic in-fluence China exerted over its smaller neighbors. Although many Chinese imperial regimes permitted extensive trade and commercial

______________

7Fairbank (1992), pp. 51–53, 62–63.8This point is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.




contact with the outside, such activities were in most instances notessential to the maintenance of domestic order and well-being. Infact, an excessive dependence on foreign economic activities wasoften seen as a source of regime weakness and vulnerability toforeign manipulation and influence and hence was resisted by many Chinese rulers. Moreover, for most of its history, the Chinese state

was far wealthier, and controlled far more resources, than any of theforeign states, kingdoms, or tribal groupings with which it interacted.

The above suggests that China’s self-image as a great power during the imperial era derived primarily from the dominant influenceChina exerted over the Asian region by virtue of the sheer size,longevity, cultural and bureaucratic influence, and economic wealth

of the Chinese heartland and the Chinese state that ruled it. China’smilitary might also contributed to its great power self-image. Yet thisfactor was arguably of secondary importance in the minds of mostChinese. In other words, China’s sinocentric world view did not re-sult primarily from nor rely upon an ability to exercise clear military dominance over its neighbors. Indeed, as discussed in the nextchapter, strong imperial Chinese states did not always manage todominate militarily neighboring political entities.

During the modern era, several events have injected a strong elementof political equality into Chinese perceptions of interstate relations:Chinese contact with industrialized nation-states operating in aglobal political arena, the collapse of Neo-Confucianism as China’s

conceptual framework for the international order, and its subse-quent replacement by a state-centric form of nationalism. As a re-sult, since at least the early 20th century, many educated Chinesehave stressed the need for China to attain the status, respect, and in-fluence of a major power contending with other major powers in theglobal arena. That is, they have stressed the need for China to attainequality with, and not necessarily superiority over, other major pow-ers. At the same time, the notion that China should in some senseenjoy a preeminent place among neighboring Asian states remainsrelatively strong among both elites and ordinary Chinese citizens.This is true even though the form and basis of Chinese preeminencein the modern era have changed significantly. In particular, the lossof China’s cultural preeminence and economic self-sufficiency andthe emergence of powerful industrialized nation-states along its bor-ders have resulted in a stronger emphasis on the attainment of great




power status through external economic/technological influenceand military might. However, it remains unclear as to whether and,if so, to what degree China’s aspirations for regional great power sta-tus consciously require military dominance over its periphery; it iseven less clear whether China’s self-image as a great power requiresthe deliberate attainment of a superior military position on a globalscale.9

Historically, the combination of extreme geographic vulnerability toattacks from the periphery, state-society volatility, and a deeply rooted great power mentality have produced two fundamental sets of security perceptions among most Chinese: On the one hand, an in-tense fear of social chaos and political fragmentation or collapse,

usually seen as “just-around-the-corner” and often closely associ-ated with aggression and intervention from the outside; on the otherhand, a belief that such chaos can be avoided only through the es-tablishment and maintenance of a strong, united, and “just” (i.e.,relatively uncorrupt and unabusive) government. From the Chineseperspective, such governmental qualities ideally require the creationand maintenance of a monolithic political order with a single sourceof power and authority and, until recent decades, a high level of eco-nomic self-sufficiency. Moreover, these qualities of government areto be cultivated and protected by the moral rectitude of individualleaders—and in particular by a single, dominant, public-spiritedleader—not by an internal structure of institutional checks and bal-ances or the adherence to impartial legal procedures and rulings.10

For the Chinese, such a personalistic, concentrated pattern of politi-cal power is viewed as necessary to provide domestic order and well-being, deter potential nearby threats to Chinese territory, and gen-

______________9This of course is not to deny that material factors associated with a perceived need toprotect and advance China’s expanding economic and political interests could even-tually compel Chinese rulers to seek such military dominance. The details of the evo-lution of China’s self-image as a great power and its implications for Chinese security behavior will be discussed in greater detail below.10The strong belief in the need for a monolithic political order does not imply thatChinese regimes have invariably been led by a single, powerful figure. In many imperial regimes (e.g., during the Qing Dynasty), the power of the supreme leader wasseverely limited by the practical realities and complexities of elite politics. See, forexample, Bartlett (1991); and Oxnam (1975). The authors are indebted to LymanMiller for drawing our attention to these sources.




erally maintain regional peace and tranquillity. Moreover, for mostChinese, the full attainment of these core security objectives requiresnot only strong military defenses and economic wealth but also theability to greatly influence, if not dominate, events on China’s pe-riphery, through both military and nonmilitary means. In the mod-ern period, these requirements have also included a strongly feltneed to deter aggression from and elicit the respect, if not deference,of more distant, major powers outside the periphery.

The twin security goals of preserving domestic order and well-being and deterring external threats to Chinese territory are closely interre-lated, from the Chinese perspective. On the one hand, the mainte-nance of domestic order and well-being is viewed as the sine qua non

for the defense of Chinese territory against outside threats. Specifi-cally, a weak, divided and conflictual, or “unjust” (i.e., highly coerciveand corrupt) leadership and an impoverished, disgruntled populaceare viewed as the primary sources of domestic instability and conflictand invariably lead to a weakening of China’s defenses, which in turninvite foreign manipulation and aggression. On the other hand,maintaining a strong defense, eliciting political (and, during the pre-modern period, cultural) deference from the periphery, preserving the broader goal of Chinese regional centrality, and influencing theactions of more distant powers are seen as absolutely necessary notonly to ensure regional order and deter or prevent foreign aggressionand territorial dismemberment but also to avert internal social un-rest. This is because a state that is unable to control its borders andcommand the respect of foreign powers is seen as weak and unableto rule its citizenry.

Overall, in the Chinese security calculus, the maintenance of domes-tic order and well-being usually takes precedence over the preserva-tion of geopolitical centrality and the establishment of influence overthe Chinese periphery, for two reasons. First, the latter two goalscannot be reached without the prior attainment of the former objec-tive. Second, historically, domestic order and well-being have oftenproved to be extremely difficult to achieve and preserve over time, asindicated above, and thus usually require enormous efforts by thestate. In contrast, although an inability to maintain adequate mate-rial capabilities and resources for internal order poses a direct threatto regime survival, weakened military capabilities vis-à-vis theoutside could be compensated for, at least over the short to medium




term, through the doctrinal and ritualistic trappings of imperialpreeminence or the maintenance of a large, defense-orientedstanding army and, most recently, a small nuclear deterrent force.

The central problem arising from China’s core security goals andrequirements thus was (and remains) how to maintain, first andforemost, the robust level of resources and control features neededto preserve or enhance an often precarious domestic order and well-being and at the same time ensure an adequate defense and externalpresence keyed primarily to the maintenance of control over ordominant influence along China’s periphery to support, ultimately,the attainment or preservation of geopolitical primacy.

Three sets of variables influence the interaction between these exter-nal and internal security demands and constraints and thus deter-mine the type of security strategy adopted by the Chinese state at any particular point in time:

• The capability and outlook of the central government, as mea-sured by the unity, integrity, and security priorities of its leader-ship and the extent of control it exercises over the governmentbureaucracy and military,

• The level and origin (external or internal) of resources availableto the state for national defense versus internal security and so-cial welfare, and

• The capabilities and dispositions of potential foes, particularly those located along China’s periphery, as well as more distantmajor powers.

As discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, throughout most of Chinese history, the largely self-sufficient, internally oriented, andinstability-prone Chinese state has been more concerned, whenproviding for its external security, with controlling or neutralizing di-rect threats to an established geographic heartland originating froman extensive periphery than with acquiring territory or generally ex-panding Chinese power and influence far beyond China’s borders.During the imperial period, wealthy and powerful Chinese regimesoften sought to ensure external security and affirm (or reaffirm) the

superiority of the Chinese politico-cultural order by attaining a posi-tion of clear dominance over the nearby periphery, preferably




through the establishment of unambiguous suzerainty relationsbacked, when possible, by superior military force. This was particu-larly evident during the founding or early stages of a regime, whenstrong, charismatic military figures controlled events. But the ability of a strong regime to implement and sustain such dominance variedgreatly, depending upon the capabilities and geostrategic dispositionand posture of the foreign state, kingdom, or tribal confederation inquestion and, to a lesser extent, on the general attitudes and beliefsof later Chinese emperors toward the use of force and the level of civilian elites’ opposition to costly and politically disruptive, military-based, coercive security approaches. Often, when faced with bothdomestic opposition and leadership uncertainty and persistent ex-ternal pressure, strong imperial Chinese states would discard coer-cive, offensive military strategies in favor of a variety of pragmatic,noncoercive, suboptimal external security strategies, all carried outunder a guise of symbolic deference to “superior” Chinese authority.

In contrast, relatively weak or declining imperial Chinese regimes,usually faced with growing concerns over domestic order and well-being and often unable to elicit even symbolic deference from otherstates, would rely primarily on noncoercive strategies to stave off foreign attacks or maintain stability along the periphery. When suchstrategies proved unsuccessful, weak and internally divided regimes

would in a few instances resort to desperate military means to de-fend their security, at times in response to the demands of dominant,conservative domestic leadership groups. Such resistance invariably met with little success, however, and a severely weakened regime, orthe wholesale collapse of a regime, would result in major reductionsin Chinese control over the periphery and sometimes also in the lossof Chinese territory to foreigners. Yet strong, unified Chineseregimes would eventually reemerge and seek to regain such losses.Hence, the dynamic interaction among changing foreign anddomestic capabilities and domestic elite attitudes and behavior cre-ated a repetitive, cyclical pattern of expansion, consolidation, andcontraction of Chinese control over the periphery that coincided

with the rise, maintenance, and fall of imperial Chinese regimes.

During the modern period, China’s security problem and resulting strategy has continued to center on efforts to preserve a fragiledegree of domestic order and well-being as a first priority, and toconsolidate control over the periphery as a primary means of exter-




nal defense. However, these efforts have taken place largely withinan environment of generally limited but increasing resources andcapabilities. Moreover, as discussed in greater detail in the nextchapter, the modern era has precipitated some major shifts in Chi-na’s overall security environment and leadership outlook, leading tochanges in threat perceptions, the definition of the periphery andrequisites for periphery control, the internal and external require-ments of domestic order and well-being, and hence the specific typeof security strategies pursued by the Chinese state. The key questionthat China’s basic security problem presents for the future is theextent to which these changing requirements for domestic order andperiphery control, combined with China’s increasing capabilities,

will alter or reaffirm past historical patterns of strong state behavior,especially regarding the use of force rather than diplomacy. To an-swer this question, the historical record concerning China’s security behavior will first be examined more closely. Following that, thestudy examines the specific features of China’s present security strat-egy, assesses its longevity, and identifies what might replace it overthe long term.



21

Chapter Three

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Chinese security behavior since the emergence and maturation of the unified Chinese state well over 1,000 years ago has contained fivecore features, each significant to both current and future security policy:

• Efforts to protect the Chinese heartland through border defenseand control over a large and long-standing strategic periphery

whose outer geographic limits remained relatively constant overtime.

• Periodic expansion and contraction of periphery control andregime boundaries, primarily as a result of fluctuations in statecapacity; the eventual reemergence of a unified state, often de-

spite long periods of fragmentation and civil war.• The frequent yet limited use of force against external entities,

primarily for heartland defense and periphery control, and oftenon the basis of pragmatic calculations of relative power and ef-fect.

• A heavy reliance on noncoercive security strategies to control orpacify the periphery when the state is relatively weak, unable todominate the periphery through military means, or regards theuse of force as unnecessary or excessively costly.

• A strong, albeit sporadic, susceptibility to the influence of do-mestic leadership politics, through both the largely idiosyncraticeffect of charismatic leaders and elite strife and the more regularinfluence of recurring leadership debates over autonomy and theuse of force.




This chapter describes and analyzes each of these features, thusproviding the historical context for presenting and evaluating Chi-na’s current and possible future strategic orientation and behavior,contained in Chapters Four and Five, respectively.

BORDER DEFENSE AND PERIPHERY CONTROL

For over 1,000 years, China’s external security behavior has beenkeyed to the defense of a Chinese cultural, geographic, and sociopo-litical heartland. This area largely comprises present-day North andSouth China Proper, which encompasses a mosaic of rich agricul-tural plains, interspersed with small and medium-sized mountain

ranges, centered on the tributaries and floodplains of the Yellow River in the north and the Yangtze River in the south. The eastern,southern, and southwestern boundaries of the Chinese heartland aredefined primarily by geographical barriers (the Yellow Sea, the EastChina Sea, the South China Sea, and the mountains, jungles, andhigh plateaus of the west and southwest). In the north, however, theboundaries of the Chinese heartland were determined by a combi-nation of both geographic and human factors: the enormous ex-panse of the arid steppes and deserts of the north and northwest,

which resisted the establishment of the sedentary, intensive agricul-tural settlements of the south, and the fierce resistance presented by nomadic tribes that occupied the entire northern frontier. Map 2highlights the approximate area of the Chinese heartland.

Demographically, over 90 percent of the occupants of the Chineseheartland are ethnic Han Chinese or descendants of mixed Han-nomadic or Han-Southeast Asian peoples.1 These people constitutea highly homogeneous culture distinguished by a single written lan-guage, a tight-knit, lineage- and clan-based pattern of social organi-zation, and a common set of social beliefs drawn largely from thehumanistic and ethical doctrine of Confucianism.

______________1The Han Chinese have not remained separate from other cultures in Asia. They haveabsorbed many of the political and social customs and beliefs of nearby peoplesthroughout their long occupation of the Chinese heartland. Indeed, prolonged inter-action between Han Chinese and Inner Asian peoples in particular significantly influ-

enced the structure and behavior of the imperial Chinese state, as discussed below.



The Historical Context 23

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Map 2—China’s Heartland

The Chinese heartland emerged over 1,000 years ago largely as aresult of four historical developments:

• The creation of a single, unified Chinese state (the short-livedQin Dynasty) in 221 B.C., through a protracted process of warfareand diplomatic maneuver among many rival feudal kingdoms.This first Chinese state encompassed much of present-day NorthChina south of the Great Wall.

• The emergence of the major institutional and conceptual fea-tures of the imperial Chinese state during the Former Han Dy-




nasty (206 B.C.–24 A.D.), the refinement and extension of thosefeatures over the next several centuries, and the concurrent ex-tension of the Chinese regime’s centralized political and military control over most of the heartland region described above.2

• The subsequent occupation and settlement of the entire heart-land region, through the gradual migration of northern Chinesepeoples southward, eastward, and southwestward to the ocean,the high plateaus of Central Asia, and the jungles of Southeast

Asia. Much of North and Central China Proper had been settledby the end of the Later Han Dynasty (220 A.D.), although parts of the southwest and South China Proper were not fully, and per-manently, settled until centuries later, during the Tang Dynasty

(618–907), the Song Dynasty (960–1279), and, in the case of present-day Yunnan Province, during the early decades of theMing Dynasty (1368–1644).

• The gradual acceptance by the entire populace of the heartlandregion of the fundamental precepts of Confucianism as a basisfor ordering relations within society; this process began during the Former Han Dynasty and continued through at least the endof the Tang Dynasty.

Historically, the defense of this Chinese heartland required efforts by the Chinese state to directly or indirectly control, influence, or neu-tralize a very large periphery surrounding it.3 For virtually the entire

imperial era (i.e., from the Han Dynasty until the mid 19th century, when the late Qing Dynasty came into contact with many Westernimperialist powers), this periphery region primarily encompassedlarge tracts of land along the northern and northwestern frontiers,

______________2 Although the Qin had conquered and absorbed its rivals, abolished many of thesocial and economic foundations of the previous feudal order, and established acentralized bureaucratic polity across North China, its rulers governed by rigid anddespotic laws and harsh punishments. Thus it did not survive long past the death of its founder. In its place eventually emerged a more sophisticated regime thatcombined elements of its autocratic predecessor with a more enlightened political andsocial system led by civilian government administrators and scholar-officials educatedin Confucian precepts that stressed the maintenance of political and social orderthrough the broad acceptance of explicit hierarchical roles and ethical values.3

The central importance of the concepts of core and periphery to Chinese security policy are also stressed by Michael H. Hunt, whose work has influenced our overallunderstanding of this complex subject. See in particular, Hunt (1996).




i.e., modern-day Xinjiang, Outer and Inner Mongolia, Tibet, andnortheast China (i.e., former Manchuria). The northern part of present-day Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula were only intermittently regarded as a part of China’s strategic periphery during the imperial era, whereas ocean regions adjacent to China’seastern and southern coastline, Hainan Island, Taiwan, Japan, andthe Russian Far East first took on a strategic value only at the end of the imperial era, during the Qing Dynasty.4 In other words, for mostof the imperial era, China’s strategic periphery consisted primarily of inland regions adjoining its continental borders. During the modernera (i.e., since the mid 19th century), China’s strategic periphery hasexpanded to fully encompass both continental and maritime regions.Map 3 shows the approximate extent of China’s historical periphery.

Throughout most of Chinese history, the pacification or control of this periphery was usually regarded as essential to prevent attacks onthe heartland and, during various periods of the imperial era, to se-cure Chinese dominance over significant nearby inland (and, to amuch lesser extent, maritime) trade routes. The establishment of Chinese control or influence over the periphery, whether actual (asin the form of military dominance or various specific types of lucra-tive economic and political arrangements) or largely symbolic (as re-flected in the more ritualistic aspects of China’s tributary relations

with periphery “vassal” states and kingdoms), was also consideredextremely important during most of the imperial era as a means of affirming the hierarchical, sinocentric, Confucian international or-der. Even when periphery areas did not pose a significant security threat to the Chinese heartland, or during times of relative Chinese

______________4The period of the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279)constitutes a partial exceptionto this general statement. As explained in greater detail below, at that time, theimperial Chinese state was forced, by the loss of North China to nomadic powers, todefend increasingly important maritime trade and transport routes along the southerncoastline and to ensure the security of China’s rivers and tributaries. During the final years of the Song, the growing Mongol threat to China’s rivers, lakes, and seacoastprompted a significant expansion of the Song navy. Swanson (1982), p. 59. For thevast majority of the imperial era, however, inland-oriented Chinese rulers did not view the oceanic regions adjoining China’s coastline as a strategic periphery to becontrolled through the maintenance of a superior green or blue water naval force.




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Map 3—China’s Periphery

weakness, the symbolic maintenance of a sinocentric ordernonetheless remained an important objective of the Chinese state, tosustain the political legitimacy and authority of the Chinese orderand, it was hoped, to deter potential adversaries.

In addition to seeking control or influence over the strategic periph-ery, the Chinese state also frequently employed a more passivemeans of defending the heartland—various types of static defenses

along China’s territorial frontier and coastline. These defensesusually consisted of military garrisons and fortifications. The fore-




most example of the latter was, of course, the famous Great Wall,constructed along a major portion of China’s northern frontier toprotect against nomadic attacks. The Chinese also at times builtfortifications and garrisons at various points along China’s southernmaritime borders, primarily to defend against attacks by pirates.5

Such attacks at times constituted significant security threats to theChinese heartland.6 Although sometimes serving as mutually rein-forcing strategies for the defense of the heartland, sharp debates of-ten occurred within China’s ruling circles over whether to rely pri-marily on static defenses along China’s more turbulent northern andnorthwestern frontier or to launch more costly military expeditionsto control the periphery beyond. These debates are discussed ingreater detail at the end of this chapter.

During the first part of the modern era (i.e., the late 19th and early 20th centuries), most of the northern and western parts of China’slong-standing strategic periphery were directly and formally incor-porated into the Chinese heartland, either by military force and oc-cupation (in the case of Tibet and Xinjiang) or by the sinicization of the region through cultural assimilation and acceptance of Han Chi-nese migration and settlement (in the case of Inner Mongolia andManchuria). (Mongolia itself, however, thanks to its prior status as aclient of the Soviet Union, escaped this process.) As a result of thisassimilation, the territorial boundaries of the Chinese state attainedtheir maximum extent, reaching the borders of established statesthat had emerged in the modern era. Although marking an unprece-dented increase in the aggregate territorial size of the Chinese state,this expansion did not greatly increase the overall size of those com-bined heartland and periphery areas that had historically fallen un-der Chinese rule or influence. In other words, after incorporating

______________5 As Swanson (1982, p. 55) asserts, imperial Chinese maritime strategy centered on thelargely shore-based defense of river approaches, major harbors, and large offshore is-lands.

6During the Ming, pirates repeatedly attacked the seacoasts of East Asia, from Korea toIndochina. They threatened some of the most fertile and prosperous areas of imperialChina and at times struck far inland to seize and plunder important towns and cities.Between 1552 and 1559, for example, pirate attacks spread to areas north and south of the Yangtze delta, extended into modern Jiangsu and Anhui Provinces, and threatened

urban centers such as Nanjing, Suzhou, and Yangzhou—the original base of Ming power, the location of the founder’s grave, and a political center next in importance tothe Beijing area. Such attacks accelerated the decline of the Ming. So (1975), pp. 3–7.




most of its traditional northern and western strategic periphery, theChinese state in the early modern era (i.e., during the late Qing andnationalist periods) did not immediately seek to control or dominatea new, more distant strategic periphery beyond Tibet, Xinjiang, InnerMongolia, and Manchuria. This was most likely because the state atthat point was either materially unable to establish such control ordid not see the need to do so. The communist regime has also thusfar generally eschewed efforts to control a new, larger strategic pe-riphery.

The geographical delineation of the Chinese heartland and the ex-tensive periphery beyond it remained relatively constant into themodern era for several reasons: First, major geographical formations

(i.e., oceans, mountains, high plateaus, arid steppes, deserts, and jungles) largely determined the outer limits of the heartland in thepre-modern era. Such major physical boundaries prevented, forboth geographic and practical economic/administrative7 reasons,more distant migration and permanent settlement by the largely sedentary Han Chinese agricultural population and the accompany-ing establishment of those stable governing institutions found withinthe heartland.

Second, the periphery areas along China’s continental border wereoccupied by marauding tribes and kingdoms of the northeast, north,northwest, and southwest. These included, in early times, the

Xiongnu and Xianbi of the north and northeast steppes, and, later,

the Jurchens and Manchus of the northeast, the Mongols of thenorth, and the Turkic and Tibetan peoples of the northwest andsouthwest desert and plateau areas.8 During the imperial era, thesepeoples posed the primary security threat to the Chinese state andheartland and resisted efforts by Chinese rulers to control or domi-

______________7Lattimore (1979), pp. 274–275, and Lattimore (1962), pp 88–89. Lattimore argues thatvery practical cost-benefit calculations of military and administrative expense versuslocal tax revenue income often determined the limits of Chinese imperial expansion.For a similar argument, see Sheperd (1993). Sheperd states that, because of limitedfiscal capacity, “the Chinese state only found direct rule of frontier territories attractive when a jurisdiction’s economic development ensured that local tax revenues wouldcover the costs of administration or when strategic concerns dictated an administra-tive presence (that might have to be subsidized by the central government) despitelow revenue potential” (p. 401). Also see Hucker (1975), pp. 61–62.8Barfield (1989).




nate their lands. Although many fewer in number than the Han Chi-nese and generally lacking political and social institutions suitablefor administering the settled agricultural population of the Chineseheartland, these largely pastoral nomadic and semi-nomadic9 tribes,kingdoms, and confederations constantly harassed and encroachedupon the inland continental boundaries of the Chinese state,frequently controlled large portions of Chinese territory,10 and twiceconquered the entire Chinese heartland.11 In fact, non-Chineseruled all or part of the Chinese empire for considerably more thanone-half of the period between 1000 and 1911.12

The threat posed by nomadic warriors was largely due to their supe-rior warfighting capabilities and high mobility. Expert horsemen

skilled in the use of the bow and sword, they could quickly concentrate overwhelming forces at a single point and thusoverwhelm China’s usually static defenses. They were also usually able to evade pursuit and destruction by much larger, yet slower,infantry-based and heavily armored Chinese forces. Such forces

were often hard to deploy in sufficient numbers at critical pointsalong the border, difficult to provision in barren frontier areas, andconstrained in their movement and length of time in the field by aheavy reliance on long supply trains.13

Third, throughout the imperial period, no other major power centersbeyond the Chinese state were positioned either to threaten China or

______________9Semi-nomadic peoples included tribes from areas that contained both settled farm-ing and pastoral nomadic communities. These were found primarily in parts of Manchuria and Turkestan. One major power that threatened the imperial Chinesestate was not nomadic: the Tibetan Empire.

10Most notable were the regimes established in North China by the Liao (916–1125)and the Jin (1115–1234), when parts of South China were ruled by the Han ChineseSong Dynasty (960–1279).11The Yuan Dynasty (1264–1368) was established by the Mongols and the Qing Dy-nasty (1644–1911) was established by the Manchus, both non-Han Chinese nomadicor semi-nomadic peoples. For a brief overview of the origin and nature of these non-Chinese regimes, see Hucker (1975), pp. 122–133, 144–157, and Fairbank (1992), pp.112–118, 143–162.12Oxnam (1975), p. 4.

13For further details on nomadic military prowess and the problems confronting most

imperial Chinese forces that operated in northern and northwestern periphery areas,see Barfield (1989), pp. 55–56; Hucker (1975), pp. 122–123; and Jagchid and Symons(1989), pp. 52–53.




to provide allies against nearby threats. Contemporaneous empirescentered in modern-day European Russia, India, and Italy were geo-graphically distant or extremely difficult to reach and largely unin-terested in the affairs of an empire located at the far end of theEurasian continent, remote from most critical pre-modern maritimeand land-based lines of communication and trade. As a result, theChinese state was not compelled to expand beyond its historical pe-riphery to balance or counter distant threats from other establishedpowers. It persisted as the dominant civilization and political power

within Central and East Asia until the mid 19th century.

Fourth, and closely related to the previous point, the relatively fixedextent of the Chinese heartland and periphery also resulted from the

general economic and political self-sufficiency of the Chinese state. Although at times engaged quite extensively in trade and culturalcontact with other lands, and while absorbing and adapting an array of foreign religious and ethnic beliefs and practices, the imperialChinese state generally remained self-sufficient (and, at times eveninsular) as an economic and political entity. Specifically, unlikesmaller states or larger maritime empires, the Chinese state did notrely on external sources of raw materials, commodities, or know-how to prosper or survive; nor, during most of the imperial era, did ithighly value or depend upon external political or military support, inthe form of explicit, long-standing alliances, for its existence,although it certainly cooperated at times with foreign entities tocounter major threats.

External economic interests played a notable, but highly limited, rolein imperial Chinese security calculations primarily in four ways.First, the Chinese desire to protect trade routes through Central Asiato the Middle East and beyond (e.g., the famous Silk Road) gaveadded impetus to Beijing’s efforts to control or dominate parts of Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang). Second, the imperial court’s interestin pearls, ivory, and other precious materials spurred efforts to sub-

jugate parts of Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam. Third, the Chineseneed to secure tax revenues from seaborne commerce prompted theSouthern Song Dynasty to build a notable coastal naval presence.




Fourth, the later Ming Dynasty constructed a major blue water navalforce in part to expand China’s tributary trade relations.14

However, none of these economic factors was absolutely critical toexternal Chinese security behavior, or persisted over long periods of time. The extension of imperial Chinese control far into modern-day

Xinjiang was primarily strategic and reactive, i.e., intended to out-flank nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes to the north and northeastand to deny them the resources of that area. The expansion of Chi-nese influence into northern parts of modern-day Southeast Asia waspart of the larger southward migration of Han Chinese populationsand culture mentioned above and also at times occurred in responseto various security threats, discussed below. The significance of

seaborne commerce during the Song Dynasty was only a temporary phenomenon, reflecting the fact that the Song regime had beenpushed out of North China by nomadic peoples and was forced toaugment its declining land tax revenues by levying taxes on seabornetrade. This situation did not persist long after the collapse of theSong, however, as the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) was able toestablish control over the entire Chinese heartland and resume thetraditional reliance of the Chinese imperial state on land taxes andinternal grain transport. The subsequent development of a majorblue water naval force under the early Ming emperors partly re-flected the desire to increase significantly imperial coffers after thedevastation wrought by the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the costs of establishing the Ming Dynasty, and did not survive the death of itsstrongest patron, the Emperor Ming Yongle.15

Politically, for most of the imperial era, the Confucian institutionsand beliefs of the Chinese state and the parochial interests of variousleadership groups usually led to a stress on internal order over de-velopment and the maintenance of domestic harmony, stability, andprosperity over the conquest and absorption of foreign territories,

______________14Zheng He undertook seven voyages between 1405 and 1433 as commander of theMing fleet under Emperor Ming Yongle. His fleet visited Southeast Asia, Ceylon, India,the Persian Gulf, and East Africa.

15Hucker (1975), pp. 59–61; Fitzgerald (1972), pp. 90–93, 185–186; Levathes (1994); Wolters (1970), pp. 156–157; and Thomas Barfield, personal correspondence. The sig-nificance of the Ming fleet in relation to the Chinese use of force will be discussed insome detail below.




especially those areas beyond the periphery .16 During various peri-ods of imperial Chinese history, military incursions into the knownperiphery and more ambitious efforts to expand China’s political,economic, and military reach beyond the existing periphery were of-ten strongly resisted by Confucian civilian bureaucrats and imperialadvisors, for both selfish individual/bureaucratic reasons andbroader conceptual reasons.17 Moreover, although certain foreignbeliefs such as Buddhism were clearly regarded by some Chineserulers as threats to the harmony and stability of the ConfucianChinese state and society, such intellectual threats almost invariably prompted defensive reactions from the Chinese state (i.e., sporadicefforts to stamp out the offending ideas domestically or insulate Chi-nese society from further such intrusions) rather than offensive (andexpensive) forays far from home to destroy the source of the ideas.

During the modern era, contact with industrialized nation-states, therelated demise of Confucian concepts of state authority and inter-state relations, and the overall increasing demands of economic andmilitary modernization have compelled the Chinese state to signifi-cantly alter the means by which it seeks to control its periphery,

while also limiting its ability to do so. However, these developmentshave thus far not resulted in a major expansion of China’s strategicperiphery beyond its historical limits. This might largely be becausethe security challenge posed by Western industrial states and Japanhas taken place during a weak state era covering the decline of theQing Dynasty in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a subsequentperiod of internal political fragmentation in the early to mid 20thcentury, and the emergence, under communist leadership, of a uni-fied yet still relatively weak Chinese nation-state in 1949. During these periods, the Chinese state has been almost entirely preoccu-pied with reestablishing domestic order, ensuring domestic well-being, and strengthening China’s control over traditional frontierareas, in part through the incorporation of past periphery regionsinto the heartland. Only very recently (i.e., since the mid 1980s) havesome Chinese strategists and leaders begun to speak about the needto expand and in some cases redefine China’s strategic frontiers to

______________16For various views on the primarily non-expansionist outlook of imperial Chineserulers, see Kierman and Fairbank (1974).17More on this point below.




include regions well beyond China’s present territorial boundariesand entirely new areas such as outer space and cyberspace.1 8

Whether a stronger China will formally adopt an expanded definitionof its strategic periphery and use more assertive policies to defend it

will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six.

FLUCTUATIONS IN PERIPHERY CONTROL AND REGIMEBOUNDARIES

Historically, virtually every Chinese regime (both Han Chinese andnon-Han Chinese alike) has at various times sought to maximize itscontrol or influence over the strategic periphery described above and

thus set regime boundaries at the maximum level permitted by geo-graphic, economic-administrative, and military-political constraints.However, such efforts usually depended upon the prior establish-ment of domestic order and well-being, which in turn dependedupon the existence of a relatively strong and unified state. Hence, apattern of peripheral (and territorial) expansion and contractionemerged that coincided with the rise and decline of individual Chi-nese regimes.19

For most major regimes of the imperial era (e.g., during the Han,Tang, Ming, and Qing Dynasties), attempts to assert control or influ-ence over the periphery usually occurred after an initial period of internal regime formation and consolidation. Throughout this early

period, which sometimes lasted for several decades, the energies of China’s new political leadership were devoted to eliminating any re-maining domestic resistance and reestablishing internal order andcontrol. As a result, external security policy during these times wasusually keyed to the establishment of static defenses along thoseterritorial boundaries inherited from the previous regime and thepursuit of noncoercive measures (such as various appeasement ordivide-and-conquer tactics, discussed below) designed to placate orneutralize nearby potential threats.

______________18Nan (1997); and Godwin (1997).

19The following overview of the general pattern of periphery expansion and contrac-

tion relies upon several sources, including Barfield (1989); Fairbank (1992); Hucker(1975); Huang (1997); Hunt (1984); Harding (1984); Spence (1990); Kierman andFairbank (1974); and O’Neill (1987).




cases, however, this occurred largely despite the absence of a priorperiod of regime formation and consolidation.

Nationalist China sought to capitalize on prior Qing successes in ab-sorbing most periphery territories into the Chinese empire. OnFebruary 15, 1912, the former prime minister of the defunct Qing court (Yuan Shikai) proclaimed, in the articles of abdication of thelast Qing emperor (Emperor Pu Yi), that all former periphery territo-ries acknowledging Qing suzerainty or nominally under Qing rule

were to be considered part of the new Republic of China (ROC).These included Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Tibet.21 In thedecades before the announcement of the abdication document, Xin-

jiang and Manchuria had already been formally incorporated as Chi-

nese provinces (in 1884 and 1903, respectively) but had been subse-quently ruled by local warlords as quasi-independent states. Tibethad acknowledged Qing suzerainty during most of the Qing Dynasty (usually under duress) but subsequently rejected the nationalistclaim to the kingdom. Inner and Outer Mongolia, which had alsobeen vassal states of the Qing, also rejected the nationalist claim.Nationalist Chinese leaders subsequently sought to confirm theirclaim to Tibet and Mongolia by sending military forces into bothareas soon after the establishment of the ROC.22 These efforts werenot successful, however, largely because of the weakness of the ROCregime. Taiwan was not included in Yuan Shikai’s proclamation of 1912 because it had been formally incorporated into China centuriesearlier and had become a part of the Chinese heartland through ex-tensive Han Chinese migration.23

The communist regime moved to reaffirm or consolidate Chinesecontrol over virtually all the above periphery areas (including Tai-

wan, but excluding Outer Mongolia) within the first decade of its es-tablishment in 1949, through a combination of political and military means. These efforts resulted in the formal incorporation of each

______________21O’Neill (1987), pp. 57, 214.22Goldstein (1989), pp. 65–66, 83; and Paine (1996), pp. 317–318.

23Taiwan became a prefecture of Fujian Province from 1684, the date of the estab-lishment of undisputed Qing control over Chinese settlements on the West coast of

the islands. It then became a Qing province in 1887, largely in response to foreign ag-gression from Japan and France. For further details, see Sheperd (1993), especially pp.106–107, 397.




area into the People’s Republic of China as either a province (in thecase of Xinjiang, former Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia) or an au-tonomous region (in the case of Tibet), with the sole exception of Taiwan, which was prevented from being absorbed into the PRC by the intervention of the United States in 1950.

Throughout history, attempts to consolidate Chinese control overthe periphery served three specific purposes: (a) to eliminateexisting or potential threats to Chinese frontiers and trade routesposed by nearby tribes, kingdoms, or foreign states; (b) to intimidateor persuade neighboring states, kingdoms, and peoples along theperiphery into accepting Chinese suzerainty and thereby acknowledging China’s sinocentric world view; and generally (c) to

reinforce, among the Chinese populace, the personal authority of thenew regime and its leaders. These purposes all derived, in turn, fromthe fundamental desire of the Chinese state (both imperial andmodern) to affirm its legitimacy, authority, and status with regard toboth domestic and foreign audiences and to defend the heartlandfrom attack.

During virtually the entire imperial era, security concerns arguably constituted the primary motive for efforts to control or influence theperiphery along China’s turbulent northern and northwestern bor-ders, whereas legitimacy and status concerns, although important,

were usually of secondary importance. In contrast, policy towardChina’s southern and southwestern periphery was arguably moti-

vated primarily by regime legitimacy and status concerns throughoutmost of the imperial era, although security issues were clearly in-volved in several instances, especially in relations between the Tang Dynasty and both Tibet and the Tibeto-Burman Nan-chao kingdom.These became increasingly important during the Ming and Qing periods as southern and southwestern borderlands becameincreasingly unstable. During the modern era, security concernshave come to dominate Chinese calculations toward the entireperiphery, whereas legitimacy and status concerns have become farless significant, given the collapse of the Confucian world view.24

______________24The difference in emphasis on security versus nonsecurity concerns in China’s pol-

icy toward the periphery is further discussed below, in the context of the use of coer-cive versus noncoercive security measures.




From the time of the Han Dynasty, when the Chinese state had ex-panded to occupy, if not entirely control, virtually the entire heart-land described above, efforts to control or influence China’s strategicperiphery have been largely limited to the reestablishment of thelevel of dominance that was lost during previous periods of regimedecline and/or fragmentation. In other words, periphery expansionhas been primarily defensive in nature, intended to eliminate persis-tent external security threats and bolster or reestablish regime au-thority within the established periphery and heartland, not to extendregime power and influence significantly beyond the knownperiphery described above.

The sole major exception to this general pattern of limited expansion

during the imperial era was presented by the Mongol Yuan Dynasty.This regime sought, with varying degrees of success, to extend its di-rect control beyond China’s traditional periphery to include India,the entire Korean peninsula, Japan, Burma, and Java. This effort oc-curred largely because the conquest of China was only one part of the overall Mongol conquest and occupation of the Eurasian conti-nent—a conquest that ultimately extended from eastern Germany toKorea and from the Arctic Ocean to Turkey and the Persian Gulf. Inother words, the Mongols treated the Chinese heartland as one of many conquered territories and as a stepping stone to further con-quests; this was highly atypical of Chinese regime behavior towardthe periphery.25 In contrast, other nomadic occupiers of the Chineseheartland generally undertook efforts to control or dominate only theexisting periphery. The one partial exception was the Manchu Qing Dynasty, which established stronger controls over larger expanses of territory along many inland peripheral areas and also for the firsttime began to treat certain offshore, maritime areas in a strategicmanner.

For example, Taiwan was first considered a strategic territory andhence regarded as part of China’s strategic periphery during the Qing

______________25The Mongols were also extremely atypical in their approach to domestic govern-ment. They were the only nomadic occupiers of the Chinese heartland who did notgenerally adopt Chinese methods of administration and did not extensively intermarry with Han Chinese. The Mongol presence in China was essentially a military occupa-tion designed to keep the Chinese subdued and to exploit Chinese resources. For fur-ther information on the origins and nature of the Mongol occupation of China, seeBarfield (1989), pp. 187–228. Also see Wang (1968), p. 49.




era. The Qing rulers came to view Taiwan as a potential security threat, for three reasons: First, it had served for many years as astrategic haven for the Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) andhis heirs, who had harassed the Qing regime for decades after theestablishment of the dynasty in 1644. Second, it had been occupiedand partly colonized in the last years of the Ming by representativesof what was at that time a formidable imperialist power—the DutchEast India Company. Third, it was viewed as a potential staging areafor attacks on the Mainland by pirates (a major problem during theMing, as indicated above) and by domestic rebels.26

The contraction of central state control over China’s traditional pe-riphery occurred primarily during the latter one-third of a regime’s

existence, as a result of accelerating systemic decline. During eachdynastic regime, imperial revenues would gradually decrease, andgovernment effectiveness decline, because of a combination of sev-eral factors, including (a) the progressive withdrawal of land fromtaxation to benefit the ruling class; (b) the increasing inefficiency of the ruling house resulting from protracted struggles among imperialrelatives, retainers, and concubines; and (c) the general decline inleadership capability and bureaucratic capacity resulting from grow-ing corruption, factional intrigue, and the emergence, over time, of greater numbers of weak or dissolute emperors. This process wouldcontinually increase the burden of taxation on the common peas-antry and eventually precipitate peasant unrest, which in turn wouldproduce greater demands within leadership circles for a largeramount of shrinking resources to be spent on the maintenance of domestic order and well-being. As a result, each Chinese regimesuffered a steady reduction in the level of state resources and leader-ship attention available for periphery defense and control.27

Most imperial regimes would initially attempt to compensate fordeclining central capabilities by relying on quasi-independent re-gional military forces or on various noncoercive measures, such as

______________26Sheperd (1993), pp. 1, 106, 142; and Kessler (1976), p. 90. As Sheperd states, for theQing, Taiwan was not a neglected frontier, but rather “a strategic periphery thatfrequently commanded central government attention” (p. 3).27

Descriptions of the process of dynastic decline and regime weakening can be foundin Fairbank (1992); Hucker (1975); and Huang (1997). Also see Sheperd (1993), pp.400–406.




gifts, subsidies, the ritual trappings of imperial prestige, and variousdiplomatic maneuvers (discussed in greater detail below) to ensurethe quiescence of periphery peoples. Eventually, however, growing state incapacity would force a withdrawal from the periphery or atleast a major reduction in effective central control over periphery areas and borderlands, especially those areas along the northern andnorthwestern border. This process of periphery contraction usually occurred in the face of mounting nomadic incursions, internal peas-ant uprisings, and increasing signs of independence among regionalmilitary leaders and officials. Overall, such developments would alsoproduce a prolonged interregnum of domestic unrest and eventually lead to either the wholesale collapse of the central state or its dis-placement from a large part of the Chinese heartland.

In some instances, this decline would result in the prolonged divi-sion of the heartland among several competing states, often bothHan Chinese and nomadic in origin.28 In other cases, the disinte-gration or contraction of the central state would soon be followed by the emergence of a new, unified regime, usually by a successfulleader of peasant rebellion, a formerly loyal regional military leader,or sometimes by a nomadic invader.29 Regardless of the length of time and severity of political conflict and division involved, however,a new, unified regime would eventually reemerge from the ashes of the previous regime. And once established, the new regime wouldagain seek to assert control over the entire Chinese heartland andperiphery. If successful, this would lead to a new cycle of expansionand subsequent decline and contraction.

This pattern has continued into the modern era. Both the nationalistand communist regimes sought to reestablish a unified political-so-cial order and expand and consolidate control over China’s long-standing periphery areas after the collapse or defeat of the preceding regime (i.e., the Qing and the Republic of China, respectively). How-ever, the entire process of regime establishment, consolidation, mat-

______________28The foremost examples of these periods of political disunity include the era of North-South Division (420–589), the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms era (907–960),and the Song-Liao-Jin Dynasties era (960–1234).29

The most notable examples of a relatively rapid process of regime reemergence afterthe collapse of the previous regime are the Ming Dynasty (which emerged from the Yuan) and the Qing Dynasty (which emerged from the Ming).




uration, and decline and the associated pattern of periphery expan-sion and contraction did not run its full course in either case. Thenationalist regime never managed to fully reestablish domestic orderand recover territories lost to foreign imperialists or domestic insur-gents before it was severely damaged by Japanese militarists andtoppled by the communists.30 The communist regime achieved bothof these key objectives but is still evolving toward an uncertainfuture.

The general expansion and contraction of Chinese state control overperiphery (and sometimes heartland) areas is illustrated by Maps4a–h.31

The impetus to reunify the Chinese state and regain control over theperiphery, rather than permit the Chinese heartland to be perma-nently divided into separate warring states, reflects the influence of deep-seated material and cultural factors. Perhaps most importantis the existence, among the peoples of the Chinese heartland, of ahighly homogeneous culture and civilization incorporating a com-mon set of political and social beliefs about the organizational andprocedural requirements for stability, peace, and prosperity in an of-ten chaos-prone environment. During imperial times, these beliefscentered, as outlined above, on the notion of a harmony-orientedConfucian-Legalist order enforced by a single imperial bureaucracy and sustained by a broad stratum of educated scholar-officials whoserved as both government administrators and social/intellectual

elites across the entire Chinese heartland. During the modern era,the commitment to a unified regime rests upon a popular belief inthe historical longevity and persistence of a single Chinese state anda single Chinese culture and, most recently, a less traditional, state-

______________30From this perspective, the era of the nationalist Chinese state, spanning the rela-tively short period between the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the rise topower of the communists in 1949, should most appropriately be viewed as an inter-regnum of internal disunity separating two eras ruled by unified Chinese regimes.

31These maps were adapted from Barraclough (1993), pp. 80–81, 124–125, 164–165,and 228, and Huang (1997), pp. 50, 71, 101, 176, and 215. They do not depict the exactboundaries of the imperial Chinese state, as the actual extent of imperial control along the periphery and within the heartland was indeterminate over many periods andvaried in administrative type (e.g., military versus civilian control). The purpose is toshow the general fluctuation that occurred in the extent of Chinese control overheartland and periphery areas between early and late regime periods.




RANDMR1121.M4a

Chinese presence was primarily military

Map 4a—Early Han Dynasty

RANDMR1121.M4b

Map 4b—Late Han Dynasty




RANDMR1121.M4c

Chinese presence was primarily military

Map 4c—Early Tang Dynasty

RANDMR1121.M4d

Map 4d—Late Tang Dynasty




RANDMR1121.M4e

Map 4e—Early Ming Dynasty

RANDMR1121.M4f

(Arrows denote extensive foreign incursions)

Map 4f—Late Ming Dynasty




RANDMR1121.M4g

Map 4g—Early Qing Dynasty

RANDMR1121.M4h

Map 4h—Late Qing Dynasty




centric form of Han nationalism centered upon a putative “alliance”between ethnic Han Chinese, other mixed Han and non-Han peoplesof the heartland, and the minority peoples of the traditionalperiphery.32 Overall, for both pre-modern and modern Chineseregimes, the unity of the Chinese nation is strongly associated withpeace and plenty, whereas disunity means civil war, insecurity, anddisaster for elite and commoners alike.33

THE USE OF FORCE

Many students of China’s strategic history (including many Chinesescholars) argue that Chinese rulers and military leaders generally

denigrate the role of violence in preserving external (or internal) statesecurity, preferring instead to subdue or persuade an opponentthrough nonviolent stratagems involving subterfuge, maneuver, ac-commodation, and moral suasion or force of example. For such ob-servers, warfare is viewed by the Chinese as a last resort. This argu-ment often derives from the belief that (a) Chinese philosophers andmilitary theorists such as Confucius, Mencius, and Sunzi generally eschewed violence in favor of accommodation, moral suasion, orstratagem; and (b) the views of these highly esteemed thinkers de-termined the beliefs and actions of Chinese practitioners of statecraftand warfare regarding when and how to employ force.34

A closer examination of the above thinkers’ writings and of the

historical record does not generally confirm this viewpoint, however.First, one must clearly distinguish between the beliefs of Confuciusand Mencius, who were primarily concerned with how to create andmaintain proper civilian government and, to those ends, emphasizedthe importance of moral suasion and imperial virtue (de ) over coer-

______________32This concept was enshrined in the nationalist Chinese definition of the state at thetime of the formation of the ROC in 1912., when the Chinese regime was said toinclude five races: Han Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Hui (Muslim, largely located in Xinjiang). This concept was subsequently repeated by Chiang Kai-shek (1943). O’Neill (1987), p. 214; Hunt (1984), p. 17; and Gladney (1991).

33Fairbank (1978a), p. 22.

34For a representative example of the argument that Chinese historically and cul-

turally “disesteem violence,” see Fairbank (1974), pp. 1–26. For a broader summary of the secondary literature in support of this argument, see Johnston (1995), pp. 63–65,117–123, and Johnston (1998), pp. 6–8.




cion,35 and the views of Sunzi, who was primarily concerned withhow to win military campaigns. Moreover, Sunzi’s emphasis on theuse of stratagems over simple coercion related more often to the tac-tics of military campaigns than to the larger strategic question of

whether to deploy armies against an opponent. In other words,Sunzi was primarily concerned with how a military leader could van-quish his opponent without relying extensively on brute force, oncethe decision had been made to use military measures. He did notadvocate shirking from the use of force when it was deemed neces-sary and effective. Thus, Sunzi was far more willing to apply coercionagainst a foreign power than were either Confucius or Mencius.36

Second, even though the pacifistic views of Confucius and Mencius

as espoused by the practitioners of Confucian statecraft have attimes influenced strategic decisions concerning whether, and to

what degree, force should be employed, a cursory examination of thesecurity behavior of the Chinese state suggests that Chinese rulershave frequently resorted to violence to attain their national security objectives. In fact, one could argue that the use of force has beenendemic in Chinese history. According to one Chinese military source, China engaged in a total of 3,790 recorded internal andexternal historical wars from 1100 B.C. (Western Zhou) to 1911 (endof the Qing Dynasty). These included both violent internal conflictsduring periods of internal division and conflicts with non-Chinesepowers. Moreover, in the Ming alone, China engaged in an averageof 1.12 external wars per year through the entire dynasty.37 Theoverall extent of state-sanctioned violence against both internal andexternal foes is broadly indicated by Figure 1.

Figure 2 shows the degree to which imperial and modern Chinese38

regimes have used violent methods against periphery peoples or along the periphery . As the figure indicates, most major external mil-itary campaigns carried out by the unified Chinese state occurred

______________35Of the two philosophers, Mencius arguably placed a greater stress on the impor-tance of moral suasion over coercion. Confucius was more willing to permit the use of force to punish wrongdoing and to educate the wayward subject or foreign leader.

36See, for example, Boylan (1982), especially pp. 343–345.

37For all of these figures, see Johnston (1995), p. 27.38Information on the Mongol Yuan regime is not included in Figure 2 because it is notconsidered to be a Chinese or highly sinicized regime.




RAND MR1121-1

5 8 9 – 6 1 3

6 1 4 – 6 3 8

6 3 9 – 6 6 3

6 6 4 – 6 8 8

6 8 9 – 7 1 3

7 1 4 – 7 3 8

7 3 9 – 7 6 3

7 6 4 – 7 8 8

7 8 9 – 8 1 3

8 1 4 – 8 3 8

8 3 9 – 8 6 3

8 6 4 – 8 8 8

8 8 9 – 9 1 3

9 1 4 – 9 3 8

9 3 9 – 9 6 3

9 6 4 – 9 8 8

9 8 9 – 1 0 1 3

1 0 1 4 – 1 0 3 8

1 0 3 9 – 1 0 6 3

1 0 6 4 – 1 0 8 8

1 0 8 9 – 1 1 1 3

1 1 1 4 – 1 1 3 8

1 1 3 9 – 1 1 6 3

1 1 6 4 – 1 1 8 8

1 1 8 9 – 1 2 1 3

1 2 1 4 – 1 2 3 8

1 2 3 9 – 1 2 6 3

1 2 6 4 – 1 2 8 8

1 2 8 9 – 1 3 1 3

1 3 1 4 – 1 3 3 8

1 3 3 9 – 1 3 6 3

1 3 6 4 – 1 3 8 8

1 3 8 9 – 1 4 1 3

1 4 1 4 – 1 4 3 8

1 4 3 9 – 1 4 6 3

1 4 6 4 – 1 4 8 8

1 4 8 9 – 1 5 1 3

1 5 1 4 – 1 5 3 8

1 5 3 9 – 1 5 6 3

1 5 6 4 – 1 5 8 8

1 5 8 9 – 1 6 1 3

1 6 1 4 – 1 6 3 8

1 6 3 9 – 1 6 6 3

1 6 6 4 – 1 6 8 8

1 6 8 9 – 1 7 1 3

1 7 1 4 – 1 7 3 8

1 7 3 9 – 1 7 6 3

1 7 6 4 – 1 7 8 8

1 7 8 9 – 1 8 1 3

1 8 1 4 – 1 8 4 2

11

01

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

F r e q u e n c y ( n u m b e r o f w a r s )

Date

SOURCE: Adapted from Lee (1988), p. 362.

TangDynasty618–907

SongDynasty

907–1279

MingDynasty

1368–1644

QingDynasty

1644–1911

Yuan1279–1368

Figure 1—War Frequency in Imperial China

during the first one-third of a regime’s existence (a period that lastedin some cases as long as 100 years) and were directed almost exclu-sively against peoples of the periphery. This general pattern alsoseems to hold for the most recent era. Iain Johnston shows that theuse of force by the Chinese communist regime against external foeshas been relatively frequent and intense as compared with othermajor powers of the modern era, occurred more often during theearly years of the communist regime (i.e., the 1950s and 1960s), andhas been primarily directed at the resolution of territorial issuesalong the periphery.39

In addition, the use of force by the Chinese state has involvedrelatively large numbers of soldiers, during both the imperial andmodern periods, and has often resulted in significant numbers of

______________39Johnston (1998), pp. 27–29.



Utopia R

RA

221

Qin ROCQingMingYuanSongTangSui“Era of Division”Han

19121644136812799076185812200202

Korea(108 B.C.)

Vietnam(111 B.C.)

C. Asia

(?)Xinjiang(?)

S. Manchuria(?)

Campaigns

Ko

(1

Ti(1

Ta

(1Ta

(1

In(1

Cam

Vietnam

(1405–7)

Ceylon(1408–40)

Mongol

(1413–34)Vietnam

(1418–28)

Burma(1438–46)

Campaigns

Vietnam

(931–39)

Khitan(935–36)

Khitan

(944–46)Liao

(979–91)

Tangut(990–1003)

Khitan

(1001–4)

Campaigns

Korea

(598)

Vietnam(605)

Khitans

(605)Taiwan

(610)

Korea(611–14)

Campaigns

Burma (1658–61)

Taiwan (1662)

Russia (1662–89)

Tibet (1720)

Tibet (1750–51)

Mongols (1755–7)

Sinkiang (1758–9)

Burma (1763–9)

Vietnam (1788–9)

Nepal (1792)

Campaigns

E. Turks (626–7)

(629–30)

W. Turks (641–8)

Tibet (641)

Korea (644–5)

India (648–9)W. Turks (657–9)

Korea (660–3)

Korea (661–8)

Tibet (727)

Khitans (745)

Tibet (747–51)

Khitans (751–5)

Nanchao (751–74)

Tibet (763)

Campaigns

SOURCE: Compiled primarily from information contained in O’Neill (1987), and Barraclough (1993).

Figure 2—Major Chinese Campaigns Against the Periphery, 221 B.C. to the Present




casualties. One scholar has estimated that imperial Chinese armieson average mobilized approximately 100,000 soldiers for combat, andin some cases fielded armies in excess of a million men out of a totalpopulation of less than 50 million.40 Modern Chinese standing armies have also totaled over a million soldiers. By comparison, thearmies of feudal Europe rarely exceeded 50,000 men, and modern

Western armies could approach or exceed a million soldiers only un-der conditions of total war mobilization.

Iain Johnston attributes the Chinese state’s reliance on violence tothe workings of a hard realpolitik strategic culture that prefers thecomplete elimination of security threats through force over less co-ercive methods. According to Johnston, this viewpoint, which is not

only reflected in the behavior of Chinese civilian and military rulersbut also contained in many overlooked classical writings on state-craft and warfare, views war as a relatively constant element in stateaffairs, regards the stakes involved in interstate behavior in zero-sumterms, often views pure violence as highly efficacious, and yet is alsohighly sensitive to relative material capabilities and tends to show absolute flexibility (quan bian) in the application of force. As a re-sult, according to Johnston, the Chinese state will usually choose toeliminate an opponent through offensive force over static defense oraccommodation when it clearly enjoys a superior military positionand confronts minimal political or economic repercussions.41

The broad historical assessment of Chinese security behavior pre-

sented in this chapter tends to support this observation. UnlikeJohnston, however, our assessment also suggests that such Chinesebehavior has derived more from the material or structural conditionsconfronting the Chinese regime than from cultural factors. That is,there appears to be a general correlation, over broad periods of Chi-nese regime history, between decisions to employ various types of coercive and noncoercive measures on the one hand and, on theother hand, shifts in relative power relations with foreign entities,calculations of the relative economic and social cost to the Chinese

______________40Lee (1988), pp. 210–212. Lee also concludes that the severity of wars involving theimperial Chinese state, as measured by the estimated number of deaths, was at least

as severe as those in Europe, and probably far more so (p. 224).41Johnston (1995), pp. 148–152, 249.




regime of using various measures, and changes in the structure of anoften unstable domestic and external security environment. More-over, the historical record strongly suggests that China’s past use of force against outsiders has been largely limited to efforts to regainheartland territories lost to foreigners and to generally control orpacify periphery areas.

During the imperial era, every unified Chinese regime resorted toviolence against outsiders42 at various times throughout its exis-tence—from its initial formation through its eventual decline andcollapse.43 However, the external use of violence was especially evi-dent during the early stage of an imperial regime’s existence, afterdomestic rule was consolidated, and was employed to reclaim lost

territories or to increase Chinese control or influence over the pe-riphery. Violence was also relied upon, secondarily, during the long middle stages of a regime’s existence before its decline, largely in re-sponse to armed incursions from the periphery or in an effort to“punish” or “chasten” nearby peoples for affronts to the emperor or“the people” of China. Violence against foreign entities was leastevident during the last stages of a regime’s existence, when the lead-ership was often internally divided and largely preoccupied with thesuppression of internal revolts.

Almost without exception, once imperial rule had been consolidatedinternally, the early rulers of an imperial Chinese regime would em-bark on military campaigns in an attempt to absorb adjacent territo-

ries into the Chinese heartland, forcibly retake parts of the heartlandlost during the decline of the previous regime, or simply to assert (orreassert) dominant influence over periphery areas by defeating themmilitarily. Efforts undertaken by Chinese “founding” emperors toreestablish imperial Chinese influence along the periphery were al-most exclusively military, and often occurred during the early years

______________42Obviously, the greatest aggregate levels of state violence occurred when China wasinternally divided, as a major component of often prolonged struggles among groupsor regimes contending with one another to reestablish unified central control over theheartland. However, this study is concerned primarily with the use of violence by theunified Chinese state against non-Chinese political entities.43The following broad characterization of the conditions under which the Chinese

state has employed force against external foes is drawn from Barfield (1989); Fairbank (1992); Hucker (1975); Huang (1997); Hunt (1984); O’Neill (1987); and Lee (1988).




of a regime’s existence. These campaigns would sometimes extendover many decades (and in some instances persist sporadically forover a century), largely because of the tenacity and high military ca-pabilities of China’s opponents.

The majority of these military forays were directed against nomadicor semi-nomadic peoples along China’s northern and northwesternborders and consisted largely of efforts to retake lost territory withinthe heartland or to reestablish Chinese preeminence along thelargely fixed periphery.44 The use of offensive coercive measuresduring the early life of an imperial regime was far less prevalent along China’s eastern, southern, and southwestern maritime andcontinental borders. This was largely because most outside powers

along those borders were either too distant to pose a serious threat tothe Chinese heartland (as in the case of Japan 45), did not possessformidable military forces, or did not repeatedly encroach uponChina to acquire the resources needed to maintain or expand theirlocal power position, as did most nearby inner Asian nomadic andsemi-nomadic tribes and kingdoms (more on this point below).

The few cases of major military actions taken against China’s eastern,southern, or southwestern neighbors during the early life of an im-perial regime usually occurred as part of an effort to expand Chineseterritory or to acquire resources. The most notable example of suchbehavior consisted of attacks against the ancestors of present-day

Vietnamese or other minority tribes residing in present-day south-

west China during the Qin, Han, Song, and Ming Dynasties.46 In

______________44Efforts to absorb inner Asian territories into the Chinese heartland were usually un-successful and therefore less frequently attempted. The most notable exception tothis general pattern occurred during the early Tang, when Turkish troops under theTang banner extended China’s borders (although not Chinese settlements) deep intoCentral Asia. See Barfield (1989), p. 145.

45Japan became a security concern to the imperial Chinese state only during theMing, when Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi attacked Korea and tried to con-quer China in the 1590s. However, this threat ended with his death in 1598. O’Neill(1987), p. 203.

46The founder of the Qin Dynasty, Qin Shih Huang Di, conquered the Vietnamesestate of Nan-Yueh (then occupying parts of present-day southwest China and north-ern Vietnam) in 214 B.C., but the Vietnamese soon regained their independence and

were recognized as a vassal state until 111 B.C., when Emperor Han Wudi retook Nan- Yueh and divided it into nine counties. From 111 B.C.–543 A.D., Nan-Yueh was theChinese province of Chiao-chih. It was administered at senior levels by Chinese offi-




addition, many early rulers of Chinese imperial regimes also at-tempted at various times to absorb militarily parts of present-day Korea.47

The one instance in which maritime military power was applied inthe early period of a regime against southern and southwestern pe-riphery areas (and beyond) occurred during the early years of theMing Dynasty. In addition to fulfilling the specific economic pur-poses noted above, the large blue water naval force assembled underEmperor Ming Yongle was intended to help complete the unificationof the new Ming regime, pacify maritime sea routes, establish orreinforce political relations, support Yongle’s effort to conquer Viet-nam, and generally assert Chinese influence in areas to the west of

the South China Sea, especially as part of a larger strategy aimed atcountering the growing influence of Muslim power in Central Asia.Hence, various naval forces and expeditions (which usually con-tained hundreds of ships and tens of thousands of soldiers) foughtand defeated Mongol navies, eliminated local pirates, and defended

_____________________________________________________________cials, adopted many Chinese political institutions, and employed Chinese scholarsand officials. Strong Vietnamese resistance to Chinese absorption resulted in separa-tion from direct Chinese rule. This eventually led, during the Tang, to the establish-ment of Vietnam as a protectorate. With the demise of the Tang, a more independent Vietnamese polity emerged: the Ly Dynasty. Modeled after Chinese imperial regimes,the Ly attempted to establish a position as an entirely separate and equal entity to theChinese court—the seat of the “southern emperor.” Resulting frictions led to a failedeffort during the Song to reconquer Vietnam and the emergence of a tributary rela-

tionship as the only alternative to confrontation and war. In the first decade of the1400s, early Ming Emperor Ming Yongle reconquered Vietnam (then known as Dai Viet) and attempted to reabsorb it into the Chinese empire as a province under directChinese rule. But this effort eventually failed, thus again forcing China to accept a farless intrusive tributary relationship with Vietnam. Chen (1969), pp. 1–9; SarDesai(1998), pp. 13–35; and Taylor (1992), pp. 137–150. As Taylor states: “The lesson for theChinese of their effort to occupy Vietnam was that tributary relations represented ahigher wisdom than did a policy of conquest and assimilation” (p. 150).

47Han Wudi incorporated Korea into the Chinese empire in 108 B.C. However, Chi-nese control was soon limited to the northern part of Korea and thrown off altogetherin 313 A.D. The short-lived Sui Dynasty attempted three times to conquer and absorbKorea, without success. The “vigorous warrior kings” of the early Tang had occupiednorthern Korea by the 660s but were also unable to absorb the kingdom politically.Korea maintained less-intrusive tributary relations with the more distant Song (whichdid not occupy most of northern China and hence could not pressure Korea), whereasearly Ming and Qing rulers were content to employ military, economic, and cultural“persuasion” to establish a more intrusive form of suzerainty over Korea, which be-came a virtual protectorate. O’Neill (1987), pp. 2, 145, 303–304; Barraclough (1993),pp. 81, 124; Hucker (1975), pp. 88–89, 133–134; Fairbank (1992), p. 114.




those local kings who had offered tribute and gifts to the emperorfrom armed challenges by usurpers or rebels. They also conferredtributary status on many local leaders and spent considerable timeensuring the security of the Malacca Strait, an important early Ming trade route and entrepôt linking East Asia and the Indian Ocean.However, with the exception of Ceylon, the Zheng He naval expedi-tions rarely, if ever, used force in dealing with coastal states west of Sumatra.48 Moreover, as suggested above, this entire episode wasexceedingly brief, having been prompted by the pressures (and op-portunities) confronting the early Ming and sustained by the ener-gies of Emperor Ming Yongle and his supporters. It came to anabrupt end following the death of the emperor and the decline of hissupporters’ influence at court.49

Military incursions into periphery areas or armed displays would of-ten be accompanied by the establishment of Chinese military gar-risons and the construction of fortifications, both within periphery areas and at the outermost limits of the Chinese heartland. Thesedefenses were intended both to protect the heartland from directattack and to ensure the long-term obedience of the inhabitants of the periphery by providing a quasi-permanent Chinese military presence among them.50

Imperial Chinese regimes also resorted to force at various timesduring the often extended middle period of a regime’s existence, be-fore the onset of dynastic decline. During this period, force was most

often used in response to external provocations or incursions di-rected against the Chinese heartland or periphery, or generally topunish and chastise disrespectful statements and behavior or otherperceived transgressions against Chinese authority committed by periphery states. In particular, strong, unified Chinese imperialregimes periodically employed force against both nomadic confed-erations and, to a lesser extent, more established southwestern or

______________48Swanson (1982), pp. 32–33, 39–40; Wang (1968), pp. 55–56; and Wolters (1970), pp.36, 206 (footnote 128), 155–157. Edward Dreyer, personal correspondence.

49The Zheng He expeditions also ended because Ming attention and resources be-came focused increasingly on coping with the challenges posed by a growing Mongolthreat from the north and intensifying pirate attacks along China’s southern coastline, which led to efforts to fortify land defenses. Swanson (1982), pp. 40–43.50Barfield (1989); Hunt (1984); and Hucker (1975).




southern powers when such entities violated the sinocentric hierar-chical structure of the tributary relationship and demanded to betreated explicitly and formally as an equal to the Chinese emperor,51

persistently levied excessively onerous tributary requests, or repeat-edly attacked Chinese territory or frontier areas. The Xiongnunomadic tribes of the Han Dynasty period were perhaps the worstoffenders in their demand for formal equality with the Chinese em-peror. Unable to accept this affront, the Han rulers frequently em-ployed force against them.52 Similar Chinese responses occurred atthe height of the Tang, which was plagued by military incursions intopresent-day Siquan and Yunnan Provinces by the Tibetan Kingdomand the Tibeto-Burman Nan-chao Kingdom.53 And numerous no-madic leaders along the northern and northwestern frontiers pro-voked an armed response from strong Chinese regimes through theirrepeated and escalating attacks and demands.54

However, strong Chinese imperial regimes generally did not employ force to enforce peace or to extend their influence or direct controlbeyond the established periphery. Even the famous, far-ranging Zheng He naval expeditions of the Ming era did not employ forceagainst distant peoples or to conquer distant lands. Moreover, im-perial Chinese regimes did not routinely use force to separate orsubdue warring periphery states or confederations unless such con-flict directly threatened Chinese territory or posed the prospect of lowering or removing Chinese influence along the periphery. Thus,imperial regimes would sometimes intervene militarily when an es-tablished and loyal vassal ruler was challenged by internal rebellionor attacked by a nonvassal regime but would not generally do so toenforce peace throughout all periphery areas or beyond. Such lim-ited interventions arguably occurred most often in the case of themore sedentary states or kingdoms near China’s eastern and south-

______________51The Chinese state’s demand for ritualistic deference was by no means absolute,however. Weak Chinese regimes often ignored the traditional sinocentric hierarchicalapproach to interstate relations when state security demanded it.

52Barfield (1989), pp. 53–54, 59–67.53Backus (1981). Also see Beckwith (1987), pp. 99–100; and Twitchett and Wright(1973), p. 8.

54For a general discussion of the use of force in response to excessive pressures andattacks from nomadic peoples, see Jagchid and Symons (1989), pp. 59, 65; and Barfield(1989).




ern borders, such as Korea and Vietnam.55 In these instances, ex-pectations of military support usually derived from the overall tribu-tary-suzerain relationship, which in some cases exchanged a formalacknowledgment by the vassal of Chinese preeminence for a Chineseobligation to protect the vassal when attacked.56

The use of force against outsiders was least evident during the finalstages of an imperial regime.57 Rather than rely on highly expensiveand often inconclusive military forays against the northern andnorthwestern periphery, weak indigenous Chinese dynasties usually chose to increase tributary payments to potentially threatening nomads to keep them quiescent.58 Such weak regimes would alsousually avoid the use of force in support of periphery vassal states of

whatever type, as suggested above. Moreover, by the later stages of adynasty’s existence, domestic unrest usually posed a far greater andmore urgent security threat to the regime than external aggression.In fact, in some instances, large nomadic confederations wouldactually assist the Chinese court in fending off internal challenges,primarily to maintain the lucrative tributary relationship.59

A severely weak, declining imperial Chinese regime would usually resort to force against foreigners out of desperation, or as a conse-quence of domestic political pressures and machinations. Theformer use of force most often consisted of intense (and almostinvariably unsuccessful) armed responses initiated in response to

______________55The most famous example of this type of behavior was China’s successful military defense of Korea against Japanese invasion during the Ming Dynasty.

56For a general reference to Chinese military support on behalf of vassal states, seeHunt (1984), p. 15. Also see Lam (1968), p. 178; Swanson (1982), p. 15; and Chen(1969), p. 8. This was by no means a hard and fast rule, however. Some tributary rela-tionships did not imply Chinese protection of any kind. Moreover, even when suchsecurity assurances had been provided, imperial regimes such as the Qing would attimes invoke the concept of “impartial benevolence” (i-shi tong-jen) to disclaim any responsibility to protect the state or kingdom in question. This would usually occurduring periods of regime decline, however. Fletcher (1978), p. 105.57 Again, military campaigns against internal rebellions by central armies or regionalmilitary supporters of the Chinese state are not included in this assessment, which ex-amines the behavior of the unified Chinese state against foreign powers.

58Thomas Barfield, personal correspondence. This point is discussed in greater detail

below.59For example, the Uighurs propped up the late Tang to keep tributary paymentscoming. Barfield (1989), p. 131.




persistent and major external attacks on the Chinese heartland,along with various types of military bluff to intimidate potentialforeign foes. The protracted armed defense of the Southern Song against Mongol invaders and the military actions undertaken againstforeign imperialist powers in the mid 19th century by the Qing rulers

were particularly notable examples of weak regime defensive military behavior.60

Chinese imperial regimes were by no means always successful inapplying force against periphery peoples and generally did not per-sist in the use of force when its disadvantages came to outweigh itsadvantages. Thomas Barfield has shown that most Han Chinese im-perial regimes were largely unable to militarily defeat and subjugate

the nomadic tribes and confederations along China’s Inner Asianborders, often despite concerted and costly efforts to do so. This waspartly because, with few exceptions, Han Chinese rulers, unlike mostforeign-originated dynasties, did not fully understand, and hencecould not fully exploit, the internal organizational and socialstrengths and weaknesses of their nomadic opponents.61 As a result,most unified Chinese regimes often relied on relatively unsophisti-cated measures to pacify the northern and northwestern periphery,primarily massive military campaigns. Most of these campaigns

were either entirely unsuccessful or, when initially successful, did notachieve lasting results. As highly mobile, skilled warriors, nomadicsoldiers were generally able to evade decisive defeat by the slower,primarily infantry-based Chinese forces deployed against them.62 Inaddition, Chinese forces were unable to subdue Inner Asian peoples

______________60For examples, see Hucker (1975), pp. 121–122; Rossabi (1983); Spence (1990), pp.152–158, 221–223; Hsu (1970), pp. 183–269, 376–422; Wakeman (1978); Fairbank (1978b), pp. 243–249, 252–257; and Liu and Smith (1980), pp. 269–273.

61 Although many Chinese frontier commanders understood well their nomadic foes,the Chinese court rarely attempted to understand them. The one major exception tothis was early Tang Emperor Tang Taizong, who was part Turkish and well versed inthe ways of nomadic warfare. But his highly effective, and largely coercive, strategy against nomadic peoples was opposed by Confucian officials and soon ended.Barfield (1989), p. 122.62The Chinese eventually incorporated cavalry units into the forces they deployedagainst the nomads on the steppe. However, these units had only a limited effect be-cause the Chinese had to buy horses at high prices and could not easily replace theirlosses, whereas the nomads raised their own horses in large numbers. Hence, theChinese often lacked sufficient horses to sustain mounted steppe campaigns for pro-longed periods. Thomas Barfield, personal correspondence.




by depriving them of subsistence. Pastoral nomadic communitiescould retreat in the face of Chinese invasions and return to theirlands after the Chinese had departed. In contrast, Chinese forcesdepended upon the food and materials provided by fixed agriculturalareas; yet such areas could not be established in significant numberson the arid steppe. As a result, Chinese forces were dependent upona long logistical train that originated in the heartland and would thususually remain in periphery areas for only a few months at a time.Even when they were able to defeat nomadic forces, Chinese armies

were eventually forced to return to the Chinese heartland, leaving behind isolated and largely ineffective garrisons. Eventually, no-madic communities and their warriors would reappear, and thestrategic balance along the periphery would remain largely un-changed.63

The more sedentary, sinitic states or kingdoms near China’s easternand southern borders (such as Korea and Vietnam and parts of Tibeteast of the Tibetan plateau64) did not enjoy the advantages of terrainand mobility possessed by the Inner Asian peoples. Hence, a strong Chinese state could more effectively bring its superior military forcesto bear against these powers or areas and thereby at times establish aclearly dominant position over them. In such instances, the tributary and trade relations established and maintained with strong Chineseregimes were thus ultimately founded on a genuinely hierarchicalpower structure involving the potential threat of military coercion.However, strong imperial Chinese regimes did not always achieve asustained, or undisputed, position of military dominance over suchpowers. This was especially true in the case of Vietnam, as suggestedabove. At such times, Chinese regimes would again adopt a prag-matic approach and accept from the vassal the symbolic forms of obeisance of the hierarchical tributary relationship, thereby agreeing

______________63Barfield (1989) and Jagchid and Symons (1989).

64During the Han Dynasty, the Tibetan border with China was not far from present-day Ch’ang-an, far to the east of the present-day border between the Tibet Au-tonomous Region and China Proper. Hence, eastern Tibet at that time encompassedsignificant agricultural lands, upon which the Chinese subsequently encroached. As aresult of such Chinese expansion, the Sino-Tibetan border moved progressively west, with the intervening territory coming under direct Chinese rule and subject to exten-

sive Han Chinese migration. Later dynasties eventually extended their political influ-ence into the Tibetan plateau itself, which the Chinese were unable to settle. The au-thors are indebted to Thomas Barfield for this observation.




to what was in effect an armed truce, marked by trade and reason-ably amicable political relations. As in the case of nomadic peoples,this would usually remain in effect as long as the power in questiondid not attack Chinese territory or make excessive demands on thecourt.65

The use of force against the periphery by both Han Chinese andhighly sinicized non-Han regimes was also limited by domestic polit-ical considerations. Confucian civilian officials and advisors oftenresisted costly, prolonged military campaigns against nomadic tribesand confederations because such actions weakened their power andinfluence by diverting resources from domestic civil administration,served to increase the power of military leaders, merchants, and im-

perial retainers at their expense, and in general increased the per-sonal power of the emperor over the officialdom. Some Confucianofficials also opposed the use of force against external foes because,in their eyes, the very application of massive force undermined theauthority and legitimacy of the imperial order as a whole. For them,proper rule and order derived from the observance of Confucianbenevolence and virtue, not compulsion through the use of arms.66

The influence of domestic leadership factors on the use of force isdiscussed in greater detail at the end of this chapter.

It is possible that at least some Han Chinese regimes before the un-precedented occupation of the entire Chinese heartland by the Mon-gol Yuan Dynasty did not persist in the use of force against the

northern and northwestern periphery because they did not believethat nomadic tribes and confederations posed a mortal threat to theChinese state. This is at least suggested by the fact that most no-madic leaders did not want to conquer and occupy China. Theirmain intent was to extort from Chinese rulers the riches and materi-als needed to establish and maintain internal nomadic alliances. In-deed, large nomadic confederations emerged only when a united

______________65This is not to imply that tributary relations between sinitic states and imperialChinese regimes were based solely on calculations of relative military prowess. Seebelow for a more detailed discussion of the advantages of the tributary relationship toboth sides.66This argument is especially stressed in Barfield (1989), and in personal correspon-dence. Also see Jagchid and Symons (1989), pp. 52–62; and O’Neill (1987), pp. 202,208.




and relatively strong imperial Chinese state existed to provide no-madic leaders with essential resources. Nomadic or semi-nomadicpeoples conquered parts or all of the Chinese heartland usually afterthe Chinese state had been severely weakened from within, or hadcollapsed altogether and was unable to provide the necessary tribute,or when parts of China had fallen under the control of non-Chinesenomadic groups that strongly resisted a strategy of appeasement to-

ward their nomadic neighbors. The first situation largely applies tothe Manchurian conquest of part or all of China, whereas the last ledto the Mongol conquest.67

Such experiences tended to confirm the widespread view among traditional (and modern) Chinese elites that internal weakness in-

vites foreign aggression. However, there is little direct proof that pre-Ming Chinese rulers did not persist in using force against northernand northwestern peoples primarily because they did not fear a mor-tal threat from them. Some of the most successful emperors and mil-itary leaders of imperial Chinese regimes were part-nomadic andhence presumably understood that nomadic tribes had the potentialto do much more harm militarily than merely plunder and raid fron-tier areas. More important, whether because of internal weakness ornomadic military prowess, from earliest times, nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples frequently made major inroads into and at timesoccupied large parts of the Chinese heartland (these included, mostnotably, various Xiongnu, proto-Tibetan and proto-Mongol Xianbitribes during the Later Han and the Manchurian-based Liao and Jin(Qin) regimes during the Song).68

Therefore, on balance, it is more likely that Han Chinese imperialregimes did not persist in the use of force against the northern andnorthwestern periphery for reasons more closely associated with themilitary, economic, and domestic political factors mentioned above.Eventually, the relative ineffectiveness of force against northern and

western nomadic and semi-nomadic opponents, combined with itsenormous financial cost and domestic political divisiveness, often

______________67Barfield (1989), pp. 9–10, 197–198. For similar arguments, see Suzuki (1968).

68Hucker (1975), p. 79; O’Neill (1987), p. 316. Fairbank states that the Liao, Jin, and

Yuan regimes “form a connected sequence of incursions of Inner Asian military powerinto China and must be viewed as a single, if sporadic, process” (1992, pp. 118–119).




prompted both strong and weak imperial Han Chinese regimes todiscard coercive methods in favor of a variety of noncoercive security strategies. As discussed in greater detail below, these strategiesusually employed various forms of thinly disguised appeasement,diplomatic maneuver, and a greater reliance on a static military defense.

In contrast to the experience of Han Chinese regimes, dynasties of nomadic or semi-nomadic origin were more successful in subduing periphery peoples by force. Such regimes better understood thecomplex tribal and personal relationships and internal structuresand social beliefs of nomadic tribes as well as the dynamics of con-federation formation. Thus, they would often intervene militarily at

crucial points to disrupt and weaken nomadic groups. Moreover,such regimes maintained military forces—especially large cavalry units—that were more able to conduct protracted warfare on the aridsteppe.69 Arguably the most successful practitioners of force againstthe periphery were the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing leaders.Unlike other imperial regimes, the Yuan conquered areas far beyondthe periphery, largely as part of the overall Mongol conquest and oc-cupation of the Eurasian continent. As a result of this and other fac-tors associated with its non-Chinese approach to domestic rule, the

Yuan is thus not considered typical of Chinese regimes. In contrast,the highly sinicized Manchu Qing rulers limited their external mili-tary forays largely to the traditional periphery. However, the Qing pursued a particularly aggressive, and generally successful, policy toward the periphery and as a result managed to extend imperial in-fluence and control beyond the limits achieved by earlier regimes.Specifically, using a strong, hybrid military that combined both no-madic and Han Chinese elements, the Qing secured and largely re-tained Korea, Tibet, and both Inner and Outer Mongolia as vassalstates, successfully invaded Burma and Nepal (the latter largely indefense of Tibet), advanced China’s border well north of the AmurRiver (in response to Russian settlement in the Siberian Far East),and incorporated Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang) and Taiwan into theempire as provinces. Moreover, under the Qing, the Mongols andother nomadic peoples were essentially eliminated as a threat to the

______________69Barfield (1989), pp. 112–113, 122, 275–276.




Chinese heartland.70 These successes provided the basis for thesubsequent claims to sovereignty over Xinjiang, Manchuria, Mongo-lia, Tibet, and Taiwan made by both the nationalist and communistregimes.

However, the Qing did not at first encourage Chinese immigrationinto any of these areas, preferring instead to maintain them as stablebuffers against more distant centers of power, i.e., India, France,Japan, Russia, Great Britain, and, in the case of Taiwan during the1700s, the Dutch.71 Hence, although these regions were administra-tively incorporated into the Qing empire, they did not become part of the Han Chinese heartland until subsequent Han migration had oc-curred, often despite restrictions, or they had been formally annexed

by the nationalist regime.72 Also, the original Qing effort toadministratively and militarily incorporate Tibet, Mongolia, and Xin-

jiang began in the 1700s, well before the imperialist Western threatbecame serious. In particular, a Lamaist Buddhist-based religiousand political connection between Tibet and Mongolia, establishedduring the Ming, made it necessary for the Qing to conquer Tibet tosecure their control of Mongolia and Xinjiang.73

The major exceptions to the above pragmatic approach to the use of force by Han Chinese regimes occurred during the Qin (221–207B.C.), Sui (581–618), and Ming (1368–1644) Dynasties. The first tworegimes persisted in the use of force against the periphery throughout their relatively short existence. Both dynasties united

China after centuries of disunity and conflict and then embarked onsustained (and sometimes highly successful) efforts to forcibly

______________70For further details on Qing military successes against the periphery, see O’Neill(1987), pp. 45, 139; and Hucker (1975), pp. 150–152. Also Fletcher (1978).71The Chinese also believed that permanent Chinese immigration into periphery areas would be very costly and would exacerbate social unrest by significantly upsetting the ethnic status quo and facilitating the use of such areas by pirates, rebels,and other antigovernment elements. See, for example, Sheperd (1993), pp. 142–145.72O’Neill (1987), pp. 322–323. For example, the Qing were eventually forced in the late19th century to admit Han Chinese into most of Qing Central Asia and to regularize itsprovincial administration, in large part to keep Russia at bay. The authors areindebted to Edward Dreyer for this observation.

73Edward Dreyer, personal correspondence.




subjugate nomadic groups.74 However, the enormous economic andsocial costs of such an unremittingly militant approach arguably accelerated the decline of both regimes and served as a negativelesson for subsequent Chinese rulers.

The Ming was the only long-lived Han Chinese imperial regime thatshunned the appeasement policies of earlier dynasties for most of itsexistence, at least with regard to threats along China’s northern and

western borders. Instead, early Ming emperors persisted in largely unsuccessful efforts to subdue militarily the nomadic tribes to thenorth, and middle and late Ming rulers adopted a siege mentality marked by an emphasis on strong static defenses and reduced con-tact with the outside. As a result of this largely noncooperative strat-

egy, the Ming experienced incessant raiding along the northernfrontier throughout much of its existence. Moreover, the numberand intensity of such raids grew over time and continually sappedthe strength of the Ming regime both economically and militarily.75

This largely military-based policy (which had its domestic correlatein a more autocratic form of government76) emerged to a great ex-tent because of China’s experience at the hands of the uniquely ra-pacious and destructive Mongol Yuan Dynasty that preceded theMing. That experience made Ming leaders acutely sensitive to thethreat posed to the Chinese heartland by nomadic groups.77 Even-tually, the Ming leadership was compelled, as their power declined,to purchase security by adopting the tributary “pay-off” stratagem

______________74O’Neill (1987), pp. 298–300; Hucker (1975), pp. 87–88; Barfield (1989), pp. 32–33, andpersonal correspondence. We should point out that the Sui was not an entirely HanChinese regime. It was led by rulers of mixed Chinese-nomadic blood, whichprobably explains some of its successes against northern periphery peoples.75Barfield (1989), pp. 230–231.

76Dardess (1983), p. 253; Barraclough (1993), p.165; Hucker (1975), pp. 134–135.

77Barfield (1989), pp. 248–249, and personal correspondence. Also see Wang (1968),pp. 49, 53. In addition, Ming sensitivity was probably increased by the fact thatEmperor Ming Yongle (1403–1424) had moved the capital from Nanjing to Beijing in1421, thus placing it closer to the northern border. If the capital had been far to thesouth, then even a Mongol invasion that overran the Beijing area would beembarrassing but no real threat to the dynasty, since its economic and populationcenter was in the south. A final factor that explains the greater Ming reliance on mili-tary measures is the advent of firearms. This made a wall-building strategy more

plausible and gave Ming armies a distinct advantage in the field against the horsearcher-style of warfare practiced by the nomads. The authors are indebted to EdwardDreyer and Thomas Barfield for these observations. Also, see Waldron (1990).




by support from communist Russia),82 greatly exceeding the level of control exercised by past Han Chinese regimes such as the Han,Tang, or Ming. In addition, during its early years, the PRC alsodeployed military forces to counter or deter incursions into or per-ceived threats against both nearby periphery areas (such as Korea,Tibet, and Nepal) and heartland borders from major industrial pow-ers such as the United States and Great Britain. The PRC leadershipalso planned to use military force to reestablish direct Chinese con-trol over Taiwan, which had been formally incorporated into theChinese heartland during the early Qing Dynasty but had remainedoutside Beijing’s sphere of influence since the late 19th century.These latter efforts did not meet with complete success, however, be-cause of the superior military strength of the adversaries involved.83

Since the mid 1960s, the PRC has resorted to force less often thanduring its early years. However, one should not conclude from thisapparent decrease in the use of force that the communist regime isentirely satisfied with its level of control over the Chinese periphery.

Although having incorporated many traditional periphery areas di-rectly into the Chinese nation-state, the Chinese communist regimeremains relatively weak compared with those major industrial pow-ers capable of deploying forces along its borders (e.g., the UnitedStates, Japan, and Russia) and, more important, has continued to beplagued by an assortment of domestic ills. As a result, it has not fully restored the level of influence over periphery areas enjoyed by theearly Qing rulers, as a result of their highly successful military ex-ploits. This is not to say, however, that the Chinese regime today necessarily seeks to replicate the level and type of control over theperiphery enjoyed by strong imperial Chinese regimes, nor that itseeks to expand significantly the geographic expanse of the tradi-tional periphery to encompass, for example, parts of the Russian FarEast, Central and Southwest Asia, or the Western Pacific. The influ-ence of mixed weak-strong state capabilities on near-term Chinesesecurity behavior toward the industrial powers and nearby states,and the implications of the emergence of a much stronger China

______________82Stalin essentially permitted the PRC to regain control over Manchuria and Xinjiang.

83

For excellent discussions of PRC security policy and military behavior toward Korea,Nepal, Tibet, and Taiwan, see Hunt (1996), pp. 13–17, 159–200; Christensen (1996b);Chen (1994); Grunfeld (1996); Smith (1998); and Goldstein (1989).




over the longer term for Chinese security policy and behavior will bediscussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

To sum up, the historical record suggests that the Chinese state hasfrequently employed force against foreign powers but generally fol-lowed a pragmatic and limited approach to the use of such force.Specifically, it has employed force against foreigners primarily toinfluence, control, or pacify its strategic periphery and generally hasdone so when it possessed relative superiority over its potentialadversaries on the periphery. In these instances, force was mostoften used in attempts to establish (or reestablish) relations of deference toward China by periphery powers, to absorb nearby areassuch as Vietnam and Korea, or to deter or end attacks from the

periphery by either nearby or (in the modern era) more distantpowers. However, an inability to establish a material position of superiority over the periphery through military force—or strong levels of domestic opposition to the use of such force—often led tothe adoption by the state of noncoercive methods, usually involving appeasement and passive defenses, which frequently provided long periods of security from attack. This suggests that security during much of Chinese history did not require unambiguous military dominance by the Chinese state over periphery areas. In particular,as will be discussed in the next section, when military control overthe periphery could not be established or maintained withoutthreatening internal order and prosperity, or the interests of key elites, the Chinese state usually opted for political arrangements thatprovided some measure of security from attack while often, althoughnot always, preserving some symbol of deference to Chineseauthority.

THE USE OF NONCOERCIVE SECURITY STRATEGIES

Despite a frequent reliance on force to eliminate internal opposition,reestablish the strategic periphery, chasten disrespectful foreignpowers, and quell or intimidate potential external threats, the rulersof most Chinese regimes (both modern and pre-modern) havesought to employ a variety of noncoercive military, economic, anddiplomatic measures to ensure China’s security (or maintain China’s

preeminence) over extended periods. These measures have vari-ously included the construction of passive defenses, policies of ap-




peasement and cooptation, cessation of contact with outsiders, theassertion or maintenance of hierarchical, sinocentric diplomatic re-lations, or the acceptance of more equal interactions using politicalbalance, tactical alliance, and maneuver. Often, such measures weregenerally shown to be more effective and deemed less costly and lesscontroversial domestically than offensive, military-centered security policies, and permitted the regime to focus greater energies and re-sources on the maintenance of domestic order and well-being. Thespecific precipitant, form, and timing of each noncoercive measureused by the Chinese state varied considerably, however, largely de-pending on structural factors relating to the relative strength and in-ternal unity 84 of the Chinese regime and the general historical periodunder examination (i.e., imperial or modern).

During the imperial era, relatively weak Chinese states confronted by internal problems associated with regime formation or decline (e.g.,the elimination of remaining resistance to a new imperial order orthe suppression of rising domestic rebellion) would rely most oftenon a combination of static defenses, appeasement, and, at times,cultural-ideological efforts to coopt or indoctrinate foreigners intothe sinocentric world view through the ritual trappings of the hierar-chical suzerain-vassal tributary relationship.85 Taken as a whole,these measures were intended to provide the regime with a respitefrom external attacks and thereby permit a greater concentration onthe primary task of establishing (or reestablishing) internal order and

well-being.

Toward relatively more dangerous nomadic and semi-nomadicpeoples, a weak Chinese state would rely most heavily on a combi-nation of appeasement via trade, subsidies, payments, lavish gifts,and, when possible, static defenses.86 Toward those ordinarily less-dangerous sinitic powers on its eastern and southern borders, weak Chinese regimes would tend to emphasize the culturally based,hierarchical aspects of the tributary relationship to elicit or maintain

______________84The influence of internal political factors on Chinese security strategies will bediscussed in the next section.

85Fairbank (1968a), pp. 11–12.

86Strong imperial regimes were also compelled to employ appeasement policies onoccasion. This point is discussed in greater detail below.




deference, while permitting increasingly generous trade relation-ships.87 Such stratagems were also initially applied during the lateQing period (a decidedly weak state era) to the imperialist powers. Inparticular, Qing rulers initially attempted to pressure or persuadeforeign traders and dignitaries to perform and accept traditional hi-erarchical, tributary-based rituals and trade relations.88

During periods of regime decline, such strategies of appeasementand symbolic dominance could not long conceal the weakness of adeclining Chinese regime or indefinitely buy off growing externalthreats, however. In virtually every case, they would soon be aug-mented, if not replaced altogether, by strategies keyed to diplomaticbalancing, maneuver, cooptation, collaboration, and largely tactical

alliance. This was especially true in the case of imperial China’s re-lations with nomadic and semi-nomadic entities, and with regard tolate Qing policies toward the imperialist powers from approximately 1880 onward. Such measures reflected a clear recognition of theneed for a weak China to become extensively involved in the affairsof the outside world, to play stronger powers off against one anotherto maximize strategic leverage and flexibility.89 (This does not meanthat strong imperial Chinese regimes did not also engage in diplo-matic balance and maneuver. In fact, they frequently did so, butprimarily as an adjunct to more hierarchical, tributary-centeredstrategies discussed below.)

Elements of this “weak regime” strategy of appeasement and diplo-

matic maneuver were also evident during extended periods of inter-nal political fragmentation. During such times, the imperial Chinesestate frequently relinquished even the symbolic forms of the hierar-chical tributary relationship and treated potential adversaries as po-litical equals. The foremost example of this type of regime was the

______________87This is not intended to imply that weak imperial regimes did not use the ritualistictrappings of the tributary relationship toward nomadic peoples, nor that such regimes would entirely shun efforts at outright appeasement and static defenses towardsouthern and eastern peoples. An emphasis on one or more strategies over others waslargely a matter of degree.

88Fairbank (1992), pp. 198–199; Spence (1990), pp. 117–119; and Hao and Wang (1980).

89Fairbank (1992), p. 61; for the Qing period, see Hunt (1996), pp. 32–39; Hsu (1980).




Song Dynasty (960–1279).90 During the life of this dynasty, controlover the Chinese heartland was divided between a Han Chinese im-perial state and several large nomadic regimes (the Liao, the Xi Xia,and the Jin). In this precarious security environment, the Song rulerskept their potential nomadic adversaries at bay over a very long pe-riod of time through policies that combined strong military defenses(by the middle of the 11th century, the Song army numbered wellover a million soldiers), diplomatic maneuver, appeasement, alliancebehavior, and occasionally (albeit often unsuccessfully 91) offensive

warfare. The Song relied in particular upon an appeasement policy marked by very large, and increasing, subsidy payments to nomadicstates. The regime was eventually defeated by the Mongols after afierce resistance, and largely because Song power had been greatly eroded internally as a result of the influence of weak emperors,domineering chief councilors, and wrangling careerist officials.92

In general, strong imperial Chinese regimes would also employ a wide variety of noncoercive measures to ensure peace and stability along the periphery. Once domestic power was consolidated andChina’s territorial borders secured, most regimes sought largely tomaintain order and elicit deference from periphery states and peo-ples. This normally did not require continuous military coercion orconquest. On the contrary, most established, strong Han Chineseregimes were primarily oriented toward system maintenance andhence took a relatively non-militant approach to security issues.93

In particular, when not provoked to the use of force by excessively disrespectful or aggressive periphery powers, such regimes wouldusually rely primarily on a combination of static defenses and tribu-tary/trade relations to attain their security objectives. Along thenorthern and northwestern frontiers, these measures would also fre-quently be combined with efforts to “play barbarians off against one

______________90See the contributions to Rossabi (1983), for various excellent analyses of Song for-eign relations.91The Song was for the most part successful in the use of offensive force only againstthe more sedentary areas to the south. It conquered and reunified all of the Chineseheartland south of the Yellow River. Fairbank (1992), p. 114.

92Rossabi (1983); Shiba (1983), pp. 98–101; O’Neill (1987), pp. 303–304; Fairbank

(1992), p. 114; Hucker (1975), pp. 120–121.93For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Wills (1968), pp. 252–254.




another” ( yi-yi-zhi-yi ) in various forms of alliance and maneuver andto control nomads through the regulation of trade contacts and privi-leges.

For a strong imperial state, the traditional tributary relationshipserved many practical, political, economic, and cultural purposes: Itreaffirmed the applicability to Chinese and non-Chinese alike of China’s hierarchical and sinocentric system of political and socialvalues and thereby legitimized the entire Confucian order, it pro-vided an avenue for regular diplomatic communication between theChinese court and foreign rulers, and it served as a convenient anddurable basis for mutually beneficial economic relations betweenChina and foreign states, thereby increasing, in many instances, Chi-

na’s leverage over those states.94 In addition, tributary relations alsogave recipient periphery states important legitimacy, status, andleverage within their own subregion, by providing significant eco-nomic benefits and a form of political recognition by the dominantpower in East Asia. Moreover, tributary status often, although notalways, implied Chinese diplomatic and military protection of thevassal state against domestic usurpers or foreign nontributary states,as noted above.95

When possible, strong Chinese imperial regimes generally sought toground the tributary and trade relationship in a genuinely hierarchi-cal power structure based on a clear position of military superior-ity.96 Under such circumstances, periphery powers were often pres-

sured, enticed, or coerced by strong and wealthy imperial Chineseregimes to accept a more clearly defined status as Chinese vassalsthat involved specific reciprocal benefits and obligations. Localleaders were usually allowed to retain their positions and rule theirlands as they wished, provided they “kept the peace, accepted sym-bols of [Chinese] overlordship, and assisted [Chinese] armies when

______________94One of the best summaries of the tribute system is in Fairbank (1964), pp. 23–38. Also see Fairbank (1978a), p. 30; and Wills (1968), p. 254.

95Hunt (1984), p. 15.

96Sheperd argues that practitioners of Confucian government understood thatnormative persuasion usually required the threat of coercion to provide effective

control (1993, p. 185). Also see Lam (1968), pp. 178–179; and Suzuki (1968), pp. 183–186.




called on.”97 They would also often receive generous gifts, subsidies,and trade concessions from the Chinese court, ostensibly as an ex-pression of the benevolence and generosity of the emperor, but moreaccurately to ensure continued loyalty and support.98 Such gifts andconcessions (along with various diplomatic ploys) were often used by a strong regime to foment hostilities among nomadic groups and toprevent the formation of nomadic confederations.99 In some in-stances, and particularly during the early period of contact with im-perialist powers in the mid 19th century, a compliant vassal state(such as Korea at that time) would also agree to avoid foreign rela-tions with states other than China.100 In return, the Chinese state of-ten assumed a level of responsibility for the security of the vassal, es-pecially against external attack.

This type of more genuine vassal-suzerain relationship was easier toestablish and maintain among the more sedentary, sinitic regimes of the eastern, southern, and southwestern periphery, which were cul-turally more receptive to the hierarchical, sinocentric impulses of Chinese diplomacy,101 generally less aggressive, and far more vulner-able to military pressure than the nomadic and semi-nomadic peo-ples to the north and northwest. Indeed, many of these regimes hadstrong political and economic incentives to maintain a cooperativerelationship with China. For example, some regimes used the bene-

______________97Hucker (1975), pp. 61–62. Also see O’Neill (1987), p. 327; and Fairbank (1992), pp.

112–113.98Barfield (1989), pp. 64–67, 112. Occasionally, this strategy also included morecoercive measures designed to ensure local compliance. Chinese forces were oftengarrisoned within periphery areas, as a deterrence to attack and a symbol of imperialauthority. Moreover, the sons of rulers were often sent to the Chinese capital to re-ceive education in Chinese culture and also to serve as hostages to ensure their fa-ther’s loyalty, and Chinese noblewomen were given in marriage to local leaders.These more sophisticated practices were more often implemented by non-HanChinese or partly nomadic imperial regimes against nomadic areas. See O’Neill(1987), p. 313.

99Jagchid and Symons (1989), p. 56. Such practices would at times prompt aggressiveresponses and eventually lead to the breakdown of tributary relations and military conflict along the northern and northwestern frontiers.

100O’Neill (1987), pp. 145–146. Also see Lee (1996), p. 2.101For most of the Qing Dynasty, contacts with the more sinitic southern and south-

eastern states were handled by the Ministry of Rituals, reflecting the common siniticculture of these peoples. Inner Asian peoples were handled by the Office of Border Af-fairs. Kirby (1994), p. 17; Hsu (1970), pp. 62–65; and Spence (1990), pp. 117–119.




ficial, tributary-based trade relationship with strong and unified Chi-nese regimes to establish wealthy trading states, such as the Shrivi-

jaya during the Tang and the Malacca during the Ming.102 It is thusno surprise that, as a rule, imperial Chinese rulers were more willing and able to employ noncoercive measures, centered on the tributary relationship, toward sinitic periphery states. Such entities wereexplicitly regarded by several emperors as far less of a threat to thesecurity and stability of the heartland than the nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples of the north and northwest.10 3 In fact, many Chinese rulers eventually came to believe, however incorrectly, thatthe maintenance of peace along the southern, southwestern, andeastern periphery could be explained by the persuasive and attract-ing power of Chinese culture, as symbolically expressed in the tribu-tary relationship, and not simply by material considerations such asmilitary and economic power relationships.104

Among the more threatening and less-submissive nomadic peoplesof Inner Asia, the tributary relationship, combined with other nonco-ercive measures such as frontier trade and markets, intermarriagebetween nomadic leaders and Chinese maidens, and other gifts andbestowals, often became (as in the case of weak Chinese states) anelaborate form of pay-off, albeit one couched in the guise of defer-ence to Chinese authority. In other words, as long as strong nomadicpowers performed ritual obeisance to the Chinese emperor, evenstrong Chinese states were usually content to purchase peace along the periphery, especially when such powers proved difficult to sub-due through military means. And the rulers of such regimes paidtribute not out of a genuine recognition of the superior virtue of theChinese emperor but because they gained politically and economi-cally from the exchange.105

The advent of the modern era witnessed the emergence of severalnew, or partly new, factors that affected the security environmentand outlook of the Chinese state and its leaders. These factors have

______________102 Wolters (1970), pp. 28–29, 37–38, 155.

103 Wolters (1970), pp. 31–32, 36, 50. Also see Wang (1968), p. 53.

104 Wolters (1970), p. 36.

105This is a major inference drawn from Barfield (1989). It is also argued by Jagchidand Symons (1989), pp. 52–54, 174; and Suzuki (1968), pp. 183–184.




altered the specific form and application of China’s noncoercive se-curity strategies in important ways, although they have not changedthe basically pragmatic approach used in the application of suchstrategies to protect the periphery. Five fundamental factors are of particular importance.

First, the emergence of significant security threats to the heartlandfrom distant, powerful nation-states meant that the Chinese statecould no longer protect itself from external attack by merely control-ling or dominating, through various types of suzerainty relationships,those areas immediately adjacent to the heartland. By necessity, ef-forts to control the periphery became intimately bound up in largerstrategies to counter actual or potential threats from both near and

distant industrial powers. To deal with such threats, the Chinesestate would eventually need to establish more direct forms of controlover the traditional periphery, where possible, and sustain a highly sophisticated level of diplomatic skills to influence events bothregionally and globally.

Second, the superior organizational, material, and ideological ca-pabilities and qualities of the modern nation-state fatally under-mined the past attractiveness of the imperial Confucian-Legalist po-litical-cultural order as a basis for defining the heartland and as ameans of establishing and maintaining a unified and prosperousChinese regime. In its place arose a statist, multi-ethnically baseddefinition of Chinese nationalism centered on (a) a putative

“alliance” between Han Chinese and the minority peoples of thetraditional periphery, and (b) the totalitarian institutions of a mono-lithic, Leninist bureaucratic state with a strong military component.Thus, Chinese cultural universalism gave way to a stress on nationalessence and the defense of China’s “unique” culture and people. Onthe organizational level, a centralized, authoritarian, usually status-quo-oriented, and bureaucratic state structure staffed by educatedscholar-officials and led by an imperial family and its retainers wasreplaced by an even more totalitarian and bureaucratic structure of rule staffed by often poorly educated cadres motivated by anideology of social transformation and control and led by charismaticfigures with extensive military experience.

As a result of the above two developments, the geographical scope of the Chinese heartland was broadened and the power and authority




of the Chinese state over Chinese society was strengthened anddeepened.

Third, closely related to the previous factor, the decline of Chinesecultural preeminence and the rise of a more egalitarian internationalsystem of modern nation-states eventually forced the Chinese stateto discard the hierarchical, culturally oriented tributary relationshipof the imperial era and adopt many of the concepts and practices of the European interstate system (e.g., the use of international law andinterstate treaties between legally equal and sovereign powers). Inthis context, the long-standing Chinese sensitivity to relative materialcapabilities that often influenced traditional political, cultural, andmilitary relations with the outside world became even more impor-

tant than during the imperial period and resulted in a primary stresson the relative economic and military capabilities of the major pow-ers and their shifting relationships with one another and with China.

At the same time, traditional sinocentric attitudes toward interna-tional relations were expressed, at least partly, in an emphasis onChina as an exemplary model of a nonhegemonic, nonpredatory,progressive state concerned with the plight of other underdevelopedstates.

Fourth, a deep-seated “victim mentality” among both the elite andthe populace first emerged in the imperial period106 but came to fullprominence in the modern era as a result of China’s humiliation andsubjugation by foreign imperialist states. In the context of the

previous three factors, this victim mentality has intensified the long-standing Chinese sensitivity to foreign threats and territorial incur-sions and accentuated the strong commitment to the creation of apowerful and respected Chinese nation-state able to redress past

wrongs (e.g., the seizure of Chinese territories such as Taiwan)committed by stronger imperialist states; defend Chinese statesovereignty, national interests, and regime status in a larger interna-tional arena dominated by the great powers; and protect Chinesesociety against foreign “cultural contamination” and threats to do-mestic order and stability.

______________106The Chinese notion of victimization by foreigners has been a long-standing theme

in Chinese history, deriving from earlier periods of conquest by nomadic invaderssuch as the Mongols and Manchus, which exposed Han Chinese internal weakness.The authors are indebted to Thomas Barfield for this observation.




Fifth, the primary challenge of maintaining domestic order and well-being was made worse during the modern era by huge increases inChina’s population and, until recent decades, by significant declinesin productivity per farm laborer. China’s population approximately doubled during the last 150 years of the Qing Dynasty and then dou-bled again after the communist victory in 1949, following a slightdecline in population in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as aresult of military conflicts and economic disasters. In large part as aresult of such massive population increases and resulting hunger forland, the man-land ratio per household dropped considerably andboth agricultural and industrial production slowed.107 These pres-sures added greatly to the existing sense of vulnerability of the Chi-nese state and society to domestic chaos and hence strengthened theperceived need to devote enormous energies to assuring internal or-der and well-being.

Together, these developments meant that not only the form of diplomatic relations with the outside world but also the substance of China’s security policy have changed significantly in the modern era,even though the basic security problem108 has generally remainedthe same. To ensure domestic order and establish and maintaincontrol over its periphery, the Chinese state now needed to acquirethe sophisticated organizational, material, and conceptual capabili-ties and practices of an industrialized nation-state. Moreover, tosurvive, the Chinese state would need to develop such abilities in re-lation to both nearby periphery states and more distant industrialpowers, as part of both regional and global security strategies.

However, the acquisition of these abilities would take a considerableperiod of time, given the vastly superior capabilities of Western in-dustrialized states, the depth of China’s internal problems, and thedegree of conceptual and organizational transformation required of Chinese political and military leaders. Indeed, for most of the mod-ern era, and despite its reconstitution by highly disciplined and de-termined nationalist and communist elites, the Chinese state has

______________107Fairbank (1992), pp. 167–173.

108That is, a primary emphasis on the maintenance of domestic order and well-being,

combined with efforts to dominate or neutralize the periphery and attain geopoliticalpreeminence in an overall environment of changing resources.




remained relatively weak in comparison with its major actual andpotential adversaries, even though it has become significantly stronger than many of the states on its immediate periphery.

Chinese elites in the early modern era did not immediately realizethe magnitude of the security challenge that confronted them. LateQing rulers initially attempted to deal with the security threat posedby imperialist powers through the use of hierarchical tributary-basedinteractions, trade restrictions and concessions, and usually ill-timedefforts at armed resistance. These actions resulted in disastrous mili-tary defeats and a belated recognition of the need to protect the Chi-nese heartland by a combination of both “strong-state” military ef-forts to reestablish control over the periphery where possible and

prolonged “weak state” diplomatic strategies against the industrial-ized powers that used much of the language and logic of the Euro-pean nation-state system. Thus, both late Qing and especially early nationalist rulers relied on external balancing, cooperative relation-ships, and appeals to international law to fend off imperialist aggres-sion while also undertaking efforts to build a modern military andconsolidate direct control over long-standing periphery areas such asTibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Xinjiang.109

The reunification of the Chinese heartland and the subsequent es-tablishment of a Chinese communist regime in 1949 brought furthermodifications in the hybrid “weak-strong” state security strategy of the modern era. The People’s Republic of China attained a relatively

high level of state capacity, especially compared to the much weakernationalist regime, which had existed during a period of domesticpolitical division and extreme social disarray. As a result of itsgreater strength and control over the heartland, and its political affil-iation with communist Russia, the PRC was able to successfully in-corporate three long-standing periphery areas (Inner Mongolia, Xin-

jiang, and Tibet) into the Chinese nation. However, despite suchsuccesses, the economic and military capabilities of the communistChinese state remained greatly inferior to those of the advanced in-dustrial states, partly because of the legacy of underdevelopment of the Qing and republican periods, and partly because of the disas-

______________

109This pattern of behavior is well summarized in Hunt (1996), pp. 31–50; Kirby (1994), pp. 16–19; Kirby (1997), pp. 443–445; Hsu (1970), pp. 317–342; Hao and Wang (1980), pp. 161–172; and O’Neill (1987), pp. 322–323.




trous effects of Maoist and Stalinist socioeconomic policies. Hence,efforts by the Chinese leadership to establish a stronger presencealong the entire periphery and to protect the Chinese heartland fromdirect attack were checked or complicated by the presence of a majorcontinental industrial power to the north and west (the SovietUnion) and a major maritime industrial power to the east and south(the United States), as well as other smaller nearby powers.110

In response to this unprecedented situation, the Chinese state hascontinued to pursue a version of the past “weak-state” security strat-egy of extensive diplomatic balance and maneuver throughout mostof the communist period.111 Toward the major powers, this strategy has involved Chinese efforts to establish formal or informal alliances

or strategic understandings with, first, the Soviet Union, and, thenthe United States, as the third, and weakest, player in a complex strategic triangle. It has also at times included, as an importantcorollary to the larger “great power” strategic game, extensive effortsto court lesser industrial states such as Great Britain, Japan, France,and Germany, as well as secondary efforts to elicit support fromnewly emergent Asian and African states along China’s periphery and beyond, through political or ideological appeals to third world orsocialist solidarity.112 Such appeals have frequently included at-tempts to present China as a model of a peace-loving, nonpredatory,progressive developing state deserving emulation by other develop-ing nations.113 This was often conveyed through the enunciation of various “principles” that ostensibly guide China’s international be-havior (e.g., nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries,

______________110Specifically, after 1949, the PRC was prevented from reestablishing direct controlover Taiwan, and a position of suzerainty over Korea, Nepal, and possibly Vietnam, by the military and political resistance of the United States, India, and France. It was alsounable to reestablish a position of dominance over all of Mongolia and areas north of former Manchuria, because of the presence of the Soviet Union.111One major exception to this approach occurred during the 1960s, when the Chi-nese state adopted a variant of a “strong state” autonomous strategy, for largely do-mestic reasons to be discussed below.

112Useful summaries of communist China’s strategic interactions since 1949 areprovided by Barnett (1977); Pollack (1984); Tow (1994); and Yahuda (1994).

113This approach was often accompanied, during much of the 1950s and 1960s, by

more assertive policies for enhancing Chinese influence that sought to foment Maoist-style revolutions in third world countries. Armstrong (1977).




the rejection of aggressive hegemonic ambitions, and a commitmentto a “no first use” nuclear weapons doctrine).

Such moral posturing, which continues to the present day, resonates with traditional Chinese impulses toward cultural preeminence andthus reflects a continuing desire for China to attain and hold a posi-tion of prominence within the international community. It also tosome extent derives from a genuine desire to reject the supposedpredatory motives and actions of major powers in the nation-stateera, born of China’s perceived victimization by such powers. Perhapsmore important, however, it also serves the interests of a weak stateby generating support among lesser powers while hopefully deflect-ing aggressive behavior by stronger powers. Moreover, China’s at-

tempt to present itself as a totally nonaggressive state has also beenused, at times, to reduce international criticism of its military foraysagainst the periphery.114

To successfully pursue the above strategy of balance and maneuverbetween two militarily and economically superior industrial powers,the Chinese communist state needed to augment its diplomatic ca-pabilities with a level of military prowess sufficient to deter direct at-tacks by the superpowers and to generally justify China’s participa-tion in a great power strategic triangle, albeit as a “junior partner.”Hence, the Chinese state maintained, from the pre-1949 era, a mas-sive standing army (with even more massive reserves) trained to

wear down a technologically superior opponent through the fluid

tactics of infantry envelopment and guerrilla warfare. By the end of the 1960s, the PRC had also acquired a small, crude nuclear weaponscapability and, by the early 1980s, an intermediate and long-rangenuclear ballistic missile force capable of mounting a credible retalia-tory strike against a small number of key Soviet and U.S. cities andnearby military bases. In addition, China’s ability to withstand amajor attack from either superpower was increased, in the 1960s and1970s, by the dispersal of major industrial facilities across the

______________114For example, as reflected in China’s use of the term “self-defense counterattack” todescribe its limited military invasion of Vietnam in 1979.




heartland, from the northeast (former Manchuria) to the interiorsouthwest.115

In sum, Chinese leaders in the 20th century have generally pursued ahybrid “weak-strong” state security strategy. This strategy includes avariant of the traditional “strong-state” effort to control the strategicperiphery (in this case by directly incorporating peripheral areasclaimed by the Qing regime into the Chinese heartland, wheneverpossible) as well as elements of a “weak-state” approach combining arelatively unsophisticated, territorial defense-oriented military force

with an extensive level of involvement in diplomatic balance andmaneuver, especially in relation to the superpowers. Since the es-tablishment of the communist regime in 1949 and until the decline

of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the Chinese state relied for themost part upon a security strategy keyed to external balancing through shifting strategic relationships with the United States andSoviet Union (rather than internal balancing through a crash pro-gram of military modernization), combined with the maintenance of a strong yet technologically unsophisticated defensive force designedto deter attacks on Chinese territory, not to project Chinese influenceand presence beyond the heartland.116 Thus, in many respects, theoverall security approach of the Chinese state in the 20th century hasresembled a modern-day variant of the imperial Song security strategy, combining the construction of strong military defenses (andoccasional defensive warfare along the periphery) with extensive in-volvement in diplomatic maneuver and alliance behavior.

In recent decades, a second set of modernizing changes have furtheraltered China’s security environment and brought about evengreater changes in its security strategy. These developments haveresulted in a further adaptation of the existing “weak-strong” statesecurity approach of the modern era toward a highly “calculative” se-curity strategy emphasizing market-led and outward-oriented eco-

______________115For overviews of China’s defense strategy and force structure during the 1950s,1960s, and 1970s, see Whitson (1972); Gittings (1967); Pollack (1972); and Pollack (1979).

116However, such a defensive force would almost certainly have been sufficient toreestablish dominant influence or control over former periphery areas such as Taiwan,Korea, and Mongolia if the United States and the Soviet Union had not directly or indi-rectly prevented such actions.




nomic growth, amicable external relations with all states (in contrastto the past emphasis on external balancing), relative restraint in theuse of force combined with greater efforts to create a more modernmilitary, and a continued search for asymmetric gains internation-ally. Unlike the policies of domestic social transformation and au-tarkic development of the ideologically charged Maoist era, thissecurity strategy is specifically designed to provide for long-term do-mestic social stability and to generate the means to construct astrong and prosperous nation better able to interact with and influ-ence the international community.

These developments inevitably prompt the question, Will an increas-ingly capable China eventually resort to a modern-day variant of a

purely “strong-state” security strategy that involves efforts to expandgeographically its security periphery and dominate that periphery in

ways that threaten U.S. interests and potentially undermine thestability of the Asia-Pacific region? The factors shaping China’s cur-rent calculative security strategy, the major features of that strategy,and its implications for the future will be examined in further detailin the following two chapters.

THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC LEADERSHIP POLITICS

The Chinese state has generally pursued a pragmatic approach to se-curity policy, largely responding to shifts in relative external capa-

bilities and the lessons learned through a long history of borderdefense to control or influence the periphery. However, domesticfactors have at times exerted a critical, and sometimes irrational,influence over the strategic calculations and behavior of the Chinesestate. The most important domestic influences on Chinese security policy have been associated with leadership personalities and lead-ership politics, including leadership strife resulting from the per-sonalized nature of the Chinese political system.

Chinese history is replete with instances of political leadershipgroups seeking to use both domestic and foreign policies to outma-neuver opponents. In the struggle to amass and maintain individualand bureaucratic power in a highly personalistic system of rule, Chi-

nese leaders have initiated, modified, or completely distorted policy measures in efforts to mobilize supporters, weaken the position of




individual opponents, defend/attack vested bureaucratic interestsand beliefs, or simply to place a personal stamp on events.

Understandably, the influence of elite power struggles and individualleadership personalities on security policy has generally been great-est when the Chinese regime has been either immersed in intenseconflict or led by a particularly charismatic, powerful figure. For ex-ample, vigorous, charismatic leaders have occasionally opted for orpersisted in policies of external aggression when objective conditionssuggested a more cautious, prudent approach. In the modern era,such behavior has often been motivated by a desire to build domes-tic political support by stimulating deep-rooted anti-foreign atti-tudes among the populace through the creation or intensification of

a foreign threat.117 Strong Chinese leaders have also pursued ag-gressive or ideological foreign policies as part of a more rationalstrategy designed to build domestic political support for approachesthat they believe are essential to national security and necessitatedby external “objective” factors, not just by domestic elite conflict. 118

In addition, dominant leaders have at times squandered scarce re-sources instead of using them to strengthen the security of the Chi-nese state in times of need.119

In general, the effect of personalities and power struggles on policy content and direction has been highly idiosyncratic, reflecting thepersonal whims or predilections of individual leaders and the va-garies of the power contest. Although the effect of such machina-

tions on a particular policy can be profound, it is virtually impossibleto measure or predict how or when policy might be thus affected.

Some analysts of the relationship between Chinese domestic politicsand foreign policy argue that the frequent use of force by the Chinesestate can be largely attributed to the influence of domestic leadershipconflict and competition in a political process lacking strong legaland institutional norms. Hence, for these observers, the emergence

______________117Liao (1976); and Liao (1984).118Christensen (1996b). This point is discussed in greater detail below.

119Perhaps the most notable example of such behavior is the Empress Dowager’s

decision to reconstruct the Summer Palace using large sums appropriated to build amodern naval force. Partly as a result of this decision, China’s navy was unpreparedfor the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. O’Neill (1987), p. 84.




of a less-personalized political order in which elite conflict andleadership succession are mediated by stable institutions, morepredictable processes, and commonly recognized legal structures

will inevitably produce a more cooperative, less-aggressive pattern of Chinese security behavior.120 Although a more institutionalizedpolitical process will likely reduce the propensity to use security policy as a tool in the power struggle and also restrain the arbitrary influence on policy exerted by strong leaders, other factors such asrelative material capabilities, the structure of the international order,and domestic competition over alternative policy approaches(discussed below) will probably continue to exert a decisive influenceon China’s use of force, as they have in the past.

Security policy has been affected by domestic politics in a more regu-lar and predictable manner as a result of the formation of leadershipgroups around enduring alternative policy approaches, each reflect-ing the influence of long-standing and conflicting philosophical andbureaucratic interests. Historically, the two most important policy debates affecting China’s security behavior have been over (a) au-tonomy or self-reliance (i.e., internal balancing) versus close in-volvement with or dependence upon other powers (external balanc-ing), and (b) the prolonged use of coercive strategies centered onoffensive military force against the periphery versus a policy centered on noncoercive strategies involving static defense. Thesetwo policy debates are sometimes closely related: Arguments infavor of autonomy or self-reliance have often stressed a reliance onstatic defense over offensive force, whereas proponents of extensiveinvolvement with other powers frequently emphasize security approaches centered on the use of offensive military capabilities.However, the two debates are not identical, e.g., a regime can seek tomaintain its autonomy through a primary reliance on offensive force.

Throughout much of Chinese history, and particularly in the modernera, exposure to foreign contacts and ideas has generated a deep-seated tension among China’s leadership, and within Chinese soci-ety, between those who fear excessive involvement in and depen-dence upon the outside world and those who support extensiveinteraction with outsiders, and the introduction of foreign ideas, as a

______________120For example, Waldron (1990).




necessary way to increase the capabilities of the Chinese state and todevelop Chinese society.121 This highly contentious debate, relevantto policies affecting both domestic development and externalsecurity, is of course present in every developing society. But it ex-erts a particularly strong influence in China. The combination of China’s geographical vulnerability to external attack from a variety of near and distant states, the related belief that domestic unrest invitesforeign aggression, the historical economic self-sufficiency of theChinese state, and China’s past cultural preeminence within East

Asia have together created a strong belief among Chinese elites in theadvantages of relying on China’s own resources and hence in main-taining autonomy and independence from foreign social, economic,and political contacts and influence. Within Chinese society as a

whole, this belief has contributed greatly to the existence of an un-dercurrent of extreme xenophobia that continues to the present.122

During the imperial era, support for an autonomous approach toward both domestic development and foreign security strategies wasoften expressed, in the political realm, by Confucian advisors andscholar-officials. These individuals argued that extensive diplomaticand economic contact and involvement with foreign “barbarians”(i.e., those outside the Chinese heartland who did not acknowledgeor practice the manifestly superior tenets of Confucian political andsocial organization) would weaken the Confucian-Legalist order,demoralize the population, create economic disruption and lawless-ness, and thereby threaten domestic tranquillity, harmony, andstability.123 On a more practical (and parochial) level, Confucianbureaucrats also generally opposed extensive foreign contacts andinvolvement with foreign entities because such actions tended to di-vert resources from internal civil administration and strengthenedthe political influence and power of their rivals at court (usually imperial retainers and members of the imperial family), merchants,and, in some instances, military leaders. These factors led many

______________121This argument is explicitly applied to the modern era in Hunt (1996), pp. 20–25,31–50. It is less explicitly presented in Barfield (1989).

122The virulent, anti-Western reaction of the Chinese government and society to theaccidental bombing by U.S.-led NATO forces of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yu-

goslavia, during the Kosovo conflict of 1998–1999 is at least partly attributable to suchxenophobic attitudes.

123Hunt (1996), pp. 20–21. Also see Hao (1980).




officials to oppose extensive levels of foreign trade and foreignventures such as the above-mentioned maritime expeditions of theearly Ming Dynasty.124 Such views and interests thus contributedsignificantly to the overall limitations on imperial China’s activitiesbeyond the periphery.

Opposition among Chinese elites to extensive involvement with, anddependence upon, the outside world has continued during the mod-ern period, although the specific argument against such involvementhas changed significantly since the collapse of the Confucian-Legal-ist order. In addition, sensitivities to extensive political and military involvement with foreigners, and especially with major powers, hasarguably been strengthened by the intensely negative experience of

Chinese defeat and subjugation at the hands of Western industrialnations and Japan during the imperialist era125 and, during thecommunist period, by the collapse of China’s alliance with the SovietUnion.126

Both nationalist and communist political leaders and intellectualscriticize the negative influence upon the Chinese nation and society

wrought by predatory economic imperialism and supposedly deca-dent and disruptive Western cultural, political, and social ideas. Inparticular, they point to the alleged damage done to China’s eco-nomic development by corrupt and rapacious businessmenoperating in China; the general threat of “cultural contamination andsubversion” posed by Western religious and philosophical beliefs

and popular culture and by Western concepts of social, political, andeconomic pluralism; the egoistic search for profits above all else; alegal system centered on protecting the rights of the individual above

______________124Levathes (1994), pp. 72, 163–165, 175–177; Fairbank (1992), pp. 137–139; andO’Neill (1987), p. 37.

125This experience included the failure of efforts by late Qing rulers to establish al-liances with specific imperialist states (e.g., Russia) to defend against other imperialiststates (e.g., Japan), the perceived betrayal of Chinese interests at the Versailles Confer-ence and again at the Yalta Conference, and the general problems encountered during the entire modern era with allegedly exploitative and culturally subversive foreignbusinessmen and Western missionaries. See Hsu (1970) and Spence (1990).126Hsu (1970), pp. 761–762; Hunt (1996), pp. 24–25; and Hunt (1984), pp. 30–31. The

sudden withdrawal of Soviet economic and military assistance to China in the late1950s and early 1960s seriously damaged China’s economic development and defenseefforts. For a brief overview of this episode, see Barnett (1977), pp. 36–42.




the group; and other assumed features of industrialized Westernsociety. Such ideas and practices are viewed as detrimental toChina’s effort to construct a wealthy and powerful nation-state, cor-rosive to the self-sacrificing collectivist and nationalist beliefs thatmodern Chinese leaders have sought to cultivate among ordinary citizens and, more broadly, are seen as a threat to the national andcultural identity of the Chinese people. Moreover, some contempo-rary Chinese leaders and intellectuals argue that Western, and espe-cially U.S., ideas and institutions should also be rejected by the Chi-nese people because they serve as instruments of U.S. dominanceover the international system. Hence, if adopted, such ideas and in-stitutions will allegedly perpetuate China’s subservience to theUnited States in the regional and global arenas. If China is to be-come a major power in the modern era, proponents of this viewpointargue, it must therefore reject U.S. influence and develop its ownuniquely Chinese developmental forms. Taken as a whole, these atti-tudes have thus created a highly exaggerated belief, among someleaders and many ordinary citizens, that China’s modern-day social,economic, and political development problems have been and willcontinue to be greatly aggravated, if not completely caused, by ex-tensive contact with or emulation of the West.127

To remain secure from foreign material and cultural threats, theseleaders argue, as their imperial Confucian predecessors did using adifferent logic, China must depend primarily, if not solely, on thegenius, industry, and patriotism of the Chinese people. Any signifi-cant opening of the Chinese heartland to foreign ideas and practices

will inevitably erode social order and fatally threaten the stability andsecurity of the Chinese nation and its ability to achieve great powerstatus, they insist. Thus, regarding the realm of interstate relations,such leaders maintain that China must avoid “entangling alliances”or other forms of extensive international diplomatic or political in-volvement (and especially involvement with superior industrial pow-ers) that limit the freedom and autonomy of the Chinese state or ex-pose Chinese society to extensive foreign political, economic, orsocial influences. They also argue that China must ultimately ensure

______________127Many of the themes mentioned in this paragraph are discussed in Spence (1990);Hsu (1970); Hsu (1980); Hao and Wang (1980); Hunt (1996); and Fairbank (1992). Seealso Robinson and Shambaugh (1994); and Dittmer and Kim (1993).




its security by building a strong, modern military unencumbered by the limitations inherent in multilateral security structures or defensepacts.128

Opponents of this antiforeign, pro-autonomy viewpoint generally fallinto one of two broad categories. The first, and more widely ac-cepted, opposition viewpoint has been evident, in various culturaland political forms, during both the imperial and modern eras, butbecame particularly pronounced during the final decades of the Qing Dynasty, and has emerged again in recent decades as part of theeconomic reform movement. Its proponents accept the above argu-ments of the “neo-isolationists” regarding Chinese vulnerability toforeign threats and intrusions that potentially undermine domestic

political and social stability and development. However, such indi-viduals also argue that a relatively weak China (especially as com-pared to the major powers) must adopt and modify foreign attitudes,technologies, and methods and become more deeply involved in theinternational system to survive and prosper as a strong and indepen-dent state in an increasingly interactive, rapidly developing, and of-ten dangerous world. These individuals argue that a weak Chinacannot maintain true independence and security if it does not locatereliable outside support and, when necessary, draw on appropriateforeign developmental models, beliefs, and technologies while re-taining fundamental Chinese moral and philosophical values.129

The second opposition viewpoint first emerged during the 20th

century and thus far constitutes a minority (but perhaps a growing minority) among those advocating involvement with the outside

world. It presents a liberal and western-oriented critique of both theantiforeign, pro-autonomy viewpoint and the views of those advo-cating the highly limited and instrumental use of Western techniquesby a weak Chinese state. Adherents of this viewpoint argue that

______________128Kirby (1994); and Hunt (1996), pp. 20–22.

129One version of this argument became especially strong in the later years of theQing Dynasty, during the self-strengthening (ziqiang ) movement of the latter half of the 19th century. Proponents of this movement argued that China’s modernization ef-fort must seek to retain the essential (t’i ) moral, philosophical, and organizational el-ements of Chinese state and society while accepting from the West only what is of

practical use ( yong ). Wright (1962); Hunt (1996), pp. 21–22, 31–35; Spence (1990), pp.225–226; Hsu (1970), pp. 333–352; Hsu (1980); Hao and Wang (1980), p. 201; andFairbank (1992), p. 258.




modernity ultimately requires the permanent adoption and accep-tance, as the core elements of Chinese state and society, of a widevariety of western-originated or western-supported institutions andideas, including the centrality of legal norms and procedures andcodified institutional processes over subjective, personal bases of authority; formal political and economic limits on the power of thecentral government; the construction of quasi-autonomous political,

judicial, and social spheres; and support for various internationaland multilateral regimes and fora.130 Hence, proponents of thisviewpoint insist that to sustain domestic order and well-being, deterexternal threats to Chinese territory and national interests, and ulti-mately attain great power status, China must maintain extensive in-volvement with the outside world and participate in the shaping of the international community not only when it is weak, but also (andespecially) after it becomes strong and prosperous.131

The debate between these two general positions has grown particu-larly intense during periods of regime weakness or decline, when theChinese state has become heavily involved in diplomatic machina-tions and at times permitted an expanded level of foreign access toChinese society. Such extensive involvement in foreign affairs, usu-ally accompanied by growing political and social corruption, stateincapacity, and economic collapse, often bolstered the position of those opposed to extensive foreign contacts. These individualsblamed China’s ills on excessive collaboration with foreigners anddemanded the adoption of strategies keyed to political and economicautonomy and self-reliance. This argument resulted in often highly inappropriate Chinese external strategies (including at times the use

______________130 A recognition of the need for China to adopt Western ideas and practices, not justtechnologies, was basic to the (often radical, socialist) views espoused by early 20thcentury Chinese political intellectuals such as Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yat-sen. However, arguments in favor of many of the fundamentalfeatures of Western capitalist democracies have become notable only during the re-form period of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. See Nathan (1990); Schell (1988); andHamrin (1990). Adherents of this viewpoint argue that such a transformation does notrequire the wholesale rejection of all indigenous Chinese institutions and ideas butrather their modification and adaptation to the universal requirements of modernity,as has occurred, for example, in Japan.

131Contemporary Chinese proponents of post-1978 economic and social reform

policies and the opening to the outside world include individuals from both of theabove “anti-isolationist” schools of thought.




of offensive force) that accelerated the decline of the state and ulti-mately weakened its overall security.

The two most notable examples of such policy interventions haveoccurred in the modern era (i.e., since the latter half of the 19th cen-tury). During the final years of the Qing Dynasty, the continued in-ability of the Chinese state to adequately defend the heartlandagainst imperialist pressures through a heightened weak-state policy of diplomatic appeasement, accommodation, and alliance resultedin an abrupt shift toward a policy of total autonomy and armed resis-tance to all foreigners. This took the form of the so-called Boxer Up-rising of 1898–1901. Those who supported the Boxers among theChinese leadership cited the social corruption and decline resulting

from excessive exposure to the West, the pure nativist qualities andfighting capabilities of the Boxers,132 and the general inability of China’s weak-state strategy to protect China against further incur-sions to justify the adoption of an autonomous, force-based strategy to deal with the foreign threat. However, this strategy merely led tofurther humiliations and defeat and even greater inroads on Chinesesovereignty by the imperialist powers.133

During the 1960s, the communist regime adopted a largely autarkicsecurity strategy of opposition to both superpowers. This occurreddespite the continued relative military inferiority of the Chinese stateand signs of growing threats from both the Soviet Union and theUnited States, and largely because of the dominant influence over

policy exerted by Mao Zedong.134 Although the logic of this situation would have suggested the adoption of a weak-state strategy of accommodation or alliance at that time (in fact there is someevidence that certain Chinese leaders wished to improve relations

with the Soviets in the mid 1960s—and especially after Nikita

______________132The Boxers were originally both anti-Manchu and anti-foreign Han Chinese be-lievers in the power of traditional stylized exercises, martial arts, and magic.

133Hunt (1996), pp. 37–38. For a general overview of the Boxer Uprising, see Fairbank (1992), pp. 230–232; Spence (1990), pp. 231–235; and Wakeman (1975), pp. 216–221.

134The emergence of a major dispute with the Soviet Union following the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the late 1950s, and the growing threat posed by the UnitedStates as a result of the intervention of the United States in Vietnam, the expansion of

the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile and long-range bomber force, and U.S. unwillingness to consider a “no first use” nuclear doctrine, resulted in the emergence of adual threat to China.




Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964—to strengthen China’s strategic lever-age and ease its economic problems), the Chinese state insteadadopted a “dual adversary” approach and eventually, during the Cul-tural Revolution of the late 1960s, an isolationist foreign policy. Thispolicy was pushed and justified by Mao Zedong in part on the basisof a strategy of autarkic social and economic development and mili-tary defense. Mao argued that foreign ideas and practices, in theform of, on the one hand, Soviet-led “social-imperialism” and itssystem of repressive, elitist bureaucratic party control and, on theother hand, U.S.-led imperialism and its aggressive predatory systemof exploitative capitalism, together threatened the unity, indepen-dence, and vitality of Chinese society and stifled Chinese growth. Inreaction to these threats, he espoused a policy of self-reliance andideologically motivated mass mobilization that drew on a theory of the innate “revolutionary” qualities of the Chinese people to inno-vate, cooperate, and overcome material obstacles to development.This approach arguably weakened China’s security and led to con-frontations with both superpowers and ultimately a military clash

with the Soviet Union in 1969.135

The internal leadership debate over whether to use offensive force orless-coercive measures (such as static defense) in Chinese security policy has invoked many of the same arguments outlined above.During the imperial period, a heavy and persistent reliance on of-fensive force was often resisted by Confucian civilian officials andadvisors, for many of the same political and cultural reasons thatsuch individuals opposed extensive involvement with foreigners. Inparticular, a reliance on offensive force was seen to divert resourcesfrom domestic administration (often without producing clear-cutvictories) and to augment the power and influence of non-Confucianelites, such as military leaders, merchants, and imperial retainers.More broadly, a sustained preference for coercive over noncoercivemeasures also tended to increase the personal, often arbitrary powerof the emperor over the authority of Confucian officials. This in-

______________135Mao also advocated this autarkic, populist approach to domestic development andnational defense to weaken the power and influence of his rivals within the seniorparty apparatus, who tended to support Soviet-style Leninist and Stalinist policies and

party structures of rule. For overviews of the origins and evolution of the “dual adver-sary” foreign policy, see Barnett (1977); Gittings (1974); Harding (1994a); Goldstein(1994); Yahuda (1978); and Hinton (1970).




creasingly became an issue from the late Tang onward, when Chi-nese emperors became more autocratic and the functions of gov-ernment administration and military defense became increasingly lodged in separate elites.136 In addition, for many Confucian offi-cials, the influence of certain core Confucian beliefs such as “rule by virtuous example” or de 13 7 was weakened by a heavy reliance oncoercive security strategies, which allegedly debased human natureand led to an increasing dependence on punitive central controls,state monopolies, heavy taxation, and widespread conscription.These practices, whether applied to Chinese or foreigners, were all intheory anti-Confucian and were seen to undermine the dominantbelief system and hence the social status and authority of Confucianscholars and officials.138

Political and ideological resistance to the excessive use of force,combined with the opposition to extensive involvement with for-eigners, often led to a preference among many Confucian officials fora security strategy centered on a strong, static border defense andthose diplomatic and economic approaches that minimized or regu-lated contact with the outside; foremost among the latter were thecooptation and appeasement practices basic to the traditional tribu-tary relationship, as well as the use of frontier trade and markets.Confucian officials generally did not oppose the payment of evenextremely high tributary “gifts” to nomadic leaders as long as thelatter performed symbolic acts of deference to the imperial order andrefrained from attacking the heartland. Even at their highest, thetributary “gifts” demanded by nomadic leaders were much less ex-pensive than the costs of any prolonged military campaign. Also, themost sizeable payments usually tended to come at those times when

______________136Fairbank (1992), p. 111.

137 As Fairbank states, “The central myth of the Confucian state was that the ruler’sexemplary and benevolent conduct manifesting his personal virtue (de) drew thepeople to him and gave him the Mandate [to rule]” (1992, p. 111). This concept wasapplied to both residents of China and foreign “barbarians.”

138Fairbank (1992), pp. 62, 111, 138–139; O’Neill (1987), pp. 202, 208, 355; and Barfield(1989), pp. 91, 131, and personal correspondence. One of the most eloquent and en-ergetic advocates of “rule by virtue” over the use of force was Wei Cheng, the leading scholar-advisor to Emperor Tang Taizong of the Tang Dynasty. See Wolters (1970), pp.

28–33. For a particularly good overview of Confucian arguments against the use of force when dealing with nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, see Jagchid and Symons(1989), pp. 54, 61–62.




the imperial state was weakest and thus willing to buy peace at any price to preserve itself.139

However, Confucian officials were not entirely opposed to the use of force and did not invariably shun extensive involvement with for-eigners. Theoretically, in the view of such officials, there was nofundamental contradiction between virtue and the use of force aslong as the force was applied by a ruler who possessed virtue, asmeasured by a primary reliance on noncoercive measures and themaintenance of a stable and harmonious society.140 Indeed, someConfucian officials strongly favored aggressive military measures tochastise and subdue periphery people. In particular, they could bevery demanding of military punishment for what they viewed as

symbolic insults to the doctrinal authority of the imperial order, suchas the refusal by foreign leaders to pay ritual homage to the superiorposition of the emperor in the tributary relationship.141 In the early modern era, some Confucian officials during the final years of theQing Dynasty also supported the use of force against imperialistpowers in a desperate effort to limit or eliminate foreign influenceson Chinese society, as discussed above in the case of the BoxerRebellion. At the same time, however, more pragmatic Confucianofficials also recognized that extensive diplomatic involvement in theaffairs of other powers was at times required for the survival of theChinese state. As a general principle, therefore, Confucian officialsopposed an excessive or prolonged reliance on such practices ascorrosive of their political position and the existing political andsocial order.

Opposition to the Confucian preference for noncoercive security measures was most often expressed by military figures, including hereditary military nobles and defense commanders and “warrior”founding emperors. At times, political opponents to Confucian offi-cials at court, such as members of the imperial household, non-Confucian imperial advisors, and imperial retainers, would also

______________139The authors are indebted to Thomas Barfield for these observations.

140 Wang (1968), p. 49.

141Confucian officials of the Han Dynasty were strong advocates of force against the

nomadic Xiongnu tribes for precisely this reason. Barfield (1989), pp. 53–54. Suchexamples can also be found in later dynasties.




advocate the use of force, including both extensive military campaigns against periphery powers and, more rarely, efforts toextend China’s territorial borders. Such advocacy derived from bothnarrow political motives (i.e., a desire to undermine the influence of Confucian officials) and a more principled belief that themaintenance of Chinese centrality and the preeminence of theemperor, both domestically and internationally, required relatively frequent displays of the military superiority of the imperial regime.

The balance of power between advocates of force and advocates of noncoercive measures would usually depend on both the materialcircumstances confronting a particular regime (especially its relativestrength or weakness compared to periphery states or regimes, as

discussed above) and the origins and internal leadership makeupand outlook of a regime. In general, strong, militant (or militarily experienced), and actively engaged emperors would usually tilt thebalance decidedly in favor of pro-force advocates. This especially oc-curred during the early decades of a regime, and often despite vigor-ous protests by Confucian officials. As suggested above, advocates of force would also tend to prevail when aggression by periphery peo-ples was especially persistent and accompanied by insulting behav-ior, in part because such actions would permit an alliance betweenConfucian and non-Confucian elites. Conversely, advocates of non-coercive approaches would tend to exert a greater influence on pol-icy toward powers along the southern and southwestern periphery,especially given the reduced threat posed by such entities and thefact that such states were highly receptive to core Chinese politicaland social beliefs.

The use of force against outsiders became a subject of intense debate within senior leadership circles at numerous times in the history of imperial China. In many instances the outcome could have goneeither way; at times, such conflict would produce paralysis or highly erratic behavior.142 However, as a general rule, the influence of Confucian officialdom, as the carrier of China’s core political andcultural norms, increased significantly over time during each dynasty and became especially dominant during the middle stages of a long-

______________

142Jagchid and Symons (1989), pp. 65, 178; Taylor (1992), pp. 144–145; Struve (1984),pp. 36–37; Waldron (1990), Chapters Seven and Ten; Beckwith (1987), pp. 99–100; and Wolters (1970), p. 30.




lasting regime. In many instances, this trend would reinforce thegeneral tendency during those times to prefer noncoercive measuresand, when employing force, to avoid prolonged and expansionist

wars. This would be far less true for the non-Han Chinese dynastiesof conquest (and intervention) (e.g., the Topa Wei, Liao, Jin, Xi Xia,

Yuan, and Qing), whose rulers were not Chinese, who were moregreatly influenced by the traditions of previous Inner Asian empires,and who could draw on stronger military/aristocratic elites fromtheir own peoples to balance officials drawn from Confucian official-dom.143 It was also less true for the predominantly Han ChineseMing and Sui regimes, for reasons noted above.

Unfortunately, few reliable data exist to determine the extent to

which the use of offensive force over static defense has been a majorissue of debate among leadership groups during the 20th century.The modern Chinese state, both nationalist and communist, has of-ten used offensive force in an attempt to establish stable buffer areasalong the traditional periphery. Yet little if any evidence exists tosuggest that this use of force was strongly contested by political offi-cials. Obviously, since the collapse of the imperial order, Confucianvalues and interests have not played a role in internal leadership dis-cussions or debates. However, broad-based political and bureau-cratic interests and especially the imprint of dominant personalitieshave undoubtedly remained very strong as factors influencing overalldecisionmaking. Until the 1990s, modern Chinese regimes havebeen led by assertive, charismatic founding figures with extensivemilitary experience, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and Deng

Xiaoping. Hence, as in the case of imperial China, these individualsalmost certainly dominated, if not monopolized, leadership discus-sions over the adoption of coercive over noncoercive strategies, es-pecially regarding such a critical national security issue as periphery defense. Moreover, as in the past, these leaders generally did not

______________143The authors are indebted to Edward Dreyer for this general observation, providedin a personal correspondence. Dreyer also observes that the dominance of essentially land-bound and continental-oriented Confucian officials within Han Chinese regimesgreatly reinforced the existing tendency to denigrate the strategic significance of Chi-na’s maritime periphery. Hence, the characteristic expression of Chinese naval abili-ties during most of the imperial era was not a blue water navy run by the state but, at

most, a small coastal force for the defense of rivers and shores, and the occasionalmanipulation of non-state-run pirate fleets.




shirk from the application of force in efforts to pacify the heartland,consolidate (and in some instances expand) national borders, andinfluence the periphery.

Two significant partial exceptions during the Maoist era were the Ko-rean War of 1950–1953 and the Vietnam War of 1965–1975. There issome evidence to indicate that both conflicts prompted significantdebate among Chinese leaders, especially over whether and to whatdegree China should employ offensive force. During the Korean War,senior leaders responsible for economic affairs might have resistedextensive intervention in the Korean conflict because of its likely economic costs.144 Nonetheless, it is almost certainly the case that,even in these instances, any debate occurred within narrow limits set

by the paramount leader.

It is even more difficult to find instances in which broad-based bu-reaucratic interests played a major role in decisions to use force, asopposed to decisions regarding domestic development issues, wheresuch factors have clearly played an important role. This is partly be-cause the modern Chinese regime is only just emerging from an eraof state formation and consolidation and beginning an era of moreroutinized maturation and development. Therefore, as (and if) thisprocess proceeds, one might expect that the ascension to powerduring the post-Mao era of relatively uncharismatic political leaderspossessing little military experience will result in greater internal de-bate over the use of force, perhaps duplicating, to some extent, the

general lines of debate evident during the imperial era. This seemsparticularly likely given the increasing importance to China’s na-tional security of external economic ties and the growing role in poli-cymaking of senior officials with extensive economic and bureau-cratic experience.145

______________144Christensen (1996b), especially Chapter Five; personal correspondence with Chris-tensen.

145There is some evidence to suggest that the limited application by China of military force for political ends (in the form of military exercises and missile firings) during theTaiwan mini-crisis of 1995–1996 provoked rather intense bureaucratic conflict.However, in this instance, the lines of debate were apparently between the Chinesemilitary and the professional diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not civilian

officials charged with domestic economic development. Swaine (1998a) (revisededition), p. 75.




In sum, domestic leadership competition or particular leadershipviews have at times exerted a decisive influence over the security behavior of the Chinese state. The highly personalized nature of China’s leadership system has at times injected a strong element of instability and unpredictability into external security decisionmaking as leadership groups sought to manipulate foreign and defensepolicy in an effort to outmaneuver political opponents or build sup-port among the Chinese populace. In these instances, the effect onpolicy content and direction has often been idiosyncratic, i.e., usu-ally reflecting the personal whims or predilections of strong, charis-matic leaders or the vagaries of the power struggle. This suggeststhat the influence of elite competition and individual leadership per-sonalities on security policy has generally been greatest when theChinese regime has been immersed in intense conflict or led by astrong, charismatic figure.

China’s security policy has also been affected by domestic politics ina more regular and predictable manner as a result of the formation of leadership groups around enduring alternative policy approaches.Historically, the two most important policy debates affecting China’ssecurity behavior have been over autonomy and the use of force.During the imperial era, a relatively strong leadership consensus insupport of self-reliant, coercive security strategies arguably occurredmost often in the early or middle years of regimes, in response to re-peated military provocations or insults to the authority or status of astrong Chinese state. Such actions permitted a convergence of inter-ests between militant, charismatic, founding leaders and highly sta-tus-conscious Confucian officials. At the same time, during theheight of most imperial Han Chinese regimes, the growing influenceof civilian officials would often produce a preference for noncoercivesecurity strategies, or at the very least a desire to avoid the excessiveor prolonged use of force. During the modern era, China has beenruled, until the 1990s, by assertive, charismatic founding figures withextensive military experience. Hence, as in the case of imperialChina, these individuals almost certainly dominated, if not monopo-lized, leadership discussions over the adoption of coercive over non-coercive strategies, especially regarding such a critical national se-curity issue as periphery defense.

Also of note are those instances in which internal leadership conflicthas led to a misguided rejection of noncoercive strategies in favor of




a strategy of autonomy and offensive force. Such behavior has usu-ally occurred during the latter stages of regime decline, at least dur-ing the modern period, and invariably produced disastrous results.Conversely, domestic leadership conflict has also at times resulted inthe use of noncoercive measures of accommodation and appease-ment when coercive policies might have been expected.



97

Chapter Four

CHINA’S CURRENT SECURITY STRATEGY:

FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS

The five basic features of Chinese security strategy and behavior pre-sented in the previous chapter have persisted to the present day.However, contact with industrialized nation-states, the collapse of the traditional Confucian-Legalist order, and the emergence of Chi-nese nationalism have brought about several major changes in thespecific definition of China’s security objectives and concerns (i.e.,

what is understood by domestic order and well-being, threats toChinese territory, and Chinese geopolitical preeminence) and hencethe specific means by which such objectives or concerns could beaddressed in the modern era. These changes generally broughtabout a hybrid “weak-strong” state security strategy that combinedtraditional “strong-state” efforts to control the strategic periphery

with elements of a “weak-state” approach employing a relatively un-sophisticated, territorial defense-oriented force structure and an ex-tensive level of involvement in diplomatic balance and maneuver.

In recent decades, this strategy has undergone further changes, re-sulting in a modification and extension of the existing “weak-strong”state security approach of the modern era toward a highly “calculative” security strategy. The term “calculative,” in this con-text, does not refer to the mere presence of instrumental rationality ,understood as the ability to relate means to ends in a systematic andlogical fashion and which is presumably common to all entities ininternational politics, whether weak or strong. Rather, the notion of “calculative” strategy is defined in substantive terms as a pragmaticapproach that emphasizes the primacy of internal economic growthand stability, the nurturing of amicable international relations, the




relative restraint in the use of force combined with increasing effortsto create a more modern military, and the continued search forasymmetric gains internationally. The reasons for this new strategy are ultimately rooted in the fact that China today requires high levelsof undistracted growth in economic and technological terms, andhence significant geopolitical quiescence, to both ensure domesticorder and well-being and to effectively protect its security interestsalong the periphery and beyond.

This chapter discerns the specific causes and features of China’spresent-day calculative security strategy and assesses the way thisstrategy could adversely affect U.S. interests and the stability of the

Asia-Pacific region over the near to mid term. This period, defined as

extending from the present to about the period 2015–2020, meritsspecial scrutiny because it represents the minimal timeframe during

which China, despite acquiring critical economic, technological, andmilitary capabilities, will continue to depend on the success of thepresent U.S.-dominated international and regional order for its se-curity. During this period, the actions of other states will most likely be the principal precipitants of any serious confrontations or con-flicts with China, as the growth in relative Chinese power, being not

yet complete, will limit Beijing’s ability and willingness to pursueother, more assertive, geopolitical strategies. This chapter’s discus-sion of the features and security implications of China’s calculativestrategy provides a basis for the analysis of the longevity of that strat-egy and the choices defining China’s strategic directions over thetruly long term—the period after 2015–2020. These two subjects arethe focus of the next chapter.

FACTORS SHAPING CHINA’S CALCULATIVE SECURITY STRATEGY

The Benefits and Challenges of Economic and TechnologicalReform

After a period of nearly 30 years of communist rule, the Chineseeconomy began an unprecedented structural transformation in thelate 1970s, thanks primarily to the market reforms of Deng Xiaoping.

This transformation produced revolutionary improvements in Chi-nese growth rates, patterns and volumes of manufacturing and trade,



China’s Current Security Strategy: Features and Implications 99

personal income levels, state revenues, foreign exchange earnings,and levels of technology, all of which taken together portend a quali-tative increase in national capabilities and, if continued over many decades, a shift in the regional and global balance of power.1 Thanksto the fruits of the reform program initiated in 1978, China now per-ceives the acquisition of “comprehensive national strength”2 as be-ing within its grasp—strength, which if acquired, would enable it toboth resolve its pressing internal developmental problems as well asreacquire the military capabilities and international political status itlost at the beginning of the modern era. The importance attached toconcluding the ongoing reform program successfully cannot be un-derestimated because Chinese security managers clearly recognizethat only sustained economic success can assure (a) the successfulservicing of social objectives to produce the domestic order and well-being long associated with the memories of the best Chinese stateshistorically; (b) the restoration of the geopolitical centrality and sta-tus China enjoyed for many centuries before the modern era; (c) thedesired admittance to the core structures regulating global order andgovernance; and (d) the obtaining of critical civilian, dual-use, andmilitary technologies necessary for sustaining Chinese security in theevolving regional order.3

At the same time, the continuation, over the long term, of China’s re-cent economic successes will likely require far more extensive struc-tural and procedural reforms than have taken place to date. Theseinclude more thoroughgoing price, tax, fiscal, banking, and legal re-forms; the further liberalization of foreign investment practices,trade, and currency convertibility; the reform or abandonment of many state-owned enterprises; and the implementation of more ef-fective environmental protection measures.4 Such actions, at least inthe near term, could significantly reduce growth rates, aggravate ex-

______________1The scope and significance of China’s economic and technological achievementsduring the reform era are summarized in World Bank (1997a), pp. 1–16.2Li (1990).

3 A good exposition of the role of economic considerations in China’s grand strategy,coupled with a defense of the claim that global stability will increasingly derive fromChinese strength, can be found in Song (1986).

4 World Bank (1997a), pp. 17–96, for an excellent overview of the requirements forcontinued economic growth in China and the problems confronting future reforms.




isting social problems, and will almost certainly challenge deep-rooted bureaucratic and political interests. They could also signifi-cantly increase China’s dependence on foreign supplies of criticalmaterials, consumer demand, investment, technology, and know-how.5 These possibilities could generate significant leadership de-bates over the pace and depth of future economic reforms and thestructure and extent of Chinese involvement in the world economy.How China copes with these challenges holds potentially enormousimplications for the future longevity and composition of China’s cal-culative security strategy, and if not successfully addressed, they

would prevent the growth of China as a world power.

Changing Capabilities and Orientations of Periphery Powers

Although China is thus changing dramatically and for the better, atleast in economic terms, during the last 20 or so years, the fact re-mains that the capabilities and strategic orientations of the countriesalong China’s strategic periphery have also changed.6 In fact, thechanges here have arguably been more radical, as far as relative na-tional capabilities over time are concerned and, more significantly,the processes leading up to these changes have been in motion formuch longer, in fact dating back to the end of the Second World

War.7 China’s own economic ferment has thus begun at a point when the traditionally weaker states on its periphery have already increased their national power capabilities in a manner that would

have been unrecognizable to previous generations of Chinese rulers,especially those managing the nation’s fortunes at the high tide of the imperial era. Since the end of the Second World War, the siniticstates such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam, as well as

______________5For example, extensive fiscal reform and environmental protection efforts couldtemporarily divert resources from more productive pursuits, far-reaching state-en-terprise reforms could exacerbate worker insecurity and lead to high levels of socialunrest, and greater marketization and privatization efforts could provoke strong resis-tance at all levels of the Chinese system from profit-seeking capitalist government andparty bureaucrats. See Swaine (1995b), pp. 57–80; Harding (1987), Chapter 10; andLardy (1998).

6For a brief overview of the growth in capabilities along China’s periphery, see Rohwer(1993).

7 An overview of the processes leading to the rise of the peripheral states can be foundin Tellis et al. (1998).




non-sinitic states such as India, have all emerged as independent,more-or-less strong, and stable political entities with significant andin some cases rapidly growing economic and military capabilities.8

Moreover, several of these states have established strong politicaland security links with countries other than China, especially globalpowers such as the United States, and are becoming increasingly in-tegrated into the international economy, although several countries(particularly Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea) have also recently es-tablished mutually beneficial economic and/or political connections

with Beijing.9 Areas along China’s northern and western periphery,such as Outer Mongolia and the Central Asian Republics of the for-mer Soviet Union, have also emerged as independent states, andeven though they are not as strong and stable as the countries on theeastern and southern periphery and generally enjoy amicable andcooperative relations with Beijing, they have for the most part devel-oped a primarily non-Chinese strategic orientation focused towardRussia and the Middle East.10

These developments suggest that, although the Chinese state hasmanaged to incorporate formerly peripheral areas such as Tibet,

Xinjiang, Manchuria, and parts of Mongolia into its orbit of control(sometimes by force and sometimes through deliberate sinicization),China now confronts a truly formidable challenge if it seeks to repli-cate its traditional goal of controlling or at the very least pacifying new periphery regions beyond the expanded heartland. Indeed, thepast option of direct military force now presents enormous political,economic, and military dangers to the Chinese state not only fromthe actions of the major external powers such as the United Statesand Russia (which are often tied by security linkages to the periph-eral states), but also directly from many of the peripheral statesthemselves. There is little doubt today that countries such as Japan,

Vietnam, and India, to cite but three examples of states located along the eastern and southern periphery, are powerful and stable enoughpolitically, economically, and militarily to ward off all but the most

______________8 A useful survey of the power and preferences of the Asian states can be found in Ma-lik (1993).

9The patterns of economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region are detailed in World

Bank (1993).10Snyder (1995).




violent—meaning nuclear—threats that can be mounted by Beijing. As a result, the principal peripheral area that Beijing can continue tothreaten with overwhelming force remains Taiwan—an area long regarded by China as a province. Even in this case, however, the useof force is presented as a last resort to prevent the island from be-coming permanently detached from the Chinese heartland.

The newly independent republics of Central Asia are also potentially susceptible to Chinese blandishments and coercion and could prob-ably even become subject to Beijing’s military power. But this re-mains a distant, merely hypothetical, possibility and one whoseeventual success is by no means foreordained, especially if Russia isable to regain its traditional dominant position in this area. Beijing’s

primary interests in the region revolve around securing access to itsvast, though as yet unexploited, energy supplies; moderating bothpan-Turkic nationalism and militant Islam to sustain effective politi-cal control in the Xinjiang region; and encouraging regional eco-nomic development to develop trade and other economic linkages—all of which would be ill-served by the application of sustainedmilitary force directed at the Central Asian states.11

Exponential Growth in the Capabilities of Industrial Powers

Although most parts of the traditional Chinese periphery have thusexperienced dramatic increases in national capability since the Sec-

ond World War, the economic and military capabilities of majorstates in the wider international system have grown even moresignificantly. These developments, broadly understood, implied thefurther consolidation of Western power (and now include theintegration of a formerly quasi-peripheral state—Japan—within theorbit of Western influence), which in turn was the result of two gen-eral processes. On the one hand, the economies of the major West-ern states in the international system benefited enormously fromtheir participation in the U.S.-led process of privatized manufactur-ing and trade that has swept across much of Europe, North America,

______________11Useful surveys of Chinese interests in Central Asia can be found in Munro; andBurles (1999).




and Asia since the 1950s.12 On the other hand, and partly as a resultof this dynamic process of expanding privatization, the most devel-oped industrial states, and particularly the United States, achievedmajor advances in technology that in turn served not only to greatly increase the lethality and effectiveness of their military capabilitiesbut to actually increase the power differentials between the West andits many competitors.

These developments, taken together, implied that China today facesa significant disadvantage: unlike, for example, its Ming forebears inthe 16th century, who could hold their own in the face of alternativecenters of power such as Mughul India, Muscovy Russia, and Ot-toman Turkey in the realms of technology and other national capa-

bilities such as economic strength and military power, modern China(in both its Maoist and Dengist incarnations) has appeared on the in-ternational scene at a time when Western dominance is highly entrenched and almost self-perpetuating. Even more crucially,establishing and maintaining its capabilities as a major power in thisenvironment require China to establish linkages with the highly successful economic system of the West, and consequently, both thepreservation of security and the pursuit of power require a radically different level of global integration than was required of the Ming Dynasty four centuries earlier or of any other imperial regime. Theprice for the rejuvenation of Chinese power in the modern era is thuspotentially high from the perspective of its traditional desire tomaintain both autonomy and geopolitical centrality in Asia: Notonly does the success of the U.S.-led postwar economic regimeprevent Beijing from pursuing an isolated or a nonmarket approachto economic and military development (at least during the initialstages), but it also makes continued Chinese acquisition of economicand technological power hostage to the goodwill of Western regimes,markets, and suppliers. The ascent to power thus comes at the costof limitations on Beijing’s freedom of action and although it appearsthat this is a price China is by and large willing to pay, at least in thenear term, it only makes the question of what Beijing’s long-termdirections would be—that is, the directions that can be pursued once

______________12This dynamic, together with the many changes occurring after 1971, is explored insome detail in Spero (1985), pp. 25–168.




the constraints relating to external dependency in the near termdiminish—even more interesting.

Growing Domestic Social and Political Challenges

China certainly looks forward to the day when it can recover its right-ful place in the sun—a yearning reinforced by past memories of bothgreatness and humiliation—but there is a clear recognition withinthe country’s leadership that several obstacles must be overcomebefore China’s claim to greatness rings palpably true within the re-gion and world-wide. Although the external obstacles are clear and

well-recognized, namely, China’s dependence on external capital,

technology, and markets, there has been a growing recognition, es-pecially over the past 20 years, that the internal social, political, andorganizational obstacles erected since the advent of communist rulein 1949 are just as, if not more, significant.13

The utopian and highly disruptive policies of the Great Leap Forwardand the Cultural Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s created enor-mous chaos and uncertainty within China. By the 1960s and 1970s, acombination of continued population pressures, the institutional-ized inefficiencies of a generally autarkic development strategy, andthe highly rigid, repressive, and centralized political system associ-ated with the Maoist regime had created great impoverishment anddisillusionment. Taken together, such developments not only weak-

ened the faith of ordinary citizens and officials alike in the leadershipof the Communist Party and its official statist development strategy,they also resulted, more problematically, in a corrosion of politicalculture, which brought about the loss of leadership and popularvirtue, made manifest by the appearance of pervasive corruption andthe rise of a self-serving officialdom. These developments have sig-nificantly exacerbated the challenge to maintaining domestic orderand well-being that resulted from earlier modern developments(including increases in China’s population, discussed above), andplace enormous pressure on the Chinese state to sustain high levelsof economic growth over the long term.

______________13

For a review of some of these challenges, see Harding (1994b).




Although the internal consequences of political and social corrosionare no doubt critical, insofar as they affect the prospects for nationaldisunity, regional fissures, and social unrest, their external conse-quences are just as unsettling: They have given rise to a deliberateeffort by the weakened and discredited organs of rule at wrapping themselves in the mantle of territorially defined notions of national-ism as they struggle to counter the corroding legitimacy of the com-munist state.14 The effect of this dynamic has been to restore em-phasis to the irredentist cause of “national reunification” whilesimultaneously setting the stage for the possible emergence of new,potentially dangerous, legal and ideological justifications that “couldprovide lebensraum for the Chinese people.”15 These justifications,taking the form of concepts such as haiyang guotu guan (the conceptof sea as national territory) and shengcun kongjian (survival space),16

feed off the newfound confidence that comes with two decades of high economic growth but could nonetheless bring China closer to acostly international conflict without in any way resolving theproblem of infirm structures of rule at home. Even more important,they carry within themselves the potential for undoing China’s largercalculative strategy and the geopolitical quiescence that Beijing isrelying upon to complete its internal economic transformation.

The Emergence of a More Pragmatic Program of Military Modernization

The cost of weak government has been manifested in the materialarena as well as in failures in the realm of legitimacy. This is seenmost clearly when Chinese military capabilities are examined. Thereis little doubt today that, lack of resources apart—a problem which initself can be traced to leadership failure —the inability of the Chinesearmed forces to modernize adequately since at least the 1950s mustultimately be traced to the major shortcomings of China’s economicsystem and its rigid and unimaginative bureaucracy and party

______________14 Whiting (1995), pp. 732–734; Zhao (1997); and Pye (1995), p. 582.

15Kim (1997), p. 248.

16Kim (1997), p. 248.




structure. Most of the advances in China’s military capabilities at-tained in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s came about primarily throughincremental and marginal improvements of the largely obsolete So-viet weapons designs that became available to China during the hey-day of the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950–1962. During the 1960s and1970s, an emphasis on Maoist self-reliance generally precluded any attempt to accelerate and deepen the modernization process by ac-quiring foreign military technologies and systems, and efforts toprofessionalize and modernize military practices and organizations

were blocked by intrusive Maoist political and doctrinal controls.

By the mid 1980s, however, most Chinese civilian and military lead-ers clearly recognized that a strong and stable military force could

not be built through a continued reliance on the failed autarkic andexcessively ideological policies of the past. This recognition was fa-cilitated, over time, by the gradual passing of those leaders, such asMao Zedong, who were sympathetic to such policies for political orideological reasons and was greatly spurred by the major military ad-vances attained by Western powers—advances that were subse-quently labeled the “military-technical revolution” (MTR) by Soviettheorists.17 As a result of these factors, China’s past impractical andinsular approach to military modernization gave way to a new effortat examining and selectively incorporating advanced foreign military technologies while attempting to “indigenize” these qualitiesthrough licensed coproduction of complete systems, the incorpora-tion of critical subcomponents, or the domestic absorption of know-how, wherever possible.18 This effort, in turn, required the creationof a more efficient, innovative, and productive defense industry es-tablishment and the application of more purely professional criteriato military training and personnel selection. All of these require-ments imply a much greater level of involvement with and depen-dence upon foreign, and especially Western, defense-related re-sources and know-how. They also demand the resolution of major,

______________17The key Soviet proponent of the MTR was Marshal N. V. Ogarkov. See Ogarkov (1982)—his seminal paper on the subject.

18Gill and Kim (1995) for a detailed review of China’s arms acquisition strategy andconstraints.




long-standing organizational and conceptual problems plaguing China’s defense establishment.19

All in all, this shift in emphasis in military modernization from com-plete autarky to some more modest forms of dependence on externalresources and know-how only reinforced the larger trend identifiedearlier: the growing reliance on outside powers for critical capabili-ties that can underwrite Beijing’s rise to power and, by implication,the acceptance of certain constraints by China’s security managerson its freedom of action as the price for the acquisition of those ca-pabilities that are seen to advance its march to “comprehensive na-tional strength” over the long term. At the same time, the ability of the Chinese state eventually to reduce its level of dependence on the

outside and increase its freedom of action will depend to a great ex-tent on its ability to carry out the more extensive economic reformsand overcome the kinds of structural and conceptual obstacles notedabove.

The Rise of More Institutionalized, Pragmatic Forms of Authority and Governance

Although the problematic legacy of the past has greatly stimulatedChina’s willingness to move in the new directions visible since 1978,other, more subtle, internal political changes have also coalesced tomake the latest twist in Beijing’s hybrid “weak-strong” state security

strategy possible. These factors often go unrecognized because Chi-na’s strong dependence on the external environment for continuedeconomic success usually obscures the effect of internal transforma-tions on Beijing’s newest shift in strategy. Perhaps the most impor-tant internal change is the rise of more institutionalized forms of au-thority and governance. The gradual demise of charismatic authority in recent years, combined with the widespread repudiation of ex-tremist ideological development strategies, has resulted in a morepragmatic, risk-averse brand of politics in comparison to the politicaland policy risks that could be taken by strong, militant, and charis-

______________19Such problems include (a) excessive adherence to self-reliance as a guiding prin-

ciple; (b) lack of horizontal integration; (c) separation from the civilian commercialsector; (d) lack of skilled experts, managers, and labor; (e) poor infrastructure; and (f)technology absorption problems. Swaine (1996b).




matic leaders such as Mao in the heyday of the revolutionary era. Incontrast to a previous generation of charismatic leaders who ruled by both force and popular acclamation, China’s current leaders, lacking similar charisma and experience, have been forced to rule by creat-ing a minimal policy consensus which involves, among other things,an “exchange of considerations”20 both among leading party andgovernment figures as well as the bureaucratic organs of state.21

Survival in such an environment is contingent on success at the levelof policy outcomes and, consequently, rash and imprudent externalpolicies that could imperil the fortunes of the current leadership arelikely to be avoided if for no other reason than because the individu-als involved lack the awe-inspiring charisma that would insulatethem against the worst political consequences of any serious fail-ure.22

The gradually developing administrative institutions (including moreinstitutionalized norms for leadership selection and removal), the in-creasing specialization among elites by expertise in various issue-ar-eas, and the progressive replacement of violence by intra-elite bar-gaining as the primary means of capturing and sharing power haveonly reinforced the marked tendency toward policy pragmatism wit-nessed in the post-1978 era.23 This development by no means im-plies the absence of strong contending views within the leadership orthe elimination of traditional patterns of domestic leadership debate,discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, increasing, and un-precedented, levels of involvement with the outside could arguably heighten long-standing and deep-rooted Chinese sensitivities tocultural contamination and foreign manipulation and subversion.

Arguments in favor of lessening Chinese dependence on the outsideand increasing Chinese political and diplomatic autonomy could

______________20Following Chester Bernard, Waltz (1979), p. 113, uses this concept to describe rela-tions between coordinate units. Although the relations among China’s top leaders arenot always coordinate relations, the mutual adjustment and accommodation that in-creasingly take place among various personalities and groups justifies the use of thephrase even in an environment that has room for nominal hierarchies.

21For a discussion of the evolution of the system of “collective leadership,” see Wang (1995), pp. 103–119.

22 Wang (1995), pp. 103–119.

23Pei (1998) and the discussion below of the prospects for long-term democraticchange, for a detailed review of some of these developments.




gain greater currency if economic growth falters seriously or if Chi-nese involvement in international regimes or treaties are seen to ob-struct the attainment of specific nationalist objectives, such as na-tional reunification. Those who support China’s greater involvementin world affairs, for whatever reason, would likely resist strenuously such arguments, thus creating the basis for significant leadershipconflict. However, at present, and barring any major economic orsocial crises, such contention is not strong enough to abridge theevolving “rules of the game” pertaining to the peaceful, pragmaticpursuit and distribution of power, especially at the highest levels of the government and party. Also significant is the fact that there stillexists a small though nontrivial threat of military intervention in theevent of prolonged economic decline or elite strife.24 This possibil-ity, in turn, suggests that the majority coalitions currently behindChina’s pragmatic reform era policies have an even greater interestin ensuring, first, that a pacific external environment is created to themaximum extent possible (at least as far as China’s own policies areconcerned) and, second, that this environment actually yields visibledividends as far as Chinese economic growth and technological im-provement are concerned.

Barring any catastrophic changes occurring outside of Chinese con-trol, the net effect of these domestic transformations will be to rein-force the policy of pragmatism still further—a condition that can beexpected to hold at least until China’s power-political resurgence iscomplete, at which point there may arise new elites who seek to usethe country’s newfound power in more assertive ways to advanceeither their own particular interests or the national interest at large.Such elites could attain influence by combining nationalist pride inChina’s economic successes, Chinese great power aspirations, andelite and popular fears of foreign subversion to argue, for example, infavor of a more autonomous, strong state security strategy. Until thatpoint is reached, however, the domestic leadership changes cur-rently occurring in China appear to reinforce Beijing’s appreciationof its dependence on the existing international system for continuedgrowth and prosperity.25

______________24Swaine (1995b), pp. 38–39.

25For further details on these and other facets of China’s leadership, see Chapter Fiveand Swaine (1995b), pp. 3–39, 95–104.




Lowered External Threats

China’s willingness to recognize the price of dependence is certainly a significant facet of its present security strategy, but the larger andmore consequential changes in its strategic environment that madethis attitude possible must not go unnoticed. The gradual diminu-tion in the levels of threat faced by the Chinese state since the 1970screated an environment where increased Chinese security-relatedinteractions with other states became possible. This diminution oc-curred in part because the United States initiated a process of de-tente as a means of involving China in resolving its own problems

with both Vietnam and the Soviet Union. When U.S. problems inSoutheast Asia were resolved by the mid to late 1970s, the U.S. en-

gagement of China as part of its larger strategy toward the SovietUnion only grew in intensity. Moreover, Beijing’s freedom of ma-neuver compared to that of the Soviet Union actually increased(despite its own conspicuous inferiority) after the restoration of fullSino-U.S. diplomatic relations in 1979, thanks both to the positiveexternalities of U.S. nuclear deterrence and because the Soviets weremore concerned with events in such far-off regions as Southwest Asiathan with nearby competitors such as China. As a consequence of this gradual deepening of Sino-U.S. political relations, Washingtondrastically reduced its level of military assistance to Taiwan, droppedprohibitions on the sale of certain weapons and the transfer of many critical military and civilian technologies to China, and generally permitted a wide range of beneficial commercial dealings with thePRC.26

This turnaround in Sino-U.S. relations, along with initial signs of adecline in Soviet power, eventually spurred an improvement in Chi-na’s relations with the Soviet Union, which ultimately produced adrastic reduction in military tensions between the two Eurasianpowers, marked by high-level leadership visits and consultations,confidence-building measures along the Sino-Soviet border, andgreatly increased economic and cultural contacts. Such an unprece-dented reduction in the level of foreign threat posed to the Chinese

______________26For details, see Harding (1992), and Pollack (1999).




state in the modern era thus occurred at a time when the most im-portant entity in the international system—the United States—appeared to be more supportive of China whereas its mostconsequential and proximate adversary—the Soviet Union—wasprogressively decaying in power-political capacity. This radicaldiminution in the range of traditional threats visible since the early

years of the Cold War provided China with a substantial measure of political cover under which it could pursue the internal economicreforms—finally embarked upon in 1978 and accelerated in the midto late 1980s—without excessive risk.

The general pacificity of its external environment allowed Beijing theluxury of downgrading military modernization to the last of the “four

modernizations” (identified as agriculture, industry, science andtechnology, and national defense) in terms of relative priority andenabled China to undertake its market reform program for twodecades continuously without any disproportionate diversion of itsfruits into wasteful security competition.27 The wisdom of thischoice was only buttressed by the end of the Cold War, broughtabout by the final demise of the Soviet Union in 1992. This eventprovoked Jiang Zemin’s authoritative assessment of China’s strategicenvironment as “never having been more satisfactory since thefounding of the Republic.”28 The relatively pacific external envi-ronment thus contributed to the emergence of a Chinese security policy that could focus on the long-overdue modernization of Chi-nese agriculture, industry, and science and technology. This focusenabled Beijing to lay the foundations for acquiring comprehensivenational strength as opposed to embarking on a “quick and dirty”program of accelerated military modernization which, howevermuch it increased China’s coercive power in the short run, wouldeventually undercut its ability to become a true great power andreestablish the geopolitical centrality and respect it believes to be itsdue.

______________27Chen (1990).

28Cited in Kim (1996), p. 11.




THE MAJOR GUIDING TENETS AND POLICIES OF CHINA’SCALCULATIVE SECURITY STRATEGY

Given this backdrop, it is no surprise that Chinese grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has sought to maintain the orientationvisible since 1978: the acquisition of comprehensive national powerderiving from a continued reform of the economy without the im-pediments and distractions of security competition. The traditionalobjectives that the Chinese state has pursued over the centuries stillremain and they even now constitute the ends to which all the effortsrelating to economic growth and internal transformation are di-rected. These objectives include assuring domestic order and social

well-being; maintaining an adequate defense against threats to theheartland; increasing the level of influence and control over the pe-riphery with an eye to warding off threats that may eventually men-ace the political regime; and restoring China to regional preemi-nence while attaining the respect of its peers as a true great powermarked by high levels of economic and technological development,political stability, military prowess, and manifest uprightness. Suchobjectives, however, cannot be pursued today through the assertiveand sometimes militaristic solutions associated with the “strong-state” strategy of the past, in large measure because China presently finds itself “between the times”: Although it may be a rising power, itis not yet sufficiently strong, at least relative to some of the key stateson its periphery, if not beyond. Consequently, it is in many ways still

a “consumer,” rather than an entirely self-sufficient “producer,” of security and its present grand strategy accordingly reflects the factthat its domestic and external environments constrain its preferredoutcomes much more easily than its resources can produce them.

Not surprisingly, then, as has occurred at times in the past, China’sgrand strategy today is neither “assertive” nor “cooperative” in themost straightforward sense of those terms. Instead, in this instance,it displays a “calculative” streak which, though determined to pre-vent certain critical losses at all costs, is nonetheless characterized by an outward-oriented pragmatism designed to rapidly improve itsdomestic social conditions, increase the legitimacy of its governing regime, enhance its national economic and technological capabili-

ties, and thereby ultimately strengthen its military prowess and im-prove its standing and influence in the international political order.




The logic underlying this “calculative” strategy is therefore simply one of constrained maximization, with China seeking to increase itspower in a variety of issue-areas in as non-provocative a fashion aspossible to avoid precipitating those regional or global responsesthat would seek to retard the growth of that power for all the timehonored reasons associated with the “quest for equilibrium”29 and“the creation of balances of power.”30 If successfully executed, the“calculative” strategy offers Beijing dual benefits, whether intendedor not: On the one hand, it would desensitize China’s political andeconomic partners to the debilitating problems of relative gains inChinese capabilities and thus encourage continued foreign collabo-ration in the underwriting of China’s rise to power.31 On the otherhand, it would, by accentuating China’s desire for cooperation, pro-vide Beijing with sufficient breathing space from external threats touninterruptedly achieve its goal of increased national power.32

Given these considerations, the “calculative” strategy that achieveddominance in the 1980s can be summarized by its three guiding ele-ments:

• First, overall, a highly pragmatic, non-ideological policy ap-proach keyed to market-led economic growth and themaintenance of amicable international political relations with allstates, and especially with the major powers.

• Second, a general restraint in the use of force, whether toward

the periphery or against other more distant powers, combined with efforts to modernize and streamline the Chinese military,albeit at a relatively modest pace.

• Third, an expanded involvement in regional and global interstatepolitics and various international, multilateral fora, with an

______________29Liska (1977).

30 Waltz (1979), p. 118.

31The problem of relative gains and its effect on cooperation is discussed in Grieco(1988).

32 As Jiang Zemin candidly admitted, Beijing cannot afford to be aggressive because“China needs a long-lasting peaceful international environment for its development.”

Jiang Zemin (1995).




emphasis, through such interactions, on attaining asymmetricgains whenever possible.33

Together, these elements amount to a highly modified version of China’s traditional “weak-state” strategy, designed to create thefoundations for a stronger, more modern Chinese state.

How this strategy has concretely manifested itself will now be exam-ined in the context of the policies China appears to be pursuing infour separate issue-areas (a) policies toward the United States andother powers, (b) policies toward military modernization, (c) policiestoward territorial claims and the recourse to force, and (d) policiestoward international regimes.

Policies Toward the United States and Other Major Powers

Given China’s accurate appreciation of its status as a “still weak, butrising” power, the thrust of Beijing’s security-related policies towardthe United States as the preeminent power in the international sys-tem can be characterized as a two-sided effort focusing on“cooptation” on the one hand and “prevention” on the other. The ef-fort at cooptation focuses essentially on developing and maintaining cordial relations with the United States to encourage it to consis-tently underwrite the continuing growth in Chinese power, whereasthe effort at prevention seeks to hinder any U.S. efforts that may bedirected toward frustrating the expansion in Chinese capability,status, and influence. This two-pronged strategy is grounded inthe Chinese leadership’s recognition that the United States subsists“in economic terms as an important trading partner and major in-vestor” in China, while simultaneously remaining “in nationalisticterms as a major rival in a competition for ‘comprehensive nationalstrength.’”34

The efforts at both cooptation and prevention are manifested in di-rect and indirect forms. At the direct level, both are oriented first to

______________33This feature is also described as a “mini/maxi” code of conduct keyed to the max-imization of security and other benefits through free rides or noncommital strategies

and the minimization of costs to capabilities, status, or influence. Kim (1999).34 Yi Xiaoxiong (1994), p. 681.




convincing the United States to accept the rise of China as a stabiliz-ing event both at the level of international politics and in the regionalcontext of East Asia. Convincing the United States about the in-evitability—in fact, the desirability—of the growth in Chinese poweris essential to prevent any attempts at containment on the part of either the United States and its allies or other powers in Asia. It isalso essential to forestall a heightened U.S. defensive counterre-sponse toward a rising China, especially one that—if it leads togreater military acquisitions, increased forward deployments, morerobust operational tempos, and accelerated military R&D—wouldincrease the gap in power capabilities between the United States andChina still further. Such a reaction would thus force China to run alonger race to become a major power and also would provide Bei-

jing’s regional competitors with the political cover under which they could challenge Chinese interests more effectively. Both cooptationand prevention are therefore fundamentally oriented, as one scholarsuccinctly phrased it, toward legitimizing “a kind of ‘hegemonicstability theory’ with Chinese characteristics.”35

To this end, China has attempted to maintain a variety of high-levelinteractions with the United States, at both the political and military levels. In all these exchanges, Chinese leaders have sought to secureU.S. support for the political, economic, and social transitions andtransformations currently under way in China (including seeking apolitical imprimatur that can be used to fend off political opponentsof cordial Sino-U.S. relations back home), while simultaneously at-tempting to weaken the level of support perceived to be offered by the United States to China’s current or potential future adversaries,primarily the Republic of China, and in a different way to Japan as

well. In the case of the former, Chinese efforts have been directed atencouraging a steady diminution of U.S. political and military sup-port to the ROC, especially in the context of the latter’s apparent ef-forts at achieving independence. Because U.S. support for the ROCis seen both as a direct challenge to China’s sovereignty and as evi-dence of “an American mentality of ‘not wanting to see the rise of atoo powerful China,’”36 Beijing has frequently exerted strenuous ef-

______________35Kim (1996), p. 5.

36 Yi Xiaoxiong (1994), p. 685.




forts to weaken U.S.-ROC political ties.37 Chinese objectives with re-spect to Japan are more complex in that Beijing recognizes that theU.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty is a double-edged sword: Al-though it serves to restrain Japanese remilitarization in the nearterm, it could over time become the nucleus of a containment effortdirected against China. Consequently, Beijing’s effort at preventionhere takes the form of a guarded disapproval of any deepening of theU.S.-Japan security relationship in the hope of encouraging the latterto atrophy naturally.38

Besides these political dimensions of cooptation and prevention,there is an economic dimension as well. Here, the principal objec-tive of cooptation consists of being able to ensure continued access

to U.S. markets which today constitute the wellspring of Chineseeconomic growth and prosperity. Consequently, assuring perma-nent “most favored nation” status has become the most importantlegal objective of direct cooptation at the economic level because itensures that China’s export-led growth strategy would find fulfill-ment in terms of ready access to the richest and most valuable mar-ket in the world for its consumer goods and light industrial products.

Although China already has most favored nation status from theUnited States, this status requires annual renewal and is covered by a1979 bilateral agreement between China and the United States ratherthan through membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade’s (GATT) successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). Therecurrent renewal of this status, which is mandated by law, however,subjects the process of extension to a variety of political pressures,many of which have little to do with trade per se. 39 Consequently,China’s abiding interest consists of convincing Washington to sup-

______________37 Weakening the U.S.-ROC relationship has proved much more difficult than Beijing originally anticipated, in part because it is connected to U.S. domestic politics and thestrong linkages between Taiwan and influential members of the U.S. Congress. Chinahas repeatedly sought to increase its leverage over the United States concerning thisissue, at times by offering to reduce or eliminate its exports of weapons of mass de-struction and their associated delivery systems to some South Asian and Middle East-ern states in return for reductions in U.S. military assistance to Taiwan.

38For a representative example of the official Chinese position on U.S. strategicrelations with Japan, see “Official Meets Japanese Envoy Over Defense Guidelines”

(1998).39 A good discussion of China’s interest in most favored nation status and in GATTmore generally can be found in Power (1994); and Pearson (1999).




port its admittance into the WTO as a full member, but on what amounts to preferential terms as a developing country . Admittance tothe WTO is important to the success of Beijing’s export-led growthstrategy in that it allows China access to multiple international mar-kets on uniformly preferential terms; further, such access is ensuredthrough a multilateral institution not fully under the control of theUnited States, thereby offering China opportunities to purse com-mercial and political interests (including those relating to Taiwan)outside of the restraints that may be episodically imposed within theframework of the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship. Finally, it providesChina with better cover against the protectionist policies of other de-veloping countries while simultaneously accelerating Beijing’s inte-gration into the global economy.40

In addition to these direct political and economic efforts, there areother indirect efforts at cooptation as well. These include exploiting U.S. pluralist society to undercut any adverse political objectives thatmay be pursued by the U.S. government. In this context, corporate

America, with its significant economic interests deriving from largeinvestments in China, becomes a powerful instrument conditioning the shape of U.S. strategic policy toward China. And Beijing has nothesitated to use its sovereign powers of preferential access and largecommercial orders to encourage U.S. business groups to lobby theU.S. government for consequential changes in its strategic policies asthe price for continued, profitable, interactions with China. 41 Thesechanges were usually sought in the issue-areas of human rights, therules governing technology transfers, and nonproliferation. To besure, the incentives for such lobbying exist even in the absence of any direct Chinese governmental intervention, but that implies only that the indirect mechanisms of prevention are even more profitableif China can secure a variety of advantageous political outcomes withlittle or no effort on its own part.

______________40Because Beijing seeks membership as a developing country, the United States has inthe past blocked Chinese membership on the grounds that such status would allow China to continue a variety of restrictive trading practices even as it enjoys the fruits of preferential access to the markets of many developed countries. The rationale forChina’s wish to enter the WTO as a developing country is explicated in Wong (1996);and in Pearson (1999), pp. 176–177.

41Hsiung (1995), pp. 580–584.




Although the method of coopting U.S. policy through its domesticpolitics is perhaps the most visible element of China’s indirect ef-forts, these efforts also occur in the realm of prevention as well, par-ticularly at the international level. The best known attempts at influ-encing U.S. policy here consist of the various efforts made by Beijing over the years to orchestrate Asian sentiment against growing Japanese power, especially where manifestation of that power out-side the home islands is concerned.42 A similar logic underlies theoccasional Chinese efforts to encourage an “Asia for Asians” senti-ment: Here, the effort seems focused on convincing the UnitedStates, as well as other Asian states, that the “Asian way” remains adistinctive alternative to the Anglo-American modes of ordering so-cial relations and that the Asia-Pacific region writ large can manageits affairs—whether in the arena of human rights or security—

without outside assistance.43 A more recent effort at indirect pre-vention consists of the increasingly energetic espousal by Beijing of anew multilateral mutual security structure for Asia—the so-calledNew Security Concept. Although some controversy exists over themeaning and intention of this concept, many observers believe thatit is intended to replace the current U.S.-led bilateral security al-liance structure of the Asia-Pacific region.44 Irrespective of the de-tails, the general orientation of such indirect efforts seems to focuson communicating to the United States that its present military and,to some extent, political, presence in East Asia, including its systemof security alliances, is a waning vestige of the Cold War and hence

should be muted considerably; nurturing a wedge between theUnited States and its formal and informal allies in Asia; and, finally,preparing the ground for an insular Asian theater where Chineserelative capabilities will not be eclipsed by the presence of larger ex-traregional political and military forces.

The United States is certainly the most important actor in Chinesestrategic calculations, but it is by no means the only one. Conse-

______________42 A typical example of Chinese thinking in this regard is Yu (1997).

43Such efforts do not appear to be part of a concerted, systematic strategy, however,but rather reflect the views of individual Chinese leaders, especially more conservativemilitary figures.

44The standard presentation of the New Security Concept is contained in StateCouncil Information Office (1998).




quently, it is not surprising that Beijing’s efforts at cooptation andprevention are not restricted to the United States alone but rather ex-tend to all other great powers in the international system. The objec-tives of these efforts are broadly comparable to those pursuedagainst the United States and they revolve, for the most part, aroundlowering bilateral tensions and encouraging the major powers to as-sist China in its efforts at modernization. Thus, for example, rela-tions with Russia are oriented primarily toward reducing the chancesof political and military conflict between the two former antagonistsand acquiring critical military technologies that cannot be obtainedeither from the United States or the West more generally. Althoughthis essentially arms procurement relationship has now been bap-tized as a “strategic partnership,” it is so only in name. 45 The eco-nomic meltdown in Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union hasresulted in Russian defense industries scrambling for customerssimply to survive. China’s high growth rates and its increasing con-cern with maritime, rather than continental, issues (including thethreat of Taiwanese independence) make Beijing the perfect cus-tomer and, not surprisingly, the Russian military-industrial com-plex—with the hesitant acquiescence of the Russian leadership—hasresponded by providing a variety of weapon systems or technologies,some of which will be license-produced in China itself.46

Where military products from Great Britain, France, and Israel areconcerned, Chinese interests revolve more around specific subsys-tems rather than finished platforms or weapons systems, but China’sprimary strategic interest in developing relations with these states,and with the Europeans more generally, consists of being able to en-sure access to diversified sources of civilian and dual-use technolo-gies and, more broadly, to preserve positive political and economicrelations that contribute to China’s overall development.47 Whererelations with China’s immediate East Asian neighbors such as Ko-rea, Japan, and even Taiwan are concerned, the main objective of

______________45“Can a Bear Love a Dragon?” (1997); and Anderson (1997). The notion that the Sino-Russian relationship constitutes “the beginning of a new quadrilateral alignment inEast Asia in which a continental Russo-Chinese bloc balances a ‘maritime’ American-Japanese bloc” (Garver, 1998, Chapter Five) is at the very least extremely premature.

46Blank (1996). At the same time, Russia’s leadership apparently disagrees over theappropriate level and composition of Russian arms sales to China.

47Gill and Kim (1995).




cooptation seems to be an effort to encourage greater direct andportfolio investments in and trade with the Mainland. In the specificcase of Taiwan, this interest is in large part motivated by China’sstrong desire to increase Taiwan’s overall level of involvement in anddependence upon the Mainland, as a way to increase Chinese politi-cal leverage over Taiwan. The benefits in terms of capital transfers,increased employment, and domestic wealth generation are deemedto be critical enough to encourage deeper economic participation onthe part of these countries, even if their longer-term political inter-ests may diverge substantially from China’s. In any event, the gen-eral principle underlying these relationships seems to be the same:to use China’s growing market and economic wealth to secure thoseresources that cannot be procured from the United States while si-multaneously using these transactions to provide its non-U.S. part-ners with an economic stake in China’s continued growth.

Deepened relations with China’s non-U.S. partners also has otheradvantages. Where significant arms-producing states such as GreatBritain, France, and Israel (and other European states as well) areconcerned, China seeks to manipulate access to its commercial mar-ket to prevent these states from providing arms and military tech-nologies to Taiwan.48 Such transfers, it is feared, could reinforce theTaiwanese desire for independence while simultaneously vitiating the deterrence China seeks to impose through the application of itsolder and relatively more obsolescent weaponry. Apart from thespecific benefits in relation to Taiwan, deepened relations with otherpowers also provide benefits in relation to the United States. At thevery least, deepened relations constitute a “diversification strat-egy,”49 which gives Beijing some political and economic instrumentsthat can be used to prevent the creation of a strong U.S.-led anti-Chinese coalition in those issue areas where U.S. and non-U.S.interests may not fully coincide. Thus, these relationships give Bei-

jing improved leverage in dealings with the United States and they could become in extremis the routes by which China circumventsany future U.S. efforts at restraining either its policies or its growth incapabilities more generally. As one scholar summarized it, “to Chi-nese leaders, [political] diversification offers obvious bargaining ad-

______________48Shambaugh (1996b), pp. 1301–1302.49 Yi Xiaoxiong (1994), p. 678.




vantages as it signals other powers that they are not indispensableand that China can avoid and resist foreign pressures without seri-ously hindering its national security.”50

Policies Toward Military Modernization

As part of its current “calculative” strategy, China has sought to de-velop a range of military capabilities to sustain an expanded level of political and operational objectives. These objectives include (a) se-curing the defense of Chinese sovereignty and national territory against threats or attacks from all manner of opponents, including highly sophisticated military forces; (b) acquiring the ability to

counter or neutralize a range of potential short-, medium-, and long-term security threats along China’s entire periphery, but especially inmaritime areas; (c) acquiring the ability to use military power as amore potent and versatile instrument of armed diplomacy andstatecraft in support of a complex set of regional and global policies;and (d) eventually developing the power-projection and extendedterritorial defense capabilities commensurate with the true greatpower status expected in the 21st century. These complex objectivesmay be summarized, at least over the near term, as an effort to re-duce China’s existing vulnerabilities while increasing the utility of itsmilitary forces to secure diplomatic and political leverage.51

The efforts at reducing vulnerability have materialized at two differ-

ent, though related, levels. The first level consists of a slow but de-termined effort at nuclear modernization. As indicated previously,the range of Chinese nuclear capabilities today are modest, at leastrelative to the capabilities of the superpowers during the Cold War.Despite the presence of much larger arsenals in the Soviet Union andthe United States, the Chinese historically seemed disinclined to in-crease the size of their nuclear inventory presumably because, first,they were satisfied that the mutual deterrence relations between theUnited States and the Soviet Union generated sufficient positive ex-ternalities that precluded the need for a significant expansion of ca-pabilities—specifically, such relations meant that only a small

______________50

Yi Xiaoxiong (1994), p. 678.51 A good summary of the multidimensional facets of China’s military modernizationcan be found in Shambaugh and Yang (1997).




strategic force capable of conducting a credible retaliatory strikeagainst either Soviet or U.S. cities and major U.S. military bases in

Asia was deemed sufficient to deter both states from attacking China;and, second, their modest but not insignificant capabilities already allowed them to support some primitive kinds of selective nuclearoperations, well before they either developed the accompanying doctrine that justified such operations or were given credit for suchcapabilities in the West.52 The ability to execute such selectiveoperations derived more from the diversity of their nuclear holdings,

which included small numbers of land- and sea-based ballisticmissiles, manned bombers and, more important, tactical nuclear

weapons,53 and the locational uncertainty of many of these forceelements than from a deterrence architecture that emphasized thepossession of a large “hyper-protected force for intra-war deterrence,

with long endurance and excellent communications and control.”54

Given these calculations, the Chinese are believed to have developeda diversified arsenal of about 450 warheads—an inventory similar insize to that maintained by Great Britain and France; for suchmedium powers, a strategy of limited deterrence was deemed to besufficient in the face of the complex nuclear deterrence regimemaintained by the United States and the Soviet Union during theCold War.55 Despite the many limitations of this arsenal, it isobvious that the Chinese value their nuclear weapons both for thestatus they bestow on them in the international system and becausethey remain the only effective deterrent in all situations where

Chinese conventional military power may be found wanting.

______________52For an analysis of the evolving doctrinal justifications of China’s nuclear modern-ization effort, see Johnston (1995/96).

53China’s development of tactical nuclear weapons, principally in the form of artillery warheads, atomic demolition munitions, and shells for multiple rocket systems,apparently began in the 1970s in response to increasing military tensions with theformer Soviet Union. It has continued since, however, despite the collapse of theUSSR and the improvement of political relations with all significant military powersalong China’s borders. These capabilities have never been acknowledged by Chinabut observations of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) training exercises andunderground nuclear tests have led many observers to conclude that such capabilitiesexist. See Caldwell and Lennon (1995), pp. 29–30.

54Schlesinger (1967), pp. 12–13.

55Goldstein (1992).




Given these considerations, China’s efforts at nuclear modernizationhave not focused on increasing the size of the nuclear inventory perse but rather on reducing its vulnerability to preemptive strikes by the more sophisticated forces of the industrialized powers. The ef-forts here have been directed primarily toward improving “the sur-vivability of [its] strategic forces, develop[ing] less vulnerable basing modes, and mak[ing] general improvements in the accuracy, range,guidance, and control”56 of its missile forces. Consistent with thesegoals, China appears to have focused primarily on developing new land-based, solid-fueled, road-mobile missiles such as the DF-21,DF-31, and DF-41 to replace older liquid-fueled missiles such as theDF-5A as well as producing a new class of warheads thought to be ei-ther miniaturized or of smaller yield and weight to increase targeting flexibility and launcher mobility.57 Other developments include de-veloping a new second-generation replacement sea-launched ballis-tic missile, the solid-fueled JL-2, and possibly a small fleet of four tosix more advanced ballistic missile submarines, as well as a new bomber, the FB-7, as a replacement for its antiquated H-5 and H-6fleet. There is also some speculation that China’s nuclearmodernization includes improving its tactical nuclear capabilities as

well as developing new nuclear warheads for its short-range ballisticmissiles such as the DF-11 (M-11). Almost all available evidencerelating to these programs suggests that the pace of developmentand acquisition is generally slow. This is usually taken to imply thatChina does not view these systems as very much more than an

evolutionary progression of its already existing capabilities—aprogression required both for prudential reasons relating to the new demands of operating in a unipolar environment (in which theUnited States could conceivably target more nuclear weapons onChina) and for technical reasons relating to combating obsoles-cence.58

______________56Caldwell and Lennon (1995), p. 30.57On Chinese warhead R&D objectives, see Garrett and Glazer (1995/96).

58One caveat to this general statement could exist, however. Some observers of China’s nuclear weapons modernization program believe that Beijing has recently decided to enhance significantly its theater nuclear weapons capability as its only effective means of deterring the threat or use by the United States of highly effective

long-range precision-guided, and stealthy conventional weaponry. Such weapons were used by the United States with virtual impunity during the Kosovo conflict of 1998.




The second level of efforts aimed at reducing vulnerability occurs inthe conventional realm. China’s labors in this area are much moreconcerted and its achievement much more significant. The priority attached to conventional modernization derives from a variety of factors. First, it reflects an appreciation that Chinese conventionalforces and weaponry are more useable instruments of power than itsnuclear capabilities.59 Second, given China’s evolving threat envi-ronment, Beijing believes it may be faced with “limited theater” con-tingencies that require the use of its conventional forces in the nearto mid term and, consequently, must prepare diligently for their usein a variety of situations where even modest differences in relativecapability could radically affect the kinds of outcomes obtained.60

Third, the economic reforms conducted since 1978 have produceddramatic changes in China’s strategic geography, in that its mostvaluable economic and social resources now lie along its weakly de-fended eastern and southeastern territorial periphery as opposed tothe secure interior of the heartland as was the case during the Cold

War. This development, in turn, has put a premium on the develop-ment of new kinds of conventional forces—primarily air and naval—and new concepts of operations that are quite alien to the traditionalcontinental orientation of the Chinese military.61 Fourth, the natureof China’s potential adversaries is seen to have changed: The so-lution of a “peoples’ war,” which might have sufficed against landpowers such as the Soviet Union, is now viewed to be irrelevant inthe context of future maritime adversaries such as Taiwan, Japan,

and the United States, where “limited wars under high-tech condi-tions” would increasingly require material and ideational resourcesof the sort that China does not currently possess.62 Fifth, and finally,China appears to have been greatly impressed by the experience of the Gulf War where the technologically superior coalition forcesprovided a sharp and pointed preview of the devastating punishment

______________59Chu (1994), pp. 186–190.60Munro (1994); and Godwin (1997).

61Chu (1994), pp. 187–188. Also see Swaine (1998b).

62Chu (1994); Swaine (1998b); and Godwin (1997).




that could be inflicted on any adversary possessing an obsolete forcestructure, doctrine, and capabilities.63

These five considerations, taken together, have forced a reevaluationof China’s ability to execute effective border defense aimed specifi-cally—at least in the near term—at preventing the loss of possessedand claimed territories, both contiguous and offshore. Because Chi-na’s contiguous land borders, however, are relatively secure at thistime, thanks both to Chinese diplomacy and China’s potentialneighboring adversaries’ current unwillingness to press their claims(each for their own reasons), the most visible dimensions of the con-ventional modernization have involved air and naval forces. This isnot to imply that land force modernization has been overlooked.

China is engaged in ongoing efforts to reduce the overall size andstreamline the structure of the PLA to improve its qualitative capa-bilities.64 The mobility, firepower, logistics, and communicationsassets of PLA ground forces are being improved as a prudential mea-sure should they be required for combat operations in some landborder areas as well as for internal pacification. Yet despite theseinitiatives, air and naval modernization has overshadowed all elsebecause improvements in air power are now viewed as critical for thesuccess of all military operations, and modernized naval capabilitiesare seen as indispensable for the defense of offshore claims, espe-cially those relating to Taiwan and the South China Sea, and for thedefense of China’s increasingly important strategic assets along thecoast.

Contingencies involving Taiwan in particular have provided a sharpfocus for China’s conventional modernization efforts in recent years.This includes developing both interdiction (including morale-breaking) capabilities against Taiwan as well as denial capabilitiesagainst Taiwan’s potential defenders, primarily the United States.The requirements pertaining to the interdiction of Taiwan have re-sulted in a substantial effort to strengthen China’s missile order of battle, primarily short-range ballistic missiles such as the M-9 andM-11. These missiles are viewed by the Chinese as uniquely capable

______________63See Frolov (1998) for a review of China’s modernization initiatives precipitated by

the lessons of the Gulf War.64Godwin (1992).




of sowing mass panic on Taiwan or destroying Taiwanese military installations with little advance warning. Contingencies involving Taiwan have also resulted in consequential efforts to improveChinese air battle management capabilities over the Taiwan Straitand allow China to use its recent or imminent arms acquisitionsfrom Russia—advanced air superiority aircraft such as the Su-27,advanced air defense systems such as the SA-10 and SA-15, and new surface and subsurface capabilities in the form of Soveremenny destroyers and Kilo submarines—with consequential effect.

Although each of these Russian-built weapons systems addressescritical deficiencies in China’s basic force structure and was almostcertainly acquired as part of Beijing’s overall modernization effort,each system also has a particular operational relevance in the Taiwantheater.

Because combat operations directed at Taiwan may require thatChina contend with the forward-deployed naval capabilities of theUnited States, Beijing has also embarked on a serious effort to ac-quire capabilities that could increase the risks accruing to any U.S.attempts at armed diplomacy or outright intervention. These effortshave focused principally on improving China’s ability to detect,track, and target U.S. carrier battle groups by multiple means as faraway as possible from the Mainland. This includes developing air-and ground-launched cruise missile systems for standoff attack, seadenial capabilities centered on subsurface platforms as well as anti-surface attack and mine warfare systems, and information attack ca-pabilities centered on antisatellite warfare, electronic warfare, anddeception and denial operations. Although many Chinese capabili-ties in this area are modest at present, improving these capabilities

will remain a critical priority over the long term.65

This is true a fortiori because the objectives of China’s conventionalmodernization effort are not near-term goals alone. Rather, Beijing’ssearch for increased diplomatic and political leverage—consistent

with its growing status and in response to the changing security envi-ronment of the modern era—will presumably require that it even-tually be able to operate independently throughout most of the Asian

______________

65 A good summary of Chinese efforts in this regard can be found in Khalilzad et al.(1999) and Stokes (1999).




littoral. Serving this objective by itself will likely require that the Chi-nese military be able to at least hold extraregional forces at risk, if notmaster them entirely. The quest for increased diplomatic and politi-cal leverage, therefore, has already begun in terms of efforts to opera-tionalize extended sea and information-denial capabilities. Theseinclude developing new maritime and space-based surveillance ca-pabilities, new modernized diesel and nuclear attack submarinesincorporating several Russian technologies and subsystems, new surface combatants equipped with better surface-to-surface and sur-face-to-air capabilities, new air-, surface-, and subsurface-launchedtactical cruise missiles, possibly new directed-energy weaponprograms, and new information-warfare initiatives in addition toexploring the offensive use of space.66 Although many of theseprograms remain in the very early stages of development, whencombined with new kinds of naval aviation capabilities in the coming decades, they could eventually coalesce into capabilities that willallow for an extended Chinese naval presence and power projectioncapability throughout much of East Asia.67

China’s current conventional military modernization programs arethus designed to serve pressing near- and medium-term needs, whilestill allowing for the possibility of an evolutionary expansion over thelong term as Chinese economic capabilities increase in size andimportance. It is important to recognize, however, that the long-range strategic objectives associated with China’s potential long-term economic capabilities and great power aspirations such as theacquisition of extended sea control over maritime areas extending farinto the Pacific Ocean—especially those regions described by Chi-nese naval strategists and leaders as the “first and second islandchains”68—do not determine current Chinese weapons acquisitionsand modernization programs in any direct, immediate, andstraightforward fashion. Rather, the role of broad strategic concepts,such as the control over the first and second island chains, is moreregulative than constraining: That is, these concepts provide generalbenchmarks for the future, they identify certain desired capabilitiesthat Chinese force planners likely aspire to incorporate into their

______________66Stokes (1999).

67Godwin (1997).

68For an excellent analysis of this concept, see Huang (1994).




force structure over the long term, and they no doubt justify the PLA Navy’s modernization agenda in competition with the other armedservices. But they do not provide programmatic guidance for near-term military acquisitions. These acquisitions are still determinedprimarily by the PLA’s focus on deterring or defeating attacks onChinese territory, both actual and claimed, both continental andmaritime, through the acquisition of limited air, sea, and informa-tion-denial capabilities. The larger strategic concepts then simply serve to ensure that these near-term military acquisitions are not

fundamentally inconsistent with China’s likely long-range aspirationsof attaining some level of extended control over or at the very leastpresence within distant operational areas that will become relevantto its security interests as its overall national power increases.

In their effort to achieve these objectives—developing a force capa-bility that resolves near-term challenges while simultaneously being capable of supporting longer-term aspirations—Chinese security managers have recognized that the military modernization efforts of the state must be built on a prior foundation of indigenous scientific,technological, and economic capabilities. Hence, the level of re-sources devoted to military modernization has increased at a pacethat is intended neither to undermine the attainment of essentialcivilian development priorities nor to unduly alarm both the periph-eral states and the major powers and thus erode the generally benignthreat environment facing China today. This is, in essence, the clear-est manifestation of the “calculative” strategy. And, although the ad-vantages of the current approach, which focuses on slowly develop-ing indigenous capabilities (as opposed to embarking on a rapid,highly costly, and difficult acceleration of foreign acquisitions), areclear to Beijing, it is important to recognize that the success of thisstrategy, other things being equal, could nonetheless erode the rela-tive power capabilities of China’s major regional competitors,including the United States, so long as the pace of economic growthin China continues to exceed that of its competitors. Superior eco-nomic growth rates are therefore critical because they represent, inprinciple, fungible resources that can be garnered by the state andapplied to the acquisition of some specific capabilities—military ortechnological—that one’s competitors may have. To that degree,

even an inward-focused modernization that greatly increases




China’s economic capabilities relative to other major powers will,more than any other, likely contribute to a change in the overall relative balance of power in Asia and beyond over the long term.

Policies Toward Territorial Claims and the Recourse to Force

China’s approach to territorial claims remains a subset of its generalstrategic approach toward the peripheral states under the calculativestrategy. This strategy in effect has resulted in China pursuing a gen-eralized good-neighbor policy that has focused on strengthening itsexisting ties in Northeast and Southeast Asia, mending ties whereverpossible in south and west Asia, and exploring new relationships in

Central Asia.69

This omnidirectional effort at developing good re-gional relations is centered on a sharp recognition of many criticalgeopolitical realities. First, the peripheral areas will continue to re-main highly important for Chinese security, just as they did histori-cally, even as they continue to host new sources from which many consequential challenges to Chinese power may emerge over time.Second, China today remains incapable of altering the structure of relations with many of its peripheral states through force or thethreat of force, and although Beijing may even prefer to reinstatesome of the traditional patterns of control and deference it has en-

joyed in the past, it is impossible to do so without further increases inrelative Chinese power. Third, renewed contentions with key pe-ripheral states could obliterate the prospects for a peaceful regional

environment and, by implication, frustrate China’s desire for“comprehensive national strength.” It is in this context that recentChinese initiatives at defusing old territorial disputes ought to beconsidered.

China certainly has territorial disputes with many important stateson its periphery, including Russia, Japan, Vietnam, and India. Mostof these disputes derive from the colonial era when national bound-aries were often adjusted idiosyncratically in accordance with the lo-cal balances of power present at the time. As a result, China often“lost” marginal portions of border or peripheral territory, as for ex-ample when the British annexed the northern tip of Burma in 1886.

______________69Hsiung (1995), pp. 576–577.




The actual nature of these losses is difficult to discern because thecharacter of Chinese control in these relatively small areas was often

weak, occasionally nonexistent, and sometimes merely a function of the suzerain relationships enjoyed by Chinese rulers with the localrulers of these territories. Many of these disputes remained unre-solved because China and its Asian competitors were relatively weak for most of the postwar period, and because the Cold War, whichdominated the bulk of this era, enforced a “pacification” of thesedisputes, even when the power-political capabilities to resolve thesecontentions may have existed in some cases.

Aside from these marginal losses, however, Chinese security man-agers often refer to the much larger deprivation and humiliation

suffered by China over the centuries. If all the territories claimed,occupied, or directly controlled by China since its unification in thethird century B.C. were matched against its current physical hold-ings, the presently disputed marginal territories would fade into in-significance. For example, during the early Han Dynasty, Chinesecontrol extended beyond its current boundaries to portions of pre-sent day Central Asia and northern Vietnam. During the early Tang,even larger portions of Central Asia came under Chinese rule. Simi-larly, during the Ming Dynasty, China controlled or occupied parts of

Vietnam, and under the early Qing, China controlled Mongolia andlarge portions of the Russian Far East (see the maps in ChapterThree). In fact, even if only the more recent territorial losses sufferedduring the “century of national humiliation” (lasting from roughly 1840–1940) were iterated, the previous conclusion would still hold.Despite occasional references to these losses suffered historically,the Chinese state appears to have by and large accepted the bordersit inherited in 1949, preferring instead to pursue mostly marginalclaims as opposed to seeking renewed control over the largerexpanses of territory it may have controlled or occupied at one pointor another in its history. The absence of these larger claims serves tounderscore China’s present conservatism where territorialrevisionism is concerned.7 0 The extent of its greater losses is

______________70For a clear statement of current Chinese conservatism regarding territorial issues,see Mao (1996). This work makes no reference to the possibility that China might in

future lay claim to former Chinese lands now under the undisputed control of otherstates.




nonetheless worth noting if for no other reason than it serves as amarker identifying territorial interests that in some cases might bepursued in more concerted form if favorable changes take place inthe future regional balance of power.

For the moment, however, Chinese territorial interests are focusedmainly on disputes involving Russia, along the Ussuri River andalong the Sino-Russian border west of Mongolia; India, principally in

Aksai Chin and in the Indian northeast with respect to the McMahonline and the status of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh; theSouth China Sea, where China and several Southeast Asian stateshave claims on the Spratly Islands; Japan, over the Senkakus; and, fi-nally, Taiwan, which remains a complex dispute over both the politi-

cal status of the island and the right to rule.

Beijing’s “calculative” strategy has resulted in a two-pronged ap-proach aimed at securing Chinese interests with respect to theseterritorial disputes. First, if the dispute in question is both intrinsi-cally trivial and marginal to China’s larger interests, Beijing hassought to resolve it amicably to pursue its larger goals. The borderdisputes with Russia, for example, are evidence of this approach

where China’s overarching interest in improving its political rela-tionship with Moscow and securing access to Russian military tech-nology has resulted in quick, it is hoped permanent, solutions to theUssuri River dispute.71 Another similar example pertains to thespeedy resolution of the border disputes with Kazakhstan and Kyr-

gystan: Given Chinese interests both in preventing external supportto the separatist movements in Chinese Central Asia and in ensuring access to the energy reserves of the trans-Caucasus, Beijing movedquickly to amicably delimit its border with both these newly inde-pendent states.72

______________71See “Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republicsand the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Guidelines of MutualReduction of Forces and Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Area of theSoviet-Chinese Border” (1990); and the later treaty, “Agreement Between the RussianFederation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area” (1996).72

“Agreement Between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, theKyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People’s Republic of China onConfidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area” (1996).




Second, if the dispute in question is significant but cannot be re-solved rapidly to China’s advantage by peaceful means, Beijing hasadvocated an indefinite postponement of the basic issue. This tactichas been adopted, for example, in the case of the territorial disputes

with India, Japan, and several of the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) states. The basic logic underlying this approachhas been to steadfastly avoid conceding any Chinese claims withrespect to the dispute, while simultaneously seeking to prevent thedispute from vitiating the pacific environment that China needs tocomplete its internal transformation successfully. Such an approachhas at least several advantages: It positions China as a conciliatory state seeking to resolve all outstanding disputes peacefully. It doesnot increase the demands on China’s military forces at a time whenthe PLA is relatively weak and when the Chinese economy needs allthe breathing room it can get. It prevents balancing coalitions fromarising against China in the event Beijing pursued more coercivestrategies. And, it delays the resolution of these disputes at least untilthe balance of power changes substantially in favor of China. At thattime, both simple usurpation and coercive bargaining might becomemore attractive, although it is unclear today whether the Chineseleadership would actually conclude that the benefits of such actionseasily exceed the costs.

Under the “calculative” strategy, therefore, China has sought to avoidfurther losses of territory at all costs (except when the losses aredeemed to be truly insignificant relative to the benefits of some othercompeting goals). Whenever intrinsically valuable territory is at is-sue, however, China has sought to preserve the status quo—not giv-ing up its sovereign claims, but preferring to avoid any application of force, so long as the other parties to the dispute do not attempt tochange the status quo ante either. This logic has applied even to thedispute over Taiwan, where China would prefer to freeze the island’spresently ambiguous status. It would prefer not to employ force toresolve the issue but may nonetheless be compelled to do so becausethe principle of avoiding significant territorial loss—particularly of anarea possessing enormous nationalistic significance as a Chineseprovince—would demand a military reaction, no matter how costly,if the Taiwanese sought to change the status quo unilaterally. In

general, therefore, the reluctance to employ force to resolve the out-standing territorial disputes remains a good example of the




“calculative” strategy at work. Although it represents a sensitivity tothe logic of relative material capabilities that has been evident inChinese strategic behavior since the imperial era, including astraightforward recognition that the PLA may simply not have thecapacity to prevail in some force-on-force encounters that may oc-cur, a more important aspect is Beijing’s likely perception that mostof these disputes can be resolved down the line to China’s advantageby any means of its own choosing if its national capabilities are al-lowed to grow rapidly and undisturbed in the interim.

Although China’s reluctance to seek recourse to force or the threat of force at present is intimately bound up with the demands of the cal-culative strategy, especially as it applies to the issue of territorial dis-

putes, it is important to recognize that there is no reason why thisshould be true either in principle or over the long term. That is,China could use force for reasons that have little to do with its terri-torial disputes, e.g., as a consequence of deteriorating political rela-tions with other powers or simply because of dramatic increases inChina’s military strength. This is unlikely today, especially given theimperatives of the calculative strategy, but it may become relevant asChinese power grows over time. It may also become relevant in thecontext of a larger irredentist agenda, especially one emerging from achauvinistic nationalist desire to reopen the territorial questionsarising out of a century of national humiliation. Although this willremain a concern for all of China’s neighbors confronted by itssteadily growing capability, at least in the policy-relevant future mostChinese applications of force will probably be intimately bound up

with attempts to stave off threatened territorial losses, as opposed tothe pursuit of some other autonomous power-political goals.

Policies Toward International Regimes

The calculative strategy currently pursued by Beijing has resulted inChina adopting an “instrumental” attitude toward internationalregimes. This implies that China possesses neither an intrinsiccommitment nor an intrinsic antipathy to the existing internationalnorms and organizations but approaches these simply in terms of apragmatic calculation centered on the benefits and losses of partici-

pation and nonparticipation. Consequently, it has pursued a widerange of strategies with respect to both existing and evolving interna-




tional regimes which, depending on the issue-areas in question, canrange from full participation in search of asymmetric gains, throughcontingent cooperation in pursuit of reciprocal benefits, to outright–overt or covert–defection. The manifestation of such a wide range of behaviors is by no means unique to China: It is in fact typical of moststates, since consistently simple and straightforward behaviors—ei-ther in the direction of cooperation or of defection—are usually manifested only by those few states that either disproportionately benefit from the regime or are disproportionately penalized by it.The established great powers usually fall into the first category, andthe manifestly revisionist states usually fall into the second. All otherstates that occupy the middle ground, that is, those that are bothfavored and disadvantaged by prevailing regimes in varying degrees,

would adopt behaviors similar to China’s. Since Beijing encounters avariety of international regimes in the areas of economicdevelopment, trade, technology transfer, arms control, and theenvironment, this fundamental calculus is often reflected in different

ways.

First, China either participates or has sought to actively participate inall regimes that promise asymmetric gains where accretion of new power or maintenance of existing power is concerned. In this cate-gory lie all the regimes connected with the international economy,global trade, the diffusion of technology, and international gover-nance. Participating in these regimes enables China to connect moreeffectively to the global market system that today, more than any other, has been responsible for the meteoric growth witnessed since1978. Not surprisingly, China has expressed great interest and hasengaged in arduous negotiations in an effort to join organizationssuch as the WTO, which could assure it uniform access to the mar-kets of both advanced industrialized countries and developing economies alike. Toward that end, it has made various efforts to re-form its domestic legal and patent system to ensure the protection of intellectual and material property rights to secure continued accessto the technology and know-how brought by multinational corpora-tions to China. It has striven valiantly, however, to enter the WTO onpreferential terms as a developing country, since entry on such termsprovides it access to multiple international markets but would not

require that it eliminate, either immediately upon entrance or soonthereafter, many of the domestic regulations that impose barriers to




free trade within China.73 Because of this quest for asymmetricgains, the United States had for several years prevented China fromsecuring membership in the organization, and although the Chineseleadership has often declared that membership as a developedcountry is “absolutely unacceptable,” given the growing domesticconcerns about the adverse social consequences (e.g., unemploy-ment and labor unrest) that might result from China’s deeper inte-gration with the global economy following WTO entrance,74 it seemsthat, on balance, the search for “WTO membership is still high onChina’s trade diplomacy agenda.”75 The issue of WTO membershiprepresents the clearest example of the search for asymmetric gains,but China’s continued linkages with other international organiza-tions—economic and political—provide examples of its efforts tosustain existing power and privileges. China has profitably interacted

with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the IBRD, and otherfinancial institutions that promise preferential access to capital,technical know-how, and resources. Where international gover-nance is concerned, China has continued to participate fully in theUnited Nations (UN) for reasons connected with both status and in-terests: Its acknowledged standing as a permanent member of theSecurity Council distinguishes it from powers of lesser standing andenables it to shape global and regional policies—especially in aunipolar environment—that may affect Chinese interests or those of its allies.76 As Samuel Kim has shown, China has sought to use a

wide variety of UN institutions and fora to maximize political, eco-

nomic, financial, and image benefits while minimizing any losses orrisks.77

Second, China has sought to participate in all international organi-zations and regimes where consequential policies adverse to China’sinterests might be engineered as a result of Beijing’s absence. In thiscategory lie all those regional regimes that China initially resented

______________73For an excellent summary of the issues involved in China’s quest to join the WTO,see Rosen (1997).

74For a discussion of such concerns, which derive from China’s primary security objective of maintaining domestic order and well-being, see Pearson (1999), pp. 182–183.

75 Wong (1996), p. 296.

76For instance, see speech by then PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1994).77Kim (1999), especially pp. 60–71.




but was eventually constrained to participate in, mainly to ward off future losses that may have accrued in its absence. The best exam-ples here remain China’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forumand the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference.78 China’s early disin-terest in these bodies was rooted in an effort to avoid being “cornered” by enmeshing multilateral arrangements where China’sgreater bargaining power—visible in the purely bilateralrelationships it enjoys with its smaller neighbors—would beneutralized by participation in a large forum that brought together allits many potential competitors simultaneously. Once these foraacquired a life of their own, however, Beijing realized that its lack of participation could result in these institutions adopting policies thatmight not be in China’s best interests. To forestall this possibility,China became a late entrant to these bodies. Its initial participation

was the result of a constrained choice, but China has realized thatthese institutions may offer future benefits and consequently itsdesire to continue participating may be motivated as much by thehope of future gains as it is conditioned by the current desire to avoidimmediate losses.79

Third, China has sought to undercut—through participation—thoseregimes that threaten the political interests of its communist gov-ernment. The best examples of these are in the issue-areas of humanrights, personal liberties, and political freedoms. All internationalregimes in these arenas that seek to fundamentally change thebalance of power between individuals and the state are perceived tothreaten China’s governing regime which, though in evolution, stillaffirms the primacy of the party and the state. Not surprisingly, Chi-na’s political leadership, and occasionally sections of its elite as well,have viewed universalist declarations pertaining to human rights andpolitical freedoms either as an interference in China’s domestic af-fairs or, more significantly, as an insidious effort to undermine thestability of the Chinese state with a view to preventing its rise inpower or replacing it entirely with a democratic regime. 80 The Chi-nese discomfort with such regimes, however, has usually elicitedcooptational responses when the necessity of assuaging interna-

______________78Foot (1998).

79Klintworth (1997); Vatikiotis (1997); Wanandi (1996); and Bert (1993).

80Nathan (1999); and Nathan (1994).




tional public opinion is deemed to be critical. Thus, for example,China supported the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in partbecause support for such resolutions bestows benefits in the realm of international public opinion, because the declaration itself is unen-forceable, and because the language in the statement is loose enoughto lend itself comfortably to a variety of political systems and prac-tices.81 Consistent with the objective of shaping international opin-ion, China has in fact attempted to offer alternative visions of whatgood politics entails, one of which emphasizes the communitarianrequirements of order over individual preferences of freedom and issupposed to represent an “Asian way” that allegedly comports moreappropriately with regional traditions and values. In attempting tooffer such an alternative vision, which implicitly legitimizes the exist-ing power relations within China, Beijing has managed to secure aconsiderable degree of support from other authoritarian countries in

Asia, all of which view the contemporary concern about humanrights, personal liberties, and political freedoms as merely anotherparticularist, Western view of political arrangements rather than asuniversal norms—a view that allegedly either intentionally or unin-tentionally is used by Western powers to beat up on the Asian statesto perpetuate their own dominant influence.82

Fourth, China has sought to overtly or covertly undercut or defectfrom those regimes that threaten its political and strategic interestsand generally to adhere to those regimes that advance such interests.

A well-known example of such Chinese behavior can be found in theissue-area of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Chinesepolicy has evolved greatly in this area. From an early posture thatcondemned Western and Soviet-U.S. arms control efforts as a formof “sham disarmament” designed to perpetuate superpower domi-nance (thus leading to calls for widespread proliferation as a meansof defeating such “superpower hegemony”), China has now reachedthe conclusion that “high entropy” proliferation—meaning a highly proliferated world with few “rules of the nuclear road”83— would be

______________81“Envoy Comments on Declaration on Human Rights Defenders” (1998).

82For one example of a defense of the “Asian way,” see Zakaria (1994).

83Molander and Wilson (1993), p. xiii.




prejudicial to its interests in principle.84 Thus, over the years, it hasprogressively joined international regimes such as the Biological

Weapons Convention (BWC) (1985), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1992), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1993), andthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1996) (and has agreed toabide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime—MTCR (1991)), though often with great reluctance and not withoutseveral attempts to water down the level of commitments imposedby such regimes. Although Beijing has now accepted its legal obliga-tions under these regimes, its record at compliance, however, has insome instances been less than reassuring.85 In practice, it has as-sisted the WMD programs of some countries along or near its pe-riphery such as Iran and Pakistan. In effect, those countries deemedvital for the success of Chinese regional security policies have attimes been partly “exempted” from the universal obligations Beijing has undertaken with respect to proliferation. Some Chinese assis-tance in this regard has been simply a product of poor domestic con-trol over its military-industrial complex, but it has in other moreegregious instances been a deliberate consequence of state sanc-tioned policy.86 This behavior led one analyst to conclude that Chi-nese proliferation behavior exemplifies a perfect case of “differentrules for different exports,”87 suggesting that in general Chinese be-havior in the arena of export controls “does not demonstrate a clearpattern of either compliance or violation.”88

Fifth, China has gone along with those international regimes thatnotionally provide joint gains, if the initial private costs of participa-tion can either be extorted, shifted, or written off. The best exampleof such behavior is found in the issue-area of the environment,

where the efforts to control greenhouse gases, restrict carbon dioxide

______________84For a review of early Chinese attitudes, see Pillsbury (1975). A good discussion oncurrent Chinese attitudes to high-entropy proliferation can be found in Garrett andGlaser (1995/96), pp. 50–53.

85 A good survey of the Chinese record with respect to participation and compliancecan be found in Swaine and Johnston (1999); and Frieman (1996). See also Garrett andGlaser (1995/96); and Johnston (1996a).

86For details, see U.S. Senate (1998), pp. 3–16.87

Davis (1995), p. 595.88Frieman (1996), p. 28.




emissions, and reduce the level of pollutants more generally havebeen supported by China only after several attempts to shift the costsof such compliance asymmetrically on to other states. More specifi-cally, China’s reluctant accommodation of regime interests in in-stances such as the Montreal Protocol has been clearly a function of its ability to extort resources from the developed states as the pricefor its participation in such regimes. As Samuel Kim succinctly con-cluded, “China’s ‘principled stand’ on the global campaign to protectthe ozone layer was issued in the form of thinly disguised blackmail:China refused to sign the 1987 Montreal Protocol without thepromise of big cash and greater ‘flexibility’ on the use and produc-tion of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).”89 On this matter, as in many others, China’s eventual participation in this and other internationalregimes was conditioned by multiple considerations.90 To begin

with, Beijing has perceived that Chinese interests eventually wouldbe advanced, even if only marginally, by the regime in question;hence, it has complied only after attempts at resistance, defection, orfree riding were perceived to fail.91 Further, its participation in many instances becomes contingent on the success of institutionalizedcost shifting, that is, on China’s ability to exploit its relative im-portance to get other participants to bear a portion of Beijing’s costsas the price of Chinese participation in the regime. In the issue-areaof environmental protection, for example, Elizabeth Economy notesthat “fully 80 percent of China’s environmental protection budget isderived from abroad. Overall, China is the largest recipient of total

environmental aid from the World Bank and has received extensivesupport from the Global Environmental Facility, the Asian Develop-ment Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and bilateralsources.”92 Finally, the decision to participate usually represents ashrewd appreciation of the relative power of stronger states involvedin the issue-area in question, especially the United States and itsother OECD partners, as well as an attempt to play “quid pro quo,” inthat the benefits of Chinese participation and support are offered in

______________89Kim (1991), pp. 40–41.90Sims (1996).

91Such behavior is also evident in the arms-control arena, as suggested by Swaine and

Johnston (1999).92Economy (1998), p. 278.




the expectation that the goodwill gained could be cashed in in otherissue-areas where the gains sought by China would presumably behigher.93 For all such reasons, China has participated in interna-tional regimes such as the Montreal Protocol where the costs of par-ticipation though initially high could be borne through external as-sistance and possible future exploitation.

Sixth, China has also participated in regimes where the costs of uni-lateral defection were very high. The best example here remains Chi-na’s willingness to participate in the CTBT. Given the relatively modest capabilities of China’s nuclear arsenal, all early indicationssuggested that China would either abstain from participation or ex-ploit the opposition to the CTBT emerging from other states, such as

India, to avoid signing the treaty.94 Over time, however, it becameclear that the United States had staked an inordinate amount of diplomatic and political resources to have the treaty signed by all themajor nuclear-capable powers in the international system. Thesheer pressure applied by the United States and the implications of aChinese refusal to participate—perhaps affecting technology trans-fers, membership in the WTO, and MFN status—finally resulted in aChinese accession to the treaty, but only after Beijing concluded a fi-nal series of underground nuclear tests. To be sure, other considera-tions also intervened: the declining utility of nuclear weapons, theabsence of any need to expand China’s present nuclear capabilitiesin radically new directions, the recognition that China’s growing power capabilities would always allow for a future breakout from thetreaty at relatively low cost in force majeure situations, and the notinconsequential image concerns associated with China’s desire to beseen as a responsible great power and as a just and principled state.

All these factors combined with a sensitivity to the high politicalcosts of being a nonsignatory finally ensured China’s successful par-ticipation in the CTBT, even though, other things being equal, itmight have preferred to unilaterally “defect” on this, more than any other, issue.95

______________93This calculus is of course also evident in other policy areas, including bilateraldiplomatic, economic, and security relations with the United States.

94Garrett and Glaser (1995/96), pp. 53 ff.

95For a good discussion, see Johnston (1996b).




BENEFITS AND RISKS

Pursuit of the calculative strategy, as manifested in the four issue-ar-eas analyzed above, has resulted in significant security gains for theChinese state during the past decade. First, it has greatly strength-ened domestic order and well-being by producing sustained, highrates of economic growth and major increases in the living standardsof many Chinese. Second, it has greatly increased China’s interna-tional leverage, especially along its periphery, and raised its overallregional and global status and prestige. Third, it has resulted in anexpansion in its foreign economic presence and an increase in itspolitical involvement and influence in Asia and beyond. Fourth, ithas also generated a huge foreign currency reserve as well as pro-

vided the Chinese state with the financial wherewithal to purchaseadvanced weaponry and critical technologies from foreign states,thus compensating, in part, for the significant continued shortcom-ings in its military capabilities.96 Fifth, in perhaps the greatestachievement of all, it has contributed—despite the numerous unre-solved disputes between China and its neighbors—to the mainte-nance of a relatively benign external environment that enablesBeijing to make the processes of internal economic growth more self-replicating than ever before.

All told, therefore, the calculative strategy has paid off handsomely for China: It has put it along a path that, if sustained, could makeChina the largest economy in the world sometime in the first half of

the 21st century. Even more significantly, it has allowed such growthto occur as a result of an export-led strategy that increasingly em-ploys significant proportions of imported technology and inputs—anamazing fact signifying that China has been able to rely upon boththe markets and, increasingly, the resources of its partners to createthe kind of growth that might eventually pose major concerns to itseconomic partners, all without greatly unnerving those partners inthe interim. This does not imply that China’s partners in Asia andelsewhere are unconcerned about the implications of China’s growthin power. It implies only that such concerns have not resulted, thus

______________96For example, Chinese purchases of advanced weapons from Russia are to a signifi-

cant extent a testimony to the failure of China’s defense industry to indigenously pro-duce many such critical systems.




far, in efforts to constrain China’s growth because the desire for abso-lute gains on the part of all (including China) has outweighed thecorrosive concerns brought about by the problem of relative gains.This represents the true success of the calculative strategy. By being explicitly premised on a refusal to provoke fear and uncertainty as aresult of provocative Chinese actions, Beijing has succeeded,

whether intentionally or not, not only in desensitizing its trading partners to the problems of relative gains but it has also, by rhetoricand actions aimed at exploiting all sides’ desire for absolute gains,created the bases for the kind of continued collaboration that in-evitably results in further increases in Chinese power and capabili-ties. Carried to its natural conclusion, the Chinese transition to truegreat-power status could occur in large part because of its partners’desire for trade and commercial intercourse so long as Beijing iscareful enough not to let any security competition short-circuit theprocess in the interim.

The desire to avoid such competition is certainly China’s intention,especially given its continued weakness in certain critical measuresof economic and military power relative to the United States and key peripheral states such as Japan, Russia, and India. This being so, it ismost likely that Chinese state-initiated revisionism of the interna-tional arena will be minimal in the years ahead and especially before,say, the period 2015–2020, which by most indicators is the earliest date when relative power capabilities would begin to be transformedto Beijing’s advantage. That fact notwithstanding, the very successesof the calculative strategy, insofar as they precipitate unintendedexternal and internal developments, could produce new security problems, for both China and the Asia-Pacific region at large, thatmight worsen before 2015.

First, the significant, albeit incremental, advances in China’s military capabilities, combined with the emergence in the late 1980s andearly 1990s of tensions over territorial issues such as Taiwan and theSpratly Islands, have raised anxieties among both the peripheralstates and the Western powers over whether, and to what extent,China will seek to use its steadily growing military capabilities to re-solve local security competition and more generally to establish adominant strategic position in East Asia over the long term. The lack of clear-cut answers to these questions, as a result of both Beijing’sambiguity and its own ignorance about its future security environ-




ment in the long term, as well as simple systemic uncertainty (meaning, the fear of an unknown future), have given rise to a variety of regional counterresponses. A few of the more capable regionalstates have initiated a variety of military modernization programsthat are at least partly motivated by long-range concerns over Chi-na’s increasing capabilities and the uncertainty about the future U.S.regional presence, and several of the weaker states have begun ex-ploring new diplomatic and political forms of reassurance.97 If thesecounterresponses continue to gather steam, Beijing might be faced

with a gradually deteriorating regional environment wherein moreand more energetic military acquisitions and counter-acquisitions as

well as competitive efforts at alliance formation begin to displace allthe positive benefits of the calculative strategy over time. 98 The netresult of such a dynamic would be the return to a more adversarialregional environment. Such an outcome may not by itself arrestChina’s relative growth, but it would nonetheless degrade theenthusiasm with which the regional states participate in China’seconomic renewal—with all the implications that has for technology transfers, direct and portfolio investments, market access, and globaleconomic growth more generally—while simultaneously increasing the premium placed on military as opposed to other less-lethalinstruments of interstate relations.99

Second, China’s rapidly expanding involvement in foreign trade,technology transfer, and investment activities, combined with itsgrowing participation in various international fora, has generatedtensions with many of the advanced industrial states over issues of reciprocity, fair access, and responsibility. In part, this has been a di-rect result of the calculative strategy which, by positioning China in a

______________97 A good survey of these regional developments, together with the role played by theinteraction of external fears (including local rivalries) with internal growth, domesticbusiness interests, and the search for regional prestige, can be found in Ball (1993/94).Beijing has attempted to reassure the international community about its intentionsthrough the issuance of a defense White Paper in July 1998, but the lack of authenticinformation about budget expenditures and numbers and the likely disposition andpurpose of forces makes it a less-than-complete document.

98The current Asian financial crisis could significantly reduce the pace of such a de-velopment because it has constrained the ability and willingness of many Asian

countries to expand their military arsenals in response to increasing Chinese capabili-ties. For a broad survey of these developments, see Simon (1998).

99Friedberg (1993/94) concludes that such an outcome is in fact likely.




generally “exploitative” mode, has made it less sensitive to the exter-nal costs of maintaining high growth rates. Not surprisingly, Chinatoday is viewed by some Western observers, in some instances, as anunfair economic partner and multilateral regime participant thatoften chooses to free ride or defect from international and bilateralagreements or understandings and generally resists opening upmany of its markets unless forced to do so. If such a sentimentgathers steam, there would be an increase in economic and politicalretaliation directed against China.100 Although such actions may beintended merely to secure reciprocal “good behavior” in the eco-nomic realm, it could have unintended consequences in other areas.Given the strong suspicion in Beijing about emerging Western, andin particular, U.S., efforts at containing China, even purely economicretaliation may be read as part of a larger more concerted effort tobring China to heel. This perception, in turn, could lead to Chineserecalcitrance and obstructionism in other issue-areas such as prolif-eration, attitudes toward the U.S. presence in Asia, and the like, andbefore long could result in a tit-for-tat game that clouds more aspectsof Chinese relations with the West than were initially at issue.101

Third, China’s increasing dependence on foreign markets, maritimetrade routes, and energy supplies has contributed to a growing senseof strategic vulnerability in Beijing to external economic factors, andthis could result in increased pressures for expanding China’s ability to control events beyond its borders. These pressures are reinforcedby the fact that the concentration of China’s major economic centersalong the eastern and southern coastline, combined with the dra-matic advances occurring in military technology, has increased Chi-nese vulnerability to a crippling military attack executed from stand-off distances well outside the traditional defensive perimeter soughtto be maintained by the Chinese state. Chinese responses to issuesof resource and market dependence thus far have been both re-strained and marginal, at least in military terms. For example, forenergy dependence, China has sought to rely increasingly on the in-ternational market (and hence, from a security perspective, contin-ues to depend on the U.S. interest in defending the oil-rich Arabstates); develop stable, long-term energy supplies from key Central

______________100Sanger (1997).101Shambaugh (1996a).




Asian energy producers; increase internal efficiency in the extractionof domestic resources and in manufacturing processes in general;and maintain good relations with the Gulf states, in part through thesupply of lethal military and in some instances WMD technologies.Thus far, China has not responded to this problem by seeking unilat-eral solutions built around the development of power-projectionforces able to operate at great distances from the Chinese Mainland.The problems of increased vulnerability to threats against existing orclaimed Chinese territories, however, have apparently resulted inprogrammatic decisions initially aimed at acquiring military instru-ments capable of maritime barrier operations (such as the creationand maintenance of naval exclusion zones) and eventually securing and maintaining nearby offshore zones of influence through at leastdefensive sea control operations (such as the establishment of asustained naval presence able to repel armed incursions into its areaof operation).102 These solutions, although conservative today, havethe potential to develop into more powerful capabilities, including those required for offensive sea control in the form of forwardoperations throughout much of Asia-Pacific and the Indian Oceanareas.103 Most emerging great powers in the past naturally devel-oped such capabilities as their own perceptions of vulnerability in-creased. If China proves an exception to this past pattern (either by choice or because of a failure to develop the requisite economic andmilitary capabilities), it could face a combined regional and extrare-gional response that makes the need for such capabilities even more

imperative over time.

Fourth, the end of the U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry as a result of thecollapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the United States

______________102The judgment that China’s modernization of its naval and air assets includes ele-ments of an explicit battlespace control (as opposed to mere denial) capability isbased on both the diverse types of weapons platforms and support systems the Chi-nese are acquiring or attempting to acquire (e.g., long-range surface and subsurfacecombatants, more capable early warning and precision-strike assets, space-basedsurveillance capabilities, and possibly one or more aircraft carriers), and the inherentlogic of geopolitics, technology, and operational considerations. Such factors suggestthat the maintenance of a robust sea-denial capability over time will eventually re-quire increasingly more effective sea-control capabilities, especially if China wants tomaintain the security of maritime regions for hundreds of miles beyond its coastline,

as is implied by the “islands chain” concept.103The technologies required to sustain such operations are assessed in Tellis (1995).




as the sole global superpower have served to reduce Washington’sstrategic rationale for maintaining amicable security relations withthe Chinese state. This factor, combined with the images of brutality and totalitarian repression resulting from the forcible suppression of large numbers of peaceful Chinese demonstrators in June 1989, theoften-acrimonious Sino-U.S. disputes over economic and humanrights issues, and a growing confrontation between Washington andBeijing over Taiwan, has significantly raised the Chinese sense of threat from the United States in the 1990s. Indeed, in recent years,U.S. policies toward China have been increasingly viewed as directly threatening core Chinese national security interests. The notion of “peaceful evolution,”104 for example, threatens the Chinese state’sconceptions of domestic order and well-being, continuing Americansupport for Taiwan (including the political and military assistancethat makes its supposed drive toward formal independence possible)threatens the Chinese vision of territorial integrity and unity, and the

widespread discussions within the United States of the possible util-ity of containing or “constraining” China threatens the Chinese de-sire to recover its status and reestablish a position of geopoliticalcentrality in Asia. All in all, then, the demise of the Soviet Union cre-ated a situation in which Chinese grand strategic interests and thoseof the United States do not automatically cohere. This creates anopportunity for the growth of new irritants in the bilateral relation-ship. If such irritants are not managed successfully, they couldeventually increase to a point where they radically undermine the

success of any calculative strategy pursued by Beijing.

Fifth, the emergence of autonomous factors in the regional environ-ment that affect Chinese core interests but which Beijing may be un-able to control could bring about an escalation of tensions with otherpowers even before the calculative strategy runs its natural course.

Among the most critical such issues are the future of Taiwan and the

______________104This term is used by many Chinese elites to describe a U.S. strategy to weaken andeventually destroy the existing Chinese political system from within, through the pro-motion of Western political and social values and structures in China. As Betts notes,“the liberal solution for pacifying international relations—liberal ideology—is pre-cisely what present Chinese leaders perceive as a direct security threat to theirregime.” Betts (1993/94), p. 55.




Spratly islands.105 The democratization of the political process onTaiwan that has taken place since the 1980s has led to a steady shiftin political power, away from pro-reunification forces associated

with the Mainlander-dominated Nationalist Party to independence-minded forces associated with the native Taiwanese-dominatedDemocratic Progressive Party.106 Moreover, continued high growthrates, expanding levels of foreign trade and investment across theregion, and the accumulation of enormous foreign exchange reserveshave given Taiwan new avenues for asserting its influence in the re-gional and global arenas. These political and economic trends lay behind Taiwan’s determined effort, begun in the early 1990s, to in-crease its international stature and influence as a sovereign statethrough an avowed strategy of “pragmatic diplomacy.”107 Such be-havior, combined with Beijing’s increasing reliance on territorially defined notions of nationalism, noted above, and its growing fearthat Washington is directly or indirectly supportive of Taiwan’s ef-forts, have served to strengthen China’s sense of concern over Tai-

wan and increase its willingness to use coercive diplomacy, if notoutright force, to prevent the island from achieving permanent inde-pendence. Hence, future attempts by Taiwan to strengthen its statusas a sovereign entity through, for example, the attainment of a seat inthe United Nations, as well as Chinese perceptions of growing West-ern (and especially U.S.) support for such behavior, could provokeBeijing to undertake aggressive political and military actions(including, perhaps, a direct attack on Taiwan) that would likely pre-

cipitate a confrontation with the United States, greatly alarm China’s Asian neighbors, and generally destroy the incentives for continuedrestraint and caution basic to the calculative strategy.108

A similar outcome could conceivably occur as a result of develop-ments in the South China Sea. Despite episodic altercations with

Vietnam and the Philippines, China has thus far generally exercisedconsiderable restraint in the pursuit of its claims to the Spratly

______________105The future of the Korean peninsula would also be an issue directly affecting Chinaeven though no sovereignty claims are at stake here.

106Friedman (1994), especially Chapter 8; and Tien and Chu (1996).

107 Yue (1997).

108For a good summary of these issues see Cheung (1996).




Islands, agreeing to shelve the sovereignty dispute with otherclaimants and pursue joint exploitation of any possible resources lo-cated in the area. However, such restraint could diminish signifi-cantly in the future if other states were to become more aggressive inadvancing their claims to the area, or if large viable oil or natural gasdeposits were discovered beneath the islands or seabed of the region.The attraction of plentiful nearby energy resources to an increasingly energy-import-dependent China could prompt Beijing to undertakeefforts to seize control of all or some of the Spratlys or restrict navaltransit of the area and thereby precipitate dangerous military con-frontations with other claimants and possibly the United States.Such a development, in turn, would almost certainly erode China’sability or willingness to pursue its current calculative strategy.109

Sixth, the increasing wealth and the general liberalization of society that have resulted from the reforms have generated a variety of socialills and economic dislocations which together have contributed togrowing fears of domestic disorder within China. These ills, whichinclude endemic corruption, rising crime rates, significant pockets of unemployment, growing regional income disparities, overcrowding in cities, and increased strikes and demonstrations, have given rise toa perception both within China and abroad of a growing “public or-der crisis.”110 These developments, combined with China’s increas-ing dependence on external resources, markets, and investmentcapital and growing fears over the increasing acceptance by many Chinese of “decadent and corrupting” Western cultural products,have led some Chinese elites and ordinary citizens to espouse amodern version of the traditional argument favoring greater devel-opmental autonomy, limited foreign contacts, a more centralized,coercive state apparatus, and accelerated efforts to develop the ca-pabilities necessary to control the periphery.111 Such argumentsmight over time provide renewed power to those more isolationist-oriented conservatives in the Communist Party and the military who,though currently out of favor, nonetheless could gain greater popularand elite support for their views if China’s domestic and

______________109 An excellent discussion of China’s strategic calculus with respect to the use of forcein the South China Sea can be found in Austin (1998), pp. 297–326.

110 Austin (1995).

111Zhao (1997), pp. 733–734; and Chen (1997).




international environment were to deteriorate rapidly, even before2015–2020. The core of this potential internal crisis, such as it is,derives in part from the increasing hollowing-out of the CommunistParty from below. As a result, the struggle for domestic orderbecomes simultaneously a struggle for national discipline andpolitical survival. In such circumstances, the increasing importanceof the PLA as the guarantor of domestic security coupled with therising attractiveness of an authoritarian ideology of “order-first”could combine to create domestic transformations that would makeChina more fearsome in appearance and, thereby, undercut thetrustworthiness required for the success of its calculative strategy.

Any of these six developments occurring either independently or in

combination could result in enormous pressures to expand andrapidly accelerate improvements in China’s military and economiccapabilities as well as increase its external influence to simultane-ously establish political and economic dominance over the periph-ery, ensure continued high rates of domestic economic growth, andprovide leverage against future great power pressure. Although theseobjectives remain in some sense the distant goals to which the pres-ent calculative strategy is arguably directed, the pursuit of these aims

will become much more fervid and may be undertaken by morecoercive means in the near to mid term if a breakdown in the calcu-lative strategy occurs. In fact, many observers have noted that, by the early 1990s, the Chinese state had already apparently movedsome distance in developing a military “fallback” solution in theevent of a conspicuous failure of the calculative strategy. This solu-tion has entailed an increased level of defense spending and the pro-gressive implementation of a new defense doctrine keyed to theacquisition of capabilities to undertake offensive, preemptive,conventional attacks beyond its borders, coupled with enhancedefforts to create a more survivable and flexible nuclear deterrentcapability.112

Whether these developments materialize in “strong” form still re-mains to be seen, but at any rate they raise two critical questions thatdemand scrutiny and, if possible, an explanation. First, assuming

______________

112Regarding PLA doctrine, see Godwin (1997). For Chinese nuclear force moderniz-ation, see Johnston (1996b).




that no mishaps occur in the interim, how long can the calculativestrategy be expected to last? Second, what, if any, posture can be ex-pected to replace the calculative strategy after the latter has success-fully run its course? The next chapter attempts to provide tentativeanswers to both these questions.



151

Chapter Five

CHINA FACES THE FUTURE: THE FAR TERM

The challenges facing China’s calculative strategy, even in the nearterm, should not be underestimated. As indicated in the previouschapter, a variety of external and internal factors could coalesce toundermine both China’s efforts at pragmatism and its desire toeconomize on the use of force. This could result in serious crises in avariety of issue-areas—such as Taiwan, the Spratlys, Tibet, Korea,

WMD proliferation, and trade—which could compel Beijing to adoptmore muscular policies toward both the United States and its re-gional neighbors. Assuming for the moment, however, that no catas-trophic revisions of the calculative strategy are forced in the near tomid term, the “natural” longevity of this strategy then becomes aninteresting question. That is, the issue of how long China’s calcula-tive posture would survive assuming rapid and continuing economic

growth becomes a question of great relevance for policy because theanswer to this question enables both China’s regional neighbors andthe United States to anticipate future changes in Beijing’s attitudesand prudently prepare accordingly. Unfortunately, this questioncannot be answered with any certitude, but it is possible to identify the conditions under which the calculative strategy would naturally evolve over the long term, thereby providing a basis for understand-ing those circumstances that portend a consequential change inChina’s future strategic direction.




ASSESSING THE “NATURAL” LONGEVITY OF THECALCULATIVE STRATEGY

The key to assessing the natural longevity of the calculative strategy lies in examining more closely why the strategy was devised to begin

with. The reasons essentially boil down to the fact that China is arising but not yet strong power, whose further growth in capabilitiesdepends fundamentally on the quality of its external environment.This strong dependence on the external environment is manifestednot simply by Beijing’s desire for peace to prevent the distractions of security competition but, more fundamentally, by its continuing need for external markets, capital, and know-how to maintain itscurrent export-led strategy of growth. The continuing growth neces-sary to maintain domestic order and well-being and complete Chi-na’s ascent to power thus depends on the actions of others: access totheir markets, capital, and technology, which is contingent on Beijing not posing a threat both to the regional states and to the in-ternational system in general. This recognition, more than any other, has guided the development of the calculative strategy and itis, therefore, reasonable to suggest that, ceteris paribus , China’s ad-herence to this approach will endure at least as long as its acquisitionof comprehensive national strength is incomplete.

This argument, in effect, implies that the quality of China’s externalenvironment, at least in the first instance , remains the key variablethat determines the degree to which China can attain its principal

power-political goals, namely, the ensuring of domestic order and well-being, the attainment of strategic influence and, if possible,control, over the periphery, and the restoration of geopoliticalpreeminence. The realization of these goals—whenever thatoccurs—will represent an important culminating point in China’smodern political history in that it will have completed anevolutionary sequence from weakness to strength. Beginning withbeing a weak state in the late Qing, China has progressively evolvedinto a weak-strong state under communist rule, only to possibly endup as a strong state once again at some point in the distant future,perhaps still under communist rule, but more likely enjoying someother more liberalized form of political governance.

If and when this process is completed, the wheel will have turned fullcircle and—other things being equal—China could, once again, be



China Faces the Future: The Far Term 153

faced with the opportunity to employ some of the traditional strong-state strategies not witnessed since the highpoint of the imperial era.

Whether such strong-state strategies are in fact employed will alsodepend on the quality of China’s internal environment. The issue of the institutionalization and democratization of China’s political or-der (discussed below) certainly becomes relevant here, but otherconsiderations relating to the spatial distribution of wealth andpower internally, the social forms that arise as a result of new eco-nomic inequalities, and the character of the convergence that devel-ops between holders of economic and political power will all play acritical role in how future strong-state strategies evolve and aremanifested. These variables, in interaction with external impera-tives, will shape how China’s leadership determines and executes itspreferred strong-state strategies in the future and while these strate-gies cannot be discerned in their detail right now, it is possible to atleast identify broad alternatives. Before this exercise is conducted,however, it is important first to assess how certain key variables willaffect China’s continued commitment to its present calculative strat-egy and how changes in these variables might demarcate the time-frame within which any future shifts in strategy might take place.

The discussion in this chapter, which pertains to the possibility of ashift in China’s present calculative strategy to something resembling the strong-state strategy of the imperial era, must not be interpretedto mean that China currently seeks to consciously and deliberately shift out of its present strategy at some point in the future. Nor mustit be understood as a simplistic stratagem of “lying in wait,” whereinthe Chinese state patiently bides its time until the balance of powershifts to its advantage before it can revert to a supposedly “normal”pattern of muscular behavior. The premises underlying the discus-sion here, in fact, do not impute any sinister motives to China’scalculative strategy. They are sensitive, however, to structural trans-formations in the international order, especially to changes in rela-tive capability among countries and to the implications of thosechanges for international politics. In particular, they incorporate thesupposition that as Beijing’s relative capability changes for the bet-ter, its interests will expand proportionately, as will the spatial andinstitutional realms within which those interests are sought to be

defended. It is therefore possible, for purely structural reasons, thatChina’s currently limited objectives—domestic order, peripheral




stability, and geopolitical recognition—may gradually evolve in thedirection of more expanded interests requiring that it “exert morecontrol over its surroundings.”1

The possibility that such an expansion of interests may occur overtime is precisely what makes the Chinese transformation so in-teresting and so pressing from the perspective of U.S. grand strategy because it directly intersects with U.S. efforts to preserve its own pre-eminence even as it struggles to maintain a stable regional order in

Asia. In fact, it would be surprising if such an expansion of interestsdid not occur as Chinese capabilities increase because, as historiansoften point out, expanding interests as a function of expanding power have invariably been the norm throughout recorded history

for three reasons.2 First, rising power leads to increased interna-tional interests and commitments. Second, as rising powers gain inrelative power, they are more likely to attempt to advance theirstanding in the international system. Third, rising power inexorably leads to increasing ambition. Taken together, these considerationsimply that China’s “dependence on the favor of its neighbors,[which] has been comparatively high” when it subsisted as a weakerpower, may not survive its ascent to greatness when, as a true super-power, it will have all the capabilities to “behave boldly,” and per-haps be “more inclined to force its will upon others than to consult

with them.”3 Such changed behaviors are possible because, asRobert Gilpin succinctly concluded, “the critical significance of thedifferential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost of changing the international system and therefore the incentives forchanging the . . . [existing] . . . system.4

Because of such considerations, the possibilities for change inChina’s current calculative strategy, the conditions governing such achange, and the timeframe within which such change could takeplace all become questions of pressing analytical interest. It is in thiscontext that the proposition, “China’s adherence to a calculativestrategy will endure at least as long as its acquisition of comprehen-

______________1Roy (1996), p. 762.

2See Gilpin (1981); Kennedy (1987).

3Roy (1996), pp. 761–762.

4Gilpin (1981), p. 95.




sive national strength is incomplete,” can be broken down into threespecific dimensions.

First, China’s commitment to a calculative strategy will be a critical function of the extent and structure of its economic capabilities. Tobegin with, this implies that Beijing’s freedom of action will beconditioned substantially by the size of its GNP both in absolute andin relative terms. The size of absolute GNP (both in an aggregate andin a per capita sense) will determine the degree to which China isable to service its vast internal developmental needs. Fulfilling thisobjective is critical to ensuring domestic order and well-being toboth attenuate the volatility of intrasocietal relations and increasethe legitimacy of the Chinese state. Given the importance of these

two objectives, it is unlikely that China would shift from its currently profitable calculative strategy before it can attain those relatively high levels of absolute GNP that are “convertible into virtually alltypes of power and influence.”5 Such an achievement would allow itto further reduce the numbers of near-to-absolute poor, estimated toconsist of about 170 million people in 1995; preempt urban poverty

which, despite being as low as 0.3 percent of the urban population in1981, could become a matter of concern as urbanization increasesand China’s state-owned enterprises are reformed; and arrest thegrowing inequality across the urban-rural divide (an income gap thatexplains at least one-third of total inequality in 1995 and about one-half of the increase in inequality since 1985) and also interprovincialdisparities (which account for almost one-quarter of the total in-equality in 1995 and explain one-third of the increase since 1985).6

Although attaining a high level of absolute GNP contributes toimproving the quality of life of China’s population and, by impli-cation, gives China an opportunity to pursue other political objec-tives, Beijing will also have to be sensitive to its GNP levels in relativeterms. This measure defines China’s standing in comparison to itspeers and, to that degree, it suggests the freedom of action that Chinais likely to enjoy relative to other states in the international system.

______________5Knorr (1973), p. 75. For a dissenting view on the easy fungibility of power, see Bald- win (1979). For an analysis of the relevant constituents of national power in the

postindustrial age, see Tellis et al. (forthcoming).6The World Bank (1997b), pp. 1–13.




Economists debate how to calculate relative GNP among states, butthe critical issue here is that a China with higher GNP relative to itscompetitors will acquire commensurate political weight and, conse-quently, will have a greater capacity to embark on efforts to remakeor shape the international political order to better suit its own needsand preferences.7 Because such an effort cannot be undertaken solong as China is outside the league of “hegemonic”8 states—that is,states powerful enough to determine or decisively influence the na-ture of the rules and institutions governing global politics—it is un-likely that Beijing would shift out of its calculative approach beforeattaining global economic preponderance, especially when it islocked in a situation where the calculative strategy remains thecheapest route through which it can acquire hegemonic capabilitiesin the sense described above. Most assessments suggest that China

would not become the world’s preeminent economic power before2015–2020 (when measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms)at the very earliest and, while it might exceed the size of the U.S.economy at that point, it would still trail far behind the United Statesand many other Western countries when measured in terms of percapita GDP.9

Although the size of GDP, both in absolute and relative terms, is im-portant, the issue of China’s economic structure also bears on thequestion of when Beijing might shift from its calculative strategy.The economic structure of a country defines its degree of structuralpreparedness for an autonomous pursuit of great-power goals. Inconsidering this fact, it is important to recognize that, despite itsrapid economic growth, China today still remains predominantly an

______________7Knorr (1973), p. 75, summarized this notion by defining “two sides to nation power”:one, which “is concerned with what a country can do to other countries,” and theother, which “concerns a country’s ability to limit what other countries do to it.”8The terms “hegemonic state” or “hegemonic behavior” are employed in this study inthe technical manner suggested by U.S. international relations theory, where they re-fer to the structure-defined, global rule-making capacity of certain great powers,rather than in the Chinese sense where such terms convey a pejorative meaning, andare most often used to describe oppressive and predatory behavior by strong states.9The World Bank (1997a), p. 21. It is quite clear that China will be unable to sustain itstarget of 8 percent growth in the near term, but even rates of 5–6 percent would still be

impressive relative to growth rates in the rest of the global economy. For an analysis of the prognosis for future Chinese growth and why its growth rates are likely to slow down during the next decade, see Wolf (1999).




agricultural country, when measured by employment (50 percent)though not by sectoral contributions to GDP (20 percent).10 Any shift out of its current calculative strategy would therefore be pru-dent only when its structural transformation is complete—that is,

when it has developed a large, skilled, industrial workforce able toautonomously produce the range of civil and military instrumentsrequired to sustain an independent political trajectory as well as aneffective service sector that produces the complex enabling capabili-ties required by both an industrial society and a modernized military.

This shift from agriculture to industry and services, when measuredby employment, may come about faster than is usually imagined. Incontrast to the United States and Japan, which took over 50 years to

reduce the share of agriculture in the labor force from 70 percent to50 percent, China has succeeded in doing the same in less than 20

years. Assuming that this process continues at such a pace, China would be able to reduce the proportion of agricultural labor to about20 percent of the total labor pool by 2020 and perhaps even further inthe years beyond. At somewhere around this point, it is expectedthat both the contribution of the industrial and services sector toGNP, and the size of the industrial and services workforce as afraction of total employment, will roughly approximate thoseproportions currently holding in typical upper-middle-incomecountries today.11 Even more significantly, however, it is expectedthat the level of technology “domesticated” by the Chinese economy

will reach significant enough levels to make indigenous “niche”capabilities fairly commonplace.

Finally, the level of dependence on the international economy will bethe final, albeit arguably least important , factor (in the economicrealm) that determines when a shift from the calculative strategy ispossible.12 In the late 1970s, China’s foreign economic relations

______________10The World Bank (1997a), p. 22.

11The World Bank (1997a), p. 22.

12This factor is arguably least important as a structural indicator of China’s possibleshift from the calculative strategy because, although levels of external economic de-pendence might restrain a state from acting more assertively, they will not in any

sense guarantee such restraint. As argued below, the historical record does not show that economic dependency significantly lowers the likelihood of conflict between




contributed about 13 percent of its GDP. In 1995, that figure jumpedto almost 30 percent—a proportion comparable to that of other largedeveloping countries.13 This significant, though not exceptional levelof dependence, at least in comparison to the other East Asianeconomies that rely on foreign trade for almost 60 percent of theirGDP, clearly indicates why the calculative strategy remains essentialfor continued Chinese economic growth. Only when China reachesthe point where it becomes like a large developed country—that is,one pursuing an internally driven growth strategy that exploits thediversity of resources and markets within its own borders—would itexperience significant economic incentives to shift toward the morenormal, risk-acceptant, international political behaviors associated

with true great powers. Even if the levels of foreign direct investment(FDI) it receives continue to remain high at that point—Chinaalready receives 40 percent of the FDI going to developing countriesand is the largest recipient of FDI after the United States today—itsability to shift from a calculative strategy would not necessarily beimpaired so long as its internal economic environment is strong andstable and the Chinese market is seen to offer opportunities that areprofitable enough for foreign investors despite any of the uncertain-ties that may be induced by Beijing’s perhaps more assertive inter-national political behavior.14

Equally significant here is the nature of China’s dependence on itsexternal environment for natural resources. Today, Chinese exportsare dominated by a variety of labor-intensive manufacturers, withprimary products accounting for only a very small share of totaltrade. As its economic growth continues, however, it is likely thatChina will become a large net importer of many primary productsincluding food grains and energy. Any increased dependence herecould in principle lead to two opposed kinds of policy outcomes: Itcould lead to a continuation of the calculative strategy as politicalconservatism and military restraint are oriented toward maintaining good relations with key suppliers. This approach would emphasize

_____________________________________________________________states. The most important structural factor influencing strategic behavior is the ag-gregate level of national power, as measured by economic and military capabilities.

13The World Bank (1997a), pp. 84–85.

14Foreign portfolio investment is minimal and 75 percent of the cumulative invest-ment here comes from ethnic overseas Chinese.




continued market solutions to the problem of scarcity. It could alsolead to a more assertive political strategy as China, fearing the un-palatable consequences of dependency, begins to contemplate uni-lateral, exclusivist, solutions to the problem of resource constraints—solutions that require, among other things, the development of privi-leged political relations with certain key suppliers and the acquisi-tion of potent military forces designed to preserve the lines of supply,protect the supplies themselves, and finally provide for the security of the suppliers.

Which solution will be applied over time cannot be forecast a priori,but what remains certain is that any successful effort to reducedependency, especially in the arena of energy supplies, would give

China significant opportunities to change its calculative strategy assuming, of course, that its overall growth patterns remain un-changed. Almost all analyses today suggest that China’s dependency on foreign energy sources will steadily increase, at least until the year2010 and possibly even to 2020 and beyond.15 However, one study suggests that after 2025, Chinese dependence on foreign energy may actually begin to drop as alternative domestic sources of energy areexploited, increased efficiencies accrue in industrial production, andconservation and energy management measures, combined with theeconomies forced by steadily rising energy prices, finally begin tobear fruit.16 If this assessment is correct, it is likely that China wouldbe faced with some additional opportunities to shift from its calcula-tive strategy at some point during or after the circa-2020 timeframe.

Second, China’s commitment to a calculative strategy will be acritical function of the nature of its military capabilities, its op-erational effectiveness, and the character of regional power rela-tions. Besides the issues related to economic capability and depen-dence on foreign trade, an important consideration underlying theneed for a calculative strategy is the generally poor state of the Chi-nese military. This force, which was designed primarily to provide adeterrent capability in the realm of land warfare during the Cold War,

would be outclassed today in many circumstances involving both theseizure and control of contested land territories and the advanta-

______________

15For a good survey and analysis of these sources, see Downs (unpublished).16Freris (1995).




geous resolution of maritime disputes involving China’s offshoreclaims. China presently does not have the military capabilities topursue any political strategy that requires more than an economy of force in the conventional realm, particularly where its regional peersare concerned. This reflects its significant military weaknessescaused, in part, by the new operational demands that have arisen inthe course of the last 20 odd years, the concomitant civilian demandsplaced on available Chinese resources by the imperative of maintain-ing relatively high growth rates, the steady expansion of the areas of interest deemed essential to Chinese security, and the seriousqualitative degradation that the PLA has had to endure over severaldecades as a result of China’s internal political and economic cata-clysms at a time when many of its regional peers were steadily ac-quiring new and sophisticated military technologies. Any changes inthe presently dominant calculative strategy in a direction other thanuniversal cooperation and restraint in the use of force would thus re-quire at the very least a significant improvement in Chinese military power, especially at the conventional level, and relative to China’slarger Asian neighbors and the United States.

Such improvement could increase China’s warfighting potentialalong three generic levels of capability. At the first and simplest level,China would need to develop a range of military capabilities that

would allow it to deny its adversaries the free use of a givenbattlespace. This capability is essentially negative in that it seeksprimarily to prevent China’s competitors from completing their de-sired missions successfully. At the second, intermediate, level, China

would move beyond merely denial capabilities to something re-sembling positive control , thereby allowing it to operate within agiven battlespace without inordinate risks to its own forces. Thislevel of capability bequeaths China the ability to use certainbattlespaces in the pursuit of some tactically limited goals. At thethird and most demanding level, China would actually have thecapability to exploit its positive control over a given battlespace tobring coercive power to bear against the strategic centers of gravity valued by its adversaries. This level of capability would represent themost assertive use of its military prowess in that it would permitChina to conduct a variety of forcible entry operations involving

land, air, and sea power, that hold either the homeland or thestrategic assets of its adversaries at grave risk.




Since the principal external military challenges to China today areperceived to be maritime and concern unresolved disputes overeither the ownership or the sovereignty of several offshore areas, it islikely that China would make no fundamental change in its cal-culative strategy until it reaches the second level of capability, that is,until it acquires the military wherewithal (measured in terms of

weapons systems, organic support, and operational capabilities) todominate and control the local battlespaces along its periphery. Tobe sure, China already has significant denial, and in some cases evenexploitative, capabilities that can be brought to bear against thoseadversaries who seek to disturb the status quo to its disadvantage inareas close to China’s borders, especially its interior, continental bor-ders. But, it still lacks many of the military instruments and opera-tional skills needed to control the peripheral battlespaces on a con-tinuing basis (both near and far) and it is still far from acquiring thecapabilities that would allow it to exploit control in support of somemore assertive forms of forcible entry involving land, naval, and airforces.17

The PLA today does possess a large and growing force of conventionally armed short- and intermediate-range ballistic andcruise missiles, which it could use for interdicting targets either inthe homelands of its regional neighbors or at sea. It also has a largeforce of short-range attack aircraft and numerous surface and sub-surface naval combatants, which could likely overwhelm, thoughprobably at some cost, the capabilities of many smaller nearby re-gional states. These instruments, however, are more useful fordenying others the objectives they may seek or for deterring them or,failing that, punishing them should they embark on any military op-erations against Chinese territory. They are much less useful for ac-quiring and sustaining effective control over the foreign battlespacesof interest to Beijing, at least when major regional competitors areconcerned, and they would be quite inadequate for prosecuting thekind of forcible entry operations that would be most threatening toChina’s most important neighbors.

______________17 A good assessment of the PLA’s current ability to project power can be found inGodwin (1997).




This incapability, both at the intermediate and at the higher ends of the scale, derives from the fact that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), for example, does not have carrier battle groups oreven surface action groups built around platforms with tactically matched capabilities; it has a small marine force capable of amphibious landings, but it is incapable of anything resembling amphibious assault under conditions of forcible entry.18 Similarly,the PLAAF does not have any worthwhile expeditionary aircapabilities (despite the inherent speed and flexibility of all airpower), and even the mostly obsolete long-range airframes it doeshave are not rapidly deployable for campaigns outside their perma-nent bases. The PLAAF cannot even transport its relatively largenumber of airborne units en masse, much less insert and supportthem in the face of significant air and ground opposition emanating from the major regional powers.19

None of this should be taken to imply, however, that China would beabsolutely unable to undertake any successful military actions withinthe maritime areas adjacent to its coastlines. To be sure, Beijing cer-tainly has the ability to seize lightly defended or undefended areasclaimed by smaller regional neighbors such as the Philippines or

Vietnam, or to prevent such neighboring powers from occupying such contested areas. China has in fact clearly displayed thiscapability in the case of disputed islands in the South China Sea. Ithas also demonstrated the capability to strike with ballistic missilesat fixed offshore targets within about 100 nautical miles of theChinese Mainland and it could probably conduct small-scaleblockades which, despite their operational limitations, could stillhave serious political effects against weaker powers such as Taiwanor some of the smaller ASEAN states. All these abilities, which aremost effective against the marginal Asian states, do not in any way undercut the general conclusion that China currently confrontsmajor limitations in the arenas of extended battlespace denial,control, and exploitation against most major Asian powers such asJapan, Russia, and India.

______________18Jencks (1997).

19

Jencks (1997).




Not surprisingly, China has begun several efforts to acquire a rangeof capabilities intended, first, to deny its most capable adversariesthe use of the appropriate battlespaces through which they couldchallenge Chinese interests (especially interests associated with thedefense of territory directly under the control of or claimed by theChinese Government), and, second, to ultimately give its own forcessome measure of control over those battlespaces even in the face of concerted opposition. In the near term, this has resulted in signifi-cant efforts at acquiring modern, long-range, land-based tactical avi-ation platforms such as the Su-27 and its derivatives, together withair-to-air refueling platforms; indigenously developing a variety of more modern and versatile combat aircraft such as the J-10, the FC-1, and the FB-7; seeking new command and control and surveillancecapabilities in the form of both Airborne Warning and Control Sys-tem (AWACS) and improvements in the existing electronic war-fare/ground control intercept (EW/GCI) net; making limited acquisi-tions of modern wide-area surface-to-air missile defenses in the formof the SA-10 and SA-11; and substantially modernizing its naval war-fare capabilities, acquiring various new weapons, sensors, communi-cations, and propulsion systems for both its surface ships and itssubmarines. Although China has not paid comparable attention toits land forces modernization, it has nonetheless sought to stream-line and improve the capabilities of its ground forces including itsairborne quick-reaction forces. Most of the improvements here havefocused on increasing unit mobility, improving combined-arms

training, and modernizing logistics and combat support.

These capabilities taken together will undoubtedly improve China’s warfighting capability over time. The essential questions, however,are where will the most significant improvements likely occur andover what time period. No definitive answers can be offered to thesequestions, since the acquisition and effective integration of the kindsof capabilities needed to underwrite a muscular foreign policy overthe long term will require continued success in a variety of complex political, economic, and organizational realms. These include thesustained, high-priority, endorsement of the senior leadership;higher levels of financial resources; a well-run, innovative, and ro-bust research and development system; a technologically advanced




• At the nuclear level (strategic and tactical): a more accurate, ver-satile, and survivable nuclear force characterized by (a) an im-proved, secure second-strike capability against the United Statesand Russia, able to penetrate even the thin ballistic missile de-fense (BMD) systems that may be deployed by both countries by 2020; (b) an enhanced nuclear and conventional counterforcestrike capability against a significant number of targets in Japan,Korea, India, and Russia; and (c) some ability to integrate dis-crete nuclear and chemical weapons use with conventional op-erations on the battlefield.

Overall, it is likely that China will succeed by and large in fielding many elements of a 1990s-era military inventory, if not an actual

warfighting force, by the year 2020. However, the Chinese military will likely have limited niche capabilities in certain warfighting areassuch as space exploitation, information warfare, and directed-energy

weaponry and may even be successful at integrating sometechnologies and concepts deriving from the revolution in military affairs. Although such limited achievements may appear reassuring at first sight from the perspective of preserving regional stability, thismay be deceptive. This is because the potential for basic shifts in thecalculative strategy will be determined not simply by the adequacy of China’s force structure and the absolute effectiveness of its military as measured by state-of-the-art capabilities but also by the regionalbalances of power.21 It is in this context that possessing elements of

a 1990s-style force even in 2020 may not be entirely disadvantageous(especially if it is an effective 1990s-style force), in large measure be-cause such capabilities may be sufficient for the political objectivesChina may seek in that timeframe and because China’s regionalcompetitors may not be much further along either. As far as themaritime periphery is concerned, China faces four distinct sets of actors—the Southeast Asian states, Taiwan, the United States, Japan,and more remotely, India—and as the analysis below suggests, evena 1990s-style force could yield significant, even if still limited, divi-dends for China’s security policy by 2020, especially if the Chinesemilitary can develop the technical and operational capabilities by then to effectively control some battlespaces out to about 250 n mifrom its frontiers.

______________21For an excellent survey and analysis of these balances see Betts (1993/94).




As far as the Southeast Asian states are concerned, China already hasthe capability to overwhelm any combination of these actors in navalforce-on-force encounters, assuming that no extraregional assistanceis forthcoming. This capability will be further reinforced by the year2020. This assessment derives first from a simple correlation of thecompeting orders of battle. Chinese numerical superiority generally suffices to negate even the superior technology that could bemustered by the Southeast Asian states. The latter dimension, in any event, must not be exaggerated: Although the ASEAN countries havein recent years acquired some impressive combat aviation and anti-surface warfare technologies—Malaysia has 8 F-18s and 18 Mig-29s,Thailand has 36 F-16s, Singapore has 17 F-16s, Indonesia has 11F-16s, and Vietnam has about 6 Su-27s—these capabilities exist inrelatively small numbers. Their integration into the existing forcestructure will not be effortless in all cases save Singapore, the combatproficiency of all Southeast Asian operators, barring the Singaporean

Air Force, is an open question, and it is unlikely, in any case, that allthese relatively sophisticated aircraft would ever face the PLAAF orthe PLAN in any unified or coordinated fashion. In most contingen-cies that can be envisaged (e.g., in the South China Sea), Chinesenaval and air forces would have a considerable advantage over themilitary forces of one or even several ASEAN states. This judgment

would be altered only if ASEAN in its entirety attained the unprece-dented ability to deploy military forces in concert or if extraregionalintervention is presupposed in the form of either sea- or land-based

U.S. power, land-based Australian air power, or land-based British orFrench air power.

Chinese advantages over Taiwan will continue to increase over time.For the moment, and probably for several years to come, the rela-tively superior ROC Air Force, which is in the process of integrating into its force structure aircraft such as the F-16, the Mirage 2000, andthe Indigenous Defense Fighter in tandem with airborne warning and control platforms such as the E-2T, can effectively blunt the

worst threats that could be mounted by the PLAAF. However, Tai- wan’s ability to protect itself from Chinese military pressure over thelong term confronts significant obstacles. The ROC military, for ex-ample, has serious problems with integrating its existing equipment,

its training regimes are not entirely adequate, and its air and navalbases, air defense system, and command and control infrastructure




remain vulnerable to barrage fires of Chinese missiles. Moreover, theTaiwanese armed forces are still organizationally “stovepiped” inmany undesirable ways; they continue to possess a force structurethat is not entirely congruent, in terms of both equipment andtraining, to the needs of island defense; and they will remaindisadvantaged by their relative lack of numbers and the continuing constraints imposed on access to sophisticated military technology.China’s continuing modernization of its air, naval, and missile forcesas well as its command and control capabilities over the TaiwanStrait will only increase the levels of effective punishment it caninflict on Taiwan in a crisis. Although China will still be unable tosuccessfully invade Taiwan through an amphibious assault or seal off the island through a total naval blockade, these weaknesses may notbe very consequential if it believes it can successfully coerce Taiwanthrough increasingly accurate conventional missile fires and airattacks coupled with a damaging, albeit partial, air and subsurfaceblockade (or even a simple guerre de course ) directed at Taiwanesecommerce and shipping.22

Achieving this objective successfully presumes, of course, that theUnited States and its military forces would be entirely absent fromthe equation. Precisely because this presumption cannot be assured,China’s military modernization has focused a great deal of attentionon increasing the risks that can be imposed on any intervening U.S.force. In practice, this has meant attempting to cope with the threatsposed by U.S. carrier battle groups operating off the Chinese coast oradjacent to Taiwan. Several of the military systems currently underdevelopment by the Chinese are oriented to acquiring the capability to detect, track, target, and attack a carrier battle group operating

within about 250 n mi off China’s eastern coast. These includeairborne, naval, and space-based surveillance platforms; advanceddiesel-electric submarines with wake-homing torpedoes; long-rangetactical cruise missiles with terminal homing; and, long-rangeinterceptors and attack aircraft.

It is likely that despite all China’s efforts in this regard, it will proba-bly be unable to defeat a U.S. naval force that was fully alerted, pos-

______________

22For a reading of Chinese assessments of the military balance in relation to Taiwan,see Cheung (1996), pp. 13–17; for other readings, see Jencks (1997).




sessed adequate capabilities, and was committed under very clearrules of engagement. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that U.S.military forces would be always employed only under such condi-tions: In fact, it is very possible that in the early days of a crisis, par-ticularly in the context of a sudden attack, the United States would beable to muster a battle group composed of only a single aircraft car-rier and its escorts. Under such conditions, even a force as powerfulas a carrier battle group may not be able to survive dense and coor-dinated multi-azimuth attacks unscathed. This ability to threatenU.S. carrier battle groups operating at close distances to the ChineseMainland will only increase over time. By the year 2020, China willalmost certainly be able to mount significant denial efforts involving,inter alia, air- and space-based detection and cueing and long-rangeattacks by high-speed surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), smart mines, and torpedoes. Even then,however, none of these capabilities may suffice to conclusively de-feat a U.S. CVBG in battle. But that may not be required if Chinesemilitary modernization succeeds in providing Beijing with an impor-tant benefit it lacks today—the ability to significantly raise the cost of U.S. military operations along the Chinese periphery and, to that de-gree, eliminate the advantage that the United States currently enjoysof being able to operate with impunity throughout the East Asian re-gion.23

Chinese advantages over Japan will probably remain minimal inmost warfighting areas for a long time to come. In part, this isbecause Japan has and will continue to have access to the best U.S.technology, intelligence, and weapons. Having planned for opera-tions against the Soviet Navy during the Cold War, Japan also has theadvantage of a long lead as far as training and orienting its military forces to deal with open-ocean attack is concerned. Both theJapanese Navy and Air Force remain highly proficient operators andit is most likely that, in the event of a conflict, the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) would be able to eliminate all Chinese open-ocean surface capabilities within a matter of days, if not hours.Japan would nonetheless continue to remain vulnerable in some

warfighting arenas. The newer Chinese subsurface capabilities,assuming that they are deployed in significant numbers, will tax even

______________23This critical point is made most perceptively in Goldstein (1997/98), pp. 53–54.




Japanese antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities thanks both tothe nature of ASW operations and the peculiar geophysicalenvironment in the East and South China Seas. Japan will alsocontinue to be vulnerable to ballistic missile attack and the extent to

which this problem would be attenuated by the year 2020 isuncertain for both political and operational reasons.24 Finally, Japan

would be constrained by any surprise Chinese occupation of itsdisputed island territories because, lacking any amphibiouscapabilities for forcible entry, it would be forced to rely entirely onthe United States or on its own air power to eject the intruders.

All things considered, therefore, if present trends continue, China’smilitary modernization will likely precipitate some significant

changes in the regional balance of power by the year 2020. China willbe able to execute denial and control, if not exploitative, operationsagainst all the Southeast Asian states, if the latter are unable tocoordinate their response and are unaided by an outside power. A similar conclusion holds for Taiwan, assuming that present trends inthe realm of politics and military access continue. China will alsolikely acquire significant, albeit limited, denial capabilities againstthe United States in Asia—capabilities it does not possess today.

And, through its growing subsurface capabilities, it will be able todeny Japan the free use of its water spaces in a way that it cannot dotoday. Whether these changes will suffice to induce a shift in China’scalculative strategy at that point is unclear, but they certainly contribute toward altering the structural conditions that make forthe possibility of such a change.

Third, China’s commitment to a calculative strategy will be a critical function of developments in its domestic politics, including the na-ture of its regime and institutions. Domestic politics remains thelast, and in many ways the least understood, factor contributing to apossible shift in the calculative strategy over time. The long-term in-fluence on security strategy exerted by domestic political issues ismost closely related to the question of systemic change associated

______________24By 2020, China will likely possess several hundred short- and medium-range ballis-tic missiles able to deliver either nuclear or conventional warheads to targets any-

where in Japan with a high degree of accuracy. It is unclear whether Japan eitherdirectly, or via the U.S. military, will be able to field an effective missile defense systemby that time.




with the possible collapse of communism and the emergence of ademocratic form of government on China.

There is a substantial body of opinion which believes that China isstill a classic communist state, at least where its political regime andinstitutions are concerned.25 As such, the problems of politicalrepression, religious persecution, exploitative trade practices, andproliferation of weapons of mass destruction are viewed to be thenatural consequences of a regime implacably hostile to the West ingeneral and to the United States in particular. Such a perspectiveinevitably leads to the suggestion that the problem of regionalstability demands a radical transformation of the CommunistChinese regime. It is supposed that such a transformation, which

replaces the currently authoritarian political order with new demo-cratic structures and institutions, would inevitably produce geopolit-ical tranquility because of all the arguments associated with the con-cept of “democratic peace.” These arguments essentially boil downto the claim that, since democratic states do not fight wars with oneanother for structural and normative reasons, the advent of Chinesedemocracy would inevitably lead to peace between China and itsmajor competitors such as Japan, the United States, and India—

which are also democracies—as well as with the nascently democra-tizing states in Northeast and Southeast Asia. The intellectual logicof the claims associated with democratic peace, thus, makes thequestion of the natural longevity of the calculative strategy quite ir-relevant: If China democratizes, the competitive character of its cur-rent antagonisms toward Taiwan, Japan, Southeast Asia, the UnitedStates, and India largely disappears and, consequently, the calcula-tive strategy is inevitably and completely transformed into a coop-erative strategy similar to that followed by all other states in the so-called “zone of peace.”

Even if the logic of democratic peace is unquestionable on boththeoretical and empirical grounds, the problem of a possible shift inChina’s currently calculative strategy still remains relevant becauseof all the difficulties associated with the transition to democracy. If China becomes completely democratic, the question of adversarial

______________

25See, for example, Krauthammer (1995).




relations between itself and its neighbors may well disappear,26 butuntil that point is reached, however, the issue of how changes in thecurrent regime affect the propensity for conflict and cooperationremains both real and relevant. As Mansfield and Snyder haveargued,

countries do not become democracies overnight. More typically,they go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic con-trol over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in avolatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democrati-zation suffers reversals. In this transitional phase of democratiza-tion, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less,and they do fight wars with democratic states.27

The question of transitioning to democracy acquires special currency in the case of China only because, despite the arguments offered by many critics of the present regime in Beijing, the Chinese haveexperienced a nontrivial movement toward democracy since 1978.To be sure, this “democratization” has not resulted in the onemeasure of reform so central to democrats in the West—periodic freeand open elections—but it has nonetheless precipitated significantstructural changes that have both altered previous patterns of elitepolitics and increased the forms and extent of mass participation inpolitical life.

This process of regime transformation is significant from the

viewpoint of Chinese grand strategy because its introduction of anew class of winners and losers in domestic politics and of a new setof pressures and incentives on political elites as a whole could por-tend a transformation in the way Beijing views its role in the worldand in the means by which it fulfills that aspiration. This process willalmost certainly be neither benign nor trouble-free and Mansfield

______________26The persuasiveness of the “democratic peace” argument will be discussed in greaterdetail below.

27Mansfield and Snyder (1995), p. 5. This finding has been challenged by Wolf (1996); Weede (1996); and Thompson and Tucker (1997). See also the rejoinder by Mansfieldand Snyder (1996b). These arguments, centered considerably on methodologicalissues, cannot be adjudicated here and, consequently, Mansfield and Snyder’s

arguments are employed not necessarily as an endorsement of their theoretical fitnessbut because they provide plausible descriptions of how a democratizing China couldbehave in destabilizing ways in the future.




and Snyder have in fact argued with solid supporting evidence that“states that make the biggest leap in democratization from total au-tocracy to extensive mass democracy are about twice as likely to fight

wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remainautocracies.”28 If this assertion is true, it is not difficult to see why the question of domestic, especially regime, change becomes so rele-vant to the future of the calculative strategy and why it is essential toexamine the contours of that change in China and assess whether itcould produce the instability and war that scholarship often warnsabout when speaking about the process of democratic transition.

In general, there are four basic mechanisms through which thedemocratization process can lead to conflict. First, the transition to

democracy, being essentially tentative and evolutionary, tends togenerate relatively infirm institutions that create opportunities forauthoritarian groups (or entrenched authoritarian elites) to pursuepolicies that would not be ratified by the populace in more maturedemocracies. Second, the process of democratization creates new

winners and losers in the political realm, thereby generating com-plementary incentives for losers to arrest their loss of internal powerthrough external adventures and for winners to protect their gains by any means necessary, including war. Third, the competitive jostling for advantage between survivors from the ancient regime and thenew elites often precipitates external attention, aid, and occasionally direct intervention, as the foreign allies of both groups seek to resolvethe ongoing struggle on terms favorable to their own interests.Fourth, and finally, the chaotic processes of democratization createnew “ideational spaces” where radical ideologies, which might nothave survived under more normal political conditions, can feed off existing discontent and grow into political movements that survivemainly by belligerence and the threat of war.29

Whether any of these mechanisms, or a combination thereof, couldactually manifest themselves in China and affect either the durationor the evolution of the calculative strategy depends fundamentally on the character of the democratization process currently taking place. Assessing this issue requires a brief analysis of (a) the restruc-

______________

28Mansfield and Snyder (1995), p. 6.29These processes are explored in Mansfield and Snyder (1995), pp. 26–34.




turing of governing institutions, including the patterns of intra-elitecompetition and civil-military relations; (b) the role of the new win-ners and losers in the current economic and political reform process;(c) the external linkages and constituencies supporting various con-tentious groups within China; and (d) the prospects for the reemer-gence of an “ideology of order” and its effect on both domestic poli-tics and external relations.

The process of economic reform and opening up to the outsideunder way since the late 1970s, the simultaneous passing of China’sfounding revolutionary generation of charismatic leaders, and theChinese state’s increasing reliance on economic growth for politicallegitimacy and domestic order have together precipitated major

changes in institutional structures and relationships and in pastpatterns of intra-elite competition and contention, leadershipselection, and policy formulation and implementation. The de-mands for greater predictability and efficiency of a market-led, out-

ward-oriented pattern of economic development and the emergenceof a new leadership generation of relatively noncharismatic“bureaucratic technocrats” with specialized party or government ex-perience have created a generally risk-averse style of leadership poli-tics that places a premium on consultation, pragmatism, and policy performance. These imperatives have gradually led to reductionsin the overall power of centralized party structures; extended theinfluence of state administrative institutions at all levels; increasedfunctional distinctions among military, government, and party institutions; and generally strengthened the authority of formaladministrative institutions and processes over informal, personaland ideological bases of power. They have also produced a moreregularized, codified structure of leadership selection and removaland increased proscriptions on the use of force or unilateralleadership decisions to resolve both power and policy conflicts.30

The reforms, generational change, and an increasing emphasis oneconomic growth have also brought about major changes in civil-military relations. In particular, the process of professionalizationand institutionalization evident across the party-state structure,

______________

30For a general discussion of the reform process and its effect on the Chinese polity,see Harding (1987); Lieberthal and Lampton (1992); and Lieberthal (1995), especially Part Three, pp. 155–240, and pp. 314–330.




combined with the passing of many revolutionary military elders, iscreating a more professional military, separate and distinct in func-tion and outlook from civilian institutions and less-willing and less-able to intervene in senior leadership politics. China’s military lead-ership is becoming more concerned, as a group, with protecting andadvancing its professional, institutional interests, particularly forcemodernization for national defense and the maintenance of domes-tic order. In other words, top military leaders are less concerned withinfluencing the balance of power at the top of the party-state systemthan with ensuring that the policies passed by that system preservetheir professional interests.31

Despite such major developments, strong resistance remains within

many sectors of Chinese society and especially among China’spolitical and military leadership to (a) the emergence of genuinely autonomous political, social, and economic power centers outsidethe control of the central party-state apparatus; (b) the establishmentof a genuinely independent legal system that protects the interests of individual citizens against arbitrary acts of repression and coercionby the state; and, in general, (c) an acceptance of the importance of overt and institutionalized forms of political competition to China’sfuture growth and stability.32 In effect, most Chinese leaders believethat the continued high levels of economic growth deemed necessary for regime legitimacy, social stability, and the creation of a strong and prosperous state can be sustained primarily by expanding anddeepening the existing process of marketization and administrativereform, without encouraging or permitting significantly greater levelsof political openness.33 The military in particular serves both as a

______________31For a comprehensive assessment of the changing structures and roles of theChinese military during the reform era, see Shambaugh and Yang (1997), especially the chapters by Shambaugh, Joffe, Swaine, and Dreyer.32This is not to deny that a kind of “shadow pluralism” exists in the Chinese politicalprocess in which the success of official policies increasingly depends upon the consentof institutions and groups that have their own resources and are less dependent on theparty-state apparatus. However, the Communist Party leadership has thus far grantedthese new social forces little formal recognition or institutionalized access to the polit-ical system. See White (1994), pp. 75–76.

33 As one Chinese observer states, the main goals of political reform in China today

include (1) the enhancement of the (administrative) legal system, (2) the eliminationof government interference in economic enterprises, (3) the reduction and simplifica-tion of bureaucratic structures, (4) the improvement of democratic monitoring sys-




stimulus for continued market-led economic growth34 and as a brakeon pressures for greater political liberalization.

Because of such elite resistance and the continued successes of China’s economic reform program, the political reform process overthe near to mid term will probably not, in and of itself, generate afundamental change in the regime’s basic adherence to the calcu-lative strategy. It is possible that a severe and prolonged economicdecline could lead to the collapse of the communist regime and theemergence of forces supportive of democratic change over such atime period. However, it is very unlikely that even these develop-ments would result in a genuinely democratic polity. An intense fearof chaos, the absence of coherent civilian institutional alternatives to

the Communist Party, the weakness of socioeconomic organizationscapable of formulating and channeling nonstate interests, suspicionsof foreign manipulation and subversion, and the presence of a gen-erally conservative and increasingly professional military all suggestthat it is far more likely that economically induced social chaos

would lead to either a more repressive, insecure Chinese state or acomplete collapse of central authority and a prolonged period of po-litical disorder.35

At the same time, the very processes of economic development andreform and the concomitant emergence of a new leadershipgeneration with greater ties to the outside are undoubtedly generating more complex and internally cohesive social, bureau-

cratic, and economic groups with interests separate from those of theruling Communist Party leadership. Over the long term, continuedadministrative rationalization, marketization, and privatization,along with a deepening of involvement with outside economic enti-ties, will undoubtedly sharpen the contradiction between the forcesof social, economic, and political pluralism and the restrictions pre-

_____________________________________________________________tems, (5) the maintenance of stability and unity, and (6) the development of so-called“democracy with Chinese characteristics.” See Liu (1997), p. 9.

34Military support for continued marketization stems not only from its commitmentto force modernization but also from its direct involvement in business activities, un-dertaken to augment the insufficient revenues it receives from the government. SeeMulvenon (1998). This arguably holds true today despite recent efforts to remove the

military from business.35For a more detailed discussion of such scenarios and their implications for Chineseforeign policy, see Swaine (1995b), pp. 104–109.




sented by a largely rigid, monolithic power structure. As a result, theChinese state will likely confront increasing social pressures to rede-fine the rules of the game and reshape China’s key political institu-tions to maintain economic efficiency and productivity and moreeffectively handle a variety of social problems arising from extensiveeconomic development and reform.36

The intensity of such pressures and hence the degree of urgency inresponding to them will likely depend, first, on economic factors. If the regime is experiencing a serious economic decline, but not a

wholesale collapse, formerly satisfied social and economic groups will likely demand greater influence over the policy process, and theleadership will likely be more inclined to undertake some type of

significant political reforms as a means of averting further economicdecline and social unrest. Even in the absence of economic decline,however, it is likely that the ongoing development and reform pro-cesses in themselves will eventually require efforts at more extensivepolitical restructuring.37 However, rather than introduce far-reach-ing democratic reforms, which would almost certainly be viewed asan invitation to chaos (especially if the economy were in decline),China’s leaders will more likely be compelled, over the long term, toestablish a version of an authoritarian, corporatist state, in which (a)organically formed social and economic groups (e.g., industrial la-bor, business, and agricultural associations) are formally recognizedand granted significant, albeit limited, roles in the political and pol-icy process, (b) existing political institutions such as the People’sRepresentative Congresses are given greater authority, (c) govern-ment and party involvement in economic activities is severely cur-tailed, and (d) a more formalized relationship is established betweencentral and local governments that reflects the realities of growing local power. In this system, some significant level of institutional

______________36 White (1994), p. 76.

37Specifically, requirements for attaining more advanced levels of economic devel-opment, including greater access to information and technologies, more freedom toinnovate, and a greater ability to respond quickly and efficiently to changes in marketdemands, combined with a growing need to channel and coopt various social pres-sures arising from such development (e.g., worker unemployment and displace-ments), will likely increase pressures to cede more genuine decisionmaking power and

authority to an increasingly larger number and variety of socioeconomic actors. Suchincreasingly influential nonstate groupings will, in turn, likely demand greater influ-ence over those political, social, and economic policies that determine their fate.




pluralization would likely exist, but ultimate power would almostcertainly remain in the hands of the Communist Party, whose na-tional leadership would not be determined by open and competitiveelections nor fundamentally constrained by an independent judicialauthority.38 Moreover, such a relatively “autonomous,” growth-ori-ented regime would likely place a great emphasis on beliefs associ-ated with “developmental nationalism” (rather than legal or demo-cratic concepts) to legitimize its efforts.39 In short, the Chinese state

would most likely attempt to reduce the tensions between the newly emergent forces of pluralization and the existing political-economicstructure by implementing a set of middle-range political reformsloosely associated with the Chinese notion of “new authoritarian-ism” ( xinquanweizhuyi ).40

This process of incremental political adaptation to emergentsocioeconomic forces could extend over many decades, if properly handled and assuming reasonably high rates of economic growth.However, the enormous challenges posed by the need to simultane-ously adapt to a diversity of new socioeconomic interests withgrowing power and influence, assuage the concerns of older party,government, and military elites, and maintain relatively high growthrates suggest that an authoritarian developmental regime wouldlikely confront a variety of increasingly severe political and socialproblems over the long term that could hold significant implicationsfor the longevity of the calculative strategy. For example, rifts over

______________38Efforts to divert and deflate political opposition by granting a limited role to op-position parties could occur under this political system, but true power-sharing wouldlikely be excluded, for reasons already cited.

39The full contours of such a significant, yet limited, political reform agenda are dis-cussed by White (1994), pp. 75–77, 89–90. In sum, they include “the separation of theParty from the state administration, the removal or weakening of Party organizations within enterprises, the radical reduction of direct official controls over economicactivity, measures to bring about the internal restructuring of the Party itself, reform of existing ‘mass organizations,’ and greater space for autonomous organizations in ‘civilsociety’” (p. 90).

40This viewpoint, espoused by a variety of Chinese intellectuals, advocates a gradual transition toward full-fledged democracy through a staged, centrally directed processinvolving the introduction of a market economy that changes the balance of power be-tween state and society, the gradual expansion of the space available for the organized

expression of socioeconomic interests, and the incremental introduction of forms of democratic participation, representation, and competition. See White (1994), p. 87,and footnote 14, which presents various Chinese sources for “new authoritarianism.”




power distribution and policy issues would likely emerge (and grow in intensity) between party reformers and representatives of other in-fluential political forces, including democratic activists, state andmilitary institutional interests, and representatives of key socialgroups. These contending elites would likely use quasi-autonomousinstitutional power bases, links to various influential social strata,and even foreign entities (such as Western business or democraticgroups) to advance their positions. Moreover, in the absence of thelegitimizing and constraining functions provided by a full-blowndemocratic system and legal infrastructure, some elites would prob-ably attempt to employ chauvinistic brands of nationalism tostrengthen their position, including appeals to antiforeign senti-ments. Some elites might even be tempted to provoke external con-flicts. This would be especially likely under conditions of low eco-nomic growth, given the tremendous reliance of the regime on“developmental nationalism” for its legitimacy. Even in the absenceof poor economic performance, efforts by an authoritarian develop-mental state to impose tough economic and social decisions regard-ing issues of poverty, insecurity, distribution, and sovereignty couldpit reformers against populists. In such a climate, citizens might in-creasingly view the state’s limited political reform efforts as a form of self-serving, elitist corruption and thus might support politicians

who reject greater political and economic reform and openness inthe name of populist nationalism.41 In this context, the age-oldChinese domestic leadership debate between autonomy and foreign

involvement could come into play with a vengeance. Moreover, therole of the military in these developments would likely prove deci-sive. It could alternatively serve to ensure the continuity of politicaland economic reform, to bolster the forces of popular nationalism,or, if internally divided, to permit (or accelerate) a descent intochaos.

Such growing political fissures and conflicts could thus result inerratic shifts in the external policies of the Chinese state, betweenperiods of calculative and assertive behavior, or, alternatively, in a

wholesale and prolonged period of more aggressive behavior or evenchaos, especially under conditions of economic disarray. However,all of the above suggests that such potentially disruptive politically

______________41McCormick (1994), especially pp. 109–110. Also see McCormick (1990).




induced behaviors are far more likely to occur over the very long term, and not during the near or mid term, i.e., before 2015–2020.

When the above three variables affecting the longevity of thecalculative strategy are considered synoptically, it is possible to arguethat barring external perturbations Beijing’s present calculative ori-entation will endure for some time to come. This pragmatic course,

which emphasizes increased, multidimensional, interaction with the West coupled with an economy of force toward its regional neigh-bors, is by no means a product either of high-mindedness or of anideological conversion to a worldview centered on the primacy of reason over force and the desire for cooperative security. Rather, it isemphatically a realist strategy deriving from a shrewd recognition of

China’s still substantial political, economic, and military weakness.So long as these weaknesses persist, it is unlikely that the calculativestrategy would be perceived as having entered the zone of diminish-ing returns and the analysis undertaken in this section clearly sug-gests that China’s many weaknesses will not be redressed in any fundamental way before the 2015–2020 timeframe. Assuming thatpresent trends hold, it is only during this timeframe at the very earliest that the Chinese economy would begin to rival the U.S.economy in size, diversity, and orientation and that the Chinesemilitary will acquire the wherewithal to mount credible denialthreats aimed at its strongest regional adversaries such as the UnitedStates, Japan, and India, while simultaneously maintaining amodicum of control or exploitative power over smaller competitorssuch as Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Southeast Asian states. Althoughdisturbances in domestic politics (especially major upheavalsbrought on by severe economic problems) could no doubt occur atany point between now and the year 2020, the analysis abovesuggests that it is unlikely that the process of democratization despite being mainly illiberal could lead to any radical shift in the calculativestrategy in the interim, largely because the evolving institutions of rule, the dominant leadership and social groups in the Chinese polity together with their foreign supporters, and the new intellectual andideological forces unleashed by the reform process all profit from thesuccess of the calculative approach—at least until such time as Chinaacquires comprehensive great power capabilities.

The structural factors, all taken together, then suggest that thecalculative phase of China’s grand strategy will be relatively long and




drawn out and, by 2020, will already have been in play for about 40 years. This fact ought to be borne in mind whenever any discussionsabout “the coming conflict with China”42 take center stage in politi-cal discourse: China today is a weak country and although it may stillchallenge the United States and its regional neighbors on various is-sue-areas in the near term, these challenges for the most part wouldbe driven mainly by a desire to stave off potential losses and in many cases may be precipitated by the actions of other states. The otherkinds of challenges that China could mount—challenges driveneither by a desire for extended acquisitive gains or by a quest forcontrol over the global system—are arguably still a long time away and would not occur except as part of a systemic “power transition”taking place at the core of the global system.

This transition, which results from episodic structural “shifts in theinternational distribution of power,”43 probably would not begin toarise in the case of China and the United States before the next twodecades, if at all. This is also corroborated by Modelski and Thomp-son’s pioneering work on long cycles in international politics, whichsuggests that the next “macrodecision” relating to leadership in theglobal system would not emerge before 2030 when measured by current estimates of long-term economic growth interpreted interms of Kondratieff waves interacting with cycles of hegemonicchange.44 If one believes that global stability and economic growthcurrently derive from the presence of the United States as the world’ssole superpower, then the United States no doubt has to prepare forthis possibility right away—including doing all in its power toprevent such a transition from successfully coming to pass—but apassing of hegemonic leadership to China is by no means eitherinevitable or imminent. Although the uninterrupted success of Beijing’s calculative strategy (and the high growth rates thataccompany it) will no doubt ensure its inevitability over time, a greatdeal depends on what the United States does or does not do in theinterim.45 At the very least, if secular trends hold, this transition is not

______________42Bernstein and Munro (1997) make this point in their recent book with this title.

43Organski and Kugler (1980), p. 4.

44Modelski and Thompson (1996), pp. 4–10.45This point is made correctly—and most emphatically—in Nye ( 1991).




imminent and though the analysis in this chapter dates it out to about 2015–2020 or thereabouts—at the very earliest—it may in fact be postponed even further (or may never take place at all) depending ondevelopments both within the United States and in the Asian region at large.

In fact, even the circa 2015–2020 time point represents the earliestmoment of a longer time interval when the achievement of economicprimacy by China would begin to slowly interact with the continuedaccretion of more effective military capability. Thus, it is best un-derstood, if all goes well for Beijing in the interim, as the beginning of an extended phase during which rising Chinese power will slowly beconsolidated, and not as a magic threshold through which a hege-

monic China dramatically appears deus ex machina the following year. Needless to say, the period leading up to this point, and thecurrent calculative strategy that goes with it, may extend consider-ably longer if Beijing faces a slowdown in its historically high rates of growth, or experiences difficulty in shifting from its export-led strat-egy to a domestically driven pattern of growth, or confronts an envi-ronment of continued U.S. global and regional strength, or experi-ences national convulsions relating to the management of domesticpolitical, economic or social change; or undergoes a significant in-ternal regime transformation that institutionalizes liberal democracy over time. This last development will not obviate the problems of aglobal power transition, but it may attenuate its most destabilizing characteristics, including the propensity for war.46

Again, none of this implies that China’s interim calculative strategy will be problem-free and that all conflicts, should they arise, wouldoccur only in the wider context of a global power transition. A variety of altercations over Taiwan, Tibet, the Spratlys, proliferation, trade,and market access could still occur in the near term, but these wouldbe mainly “normal” disputes as opposed to “systemic” conflicts, thatis, disputes pertaining to the contested issue at hand, rather thanexplicit or implicit struggles over control of the international system.To be sure, even such “normal” disputes, if they occur with great in-tensity and result in significant Chinese losses, could result in a shiftfrom the presently dominant calculative strategy and, over time,

______________46This point is discussed in greater detail below.




precipitate a frantic Chinese effort to increase its military capabilitiesto acquire those permanent power-political advantages that wouldimmunize it against the worst depredations imaginable. If the nor-mal disputes identified above lead to such an outcome, they willhave succeeded in transforming what are otherwise routine com-petitive transactions between states into a more significant and con-sequential rivalry over leadership of the international system. Undersuch conditions, Beijing may alter its current calculative strategy much faster than was earlier anticipated with the intent of prevent-ing further losses, if not securing outright gains. Such relatively sud-den, aggressive shifts in Chinese security behavior have, in fact, oc-curred in the past, in response to intensified confrontations with theoutside. Should these aberrations not occur, however, it is mostlikely that the calculative strategy will persist for at least another twodecades and that the really interesting and critical issues of greatpower competition, including possible conflict to determine thedominant power in the system, will not begin to manifest themselvesbefore that time.

BEYOND THE CALCULATIVE STRATEGY

If it is assumed that China’s calculative strategy continues uninter-rupted and without mishap for the next two—perhaps several—decades, the question of what replaces it over the long term becomesan issue of great relevance. This question becomes particularly in-

teresting because the initial premises that underlay the strategy—China’s relative weakness and its general dependence on the externalenvironment for continued economic growth—may not continue toremain salient during this time period. Thus, if it is assumed (a) thatChina’s economic growth continues more or less uninterrupted, (b)that this growth becomes largely self-sustaining because it hassuccessfully shifted to an internal strategy of exploiting its domesticmarkets, and (c) that China’s rate of growth generally remains higherthan the rates of growth experienced by its competitors, the need forcontinued reliance on a calculative strategy would becomes lesspressing because the constraints imposed by external dependence

would gradually diminish at about the time when Beijing was con-tinuing to experience a substantial accretion of relative national

power. The assumption that China’s economic growth both contin-ues uninterrupted and is higher than that enjoyed by its competitors




is crucial because the issue of what replaces the calculative strategy becomes interesting only if China acquires those comprehensive na-tional capabilities that signal a systemic disequilibrium arising from adifferential growth of power among the key entities in the interna-tional system.47

If China acquires this level of national capabilities—such that apower transition at the core of the global system becomes possible—

what would Beijing’s grand strategy turn out to be? Clearly, it isunlikely to persist with the calculative strategy because this strategy,being born primarily of weakness and dependence, will havetransformed the circumstances that generated it and, thus, will haveoutlived its necessity and usefulness. At this point, the calculative

strategy will slowly atrophy and be transmuted into another strategy that better comports with China’s new power and capabilities. What

would this successor strategy be? At least three alternative strategiesare possible: a chaotic China, a cooperative China, or an assertiveChina.

The Irony of Success: A Chaotic China?

At least one distinguished observer has, in effect, argued that the in-ternational system will never be confronted with the challenges of such a power transition because China’s emerging success will only lead to “a terminal crisis within the next 10 to 15 years.” 48 The

making of this crisis, which has been described as nothing less thanthe “coming Chinese collapse,”49 is seen by such observers as having multidimensional causes that span the economic, social, and politi-cal realms. At the economic level, for example, the high Chinesegrowth rates that could lead to a global power transition are seen tobe absolutely unsustainable over time because they rely on an“extensive” strategy involving increasingly larger injections of factorinputs rather than an “intensive” strategy that exploits rapid im-provements in factor productivity.

Moreover, China’s pace of growth

is seen to incur diminishing returns over time primarily because of

______________47The assumption, for instance, underlying Dibb (1995).

48Goldstone (1995).49Goldstone (1995), p. 35.




capital rather than labor shortages. These capital shortages wouldonly be exacerbated because the current approach of relying on ex-port-led growth for capital accumulation would require that theUnited States incur a trade deficit of about $6,000 billion by the year2020—almost 48 percent of its GDP—simply to sustain the presenttrend in China. Not only would such mechanisms of accumulationbe unsustainable in a political sense, they would also be increasingly unsustainable in an economic sense since—under these assump-tions—diminished U.S. prosperity would slowly choke off the marketfor Chinese goods and products over time.50

Once other considera-tions such as the burdens of China’s state-owned enterprises, thefragility of its banking system, and the limitations of its technology base are factored in, the Chinese inability to fuel a power transitionon economic grounds alone seems to be a conviction held by mostpessimistic analysts.

The dilemmas at the social level are seen to exacerbate the economicdifficulties alluded to above. Here, the rising regional disparitiesbetween the coastal and inland provinces, coupled with the increas-ingly pervasive corruption seen at all levels in Chinese society, isviewed as preparing the way for consequential challenges to regimelegitimacy and in the limiting case, even civil war.51 Even if suchoutcomes can be avoided, the pessimists argue that China’s suc-cesses cannot be sustained: The continuing growth in the absolutesize of the population, the peculiarity of its demographic composi-tion, including the large youthful population combined with a dra-matic shortage of females (due to high female infanticide andabortion of female children), and the problems of shifting a highproportion of the rural population into the urban sector are seen asmaking for substantial social chaos, not to mention consequentialeconomic interruptions.52 The interaction of these two realms isseen to be increasingly problematic as Chinese agriculture is viewedas having entered the stage of unsustainable development: looming food shortages are anticipated, with China’s grain deficit in the year2030 estimated to be nearly double the global reserves of grain avail-

______________50Gunter (1998).

51

See Kaye (1995b) for a good overview of some of these problems.52Mulvenon (1997b).




able in 1994;53 a significant shortage of potable water is also forecastas the water table appears to be falling at the rate of almost one me-ter per year in the northern parts of China; and massive environmen-tal degradation is assessed as affecting agricultural output and publichealth, even leading to international disputes. In fact, one analysis,assessing all these factors insofar as they affect the carrying capacity of the land, concluded that “the long-term strategic goal of China’spopulation policy should be to limit the population below one bil-lion, or ideally, below 700 million,”54 clearly an estimate some dis-tance away from the 1.6 to 1.7 billion people China is expected tohave in the 2020+ timeframe.

The political challenges are also perceived to be both daunting and

unmanageable. Despite the clear success of the Chinese economy inthe past 20 years, the pessimists note that the central governmenthas been increasingly unable to siphon off the growing wealth pro-portionately through taxation, thereby resulting in the new elites be-ing able to progressively undercut the regime’s own power and pref-erences.55 This problem, caused by the rise of new power centers inChina with all the threats they embody for cohesion and unity, is ex-acerbated by fundamental disputes within the ruling regime itself.These disputes center on the degree of control sought to be main-tained over the economy, polity, and society; the pace of change; andthe appropriate methods of change.56 The future of the PLA, its re-lationship to the party, and the dilemmas afflicting its principal mis-sions—defense of the country against external threats, or defense of the party against internal opposition, or defense of the populaceagainst arbitrary government—all make the looming crisis of govern-ability even more treacherous and burdensome.57 Finally, the de-cline in the party’s direct control over society; the increasing discon-tent within its traditional bastions of support, the peasants and

workers; and the rise of a new generation of successful social elites who care little for the party or the traditional communist regime are

______________53Brown (1995).

54Cohen (1995), p. 224.

55Shirk (1993).56

Kaye (1995a).57For an excellent analysis of China’s current civil-military dynamic, see Joffe (1996).See also Paltiel (1995).




all together seen as producing a situation where “fiscal decay at thecenter, conflicts among elites, and the rise of banditry and war-lordism along the periphery” reproduce conditions analogous to theperiods of decay in imperial China, conditions that, it is concluded,“the latest ‘dynasty’ [in Beijing] appears unlikely to break.”58

With these assessments, the pessimists among China analysts wouldargue that the calculative strategy, whatever its virtues, will inevitably terminate, at best, in a chaotic and, at worst, in a collapsing China,understood either as the systemic atrophy of the state or the fissi-parous fracturing of the polity, with non-Han regions such as Tibet,

Xinjiang, and Mongolia eventually breaking away. Far from prepar-ing for an inevitable power transition where China would challenge

the United States for regional and global leadership as a result of itscontinuing economic growth and distension in military power, thereal challenge for Washington, according to this school, consists of “how best to anticipate [China’s] collapse and prevent it fromtriggering international crises.”59 The possibility of a meltdown inChina after four or more decades of high economic growth wouldcertainly turn out to be anticlimactic, representing a rare oddity ininternational history. The only example of such an outcome inmodern times would probably be the Shah’s Iran, where a rapidsurge in wealth and power occurred only to be consummated in atraumatic revolutionary collapse. A similar outcome in China wouldbe simply catastrophic, in part because of the gigantic scale of theproblem (compared to Iran), in part because of the much deeperlevels of Western involvement (in all areas of activity), and in partbecause a candidate great power armed with nuclear weaponry (asopposed to merely a regional power) is involved. A collapsing, oreven a chaotic, China thus makes for frightening internationalchallenges that simply bedevil the imagination.60

______________58Goldstone (1995), p. 51. As discussed in Chapter Three, downward spirals of eco-nomic decline, elite corruption and contention, and social decay and unrest almostinvariably preceded the collapse of Chinese states in the past.

59Goldstone (1995), p. 52.60 Waldron (1995b). Some Western (and perhaps some Chinese) observers believethat a Chinese collapse would likely result in the rise of a democratic China and should

thus be viewed as a positive development to be encouraged or even promoted by for-eign governments. However, a Chinese collapse would far more likely result in chaosand perhaps even civil war, as suggested above. Hence, efforts to encourage govern-




Fortunately, this outcome today is judged by most sinologists to be aremote possibility and, in any event, the reasons for such judgmentsand the debates between the pessimists and the optimists over thefuture of China cannot be either evaluated or settled here.61 Thepossibility of a chaotic or collapsing China must simply be acknowl-edged and the fact that it might not occur must also be confronted.In fact, if the latter outcome obtains as most sinologists today believe,the question set out earlier only demands further examination: Whatreplaces the calculative strategy eventually if China’s relatively rapidrate of growth in national power continues for several decades anddoes not result in any collapse in the interim? If this question istaken as the focus of the heuristic exercise that follows, it is possibleto argue that China’s long-term choices lie between cooperation andassertion, if chaos and collapse are outcomes ruled out of bounds foranalytic purposes. These choices are identified mainly on the basisof certain theoretical conceptions of how the international system isconstituted and operates and they also draw from historical evidenceof how other rising powers have behaved in the past and from obser-vations about the historical behavior of strong Chinese states pre-sented in Chapter Three. Although this may not be the idealmethodology for discerning China’s future grand strategic trajecto-ries, it is nonetheless the best procedure available to scholars andpolicy analysts today. It allows for adducing fairly coherent and sys-tematic expectations of how China might behave—expectations thatcan be progressively refuted over time based on how Beijing’s ac-

tions actually turn out.

The Triumph of Reason: A Cooperative China?

The competing notions of a “cooperative” and “assertive” China aremeant to convey certain “ideal types,” since it is not possible to de-scribe any political entity so far out into the future in detail. Bothideal types are intended to depict some stark, central characteristicsof a possible China and its derivative behaviors. Both assume that

_____________________________________________________________ments to promote a Chinese collapse are reckless and irresponsible. Moreover, thecosts of a collapsing China are inestimable, thus making it worthless as a policy op-tion. For a further discussion of the precipitants of collapse in China and its conse-

quences for Chinese external policy, see Swaine (1995b), pp. 104–109.61Nye (1997).




China has completed its economic reform program successfully andthat it has acquired the kind of power capabilities associated withtrue great powers, but each provides a radically different vision of both the direction in which China may proceed and the ends to

which its newly acquired power is directed.

A cooperative China is essentially one that became, and behaved like,a Kantian entity in world politics, i.e., a liberal, democratic, polity. Asany other such state, it would consider itself bound by, and obligatedto pursue, standards of behavior that are conceived and defended interms of a transcendentally grounded conception of universal hu-man rights and mutual obligations.62 The core of the liberal regimeis centered fundamentally on a “respect for persons,” that is, a belief

in the proposition that individuals are to be always treated as thesubjects rather than as the objects of action. In international rela-tions, the principle of “respect for persons” translates itself into theright of states to be “free from foreign intervention.”63 As MichaelDoyle succinctly summed up this logic, “since morally autonomouscitizens hold rights to liberty, the states that democratically representthem have the right to exercise political independence.”64 In other

words, liberal states, respecting the autonomy of their own citizens, would by extension not interfere with the rights of other similarly constituted states. They might interfere with, and in fact evenprosecute, wars with other nonliberal states, but among liberalstates, a “zone of peace, a pacific union”65 would ostensibly obtain“despite numerous particular conflicts of economic and strategicinterest.”66 It is important to recognize that the existence of a pacificunion does not imply the absence of interstate rivalry ordisagreement; it implies only that whatever these conflicts, they shallnot be resolved by any “self-regarding” solutions such as war—solutions that inherently embody a large-scale abridgment of respectfor others.

______________62The transcendental foundation of Kant’s liberalism is discussed systematically inReiss (1995).

63Doyle (1983), p. 213.64Doyle (1983).65Doyle (1983).

66Doyle (1983), p. 214.




Although such respect is no doubt accorded only to fraternal demo-cratic peers (and not to nondemocratic competitors), a cooperative,democratic China would nonetheless be good news as far as theUnited States is concerned because its entry into the liberal union

would result in a sharp diminution of the war-proneness that couldotherwise accompany China’s rise as a great power.67 A cooperativeChina—even though notionally still a potential challenger in powertransition terms—would thus not only engender pacific relations

with the dominant power, the United States, but would also producecordial intercourse with the other great powers in the internationalsystem, all of whom happen to be—luckily—liberal democratic statesas well. A cooperative China, in this context, would display severaldistinguishing characteristics as far as international politics is con-cerned. To begin with, it would be generally acceptant of the prevail-ing international order into which it entered. This acceptance wouldbe centered principally on the recognition that an international or-der that respected the rights of persons—even if initially U.S. domi-nated—would be in China’s interests so long as it allowed for thecultivation of profitable personal and social relations that con-tributed to enhancing the utility and welfare of both Chinese citizensand the Chinese state. In these circumstances, even those facets of the prevailing system that were incongruent with Beijing’s interests

would cease to be bothersome to China as they would be alteredeventually in one of two ways: either through evolutionary, market-centered mechanisms that allowed China’s relatively greater eco-

nomic power to produce outcomes that reflected its own preferencesover time, or through more deliberate mechanisms such as interna-tional institutional rules and organizations that would alter the exist-ing structures of advantage in a direct and considered way as a natu-ral consequence of China’s growing geopolitical weight.

Further, a cooperative China would strongly emphasize interdepen-dence and collective security. These twin emphases would naturally grow—in terms of liberal logic—from both ideological and pragmaticconsiderations. Interdependence would be deemed essential for thecontinued vitality of the pacific union as more complete specializa-tion and the growing density of interactions, economic and political,

______________67 As Betts phrased this argument, “what is good for China turns out to be good foreveryone.” Betts (1993/94), p. 55.




would serve to strengthen the union both in absolute terms andagainst its potential adversaries and to increase the costs of defection. This strengthening, in turn, would enlarge the union asmore states seeing the fruits of interdependence seek to join theliberal zone of peace—by engineering internal transformations if necessary—thus contributing to an increased level of pacificity throughout the international system. The emphasis on collectivesecurity, though distinct from interdependence, becomes a naturalcorollary to interdependence in the economic realm. Theelimination of self-regarding solutions such as war, at least withinthe pacific union, creates the opportunity for broader conceptions of security where an attack on one state can be treated as an attack onall. Such responses, which aim at producing “automatic obligationsof a collective character,”68 would generally result in a low individual propensity by each state to use force as a means of settling international disputes, perhaps even those involving nondemocraticstates. This reticence to use force in an autonomous fashion not only bestows great economic benefits to every liberal state, but it alsoresults in the creation of a formidable collective defense capability despite the reduction in military burdens borne by any individual state. The ideological commitment to posse comitatus thus neatly dovetails with practical advantages of reduced national defenseburdens stemming from collective security arrangements.

Finally, a cooperative China would display a conspicuous willingnessto seek joint gains rather than unilateral advantage. This disavowalof the traditional strategy of seeking unilateral advantage derivessimply from the recognition that no benefits accrue to such a strat-egy in the zone of peace. In an environment of turmoil, unilateralgains are valuable and ought to be pursued because they give theirpossessors advantageous capabilities that can be transformed intomilitary instruments. These military instruments provide greatbenefits in a world of security competition where threats to life andproperty are endemic. If security competition ceases to exist,however, as it ostensibly does within the pacific union of states, thepursuit of unilateral advantage is irrational and possibly counterpro-ductive. It is irrational because, in a realm where interstate competi-tion is mostly economic, the notion of relative gains quickly becomes

______________68Morgenthau (1968), p. 296.




irrelevant. The search for relative gains cannot be sustained instrong form even in an environment where a zone of turmoil coexists

with the zone of peace so long as the latter is stronger than the for-mer, especially in military capabilities. Since the zone of peacepresently and for the foreseeable future consists of the most powerfulstates in the international system, it is unlikely that China wouldneed to pursue unilateral advantages on the grounds that it might bethreatened by entities located in the zone of turmoil. Further, thepursuit of such a policy would undermine the collective security ar-rangements that liberal states have traditionally sought to create. Tothat degree, it would also be counterproductive because, by giving rise to suspicions about Beijing’s intentions, it could destroy the trustand cohesion already existing within the zone of peace and thereby end up further threatening both Chinese security and the security of all other liberal states.

This depiction of a cooperative China represents a Weberian idealtype—that is, a pure, unadulterated, conceptual abstraction of a cer-tain phenomenon—but it is nonetheless useful because it depicts aparticular political orientation which, though unalloyed at the analyt-ical level, could materialize through some approximation in reality.

A cooperative China in practice would be generally a status quo asopposed to a revisionist power; it would value highly continued eco-nomic interdependence and would place greater faith in institutionalas opposed to unilateral solutions for security; it would abjure theuse of force whenever possible, relying on it only when its physicalsecurity is clearly and presently threatened; and, it would, in all itsinternational affairs, place a premium on the attainment of jointgains to cement the underlying interests of all the major states asopposed to merely enhancing its own. If such a cooperative China,or some version of it, is at all possible, the critical question consists of explaining how and why such an outcome would be sustained in theface of the fact that Beijing has—by now—grown in powercapabilities and could well choose to behave in a far more unilateralmanner, as have past great powers in world politics.

In principle, four possible arguments could be adduced in support of the expectation that China would behave as a cooperative state evenafter it joins the ranks of the great powers. Each argument, either di-rectly or by implication, suggests that, even after it acquires greatpower capabilities as a result of its present calculative strategy, China




would have good reason to abjure “self-regarding” behaviors in world politics in favor of alternative “other-regarding” postures thatincrease peace and collective security.69

The first such argument in favor of a cooperative China is drawnfrom liberal theories that emphasize the value and pacifying effectsof economic interdependence .70 This argument asserts that sinceChina’s growth in capabilities was essentially a product of its partici-pation in a liberal economic order—where commercial interdepen-dence between states allowed its trade-driven growth to producestupendous increases in economic wealth—there is little reason forBeijing to abandon such a fruitful strategy even after it acquires realgreat power status. This belief is grounded, in the first instance, on

the expectation that China will need to pursue absolute gains simply to resolve its vast developmental problems for a long time to come .Since China’s population will lack the living standards enjoyed by itscontemporaries, even when Beijing becomes a consequential actorby most aggregative measures such as GNP, the size of military forces, and the like, the interdependence argument asserts that thepursuit of absolute gains would still continue so that trade-drivengrowth can enable the lowest deciles of China’s population to beslowly absorbed into the ranks of its successful and wealthy citizenry.

Even after this point is reached, however , a strong form of the inter-dependence argument asserts that Beijing would continue to pursueabsolute gains because there is no reason why a prosperous China

should not want to be even more prosperous—that is, when mea-sured by the benefits it obtains when compared to itself under some alternative international regime . This desire to be even more pros-perous and even more successful than it was at that point in time—apresumption consistent with the liberal belief that human beings areincessantly concerned with improving material well-being—wouldcompel China to become sensitive not only to the costs of alienating its trading partners but also to the minuscule benefits afforded by as-sertive postures involving military force in comparison to the moreproductive forms of international intercourse associated with trade,

______________69For a good reading of how differing versions of liberalism affect the prospects for

peace, see Betts (1993/94).70The classic statement of this position remains Russett (1967).




interdependence, and collective security. Both the high expectedcosts and the low expected benefits of noncooperation, therefore,conspire to keep Beijing’s sociable posture on a fairly even keel be-cause the alternative strategy of assertion would only result in dimin-ished absolute gains, lowered economic growth, and increased sus-picion and hostility throughout the international system, all of whichtaken together reduce the collective benefits enjoyed by all states andby implication also reduce the gains obtained by China itself.

The second argument for continued cooperation by China, even afterit acquires true great power capabilities, is related to the economicinterdependence argument but is quite distinct from it. This argu-ment, centered on claims about the changing nature of power in the

international system, asserts that the traditional assertiveness asso-ciated with great powers in the past is obsolete because power today derives less from the tools of violence and coercion than it does fromthe legitimacy, the effectiveness, and the strength of both domesticregimes and national governments within a country.71 The reasonsfor such a transformation in international politics are numerous andvary from theorist to theorist. One scholar argues that the changing nature of power is produced by the obsolescence of war, an outcome

which, even in its conventional variety, is brought about simply by the utter destructiveness of modern combat, thus making it com-pletely useless as a tool of great power assertiveness.72 Other com-mentators have divined the changing nature of power to be a func-tion of the “postmodern states”73 now inhabiting the internationalsystem. These states, infected with the viruses of individualism,cosmopolitanism, and prosperity, are seen to be part of what Machi-avelli once called a “world grown effeminate”74—a world of lost virtu

which heralds the rise of new powers that cannot nourish the inter-nal restiveness required to fuel the machines necessary for war andexpansion. Still other theorists argue that the changing nature of power derives from the diminishing returns now accruing to con-quest and territorial acquisition. The growing disutility of lebens-

______________71Luard (1988).

72Mueller (1989).

73Buzan and Segal (1996).74Machiavelli, II, 2.




raum in the modern period is supposed to set sharp limits on theutility of assertive strategies, since the international diffusion of sci-ence and technology, the possibility of knowledge-based increases inproduction at home, and the relative ease of trade and commerceover subjugation all combine to reduce the benefits produced by military might at least as far as the possibility of military conquestand occupation is concerned.75

Numerous other justifications for the belief in the changing nature of power may be adduced, but at bottom all such justifications arerooted in the central claim that “the costs, risks and difficulties inapplying force are rising, while the benefits derived therefrom aredeclining.”76 This conviction more than any other underwrites the

belief that all rising powers in the future will sustain greatness moreas “trading states” than as the traditional imperialist entities of thepast. China, too, will not be an exception to this rule. The examplesof Germany and Japan today are already seen as evidence of how growing national power can manifest itself in cooperative interna-tional postures: both states have generally declined to engage inmilitary expansion or pursue coercive uses of force; both states haveused commerce, trade, and economic intercourse, as opposed to se-curity competition, as a way to expand their national power; bothstates have sought to strengthen international regimes and institu-tions as a way to order global governance and increase their nationalsecurity; and, finally, both states have declined to use “self-re-garding” strategies for producing political safety in favor of collectivesecurity arrangements that emphasize joint gains in the form of “regulated, institutionalized balancing predicated on the notion of all against one.”77 Such behaviors, it may be argued, represent analternative future for all rising powers and, consequently, China—

which arguably has other good reasons for being a cooperativestate78—may also come to define its greatness over time in terms

______________75Rosecrance (1986), pp. 13–14, 24–25.76Orme (1997/98), p. 138.

77Kupchan and Kupchan (1995), p. 52.

78For many Chinese, these reasons include the apparent “fact” that China has histor-ically abjured interfering in the internal affairs of foreign political entities, employedforce against such entities only when its physical security was clearly and presently threatened, and generally rejected efforts at foreign expansion.




that accord with the changing notion of power manifested today by Germany and Japan.

The third reason for the belief that China would assume a coopera-tive posture even after it attains great power capabilities is rooted inthe claims associated with the nuclear revolution.79 Theorists whoargue that nuclear weapons have radically transformed the funda-mental ordering principles of international politics suggest that aresurgent China would be more cooperative than other great powersin the past simply because the presence of nuclear weapons setssharp limits on the assertiveness that can be displayed by new rising powers. Because nuclear weapons have increased the costs of conflict to a point where mutual destruction awaits all entities in-

volved in any systemic war, the most extreme forms of political as-sertiveness—unrestrained warfare that threatens the homeland of anadversary—have been sharply curtailed, at least as far as great andrising powers armed with nuclear weapons are concerned. Equally important, the possession of such weapons in the hands of all the key global powers implies that most rising states would be immunizedagainst the worst depredations—such as preventive war—which may be contemplated by a declining dominant power. This immunity toultimate destruction, then, prevents rising powers from having toactively thwart any military efforts that may be made by a declining dominant power to arrest the shifting balance of power: All such ef-forts will not only rapidly incur diminishing returns but may in factaccelerate the adverse power trends if they ultimately threaten thelarger objective of economic and societal renewal facing the declin-ing dominant power.

The presence of nuclear weapons, therefore, should make forremarkably peaceful power transitions, at least when viewed inhistorical terms. Implicitly, they should also make for significantly cooperative rising powers, since their presence implies that thelatter, despite their growing capabilities, will be unable to decisively threaten other nuclear-armed states in the international system. By the same token, the extant great powers would be unable todecisively threaten the new rising powers either. This pacificity,brought about by fears of mutual assured destruction, is also seen to

______________79Jervis (1989).




engender other beneficial effects in that the horrendous dread of systemic conflict simultaneously serves to dampen both limited warsand crisis behavior for reasons that are linked to the unacceptableconsequences of nuclear escalation. All these reasons, therefore,might be used to suggest that a Chinese ascent to great powercapabilities might be less problematic than other power transitionsin history: Being unable to make truly significant alterations in theglobal balance at the expense of other competing states, China wouldsooner or later discover the virtues of a cooperative posture, giventhat assertive policies would be unable to make any but the mostperipheral gains.

The fourth and final argument for believing in a cooperative China,

even after it acquires true great power status, is rooted in the expec-tations of the democratic peace . Although China is by no meansdemocratic today, there is little doubt that a slow process of democ-ratization has been under way since 1978. The sphere of personalfreedoms has increased; the capricious exercise of state power hasbeen reduced, especially as far as threats to the lives of Chinese citi-zens are concerned; and the development of institutions pertaining to the rule of law, the respect for property, the adjudication of dis-putes, and the exercise of power is gradually under way. If this pro-cess continues without interruption, it is possible that China wouldslowly acquire the accouterments of all democratic states even as itslowly grows in national power capabilities, thus producing at somepoint after about 2020 the happy conjunction of great power marriedto a substantially, if not fully, democratic regime.

This rise of China as a democratic great power could be held topresage a cooperative international posture for all the structural, if not normative, reasons usually associated with democratic peace.

Among these would be the consolidation of internal institutionalconstraints on the power of the most important national leaders, therise of formal or informal checks and balances within the Chinesegovernment (especially between the Chinese Communist Party andthe National Peoples’ Congress and between the Communist Party and other emergent autonomous political parties), and the integra-tion of mass political choices in matters affecting war and peace.Should such structural constraints develop within China, it is possi-ble that Beijing would see its great power interests in broader terms,that is, in terms of maintaining a stable international order in concert




with other democratic great powers rather than as a competitivestruggle for securing certain narrow self-interests.

This possibility of a cooperative China would be reinforced if thestructural factors identified above were complemented by othermore normative factors. These include, at root, the enshrinement of a liberal tradition that centers on a transcendentally grounded“respect for persons.” This tradition, which recognizes allindividuals as “subjects” rather than as “objects” of social action,results in a universalistic tolerance of all human beings, theirpreferences, and their choices. As such, it makes the possibility of acooperative China more robust, since the democratic peace thatensues is grounded not simply in the presence of institutional and

legal constraints but in a fundamental reordering of the values heldby all entities within the zone of peace. The enshrinement of normative factors thus avoids the problems that may be caused by the presence of illiberal democracies (i.e., polities with popularinstitutions and popular rule but not liberal beliefs and orientations),thereby ensuring that a cooperative China becomes possible by reason of inner necessity and belief rather than simply by accident orexternal constraint.80 The presence of this condition during aprevious power transition—involving Great Britain and the UnitedStates early in this century—is often believed to have contributed topeaceful change in the leadership of the international system and,assuming that China becomes as democratic as Great Britain and theUnited States currently are, advocates of democratic peace wouldexpect a similarly peaceful power transition to occur sometime in thefirst half of the 21st century.

The Tyranny of Power: An Assertive China?

Although China could emerge from its calculative strategy as a coop-erative power because it is steadily transformed into a liberal polity over time, it is equally possible that it could emerge as an assertivestate fully cognizant of, and demanding, its prerogatives in interna-

______________80Moreover, a liberal democratic China would presumably provide a form of statelegitimacy grounded in democratic institutions, popular participation, and liberalviews that would reduce the temptation for elites to maintain state power through ap-peals to chauvinistic forms of nationalism or to engage in foreign adventures.




tional politics. Such a turn toward assertiveness could arise becauseof factors peculiar to the Chinese experience: its historical memory of past greatness and the desire to restore previous eminence; its de-termination to erase the painful legacy of a century of national hu-miliation; its desire to recreate the traditional sinocentric world orderas a means of regulating the political and economic structures of su-per- and subordination; its belief that China’s external security in thepast was primarily assured by a strong state able to dominate or atthe very least neutralize the strategic periphery; and so on.81 But, itcould also arise as a result of the normal competition in world poli-tics that compels every state to continually seek increases in nationalpower in an effort to preserve security. Since this competition takesplace against the backdrop of “the uneven growth of power among states,”82 it should not be surprising to find that rising powers oftenadopt assertive political postures as they struggle to restructure theexisting international system to better support their own interestsand claims.

Irrespective of which mechanism (or combination thereof) propelsChina’s assertiveness, the shift toward a more assertive strategy—after the current calculative phase runs its course—remains morethan just an academic possibility. It has in fact been the normal out-come where most rising powers in the past are concerned and today there is a broad consensus in realist international relations theory on

why such assertive behavior occurs. Robert Gilpin summarized theexplanation succinctly when he argued that the assertiveness of ris-ing powers derives fundamentally from the

increasing disjuncture between the existing governance of the sys-tem and the redistribution of power in the system. Although the hi-erarchy of prestige, the distribution of territory, the rules of the sys-tem, and the international distribution of labor continue to favorthe traditional dominant power or powers, the power base on whichthe governance of the system ultimately rests has eroded because of differential growth and development among states. This disjunc-

______________81These factors, as well as other more specific historical features of China’s security behavior discussed in Chapter Three, strongly suggest that the characterization of Chinese behavior summarized in footnote number 78 represents a significant distor-tion of the historical record.82Gilpin (1988), p. 591.




ture among components of the international system creates chal-lenges for the dominant states and opportunities for the rising states in the system.83

Gilpin’s argument, in effect, suggests that rising powers become as-sertive because assertion remains the principal means by which they can reconfigure the existing international system—which hitherto

was configured and sustained by the interests of the extant dominantpower—to suit their own demands and preferences. Such assertive-ness may in fact become necessary because both the extant domi-nant power and its allies—states that profit most from the prevailing systemic arrangements—may decline to surrender their privilegesmeekly and without resistance. Consequently, rising states often feel

compelled to engage in an assertive exercise of power because they conclude that it is unlikely that they would receive the authority con-sonant with their newfound capabilities as a simple matter of course.The propensity for such assertiveness is usually reinforced by thephenomenon of uncertainty in international politics, which leadsstates to seek to accumulate power merely as a hedge against contin-gencies arising in an unknowable future. Assertive policies, there-fore, are likely to be initiated and these policies would continue solong as the marginal costs of change do not exceed or equal thebenefits accruing to the new rising power.

Accepting these arguments—that assertive behavior on the part of the rising state is inevitable because the latter seeks to restructure the

rules and arrangements by which international relations areconducted to reflect its own preferences—does not require adopting Gilpin’s larger (and more contestable) thesis that hegemonic warinexorably arises as a result of the disequilibrium between the“hierarchy of prestige” and the “hierarchy of power.” Rather, theassertiveness of rising powers can be explained entirely by materialcauses, that is, by the desire to have the established structures of global governance reflect their own interests, irrespective of what outcomes obtain at the level of status-distribution in international politics . If status considerations are important to the rising power(and, in the case of China, the historical record suggests that they are), the tendency toward assertiveness may be further magnified,

______________83Gilpin (1981), p. 186.




but arguments hinging on status acquisition are not essential toderiving assertiveness on the part of rising states.84

Given these considerations, what would the Weberian “ideal type” of an assertive China look like? To begin with, an assertive China wouldbe one that exhibited a consistently “self-regarding” posture on allmajor international issues. This means that no significant questionin the realm of regional and global politics could be addressed, muchless resolved, without reference to the interests, preferences, anddesires of Beijing. Such assertiveness would be oriented toward en-suring that the evolving regional and global order contributes to, if not enhances, China’s growing power and prestige; at the very least,it cannot be allowed to detract from, or undercut, Beijing’s enduring

interests. In all matters then, whether economic, political, or strate-gic, their effect on the preservation, if not the improvement, of Chi-nese power would become the key consideration governing Beijing’sresponses and behavior.

China’s first priority in this regard would consist of securing unilateral gains that give it an advantage in the ongoing security competition among states; in most instances, the attainment of highrelative gains would be accorded priority over securing high absoluteor high joint gains, especially in those issue-areas considered to bestrategically important to China. This does not imply that the pursuitof absolute or joint gains would be neglected, only that these gains

would not be pursued if they came at the cost of important Chinese

interests or if they required significant compromise or concessions ata time when China could well afford to be disdainful of cooperation

with both the few powerful, but declining, states and the morenumerous, but weaker, entities in international politics.

Such an orientation would no doubt become troubling to many of China’s neighbors, but most particularly to the United States,because all its principal power-political interests (if examples drawnfrom current concerns are still relevant during a future powertransition), such as the fate of the U.S. military presence in East Asia,the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, the protection of

______________

84This point suggests that for historical or other reasons, whether China desires greatpower status and prestige in the international system is not a decisive determinant of the propensity for a strong Chinese state to adopt assertive behavior.




international property rights, and the expansion of the open trading system, would be realized if they did not clash with China’s ownpreferences in each of these issue-areas.

Apart from such specific issues that directly affect the United States,the self-regarding behavior associated with an assertive China wouldmanifest itself along three dimensions. First, Beijing would seek sinocentric solutions to most, if not all, of its territorial disputes(assuming that they still existed during a future power transition).This implies that the current strategy of either making minor con-cessions or postponing resolution of outstanding disputes wouldatrophy irrevocably. China would expect its regional competitors toeither acquiesce to its claims or face the prospect of armed diplo-

macy, if not outright applications of military force. Since by thispoint it can be presumed that China would have consequential mili-tary capabilities, it would not be unreasonable for Beijing to hopethat its steadily accumulating coercive power would actually yieldsome favorable returns where resolving its territorial claims is con-cerned. This would be particularly true with respect to importantterritorial claims, including the ideationally driven claims involving Taiwan, the strategically driven claims involving India in Aksai Chin,and the economically driven claims involving the Spratly Islands andthe South China Sea in general. An assertive China would have anadvantage over each of these local competitors in the balance of resolve because, assuming its interests in these disputed territories tobe unwavering, Beijing’s new power, including its military strength,

would tip the balance of capabilities enough to make local opposi-tion to China either irrelevant or relatively costly for most of its an-tagonists.

Second, Beijing would exhibit a readiness to use or threaten to usemilitary instruments relatively freely for securing various politicalends. In contrast to both the present posture, which is characterizedby a general reluctance to use force except in self-defense or to wardoff serious threats or losses, and the posture associated with a coop-erative China, which is characterized by the subordination of military tools to the institutions and practices of collective security, the use of military force under an assertive strategy would be more unilateral,frequent, and closely oriented toward the pursuit of extended power-political goals. To be sure, all use of force is relatively costly and thereadiness to use military instruments more freely does not imply that




a powerful Beijing would automatically become mindlessly trigger-happy. It does imply, however, that whereas under previous condi-tions of weakness China might have shied away from actively using force, or the threat of force, to secure supernumerary goals, it wouldbe less reticent about behaving similarly in circumstances when it

was actually strong and capable in military terms and less dependenton the goodwill of external actors for the continued expansion of itsnational power. Under such circumstances, not only would the costsof using force actually decrease but the range of circumstancesamenable to the successful use of force also increases. 85 Equally significant, military instruments can be usefully employed in less-conventional ways: They will continue to defend China and mitigateits losses but they can also be used for more acquisitive purposes—asthey traditionally did during some strong-state periods—such as ap-propriating new territory or resources or as useful instruments of diplomacy, for subtly coercing adversaries; or as visible manifesta-tions of China’s power in the open commons; or as symbols of reas-surance offered to others, as, for example, when military instrumentsbecome the embodied promises of extended deterrence. An assertiveChina, faced with more opportunities for the profitable use of itsmilitary instruments, would then find itself less restrained in using these instruments to secure objectives other than simply nationalsurvival.

Third, Beijing would seek to secure and sustain geopoliticalpreeminence on a global scale. Although the search for suchpreeminence may be rooted in the fact that China enjoyed forextended periods over many centuries throughout the imperial era asuperior political, economic, and cultural position relative to itsperiphery in Asia, an ascendant China in the 21st century wouldarguably seek geopolitical preeminence on a global scale. In part,this would simply become a product of necessity as technology andthe diffusion of power more generally result in dramatic increases inthe range of political control. Further, the extant dominant power—the United States—already possesses political influence on a massivescale unparalleled in history and any suppression of this dominance,

______________85 As Gilpin succinctly argued, “the critical significance of the differential growth of power among states is that it alters the cost of changing the international system andtherefore the incentives for changing the international system [itself]” (1981), p. 95.




therefore, almost by definition must involve a substitution of controlon a similar scale. Recognizing this, however, does not imply thatChina would be able to effortlessly control global outcomes, even if it

were to become an assertive state. The constraints imposed by thepower gradient, meaning the loss of power as a function of distance,

would still apply: China would find it easier to control outcomesnearer to home than farther away. All imperial powers, historically,have been confronted by this phenomenon and it is unlikely thatChina would turn out to be the first successful exception to the rule.This implies that Beijing’s principal objective would be to secure itshinterland first—meaning, as in the past, its Asian periphery along both its landward and oceanic borders—precisely to obtain thoseresources that would give it an advantage in its efforts to control thelarger outcomes unfolding over the larger regional and global canvas.Control over the hinterland would inevitably require the closeintegration of client states, the acquisition of veto rights over thepolicies of neutral states, and the explicit or implicit containment, if not outright neutralization, of all local adversaries.

The search for global preeminence, therefore, implies that China would seek to enforce a structure of super- and subordinationamong the powers along its periphery as the first, and likely necessary, step toward reproducing, however loosely, a similarstructure of super- and subordination at the core of the largerregional and global system. Indeed, because the Asian regionrepresents a GNP even greater than that of NATO Europe, theattainment of such a position of regional preeminence would greatly facilitate, if not ensure, the attainment of China’s larger objective of global preeminence—assuming that Asia’s overall importance toglobal stability and prosperity continues to increase, as it has during the past several decades.

As mentioned above, this depiction of an assertive China remains a Weberian “ideal type.” It delineates a stark vision of what an egotis-tical, “self-regarding” entity would look like. The purpose of thisanalytical image is, first, to present a clear conception of what an as-sertive Chinese posture would entail in theory, even if it never mate-rializes with such clarity in practice. The second purpose is to draw as clear a distinction as possible between an assertive and a coop-erative China. Each of these ideal types represents radically differentapproaches to international politics and understanding their dis-




tinctiveness conceptually is essential to assessing the broad underly-ing direction of any future Chinese grand strategy, a direction that

would otherwise be hidden by the complexity and confusion that always surround the vast mass of political behaviors in reality. Theclarity embodied by the ideal type is therefore essential precisely be-cause it serves as the template that enables an observer to interpretthe general orientation—cooperation or assertion—that Chinesegrand strategy may follow over the long term. This is particularly important because any future assertiveness on the part of China willnot be unadorned, raw, and clearly manifest. Rather, it will beclouded by various cooperative trappings and much complexity asfar as “process”—understood as “the ways in which units relate toeach other”86—is concerned. Yet, despite these complexities, anassertive orientation would reveal itself through certain basicattitudes adopted by China: the pervasive emphasis on securing sinocentric solutions to outstanding problems; the singular pursuitof its national aims by all means necessary, largely irrespective of thecontending interests of others; the emphasis on developing potentmilitary instruments and the ready willingness, in many instances, touse these as part of national policy; and, finally, the possible develop-ment of an ideology that legitimizes Chinese national interests interms of some universal values.

If an assertive China were to materialize in some such form in thedistant future, what factors would produce it? Or, framed differently,

why would one expect China to behave as an assertive power whenthere are in fact several good reasons for believing in the possibility of a cooperative China? The summary answer to this latter questionis that the good reasons enumerated above for believing that acooperative China will emerge under the assumed conditions of highcapacity and low external dependence are simply not good enough.

To begin with, the claim that China’s current reliance on economicinterdependence would socialize it into pursuing the benefits of co-operation (arising from the quest for joint gains) even after it be-comes a great power is contestable on both empirical and concep-tual grounds. There is little evidence historically that high levels of economic interdependence have retarded the assertive behavior and

______________86Keohane and Nye (1987).




the war-proneness of states when control of the international system was at issue, including those that were locked in very tight circles of economic interdependence with one another. The classic exampleof such high interdependence coinciding with assertive political be-haviors remains Britain and Germany on the eve of World War I,

when “economic ties were more extensive and significant than at any time before or since.”87 Yet this interdependence failed to preventGermany from pursuing an expansionist policy that eventually led to

war. One study in fact concludes that the relationship between“interdependence and conflict appears to be curvilinear, where low to moderate degrees of interdependence reduce the likelihood of dyadic disputes, and extensive economic linkages increase the prob-ability of militarized disputes.”88 Most realists, reading the historicalevidence, affirm this conclusion by arguing that high economicinterdependence would actually increase the prospects of assertivebehavior because states, faced with the increased vulnerability asso-ciated with high interdependence, will embark on predatory or pre-emptive responses to minimize their national exposure. Althoughthis claim has been corroborated by the quantitative study citedabove, it is still unclear—at a theoretical level—what the relationshipbetween economic interdependence and assertive international be-haviors actually is. In large part, this is because the establishedtheories have not yet been able to satisfactorily integrate how thespecific issue of interdependence affects the more general problemabout decisionmaking choices relating to war or peace. Absent such

an explanation, it is difficult to assess the precise causal mechanismsunderlying the empirical claims about high trade coinciding with alower incidence of conflict.

What makes matters more difficult analytically is that most estab-lished theories about interdependence and conflict are fairly generalformulations: They do not incorporate variables such as domesticeconomic interests, the strength of the state relative to its society,and the role of future expectations about the value of interdepen-dence, all of which arguably would bear upon the traditional liberalclaim that high interdependence inevitably leads to cooperative asopposed to assertive behaviors. Research that incorporates such

______________87Papayoanou (1996), p. 42.88Barbieri (1996).




variables has only just begun; findings are still not extensively cor-roborated but, unfortunately, they do not reinforce the liberal opti-mism that high interdependence inevitably and unconditionally leads to peace.89 By demonstrating a more contingent relationshipbetween these two variables, this new research only serves to suggestthat dense economic interconnectivity may not be sufficient to pre-vent a great-power China in the future from embarking on assertivepolicies. Even more pessimistically, the degree of interdependencerequired to sustain a cooperative China may simply not exist in thefuture to begin with. If China’s economic growth over the long termis sustained through an exploitation of its internal markets as op-posed to its current export-led trading strategies, all the discussionabout the pacifying effects of interdependence may simply becomeacademic. The presence of autarkic growth would simply eliminateall the constraints imposed by economic interdependence (assuming that these were efficacious to begin with), thereby allowing othervariables such as the pursuit of security, power, gain, or glory to be-come the determinants beneath an assertive strategy. Since it is very possible that China’s level of interdependence will actually drop as itcontinues to grow in both economic and in power-political terms,the hypothesized cooperation that ostensibly arises from participat-ing in a liberal economic regime will also steadily diminish over time.

If the benefits of economic interdependence turn out to be lesssalient than is usually expected, the claims for cooperation deriving from beliefs about the changing nature of power are even more mis-guided. The ultimate nature of power in international politics hasremained largely unchanged since the beginning of time; what haschanged are simply the sources that generate that power. Power ininternational politics, at least in the realist reading, has always beenultimately a function of a state’s capability to coerce other states:

What contributes toward the making of such capabilities, however,has changed as a result of new technologies and new socialarrangements. Whereas in a previous age, for example, industrialexpertise and nationalized or state-directed production may havecontributed to building effective sinews of war, information-intensive technologies produced by profit-driven private enterprises

______________89See, for example, Copeland (1996); Rowe (1999); and Papayoanou (1999).




today arguably constitute the new sources of power.90 Thesechanges alter the means by which a state acquires national power

while transforming how this power may be harnessed on thebattlefield. But, in a structural sense, these changes are trivial whencompared to the permanence exhibited by the essential nature of power itself. All great powers—yesterday and today—have beendefined by their possession of superior coercive capabilities relativeto the rest of the international system and a transformation of thiskey attribute cannot occur unless the “deep structure”9 1 of international politics is itself altered. No such alteration, however, isin sight: International politics still remains the arena of egoistcompetition among states par excellence ; it still subsists as a realm of self-help; and it still continues to be defined by the preferences of thegreat powers populating the system. In such an environment, no“candidate” great-power is likely to eschew acquiring the best andmost sophisticated military capabilities it can afford; to do so wouldboth imperil its security and undercut its claims to superiorrecognition, status, and control.

Germany and Japan today simply do not constitute examples of thechanging nature of power. Rather, they remain illustrations of how defeat at the hands of other great powers can constrain and condi-tion national preferences in certain unnatural directions for a while.Both Germany and Japan are models not of great powers but of clientstates whose fundamental autonomy—the ability to independently choose one’s national direction—was compromised through defeatin war and whose subsequent direction as “trading states” was sus-tained only because they were compelled, thanks to commonthreats, to operate within an alliance framework managed by onegreat power, the United States, which found itself in competition

with another great power, the Soviet Union, for global dominance.Thus, their “trading state” profile is testimony more to the dominantpower of the United States and its ability to regulate the directionadopted by its clients than it is to any alleged changes in the natureof power in international politics. In fact, this profile will be sus-tained only so long as the United States can continue to protectGermany and Japan while simultaneously sustaining the global eco-

______________90These issues are further discussed in Tellis et al. (forthcoming).91On the realist reading of deep structure, see Ruggie (1986).




nomic regime that allows both countries a peaceful outlet for theirnational energies; should U.S. capabilities in these two arenas atro-phy, the trading state profiles of both countries would also quickly atrophy and be replaced by the “territorial state” forms common toall other countries in the international system. If anything, Germany and Japan are also examples of another less-recognized reality in in-ternational politics: Although both countries may have been greatpowers in an age when control of their local periphery afforded thema claim over the larger commons, the economies of scale associated

with efficiently acquiring the attributes of modern military and eco-nomic powers today give advantage mostly to continental powers

whose great size, vast natural resources, and large populations be-come incredible assets so long as they can resolve their power“transformation” problems with minimal efficiency.92

The implications of these judgments for possible Chinese assertive-ness should be clear. Not only is there little evidence that coercion isbecoming less central to the structure, organization, and adminis-tration of international politics, there is even less evidence that Chinabelieves such a transformation is presently under way. As one Chi-nese politics specialist put it, “China may well be the high church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.”93 If so, Beijing would—quite

justifiably—presume that acquiring superior coercive capabilities isfundamentally necessary to sustaining its great power claims among other things because it perceives—quite rightly again—that there islittle evidence for the belief that the nature of power is in factchanging. When China’s desire to redress past humiliations is addedto its strong (and possibly growing) suspicion that the United States,in concert with its regional allies, is stealthily contemplating re-sponses aimed at the “constrainment” of Beijing, the expectationthat a strong China would eschew acquiring the military attributes of a great nation and behave cooperatively in accordance with thechanging nature of power thesis only becomes more untenable. Fora variety of reasons, some unique to China and some common to allrising states, Beijing is likely to view claims about the changing na-ture of power as little other than a ruse fostered by the establishedstates in the system to change the extant “rules of the game” just

______________92Kennedy (1983).93Christensen (1996a), p. 37.




when it appeared as if China would be—finally—successful whenmeasured by the predicates of those “rules.” Not surprisingly, astrong China is likely to resist all such efforts at redefinition becausethey promise only to denature what is most attractive about power-political greatness—the ability to use superior coercive power toreshape the international system to comport with one’s own inter-ests—at exactly the time when China seeks to enjoy those hard-earned fruits accruing to its growing eminence.94

One partial caveat to the above assessment of the influence of Chi-nese history should be kept in mind, however. Although bothstructural factors associated with China’s ascent to power within theinternational system and certain Chinese attitudes about state power

suggest that Beijing will become more assertive, both militarily andotherwise, in protecting its expanding interests, the historical recordalso suggests that domestic leadership factors could seriously reducethe extent to which a strong Chinese state employs military force un-der certain circumstances. As Chapter Three indicates, considerableelite opposition to prolonged and particularly intense levels of force

was evident even during strong-state periods in Chinese imperialhistory. Such opposition reflected the influence of both pragmaticbureaucratic calculations and more normative beliefs, including along-standing, deep-seated notion that successful and just regimesattain their objectives, whenever possible, through a reliance on“benevolent” behavior and the force of example. In the modern era,such a belief continues to exert some influence on both elite andpopular attitudes in China, despite the collapse of state Confucian-ism. Moreover, this notion has to some extent been reinforced by the belief that China should not act unilaterally to enforce its will onthe regional or global system, derived from a modern-day Chineseaversion to the allegedly “predatory hegemonic behavior” of impe-rialist nation-states. This certainly does not mean that a strong Chi-nese state would employ force only in extremis, or would never em-ploy high levels of force over a prolonged period. But it does suggestthat the willingness of a strong and assertive China to unilaterally

______________94This argument thus suggests that the current emphasis placed by many Chinese ob-servers on the importance of economic and technological over military factors in the

definition of a state’s “comprehensive national strength” is probably more indicativeof the workings of the present-day calculative strategy than an indication of a funda-mental disbelief in the continued vital relevance of military attributes to state power.




employ force in such a manner might be decisively restrained by thedomestic leadership context.95

The claims for cooperation deriving from expectations based on thenuclear revolution are also misguided. Nuclear weapons no doubtcan serve as fairly formidable deterrents: Assuming that all their pos-sessors are rational and that the threats of accidents and catalytic useare ruled out, nuclear weapons can reduce, though not entirely elimi-nate, the risks of premeditated attack on the homeland and on thecentral assets cherished by a great power.96 Such an outcome, how-ever, is not automatic. It involves many political decisions to de-velop and acquire the secure retaliatory capabilities that can immu-nize against destruction. Until that point is reached, a fairly hostile

competition can in fact ensue as each side attempts to preserve itsnuclear capabilities against any damage-limiting technologies orstrategies that may be adopted by an adversary. This interaction caninvolve highly assertive and visible actions in the realm of competi-tive nuclear modernization—an issue that becomes particularly rele-vant in the case of China because its currently small and fairly vul-nerable arsenal appeared adequate only in the context of the positiveexternalities generated by the mutual deterrence relationship be-tween the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, when neitherRussian nor U.S. weapons provide any spillover benefits that can beexploited by Beijing, the imperative to modernize its arsenal—in theface of growing U.S. efforts to both deemphasize nuclear weaponsand develop various technologies, such as national and theater mis-sile defense systems, that could degrade hostile nuclear capabilitiesin general—may only result in new forms of arms racing and poten-tial instability.

______________95It should be added that domestic leadership factors could at times also prompt both weak and strong Chinese regimes to employ a greater level of force than might bedeemed prudent or “rational” from a structural perspective.

96This weaker conclusion holds because the nuclear era has provided numerous ex-amples when established nuclear powers were attacked by conventional means, thusraising serious questions about the reliability of nuclear deterrence. These examplesinclude China’s attack on U.S. forces in Korea (1950), China’s attack on the SovietUnion (1969), and Argentina’s attack on Great Britain (1981). In at least one instance(1969), the conflict included an attack by one nuclear power on the territory of the

other, leading Organski and Kugler to exclaim that to believe that nuclear weapons de-ter all conflicts is “to believe in magic” (1980), p. 179.




Even if this process is completed without mishap, with China acquir-ing comprehensive and highly secure nuclear retaliatory capabilitiesover time, it implies only that both Chinese and U.S. homelands

would be further immunized against the prospect of comprehensivesocietal destruction (thanks to the dynamics of mutual deterrence).That, in turn, however, would push any on-going political competi-tion “below” the strategic realm and into the arenas of extended de-terrence and conventional and low-intensity conflicts occurring inperipheral areas. This phenomenon, brought about by the “stability-instability” paradox, could translate into severe threats being mounted by China to important U.S. strategic interests, including those involving the safety of U.S. possessions or forces abroad as wellas the security of overseas allies. The presence of robust strategicnuclear capabilities would, then, serve mainly to channel active se-curity competition into areas other than direct attacks on the home-land, which nonetheless would continue to remain vulnerablethanks to the complications of escalation, even if it could otherwiseavoid the dangers inherent in straightforward premeditated attack.

The growing threat to extended U.S interests, which would inevitably occur as China grew in national capabilities (including both strategicnuclear weaponry and conventional power-projection capabilities),cannot provide any significant consolation to the United States

whose global position is inextricably linked to its ability to defendnumerous allies, some quite close to China but all quite far removedfrom its own home territory.97 It was precisely this concern thatdominated U.S. defense policy throughout the Cold War and this pe-riod abundantly illustrates the fact that even though the direct threatto the U.S. homeland was more or less “managed,” thanks to theconstraints of mutual assured destruction after about 1964, theUnited States was still engaged in an arduous struggle to contain So-viet assertiveness directed both at its extended allies in Europe andthe Far East and on peripheral battlegrounds such as Central Amer-ica, Africa, and South Asia.

______________97For this reason, among many others, the United States cannot contemplate the ac-ceptance of a “no-first-use” nuclear strategy just as certainly as China will continue toinsist on such a pledge for both geopolitical and propaganda purposes.




ernance remain intact. Consequently, an assertive China should notprove surprising because it represents “a flawed regime”99 that couldassault democratic polities, including the United States, through any means including war. Other theorists might argue, as suggestedabove, that China, though flawed, is evolving toward democracy andthe prospects of assertiveness increase not because of its benightednature but because of its democratic immaturity. 100 To assess theprospect of an assertive China in the context of a systemic powertransition many decades hence, both these arguments may be setaside, however. Even if it is assumed that China successfully democratizes, and that it avoids all the perils associated with ademocratic transition in the interim, it is still unlikely that thisdemocratic China would prove to be highly cooperative in the We-berian “ideal typical” sense described above, not because of any pe-culiarities relating to China per se, but because the notion of thedemocratic peace is less-than-entirely robust to begin with.

Although it has been argued that the “absence of war betweendemocracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,”101 the fact remains that the substantiveclaims underlying this generalization are at least controversial if notproblematic. For starters, the assertion that democracies never fighteach other appears to be highly sensitive both to the way in whichthe terms “democracy” and “war” are viewed and to the statisticalmethods used to make the overarching generalization plausible. 102

Even if these problems are overlooked, however, the issue of whetherthe absence of war between democratic states is a statistically signifi-cant result remains an open question and at least one scholar hasquite convincingly argued that the zero instances of war betweendemocratic states is simply “predicted by random chance,” whichimplies that if the “explanation we know to be untrue—randomchance—predicts the absence of war between democracies betterthan liberal theories of international relations,” then “the absence of

______________99Goldstein (1997/98), p. 66.

100See Mansfield and Snyder (1995) for an elaboration of such an argument.

101Levy (1989), p. 270.102

See the discussion in Thompson and Tucker (1997).




war should not be considered as confirming evidence of those theo-ries.”103

Moving on to more substantive grounds, other scholars have notedthat “democracies have been few in number over the past twocenturies” and hence, it should not be surprising to find that “therehave not been many cases where two democracies were in a positionto fight each other.”104 This argument also applies to the absence of

war among democracies in the post-1945 period where the strong threats mounted by the Soviet Union, coupled with the stability provided by the United States as the dominant superpower, morethan amply accounts for the pacificity among democratic states,especially in Europe. In fact, even one defender of the democratic

peace argument has quite cogently argued that

the creation of zones of peace or areas in which states are much lesslikely to go to war with one another has as much, and perhapsmore, to do with the settlement of, or restraints imposed on, re-gional primacy questions as it does the type of political system. Inessence, most of the states that became (and remained) democraticin the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had created orfound themselves in relatively cooperative niches that insulatedthem from extremely competitive, regional international politics.The various ways in which these niches were established had im-portant and positive implications for the likelihood of domesticdemocratization processes. Usually the niches preceded substan-tial progress in democratization and, short of outright invasion, thegeopolitical circumstances leading to the evolution of the nichesseem most responsible for peace between democracies.105

Perhaps the most damning argument against democratic peace,however, has come from a close scrutiny of those instances whendemocratic powers went to the brink of war without going over it:One scholar was able to demonstrate that in every one of four majorepisodes examined, the claims of democratic peace theory werecompletely unable to account for the pacific outcomes eventually obtained, all of which in fact were better explained by power-

______________103Spiro (1994), p. 51.

104Mearsheimer (1994/95), pp. 50–51.

105Thompson (1996).




political considerations such as differences in national interests, theinternational distribution of capabilities, and the positional locationof the competing states in the global system.106

Not surprisingly, one comprehensive survey of the relationship be-tween democracy and peace concluded that “on the basis of thehistorical record, it is not clear that the spread of democracy in andof itself will exert much influence on the incidence of serious inter-state conflict.”107 Given such conclusions, it is difficult to affirm thata democratic China would ipso facto resist the assertiveness thatcould possibly lead to war. If the realists are correct, even an interna-tional system populated entirely by democratic states would experi-ence assertive behaviors and possibly even wars because the many

shades of democracy would intersect with differing national intereststo create conflicts in much the same way as competing national in-terests intersect with differences in domestic regimes today to pro-duce occasional altercations and war. The democratic revolution perse may simply not be sufficient to prevent China from assertively reaching out for those great power privileges it believes are rightfully its own: It did not prevent the United States, a democratic power,from asserting its prerogatives against Great Britain, the previousdominant power and a democratic state to boot, in such a way dur-ing the last power transition at the turn of the century that one mag-isterial analysis concluded that “there was every strategic, economicand psychological justification for England to see in the UnitedStates the successor to Imperial Germany, Napoleonic and BourbonFrance and Philip II’s Spain as an overwhelming super-power dan-gerous to English prosperity and independence, even if armed ag-gression itself was hardly to be expected.”108 Mutatis mutandis , U.S.

______________106See Layne (1994).

107Farber and Gowa (1995), p. 146. This conclusion too has been contested mainly onmethodological grounds. See Thompson and Tucker (1997); Gochman (1996/97); andFarber and Gowa’s rejoinder in the same issue. For Gowa’s definitive statement aboutthe untenability of the democratic peace argument, see Gowa (1999).

108Barnett (1972), p. 257. Lest the last clause in this quotation cause any misunder-standing, it should be noted that the absence of “armed aggression” in the Anglo- American power transition referred to here had little to do with the democraticcharacter of the two protagonists. Rather, Barnett convincingly argues that pacificity

in this instance was clearly a product of a sentimental English disposition that resultedin the “British display[ing] towards the United States the forgiveness, [and] theblindness towards blemishes of character and conduct, commonly found in a man




attitudes toward China may one day be described in similar terms,their presumed common democratic structures notwithstanding.

The debate and the evidence for democratic peace, therefore, do notprovide any uncontestable assurance of a cooperative China. Yet, itis possible that the spread of democracy remains the best hope foravoiding major conflicts leading to war if one believes that the uni-versal egoism of human nature so clearly described by ThomasHobbes in the Leviathan could in fact evolve in the direction of thatgreater moral awareness implicit in the conditions necessary for thesuccess of Kant’s prescriptions in Perpetual Peace . In other words, if a gradual growth of moral sensibilities is assumed to characterize theevolution of political order, it is possible that a strong, democratic

China, although increasingly assertive in many respects, might rely less on military force to resolve major disputes with other democraticstates, including the United States, than would a strong, authoritar-ian, China.

Overall, then, the expectation that China would increasingly pursuean assertive course, as (and if) its power grows to the point where asystemic power transition is feasible, derives in the first instancefrom an assessment that all the arguments offered for the pursuit of acontrary trajectory are either limited, contested, flawed, or irrelevant.Economic interdependence either may not be a salient restraining condition for China at this time or it may not create the cooperativeposture even if dense economic interconnectivity obtains. Further,

the nature of power in international politics has not been trans-formed as far as the fundamentals are concerned, thus leaving China

with little choice but to pursue the strategies associated traditionally with “territorial states.” Although nuclear weapons may provide se-curity for the homeland—if they are not substantially denatured inthe interim by new technologies created to counter them—they do soonly at the cost of shifting the locus of assertive behavior towardconventional warfighting, targeting the extended deterrence rela-tionships held by the adversary, and controlling important neutral

_____________________________________________________________infatuated. For the British governing classes were infatuated with America—or, rather, with a mythical America conjured up by their own romantic vision” (p. 258).




states in the international system. And, finally, the spread of democ-racy, however perfect, also does not provide any clear assuranceagainst the pursuit of an assertive posture, although, in the finalanalysis, the spread of democracy offers perhaps the best hope formitigating the worst outcomes associated with power transitions atthe core of the international system if some metaphysical conceptionof progress is held to be operative in the human world of politics.

In addition to all these arguments, which are derived primarily fromthe weaknesses of the claims for expected cooperation, there areother simple but extremely powerful reasons for arguing that Chi-nese assertiveness is to be expected for all the time-honored reasonsassociated with power-politics. First, “fear”: As rising states grow in

relative power, they seek to protect their steadily growing assetsagainst the possible depredations of others by all means necessary,including assertive acts involving military force. Second,“anticipation”: As rising states grow in relative power, they often feelcompelled to act preemptively against potential rivals if they per-ceive that preclusive strategies would better safeguard their interestsin the face of those inevitable counterresponses that will be mountedby other states as a reaction to their expanding power. Third,“status”: As rising states grow in relative power, they inevitably seek to advance their standing in the international system as a way to se-cure both the psychic rewards of eminence and the more materialbenefits that arise from an ability to control the rules and arrange-ments governing the distribution of resources and rewards in inter-national politics. Fourth, “greed”: As rising states grow in relativepower, they acquire the resources necessary to appropriate thoseobjects they may have long desired but could not secure before theirgrowth in power. Fifth, “irredentism”: As rising states grow in rela-tive power, they sometimes use their new capabilities to reacquiregoods they once possessed (or believe are rightfully theirs) before theownership of these goods changed hands either because of the men-dacity or the superior power of others. Sixth, “cooptation”: As rising states grow in relative power, their political leadership may occa-sionally use assertive international policies as payoffs for critical do-mestic constituencies whose support is essential for the continuedsurvival and dominance of such elites at home.




These motivations, in various combinations, usually drive rising states toward assertive behaviors that often take the form of ex-panded military capabilities, increasingly muscular overseas pres-ence, and greatly enlarged foreign security commitments. Together,they serve to exacerbate the “security dilemma”109 that arises be-cause of the difficulty in distinguishing between the measures statestake to defend themselves and the measures that increase their ca-pacity for aggression. Thanks to such difficulties, other powers—es-pecially the existing dominant power and the neighbors of the rising state—tend to react to the rising state by military or political counter-responses of their own; these, in turn, serve only to increase the ris-ing state’s sense of threat and results in even more accelerated effortsat power accumulation as the latter prepares to stave off any poten-tial “preventive war” that may be waged by the declining dominantpower. The interactive nature of this dynamic can produce extended“crisis slides” during an incipient power transition when “relatively trivial incidents or a string of seemingly minor crises”110 may sufficeto transform what is usually a precarious structural transformationinto major war.

The historical record, in fact, seems to corroborate the theoreticalexpectations delineated above and it suggests that, despite the dif-ferent reasons in every case, rising powers invariably turn out to beassertive—an assertiveness that has usually led to war in the past. Itis useful, therefore, to briefly scrutinize the historical record becauseit provides many insights that bear on the prospects for future as-sertiveness by China over the long term. The record, summarized inTable 1 is drawn from Modelski and Thompson’s early work on the“long cycles of world politics,” and this chronology is used, despitethe problems attributed to Modelski and Thompson in particular andto narratives centered on hegemonic theories in general, primarily asa heuristic that illuminates the dynamics associated with systemictransitions rather than as an endorsement of long-cycle theory in all

______________109Jervis (1978).

110Thompson (1983a), p. 100.



Utopia R

Table 1

Hegemonic Cycles in Modern History

Hegemon Rising Power Rising Power’s ActionsOpposition toRising Power Outcome Structura

Venice(MiddleAges–1494)

Spain,France

Spain and France at war over Italy England,Ottoman Turkey,Italian city-states

1494–1517 (ItalianWars)

Spanish victortian hegemonhegemony

Portugal(1517–1580)

Spain Spain absorbs Portugal (1580),attacks Portuguese ally, the UnitedProvinces

England,France

1585–1608(Spanish Wars)

Demise of Spaof Dutch hege

Netherlands(1609–1713)

France,Great Britain

France attacks the United Provinces,Germany, and Spain

Great Britain 1689–1713 (Warsof Louis XIV)

Demise of Fredemise of Dutof British hege

Great Britain(1714–1815)

France Napoleonic France wars against restof Europe

Great Britain,Austria,Prussia,Russia

1793–1815(Napoleonic Wars)

Demise of Nap

continued Bri


Germany,United States,Russia

Germany attempts to dominateEurope

Great Britain,United States,Russia

1914–1918 (FirstWorld War)

Demise of Gercontinued Bri


Germany, Japan,USSR,United States

Germany and Japan attempt todominate Europe and the Pacific

Great Britain,United States,USSR

1939–1945 (SecondWorld War)

Demise of Gerchallenge andmony; rise of U

United States(1945–1992)

USSR,China (after1978)

Soviets attempt to dominate Europeand the globe

United States,Western Europe, Japan,China (after ~1960)

1950–1992 (ColdWar)

Collapse of thcontinuation

United States(1992–)

China (?) (?) United States (?) (?) (?)




its details.111 The analysis below does not attempt to describe thevarious hegemonic cycles at length, as these descriptions are avail-able elsewhere. Instead, it concentrates on uncovering the insightsoffered by such a reconstruction with respect to the propensity for,and patterns of, assertiveness on the part of competing great(including rising) powers and the effects of such competition in thecontext of the power transitions that have previously taken place ininternational politics.

The historical reconstruction represented by Table 1 obviously rep-resents a view of international politics as a succession of hegemoniccycles. In an analytic tradition going back to Quincy Wright’s work atthe University of Chicago in the 1940s and incorporating the views of

others such as Arnold Toynbee, Ludwig Dehio, and A.F.K. Organski,the hegemonic cycle is based on the idea that one country rises to thepinnacle of the international system as the result of a hegemonic warand it subsists there until the uneven growth of power creates new challengers who, through political actions aimed at either the exist-ing dominant power or other states, precipitate new global wars thatstart a new hegemonic cycle.

Viewed in this perspective, the reconstruction begins with Venice asthe first dominant power in the modern period, since before about1500 “the global system was a dispersed one.”112 The Venetianhegemony arose gradually as a result of Venice’s maritime victoriesover its other Italian competitors, mainly Genoa, in the late 14th cen-

tury, and it was steadily consolidated thanks to its maritime location which allowed it to control the long distance trade between China,India, Persia, and Western Europe. As Venetian hegemony was being consolidated, however, an internal transformation was occurring in

______________111One difficulty associated with the hegemonic cycles conceptualized by long-cycletheories is the criterion for hegemony. By defining hegemony primarily in terms of seapower, these hegemonic cycles underplay the importance of continental states that,despite their lack of sea power assets, nonetheless dominated the political affairs of large continental areas. For a good discussion of the substantive and methodologicallimits of various conceptions of hegemony, see Nye (1991), pp. 1–48. Fortunately,none of these difficulties handicap this analysis unduly, since all alternativeconstructions of hegemonic cycles, as for example those detailed in Goldstein (1988),support the primary conclusion advanced in the following paragraphs: that systemic

power transitions historically have usually been accompanied by war.112Modelski (1978), p. 218.




Spain in the form of the marriage between Ferdinand II of Aragonand Isabella of Castile—an event that would create a new “unitedand revitalized country [and] lead Spain to a pre-eminent globalposition of power and wealth.”113 A similar transformation was oc-curring in France with the rise of the Valois monarchy and beforelong the two rising powers—the French Valois and the SpanishHapsburgs—were engaged in the Italian wars, a lengthy series of struggles for dominance over the Italian city states. The eventualSpanish victory over France, assisted in great measure by assistancefrom England, Ottoman Turkey, and most of the Italian city-states,including Venice, did not suffice to prevent the slow demise of Vene-tian hegemony as a result of the painfully high costs borne during theItalian wars.

As the Italian wars were occurring along the south European periph-ery, the Portuguese monarchs, determined to replace the lucrative

Venetian control over the eastern trade east with their own, began aseries of overseas expeditions and “in the series of swift naval cam-paigns that followed, a string of naval bases was established and rivalfleets were wiped off the oceans.”114 By 1515, Portugal, hithertomerely a rising aspirant, became a global power on the strength of her naval fleet which, incorporating new long-range sailing tech-nologies such as the galleon and the caravel, allowed it to secure anEastern empire, monopolize the spice trade, and mount explorationsas far off as Brazil. The rise of Portuguese hegemony, however, wasto be short lived: “feeling the strain of maintaining this far-flung sys-tem on a rather slender home base,”115 Portugal succumbed to itsstill-growing landward neighbor, Spain, which, fresh from its victo-ries in the Italian Wars, seized Portugal in 1580. On the strength of this conquest, the newly enlarged Spain attempted to incorporateprevious Portuguese territories and allies by force and in particularfocused on the wealthy Dutch United Provinces “which derivedmuch of their income from trade with Lisbon” and until a short timeago had “served as the banking and distribution center of the Por-

______________113Dupuy and Dupuy (1986), p. 430.

114Modelski (1978), p. 218

115Modelski (1978), p. 219




tuguese system.”116 This assertive Spanish behavior was opposed by England and Spain’s old but not entirely eliminated competitor,France. The resulting Spanish wars that followed resulted in the de-feat of Spanish assertiveness and the rise of Dutch hegemony.

The Dutch hegemony which probably could be dated as beginning in1609 was consolidated by 1660, when the Dutch navy established itssuperiority over the Spanish fleet and controlled three-quarters of allEuropean merchant shipping. As the Dutch slowly replaced first the

Venetian and then the Portuguese and Spanish control over the east-ern trade with their own “firm hold over the spice trade of the Indies”combined with “substantial interests in Africa and the Americas,” 117

another rising European power was emerging on the horizon. This

power, France, had profited greatly from English assistance in theprevious struggles with Spain and thanks to its new growth in inter-nal power under the Bourbon monarchy, launched another round of assertive behaviors through attacks on the Dutch United Provinces,Germany, and Spain for mastery in Europe. The great French pres-sure on the Dutch in particular resulted in a new alliance betweenthe Dutch United Provinces and Great Britain—an alliance whichcontinued throughout the wars of Louis XIV. Although the Dutchmanaged to hold their own against France, the costs of resistanceturned out to be extremely high “as the Netherlands were as slendera platform for [sustaining] a global system as Portugal had been[before].”118 As a result, even though French assertiveness wasbeaten back, Dutch hegemony declined as well and there occurredan “effective transfer of global power to what had just become GreatBritain.”119

The rise of Great Britain, which resulted both from internal consoli-dation occurring within the British Isles and the successful defeat of successive challenges emanating from Spain and France over a cou-ple of centuries, would over time produce the most significant im-perium in modern times. During this period, however, it would facethree important rising powers, each of which launched formidably

______________116Modelski (1978), p. 220.

117Modelski (1978), p. 220.

118Modelski (1978), p. 220.

119Modelski (1978), p. 221.




assertive campaigns aimed at restructuring the existing patterns of governance in the global system. During the first phase of Britishhegemony (1714–1815), Great Britain, mostly alone, faced a rising France in the person of Napoleon whose exercise of assertion in-volved simply a war against all of Europe. This challenge, which re-sulted in the Napoleonic wars between 1793–1815, was settled by thedefeat of the Napoleonic challenge and a continuation of Britain’shegemony. During the second phase (1816–1918), Great Britainfaced a rising Germany which, after its unification in 1870, grew rapidly in power and eventually engaged in an exercise of assertionthat would embroil all of Europe in the First World War. Aided by theUnited States, Britain beat back the German challenge momentarily but was greatly enervated in the process. Thanks to internal changesduring the 1930s, Germany returned once again—in tandem withanother rising power, Japan—to confront Great Britain during thethird phase of its hegemony (1918–1945) in an even more demanding exercise of assertiveness, which eventually became the Second World

War. Aided now by the recently consolidated Soviet Union and themature but hitherto uninvolved United States, Britain checkmatedthe German and Japanese challenges but at the cost of its own hege-mony which, like the transfer to the Dutch United Provinces many centuries earlier, was now similarly transferred to the United Statesthrough the crucible of war.

The affirmation of U.S. hegemony in 1945 was immediately con-fronted by the assertive attempts made by the Soviet Union which, asone of the victors in the war against Germany and Japan, experi-enced a rapid distension in its power after the Second World War.From 1950–1992, the United States spent enormous resources, effort,and energy in checkmating various assertive behaviors on the part of the Soviet Union in a fashion quite closely analogous to the Britishefforts directed against Napoleon between 1793–1815. These efforts,collectively termed the Cold War, ended only in 1992 with the inter-nal collapse of the Soviet Union and the triumphant continuation of U.S. hegemony, at least until the next serious assertive challenge ismounted by some other rising challenger in the future. The relatively peaceful systemic transition that occurred in 1992 was the first suchexample in over 500 years of modern history and has been attributed

in large part to the presence of nuclear weaponry possessed by boththe existing hegemon and the declining challenger. The extreme de-




structiveness embodied by these weapons is supposed to have pre-vented the latter from resorting to war even in the face of an un-precedented internal political failure and subsequent collapse.

This brief reconstruction of international political history since 1494embodies several critical insights that bear on the question of futureChinese behavior over the long term. Before this extrapolation isexplicitly addressed however, it may be useful to simply summarizethe major insights gleaned from the historical record.

First, rising challengers have materialized throughout history forvarious reasons. These include internal political consolidation, asoccurred in Spain during 1479–1504; revolutionary technological

changes as, for example, those occurring in the realm in seafaring, which underwrote Portugal’s rise in power from 1517–1580; externaleconomic and political changes, primarily the acquisition of a stableoverseas empire which was responsible for Britain’s maintenance of global hegemony during the years 1714–1945; and, finally, the experi-ence of rapid domestic economic growth, as occurred in Germany after its reunification in 1870 and continuing until the onset of theFirst World War in 1914.

Second, no rising state thus far has accepted the prevailing interna-tional political order and peacefully integrated itself into it. Giventhe theoretical arguments elucidated above, this is not at allsurprising, since accepting the extant arrangements of governance

would imply that the rising state has chosen not to reconfigure theexisting order to suit its own interests. It is theoretically possible thatthe existing order perfectly suits the interests of the new rising stateand hence demands no restructuring, but it is highly unlikely thatsuch a condition would ever obtain in practice. This is because eachinternational order usually reflects, however imperfectly, thepreferences of the reigning hegemon and, in the competitive world of egoist international politics, it is highly unlikely that what suits theexisting hegemon also suits the rising challenger just as well. Notsurprisingly, then, every major rising power thus far—Spain, France,Germany, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union—hasmounted challenges in different ways to the established order whenthey were in their ascending phase, and even those rising powers

that appear not to have mounted any military challenges leading tosystemic war—such as the United States—were spared the burdens




of doing so because other rising powers—by challenging thepreexisting hegemonies—provided an opportunity for challengerssuch as the United States to temporarily defend the preexisting hegemonic order but ultimately replace it with their own.120

Third, geopolitics conditions the character and targets of a rising state’s assertiveness, not the fact of it. The evidence seems to suggestthat geographical considerations—that is, whether a country is acontinental or a maritime entity—affect how its assertiveness wouldbe manifested, especially with respect to the range and identity of itstargets, but it does not seem to make a major difference as far as thepresence or absence of assertiveness is concerned. In general, rising states that have a continental character appear to focus on nearby

targets, whereas maritime states can range more widely, dominating territories at a much greater range from the homeland. Althoughthese differences, therefore, both affect who the “victims” of a rising state might be and condition the intensity of opposition emerging asa result of a given state’s assertiveness—with continental powersprecipitating greater immediate opposition in comparison to mar-itime powers—the geophysical location of the rising state itself doesnot seem to make any difference to the fact of assertiveness: Thus,maritime powers such as Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain,Japan, and the United States proceeded to acquire great formal orinformal empires at some distance from their political frontiers (evenas they attempted to manipulate strategic outcomes in other areas),

whereas Spain, France, Germany, Russia, and the Soviet Union were,thanks to geography, condemned to manifest their assertive strate-gies much closer to home and often in the face of immediate andmore intense opposition.

Fourth, all rising states, save one, have been involved in systemic wars at the time of a global power transition. As noted above, theprincipal exception to the rule involves the collapse of the SovietUnion, an exception usually attributed to the presence of nuclear

weapons. Whether this attribution is accurate is hard to say giventhat Soviet collapse occurred outside of the context of defeat in war

______________120It is worth noting that before its defense of the preexisting hegemonic order, first in

1914–1918 and later in 1939–1945, the United States itself mounted a series of chal-lenges to British hegemony, mainly in the Western Hemisphere. See, Barnett (1972)and Thompson (1996), for a good review of the details.




and principally as a result of internal political choices. If the lattercause, in fact, was responsible for the absence of war, then thepeacefulness of this systemic transition was a product of mainly id-iosyncratic causes. Very often, though, another example of a peace-ful transition is offered—that involving the United States and GreatBritain. It is difficult to accept this as a good example of a peacefulsystemic transition because the transfer of power from Britain to theUnited States came about explicitly through war—a war that did notpit the United States against Great Britain because, among otherthings, German actions guaranteed that such a conflict was in factunnecessary. During the Second World War, two rising states, Ger-many and Japan, attacked the existing hegemon, Great Britain, forc-ing the hegemon-in-waiting, the United States, to rush to the assis-tance of the latter because it too would soon be attacked by the rising challengers. Whether a peaceful systemic transition would have oc-curred between Britain and the United States, if Germany and Japanhad not been present on the global scene, remains an issue forcounterfactual history, but the empirical record does not warrant la-beling this systemic transition peaceful except in a narrow Pickwick-ian sense.121

Fifth, the systemic wars that do occur as part of hegemonic transi-tions have multiple causes and diverse origins. Some of these warsoccur because rising challengers may choose to attack the existing hegemon directly . Although there is an impression that such warsare frequent, an impression that may be fostered in part by cursory readings of Organski’s and Gilpin’s work on hegemonic wars, the factremains that direct attacks on a hegemon by rising challengers arerare and infrequent in modern times. The best examples of such a

______________121This confusion about the peacefulness of the U.S.-British transition often arises onmethodological grounds because systemic power transitions are often viewed aspurely dyadic events, an impression unfortunately fostered by Organski and Kugler’searly work on power transition theory. If systemic transitions, however, are viewed—as they should be—as involving more than two actors (which include the existing hegemon, several rising powers, and some bystanders), then the fact that some rising powers may not initiate systemic wars because other rising powers either attack themor attack the preexisting hegemon can be properly appreciated. The fact that some of these rising challengers do not initiate wars, then, does not make the systemic transi-tion peaceful: Rather, the transition is always conflictual whether it is brought about

by the actions of some or of all rising powers or even because of preventative war deci-sions made by the declining hegemon.




war from Modelski’s narrative remains the French attack on theDutch United Provinces under Louis XIV. Most systemic wars in factoccur because (a) some rising states attack other rising states to con-solidate their power but nonetheless manage to precipitate systemic

war because the existing hegemon enters the fray on behalf of the weaker side to preempt a future challenge that may be mounted by the stronger rising power (the Italian wars); or, (b) some rising statesattack key allies of the existing hegemon or important neutrals in asearch for regional gains, which nonetheless precipitates systemic

war because the existing hegemon enters the fray on behalf of theally or the neutral to prevent a shift in the future balance of power(the Spanish wars, the Napoleonic wars, and the First and Second

World Wars). Most systemic wars, therefore, come about as a resultof catalytic interventions by the existing hegemon on behalf of someother victims—interventions undertaken mainly for balance of power considerations—and rarely because the rising state directly attacks the existing hegemon to begin with.122

Sixth, and finally, systemic power transitions often occur becausesuccesses in systemic wars can irreparably weaken existing hege-monies. In fact, no rising challenger has thus far succeeded in sup-planting any prevailing hegemony by war. Spain, France, Germany,Japan, and the Soviet Union all tried in different ways but failed. Thisfact notwithstanding, hegemonic transitions still occurred and thispoints to two critical insights about the succession process in worldpolitics. First, struggles for hegemony are rarely dyadic encountersbetween two powers. Although these struggles involve the existing hegemon and the rising challenger as the preeminent antagonists,the entire cast of characters and the nature of their involvement be-come relevant to the succession process. Second, who wins is as im-portant as by how much. This is particularly true because thestrongest surviving state in the winning coalition usually turns out tobe the new hegemon after a systemic war. Both Great Britain and theUnited States secured their hegemony in this way, the former

______________122 As Thompson (1983a) succinctly phrased it, it is “the threat of transition, and not its accomplishment, that creates a crisis for the global political system,” as assertivebehaviors on the part of rising powers, which may be inherently “relatively

insignificant, or seemingly so” create conflagration because they occur at about thetime when a structural transition is exactly at stake in the system and looks all butinevitable (cf., p. 112) [emphasis added].




through the wreckage of the wars with Louis XIV and with Napoleon,the latter through the wreckage of the wars with Hitler and Hirohito.Thus, “while fundamental structural changes are indeed associated

with world or global wars, the changes [eventually] brought about areas much in spite of the challengers’ efforts as they are due tothem.”123

What does this comparative historical narrative suggest about Chi-na’s future behavior? Expressed briefly in propositional form, it sug-gests the following:

• If China does materialize as a rising power, it will be because adomestic economic transformation converts it into a potential

challenger at the core of the international system.

• As a rising state, it is unlikely to simply accept the prevailing U.S.-dominated international political order and peacefully integrateitself into it.

• As a continental state (though with local maritime aspirations),China is more likely to display assertiveness closer to homerather than in the “distant abroad” (at least in the early stages of its growing power) though such behavior—if it occurs—is likely to precipitate counterbalancing coalitions involving its immedi-ate landward and offshore neighbors in concert with more dis-tant powers.

•

This exercise of assertiveness could generate a range of political,economic, and military conflicts and, in the limiting case, even amajor regional war which involves the existing hegemon, theUnited States.

• The participation of the United States in such a conflict on behalf of, or in concert with, other local states threatened by China may be intended initially merely as a limited engagement but it couldmutate ultimately into a consequential struggle over control of the international system.

These five propositions drawn from the analysis of the past powertransitions in international politics illustrated in Table 1 may be

______________123Thompson (1983b), p. 353.




summed up in the deceptively simple conclusion that the weight of global history suggests that China as a rising power will exhibitincreasingly assertive behaviors over time, especially during thephase surrounding a systemic power transition, but that the triumphof the United States would be truly evanescent if, in the process of successfully combating such assertiveness, it enervated itself to thepoint where another rising power assumes global leadership simply because the victorious but now exhausted hegemon has no furthercapacity to resist.



231

Chapter Six

CONCLUSIONS

The expectation that China eventually would pursue an assertivegrand strategic policy—in the aftermath of successfully attaining comprehensive national strength—will not be surprising to most stu-dents of international politics, since such behavior would be fairly consistent with the conduct of previous great powers historically.

Assertive policies in the case of China may be more likely for twoother reasons. First, the unique and long-standing Chinese experi-ence of geopolitical primacy and the association of that primacy withgood order, civilization, virtue, and justice, may make the pursuit of geopolitical centrality through assertive behavior once again attrac-tive, even in the absence of a hierarchical Confucian world view.1

Moreover, the record presented in Chapter Three suggests that the

use and exploitation of force was by no means exceptional in Chi-nese history, many official protestations today notwithstanding,2

even though the application of intense levels of force for prolongedperiods was often resisted by some Chinese political elites and eventhough strong Chinese regimes would at times eschew the use of force when it was shown to be ineffective and inferior to appease-ment. In general, it is unlikely that imperial China behaved signifi-cantly differently from Republican Rome where defense of the pe-riphery was concerned and at least one authority has argued that

______________1 As suggested in Chapters Two and Three, the Chinese emphasis on geopolitical pri-macy derives as much from China’s general historical experience as the predominantpolitical, economic, cultural, and military power of East Asia as it does on the specificbelief system of the Chinese state at any particular time.2For one such example, see Li (1997).



232 China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future

Neither Chinese nor Romans, retreating in the face of aggressivebarbarians, dug in on a fortified line to save civilization. On thecontrary, Chinese and Romans, each exploiting a geographical envi-ronment that had recognizable characteristics, built up the highestcivilizations of their times. They expanded to take in all the terrainthat could be profitably exploited by the techniques they already had, until they reached a zone—the depths of Mongolia, the depthsof Germany—which because of costs of transportation and dis-tances from metropolitan markets could not be further integrated

with the urban-rural oikumene . Further expansion would meandiminishing returns—too much military expenditure, too little addi-tional revenue. That was where they dug in and why they dug in.Their “defense lines” were in fact the limits which they themselvesset on their own expansion.3

As also shown in Chapter Three, within this general dynamic, theChinese, like the Romans, pursued a variety of stratagems—punitiveexpeditions in some cases, coopting adversaries in others, andmultiple forms of bribery in still some other instances—but theoverarching objective still remained at the very least theneutralization of, or at best control over, the strategic periphery and,more important, the defense of a hegemony that was initially createdby force, when possible, and ultimately legitimized and maintainedby the claim of virtue and superior order and a related demand fordeference from neighboring powers. If China fulfills its expectedpotential, there is no reason to believe that it will not eventually seek

to “establish some sort of hegemony to protect and promote itsinterests.”4 Thanks to the changing circumstances of the age and atleast some of the lessons provided by Chinese history, this hegemony may not “necessarily involve the physical conquest and occupationof neighboring countries5 . . . but [it] would mean the use of varioustypes of coercion to maintain an environment favorable to China’sinterests, and not necessarily to anyone else’s.”6

At the very least, therefore, growing Chinese power would at somepoint in the future likely result in a search for “hegemony” under-

______________3Lattimore (1979), p. 274.

4Roy (1996), p. 762.

5Nor, we should add, prolonged or major conflicts with other powers.6Roy (1996).



Conclusions 233

stood as a quest for universal acceptance of its increased power,status, and influence as a legitimate right. Toward that end, if history is a reasonably accurate guide, an assertive China could reasonably be expected to augment its military capabilities in a mannercommensurate with its increased power; develop a sphere of influ-ence by acquiring new allies and underwriting the protection of oth-ers; acquire new or reclaim old territory for their resources or forsymbolic reasons by penalizing, if necessary, any opponents or by-standers who resist such claims; prepare to redress past wrongs itbelieves it may have suffered; attempt to rewrite the prevailing inter-national “rules of the game” to reflect its own interests; and, in themost extreme policy choice imaginable, even ready itself to thwartpreventive war or to launch predatory attacks on its foes. Although itis unlikely that the last choice would be attractive in the nuclear ageand might be made less likely if China were to become a democracy,the fact remains that any combination of these policies, thoughnatural from the perspective of a powerful state, would stir thesuspicion of its rivals and precipitate an action-reaction spiral thatreinforces the temptation to embark on assertive stratagems evenmore strongly.

Second, an assertive China is likely to appear over the long haul, un-der the assumptions discussed above (including continued highgrowth, domestic political and social stability, etc.) precisely becausethe United States, the established hegemon, will—if the historicalrecord pertaining to previous declining hegemonies holds—prepareto arrest its own gradual loss of relative power and influence. Thisbehavior may, of course, not be oriented explicitly and solely tocoping with an emerging Chinese threat, but it will nonetheless takeplace “under the shadow” of steadily increasing Chinese power. As aresult, the attempts at regeneration will most likely provide numer-ous opportunities for various domestic constituencies within theUnited States to cast the process in explicitly anti-Chinese terms.Some of this rhetoric may be intended to shape the national consen-sus in pursuit of a robust containment strategy directed against thenew rival, whereas other constituencies may be content simply touse the rhetoric to obscure their own private pursuit of some narrow rent-seeking opportunities that may arise as a result of growing Chi-

nese power.




Even apart from such efforts at exploiting the China threat (whichmight materialize at the societal level), the U.S. state itself, for purely prudent reasons, would most likely be inclined at some point to ac-celerate its efforts at national renewal merely to immunize itself against the worst consequences imaginable as a result of greatly in-creased Chinese power. Consistent with this objective, the UnitedStates, for fully understandable reasons, would eventually seek tofurther improve its military capabilities in the face of significant in-creases in Chinese military power to ensure an effective defense of itself and its allies; restructure its economy and society to reverse un-favorable growth trends, increase technological innovation, or ab-sorb or counter innovations that may be emerging elsewhere; pre-serve the extant international “rules of the game” with minimalchanges in an effort to accommodate the rising challenger at thelowest minimal cost; maintain the existing political order by renew-ing its existing alliances, perhaps by altering the existing division of labor, reapportioning prevailing burdens, or recruiting new allies;develop new alliances by offering protection to states potentially threatened by the new rising power; and, in the most extreme re-sponse imaginable, contemplate preventive war or at least anticipateand prepare for military challenges mounted at itself and its allies.

Although it is unlikely that extreme variants of the last ingredient would form part of responsible U.S. policymaking, the fact remainsthat even the other policy responses would be interpreted by Beijing as little other than a covert attempt to contain China. Suspicions of this sort are already strong in Beijing, but they are likely to becomeeven more corrosive—probably more justifiably—if and when Chinaapproaches the status of a true global peer of the United States . If China, in fact, continues to be governed by a nonliberal regime atthat point, the traditional U.S. crusading impulse may only reinforcethose imperatives flowing from the desire to maintain a balance of power into an even more aggressive attempt at containment. In any event, and irrespective of the precise dynamics involved, the inter-section of diffidence on the part of the declining power—and all theefforts at arresting decline that those give rise to—and confidence onthe part of the rising power—with all the assertiveness occasioned by that assurance—is likely to result in a rivalry that can only be

managed but not avoided or wished away.



Conclusions 235

If such a rivalry can be anticipated, even if only over the long term,the question of how the United States should respond becomes acritical issue.7 Many political realists argue that so long as the rise of China is assessed to be inevitable, there is no strategic alternative, inessence, to containing China—assuming that weakening, or under-mining, or destroying it in some risk-free way is impossible. Machi-avelli, writing at a different point in history, in fact provided the firstsystematic baseline for such a policy when he described the contoursof Roman imperial strategy toward the Greeks. As Machiavelli ap-provingly described, Rome was compelled to conquer Greece to pre-empt Antiochus of Syria from securing Greece for himself. Clearly,neither Greece nor Syria threatened Roman security in any immedi-ate sense but,

the Romans, seeing inconveniences from afar, always found reme-dies for them and never allowed them to continue so as to escape a

war, because they knew that war may not be avoided but [only] de-ferred to the advantage of others.8

The realism of Machiavelli, therefore, concludes that security can bepreserved only by prudential action and that prudence in the face of potential changes in the international power structure can only takethe form of continual preemptive conquest.9 Since it is unlikely thatthe U.S. polity would find the Machiavellian solution very appetizing,preemptive conquest, which may be costly, unsuccessful, andperhaps even unethical in the modern age, may have to be replaced,in the view of some observers, by more conservative strategies suchas preemptive containment or “polite containment,”10 since weak-ening or undermining China is both costly to the current U.S. desirefor high absolute gains and is fraught with great risks. One of themost insightful analyses of U.S. foreign policy has claimed, however,

______________7The best discussion of how alternative theoretical formulations like realism and lib-eralism in their various forms generate different policy responses can be found inBetts (1993/94). For a more recent discussion of U.S. policy responses, see Khalilzad etal. (1999).

8Machiavelli, XII–XIII.

9On Machiavelli’s realism and its prescriptions for effective politics, see Tellis

(1995/96), pp. 25–39.10Betts (1993/94), p. 54.




that preemptive containment, even if desirable and effective, is notpossible. Quoting John Quincy Adams who remarked that “Americadoes not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy,” the historian

Walter McDougall has argued that the U.S. national temperament, which favors late and reluctant entrance into warfare (perhaps, afterhaving absorbed the first blow), could not countenance preemptivestrategies of any kind, no matter how efficacious those might havebeen in retrospect.11 Other scholars have argued that even if pre-emptive containment of China were possible, it is simply undesirablebecause “if you insist on treating another country like an enemy, it islikely to become one.”12 In other words, U.S. efforts to contain China

would almost certainly provoke the emergence of an assertive, andmore militant, China far sooner and to a much greater degree thanmight have otherwise occurred and, by implication, would likely preclude the emergence of a more cooperative China through any means short of internal collapse or conquest in war. For a variety of reasons, therefore, a containment strategy configured as ananticipatory response to the potential growth in Chinese power, isnot feasible or desirable as a U.S. grand strategic policy.

If preemptive containment is inappropriate, the opposite strategy of preemptive appeasement is certainly premature and probably un-tenable as well. The notion of appeasement has acquired a certainodium in the vocabulary of modern politics because of its association

with the failure of British policies toward Hitler in the 1930s and atleast one scholar has argued that because of its loaded connotations,it ought to be banished from the political lexicon altogether.13 If these nominalistic considerations are disregarded for the moment infavor of a more analytic approach, the fact remains that appease-ment has been a time-honored strategy employed by many states,often with effective results. In the most general sense, appeasementconsists of meeting a claimant’s demands without asking for any re-ciprocal advantages. Such a strategy has often been thought to beself-defeating because of the inherently altruistic premises built into

______________11McDougall (1997), p. 25.

12Harries (1997), p. 35.

13Medlicott (1969).



Conclusions 237

its logic.14 Yet, successful instances of appeasement in the past havehad little to do with altruism. Rather, they arose because the ap-peaser often could do nothing other than appease in the specific sit-uation at hand; or because the claimant’s objectives were limited,

justified, and legitimate; or because the appeaser simply elected torespond conciliatorily to initiate a process of diffuse reciprocity that

would eventually result in higher joint gains for both sides.

The principal problem with preemptive appeasement as a grandstrategic response to China, however, may not be its potential inef-fectiveness but rather its prematurity. This is because China’s rise togreatness is yet to be assured.15 As argued in Chapter Five, many obstacles could still undermine its acquisition of comprehensive na-

tional strength and result in the failure of China to become a globalpeer competitor of the United States, or delay the attainment of thatstatus beyond even the lengthy time period identified in this study.Because China’s success is not yet assured, a general strategy of pre-emptively appeasing China may turn out to be a case of giving away too much, too early. Consequently, so long as China is not a true su-perpower, that is, a state that “enjoys relatively low sensitivity, vul-nerability, and security interdependence because of massiveresources and skill differentials and relative economic self-suffi-ciency,”16 it ought not be treated as a peer competitor whosegoodwill must be procured at any cost, including unilateral concilia-tion on important strategic issues, by the United States.

This of course does not mean that the United States should neverundertake unilateral initiatives to encourage a more cooperativeChina, or to reassure a fearful China, or even to catalyze a coopera-tive relationship with a powerful China. Those decisions should de-pend, as Morgenthau put it, on whether the Chinese claim or con-cern in question embodies “rationally limited objectives which mustbe disposed of either on their intrinsic merits or by way of compro-mise.”17 If this claim is not part of a “chain at the end of which

______________14Middlemas (1972).

15In a somewhat hyperbolic vein, one commentator has even argued that China may not even matter very much today. See Segal (1999).

16Kim (1997), p. 24.17Morgenthau (1985), p. 78.




stands the overthrow of the status quo,”18 U.S. appeasement may be worthwhile at some future point in time. But U.S. grand strategy to-day is simply confronted by the possibility of a rising China, not theassurance of a global rival, and consequently a significant preemp-tive appeasement strategy that results both in the continued accre-tion of Chinese power and in the bolstering of Chinese status withoutconcern for the implications such improvements pose for U.S. powerand status cannot be in U.S. interests.

If both preemptive containment and preemptive appeasement of China are then judged to be premature as basic strategies, the only broad surviving policy option for the United States remains someform of realistic engagement. It may seem ironic that an analytic as-

sessment that prognosticates the rise of Chinese power and arguesthat such power would eventually become assertive finally concludesthat there may be no alternative to engaging China, at least in thepolicy-relevant future. Yet, the presumed irony rapidly disappears

when it is understood that the analysis emphatically affirms the in-herently high level of uncertainty afflicting all projections relating toChina’s future growth in power-political capacity, and the possibility that an assertive, strong China might become more moderate towardthe use of force under some circumstances if its political system wereto become democratic. If the growth in Chinese power and the re-sulting application of that power to external policy-related areas is amuch more contingent phenomenon than is usually realized, thenthe mere possibility of this growth occurring cannot be reasonenough for engaging in a preemptive strategy of any kind. This is es-pecially true so long as there exists some small chance of avoiding the worst outcomes that would almost certainly result from the pur-suit of a preemptive strategy.

Thus, so long as there is some chance that Chinese assertiveness may not occur for various reasons, U.S. strategy ought neither create thepreconditions for its occurrence nor retreat in the expectation that itsoccurrence is inevitable. Further, if there is some hope that the worstravages of future security competition between the United States anda strong China can be avoided, U.S. grand strategists are bound by

______________

18Morgenthau (1985).



Conclusions 239

both the dictates of prudence and moral sensibility to explore every possibility that reduces the prospects of future international turmoil.

Even if the rise of Chinese power and its associated assertiveness were an absolute certainty—in terms of the “systemic” predictionsdeduced by some theory of world politics—the sheer length of time it

would take this process to unfold allows the United States anopportunity to condition both the form and the intensity of theresulting competition. Among the first things the United Statesought to do in preparing for this potential competition is to jettisonthe use of rhetorical labels such as “containment,” “appeasement,”and “constrainment” to define all or part of its strategic orientationtoward China. It is worth remembering that an effective policy

toward rising Chinese power will include various operationalelements associated with each of these very different, and in many respects antagonistic, concepts. Consequently, it is more productivefor U.S. security managers to focus on the content of desirablepolicies to be pursued in various issue-areas than on iconic and insome cases potentially inflammatory labels that are supposed toexhaustively describe the nature of U.S. strategic orientation.19

Unfortunately, discussing the precise content of these desirablepolicies would take this document too far afield20 and, hence, sub-sequent discussion will be restricted simply to identifying the basiccomponents that any realistic engagement of China ought to en-compass. First, the process of engagement ought to include three

related strands or objectives of policy: (1) to pursue , wheneverfeasible, the possibilities of cooperation aimed at attaining deeperlevels of encounter, stronger degrees of mutual trust and confidence,more clearly defined notions of reciprocity or equity, and greaterlevels of integration into the international system, and to use theresulting expanded level of cooperation and integration to encouragemovement by China toward a democratic form of government; (2) todiscourage or, if ultimately necessary, prevent acquisition by China

______________19Even the term “engagement” itself can be highly misleading in this context, if it istaken to mean some form of appeasement or unqualified search for amicable relations with China at any cost. As is made clear below, the authors do not ascribe to such aflawed definition of “engagement.”

20However, such an effort is currently under way, as part of a more detailed examina-tion by the authors of China’s calculative strategy and its implications for U.S. policy.




of capabilities that could unambiguously threaten the mostfundamental core national security interests of the United States in

Asia and beyond; and (3) to remain prepared , if necessary, to cope with—by means of diplomacy, economic relations, and military instruments—the consequences of a more assertive and militantChina with greater capabilities in a variety of political, strategic, andeconomic issue-areas.

All three of these policy strands are arguably implicit in existing U.S.strategy toward China. Yet they are rarely recognized as such; norare they espoused, much less implemented, in a coordinated and in-tegrated fashion across various issue areas by the multiple bureau-cracies within the U.S. government. On the contrary, many ob-

servers, and some government officials, often emphasize only onestrand, often at the expense of one or both of the other two.

Second, engagement should identify and maintain a clear set of op-erational objectives, preferably centered on China’s external security behavior, given the critical significance of such behavior to core U.S.national security interests. In particular, these objectives should re-late most directly to key issue-areas of interest to the United States,including the U.S. presence, access, and alliance structure in Asia,the open international economic order, and the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction.

Third, engagement should be based upon a clear assessment of the

multiple instruments available to support its three central strandsand the tradeoffs inherent in the use of these instruments. Thisshould include an evaluation of the range and types of hedging strategies required of the United States together with an assessmentof how the pursuit of some hedging strategies could either under-mine or enhance the success of engagement to begin with. Further,it should be recognized that even if engagement experiences greatsuccess in the interim, the policy may not survive unscathed over thelonger term, when the superiority in Chinese power may make thenecessity of accommodating the United States less pressing. Conse-quently, prudent forethought about what is necessary should or

when engagement fails, both in the near and far term, is critical.

Finally, the overall development of a more effective engagementpolicy requires a better understanding of how China’s calculative



Conclusions 241

strategy might evolve over time as China’s capabilities change, to in-fluence the form and intensity of both China’s cooperative and its as-sertive behavior.

Even as this sharper reassessment of engagement is developed, how-ever, it is important to clarify U.S. grand strategy and the objectivesto which it aspires: The engagement of China should not be a policy prescription designed to assist the growth of Chinese power so that itmay eventually eclipse the United States, even if peacefully. Rather,engagement must be oriented toward encouraging a more coopera-tive China, whether strong or weak, while also preserving U.S. pri-macy in geopolitical terms, including in critical military and eco-nomic arenas, given the fact that such primacy has provided the

conditions for both regional and global order and economic pros-perity. Together, the predicates of engagement should also focus oneliciting Beijing’s recognition that challenging existing U.S.leadership would be both arduous and costly and, hence, not inChina’s long-term interest.

The U.S. effort in this regard will arguably be facilitated if China be-comes a democratic state that is more fully integrated into the inter-national order and less inclined to employ military means. In gen-eral, so long as Beijing eschews the use of force and works peacefully to both adjust to and shape the future international system, the mostdestabilizing consequences of growing Chinese power will be mini-mized and, if the advocates of the democratic peace are correct, a

U.S.-led international order of democratic states of which China is apart might even be able to avoid the worst ravages of security compe-tition. Yet one must also keep in mind that the historical record sug-gests that the challenges to the attainment of this goal are likely toprove enormous because the structural constraints imposed by competitive international politics will interact with the chaotic do-mestic processes in both the United States and China to most likely produce an antagonistic interaction between these entities at thecore of the global system.



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