485. Craven St (38) The Henry Jackson Society, address

8/6/2019 485. Craven St (38) The Henry Jackson Society, address

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A Gl Be Cme:The Future of Genocide Prevenon

in the Anglo-American Sphere

By Julia Peengill


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First published in 2009 by The Henry Jackson Society

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Julia Peengill & the Henry Jackson Society, 2009

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Ab he He Jacks Sce

The Henry Jackson Society: Project for Democrac Geopolics is a cross-

parsan, Brish think-tank.

Our founders and supporters are united by a common interest in fostering

a strong Brish, European and American commitment towards freedom,

liberty, constuonal democracy, human rights, governmental and

instuonal reform and a robust foreign, security and defence policy and

transatlanc alliance.

The Henry Jackson Society is a registered charity (no. 1113948).

For more informaon about Henry Jackson Society acvies, our research

programme and public events please see www.henryjacksonsociety.org.


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Ab he Ah

Julia Peengill is an Associate Fellow of the Henry Jackson Society and a

graduate of the University of St Andrews. She has extensive experience

in the eld of genocide studies, including a thesis on the tesmony of

Holocaust survivors. She has also served as an Editorial Assistant for the

Montreal Instute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, which will

release a further publicaon on the issue of humanitarian intervenon in

September 2009.


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A Gl Be Cme:The Future of Genocide Prevenon

in the Anglo-American Sphere

By Julia Peengill

.hejackssce.g


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Fe b Ec Jce MP

The prevenon of genocide is a challenge which must engage the aenon

of all polical pares and all cizens in Britain. This momentous task is

perhaps impossible to tackle without the cooperaon of key allies; yet

with the acve engagement of voters, civil society groups and Members of

Parliament, Britain may nd that she has a great deal to contribute to this

vital and necessary cause. In my own work as Chairman of the All-Party

Parliamentary Group on Genocide Prevenon & the Great Lakes Region ofAfrica, I have witnessed the tremendous potenal within Parliament itself

and the electorate to advance this cause at the highest levels of government.

Our APPG in cooperaon with civil society groups and acve cizens is

currently campaigning to close the gaps in UK legislaon relang to the

prosecuon of suspected perpetrators of genocide.

This need for mobilizaon and concrete goals forms the central focus of this

new report wrien by Julia Peengill for the Henry Jackson Society, entled

A Guilt Beyond Crime: The Future of Genocide Prevenon in the Anglo-American Sphere. In this report, Ms. Peengill highlights the opportunity

to promote this issue in the United Kingdom and the United States by

examining the policy opons available to policians on both sides of the

Atlanc, and the construcve role which should be played by civil society

groups. She draws aenon to the need for a praccal reassessment of

this issue, arguing that the persistent threat of genocide constutes both a

moral failure to uphold the terms of the UN Convenon on the Prevenon

and Punishment of Genocide, and a signicant peril to regional stability and

internaonal security. By bringing together the perspecves of eminentpolicians, policy experts and civil society representaves from the US and

UK, this report adds to the exisng body of perspecves on this subject, and

will, I hope, contribute to a reinvigorated discussion of the issue within and

between these two countries.


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ContEntS

Foreword 6

List of Main Acronyms used in this Publicaon 8

Execuve Summary 9

Introducon 11

Chapter One: 14

Compeng Legal, Academic

and Polical Understandings of Genocide

Chapter Two: 50

Civil Society, Polical Will and Genocide Prevenon

Conclusion 62

Interview Subjects 66

Wrien Sources & Further Reading 71

Useful Websites 75


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LiSt MAin oF ACronyMS uSEd in tHiS PuBLiCAtion

Au African Union

dfid Department for Internaonal Development

Eu European Union

FCo Foreign and Commonwealth Oce

iCC Internaonal Criminal Court

iCtr Internaonal Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

iCty Internaonal Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia

idP Internally Displaced Persons

Mod Ministry of Defence

nAto North Atlanc Treaty Organisaon

nGo Non-Governmental Organisaon

oSAPG Oce for the Special Adviser on the Prevenon of Genocide

P-5 Permanent Five (members of the UN Security Council)

r2P Responsibility to Protect

un United Naons

unAMid African Union/United Naons Hybrid operaon in Darfur

unGC UN Convenon on the Prevenon and Punishment of Genocide

A Guilt Beyond Crime


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ExECutivE SuMMAry:

The United Naons Conenon on the Preenon and

Punishent of Genocide passed in tande with the Uniersal

Declaraon of Huan Rights was intended to be a foundaonaldocuent of the post-war era. Howeer, the internaonal

counit and parcularl the UN Securit Council has

consistentl failed to priorize the preenon of genocide, and

hae reained bstanders to at least e subsequent genocides.

As two of the worlds leading deocracies, the United Kingdo

and the United States hae a responsibilit to put the issue of

eece genocide preenon at the forefront of their foreign

plc ageas.

This report adocates the prooon of this issue at the

highest leels of goernent with parcular ephasis on the

leadership of the Execue. This can be approached under the

rubric of the Responsibilit to Protect, a cogent expression of

the oral and praccal intolerabilit of genocide. If this concept

is to hae an eaning, it cannot reain wedded to seeking

Securit Council approal for coercie acon in the eent of

genocide or ass atrocies, as the Securit Councils record onthis issue is one of abject failure. The US and UK and indeed

all espsble membe saes ms beg fmlae a

alternae approach, and can begin b aking a coitent

to protect the ciilians of Darfur fro the ongoing capaign of

atrocies orchestrated b the Sudanese goernent.

A new approach to genocide preenon cannot rel on

the Internaonal Criinal Court as a deterrent for future

genocidaires. The alue of the ICC can onl be easured aer

Execuve Summary


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a genocide is halted and, if possible, its perpetrators brought to

jusce; in the iediate situaon, the US and UK ust focus on

concrete easures to protect targeted ciilians and take steps for

the eentual reoal of the regie in queson.

Long ter polic shis and inter-agenc cooperaon within

both the US and UK goernents are absolutel essenal to

the deelopent of a responsie earl warning capacit, and

conngenc plans for huanitarian interenon. This should

for the springboard of a treat coied to ending genocide,

which could be iniated through NATO, a new global bod of

deocracies or ad hoc coalions of the willing. This should be

undertaken as a deonstraon of the alidit and necessit of

he respsbl Pec.

Non-goernental pressure groups are ital to assebling the

polical will necessar for goernental acon, and genocide-

focused ciil societ groups ust place the goal of engaging the

electorate at the centre of their strategies. In the UK where the

an-genocide oeent is less isible than the US ciil societ

groups should push for the creaon of a polic group siilar to

the US Genocide Preenon Task Force, which could propose UK-

specic policies for genocide preenon.



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introduCtion

This guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shaers any andall legal systems...We are simply not equipped to deal, on a human, polical

level, with a guilt that is beyond crime and an innocence that is beyond

good and virtue.1

When Hannah Arendt wrote of a guilt that is beyond crime, she

referred to the incomprehensible scale of the murder conducted by Nazi

war criminals. This unprecedented atrocity is honoured annually through

events such as Holocaust Memorial Day, where policians rounely make

the now-clichd promise of Never Again. Yet the moral clarity with whichwe recall the liberaon of the concentraon camps, the discovery of the

killing elds of Cambodia and the mass graves in Iraq and Bosnia has a

curious habit of fading from the general polical view, only to recur aer

the next genocide has been successfully concluded.

In this sense, the bystander naons of the internaonal

community but parcularly the powerful permanent members of the

Security Council have become party to this guilt beyond crime. The

modern phenomena of organised and targeted mass murder has occurredin the context of a globalized world, yet many policians have tended

to cordon this issue o from the calculaons of internaonal relaons,

maintaining that nothing can be done about it and, in any case, it is not

relevant to our strategic interests. Former President Bill Clinton once

observed that All over the world were people like me, sing in oces...

who did not fully appreciate the depth or the speed with which [the

1. Arendt, Hannah, & Jaspers, Karl, Correspondence 1926-1969, eds. Loe Kohler & Hans Saner; trans.

Robert & Rita Kimber (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992) p. 54

Introducon


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Rwandan Tutsis] were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.2 Then

again, none of those people occupied the most powerful oce in the

world.

The task of assembling sucient polical will remains thecentral obstacle to construcng a clear, consistent and morally acceptable

strategy for the prevenon of genocide in any of its stages. Although

the intervenon in Kosovo demonstrated the US and UK governments

willingness to intervene in ancipaon of a repeat of the Bosnian genocide,

a consistent and muscular Anglo-American policy on genocide prevenon

did not emerge from this experience as demonstrated by the absence of

a robust response to the occurrence of genocide in the Darfur region of

Sudan.

The public discourse on genocide in both the United States and

the United Kingdom is plagued by two opposing and incorrect assumpons.

First, that the Western world and America in parcular can halt all of

the worlds evils simply by virtue of its economic and military strength. This

approach ignores the realies of the democrac system, characterized by

compeng interests, priories and a penchant for short-sighted decisions.

The second supposion holds that the West can do nothing, and perhaps

should do nothing, to stop genocide that we would just make things

worse, and that it is none of our business anyway. This report seeks to

dispel these corrosive assumpons by invesgang pragmac strategies to

both build polical will and fashion implementable an-genocide policies.

The scope of this report has been limited to the Anglo-American sphere,

and is framed around the insights of forty academics, legal and human

rights experts, NGO representaves and policians from both sides of the

Atlanc regarding the viability of various long and short-term strategies

for the prevenon of genocide and mass atrocies. This survey of opinion

unique to this Henry Jackson Society report provides a collecon ofperspecves on the crucial need to close the gap between rhetoric and

acon on this issue.

The rst chapter of this report provides an overview of the legal

and polical issues which have inhibited the development of a consistent

strategy for genocide prevenon, and some suggesons as to how these

obstacles can be overcome. This report argues for the integraon of

2. Power, Samantha, Bystanders to Genocide, The Atlanc Monthly, September, 2001, hp://www.

theatlanc.com/doc/200109/power-genocide



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concrete measures for the prevenon of genocide in the foreign policy

of the US and UK. The past sixty years of history and most recently the

feckless handling of the UNAMID (African Union/United Naons Hybrid

operaon in Darfur) mission have demonstrated the uselessness of

relying on the UN Security Council to take steps to end genocide. Moreover,

while the recent decision to issue a warrant for President Omar Bashirs

arrest may create the illusion of internaonal acon on behalf of Darfur, it

is essenally unenforceable and inuenced President Bashirs subsequent

expulsion of vital humanitarian organisaons from Sudan. It is me for the

Anglo-American alliance to abandon rhetoric and obfuscaon in favour

of a permanent and realisc strategy a strategy which includes an early

warning mechanism at the governmental level and a standing conngency

plan for immediate intervenon in the case of genocide.

Although policians may embrace the idea of a rm an-

genocide agenda, compeng polical priories and a lack of sustained

public pressure have prevented this from emerging, parcularly in the UK.

Consequently, Chapter Two of this report underscores the indispensability

of a vocal non-governmental an-genocide campaign in mobilizing

electorates on this issue. The report advocates the expansion of these civil

society iniaves parcularly in the UK, where genocide-focused projects

are comparavely rare in contrast with the US.

Introducon


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CHAPtEr onECOmPETING LEGAL, ACADEmIC AND POLITICAL

undErStAndinGS oF GEnoCidE

What is genocide, and why does it exact a duty from the

internaonal community beyond other cases of mass death? The

term brings to mind vivid images and associaons, but does this basic

understanding necessarily reect either the scope or limitaons of this

word? Genocide might immediately be associated with the skeletal

prisoners at the gates of Auschwitz or Belsen, but would the mass graves of

Burundi, Bangladesh or East Timor be recalled similarly? If Saddam Hussein

only murdered an esmated 200,000 Kurds, does the Anfal Campaign

count as genocide?

This report denes genocide as the targeted murder of dened

ethnic, religious and/or social, polical and cultural groups deemed to

possess endemic qualies which render them essenally inhuman and thus

suitable for destrucon. As stated by the UN Convenon on the Prevenon

and Punishment of Genocide to be discussed in the following secon

this destrucon can be undertaken in whole or in part, and includes

aempts to destroy the possibility of the connuaon of that group via

the destrucon of collecve pracces, knowledge and artefacts, policies of

forced aboron or sterilisaon and the indirect murder of groups through

intenonal policies of deprivaon, which Helen Fein describes as genocide

by arion.3

Dr Greg Stanton is one of the leading scholars of comparave

genocide, a former diplomat at the US State Department and the

3. Fein, Helen, Genocide by Arion 1939-1993, Health and Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1997), pp. 10-45



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founder of the rst dedicated an-genocide organisaon, Genocide

Watch. Stantons pioneering study The Eight Stages of Genocide oers

clear guidelines for the process by which genocide occurs, and posits

that genocide is not so much an explosion of violence, as occurs with

massacres commied at a me of war, but rather the breakdown of the

bonds which prevent a neighbour from murdering his neighbour. The

process unfolds in dierent ways depending on the cultural context,

explains Stanton. Whereas the Final Soluon took years to come

together, and was exemplary by virtue of its incredible bureaucrazaon,

the Rwandan genocide killed 800,000 people in 100 days in a really low-

tech operaon. Stanton argues that the essenal steps towards murder

are shared in each case, and consist of Classicaon, Symbolizaon,

Dehumanizaon, Organisaon, Polarizaon, Preparaon, Exterminaon,and Denial.4

Dr Brian Briva, Director of the John Smith Memorial Trust

and former Professor of Comparave Genocide at Kingston University,

expressed a similarly process-oriented approach to the phenomenon.

When a governing party starts to describe its opponents in an overtly

ethnic or derogatory way, and when this starts a mushroom eect of

isolaon, exclusion and dierenaon, you see the psychological shi

take place which is necessary for genocide, Briva argues. In this way,destabilized sociees become ideal host states for racist, naonalist and

other extremist pathologies.

Briva observes that one of the underpinnings of his

understanding is Raul Hilbergs seminal observaon that the Holocaust

occurred as the result of a sinister triangle between vicms, perpetrators

and bystanders.5 The nal point on that triangle signies the passive

complicity of those who, either out of terror or silent approval, stand by

as genocide proceeds. Scholars such as Robert Gellately, Ben Kiernan andRobert Melson have argued that genocides tend to emerge in mes of

war parcularly civil war or extreme polical crisis, when the normal

rules of human interacon are suspended and the pracce of violence is

honoured and rewarded.6 This link has been borne out by stascal studies

4. Stanton, Gregory, The Eight Stages of Genocide, Yale Genocide Studies Series, (February, 1998)

5. Hilberg, Raul, The Destrucon of the European Jews, (New York: Holmes & Meir, 1985)

6. Gellately, Robert & Kiernan, Ben, The Spectre of Genocide, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres,

2003), p. 56

Compeng Legal, Academic and Polical Understandings of Genocide


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by Barbara Har and Rudy Rummel, whose comparave genocide models

reveal almost every case to have resulted from these condions.7

The UN Conenon on the Preenon and Punishent

f Gece

The aforesaid models of the processes of genocide are rooted rst

and foremost in the UN Convenon on the Prevenon and Punishment

of Genocide (UNGC), conceived and wrien by Dr Raphael Lemkin. The

Genocide Convenon was a turning point for humanity, the founding moral

document of the post-war era remarks Philip Spencer, Associate Dean and

Professor of Comparave Genocide at Kingston University. To borrow an

analogy, the convenon was like the discovery of how the heart pumpsblood around the body. It doesnt stop you from having a heart aack,

but it does tell you what a heart aack is it is our task to translate that

understanding into prevenon.

The UNGC was passed aer the devastang and unprecedented

murder of an esmated six million European Jews, in addion to thousands

of Sin and Roma and the mentally and physically disabled. However, the

legal foundaons of Lemkins argument can be traced back to his proposal

for the introducon of internaonal laws against barbarity (the murderof groups) and vandalism (the destrucon of cultures) in 1933, which was

itself a reacon against the mass murder of Armenians by the Turkish state

during the First World War.8 In the aermath of the Holocaust, there was

lile excuse not to endorse a document which would recognize a crime

of this scale and which pledged to prevent and punish its perpetrators.9

Concurrent with the newly-minted proscripon of crimes against

humanity, the UNGC recognized genocide as a unique variant in its scope

and in:

...the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a naonal, ethnical,

racial or religious group... by Killing members of the group;

7. Har, Barbara, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Polical Mass

Murder Since 1955, The American Polical Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, p. 57-73; Rummel, Rudy, Power,

Genocide and Mass Murder,Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb., 1994), pp. 1-10

8. Lemkin Raphael, Genocide as a Crime under Internaonal Law, The American Journal of Internaonal

Law, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 1947), pp. 145-151

9. Although despite American support for the measure at the UN, the United States Congress did not rafy

the treaty unl 1988.



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causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the

group; deliberately inicng on the group condions of life

calculated to bring about its physical destrucon in whole or in

part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the

group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another

group.10

The only legal obligaons imposed upon signatories are Arcle 5,

which requires that state-pares enact laws to outlaw genocide, and

Arcle 7, which compels signed states to extradite persons indicted on

the charge of genocide. However, signing on to a convenon implies that

the signatories have commied to arculang the principles therein

as a maer of policy. To this extent, the obligaon to prevent is clearly

undertaken in Arcles 1 and 8:

The Contracng Pares conrm that genocide, whether commied

in me of peace or in me of war, is a crime under internaonal law

which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Any Contracng Party may call upon the competent organs of

the United naons to take such acon under the Charter of the

United Naons as they consider appropriate for the prevenon and

suppression of acts of genocide or any other acts enumerated in Arcle

III. [emphasis mine].11

This document does contain some problemac elements.

Namely, the failure to include the murder of polical and social groups

in the denion; the ambiguous mental harm provision; the legal

dicules of proving the intent to destroy in whole or in part; the lack

of recommendaons for prevenonand the lack of a specic quantave

denion of genocide.12 In fact, polical and social groups were included

in Lemkins original dra of the Convenon but were excised from the

nal version at the insistence of the Soviet Union.13 The omission of social

and polical groups from the text of the convenon, in addion to the

10. Convenon on the Prevenon and Punishment of Genocide, 9 December 1948, hp://www.unhchr.

ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm

11. Ibid.

12. Har, Barbara, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Polical

Mass Murder Since 1955, The American Polical Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, p. 58

13. Power, Samantha,A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, (New York: Harper

Perennial, 2003),p. 386



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inclusion of the rather vague phrase the aempt to destroy in whole or

in part, have been enduring bones of contenon in the interpretaon and

applicaon of the UNGC. One sad consequence of this debate is that it has

been invoked as an excuse for inacon.

Some experts feel that infrequent applicaon of the word

genocide is the only prudent way to protect the convenon from diluon

and abuse. In keeping with this atude, Human Rights Watch has declined

to label the atrocies in Darfur as genocide, and has chosen to maintain

this posion despite the Internaonal Criminal Courts (ICC) indictments of

senior Sudanese ocials on the charge of genocide. Senior Legal Adviser

for Human Rights Watch James Ross explains the legal raonale for this

decision as a strict interpretaon of the convenon. According to Ross,

while Cambodia was certainly a case of state-organised mass murder,

legally one can only refer to the targeng of the Cham and Vietnamese as

genocide because they were killed because of their naonal and religious

idenes. The Khmer Rouges polically movated mass murder is a

crime against humanity, but does not fall under the same descripon as

genocide. Charles Garraway, one of the Brish jurists consulted during the

draing of the Rome Statute, concurs: When one speaks of destrucon

in whole or in part...one must beware of broadening the denion so

much that genocide becomes indisnguishable from other crimes underinternaonal law, Garraway reasons. There really has to be some noon

of size, adds Joost Hiltermann, Deputy Programme Director of the Middle

East and North Africa Secon of the Internaonal Crisis Group and author

ofA Poisonous Aair: America, Iraq and the Gassing of Halabja. And

one mustnt confuse crimes against humanity with genocide genocide

must remain the most severe crime and thus have accompanying strict

evidenary standards.

James Ross argues that while many situaons fall under therubric of crimes against humanity, to prove genocide one must provide

sucient documentary, tesmonial and circumstanal evidence of intent

to destroy a certain populaon and that it is the intent aspect of the

convenon which ulmately limits its applicaon. In the case of Darfur,

Ross argues that the research conducted by Human Rights Watch aests to

a campaign of severe crimes against humanity, but that their research had

not uncovered a smoking gun of genocidal intent, based on documentary,

tesmonial and circumstanal evidence. Interesngly, the Human Rights

Watch report Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and



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Milia Forces in Western Sudan did nd evidence of the intenonal

targeng of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups for annihilaon,

but determined that this did not full the criteria of in whole or in part.

As for the legal onus imposed by these ndings, Mr Ross argues that

since the convenon does not impose a requirement for intervenon, our

perspecve is that whether a situaon meets the legal requirement for

genocide or not, the internaonal community has an obligaon to take

steps to bring genocide or crimes against humanity to an end.

This minimalist interpretaon of the term genocide rightly

contends that the term genocide must have a specic and narrow

applicaon if it is to retain its meaning and moral potency. To be sure,

the word must be defended against policized misapplicaon, which

undermines the purpose of the UNGC. The recent Israeli-Hamas conict,

the Russian invasion of Georgia and, indeed, the Georgian governance

of South Ossea have all been labelled genocidal at various points, in a

manner which constutes a dangerous abuse of the term.

Yet should this interpretaon be so narrow as to exclude cases

which certainly appeargenocidal from being covered under the UNGC?

Greg Stanton advocates a broader interpretaon of the convenon. The

fact is, genocide in part as dened by the UNGC is far more common

than many people think, he contends. According to Stanton, arguments in

favour of a narrow understanding of the convenon tend to misconstrue

both the obligaons imposed by the convenon and the body of legal

precedent which has arisen from subsequent cases of genocide, such as

the Nuremberg Trials and the Internaonal Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda

(ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). To that end, the convicon of

Jean-Paul Akeyesu on the charge of genocide at the ICTR set an important

precedent for the applicaon of broad evidenary standards to prove

intent and complicity.14

In Stantons view, lawyers who have argued thatthere is a legal obligaon to intervene, and that hence it is necessary to

invoke the term genocide sparingly, fundamentally misunderstand or

misrepresent the legal obligaons imposed by the convenon. In fact,

the convenon is notoriously recent on the subject of intervenon, and

through Arcle 8 leaves the decision to the discreon of the contracng

state pares, which may call upon competent organs of the United Naons

to take such acon under the Charter as they consider appropriate for the

14. Greenawalt, Alexander, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretaon,

Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 8 (Dec., 1999), pp. 2259-2294



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prevenon and suppression of genocide.

For Greg Stanton, the inclusion of policide in the accepted legal

denion of genocide would be the natural extension of Lemkins original

intent. Indeed, had it not been for the Soviet Unions presence on theSecurity Council, the Convenon would have included the targeng of

socio-polical groups in the denion of genocide. Moreover, scholars such

as Beth van Schaack have argued that this blind spot of the convenon

has been superseded by thejus cogens norms of internaonal treaty law,

whereby the body of precedent now supports the inclusion of polical

groups in the denion.15 Jane Gordon, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights at

Kingston University, comments in a similar vein: The Genocide Convenon

was originally wrien as a generic policy statement. And over the years

more bones have been added to it, with the evoluon of case law and

the Rome Statute in parcular. Dr James Smith, Execuve Director of the

an-genocide charity Aegis Trust, is a rm opponent of the minimalist

interpretaons of the UNGC, which he feels have tended to reduce the

convenon to something of a dead leer. Unfortunately, Dr Smith argues,

it is oen lawyers who have undermined the spirit of the genocide

convenon because they have claimed that you need to prove intent in

the form of some sort of blueprint for annihilaon. In fact, there is never

a clear documentary blueprint, so its a maer of assembling evidence toprove the crime via evidence on the ground, and analyzing that evidence to

see if genocidal processes are underway.

The US State Department began to take a more proacve stance towards

the applicaon of the convenon in the aermath of the Departments

endorsement of inacon during the Rwandan genocide. Between 1996

and 1998, US aorney Pierre-Richard Prosper prosecuted Jean-Paul

Akeysu at the ICTR and won the rst successful convicon under the

terms of the Genocide Convenon. In 1997 President Clinton approvedthe creaon of the posion Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,

and in 2004, Prosper, the-then-occupant of this posion, launched an

unprecedented invesgave project to determine whether the Sudanese

governments acons in Darfur constuted genocide, entled the Atrocies

Documentaon Project. This invesgaon and stascal analysis was

conducted by the State Departments Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights

and Labour, which aer interviewing a sample of over 1,000 Sudanese

15. Van Schaack, Beth, The Crime of Polical Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convenons Blind Spot,

The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, No. 7 (May, 1997), pp. 2259-2291



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refugees concluded in 2004 that the atrocies constuted genocide.16

While this led US Secretary of State Colin Powell to publically acknowledge

the situaon as genocide, no other permanent members of the Security

Council have done so, and the Internaonal Commission of Inquiry into

Darfur has declined to label the atrocies genocide.

To date, the UK Foreign Oce connues to classify the events in

Darfur as a humanitarian disaster, as if the Darfuri people were vicms

of earthquakes rather than AK-47s. What more evidence do you need?

asks Greg Stanton. The acons of the government and milias the

demonstraon of a paern of targeted mass murder of whole groups, of

rape and intenonal displacement and starvaon all t the evidenary

standards built through precedent. Brian Briva observes that withholding

an ocial acknowledgement of genocide gives legal cover to inacon, and

successive genocidaires have learned and grown from that precedent

theyve learned to destroy evidence, and they look to the rest of the world

to see what they can get away with.

Genocide Preenon and the Internaonal

Cmal C

The ICC has indicted Sudans Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushaybfor genocide and crimes against humanity and has issued a warrant for

President Omar Bashirs arrest for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Does the ICC hold any promise as an instrument of jusce for sing

ministers of state and, moreover, as a deterrent for potenally genocidal

governments?

The Rome Statute, which came into eect in 2002, gives the ICC jurisdicon

over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the

crime of aggression. Arcle 6 denes the crime of genocide as:

Any of the following acts commied with intent to destroy, in whole

or in part, a naonal, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of

the group;

16. Stanton, Gregory, Proving Genocide in Darfur: The Atrocies Documentaon Project and Resistance to

its Findings, in Toen, Samuel & Markusen, Eric (eds.), Genocide in Darfur, (New York: Routledge, 2006)



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(c) Deliberately inicng on the group condions of life calculated

to bring about its physical destrucon in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within

the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.17

As one of the UK delegaon of jurists charged with draing the

Rome Statute, Charles Garraway is sanguine about its potenal to protect or

stop genocide. Its more of a polical problem than a legal problem, because

it comes down to choices that states make, oers Garraway. The ICC is a

step forward, but internaonal criminal law can only go so far parcularly

when youre looking at cases like Rwanda where you had a lot of voluntary

parcipaon on the part of the Hutu populaon. The perpetrator-oriented

processes of the ICC are necessarily arduous and slow, and are of limitedhelp to sociees devastated by genocide. Moreover, the ICC cannot arrest an

ongoing genocide because it lacks enforcement power and is enrely reliant

on states to support it. To this extent, Garraway points out that the ICC has

essenally been given the task of taking the fall for the Security Councils

unwillingness to make a polical decision to stop genocide.

The United States has refused to rafy the Rome Statute due

to objecons over the scope of the Courts powers and its lack of checks

and balances. By the end of President Bushs administraon however,the United States had begun to enter into a new modus vivendiwith

the ICC a development which looks likely to connue under President

Obama, who has indicated his willingness to re-sign the Rome Treaty.

Clint Williamson, the current US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes,

comments, I think that over the past three years the US has had a much

more cooperave relaonship with the ICC. For instance, we did not block

the UN Security Councils referral of the situaon in Darfur to the ICC, and

we abstained on the Security Council resoluon on the AU/UN Mission in

Darfur mandate because the language undermined the ability of the ICC

to pursue these prosecuons. However, Ambassador Williamson noted

that The US governments posion, as well as the ICCs own approach,

is based on complementarity, so were commied whenever possible to

having these actors tried in their own courts domescally, or if necessary in

a hybrid domesc-internaonal arrangement and if all else fails by a purely

internaonal process.

17. Arcle 6, Rome Statute of the Internaonal Criminal Court, 10 November 1998, hp://untreaty.

un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm



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Certainly, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampos decision to issue

warrants for the arrest of Sudanese ocials was an important symbolic

gesture, and exile groups such as the Darfur Union of the UK have shown

their support at recent protests calling for the arrest and trial of Omar

Bashir. It makes me so happy that the world will hold them accountable

for their crimes, says Dr Halima Bashir, a Darfuri refugee and author of the

recently-published memoir Tears of the Desert. Kishan Manocha, barrister

and Fellow of the Montreal Instute for Genocide and Human Rights

Studies, is also encouraged: There are problems and it is slow, but the ICC

indictments are valuable in themselves because they send a message.

Yet the likelihood of these indictments acng as a deterrent

without powers of coercion is slim, and may actually work against the

interest of the vicms of these perpetrators as evidenced by President

Bashirs recent expulsion of humanitarian groups in response to the

warrant for his arrest. On the one hand issuing these indictments is

absolutely the right thing to do, reasons Brian Briva. But on the other

hand, it doesnt give the perpetrators any incenve to stop what theyre

doing. You could write an eloquent editorial in The Guardian about how

wonderful this indictment is, but at the end of the day nothing happens.

And from a purely realist perspecve, genocidaires dont understand

indictments they understand airstrikes.

In addion, a careful balance must be struck between recognizing

genocide as a universal crime which imposes a duty of acon upon the

internaonal community, and the right of a people to try their own

criminals. Of course, this is not possible unl those genocidaires are

stopped and apprehended. When we talk about naon-building, I think

one of the factors that is put low on the list, which should actually be

at the top, is building the rule of law, notes Ann McKechin, Labour MP

for Glasgow North and former Vice Chair of the All-Party ParliamentaryGroup for Genocide Prevenon. For example the ICTY has stymied the

development of a robust Bosnian judicial system by marginalizing Bosnian

judges and prosecutors within it.18 Mary Kayitesi-Blewi, founder and

former Director of the Survivors Fund, noted that many of the survivors

of the Rwandan genocide whom she assists have been unable to tesfy

in front of the Internaonal Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda because there

is no funding for their travel expenses. They feel totally uninvolved in

18. Snyder, Jack & Vinjamuri, Leslie, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmasm in Strategies of

Internaonal Jusce, Internaonal Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003 - Spring, 2004) p.23



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this process which is supposed to bring us jusce, Blewi remarks. More

recently, the long-awaited trial of former Khmer Rouge leader Kaing Guek

Eav has been received approvingly by the internaonal community and the

people of Cambodia. However, the evidence suggests that although jusce

may nally be done, such trials will do lile to deter future genocidaires.

Is it me for a renewed aenon to the text of the genocide

convenon, and possibly for an amendment to that text? The majority of

the individuals interviewed for this report stressed that the UNGC must be

re-emphasized, but that it was most likely a waste of resources to aempt

to revisit or amend the language of the treaty. An oponal protocol to

set up a treaty monitoring body may be a good step forward, to remove

the gap in enforcement and reporng, Greg Stanton reasons. But on the

whole I think an amendment might be a waste of me, as the ICC has

already codied the law of crimes against humanity to include polical

exterminaon. James Ross concurs: I would be afraid that any aempt

to amend it might actually weaken the text, so I would rather we focus

on complying with the exisng body of law. Ulmately, legal strategies

to confront genocide will arise in the polical sphere, and will require

sucient polical will to become a reality. The following chapter addresses

ways in which policians in the US and UK can put genocide prevenon on

the policy-making agenda, and why they should do so.

Current Polic Iniaes Progress, Challenges and

Suggesons

I think the vicms of Darfur who lost their lives are, in a way,

luckier than those of us who survived and are sll waing for support and

help aer six years. Like so many survivors of genocides before her, Dr

Halima Bashir carries the guilt and the pain of not being able to ght the

forces who murdered her family, friends and neighbours. Bashirs recently-published memoir Tears of the Desertteses to the marginalizaon and

racist discriminaon meted out by the Arab-dominated regime in Khartoum

towards the African Animists, Chrisans and Muslims of Darfur. Years of

discriminaon and civil war culminated in the state-ordered aacks by

the Janjaweed milias upon the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes, which

reached the point of genocide by 2004.

A medical doctor, Bashir was brutalized and raped by the

Janjaweed milia for speaking out against the mass rape of primary school



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girls by the milia and government ocials. Her village was later aacked,

her father killed and Bashir was forced to ee the country without her

family. Bashir now lives in Britain, but is under surveillance by the Sudanese

government and must cover her face in public to avoid idencaon.19 I

was provided Bashirs details through a mutual contact, and became aware

that she was noceably wary about even speaking on the phone, given

her need for constant vigilance. Despite the threat to her safety, Dr Bashir

is determined that her story should inform policians and the public of

the consequences of inacon in Darfur. The Sudanese government has

created a misconcepon that this is a problem of warring groups, when in

fact the Darfuri people had been increasingly discriminated against right

up to when the killing began, Bashir explains. Now the government is

aacking the survivors in the camps, and we are looking for more supportfrom everyone from the UN, from the UK, from the whole internaonal

community.

The situaon in Sudan has been a top-er issue at the UN Security

Council, the US Department of State and to a lesser extent the UK Foreign

Oce, and yet lile eecve acon has been taken to adequately protect

civilians from aack. Where are the helicopters so desperately needed

by the UNAMID forces? Where are the addional 16,000+ troops needed

to patrol the area of Sudan targeted by the Janjaweed a region roughlythe size of France with only 9,000 UNAMID troops to patrol, protect and

rebuild the lives of the fragmented Darfuri populaon? Where, indeed, are

the forces needed to protect the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps

where the Janjaweed connue to raid, rape and murder their inhabitants

with impunity? It seems incredible that this should be the result of

thousands of hours spent passing bills and resoluons, construcng

treaes and forming commiees on this issue. Even before the recent

expulsions of humanitarian workers from Darfur, the Sudanese regime

acvely obstructed these groups and worse sll deployed government-backed milias to aack and inmidate aid workers. The key components

of the 2004 communiqu between the UN and the Sudanese government

the promise to disarm the Janjaweed, protect IDPs and protect civilians

from human rights abuse remain almost farcically unfullled.

The human costs and threat to regional security increase by

the day, as at least 300,000 Darfuris have been killed and an esmated

19. Bashir, Halima & Lewis, Damien, Tears of the Desert: A Memoir of Survival in Darfur(London: Hodder &

Stoughton, 2008)



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3 million IDPs have ed to Chad and the Central African Republic. If le

unresolved and the perpetrators unpunished, such wounds are likely to

fester for years as has happened in the Democrac Republic of Congo,

where conicts between Hutus and Tutsis have ared up consistently since

the conclusion of the Rwandan genocide. When you look at these quite

monumental failures, remarks Brian Briva, you have to ask: is this a

failure of will, understanding, policy or just of indierence? At this pivotal

moment in the future of the Anglo-American alliance, the priorizaon of

genocide prevenon could provide a springboard from which to broach

the intersecon of human rights, the implementaon of internaonal

law and responsible statehood, conict prevenon and the deterrence of

aggression. Genocide prevenon is inmately ed to shiing concepts of

sovereignty and responsible statehood, and is a challenge which is at oncesingular in its polical and moral dimensions and also very much connected

with the top-er concerns of the State Department and FCO.

As a consequence of the Iraq War, policians on both sides of

the Atlanc have distanced themselves from the topics of the limits of

sovereignty and humanitarian intervenon. Indeed, some commentators

have argued that the distrust bred by this conict has permanently

damaged the Anglo-American ability to garner the support necessary to

undertake a full-scale humanitarian intervenon. Yet a similar generalaversion characterized much of the Anglo-American foreign policy agenda

for many years prior to the second Iraq War. Indeed, the mismanaged and

aborted 1993 intervenon in Somalia was one of the primary reasons that

the Clinton administraon was unwilling to become involved in Bosnia

and Rwanda. But at a me of mounng belligerence from Russia and Iran,

an emboldened authoritarian regime in Beijing, and the persistent threat

of rogue states, there has never been a more important moment for the

US and UK to forge a resolute and clear consensus on the privileges and

limitaons of sovereignty in the 21st century. This inevitably requires a fulland frank assessment of the UNs record on genocide prevenon, and the

organisaons current eorts to redress these failings.

The United Naons and Genocide Preenon:

A upmsg rec

The sovereign territorial state claims, as an integral part of

its sovereignty, the right to commit genocide, or engage in genocidal

massacres, against people under its rule, and the United Naons, for all



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praccal purposes, defends this right.20 As one of the tweneth centurys

foremost scholars of genocide, Leo Kuper arrived at this bleak conclusion

just four years aer the end of the Cambodian genocide. Twenty-ve years

and at least four genocides later, has anything improved? To respond with

a resounding no would seem obvious to the point of clich the Kurdish,

Rwandan and Bosnian genocides unfolded virtually without interrupon,

with the Security Councils stance ranging from bystander to outright

complicity.

The Rwandan genocide is the most dramac example of the

instuonal failure of the United Naons, and the failure of individual

member states, to arrest the progress of genocide. Incredibly, as the

Hutu massacres of the Rwandan Tutsi intensied in the Spring of 1994,

the US and the UK lobbied the Security Council for a drawdown of the

already-paltry UNAMIR Peacekeeping Force there. Rwanda should have

stopped us in our tracks, observes Linda Melvern, invesgave journalist

and a foremost expert on the Rwandan genocide. Ive studied this for

fourteen years now, and I sll have trouble believing that this could have

been allowed to happen, and that no one has been held to account. It

is the human rights catastrophe of recent years and that should have

made us re-think absolutely everything. Less than one year aer 800,000

Rwandans were murdered, the UN peacekeeper Lieutenant-ColonelThomas Karremans famously shared a drink with Bosnian-Serb General

Ratko Mladic as the laers army prepared to massacre over 7,000 Bosnian

civilians.21

Under the terms of the UNGC, the Security Council is meant to

be the central instrument although, crucially, not the only instrument

for the applicaon of the convenon at the earliest or latest stages of

genocide. Some crics believe that the failure of the UN to apply the

genocide convenon at any point has discredited the instuon so indeliblyas to nullify its original purpose. Others contend that, through reforms and

the elaboraon of concepts such as the Responsibility to Protect, the UN

can gradually evolve into the posive role envisioned at its founding. What,

at this point, is the most praccal approach to take towards the UNs role in

genocide prevenon, both in the long and short-term?

20. Kuper, Leo, Genocide: Its Polical Use in the Tweneth Century, (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1983) p. 161

21. Woodhead, Leslie (Director), Srebrenica: A Cry from the Grave, 1999, BBC4 Producons



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Almost all of the policians, academics and NGO representaves

with whom I spoke cited the power and composion of the Security

Council as one of the key impediments to the prevenon of genocide. As

an instuon it just has not delivered, remarks US Congresswoman Louise

Slaughter, Chairwoman of the House Rules Commiee and member of the

Helsinki Commission. The existence of the Russo-Chinese vong bloc within

the permanent ve (P-5) members of the Security Council was cited by

nearly all interview subjects as the primary obstacle to achieving any acon

on genocide through the Security Council mechanism. Indeed, although

Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to undertake

military acon in the event of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace

or act of aggression, this device has not met the immediate challenge of

halng incidents of genocide.

The lack of accountability in the UN decision-making process

emerges as the shared theme of any discussion of genocide prevenon,

and parcularly on the failure of the Security Council to forge eecve

responses to potenal or ongoing genocides. Linda Melvern uncovered one

of the most disturbing examples of this opaque decision-making process. In

June 1994, Colin Keang of New Zealand, acng President of the Security

Council, informed Melvern that he was being kept in the dark regarding

the ongoing Rwandan genocide by the Secretary-General and P-5.22

Melvern has uncovered substanal evidence not only of collusion by P-5

members parcularly France to reduce the potenal for intervenon,

but of an intenonal cover-up of this informaon by senior UN ocials.

In contrast to the Rwandan genocide, the Security Council has

dedicated many sessions to the fate of Darfur, and yet has taken years to

deploy the undermanned, poorly equipped and inadequately trained joint

UN-AU UNAMID peacekeeping force. Hiding behind the judgement of the

Internaonal Commission of Inquiry into Darfur, P-5 members China andRussia have been decisive in forcing the issue over to the ICC. The watered-

down sancons passed against the Sudanese regime are best described

as farcical given the fact that the Chinese government connues to sell

arms to Khartoum. Moreover, the protecon of civilians in Darfur has

been circumscribed by the decient mandate of the UNAMID force, whose

presence remains conngent on the consent of the Sudanese government.

22. Interview, Linda Melvern; See alsoA People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwandas Genocide,

(London: Zed Books Ltd., 2000)



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The ongoing misery in Darfur cannot be laid enrely at the feet of

Russia and China or at some more general failure by the UN as a whole. As

P-5 members, the US and UK have the power to both bring situaons to the

aenon of the Security Council and conclude alternave arrangements

outside the Security Council if no appropriate acon is taken. However, it

would appear that fallout from the Iraq War has le the State Department

and Foreign Oce eager to pursue the issue via the Security Council, even

at the price of inera and inacon. The failure of this approach, and some

pragmac steps forward for US and UK policy, will be discussed later in

this report; the following secon assesses the opportunies for useful

collaboraon with the UN on the issue of genocide prevenon.

Posie Steps ForwardAlthough the policized nature of UN decision-making has

hindered genocide prevenon eorts, it must be stressed that individual

agencies such as UNICEF have saved and improved lives in some of the

most deprived areas of the world. While the sprawling bureaucracy of

the UN and the dicules of oversight can yield diminishing returns if

not outright corrupon, that bureaucracy also has an extremely valuable

capacity for the collecon and analysis of informaon across the globe.

However, policians would do well to quietly abandon the belief that theSecurity Council will ever make responsible decisions to this end. If the US

and the UK are commied to an eecve strategy for the prevenon and

arrest of genocide, the best strategy would be to phase out the pracce of

turning to the Security Council on these maers, and draw upon the areas

in which the UN has demonstrated success. Some crics may dismiss the

UN as an overfunded talking shop, yet this weakness may also be one of

the organisaons most important strengths. Possessed of a formidable

capacity for the collecon and analysis of informaon, the UN may well

serve the cause of genocide prevenon through the collecon of on-the-ground informaon as part of an early warning mechanism. Two recently-

founded iniaves within the UN are aempng to do just this the Oce

for the Special Adviser on the Prevenon of Genocide and the Oce of the

Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.

The Oce of the Special Adiser on the

Preenon of Genocide

The abject failure of the UN to prevent or intervene in any



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of the genocides of the laer half of the tweneth century became a

cause for instuonal concern in the aermath of the Rwandan and

Bosnian debacles for existenal, if not moral, reasons. Although a full

and frank invesgaon of allegaons that senior UN ocials withheld

evidence of the Rwandan genocide from the non-permanent members

of the Security Council has not been undertaken, in 2000 the Security

Council acknowledged its failure to act. In 2004, Secretary-General Ko

Annan created a new post designated with coordinang an instuonal

strategy for genocide prevenon, the Oce for the Special Adviser on the

Prevenon of Genocide (OSAPG). Greg Stanton inially proposed this oce

in 2002, and is an admirer and associate of the current Special Adviser,

Dr Francis Deng one of the original theorists of the doctrine of the

Responsibility to Protect.

Over the past four years, the oce has been assembling the

funding and capacity to carry out its mandate, namely to collect and

analyze informaon from within and outside of the UN system of massive

and serious violaons of human rights and internaonal humanitarian law.

The oce intends to harness this informaon in the service of an early

warning mechanism for the Secretary-General, to make recommendaons

to the Security Council through the Secretary-General based on issues

of concern, and to liaise between relevant agencies in order to enhancethe capacity and eecveness of UN performance in cases of potenal or

ongoing genocide.

Simona Cruciani directs the Informaon Management component

of the OSAPG, and explained some of the challenges facing this new

oce. Our sta has worked for the past four years to develop a careful

methodology so that the OSAPG can carry out its mandate eecvely but

it is dicult to engage and process informaon from various agencies,

Ms Cruciani notes. We have made progress in terms of establishing ourinformaon-sharing with agencies like UNICEF and the Department of

Peacekeeping Operaons, but sensivity to the use of the term genocide

tends to complicate our ability to communicate eecvely about specic

events and countries we might be concerned about. To that extent, the

OSAPG has aempted to both keep discussions behind closed doors while

interacng with the public sphere through its collaboraon and links with

civil society groups. The implicit assumpon seems to be that civil society

groups should voice the judgements that the OSAPG cannot arculate in

the interest of working eecvely within the UN system.



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Is this quiet diplomacy approach helpful, or does it symbolize

the UN preference for ornamental but impotent commiees, commissions

and tles? While James Smith of the Aegis Trust supports the OSAPGs

objecves, he fears the posion may be fundamentally weak. Realiscally,

the OSAPG will not change the fundamental interests, calculaons or veto

decisions of the P-5 members of the Security Council. The present situaon

in Darfur and past precedent suciently shows that naming and shaming

may somewhat inuence the democrac P-5 states, but that China and

Russia remain relavely impervious to this form of pressure.

However, the OSAPG can provide a focal point within the UN

system to digest and analyze informaon, in concert with independent

non-governmental organisaons, and provide genocide-specic warnings

of potenal or unfolding genocides. Dr Mahew Krain, Professor of Polical

Science at the College of Wooster and an expert on genocide, notes that

the most important task for such eorts is to put policians to the test,

and remove the opportunity for excuse-making. In the best case scenario,

the OSAPG would limit the ability of policians to claim ignorance of

genocide; in the worst case, the oce will be ignored. The OSAPG has

established a beachhead of informaonal capacity, and the Special Adviser

should bring aenon to the issues being addressed by enhancing his

public role. While Francis Deng must necessarily lobby quietly within theUN system, the oce should show its commitment to engaging in a public

discourse by increasing Dr Dengs public role, perhaps best accomplished

by organising joint speeches or publicaons with survivors such as Halima

Bashir. However, given the fact that the UN does not instuonally

recognize Darfur as genocide, it remains to be seen whether the Special

Adviser can take even these limited steps.

The Oce of the Special Adiser on the

respsbl Pec

The concept of the Responsibility to Protect or R2P is perhaps

the most encouraging step forward in genocide prevenon from the UN

since the genocide convenon itself. As agreed upon at the 2005 World

Summit, the R2P entails the

...clear and unambiguous acceptance by all governments of

the collecve internaonal responsibility to protect populaons

from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against



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humanity...[and] the willingness to take mely and decisive

collecve acon for this purpose, through the Security Council,

when peaceful means prove inadequate and naonal authories

are manifestly failing to do it.23

The concept of sovereignty as responsibility was inially

formulated by Francis Deng and fellow scholars at the Brookings

Instute in the 1996 publicaon Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conict

Management in Africa. Deng and his colleagues concluded that sovereignty

is fundamentally linked to behaviour, and that the failure to protect ones

populaon from massive violence, crimes against humanity or genocide

constutes, in eect, the abdicaon of the privileges of sovereignty.24

This recognion was rst translated into policy in the African Unions

Constuve Act of 2000, which asserts the right of the Union to intervene

in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to

grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against

humanity.25 The evoluon of this concept led various scholars and

dignitaries to convene the independent Internaonal Commission on

Intervenon and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, chaired by former

Australian diplomat and current President of the Internaonal Crisis Group

Gareth Evans.26 The ndings of the ICISS report formed the basis of Ko

Annans recommendaons in the 2005 report In Larger Freedom: TowardsSecurity, Development and Human Rights for All, and the passage of the

2005 World Summit Outcomes Document.27

The R2P is a common-sense proposion which carries immense

and complex implicaons for internaonal relaons. It falls to Dr Edward

Luck, the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, to communicate

23. 2005 World Outcome Resoluon by the United Naons General Assembly, 24 October 2005, hp://

www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/united_naons/

24. Deng, Francis, Sadikiel, Kimaro, Lyons, Terrence, Rothchild, Donald, & Zartman, William, Sovereignty as

Responsibility: Conict Management in Africa, (Washington, DC: Brookings Instuon Press, 1996)

25. Statement by Edward C. Luck, Special Adviser to United Naons Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

Senior Vice President and Director of Studies of the Internaonal Peace Instute (IPI), 1 December 2008,

hp://www.ipacademy.org/asset/le/409/LArria.pdf

26. The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the Internaonal Commission on Intervenon and State

Sovereignty, February 2007, hp://www.iciss.ca/media-en.asp; see also Evans, Gareth, The Responsibility

to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, (Washington, DC: Brookings Instuon Press,

2008)

27. In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, Report of theSecretary-General to the General Assembly of the United Naons, September 2005, hp://www.un.org/

largerfreedom/



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the UNs vision of the concepts applicaon. If the Responsibility to

Protect is to become an implementable policy, we must keep the scope

narrow, Luck argues. It is crucial that we orient the R2P around three

bedrock pillars rst, reinforcing the concept of the states responsibility

to protect its populaon from mass violence or genocide; second, to assist

and support states which have dicules meeng that responsibility

and to build structures to make this less likely; and nally, to respond

appropriately when a state fails to uphold its responsibility. He notes that

one of the most important points of departure from previous UN policy

is the spulaon that the internaonal must intervene ...when a state

is manifestly failing that is, when the state begins to fail rather than

when it has already failed. This has important implicaons for genocide

prevenon, because it means that as soon as that process is underway theinternaonal community has a responsibility to interrupt it.

How does Dr Luck propose to translate this concept into an

internaonal norm? Our rst task is to get the General Assembly on

board weve already agreed upon the R2P as a goal at the 2005 Summit,

and now we have to be prepared for the next debate in the General,

explains Dr Luck. The challenge is geng countries who are nervous

about sovereignty on board, and that needs to be done by arculang

sovereignty as a responsibility which also has benets. If countries committo that responsibility, they also commit to protecon for themselves, and

to internaonal assistance if need be. Moreover, Luck argues that the third

pillar of the R2P concept the possibility of intervenon is only a last

resort, far outweighed by the emphasis on prevenng state failure through

assistance via development and an emphasis on good governance.

The World Federalist Movement-Instute for Global Policy has

partnered itself with Dr Lucks oce through its dedicated Responsibility

to Protect -Engaging Civil Society (R2PCS) Project.28

Were focused onengaging civil society around the globe in a discussion about what the R2P

means, explains Sapna Chhatpar, Project Manager for the Responsibility to

Protect. We concentrate most of our eorts on working with other NGOs,

parcularly in the Global South, to dispel the impression that this is some

sort of Western, imperialist agenda. By working in close coordinaon with

Dr Lucks oce, the Responsibility to Protect Project seeks to build a global

28. On January 28, 2009, the World Federalist Movement-Instute for Global Policy and 7 other NGOslaunched the Internaonal Coalion for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP). WFM-IGP will dedicate and

integrate its ve year old R2PCS project into the Coalion iniave.



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norm a priority of the last Foreign Oce Strategy Report. In an interview

in Prospect, Mr Miliband rearmed his commitment to the principles of

sovereignty-as-responsibility, arguing that: ...[there is a] responsibility of

states to their own people according to certain universal values, but also

[a] responsibility they have to the internaonal system.... in extreme cases

you do intervene.30 The US State Department does not have a dedicated

R2P desk, and seems to be taking a wait-and-see approach to the

iniave. The individuals with whom I spoke with at the State Department

and legislave advisors who deal specically with the issue of genocide

commented that the underlying principle of the Responsibility to Protect

was, as far as they were concerned, already the operang assumpon of

US foreign policy. Needless to say, much could be done to concreze that

assumpon.

The R2P is a concept of universal signicance, and as such the

US and the UK have a duty to iniate a robust discourse on its potenal

applicaon. It is a welcome sign that this was iniated by the United

Naons, but it would be irresponsible for elected ocials to leave

the development of the concept under the exclusive remit of the UN,

parcularly in light of some of the more problemac aspects of the current

R2P proposal. To begin with, the UN schemes provision that humanitarian

intervenon should be the prerogave of the Security Council wouldinevitably make the applicaon of the principle a non-starter. Aer sixty

years of ignoring the UNGC, there is scant reason to believe that the

Security Council will embrace the principles of the R2P with any convicon,

and the US and UK governments have an obligaon to point this out.

It is crucial that the R2P is subjected to crique in forums

outside of the UN, where policy makers can openly explore the praccal

applicaon of this principle, and discuss strategies to persuade burgeoning

democracies to embrace this principle. While the R2P may be very muchon the radar at the FCO and State Department, there are no current

iniaves within either the US Congress or the UK Houses of Parliament

to bring this issue to the forefront of the legislave agenda. If the R2P is to

evolve into an internaonal norm, parliamentary scruny would provide

a crucial opportunity to address its problemac aspects. The introducon

of a debate or bill on this concept in the US Congress could provide a step

towards achieving some sort of biparsan consensus on Americas future

30. Falkner, Kishwer, Goodhart, David, Miliband, David, Lawson, Dominic, & Reeves, Richard, Milibands

Message, Prospect Magazine, No. 151, October 2008



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Certainly, sprees of UN-bashing can deect aenon from the

fundamental responsibilies of the US and UK to uphold the principles

which the Charter as occurred in the Brish parliament in the aermath

of Rwanda. If we are to avoid another Rwanda, there must be some

way to hold policians accountable for their decisions, Linda Melvern

maintains. This is never going to happen at the UN, but must happen in

Parliament and in Congress as part of the democrac process. Genocide

prevenon and the establishment of the R2P as an internaonal norm

should be central to a renewed eort to full the mandate of the UN

Charter through the creaon of a caucus of democracies within the United

Naons. Alternavely, this could be the goal of new treaty organisaon of

global democracies designed to incenvize responsible behaviour on the

part of states, and, if necessary, to provide an alliance of naons willing toassemble a coalion of the willing to arrest the progress of genocide.

Polic Opons: Forging a United and Consistent Strateg

The failure of a comprehensive strategy for genocide prevenon

to take root in either the State Department or the Foreign Oce can be

largely aributed to the imperaves of mulple compeng goals. Career

diplomats and analysts have a lot on their plate, and are already hard-

pressed to full the priories set by their superiors, explains Victoria Holt,Senior Associate at the Henry L. Smson Centre and expert lead of the

Military Opons component of the Genocide Prevenon Task Forces

2008 report Prevenng Genocide: A Blueprint for US Policymakers. The

challenge is integrang various concerns into a common strategy. For

instance, the decision-makers at the Pentagon are worried about stability,

and are thinking about problems from a dierent vantage point than the

Oce for War Crimes. Everyones got one-too-many things on their plate to

begin with; where will this new priority t into their tasks at hand? So we

need to incorporate the issue into an overall organisaonal strategy, andthe impetus for doing so really has to come from senior leaders inially,

such as the Secretary of State and the President.

Ms Holt added that it is vital that the issue of genocide not be

subsumed solely into the eld of conict prevenon, but that it instead

receive dedicated aenon on the basis of its extremity. Genocide has

a unique place in American thinking for its moral component and the

incalculable loss incurred by the fact not just of mass murder, but of

the loss of generaons, a loss of a people. Accordingly, the Genocide



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Prevenon Task Force report recommends that the Department of

Defense develop clear guidance for planning and policy, and interagency

cooperaon on this issue, with a parcular emphasis on improving the

coordinaon between intelligence-gathering agencies and the Department

of Defence.31

The research achieved by the Genocide Prevenon Task Force

group signals a posive step forward in pung genocide prevenon

on Americas foreign policy agenda. The key recommendaons made

by the Commission express perhaps too much faith in the goodwill and

eecveness of internaonal instuons, yet the core content is likely

to appeal to a biparsan conngent of the US government. Such a policy

iniave oers the Republican minority in Congress the opportunity to join

the Democrac majority to achieve a genuine step forward for the United

States foreign policy agenda, and may help to dispel the popular disgust

expressed towards both pares for the past eight years of parsan rancor.

However, Congressional support is not likely to aect any signicant policy

change without the leadership of President Obama.

President Obama has been sphinx-like on the queson of

whether his foreign policy will further US aempts to promote and protect

internaonal human rights, and even less clear on his intenons regarding

genocide prevenon. Although he has appointed the formidable genocide

expert Samantha Power to his Naonal Security Council, Powers success

as an advocate for eecve prevenon strategies may be hampered by her

enduring convicon that the United Naons should be the locus for such

an endeavour.

Encouragingly, Obama consistently supported legislaon to

address Darfur during his me as a Senator, and raised the issue of

genocide specically in his second debate with John McCain: ...Whengenocide is happening, when ethnic cleansing is happening somewhere

around the world and we stand idly by, that diminishes us. And so I do

believe that we have to consider it as part of our interests, our naonal

interests, in intervening where possible. He has also menoned the

possibility of imposing a no-y zone in Darfur, but has taken no specic

31. Prevenng Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers, Madeleine Albright & William Cohen,Co-Chairs, Genocide Prevenon Task Force, December 2008, hp://www.usip.org/events/2008/1211_

prevenng_genocide.html



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steps on this point since entering oce.32

President Obama has reportedly designated top policy analysts to

review the current US policy on Darfur and make a decision about future

steps. However, this policy review seems unlikely to yield any substanvechange if it does not acknowledge the need to place pressure on China

the chief arms supplier and diplomac defender of Khartoum. This seems

unlikely at present. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has promised that

the Obama administraon will place the issue of Chinas human rights

record on the backburner in exchange for Beijings cooperaon during

the nancial crisis, while at the same me expressing concern over the

situaon in Darfur. Advocates within the US Senate and House should

bring this incompability to the aenon of Congress, and cooperate

with human rights campaigners to expose the likely consequences of this

approach.

What sort of preparatory work should the State Department and

Foreign Oce take to beer ancipate the possibility of genocide, and to

prepare an appropriate response? Genocide should be seen as the most

severe point of a breakdown which is quite common around the world,

argues Charles Garraway. It is characterisc of the post-Westphalian stage

we may well have reached, in which the end of the Cold War has loosed the

arcial boundaries of states, and the ethnic and human divisions those

boundaries cut across are coming into conict. Certainly, the divisions so

oen dened by ethnicity or religion parcularly in countries lacking the

habits of democrac governance, coping with the legacy of colonial divide-

and-rule policies, or suering from problems of scarce resources have the

potenal for targeted violence on a mass scale.

A long-term prevenon strategy would be the most polically

appealing approach to this issue. The US State Department alreadycontains a number of departments which handle the issues of US policy

relang to genocide and mass atrocies. However, there may be a case for

assembling a new iniave focused on sovereignty and mass atrocies,

which could draw together interagency eorts at early warning and

arculate US policy in relaon to sovereignty and the issues of prevenon

and intervenon. According to the Genocide Prevenon Task Force, the

Oce of War Crimes Issues which should be the go-to point within the

State Department for risk assessment and strategy relang to potenally

genocidal situaons is currently only able to devote an esmated 10%

32. Marshall, Will, Obama Needs a Strong Foreign Policy, The Wall Street Journal, 7 November 2008



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of its me and resources to these tasks.33 Instead, most of the oces

resources are focused on the criminal tribunals which contribute lile to

the task of prevenng or stopping genocide to begin with. The FCO has

tended to focus on tribunals and models of conict prevenon which rely

on the assumpon of reasonable conduct by perpetrators, and which

overlook the extremist views which so oen inform genocidal policies. To

that end, the incorporaon of a genocide prevenon model in the Foreign

Oces analycal framework may be a step towards a more proacve

approach in the Anglosphere and, potenally, for Europe as a whole.

In the short term, diplomac eorts at negoaon with groups

likely to enter into the condions necessary for genocide namely, a civil

war or a takeover of power by a group dened in totalist or exclusivist

terms is a necessary but oen insucient pursuit. If the US were to

replace the State Department with the AFL-CIO and Britain replaced

the Foreign Oce with the trade unions, we would be much beer o,

jokes Michael Horowitz, Director of the Hudson Instutes Project for

Internaonal Religious Liberty. These diplomats have no skill in bargaining

with nasty governments, and they fall into this trap where they think that

the guy on the other side of the table is representave of his people.

Scoop Jackson understood that when youre bargaining with bad regimes,

they tend to be much more fragile than they seem, and if you ghten thescrews a bit, you may just get them to make some concessions.34

James Smith, Director of the Aegis Trust, commented on what

he perceives as reluctance by diplomats to depart from preconceived

understandings of a situaon as a convenonal conict, when that

altercaon may have shied to full-scale genocide. Genocide nearly always

occurs during a me of war, but this seems always to confuse diplomats,

he reasons. They cant see the forest of genocide, if you will, for the

trees of conict. The United Kingdom has shown lile interest in Darfuroutside its assistance in forging the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of

2005. Incredibly, these negoaons did not take the ongoing genocide into

consideraon as a hindrance to an implementable peace agreement. The

33. Prevenng Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers, Madeleine Albright & William Cohen,

Co-Chairs, Genocide Prevenon Task Force, December 2008, hp://www.usip.org/events/2008/1211_

prevenng_genocide.html

34. Henry M. Scoop Jackson (D-Washington) was a Congressman and Senator from 1941-1983 known for

his robust atude to internaonal security issues and the Soviet Union but also for his human rights focusin foreign policy as a way of demonstrang that there can be no moral equivalence between democracies

and non-democracies. The Henry Jackson Society is named aer him.



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UK government could have done so much more, laments Louise Roland-

Gosselin, Director of the an-genocide NGO Waging Peace. DfID and the

FCO just changed the subject and would not address the Sudanese regimes

predominant role in the deaths of civilians in the West. By constantly

arming that all sides of the conict were at fault, they reassured the

Sudanese government that the UK was not ready to use its power or

inuence to stop the killing. As an advocate of the Darfuri cause in the

House of Lords, Lord Avebury concurs, I think we could have taken a much

rmer line of Darfur, but it took quite a long me to get it on the agenda.

It is crucial for US and Brish diplomats to take a bold and creave

approach towards instances of genocide or mass atrocity; an approach

which appreciates the dangers of instuonal groupthink, recognizes the

limits of negoaon and remains in close consultaon with actors external

to the diplomac process such as displaced peoples. Sancons, travel bans

and the imposion of no-y zones may help to deter perpetrators, but

these forms of non-military coercion are rarely implemented in full force,

and must be backed by the promise of punive acon by the internaonal

community. Targeted sancons and measures such as divestment are

designed not to aect the populaon at large, although their overall

eecveness in deterring genocide or atrocies remains quesonable.

Oversight of the use and abuse of trade partnerships and internaonal aidis a related area of concern in genocide prevenon, and deserves sustained

aenon.35

The US and the UK are at a turning point in dening their essenal

approach to foreign policy. At this me of nancial, polical and diplomac

turmoil, neither country can aord to be indecisive. In the UK, there

is a distressing gap between David Milibands erudite rhetoric on the

imperave of democracy and the Foreign Oces weak response to the

2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, which implicitly backed Brussels virtualacquiescence to the revival of Russian imperialism. Following his more

recent and widely cricized rejecon of the concept of a War on Terror,

Mr Milibands desire to forcefully tackle the key issues and threats of

the age has begun to seem increasingly doubul. It remains to be seen

whether a renewed and reorganised Labour leadership or an incoming

Conservave government can change this current stalemate, although

35. For example, Linda Melvern reports that the Rwandan government siphoned millions of dollars fromthe IMFs World Development Fund to nance the purchase of machetesa case which has yet to receive

any sustained aenon by the internaonal community.



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Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague has indicated that his approach

to the FCO would be bolder than that of Mr Miliband. Michael Horowitz

of the Hudson Instute is parcularly opmisc that Hague would beer

integrate a consideraon of human rights into the instuonal conduct

of the FCO: He understands both the moral and strategic importance of

building cross-party coalions to take a stand on key human rights issues.

Its no coincidence that he is a biographer of Wilberforce I believe he will

bring that Wilberforce-ian agenda back into Brish polics.36

Is this failure of Brish foreign policy symptomac of a

malaise within Parliament regarding foreign aairs? A numbe

485. Craven St (38) The Henry Jackson Society, address

Documents

Transcript of 485. Craven St (38) The Henry Jackson Society, address