4C CIV REV 3RD SET

8/10/2019 4C CIV REV 3RD SET

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ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON -4C CIV REV 3RD SET OF DIGESTS

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1. Alvarez vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-68053. May 7, 1990

Aguila

ISSUE:

W/N the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots

Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by

operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and

due process.

RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the

general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the

deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased

party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that

money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his

estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs. The

reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate isultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the

amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares

that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.

“Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s

contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the

successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive

‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they

cannot escape the legal consequences of their father’s

transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

2. GEVERO vs. IACG.R. No. 77029. August 30, 1990

Alconaba

ISSUE: Whether or not the ½ share of interest of Teodorica

in one of the litigated lots is included in the deed of sale.

RULING:

YES. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is

transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the deathof the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of thePhilippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditaryshare immediately after such death, even if the actual extent ofsuch share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation ofthe estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577[1972]).Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II,hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from themoment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it wasonly in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo

received his share in the lot as inheritance from his motherTeodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 thatshare which he inherited from Teodorica was also includedunless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.

3. Locsin vs CA

GR No. 89783 February 19, 1992

Apostol

ISSUE: WON the nephews and neices are entitled to inherit the

properties which Dona Catalina already disposed of more than10 years before her death.

HELD: NO, for those properties did not form part of her

hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and

obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and




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those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the

succession." The rights to a person's succession are transmitted

from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until

such time. Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or

conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed

part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may

lay claim.

4.Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. 125385 July 30, 1998

Ayo

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract to sell executed after the

death of the decedent is valid even withouth probate court

approval?

HELD: We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the

heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death.[14]

Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share

the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval

does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner

has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share

in the estate of her late father.

5.Emnace vs. CA

G.R. No. 126334

Balicas

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Vicente Tabanao has the

capacity to sue Emnace HELD: Yes. The surviving spouse does

not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the

estate before she can file the action. She and her children are

complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente

Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his

rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted

to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the

moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and rights

Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were

transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly

by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which

the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of

the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover,

respondents became owners of their respective hereditary

shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died

6.

Rabadilla vs. CA

ISSUE: WON there is substitution in the given case

HELD: Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person

or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.

Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide

for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall

pass in case the original heir should die before him/her,

renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a

simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person

with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently toanother or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The

Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two. In simple

substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in

default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease

or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the

provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr.




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Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or

renunciation, the testatrix’s near descendantswould

substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.

Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions

imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be

seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants.

7. Tanedo vs ca

G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996

Basco

Issue: whether or not there is a valid sale to respondents.

Held: the supreme court ruled that a sale of future inheritance is

void. However, These two documents of sale were executedafter the death of Matias(faher of lazaro) (and his spouse) and

after a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate

was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said

property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting,

were no longer infected with the infirmities.

-SC ruled in favour od respondents because they were the first

to register land

8. Santos vs Lumbao

GR No. 169129; March 28, 2007

Baylon

ISSUE: WON a co-owner can alienate, mortgage, or assign his

aliquot or undivided share in the property

HELD: It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the

documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire

property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided

among her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire

estate is the only description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng

Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the

exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to

respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined

at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of

sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid

because both the law and jurisprudence have categorically held

that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have

each full ownership of their respective aliquots or undivided

shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them.

The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific

or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because suchright over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion

without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the

deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se

render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to

the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is

subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the

co-ownership.

9. NHA vs. Almeida

G.R. No. 162784Beltran

Issue: Whether or not the award of the subject lots by the NHA

is arbitrary.

Held: We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the

"Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity




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of the said document commences at the time of death of the

author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na

ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the

interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in

the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her

heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code. When the original

buyer died (Margarita), the NHA should have considered the

estate of the decedent as the next "person" likely to stand in to

fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The

opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera

should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots.

Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263

(questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the

deed therein null and void should have alerted the NHA that

there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the

decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestateproceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in

the award of the lots.

10. CONDE v. ABAYA

GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909

13 PHIL 249

Buenaventura

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bringan action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor

of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the

inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim

his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim

the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of

his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a

natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the

heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of

the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and

second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express

acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother,

the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.

But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can

only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his

descendants, or his ascendants.

11. Pamplona vs Moreto

GR no L-33187

Buhay

Issue:Whether or not the spouses Pamplona are entitled to the full

ownership of property or only to the one-half of the same.

Ruling:

The spouses Pamplona are entitled to the full ownership of the

property. Equity commands that the private respondents, the

successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and

Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by

Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of

P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from the

same. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance whichprivate respondents received from their deceased parents and/or

predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and

obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death.

And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract

of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect

between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private




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respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is

transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole

area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original

obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only

one-half thereof.

12.PEOPLE vs. UMALI

[G.R. No. 84450. February 4, 1991.]

Cadugo

ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco Manalo can be used as a

witness in the criminal case against Gloria Umali?

HELD:

However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said

that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal

charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify

him as a witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and

probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material

respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police

officers." Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court

provides that:

"Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons

who can perceive, and perceiving can make known their

perception to others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case,

or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shallnot be a ground for disqualification."

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by

law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code which states

that persons "convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or

false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of

the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a witness and

this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the

fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he

testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

13. Dolar v. Diancin

G.R. No. L-33365 December 20, 1930

Calugay

Issue: Whether the thumbmark placed on the will by the testator

sufficiently complies with the formalities required by law

Held: Yes. The requirement of the statute that the will shall be

"signed" is satisfied not only the customary written signature but

also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark. Expert testimony

as to the identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course

admissible. The method of identification of fingerprints is a

science requiring close study .Where thumb impressions are

blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from clear, thus

rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated by experts

as showing the identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the

court is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged

experts and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct

similarity in some respects between the admittedly genuine

thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is evident.

14. YAP TUA vs.YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN -G.R. No. 6845Calugtong

ISSUE: Whether or not the testator and witnesses sign the willin the spresence of each other.




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HELD: While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will mustsign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that thewitnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as inthe presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, theactual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It issufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each

of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see thesignatures placed upon the will.

15. AVERA vs GARCIA

G.R. No. 15566 September 14, 1921

Canasa

Issues:

a) Whether the proof of a single attesting witness without

accounting for the proof of the other two witnesses and where

opposition to the will was made would render the will invalid;

b) Whether signature of the testator and of the three attestingwitnesses written on the right margin of each page of the will

instead of the left margin would render the will invalid.

Held:

a) The will is valid. In Cabang vs. Delfinado, it was held that

when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must

be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court.

However, in the instant case, such question cannot be raised

any more for the first time in this court unless the case is

remanded for a new trial. The question should have been made

at the lower court, either during the hearing or upon a motion fora new trial.

b) The will is valid. So far as it concerns the authentication of the

will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible

difference whether the names appear on the left or on the

right margin, provided they are on one or the other. The object

of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close

the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of

wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and

authenticity. Therefore laws should be interpreted in such a

way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand,

it is not the object of the law to restrain the exercise of the

right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given

assures such ends, interpretation that adds nothing but

demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and

frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

16. Nayve vs Mojal G.R. No. L-21755Claudio

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid, hence, will allow the Will

to probate.

HELD: YES. As to the signatures on the margin, it is true, asabove stated, that the third page actually used was signed by thetestator, not on the left margin, as it was by the witnesses, butabout the middle of the page and the end of the will; and that thefourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin,as it was by the testator, but about the middle of the page and atthe end of the attestation clause. In this respect the holding ofthis court in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42Phil., 145), is applicable, wherein the will in question was signedby the testator and the witnesses, not on the left, but right,margin. The rule laid down in that case is that the documentcontained the necessary signatures on each page, wherebyeach page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded againstany possible alteration. Therefore, as in the instant case the factthat the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page




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of the will is proven by the mere examination of the signatures inthe will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact doesnot invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.

17. Testate estate of Pilapil vs CA

G.R. No. 111904. October 5, 2000Topic: nature of donation

Cruz

Issue: what is the nature of the donation executed in favor of

Mercedes.

Held:

TO DETERMINE WHETHER DONATION IS INTER VIVOS OR

MORTIS CAUSA, INTENT OF DONOR MUST BE

ASCERTAINED. In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all ofthe deed's provisions must be read together. In this case, it is a

donation inter vivos as shown by the acceptance clause of the

deed w/c the donee in this case accepted. In a donation Mortis

cause, acceptance is not required.

18. Testate Estate of Abada vs. AbajaG.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005Topic: Forms of Wills (Attestation Clause)

De Guzman

ISSUES:

(1) What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;

(2) Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a

notary public;

(3) Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a

language or dialect known to the testator;

(4) Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if

so, whether the attestation clause complies with the

requirements of the applicable laws;

HELD:

(1) Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at

that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and

Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed the

execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.

(2) The SC stated that the Code of Civil Procedure repealed

Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil

Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the

execution of any will. Therefore, Abada's will does not require

acknowledgment before a notary public.

(3) The SC stated that There is no statutory requirement to state

in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect

used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by

proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in histestimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or

understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language

used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to

gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these




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gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish

language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the

Spanish language.

(4) Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause fails to

state the number of pages on which the will is written.

The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo

de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el

mismo" which means "in the left margin of each and every one of

the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will

consists of two pages. The pages are numbered correlatively

with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the

phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las

letras "UNO" y "DOS."

However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the

attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On

this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying

the rule on substantial compliance in determining the number of

witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the

number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that

three witnesses signed it.

This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even

before the effectivity of the New Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson

v. De Gorostiza, the Court recognized that there are two

divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on

strict construction and the other on liberal construction. In

Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan, the basic

case on the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later

decisions of the Court.

19.

CANEDA, et al. v. CAG.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993

De Mesa

ISSUE:

Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will

and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the

requirements of Article 805 of the Civil Code.

HELD:The Supreme Court (SC) held in the negative. What is fairly

apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause is the

fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will

and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses

and states as well the number of pages that were used, the

same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said

witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the

presence of the testator and of each other. The phrase "and he

has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces

provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviouslyrefers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is

immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and

Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the

presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of

us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the




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witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to

the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said

phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same

and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature

and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the

final logical analysis , is the statement that the witnesses signed

the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator

and of one another. It is our considered view that the absence of

that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection

which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that

is here sought to be admitted to probate.

20. Codoy vs. CalugayG.R. 123486

De VeyraISSUES:

1. Whether the Article 811 of the Civil Code is permissive ormandatory

2. Whether or not the witnesses presented sufficientlyestablish the authenticity and due execution of thedeceased’s holographic will

HELD:1. Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word

"shall" connotes a mandatory order. The court cannot eliminate

the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of

the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that

law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in thehandwriting of the deceased.

2. NO. Not all the witnesses presented by the respondents

testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of

testator. The clerk of court merely identified the record of Special

Proceedings No. 427 before said court and did not declare

explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that

of the deceased. The election registrar was presented to identify

the signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was

not even produced as it was no longer available. What the

deceased’s niece saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of

the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants,

and she did not even declare that she saw the deceased sign a

document or write a note. As for respondent Evangeline

Calugay, the only reason that she can give as to why she was

familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she

lived with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the

deceased write a note or sign a document. Also, there was no

opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the

handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and

executed by her during her lifetime. Even the former lawyer ofthe deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the

signature in the holographic will. A visual examination of the

holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when

compared with other documents written by the testator.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will and the

signatures in several documents such as the application letter for

pasture permit and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are

different. The Court, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling

holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

21. Ajero vs. CA

G.R. No. 106720; September 15, 1994

Topic: Forms of Wills (Art. 813-814)

Dechavez




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Issue: Whether or not the non compliance with Articles 813 &

814 shall render the entire will invalid.

Held:

No. The requirements of authentication of changes and signing

and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and814) separate from that which provides for the necessary

conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The

distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish

Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering

holographic wills are taken. This separation and distinction adds

support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article

810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813

and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a

holographic will. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code

shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions

contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the

testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result

is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,

however, does not render the whole testament void. Thus,

unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or

insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on

testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will

itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of

such changes.

22. Azaola vs SingsonG.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960Diamzon

Issue: Is the 3 witnesses under Art. 811 mandatory? No.

Held: We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of

the will was not contested, he was not required to produce more

than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic

will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our

present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require thecompulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the

handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate

denied. Since no witness may have been present at the

execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art.

810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of

witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter

beyond the control of the proponent. That is evidently the reason

why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the

preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert

testimony may be resorted to.

23. Nazareno vs CA

Dulce

Issue:

1)Whether the restoration of the titles to the lots in question to

the estate of Maximino Sr.was proper

2)Whether it was the intention of Maximino,Sr. to give the subject

lots to Natividad

Held:




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1)Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to

their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of

inheritance taxes. Facts & circumstances indicate badges of a

simulated sale w/c make the Jan 29, 1970 sale void & of no

effect. Natividad never acquired ownership over the property

because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being w/o

consideration.

2)Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr.intended to give the

six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their

parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because

the latter was the only "female and the only unmarried member

of the family." She was thus entrusted with the real properties in

behalf of her siblings. Art.1449 of the Civil Code states:

There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a

person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted

to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial

interest or only a part thereof.

There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore

subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory

heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right

which he may have received from the decedent, during the

lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous

title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the

legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

24. RIVERA v. IAC

G.R. Nos. 75005-06

Dunuan

Issues:

1. WON the holographic will is valid .

2. WON there is need to present 3 witnesses required under Art.811 in probating the will.

Ruling:

1. YES, it is valid. The respondent court considered them valid

because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by

the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil

Code.

2. NO, there is no need. It also held there was no necessity of

presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811

because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the

holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In both

proceedings, Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills

submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were

spurious. Consequently, it may be argued, the respondent

court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code. The

flaw in this argument is that, as already determined, Jose

Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose

estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no

personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto didnot have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The

testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who

authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by

their father, was sufficient.




12

25. LABRADOR v. CA

G.R. No. 83843-44; April 5, 1990

Flores

Issue: Whether or not the holographic will is dated, as provided

for in Article 180 of the New Civil Code.

Held: Yes, the will is dated. The law does not specify a particular

location where the date should be placed in the will. The only

requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed

in the hand of the testator. The requirements are present in the

subject will.

26. SEANGIO VS REYES

GR NO. 140371-72

GantuangcoISSUE:

Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be

considered as a holographic will.

RULING:

A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the

testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly

deducted from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not

make an affirmative deposition of the latter’s property, the

disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The

disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in favor of

those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. With regard

to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory

heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was

Segundo’s last expression bequeath his estate to all his

compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.

27. Capitle v. Elbambuena

G.R. No. 169193. November 30, 2006Garcia

Issue: WON respondent has a right to inherit from Olar.

Held:Yes, Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata

remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a

legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an

heir of the deceased spouse.

28. Guerrero v. Bihis

G.R. No. 174144, April 17, 2007

Gatacelo

Issue:

WON the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the

instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the

place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article

806 of the Civil Code.

Held:

No. Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent

officer, that is, a lawyer duly commissioned as a notary public. A

notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor toperform notarial acts. A notary public is authorized to perform

notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments, within

that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his

commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he

is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his




13

jurisdiction has no force and effect. Thus, the last will and

testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by Article

806.

29. Paz Samaniego-Celada vs. Lucia D. Abena

G.R. No. 145545. June 30, 2008

TOPIC: Art. 809 (Substantial Compliance)Gomez

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid

for failure to comply with the formalities required by law

HELD:

Petitioner posits that the will is fatally defective for the reason

that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three

(3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2)

pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial

will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestationclause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the

totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the

number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is

not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that

the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B,

and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an

omission of some of the pages. The error must have been

brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole

instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the

attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of thecourt is in consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation"

enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code. In fine, the court finds

that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the

time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court

is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal

requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution

of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject

notarial will.

30. RODELAS vs.ARANZA

G.R.NO. L-58509 DECEMBER 7, 1982

Gregorio

Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved bymeans of a photograph.

Ruling: Yes.If the holographic will has been lost or destroyedand noother copy is available, the will cannot be probated because thebest and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in saidwill. It is necessary that there be a comparison between samplehandwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.

However, A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic willmaybe admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting ofthe deceased can be determined by the probate court with thestandard writings of the testator.

31. Spouses Ajero vs. CA

Topic: Formalities of Holographic Will; Articles 813 and 814

NCC

Hernandez

ISSUE:

WON the CA was correct in disallowing the probate of the will

based on the provisions of Articles 813 and 814.

RULING:

http://g.r.no/

http://g.r.no/




14

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the CA is incorrect to disallow

the will of Annie Sand. The Court cited

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the

New Civil Code. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can

serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic

will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether

the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will andtestament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with

the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had

the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was

executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its

signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. In the case of

holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement

that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator

himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code,

thus: A person may execute a holographic will which must be

entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator

himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out

of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Failure to strictly

observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a

holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the

testator. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows

that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions

contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the

testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result

is that these disposition cannot be effectuated. Such failure,

however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a

holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding

non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless

the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were

made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's

signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The

lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such

changes.

32. Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-62952. October 9, 1985

Hussin

Issue: W/N the court can decide on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes. As a general rule, the court can only decide on

the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not

inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the

probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains

it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the wills since

the same admitted on its face the relationship between thetestator and the petitioner.The will was validly executed in

accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical

purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for

that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does

not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a

donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage

at the time of the donations.

33. Cayetano vs. Leonidas

G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984

Jandusay




15

Issue:

Whether or not the reprobation of the will is valid.

Held:

YES. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited

the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied

its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently

established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an

American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, U.S.A. The order of succession and to the amount

of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary

provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person

whose succession is under consideration. It is therefore evidentthat whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in

our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the

same to the succession of foreign nationals.

34. Vda. De Molo vs. Molo

G.R. Nos. L-2538; September 21, 1951

Lacsina

Issue:

Can an earlier will be admitted to probate if it was revoked by asubsequent will made not in accordance with the formalities

required by law?

Held:

Yes. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the

principle of "dependent relative revocation”. This doctrine is

usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or

executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present

intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute

for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails

of effect for same reason. The doctrine is n limited to theexistence of some other document, however, and has been

applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a

mistake of law. . . . (68 C.J.P. 799). The court held that even in

the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the

testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to

produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of

defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is

founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been

validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on

which this principle is predicated is that the testator did notintend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when

he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his

wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as

to his intention of dying testate.

35. HEIRS OF FRAN vs. SALAS

G.R. No. 53546. June 25, 1992

TOPIC: ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE

Lazaro

ISSUE:

WON the final judgment allowing the probate of the will may be

declared null and void on the ground of fraud.

HELD:




16

No. Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of

promise to show the will constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of

the kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for

reconsideration or a petition for relief from judgment under Rule

37 and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or even a

separate action for annulment of judgment. It is settled that for

fraud to be invested with such sufficiency, it must be extrinsic orcollateral to the matters involved in the issues raised during the

trial which resulted in such judgment. ||

In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an

aggrieved party to set aside or attack the validity of a final

judgment:

(1)Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which

must be filed within sixty (60) days after learning of the decision,

but not more than six (6) months after such decision is entered;

(2)By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by

collateral attack, assuming that the decision is void for want of

jurisdiction;

(3)By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil

Code, assuming that the decision was obtained through fraud

and Rule 38 cannot be applied.

It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their

right to file a petition for relief from judgment, it appearing that

their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly six (6)

years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days after the

rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and

thirteen (13) days after the court issued the order approving the

Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their

conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the

testate proceedings.

The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and

undistributed by any attempt to unsettle it, had inevitably passed

beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the sameaside, by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery.

Settled in the rule that the decree of probate is conclusive with

respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot be

impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that

of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding.

Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and

judicial time and the interests of litigants, as well as the peace

and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the

solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of

competent jurisdiction.

36. Caneda vs. CA

G.R. No. 103554. May 28, 1993

Lim

Issue: WON substantial compliance is applicable to defects in

an attestation clause

Held: No. The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809

cannot be invoked or relied on by respondents since it

presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be

cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of

matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not

expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may

necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated




17

in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied with

in the execution of the will. In other words, the defects must be

remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. In the

case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been

performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied only by

extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the

contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from which suchfacts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists

on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they saw the

compliance with such requirements by the instrumental

witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to

extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be

doing by indirection what in law he cannot do directly. It may thus

be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which

can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the

need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and,

correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate ofthe will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot

be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the

invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will

itself.

37. Agapay vs Palang

G.R. No. 116668

Lozano

ISSUE: WON Erlinda is the rightful owner of the said property?

HELD: NO, the court held that there was no evidence that she

could have bought the property herself and a testimony of the

Notary Public stated that when the deed was executed, Miguel

was the one who paid the property but with a condition that

Erlinda will be named as sole vendee. Assuming that the case is

falls under donation, the said donation is void due to the fact that

the law prohibits such donation because it was made between

persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the

donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article

87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition

against donations between spouses now applies to donations

between persons living together as husband and wife without avalid marriage.

38. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997Mariano

Issue: Whether or not the court can rule on the intrinsic validity of thedisposition made by Torcuato Reyes in his will in favor of Oning

Ruling:No. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limitedto pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to beprobated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution,whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law,and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does notdetermine nor even by implication prejudge the validity orefficacy of the will’s provisions. The intrinsic validity is notconsidered since the consideration thereof usually comes onlyafter the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however,

notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was firstdetermined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its faceand the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if itis intrinsically invalid The intrinsic validity of a will may be passedupon because “practical considerations” demanded it as whenthere is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions aredoubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic




18

validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so.Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible andabsolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court isnot powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do andpass upon certain provisions of the will.

39. Sanchez vs. CA

G.R. No. 108947. September 29, 1997MarianoIssue

Whether or not the trial court can rule on the question ofownership of the properties listed in the the will.

Ruling

No. It is hornbook doctrine that “in a special proceeding for theprobate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneousmatter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thispronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestateproceeding as in the case at bar.” In the instant case, the trialcourt rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious allthe deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26,1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favorof their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren,namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S. Lugod and Roberto S.

Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties coveredby the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409(2) of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of saleand determined with finality the ownership of the propertiessubject thereof . In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdictionas a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches: [A] probate court orone in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot

adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part ofthe estate and which are claimed to belong to outsideparties. All that the said court could do as regards saidproperties is to determine whether they should or should not beincluded in the inventory or list of properties to be administeredby the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but ifthere is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposingparties have to resort to an ordinary action for a finaldetermination of the conflicting claims of title because theprobate court cannot do so.

40. Ganuelas vs Cawed.

G.R. No. 123968. April 24, 2003

MedranoISSUE: Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa.

RULING: The Court ruled that, it was mortis causa. It noted thatthere was nothing in the Donation which indicates that any right,

title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to

Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase therein "to

become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits no other

interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the

ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during

her lifetime. It was also provided therein that if the donee should

die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded

and of no further force and effect. The deed even contains anattestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis

causa. Nevertheless, as there was failure to comply with the

formalities of a will, the Court ruled that the donation was void.

41. Sicad vs Court of Appeals.




19

279 SCRA 647

Medrano

ISSUE: Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the donation in

question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortiscausa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validityhave not been complied with. A donation which purports to beone inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to disposeof the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth onemortis causa. In the case at bar, nothing of any consequencewas transferred by the deed of donation in question toMontinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did notget possession of the property donated. They did not acquire theright to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over theproperty. More importantly, they did not acquire the right todispose of the property. They were simply "paper owners" of thedonated property.

42. Cañiza vs. CA

Mendoza

ISSUE: (relevant) Do the Estradas have the right to remain in

possession of the lots by virtue of the holographic will, although

such is of no force and effect until probated?

HELD: A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the

testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and until

admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can

be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: ‘No will shall

pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and

allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.’

43. Cua vs. Vargas

Mendoza

ISSUE: WON PUBLICATION of the extrajudicial partition was

binding on the non-signatory heirs, therefore estopping them

from assailing the partition and sale.

HELD: No. Publication was made AFTER THE PARTITION

WAS MADE, NOT BEFORE WHICH WAS REQUIRED IN Rule

74.1.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte

proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who

do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement

will not be bound. The publication of the settlement does not

constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge

or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the

fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for

the protection of creditors and was never intended to depriveheirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate.

44. RABADILLA vs. CA UNDER ART 882

G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

Millora




20

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that the testamentary

institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution within the

purview of Article 882 of the NCC.

HELD: The petition is not impressed with merit.

MODAL INSTITUTION DISTINGUISHED FROM CONDITIONAL

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION. — The institution of an heir inthe manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law

of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution.

In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the

institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by

the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the

heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee

but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.

On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the

condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be

entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends butdoes not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.

To some extend, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

OBLIGATION IMPOSED ON HEIRS SHOULD NOT BE

CONSIDERED A CONDITION UNLESS IT CLEARLY APPEARS

FROM THE WILL ITSELF THAT SUCH WAS THE INTENTION

OF THE TESTATOR. — Since testamentary dispositions are

generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir

should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears

from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In

case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and

not conditional.

45. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez

G.R. No. 175720, September 11, 2007

Millora

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that the Huling Habilin at

Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific apartments

disregarding the fact that the same is not probated yet and that

the testator changed or revoked his will by selling the property to

petitioner prior to his death.

HELD: The petition has merit.Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the

Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement have

no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before any

will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be

dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the

Civil Code mandates that "[n]o will shall pass either real or

personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance

with the Rules of Court." As the will was not probated, the

Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto

cannot be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a partyto said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of

the issue of possession. Moreover, at the time the deed of sale

was executed in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez

remained the owner thereof since ownership would only pass to

his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property,

he had the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.

46. BORDALBA VS. CA

G.R. No. 112443. January 25, 2002.

TOPIC: Art. 840-856 (Institution of Heir)

Munez

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s claim that private respondents are not

legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme is tenable.

HELD: No. Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that

private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and




21

Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to

dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them

to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir

may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous

judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.

47. HEIRS OF CONTI VS. CA[G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998.]

TOPIC: Art. 840-856 (Institution of Heir)

Munez

ISSUE: WON a prior settlement of the estate is essential before

the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the

deceased (i.e. complaint for partition).

HELD: No. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before

the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the

deceased. The title of the property owned by a person who diesintestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under

the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the

property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying

debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate

passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself

to his heirs. In Quison vs. Salud, the Court held - without some

showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in

proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the

plaintiffs to maintain this action is established. Conformably with

the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 ofthe Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as

a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition at

any time or to terminate the co-ownership, where transmitted to

her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents

merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent,

their predecessor-in-interest.

48. Gala vs. Ellice Agro Industrial

G.R. No. 156819 December 11, 2003

Topic: Legitime

NatavioISSUE: Whether or not the organization of respondent

corporations was illegal for depriving petitioners Rita Benson and

Guia Domingo of their legitime.

RULING: The SC ruled that the reliefs sought by petitioners

should have been raised in a proceeding for settlement of estate,

rather than in the present intra-corporate controversy. If they are

genuinely interested in securing that part of their late father’s

property which has been reserved for them in their capacity as

compulsory heirs, then they should simply exercise their actio adsupplendam legitimam, or their right of completion of

legitime.Such relief must be sought during the distribution and

partition stage of a case for the settlement of the estate of

Manuel Gala, filed before a court which has taken jurisdiction

over the settlement of said estate.

49. Seangio vs. Reyes

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006

Topic: Disinheritance

NatavioISSUES: (1) Whether the disinheritance of Alfred Seangio is

valid.

(2)Whether the document executed by Segundo Seangio can be

considered as a holographic will.




22

RULING: (1)YES.For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the

Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will

wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard

to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by

Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,

taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of

Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents asufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant

under Article 919 of the Civil Code.

(2) YES.A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the

Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the

hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and

may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be

witnessed.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as amere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a

holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed

by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis

causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument,

and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the

latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an

act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance

results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo

in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

50. Bagunu v. Piedad

G.R. No. 140975

Neri

ISSUE: The issue here is the applicability of the rule on proximity

among collateral relatives. Thus, the question is, Can petitioner

inherit alongside respondent?

RULING: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the

relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the

more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right ofrepresentation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of

representation may only take place in favor of the children of

brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive

with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not

apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to

which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are

sixth in the order of preference. Applying now the rule on

proximity, respondent relative within the third civil degree

excludes petitioner relative within the fifth civil degree from

succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

51. Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciana Rustia

Vda. de Damian

G.R. No. 155733

Neri

ISSUE: Who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia

and Josefa Delgado are (Their estates were to be disposed of

separately since their marriage was not governed by absolute

community of property)

RULING: The lawful heirs of Delgado are her siblings related to

her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother.

Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit

from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit

from Josefa Delgado. However,the petitioners during the latter




23

stage of the case were already the nephews, nieces,

grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under

Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in

the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of

brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it

cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.

Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado whoare entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers

and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her

death on September 8, 1972.

As for the estate of Rustia, his illegitimate child and his "ampun-

ampunan" failed to produce documentary evidence of their

father's acknowledgment, therefore, not lawful heirs of the

decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are

no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate

of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustiaare the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and

nephews.

52. Pascual vs Pascual-Bautista

G.R. No. 84240

March 25,1992

Palileo

Issues: 1. Does the term "illegitimate" children as provided in

Article 992 strictly construed to refer only to spurious children?

2. Can they inherit from their uncle?

Held:

1. NO, Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and

spurious. under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate

children are generally placed under one category, which

undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged

natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.

2. No, Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or ironcurtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato

between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and

relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They

may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by

law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate

family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an

intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate

child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate

family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the

latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and theresources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,

sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,

palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no

more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of

resentment.

53. Manuel vs Ferrer

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

Pamplona

Issue: whether the illegitimate siblings are the legal heirs over

one-half of Juan's intestate estate




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Held :The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by

the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where

the illegitimate child had

half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the

former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the

mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural

child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to theestate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter

cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a

legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate

child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on

succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no

part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be

construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a

harmonious whole.

54. Tison v. CA

(G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997)

Pelayo

ISSUE: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir,

may attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes?

HELD: NO. the private respondent is not the proper party to

impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is no

presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on

sounder morality and more convincing reason than thepresumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And

well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be

attacked collaterally. Only the husband can contest the

legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly

confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his

wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that

infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest

involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed

to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even

his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an

insult to his memory.

55. Heirs of Uriate versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 116775Topic: Legal of Intestate Succession - General Provisionsand Right of RepresentationPerfectoIssue:

The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and theprivate respondent is entitled to Justa’s estate as her nearestrelatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.

Held:According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance,the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relativesof the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2,concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are

provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code. Petitionersmisappreciate the relationship between Justa and privaterespondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son ofJusta’s half -sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. Anephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if nodescendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. Thatprivate respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial.




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This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt’s heir. Asthe Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, “The determination ofwhether the relationship is of the full or half blood is importantonly to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.”

56. Gonzalez vs. CA

G.R. No. L-37453, 25 May 1979

Pernato

Issue:

WON the three instrumental witnesses can be considered as

credible witnesses as required by law.

Ruling:

The SC considered them as credible witness. "Credible

witnesses" mean competent witnesses and not those who testify

to facts from or upon hearsay. In the strict sense, the

competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will isdetermined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code,

whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his

testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the court

that said witness is telling the truth. It is not necessary to

introduce prior and independent proof of the fact that the

witnesses are "credible witnesses", that is, that they have a good

standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and

reliable.

57. Adlawan vs. AdlawanTOPIC: Suriviving Spouse; Collateral Relatives; The State

Prado

ISSUE: The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not

petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.

HELD: NO. The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino,

explained – “A co-owner may bring such an action, without the

necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,

because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of

all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that

he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership,

the action will not prosper.” There is no merit in petitioner’s claimthat he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful

detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would

benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However,

petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire

possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted,

he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the

proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs

of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on

the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should bepointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom

petitioner labeled as “fictitious heirs,” the State will inherit her

share and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to

possession and enjoyment of the property.

58. Guy vs Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

TOPIC: Acceptance and Repudiation of InheritanceReopta

ISSUE: WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes

private respondents from claiming their succesional rights.

RULING: Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the

hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar




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the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: “ART.

1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may

accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to minors

or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or

guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance

left to their wards only by judicial authorization. The right to

accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the personsdesignated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and

distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in

Article 1030.” Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate

the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is

because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which

must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of

the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and

Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private

respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentionalrelinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of

a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.

Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot

be established by a consent given under a mistake or

misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private

respondents could not have possibly waived their successional

rights because they are yet to prove their status as

acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner

himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his

co-heirs.

59. Nazareno vs. CA

Rodriguez

60. Sanchez v. CA

G.R. No. 108947

Rome

Issue:

WON fraud attended the execution of the compromise and/or

collation of the properties rendering the compromise agreement

void.

Ruling:

The petition is not meritorious. In opposing the validity and

enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on

the minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna.although

denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this

case is essentially a deed of partition.the Civil Code provides

that “[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision

among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a

partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, acompromise, or any other transaction.”

For a valid partition, it must be that 1) the decedent left no will;

(2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had

been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they

are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or

legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means

of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of

Deeds.The foregoing requisites are present in this case. It

affirms the validity of the parties’ partition in this case.

61.Heirs of Conti vs. CA

GR No. 118464. Dec 21, 1998

Soriano

ATTY MARCIANO DELSON C CIV REV RD SET OF DIGESTS




27

Issue: WON private respondents could establish co-ownership

by way of succession.

Held: Yes. There are 2 simultaneous issues in an action for

partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the

property sought to be partitioned, and second, the manner of the

division of the property. Thus, in this case, we must determine

whether private respondents, have been able to establish thatthey are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of

the late Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, a sister, a

nephew or a niece. These, they were able to prove in. The RTC

and CA. Ownership is therefore established by way of

succession.

62. Alejandro vs CA

G.R. No. 114151

Tapia

Issue: Can the TC order partition of an estate in an action forquieting of title?

Held: No. Under the law, partition of the estate of a deceased

may only be effected by: (1) the heirs themselves extrajudically,

(2) by the court in an ordianry action for partition or in the course

of administration proceeding, (3) by the testator himself, and, (4)

by the 3rd person designated by the testator

63.

Lopez vs. CA

Tayo64. BRAVO – GUERRERO VS BRAVO

G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005

Tayco

ISSUE: WON the partition of the properties shall be allowed.

HELD:

YES. The partition of the properties shall be allowed.Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one ofthe vendees who bought the Properties. Vendees Elizabeth andOfelia both testified that the Roland A. Bravo in the Deed of Saleis their father, although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr., made

some of the mortgage payments. As Roland Bravo, Sr. is alsothe father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus acompulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, alongwith his brothers and sisters, in his father’s portion of theProperties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co-owners ofthe Properties.As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partitionof the Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any time thepartition of the common property unless a co-owner hasrepudiated the co-ownership. This action for partition does notprescribe and is not subject to laches.

65. Figuracion-Guerilla vs. Vda De Figuracion

GR No. 154322

Topic: Partition

Untalan

ISSUE:

Is there a need for a prior settlement of Leandro’s intestate

estate before the properties can be partitioned or distributed?

HELD: YES; Petition denied. CA decision affirmed. Suffice it to

say that partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in

dispute. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the

expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate.

Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their

father’s estate to settlement because the determination of these

expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

ATTY MARCIANO DELSON 4C CIV REV 3RD SET OF DIGESTS




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66.

Cua vs. Vargas

Uy

67.

Bautista vs. Bautista

Velasco

68. Daclag and Daclag vs. Macahilig, et al.

G.R. No. 159578. February 18, 2009Vigilia

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners' claims may be recovered thru the

estate of the deceased in the present case.

Held:

Notably, petitioners never raised this issue in their appellants'

brief or in their motion for reconsideration filed before the CA. In

fact, they never raised this matter before the SC when they filed

their petition for review. Thus, petitioners cannot raise the samein this motion for reconsideration without offending the basic

rules of fair play, justice and due process, specially since

Maxima was not substituted at all by her heirs after the

promulgation of the RTC Decision.

4C CIV REV 3RD SET

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