62404529-Wills-3-Digest
Transcript of 62404529-Wills-3-Digest
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Marcela Rodelas v. Amparo Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509; December 7, 1982
Facts:
Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holo will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was
opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla
Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. The grounds of their opposition are as follows:
1. Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce
the will within twenty days of the death of the testator.
2. The alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was
not intended to take effect.
3. The original must be presented and not the copy thereof.
4. The deceased did not leave any will.
The appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will. The
appellees' motions were denied. They filed a Motion for recon. Motion for Recon was
approved. Appellant's motion for recon was denied. Appellant appealed the case to the CA
which certified the case to the SC on hte ground that the appeal does not involve questions
of fact.
Issue:
Whether or not a holo will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.
Ruling:
Yes. a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs.
Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity."
But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of
the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
Spouses Roberto and Thelma Ajero v. Court of Appeals and Clemente Sand
G.R. No. 106720; September 15, 1994
Facts:
The decedent names as devisees Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente
Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose
Ajero and their children.
The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decendent's holo will.
Private Respondnet opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's
body nor the signature therein was in decendent's handwriting; it contained alterations
and corrections which were not duly signed by the decedent; and the will was procured by
pets through improper pressure and undue influence. Dr. Jose Ajero also opposed the
petition. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran,
Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
The trial court admitted the holo will to probate. On appeal, the said decision was reversed
and the pet for probate was dismissed. The CA found that the holo will failed to meet the
requirements for its validity. I held that the decedent did not comply with Arts 813 and
814.It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,
or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made
thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Ruling:
1. Refer to Art. 839.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition
to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and,
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament
void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Kalaw vs. Relova:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not
thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that
which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810).
2. The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of
the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct
and must be affirmed.As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass
only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional
instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and
pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably
stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late
father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly
dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
--
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Sofia Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, Rufina Gomez, Oscar Jugo Ang, Carmelita Jugo
G.R. No. L-62952; October 9, 1985
Facts:
Martin Jugo named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. The will clearly stated that the testator was legally married to a
certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita. He stated
that since 1952 he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living
with petitioner as husband and wife. The testator and the petitioner herein were married
in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs,
namely his legal wife and his children (Oscar & Carmelita) his entire estate. He devised the
free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The pet filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased. The
legal wife and her children filed an opposition.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to
cohabiting with the pet. The Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on
the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The respondent
court set aside the decision of the CFI. It declared the will to be valid except the devise in
favor of the pet pursuant to Art, 739 in relation with Art. 1028.
Pet filed a motion for recon - denied.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after
declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein
petitioner.
2. Validity of hte disposition in favor of the pet.
Ruling:
1. No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the
devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of
the Will.
In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because
of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have
been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing
upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
2. Invalid. Refer to Art. 739.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private
respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the
meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance
of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary
evidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the
will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as
man and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the
parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who
opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Polly Cayetano v. Hon. Tomas Leonidas and Nenita Campos Paguia
G.R. No. L-54919; May 30, 1984
Facts:
Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters,
private respondent Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as surviving heirs.
Hermogenes Campos adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased. Eleven months after, Nenita filed a pet for the reprobate of a will of the deceased
which was allegedly executed un the US.
Nenita alleged that after the testatrix death, her last will and test was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered in Philly.
The pet for the reprobate of the will was opposed. Pet filed a motion to dismiss opposition
stating that he has been able to verify the veracity of the will and now confirms the same to
be truly the probated will of his daughter.
The lower court admitted the will to probate. Hermogenes filed a pet for relief, praying
that the order allowing the will to be set aside was secured through fraudulent means.
Motion for recon denied.
Meanwhile, pet died and left a will, which incidentally has been questioned by the
respondent.
Issues:
Validity of the provisions of the will.
Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's
will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law
for him. - Without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. -Art. 16, 1039.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is
the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to
a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would
be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Vda. De Molo v. Molo
90 Phil 37
Facts:
The proponent of the will is the widow of the testator, while the opponents are nephews
and nieces of the testator. Petitioner filed a pet for the probate of a will executed by the
deceased on June 20, 1939. The will was denied probate on the ground that it did not
comply with the formalities prescribed by law. In view of the disallowance, the widow filed
another petition for the probate of a copy of another will executed on August 17, 1918. The
will was admitted to probate in spite of the opposition of the appellants. The will of 1939
contains a revocatory clause expressly revoking the will of 1918.
Ruling:
The will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of ‘dependent relative
revocation.’ Under this doctrine, the rule is established that where the act of destruction is
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the
testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the
efficacy of the new disposition; and if for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a
substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in force.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Teodora Caneda v. Court of Appeals and William Cabrera
G.R. No. 103554; May 28, 1993
Facts:
Mateo Caballero executed a last will and testament in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting
witnesses. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was
declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo,
Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the
testator.
Four months after the execution of the will, Mateo himself filed a petition seeking the
probate of his will. The testator passed away before his petition could be heard.
One of the legatees named in his will sought appointment as special administrator of the
estate. The estimated value of the estate was 24K. Petitioners, claiming to be nephews and
nieces of the testator, instituted a 2nd petition for the intestate proceeding of the estate
and opposed thereat the probate of the testator's will.
Benoni Cabrera died, hence, the probate court appointed William Cabrera as special
administrator. Petitioners opposed the probate on the ground that the testator was
already in poor health when the will was executed. Petitioners likewise question the
genuineness of the testator's signature.
One of the attesting witness and the notary public testified that the testator was of sound
mind. The probate court rendered a decision declaring the will as the last will and
testament of the deceased.
The pets elevated the case to the CA on the ground that the will in question is null and void
for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective. The appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court. MR denied.
Issue:
Validity of the attestation clause.
Ruling:
Invalid. It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in
contravention of the express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil
Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses
the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,
likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
While the will recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were
used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other.
The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for
his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the
instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and
Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in
the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer
to the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing
in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has
signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on
the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the
statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect
or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here
sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the
aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely
involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the
application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision
thereon in the Civil Code(Refer to Art, 809)
While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and
at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be
conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in
the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the
presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does
not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where
the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various
combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina Palang and Herminia Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 116668; July 28, 1997
Facts:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marraige(1949) with Carlina Vallesterol. They had one
child, Hermina Palang(1950). Miguel left to work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. He returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit was in 1964. The trial court found
evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
came back for good in 1972, he refused to live with the PRs.
Miguel contracted a 2nd marriage with Erlinda Aglipay (1973). Two months earlier, M and
E jointly purchased an agricultural land. They also bought a res. lot. In 1975, M and C
executed a Deed of of all their conjugal prop to Herminia Palang. M and E produced a
son(Kristofer). In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage. Miguel died 2 yrs later. RPs
instituted an action for the recovery of ownership and poss with damages against pet in
the RTC of Urdaneta. PRs sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with the pet. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.
Issues:
1. Ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action;
2. Kristofer's heirship and filiation.
Ruling:
1. In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually
contributed money to buy the subject Riceland. On the date of conveyance, petitioner was
only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner
of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price. Petitioner now claims that the
riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the
nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the
operation of Article 148 of the Family Code.
2. "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery of ownership and possession."
Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio Vivares
G.R. No. 12099; October 30, 1997
Facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament. He bequeathed all
his prop to his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his brother Jose. The will consisted of two pages
and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso,
Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated
the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a
petition for probate of the will. The recognized natural children of Torcuato with Estebana
Galolo and Celsa Agape filed an opposition. The court declared that the will was exec
according w/ the forma prescribed by law. However, it ruled that Asuncion was never
married to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is invalid). Julio Vivares filed an
appeals before the CA with the allegation that the oppositos failed to present ay comp.
evidence taht Asuncion was legally married to another person. The CA affirmed the trial
court's decision but with the modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.
Ruling:
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due
execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the
testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's provisions. The intrinsic validity is not
considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been
proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the
probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical considerations"
demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are of
doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The lower court was not
asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result,
the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be
scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes
as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and
which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Ursulina Ganuelas v. Robert Cawed
G.R. No. 123968; April 24, 2003
Facts:
Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of real prop covering seven parcels of land
in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas .Celestina executed a docu purporting to set aside
the deed of donation. More than a month later, Celestina died(1967) without issue and any
surviving ascendants and siblings. After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the
produce of the donated properties with private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al.,
nieces of Celestina. In 1982, Ursulina secured tax decs in her name over the donated props
and since then, she refused to give private respondents any share in the produce. PRs filed
a complaint against Ursulina. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by
Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void. The trial court rendering judgment declaring null
and void the Deed of Donation and ordered the partition of the estate of Celestina.
Issue:
Donation inter vivos or mortis causa??
Ruling:
TC decision affirmed! Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the
former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until
the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee
until the death of the donor-testator. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and
accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except
when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the
donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills,
otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that
any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior
to the death of Celestina.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to
Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in the deed
stating that if the donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed
rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem
disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis
causa. As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the
formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with,
failing which the donation is void and produces no effect.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125888; August 13, 1998
Facts:
A deed of donation was executed by Aurora Montinola. It named as donees her
grandchildren. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of
their acceptance of the donation. Aurora drew up a deed of revocation and caused it to be
annotated as an adverse claim on hte title. She filed a petition in court for the cancellation
of the transfer on the ground that the transfer was mortis causa - thus, void because it did
not comply with the formalities of a will. The donees opposed the pet. The trial court
judgment holding that the donation was one inter vivos. She elevated the case to the CA.
Meanwhile, Aurora died. Shortly after A's demise, a manifestation and motion was filed by
Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Sicad alleged taht they had become the owners of the prop by
virtue of a deed of definite sale. The CA affirmed the TC's decision.
Issue:
Character of the deed of donation.
Ruling:
The evidence establishes that Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect
only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale
of the property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed
reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated
within 10 years after the death of the donor." The actuality of the subsequent insertion of
this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easily
perceived and identified — it was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed
into the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that immediately
preceding it.
Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion in the deed of that restrictive proviso,
but also, after recordation of the deed of donation, she never stopped treating the property
as her own. She continued, as explicity authorized in the deed itself, to possess the
property, enjoy its fruits and otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the
property taxes as they fell due — all these she did until she transferred the Property to the
Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990.
As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and
the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its
execution. In this respect, case law has laid down significant parameters.
The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora Estrada
G.R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997
Facts:
Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College
of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent
by judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities
which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was
appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Amparo commenced a suit to eject the
spouses Estrada from the said premises. In their Answer, the defendants declared that they
had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful
service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact
executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in
question.The MTC rendered judgment in favor of Caniza. The RTC reversed said decision.
The appellate court affirmed the RTC's judgment.
Issue:
Evangelista's authority.
Ruling:
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her
intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial
guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed
or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,
id.). An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by
his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime
for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the
owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the
house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly
installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN
CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary
for the management of her properties . . " By that appointment, it became Evangelista's
duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure
her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. It
also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's
property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right
to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the
ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from
anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose.
--
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Heirs of Jesus Fran v. Hon. Bernardo LL. Salas
G.R. No. L-53546; June 25, 1992
Facts:
Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal
properties located in Cebu City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. She left a last
will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives(b,s,n,n) all her
properties. She designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor.
Jesus Fran filed a pet for the probate of Remedios' will. The pet alleged that Rosario was
not physically well. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Fran on hte third page of the pet.
The PRs (sisters of the deceased) filed a manifestation, alleging that they needed time to
study the petition bec. some heirs have been intentionally omitted. PRs did not file any
opposition. The pet thus became uncontested. The probate court rendered a decision
admitting the will to probate. Pet filed an Inventory of the Estate, copies thereof were
furnished to the PRs. A Project of Partition was submitted by hte exec to the court. The PRs
still did not make any objections. TC issued its Order approving the partition. Thereafter,
the aforesaid branch(which issued the order) was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
PRs filed with the new branch a MR of the probate judgment and the order of partition.
Pets challenged the juris of the court. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring the
testamentary dispos as void.
Issue:
1. GAD of respondent Judge.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter set
aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the
subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions therein and
ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been
no claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a
Project of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily
signed and to which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity through a
certification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private
respondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their
prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony. In
testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is
normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate
the proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they
should have desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded from
petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The same
conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing
the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of
the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because private
respondents were present when the court dictated the said order.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Joseph Cua v. Gloria Vargas
G.R. No. 156536; October 31, 2006
Facts:
A parcel of land(99 sqm) was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. The heirs executed a
notarized extrajudicial settlement among themselves, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question, each of them getting a share of 11 sq meters. Among the
heirs, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. Florentino, Andres,
Antonina, and Gloria did not sign the document. The document was published for three
consecutive weeks. An extra-j settlement with sale was again executed. Once more, only
E,V,J,Z, and R signed and their shares were sold to Joseph Cua. According to Gloria, she
came to know of hte settlement only when the original house was being demolished. She
also claimed that she was unaware of the first document. She sent a letter to petitioner in
order to redeem the property.
When Gloria and Jose failed to reach an amicable settlement, the former filed a case for
annulment of the EJS and legal redemption of the lot. After trial on the merits, the MTC
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because
the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-
owner heirs. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision.
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts. MR denied.
Issues:
1. Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure
to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published;
2. Whether the written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection
with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of the
Civil Code can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale.
Ruling:
1. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs
who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact
of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and
was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.
In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed
either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before
the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do
not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is
invalid insofar as they are concerned.
*This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary
rights to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually
participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to
petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.
Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article
1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were
never notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs.
2. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in
some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the
time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-
heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his
or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the
vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners
who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This will remove all uncertainty as to the
fact of the sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the
alienation is not definitive. As a result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the
seller may still contest the alienation.
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement,
there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to
petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Cresencia Tubo Rodriguez v. Evangeline Rodriguez
G.R. No. 175720; September 11, 2007
Facts:
Juanito Rodriguez owned a 5-door apartment. In 1983, he executed a "Huling habilin at
testamento' giving petitioner Cresencia Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D
and E, and his children Benjamin(deceased husband of respondent), apartment A;
respondent Buenaventura, aprtment B; and Belen, apartment C.
However, in 1984, the deceased executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor
of the petitioner.
In 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents,
alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property, and that in 1984, she
allowed respondents to occupy hte units. However, without her knowlege and consent, the
respondents separately leased the units to Magpantay, Navarro, and Escota.
Respondents claimed ownership of hte property by succession. They alleged that the deed
of sale was simulated and void. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents.
The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. MR
denied.
Issue:
1. Possession of the property.
2. Ownership
Ruling:
1. *Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject property, she enjoys the
right of possession thereof and that question of ownership cannot be raised in an
ejectment case unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the court may
look into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure to determine the nature
of possession, it cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the resolution of said issue
would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not proper in the summary action for
unlawful detainer. Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments
disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that the testator changed or
revoked his will by selling the property to petitioner prior to his death. -ya! duh!
--> Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right to possession of property, the question of title is not involved
and should be raised by the affected party in an appropriate action in the proper court.
2. However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is not ousted of its jurisdiction.
Section 16 of Rule 70.(ROC) All that the trial court can do is to make an initial
determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to
its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership. But this adjudication is only
provisional and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the property.
*Wills - The lower courts considered the following documentary evidence in arriving at
their respective decisions: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento 2) Deed of Sale 3) TCT No. in
the name of the petitioner; and 4) Partition Agreement executed by both the respondents
and the petitioner.
Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that there is preponderance of
evidence in favor of the petitioner’s claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of
possession, as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal
effect since the will has not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it
must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article
838 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” As the will was not
probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto cannot be given
effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said agreement becomes immaterial in
the determination of the issue of possession.
Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito
Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the
time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to dispose of it
during his lifetime.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Teresita Bordalba v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112443; January 25, 2002
Facts:
A lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned by the late Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita de Jayme. In 1947, an EJP was executed. Distributed as follows:
1. 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private
respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia
and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose
heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
2. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.
Bordalba; and
3. 1/3 to an unidentified party.
Nicanor's house stands on the land adjudicated to the heirs. Sometime in 1964, pets
mother, filed with the RTC an amended application for the registration of the lot. Nicanor
and Asuncion filed their opposition contending that said application included the 1/3
portion inherited by them in the extra-judicial partition. The case was dismissed.
Subsequently, pet filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a free patent. Pet was
successfullly granted a free patent. Thereafter, pet caused the subdivision of the lot into 6
lots. The private respondents filed with the RTC, the instant complaint against the
petitioner and the director of the BOL. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by
pet, declared said patent and title void and ordered its cancellation. However, it declared
that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are
purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as valid
the sale of the lot. Both petitioner and private respondents appealed to the CA which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
Wills Issue:(ito lang ata)
WON the PRs are the legal heirs of the deceased.
Ruling:
Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented
by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right
to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.
Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118464; Decemebr 21, 1998
Facts:
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of a
lot in Lucena City. Lourdes died without issue. PRs, claiming to be the collateral relatives of
the deceased Lourdes, filed an action for partition. Conti refused the partition on the
ground that PRs failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs
of Lourdes. When Ignacio died, he was substituted as party-defendant by his kids.
PR Lydia Sampayo presented an original copy of her cert. of live birth to prove that she
was one of the nieces of Lourdes. Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel tried to prove that
they were the siblings of Lourdes by presenting their baptismal certs together with the
birth cert of Manuel.
Rosario claimed that Lourdes agreed to leave her share of the property to them. However,
no will, either testamentary of holo, was presented by pets to substantiate this claim. The
TC declared PRs as the rightful heirs of Lourdes. It further ordered PRs and pets to submit
a project of partition. Pets elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the assailed decision.
MR denied.
Issues:
1. WON the settlement of the estate is a condition precedent before the commencement of
any action pertaining to hte deceased.
2. WON PRs are the rightful heirs of the deceased.
Ruling:
1. No. The title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his
heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration
and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and
expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the
intestate, from himself to his heirs.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the
action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with
extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of
estates of small value. But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation
of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through intestate succession.
This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. Rule 69, Sec. 1)
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
2. Yes. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent
and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Legal or intestate succession
takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent. It was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issue.
Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives
of Lourdes.
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
[G.R. No. 156819. December 11, 2003]
ALICIA E. GALA, GUIA G. DOMINGO and RITA G. BENSON, petitioners, vs. ELLICE
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, MARGO MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, RAUL E. GALA, VITALIANO N. AGUIRRE II, ADNAN V. ALONTO, ELIAS
N. CRESENCIO, MOISES S. MANIEGO, RODOLFO B. REYNO, RENATO S. GONZALES,
VICENTE C. NOLAN, NESTOR N. BATICULON, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the
decision dated November 8, 2002 [1] and the resolution dated December 27, 2002 [2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71979.
On March 28, 1979, the spouses Manuel and Alicia Gala, their children Guia Domingo,
Ofelia Gala, Raul Gala, and Rita Benson, and their encargados Virgilio Galeon and Julian
Jader formed and organized the Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation. [3] The total
subscribed capital stock of the corporation was apportioned as follows:
Name Number of Shares Amount
Manuel R. Gala 11, 700 1,170,000.00
Alicia E. Gala 23,200 2,320,000.00
Guia G. Domingo 16 1,600.00
Ofelia E. Gala 40 4,000.00
Raul E. Gala 40 4,000.00
Rita G. Benson 2 200.00
Virgilio Galeon 1 100.00
Julian Jader 1 100.00
TOTAL 35,000 P3,500,000.00 [4]
As payment for their subscriptions, the Gala spouses transferred several parcels of land
located in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna to Ellice. [5]
In 1982, Manuel Gala, Alicia Gala and Ofelia Gala subscribed to an additional 3,299 shares,
10,652.5 shares and 286.5 shares, respectively. [6]
On June 28, 1982, Manuel Gala and Alicia Gala acquired an additional 550 shares and 281
shares, respectively. [7]
Subsequently, on September 16, 1982, Guia Domingo, Ofelia Gala, Raul Gala, Virgilio Galeon
and Julian Jader incorporated the Margo Management and Development Corporation
(Margo). [8] The total subscribed capital stock of Margo was apportioned as follows:
Name Number of Shares Amount
Raul E. Gala 6,640 66,400.00
Ofelia E. Gala 6,640 66,400.00
Guia G. Domingo 6,640 66,400.00
Virgilio Galeon 40 40.00
Julian Jader 40 40.00
TOTAL 20,000 P200,000.00 [9]
On November 10, 1982, Manuel Gala sold 13,314 of his shares in Ellice to Margo. [10]
Alicia Gala transferred 1,000 of her shares in Ellice to a certain Victor de Villa on March 2,
1983. That same day, de Villa transferred said shares to Margo. [11] A few months later,
on August 28, 1983, Alicia Gala transferred 854.3 of her shares to Ofelia Gala, 500 to Guia
Domingo and 500 to Raul Gala. [12]
Years later, on February 8, 1988, Manuel Gala transferred all of his remaining holdings in
Ellice, amounting to 2,164 shares, to Raul Gala. [13]
On July 20, 1988, Alicia Gala transferred 10,000 of her shares to Margo. [14]
Thus, as of the date on which this case was commenced, the stockholdings in Ellice were
allocated as follows:
Name Number of Shares Amount
Margo 24,312.5 2,431,250.00
Alicia Gala 21,480.2 2,148,020.00
Raul Gala 2,704.5 270,450.00
Ofelia Gala 980.8 98,080.00
Gina Domingo 516 51,600.00
Rita Benson 2 200.00
Virgilio Galeon 1 100.00
Julian Jader 1 100.00
Adnan Alonto 1 100.00
Elias Cresencio 1 100.00
TOTAL 50,000 P5,000,000.00
On June 23, 1990, a special stockholders’ meeting of Margo was held, where a new board of
directors was elected. [15] That same day, the newly-elected board elected a new set of
officers. Raul Gala was elected as chairman, president and general manager. During the
meeting, the board approved several actions, including the commencement of proceedings
to annul certain dispositions of Margo’s property made by Alicia Gala. The board also
resolved to change the name of the corporation to MRG Management and Development
Corporation. [16]
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
Similarly, a special stockholders’ meeting of Ellice was held on August 24, 1990 to elect a
new board of directors. In the ensuing organizational meeting later that day, a new set of
corporate officers was elected. Likewise, Raul Gala was elected as chairman, president and
general manager.
On March 27, 1990, respondents filed against petitioners with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a petition for the appointment of a management committee or receiver,
accounting and restitution by the directors and officers, and the dissolution of Ellice Agro-
Industrial Corporation for alleged mismanagement, diversion of funds, financial losses and
the dissipation of assets, docketed as SEC Case No. 3747. [17] The petition was amended
to delete the prayer for the appointment of a management committee or receiver and for
the dissolution of Ellice. Additionally, respondents prayed that they be allowed to inspect
the corporate books and documents of Ellice. [18]
In turn, petitioners initiated a complaint against the respondents on June 26, 1991,
docketed as SEC Case No. 4027, praying for, among others, the nullification of the elections
of directors and officers of both Margo Management and Development Corporation and
Ellice Industrial Corporation; the nullification of all board resolutions issued by Margo
from June 23, 1990 up to the present and all board resolutions issued by Ellice from
August 24, 1990 up to the present; and the return of all titles to real property in the name
of Margo and Ellice, as well as all corporate papers and records of both Margo and Ellice
which are in the possession and control of the respondents. [19]
The two cases were consolidated in an Order dated November 23, 1993. [20]
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the SEC cases, the shares of stock of Alicia and Ofelia
Gala in Ellice were levied and sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against
them by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66, in Civil Case No. 42560, entitled
“Regines Condominium v. Ofelia (Gala) Panes and Alicia Gala.” [21]
On November 3, 1998, the SEC rendered a Joint Decision in SEC Cases Nos. 3747 and 4027,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Dismissing the petition in SEC Case No. 3747,
2. Issuing the following orders in SEC Case No. 4027;
(a) Enjoining herein respondents to perform corporate acts of both Ellice and Margo,
as directors and officers thereof.
(b) Nullifying the election of the new sets of Board of Directors and Officers of Ellice
and Margo from June 23, 1990 to the present, and that of Ellice from August 24, 1990 to
the present.
(c) Ordering the respondent Raul Gala to return all the titles of real properties in the
names of Ellice and Margo which were unlawfully taken and held by him.
(d) Directing the respondents to return to herein petitioners all corporate papers,
records of both Ellice and Margo which are in their possession and control.
SO ORDERED. [22]
Respondents appealed to the SEC En Banc, which, on July 4, 2002, rendered its Decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Hearing Officer dated November 3, 1998 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one hereby rendered granting the appeal, upholding
the Amended Petition in SEC Case No. 3747, and dismissing the Petition with Prayer for
Issuance of Preliminary Restraining Order and granting the Compulsory Counterclaim in
SEC Case No. 4027.
Accordingly, appellees Alicia Gala and Guia G. Domingo are ordered as follows:
(1) jointly and solidarily pay ELLICE and/or MARGO the amount of P700,000.00
representing the consideration for the unauthorized sale of a parcel of land to Lucky
Homes and Development Corporation (Exhs. “N” and “CCC”);
(2) jointly and severally pay ELLICE and MARGO the proceeds of sales of agricultural
products averaging P120,000.00 per month from February 17, 1988;
(3) jointly and severally indemnify the appellants P90,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
(4) jointly and solidarily pay the costs of suit;
(5) turn over to the individual appellants the corporate records of ELLICE and
MARGO in their possession; and
(6) desist and refrain from interfering with the management of ELLICE and MARGO.
SO ORDERED. [23]
Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
petition for review and affirmed the decision of the SEC En Banc. [24]
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS ILLEGAL AND
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY THE PURPOSES AND MANNER IN WHICH RESPONDENT
CORPORATIONS WERE ORGANIZED – WHICH WERE, E.G. TO (1) “PREVENT THE GALA
ESTATE FROM BEING BROUGHT UNDER THE COVERAGE (SIC)” OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP) AND (2) PURPORTEDLY FOR “ESTATE
PLANNING.”
II
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED (1) IN SUSPICIOUSLY RESOLVING THE
CASE WITHIN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT; AND (2) IN
NOT MAKING A DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES OF FACTS AND INSTEAD RITUALLY
CITING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION A QUO WITHOUT DISCUSSION
AND ANALYSIS;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF
RESPONDENT CORPORATIONS WAS NOT ILLEGAL FOR DEPRIVING PETITIONER RITA G.
BENSON OF HER LEGITIME.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT PIERCING THE VEILS OF
CORPORATE FICTION OF RESPONDENTS CORPORATIONS ELLICE AND MARGO. [25]
In essence, petitioners want this Court to disregard the separate juridical personalities of
Ellice and Margo for the purpose of treating all property purportedly owned by said
corporations as property solely owned by the Gala spouses.
The petitioners’ first contention in support of this theory is that the purposes for which
Ellice and Margo were organized should be declared as illegal and contrary to public
policy. They claim that the respondents never pursued exemption from land reform
coverage in good faith and instead merely used the corporations as tools to circumvent
land reform laws and to avoid estate taxes. Specifically, they point out that respondents
have not shown that the transfers of the land in favor of Ellice were executed in
compliance with the requirements of Section 13 of R.A. 3844. [26] Furthermore, they
alleged that respondent corporations were run without any of the conventional corporate
formalities. [27]
At the outset, the Court holds that petitioners’ contentions impugning the legality of the
purposes for which Ellice and Margo were organized, amount to collateral attacks which
are prohibited in this jurisdiction. [28]
The best proof of the purpose of a corporation is its articles of incorporation and by-laws.
The articles of incorporation must state the primary and secondary purposes of the
corporation, while the by-laws outline the administrative organization of the corporation,
which, in turn, is supposed to insure or facilitate the accomplishment of said purpose. [29]
In the case at bar, a perusal of the Articles of Incorporation of Ellice and Margo shows no
sign of the allegedly illegal purposes that petitioners are complaining of. It is well to note
that, if a corporation’s purpose, as stated in the Articles of Incorporation, is lawful, then the
SEC has no authority to inquire whether the corporation has purposes other than those
stated, and mandamus will lie to compel it to issue the certificate of incorporation. [30]
Assuming there was even a grain of truth to the petitioners’ claims regarding the legality of
what are alleged to be the corporations’ true purposes, we are still precluded from
granting them relief. We cannot address here their concerns regarding circumvention of
land reform laws, for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. [31] Since primary
jurisdiction over any violation of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3844 that may have been
committed is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
[32] then it is with said administrative agency that the petitioners must first plead their
case. With regard to their claim that Ellice and Margo were meant to be used as mere tools
for the avoidance of estate taxes, suffice it say that the legal right of a taxpayer to reduce
the amount of what otherwise could be his taxes or altogether avoid them, by means which
the law permits, cannot be doubted. [33]
The petitioners’ allegation that Ellice and Margo were run without any of the typical
corporate formalities, even if true, would not merit the grant of any of the relief set forth in
their prayer. We cannot disregard the corporate entities of Ellice and Margo on this
ground. At most, such allegations, if proven to be true, should be addressed in an
administrative case before the SEC. [34]
Thus, even if Ellice and Margo were organized for the purpose of exempting the properties
of the Gala spouses from the coverage of land reform legislation and avoiding estate taxes,
we cannot disregard their separate juridical personalities.
Next, petitioners make much of the fact that the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision a mere two days from the time the respondents filed their Comment. They
alleged that the appellate court could not have made a deliberate study of the factual
questions in the case, considering the sheer volume of evidence available. [35] In support
of this allegation, they point out that the Court of Appeals merely adopted the factual
findings of the SEC En Banc verbatim, without deliberation and analysis. [36]
In People v. Mercado, [37] we ruled that the speed with which a lower court disposes of a
case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed,
magistrates are not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have
been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that jurists study a case long
before the deadline set for the promulgation of their decision has arrived. The two-day
period between the filing of petitioners’ Comment and the promulgation of the decision
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision.
As long as the lower court does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor
of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, it cannot be taken to task for rendering its
decision with due dispatch. The Court of Appeals in this intra-corporate controversy
committed no reversible error and, consequently, its decision should be affirmed. [38]
Verily, if such swift disposition of a case is considered a non-issue in cases where the life or
liberty of a person is at stake, then we see no reason why the same principle cannot apply
when only private rights are involved.
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. They carry even
more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of a lower fact-finding
body. [39] Likewise, the findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not
be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. [40]
However, in the interest of equity, this Court has reviewed the factual findings of the SEC
En Banc, which were affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, and has found no cogent
reason to disturb the same. Indeed, we are convinced that the arguments raised by the
petitioners are nothing but unwarranted conclusions of law. Specifically, they insist that
the Gala spouses never meant to part with the ownership of the shares which are in the
names of their children and encargados, and that all transfers of property to these
individuals are supposedly void for being absolutely simulated for lack of consideration.
[41] However, as correctly held by the SEC En Banc, the transfers were only relatively
simulated, inasmuch as the evident intention of the Gala spouses was to donate portions of
their property to their children and encargados. [42]
In an attempt to bolster their theory that the organization of the respondent corporations
was illegal, the petitioners aver that the legitime pertaining to petitioners Rita G. Benson
and Guia G. Domingo from the estate of their father had been subject to unwarranted
reductions as a result thereof. In sum, they claim that stockholdings in Ellice which the late
Manuel Gala had assigned to them were insufficient to cover their legitimes, since Benson
was only given two shares while Domingo received only sixteen shares out of a total
number of 35,000 issued shares. [43]
Moreover, the reliefs sought by petitioners should have been raised in a proceeding for
settlement of estate, rather than in the present intra-corporate controversy. If they are
genuinely interested in securing that part of their late father’s property which has been
reserved for them in their capacity as compulsory heirs, then they should simply exercise
their actio ad supplendam legitimam, or their right of completion of legitime. [44] Such
relief must be sought during the distribution and partition stage of a case for the
settlement of the estate of Manuel Gala, filed before a court which has taken jurisdiction
over the settlement of said estate. [45]
Finally, the petitioners pray that the veil of corporate fiction that shroud both Ellice and
Margo be pierced, consistent with their earlier allegation that both corporations were
formed for purposes contrary to law and public policy. In sum, they submit that the
respondent corporations are mere business conduits of the deceased Manuel Gala and thus
may be disregarded to prevent injustice, the distortion or hiding of the truth or the “letting
in” of a just defense. [46]
However, to warrant resort to the extraordinary remedy of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction, there must be proof that the corporation is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud
or illegality, or to work injustice, [47] and the petitioners have failed to prove that Ellice
and Margo were being used thus. They have not presented any evidence to show how the
separate juridical entities of Ellice and Margo were used by the respondents to commit
fraudulent, illegal or unjust acts. Hence, this contention, too, must fail.
On June 5, 2003, the petitioners filed a Reply, where, aside from reiterating the contentions
raised in their Petition, they averred that there is no proof that either capital gains taxes or
documentary stamp taxes were paid in the series of transfers of Ellice and Margo shares.
Thus, they invoke Sections 176 and 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, which
would bar the presentation or admission into evidence of any document that purports to
transfer any benefit derived from certificates of stock if the requisite documentary stamps
have not been affixed thereto and cancelled.
Curiously, the petitioners never raised this issue before the SEC Hearing Officer, the SEC En
Banc or the Court of Appeals. Thus, we are precluded from passing upon the same for, as a
rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below,
for points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of due process
impel this rule. [48] Furthermore, even if these allegations were proven to be true, such
facts would not render the underlying transactions void, for these instruments would not
be the sole means, much less the best means, by which the existence of these transactions
could be proved. For this purpose, the books and records of a corporation, which include
the stock and transfer book, are generally admissible in evidence in favor of or against the
Octaviano, Clarence ∑β (1932)
corporation and its members. They can be used to prove corporate acts, a corporation’s
financial status and other matters, including one’s status as a stockholder. Most
importantly, these books and records are, ordinarily, the best evidence of corporate acts
and proceedings. [49] Thus, reference to these should have been made before the SEC
Hearing Officer, for this Court will not entertain this belated questioning of the evidence
now.
It is always sad to see families torn apart by money matters and property disputes. The
concept of a close corporation organized for the purpose of running a family business or
managing family property has formed the backbone of Philippine commerce and industry.
Through this device, Filipino families have been able to turn their humble, hard-earned life
savings into going concerns capable of providing them and their families with a modicum
of material comfort and financial security as a reward for years of hard work. A family
corporation should serve as a rallying point for family unity and prosperity, not as a
flashpoint for familial strife. It is hoped that people reacquaint themselves with the
concepts of mutual aid and security that are the original driving forces behind the
formation of family corporations and use these tenets in order to facilitate more civil, if not
more amicable, settlements of family corporate disputes.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
November 8, 2002 and the Resolution dated December 27, 2002, both of the Court of
Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.