So, how do you manage or win at this gameof exchange?As a participant in exchanges, yourability to fulfill your preferences andidentity depends on a few things.But first, is your ability to control therules.The rules of the game.Do you write the laws?Did you define the boundary or the, thegame rules of exchange?And a great example of this is RobertCaro's book, The Power Broker, where hedescribes Robert Moses who is an unelectedbureaucrat who ends up controling thetransit construction budgets in New YorkCity.And he eventually, you know, controlspoliticians.And he did this by writing himself intothe rules, of the legislative rules ofbudgets.And through this, he elected new officialsor helped promote them, and he tore up thewhole city and made it the kind oflandscape that it is today in New York.And this is a great example of, ofcontrolling rules.Another example of how to manage and winexchanges is to control resources.In particular you, you need to considerwhether you have resources everyone needs,right and vice-verse whether other firmsor organizations have resources thatyou're depending on, and this creates akind of power dependence relation that youmight have to exchange far more for thatone thing that you really need just to getit, and if they have that leverage overyou, you're kind of at a disadvantage.The third thing is control overpreferences or identities.So, you want to transform once so othersdemand the goods you provide.You make others preferences and identitiesincompatible with core ones.So, this is like creating demand for theresources you have and controlling anidentity and what it means.So, in a way, the adage that, that peoplefollow when trying to control, controlexchange is get rich resources, sees ahostage, right, to find the game, andthen, build a better mousetrap, right?So, this is the kind of idea behindexchange.Of course, I don't want you to follow thisliterally.But it is figuratively kind of a great

 

quote to think about how to manageexchange relations.Alright.Now, that we have a better sense of theexchange process and how to manage or, orwin at it, let's go back to coalitions andexplain how they work.Keep in mind that, that exchange is stillthe generative process of coalitionformation.That hasn't changed.All we wanted to talk about now is thelarger context of multiple exchanges or alarger group.So here, coalitions or social systemswherein decisions are made and reforms arepursued within a context of, say,potential conflict.And that means that coalitions entailactors with mixed preferences andidentities that don't always align.They're juxtaposed, so they require thiskind of bargaining.Second, the objective of members is toform a coalition capable of makingdecisions that are favorable to them.It's parochial interest, still.And this is obviously difficult, becauseof all the internal consistencies.The fact that others in this, this loosecoalition are, are, have other interests.The third is that people therefore have tomake exchanges, deals, agreements as towhat decisions we made by the coalition.And this kind of follows the core processwe described above of, of, of exchange.And then finally, resources are extractedthrough such coordinated action anddistributed to competing coalitionnumbers.This is what members get in return forjoining a coalition.So, the resource is Hula will cite ourstrategic incentives, information, andsymbolic benefits.Something we'll discuss more in the nextlecture.So, who will be in the coalition?How are the spoils divided?This can follow both a logic ofconsequence, which seems kind of primaryhere at times, and the logic ofappropriateness.As an instrumental act or you join minimalwinning coalitions, so you reap the mostrewards.As a rule follower, you seek coalitionsthat match your identity and the standardsthat you adhere to.If we look back at the bureaucratic

 

politics model, we'll see that all thesame features that I'm relating here werecoarsely related there.It's just that in this lecture, I've triedto elaborate and anchor the description ofcoalitions more in a process of bargainingand exchange.Above or in the prior slide, I describedsome of the means we use to controlexchange.And that can be extended to a coalition.However, most coalitions requirenegotiation and bargaining that's moreextensive.So, there's a whole variety of moves thatmanagers use.So, a coalition manager's primary concernwith the interaction processes by whichexchanges are negotiated.Now what exactly do I mean by this?What, what kinds of interactions orexchanges create coalitions?Well, there are a variety of forms andthey, they range from horsetrading,bribing, persuasion, threats.Managing information that people see ordon't see, logrolling, forming alliances,joining associations.Managers of collolitions really primarilyfocus on these behaviors and they vary, Imean, log rolling is a good example of anodd kind of exchange where I could be partof a faculty group and sometimes there areissues that arise that I may not caredeeply about and I basically go along withthem because other people care more aboutthem and vice versa.I expect them to go along with things Ireally care about that maybe they don'tcare so much about.This is called logrolling.You kind of exchange acquiescence ofsorts.And when you violate that, suddenly peoplemake a stink over something they don'tcare about, that can create issues oftrust and the lack of agreement and allkinds of problems.But, the point here is that to manage acoalition, you need to think about aseries of exchange logics that havedifferent kinds of, of allocations ordifferent kinds of games and assumptionsin them.And here, are a variety of them.So, coalitions are a dynamicaccomplishment through exchange.All kinds of wrangling and bargaining.As such, they're often under threat, andthere's a variety of things that can

 

threaten them.For example, ambiguity is a good thing andJim March writes about this in hisdiscussion of coalitions.He says, that when issues get cleared upor resolved, members tend to leave.So clarity or the resolution is not alwaysgood for a coalition's survival.Second, outcome optimism is often needed,and you have to overestimate positiveconsequences of coordinated action whenyou're trying to bargain for a coalition.And this often leads to post-decisiondisappointment and danger of dissolutionduring the actual implementation of acoalition's reform.And then finally, members often exaggeratetheir support.So, as the coalition adopts and implementthings, it starts to fall apart.All these weakly aligned individuals findthat once that initial formation is had,they no longer care.So coalitions have this odd dynamic thatthey seem to start very strong and full ofhope.And they kind of end weak or fall apartduring implementation.So, building them requires a lot ofbargaining and wrangling, horse trading,logrolling, and all that kind of exchangeefforts.And then, once you maintain them oraccomplish them, you, you're trying tomaintain them through ambiguity andcontrol over resources and dependencies,so as to maintain them through the processof implementation.So, it's a, a long process and it's fullof complexities, and trials, andtribulations along the way.