8/13/2019 5 - 12 - Lecture 9 - Hula and Lobbying Coalitions - Part 2 [6-39]

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What do these commitments mean for themaintenance of a coalition?So Hula has this nice Rousseau quote toarticulate this concern on page 43 of hisbook.So he says when hunting those pursuing adeer will be willing to share, thosepursuing a rabbit will not share.And this is kind of a sly reference to thecore members who hunt the deer, and theplayers who hunt a rabbit.In the coalition, the core members wantnothing less than a stag.And players will jump for a rabbit if theycan.So, because of this coalition managersneed to make sure the broader goal ofaccomplishing the, the collection of a, astag on the route has all kinds of littlerabbits all along the way to bring inplayers to sustain their commitment.So for example, when I run a largeresearch project focused on a, on a big

issue I try to encourage themethodologists and computer scientists, orspecialists in this case, to send offpapers to count those proceedings inmethodology journals.Our larger research questions isn'tmethodological, but many of thesespecialists hope that collaboration on anew topic will help them innovate theirmethods along the way.So hence I'm in running these projectstrying to point out rabbits along the wayso that they can get off projects and

sustain their commitment.It's feasible one can view this variationand commitment in another moremachiavellian way.Though opponents can target less committedindividuals, and pick them off as membersof a coalition.I could show you alternative legislationwhere your issue, your specific issue, issubsumed, like an amendment, and pull youoff this other coalition.And, of course, tagalongs are the leastcommitted.

And they won't commit much energy to acoalition.But they join to get selective benefits ofinformation and symbolic clout.So tagalongs are the third group in thewoods.They are kind of like the discount huntersalong for the beer and the company.So members can have different goals.They have different levels of interest and

8/13/2019 5 - 12 - Lecture 9 - Hula and Lobbying Coalitions - Part 2 [6-39]

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commitment to the coalition.And asymmetries are allowed at differentlevels, because different exchanges arehad.Leaders must be able to welcome tagalongsand differentiate real players willing togo the distance from ones that will jumpat that first rabbit and disappear.And the danger of the tagalongs is thatthey may feel betrayed in the end or usedthereby enacting a revolt, like in Prop187 in California.The 1994 passage of, of a bill on illegalaliens.Trust was had but it kind of had theresult that, that they tried to bring intagalongs and this resulted in a kind of asense of betrayal in the end.So given all of this, how do you developand manage a coalition?Earlier in this week I talked aboutmanaging exchange, now the concern isgoing outward and managing this largerfleeting group of exchanges and their

alignments in some kind of consistent formthat meets your kind of interest.So first, the thing as a coalition manageris you want to think about and identifyall the interested actors andorganizations in the environment, considerthe related issues, who would beinterested in this one.Second.Ask yourself why they would be interestedand whose side they will be on friend andfoe kind of stuff and keep in mind afriend of a friend is a friend and the foe

of a foe may also be your friend.You don't want to mobilize opposition justsupport and you may want to considerpossible responses to oppositions.For example targeting their specialistsand tagalongs and pulling away supportfrom oppositions that way.Third.Keep in mind that staff members havehistories of intergroup linkages, you candraw upon.These can be effective conduits forcoordination.

For example, a former employer might be abetter connection than a former employee.Upchain is better than downchain.Some people even belong to multiplecoalitions.Use them as well for information, andhistory and wealth of contacts develop.They can identify potential partners andadversaries efficiently.And relations serve as points of action

8/13/2019 5 - 12 - Lecture 9 - Hula and Lobbying Coalitions - Part 2 [6-39]

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and information collection, thereceptacles.With more linkages, you need not developlasting coalitions, because you alwayshave access to new members and theirresources.In the field of education, there are fewerlinks and developed networks, so long termcoalitions are relied on more heavily.Nonetheless, the basic rule is one ofimmediate usage of ties and their cache isnow.So, commitments fleeting, exaggerated andambiguous in organizations, and your timewindow is short.Last, as the prior lecture made clear.Work exchange, work those kinds ofbargaining and negotiation.Now that you know interests, optionsetcetera.You can begin a horse trade, log rolling.You can negotiate and work the coalitioninto what you need.Now that you have some overview of

coalition views on organizations, we canbegin to apply them to a variety of cases.The Hula reading was great for this interms of an application to lobbyingexamples and Congress.But we also have some examples of our ownthat are offered in this course.For example, the Milwaukee voucherprogram.The case readings provided on theMilwaukee voucher program are quick.They're quick reads and they are availablefree of cost.

In addition, some of you will readanalyses of the Milwaukee voucher programin your peer evaluation training.You'll see papers that actually applycoalition theory to that case.Therefore, I, I think it's best to leavethe discuss, discussion of the Milwaukeevoucher program to the larger forum.It would be great to hear from studentswhere they found the coalition views onexchange most salient and where it mightnot apply.It also would be great to hear how people

think the coalition driving the Milwaukeevoucher program could swing in theopposite direction if democrats retook thelegislature and so on.Can liberal groups form coalitions whichsupport the poor, or is this a biased viewof liberal reforms becoming co-opted bybusiness and private interests?Do coalitions always veer right inimplementation?

8/13/2019 5 - 12 - Lecture 9 - Hula and Lobbying Coalitions - Part 2 [6-39]

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What are some examples and where thatdoesn't happen?So thinking about alternatives andpossible different trajectories of thiscoalition and its development.Where other examples or cases like it,would be a really helpful discussion forthe use of our online forum this week.Thank you.