58. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINAGRN 108763 Feb 13, 1997268 SCRA 198

Doctrine: In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

FACTS: PANGANIBAN, J.Private respondent, Roridel Molina, in her verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina

alleged the following circumstances:- that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he

preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;-that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,

resulting in frequent quarrels between them;-that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole

breadwinner of the family;-that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged;-that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;-that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;-that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and

was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;-and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what

appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer, Reynaldo admitted that he and private respondent could no longer live together as husband and wife, but argued that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to private responden’ts behavior and refusal to perform her marital obligations, ie., cooking meals, running the household and handling their finances.

The couple had been separated-in-fact for more than 3 years.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.

The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. (In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture"). The respondent court relied heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to private respondent, thus a valid ground to render the marriage void.

HELD: NO. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (or physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

(From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,

(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of

marriage.(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the

husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not

controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.)

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, the Court have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

-Olay M. Omar

76. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO.351 SCRA 131G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Doctrine: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

FACTS: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first with petitioner Susan Nicdao

Cariño (Susan Nicdao) in 1969, with whom he had two offsprings; and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (Susan Yee) in 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis, and eventually he passed away, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”

Respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license as evidenced by a certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. She further claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.

The trial court ruled in favour of respondent ordering petitioner to pay the former, P73,000.00 which is one-half of the subject death benefits. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUES: (1)W/N the court has the authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages (despite being invoked by respondent NOT for purposes of remarriage).

(2) Who has a better claim to the death benefits?

HELD: (1) YES.Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage

on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

[In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence.]

(2) Petitioner has a better claim to the death benefits.

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

Petition GRANTED. Assalied decision reversed and set aside.

-Olay M. Omar

93. JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,227 SCRA 303G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993

Doctrine: Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 when an agreement for its purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in 1959 when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the legal results would be the same. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.FACTS: VITUG, J.

In 1927, the deceased, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday, with whom he had three childrenbut in 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he had one child, named Josephine Bosing, now petitioner.

In 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 October 1959, which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24 October 1959. A few days later, or on 09 November 1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing, . . ."

In 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo then died in 1967. About three years later, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2) interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby completing for herself, along with her one-fourth (1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership" of the property. A new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued in the name of Josephine.

The legitimate wife, Juliana died, and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of he above facts, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's order for reconveyance.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in not holding that the property in question belongs exclusively to her.

ISSUE: W/N the lot in question belongs exclusively to petitioner.

HELD: NO. The property had been bought by the deceased on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during the latter Code's regime. Now, of course, there is also the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.

Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 when an agreement for its purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in 1959- when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the legal results would be the same. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.

It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have title to the property transferred to her name. More importantly, she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest in the property in what may be described as her share in the "conjugal partnership" with Alayo, plus another one-fourth (1/4) interest as "surviving widow," the last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the issue of the deceased. Observe that the above adjudication would have exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had they been the sole and legitimate heirs of the decedent.

The appellate court below, given the above circumstances, certainly cannot be said to have been without valid basis in concluding that the property really belonged to the lawful conjugal partnership between Alayo and his true spouse Juliana.

As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code (Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984). In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry (Jeroniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306). The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Family Code).

-Olay M. Omar