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44 Risk Governance

S. Roeser, R

DOI 10.100

Marijke A. Hermans . Tessa Fox . Marjolein B. A. van AsseltFaculty of Arts & Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht,

The Netherlands

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094

The Origins of Risk Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095

Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095

Positivistic Risk Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096

Enlightened Engineering and Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096

Anthropology/Sociology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097

Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098

Science and Technology Studies (STS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1098

Political Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099

Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099

Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1100

Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1101

The Origins of Risk Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1102

The Typology of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104

Risk Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108

Risk Governance Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108

The Communication and Inclusion Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109

The Integration Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110

The Reflection Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1111

Conclusion and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112

. Hillerbrand, P. Sandin, M. Peterson (eds.),Handbook of Risk Theory,

7/978-94-007-1433-5_44, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

1094 44 Risk Governance

Abstract: Recently, the notion of risk governance has been introduced in risk theory. This

chapter aims to unravel this new concept by exploring its genesis and analytical scope. We

understand the term ‘‘risk governance’’ as the various ways in which many actors, individuals,

and institutions – public and private – deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity

and/or ambiguity. It includes, but also extends beyond, the three conventionally recognized

elements of risk analysis (risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication). Risk

governance emphasizes that not all risks can be calculated as a function of probability and effect.

We argue that risk governance is more than only the critical study of complex, interacting

networks in which choices and decisions are made around risks; it should also be understood as

a set of normative principles which can inform all relevant actors of society on how to deal

responsibly with risks. In this chapter, we take stock of the current body of scholarly ideas and

proposals on the governance of contemporary risks along the lines of three principles: the

communication and inclusion principle, the integration principle, and the reflection principle.

Introduction

Over the past few decades, modern society has been increasingly challenged to manage poten-

tially negative outcomes of technological developments. The nature of these hazards, as well as

their lack of temporal and spatial limits, has given rise to a call for a new integrative approach that

aims to understand, assess, and handle risks to human health and the environment by building

upon and extending current risk analysis practices. Many discussions about technological

innovation occur nowadays in the public arena, which concern not only health and safety but

also ethical and social issues. Arguably a decline of public trust in the ability of experts and policy

makers to deal with risks has been accompanied by a growing demand for public participation in

scientific and technical decision making (Adams 2005; Beck 1992; Giddens 1991;Wynne 1982).

How can we deal with these increasingly complex and demanding risks and with the need

for more public involvement? One set of proposals is clustered under the heading ‘‘risk

governance,’’ a combination of the terms ‘‘governance’’ and ‘‘risk.’’ ‘‘Risk governance’’ aims to

provide an approach for how to deal responsibly with public risks. Risk governance pertains to

the various ways in which many actors, individuals, and institutions – public and private – deal

with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity and/or ambiguity. It includes, but also

extends beyond, the three conventionally recognized elements of risk analysis: risk assessment,

risk management, and risk communication. It moreover requires consideration of the legal,

institutional, social, and economic contexts inwhich risk is evaluated, as well as consideration of

the interests and perspectives of different actors and stakeholders. In sum, risk governance aims

to take into account the complex web of actors, rules, conventions, processes, and mechanisms

concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analyzed, and communicated, and

how management decisions are taken (IRGC (International Risk Governance Council) 2005,

2007; Renn 2008; Renn et al. 2011; van Asselt and Renn 2011; van Asselt and Vos 2008).

Risk governance has its origins in the scholarly ideas on how to deal with demanding public

risks informed by several decades of interdisciplinary research drawing from engineering

studies, psychological and sociological research on risk, science and technology studies

(STS), social movement theory, and research by policy scientists and legal scholars, including

Ravetz (e.g., Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992; Ravetz 1996 [1971]), Nowotny (e.g., Nowotny 1976,

2008; Nowotny et al. 2001), Fischhoff (e.g., Fischhoff et al. 1984), Slovic (e.g., Slovic 1987, 2000),

Risk Governance 44 1095

Wynne (e.g., Irwin and Wynne 1996; Wynne 1982, 2002a), O’Riordian (e.g., O’Riordan 1982;

O’Riordan et al. 2001; O’Riordan andMcMichael 2002), Beck (e.g., Beck 1992, 2009; Beck et al.

1994), Jasanoff (e.g., Jasanoff 1990, 2005), Tesh (Tesh 2000), the Kaspersons (e.g., Kasperson

and Kasperson 1991, 2005a, 2005b, see also Pidgeon et al. 2003), Lofstedt (e.g., Lofstedt 2005;

Lofstedt and Renn 1997), Stirling (e.g., Stirling 1998, 2004), van Asselt and Vos (e.g., van Asselt

2000; van Asselt and Vos 2006, 2008; Vos 2000, see also Fisher 2008), Fischer (e.g., Fischer 2002;

Fischer et al. 2006), Huitema (Huitema 2002), Mourik (Mourik 2004), and so-called cultural

theorists (e.g., Adams 2005; Douglas andWildavsky 1982; Rayner 1992; Thompson et al. 1990).

This body of knowledge provides a convincing and empirically sound basis to argue that many

risks cannot be calculated on the basis of quantitative methods alone, and that regulatory

models which build on this assumption are not just inadequate, but form a complication to

responsibly dealing with many contemporary risks.

In this chapter, we will explain the origins of risk governance and the issues and proposals

that fall under this heading. Is risk governance indeed amajor change in the ways in which risks

are conceptualized, appraised, regulated, and communicated as proponents claim? The con-

tours of this framework are derived from the work of a number of prominent scholars, whom

we will discuss in this chapter, but the process of turning these empirically informed theoretical

proposals into practical reality is still in its infancy. Hence, this chapter aims to provide

an original perspective on risk theory since it examines what is referred to as a ‘‘paradigm

shift’’ compared to the classic, quantitative, probability-based approach to risk assessment,

management, and communication.

We will first describe the origins of the concept (section >The Origins of Risk

Governance), reflecting on the most important scientific approaches and disciplines in risk

research that have contributed to the emergence of risk governance (section >Risk). Next,

we discuss risk governance as part of the broader governance turn in policy sciences

(section >Governance), and its context of origin (section >The Origins of Risk Governance).

Following the state-of-the-art review by van Asselt and Renn (Renn et al. 2011; van Asselt and

Renn 2011), we will discuss what is agreed to be needed to address uncertain, complex, and

ambiguous risks adequately (section>The Typology of Risk). The various ideas and proposals

pertaining to risk governance are discussed in terms of a set of principles: the communication

and inclusion principle, the integration principle, and the reflection principle (section >Risk

Governance). These principles aim to synthesize the most important aspects in organizing

structures and processes to govern risks.

The Origins of Risk Governance

Risk

The urge to suppress and control risks has been a human endeavor since the ancient Greeks,

followed in modern times by the prominent idea that risks are manageable and measurable

(Bernstein 1996). This positivistic, quantitative approach to risk, in which estimation of

probability and effect is central, has been and still is the dominant way of conceptualizing,

assessing, andmanaging risks. Only recently an academic change of focus has emerged realizing

that many contemporary risks reach beyond this traditional definition of risk as calculable and

predictable. The social experience of risk is not confined to or not even expressible as


a technical definition of risk, namely, the product of probability and effect. The way people

conceptualize and deal with risks in their everyday lives is influenced by values, attitudes, social

influences, and cultural identity. We will describe these critical developments in different

strands of literature that have contributed to the current understanding and thus explicitly

or implicitly to the idea of risk governance. These contributions are very multidisciplinary,

ranging from psychology and law to science and technology studies (STS).

Summarizing the work of many authors for several decades cannot be done without

compromising historical or scholarly accuracy. However, this overview aims to sketch

a general picture of the broad sweep of major ideas and empirically informed insights that

have given rise to risk governance. We therefore do not claim to be exhaustive.

Positivistic Risk Paradigm

In the beginning of the twentieth century, two influential economists delved into the problems

of risk. Frank Knight published Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Knight 1921) in the same year as

JohnMaynard Keynes published ATreatise on Probability (Maynard Keynes 1921 [2004]). Both

scholars addressed the problems of making choices in uncertain circumstances and both

defined the concept of ‘‘risk’’ and ‘‘uncertainty,’’ albeit in opposite ways.

Knight argued that it is possible and necessary to sharply distinguish risk from uncertainty:

risk can be explained as ‘‘you don’t know for sure what will happen, but you know the odds,’’

while uncertaintymeans that ‘‘you don’t even know the odds’’ (Adams 2005). Thus, Knightian

uncertainty is immeasurable and not calculable. By contrast, risk is measurable by using the

formula: risk = chance � effect. Keynes, on the other hand, did not distinguish risk from

uncertainty. He claimed that life was dominated by uncertainty, not probability. If life would

obey to the laws of probability, humans would have no choices and no influence on the course

of events. He therefore stressed the positive associations of uncertainty. In a way, as will become

clearer throughout his chapter, risk governance could be viewed as inheriting from the

Keynesian view on uncertainty and risk.

However, the Knightian definition dominated and is still dominant in practices of risk

assessment and management and in many scientific disciplines such as engineering and

economics, which use technical risk analyses to calculate expected benefits and monetary

costs, or as part of engineering planning and design. Knight’s concept of risk narrows the

focus to the probability of events and the magnitude of specific consequences. It has had

a major influence on risk regulation, becoming the ‘‘golden formula’’ and the basis of what is

referred to as the classical or positivistic risk approach, which developed in the course of the

twentieth century. Following the classical risk approach, two phases are distinguished and are

ideally institutionally separated: identification and evaluation of risk (risk assessment) and

taking measures to control risks that are deemed unacceptable (risk management).

Below we will discuss research traditions and contributions that implicitly or explicitly

relate to a more Keynesian view on uncertainty and risk.

Enlightened Engineering and Psychology

From the 1960s onward, we notice an important turn in risk research from a narrow positivistic

risk focus to an approach incorporating qualitative, social, cultural, and normative aspects that


are believed to be an intrinsic aspect of complex risks. In the 1960s, some engineers expanded

their risk research from a pure technical exercise into a focus on risk perception, namely on

how individuals perceive risks in everyday life. Starr (1969) developed a quantitative method to

look at how people weigh risks and advantages. He was one of the first to show that people

accept activities that are voluntary (e.g., smoking) more than those that are involuntary (e.g.,

living next to nuclear power plant). He furthermore introduced the distinction between

‘‘objective’’ and ‘‘perceived’’ risk, to discriminate between the ‘‘scientific definition’’ and the

‘‘lay perception’’ (Starr and Whipple 1980). Risk perception research, taken up by cognitive

psychologists after Starr’s pioneering work, built upon Starr’s observation that experts and the

public often have different notions of what constitutes a risk. This observation became

particularly poignant in the fierce public resistance against nuclear energy in the 1960s and

1970s. Even though scientific experts declared nuclear energy as a safe and clean form of energy,

the public perceived it as a threat and protested against it.

The field of psychology has had a major influence on risk studies since questions arose

about the publics’ acceptance of risks. Psychologists claim that the public acceptance and

reluctance to take risks needs to be explored in relation to the complexities of the human mind

(Bouder 2008). Psychologists have dramatically increased our understanding of individual risk

decisions and their wider impact on society. Challenging Starr’s strict voluntary/involuntary

model, so-called psychometric studies, rooted in psychology and decision theory, focused on

the roles of affect and emotions in influencing risk perception. Key characteristics such as

familiarity, control, catastrophic potential, equity, and level of knowledge have been proven to

influence risk decisions (Slovic 2000; Slovic et al. 1982; see also van Asselt 2000 for an

overview). The psychometric paradigm, using standardized questionnaires and large-scale

surveys, has become one of the dominant approaches in the field of risk research.

Anthropology/Sociology

In the 1980s, anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky moved

beyond the focus on the individual and his/her subjective estimates and challenged the

dominance of the psychometric paradigm by publishing Risk and Culture (Douglas and

Wildavsky 1982) in which they introduced the ‘‘Cultural Theory of Risk.’’ Cultural Theory

stresses the importance of culture and society in shaping perceptions of risk. Cultural theorists

analyze social responses to risk as being determined by cultural belief patterns that encourage

individuals and social groups to adopt certain values and reject others. Cultural Theory

outlines four ‘‘ways of life’’ in a group/grid typology: fatalism, hierarchy, individualism, and

egalitarianism. By defining risk as a socially constructed phenomenon, Douglas andWildavsky

aimed to show the limitations of quantitative risk assessment that pin down risk in objective

measurements and the limitations of psychometric studies that neglect social and cultural

influences on risk perception. They challenged the objective-perceived dichotomy:

" The main questions posed by the current controversies over risk show the inappropriateness of

dividing the problem between objectively calculated physical risks and subjectively biased

individual perceptions. (. . .) Between private, subjective perception and public, physical science

there lies culture, a middle area of shared beliefs and values. The present division of the subject

that ignores culture is arbitrary and self-defeating (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p. 194).


In the last decades, this approach has been further developed by other authors (Rayner

1992; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson, et al. 1990; Wildavsky and Dake 1990) and

applied in various contexts (see e.g., Rotmans and de Vries 1997). Even though the validity of

these prototypical descriptions has been debated, cultural analysis has indicated that there is

not one single, universal approach and conceptualization of risk (Renn 1998).

Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF)

In the 1980s, the development of sociological risk research was heavily influenced by fierce

public resistance and controversies regarding new technologies such as nuclear power and

disasters such as in Bhopal and Chernobyl. Several prominent scholars tried to integrate the

research on the public experience of risk from psychology, anthropology, sociology, and

communication studies into an interdisciplinary framework called ‘‘Social Amplification of

Risk Framework’’ (SARF) (Kasperson et al. 1988; Pidgeon et al. 2003).

" The framework aims to examine broadly, and in social and historical context, how risk and risk

events interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that amplify

or attenuate risk perceptions and concerns, and thereby shape risk behavior, influence institu-

tional processes, and affect risk consequences (Pidgeon et al. 2003, p. 2).

The main thesis of SARF is that information processes, institutional structures, social

behavior, and individual responses shape the social experience of risk in ways that either

increase or decrease public perceptions of risk. SARF tries to explain why risks or risk events

assessed as minor by experts might producemassive public reactions, and even have substantial

social and economic impacts (risk amplification), while other risks that have been assessed by

experts as dangerous do not produce anxious reactions, but are almost ignored (risk attenu-

ation). Examples of ‘‘risk attenuation’’ are smoking or traffic accidents. ‘‘Risk amplification’’

can fuel risk controversies, such as around nuclear energy or genetically modified organisms.

The framework tries to integrate the technical assessment of risk with the social and cultural

experience of risk, while at the same time it is questioned whether it offered additional

knowledge for understanding risks (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby 2006).

Science and Technology Studies (STS)

Scholars in science and technology studies (STS), or more specifically sociology of scientific

knowledge (SSK), critically examine the role and place of technology and science in contem-

porary society in an interdisciplinary way (Hess 1997b). STS is not only the study of how

modern societies are constituted by science and technology and how science and technology

affect society, politics, and culture, but also how reciprocally, cultural, social, and political

factors determine technological and scientific developments. STS cannot be defined as

a homogeneous field, but is composed of different research traditions with their own particular

interest such as philosophy of science, laboratory studies, feminist studies, and contributions to

risk research (for broad overviews of the field see, e.g., Hackett et al. 2007 and Hess 1997a).

Risk has been, implicitly or explicitly, a recurring theme in STS research. STS is especially

known for its critique on the assumption of superiority of science-based knowledge. The

underlying assumption of the objective-perceived dichotomy is that ‘‘lay persons’’


misunderstand the ‘‘real’’ risks as known to science, and thus nonscientific definitions of risks

or problems are labeled as ‘‘perception’’ (Wynne 2002b). This implies that risk controversies are

envisioned as disagreements between ‘‘objective’’ risk assessments and public misperceptions

constructed by ill-informed and emotive publics (Irwin and Wynne 1996). STS scholars

criticize this assumed hierarchized dichotomy between experts and laypersons.

STS start from a new understanding of knowledge: they argue that science is a human

product, something that has to be ‘‘made’’ or ‘‘constructed.’’ The constructed nature of

scientific knowledge is defined in contrast with a naive view of scientific work as a purely

rational process of representing nature by using transparent observations (Hess 2001). What

becomes ‘‘science’’ or ‘‘risk’’ is the outcome of complex and strategic interactions between

divergent actors (Collins 1985). Especially studies of scientific controversies have revealed the

complex processes, involving many more actors than just expert scientists, by which reliable

knowledge is created and contested (Jasanoff 1999; Shapin and Schaffer 1985).

By emphasizing the constructed nature of science, STS research claims to be impartial with

respect to truth or falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or failure of knowledge. STS explain

all belief systems symmetrically: they give equal weight to the views of laypeople and experts

(Bloor 1976). STS research does not take the views of experts for granted and challenges the

assumption that scientific knowledge is the only valid way to discuss risk issues (Wynne 1982).

Political Sciences

Political science contributes to risk research through its focus on macro-level decision making

processes and public policies in the regulation of risks, often comparing different legislations.

In policy sciences, the notion ‘‘governance’’ has become a popular concept, referring to

a blurring of the state and civil society; to increasing levels of participation; and a shared

responsibility between state, business, and civil society (Walls et al. 2005). Policy sciences have

an important influence on the development of the idea of risk governance, as governance is

a notion directly borrowed from policy science (see section >Governance for an elaborate

discussion of ‘‘governance’’). Political scientists reflect on changing patterns of governance and

differences in regulatory traditions inmanaging health-related, environmental, and other risks.

The focus of their research can vary from questioning how risks are managed in countries with

different political environments (e.g., Huitema 2002; Versluis 2003) to comparing the use of

the precautionary principle in different regulatory regimes (e.g., Wiener et al. 2010) and

analyzing organizational cultures, structures, functions, and processes in controlling and

managing risks (e.g., Sparrow 2008).

Law

The role of law in dealing with the complex dynamics of understanding risks and uncertainty

has been one of laying down rules and procedures, for example, on products, substances, or the

environment, among which are also the use of scientific advice, participation, and the precau-

tionary principle. Legal research has particularly contributed to a better understanding of how

the various institutions ranging from political actors to court deal (and struggle) with risk and

uncertainty in specific policy areas with specific reference to the role of the precautionary

principle (Alemanno 2007; Arcuri 2007; de Sadeleer 1999; Everson and Vos 2009; Fisher 2008;


Prevost 2008; van Asselt and Vos 2006; Weimer 2010). Within law, the understanding of

uncertain risks relates to looking into the regulatory reality (i.e., issues of legality, legitimacy,

credibility, and procedural requirements) when decisions must be taken in the face of scientific

uncertainty. Most research on uncertain risks in the context of risk governance has focused on

genetic engineering, climate change, food technology and safety standards (Rothstein 2009;

van Asselt and Vos 2008; Vos 2009; Surdei and Zurek 2009), and environmental risks with

much attention for the precautionary principle (Fisher 2008; Vos 1999; Zander 2010).

Reflection

From this overview, it becomes clear that there are different disciplinary and interdisciplinary

approaches and conceptual frameworks to the concept of risk. But together, the social sciences

(including contributions from authors originally trained in natural sciences and engineering)

have deeply changed our understanding of what ‘‘risk’’ means, ‘‘from something real and

physical if hard to measure, and accessible only to experts, to something constructed out of

history and experiences by experts and laypeople alike’’ (Jasanoff 1999, p. 150). The different

approaches have mostly been positioned with regard to their epistemological premises:

a positivistic/realist or a social constructivist view of risk (reviews of the implications of

a constructivist versus a realist concept of risk can be found in Bradbury 1989; Jasanoff 1999;

Krimsky and Golding 1992; Renn 1992). A realist perspective implies that there is a standard of

‘‘real’’ risk against which lay perception can bemeasured and shown to be attributed to a lack of

public understanding of science and technology. A social constructivist view of risk argues that

risk and technology are social processes rather than physical entities, risks do not ‘‘simply’’

reflect the natural reality but are shaped by history, politics, and culture. Public perceptions are

therefore not irrational but are as legitimate as other more technocratic views. Even though this

categorizationmakes perfect sense, some approaches are difficult to position and fields can also

change their perspective (e.g., SARF is difficult to classify since many scholars started out from

a psychometric ‘‘realist’’ perspective but also acknowledge the diversity of risk judgments, see

Renn 2008).

Another way to understand the differences in assumption of the diverse fields is to look at

whether, and if so, how and which boundaries are assumed, imposed, or contested. The set of

boundaries that play a role in risk research are boundaries between subjective and objective

risk; between science and nonscience; between experts and laypeople as well as between experts

and policymakers; between individual and groups; and between risk assessment and risk

management. Drawing or contesting particular boundaries in risk research has a pivotal role

in determining the policy problem of risk and a possible framework for solutions (Bradbury

1989). If it is assumed that scientific knowledge is superior to lay persons’ views, then the

ensuing solution is a better education of that public. If such boundaries are contested, solutions

will be less straightforward and might, for example, call attention to the critical role of experts

in political processes.

Where does the ‘‘risk governance’’ framework set out in this chapter stand in this major

debate? The framework both ‘‘tries to avoid the naıve realism of risk as a purely objective

category, as well as the relativistic perspective of making all risk judgments subjective reflec-

tions of power and interests.’’ (Renn 2008, p. 5). Risk governance is about dealing with both the

‘‘physical’’ and ‘‘social’’ dimensions of risk. It expands beyond the dominating technical criteria


for risk analysis and acknowledges public values and concerns as legitimate in their own right

but at the same time it searches for ways to benefit from knowledge qualified as

scientific. Public views should therefore not be downplayed by labeling them as mere irrational

fears. Risk governance is about diffusing boundaries. In this context, we propose to use the

notion of ‘‘risk perspective’’ instead of ‘‘risk perception’’ when talking about different view-

points on risk issues. Risk perception has the long-standing connotation that it implies

a distinction between ‘‘perceived’’ (by the ‘‘emotive and irrational’’ public) and ‘‘real’’ (by

‘‘objective’’ scientists) risks (Marris et al. 2001). Thus, a boundary is drawn between one

superior knowledge base above another inferior one. ‘‘Risk perspective,’’ in contrast, acknowl-

edges the multiplicity of views on risk in various arenas and in various cultures in a more

symmetrical manner (Hermans et al. in preparation).

Governance

In the previous part, we have discussed ideas that have paved the way for risk governance. Even

though many of them do not use the term risk governance explicitly, their contributions have

been indispensible in terms of bringing forward ideas, principles, and frameworks for how to

deal responsibly withmodern risks. The notion of ‘‘risk governance’’ itself has been coined only

recently (our discussion of its history follows van Asselt 2007, van Asselt and Renn 2011, and

Renn et al. 2011). Risk governance as an emerging concept should be understood in the

context of the broader ‘‘governance’’ turn in the policy sciences (Versluis 2003). The notion

‘‘governance’’ came into fashion in the 1980s in circles engaged with development (Stern 2000)

and was soon adopted in other domains. The conceptual use of governance has increasingly

been adopted in the political science context to emphasize that the state is not the only, single

most important actor (there is also a perspective on governance, provocatively termed

‘‘governance without government,’’ see Rosenau 1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), which

emphasizes the decreased and decreasing role of the nation state) in managing and organizing

society. Many classical policy theories share a hierarchic orientation with government as the

central actor. In contrast, policy theories inspired by economics award that central role to the

market. Both clusters of theories are single-actor in their perspective on power and control.

The governance perspective, however, holds that collective binding decisions are generated and

implemented in complex multi-actor networks and processes; it also considers various social

actors next to state and market such as NGOs and ad hoc coalitions of civilians, of which it is

unclear who their supporters are and whom they represent – civil servants, experts, think tanks,

agencies, and all kinds of committees active. Power, knowledge, and the capacity to act are

distributed among these various actors.

The governance perspective steers away from two other prominent strands of theories, e.g.,

supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, by raising new questions considering the role

and power of states and by drawing attention to the diversity of actors, the diversity of their

roles, the manifold relationships between them, and all kinds of dynamic networks emerging

from these relationships. When referring to a multilevel governance perspective also ‘‘govern-

ment’’ is no longer a single entity (Rauschmayer et al. 2009). Scholars subscribing to the

governance perspective examine actor-networks, the dynamics and the roles of the various

actors in these dynamics as a way to understand policy development and political decisions.

The shift to governance is best understood as a response to new challenges, such as


globalization, increased international cooperation (such as the European Union), societal

changes, including increased citizens engagement, and the rise of nongovernmental organiza-

tions (NGOs), the changing role of the private sector, and the augmenting complexity of policy

issues. The culmination of all these challenges leads to the need for a new legitimate form of

governance (Pierre and Peters 2000; Walls et al. 2005).

The notion governance is used both in a descriptive and in a normative sense (van Asselt

2007; van Asselt and Renn 2011). In a descriptive use of the term, the idea of a complex web of

manifold interactions between heterogeneous actors is used to describe the current state of

affairs. Governance is then an observation and an approach. The description of governance as

‘‘structures and processes for collective decision-making involving governmental and

nongovernmental actors’’ is an example of a descriptive definition (Nye and Donahue 2000).

In a normative use, the notion of governance refers to amodel or framework for organizing and

managing society. In the famous 2001 White Paper of the European Commission on gover-

nance (European Commission 2001), such a normative perspective is propagated. In the White

Paper, which can be read as a response to the BSE-crisis, governance is presented as an alternative

model, inwhich transparency, stakeholder participation, accountability, and policy coherence are

key principles. Often this distinction between description (of the state of affairs) and (policy)

model is not made. As a consequence, it is unclear whether governance serves as reference to the

framework guiding the analysis or whether it has the status of a (proposed) policy theory.

This is also true for risk governance. Here, the term ‘‘governance’’ is also used in

a descriptive and a normative sense. Van Asselt and Renn (2011) argue that on the one hand

the state of affairs pertaining to the regulation of many risks is adequately described in terms of

governance. Risk decisions can only be understood as the upshot of complex interplays

betweenmultiple actors. The governance perspective is needed to sensibly examine and explain

the societal dynamics around issues framed as risk issues.

Van Asselt and Renn (2011), furthermore, argue that risk governance also involves the idea

that in regulatory practice this state of affairs is not adequately accommodated. The nature of

many risks requires cooperation, coordination, and trust between a range of stakeholders, who

have diverging interests and different perceptions of the (potential) risks involved. Many risk

scholars assert that in case risks are inadequately addressed andmanaged, this may lead to what

the sociologist Ulrich Beck has called ‘‘organised irresponsibility’’ (Beck 1992). Against this

background, ideas and principles for how to deal with risks in a more adequate and more

responsible manner are proposed. In doing so, governance is no longer used only in

a descriptive but also in a normative sense: a new form, or at least new principles, of dealing

with risks. Thus, risk governance is a hybrid of an analytical frame and a normative model.

Such hybrids are also found in decision theory where the various stages of decisionmaking that

the theory suggests can be used as a checklist of how decisions aremade (descriptive use) and at

the same time functions as a guideline of how to organize the decision process when complex

decisions have to be made (normative model) (Keeney 1992, 2004; North 1968).

The Origins of Risk Governance

For a detailed discussion see van Asselt (2007) and van Asselt and Renn (2011). The notion

‘‘risk governance’’ has been coined only recently. The origins of the composition of ‘‘risk

governance’’ and its introduction to the scholarly literature can be traced back to different


sources. Notable is the link to ‘‘TRUSTNET’’ (European Commission 2000; Heriard Dubreuil

et al. 2002) concerted action on ‘‘risk governance’’ (Amendola 2001; Elliot 2001; Heriard

Dubreuil et al. 2002), as well as endeavors preceding TRUSTNET. The OECDwork on systemic

risk (OECD 2003) and the Hood et al. (Hood et al. 2001) book on the government of risk are

examples of key trailblazers. In 2001, the first articles with risk governance in their title

appeared in two peer-reviewed scientific journals: Journal of Hazardous Materials (Heriard

Dubreuil 2001) and Science and Culture (Elliot 2001). The notion was furthermore used in EU

calls for proposals (van Asselt 2007; van Asselt and Renn 2011).

To complicate the matter, interpretations of risk governance differ. In the scholarly

literature, risk governance is used as an opposition to the classical notions of risk assessment

and risk management by putting uncertainty in center stage and by advancing multi-actor,

multifaceted risk processes including contextual factors which together determine the roles,

relationships, and responsibilities of particular actors and mechanisms (Renn and Walker

2008; van Asselt and Renn 2011). The European Commission, however, used risk governance

more traditionally as an umbrella notion ‘‘embracing risk identification, assessment, manage-

ment and communication’’ rather than as an alternative paradigm (as cited in van Asselt and

Renn 2011). For some years, there was no serious attention given to how risk governance

was used and what it actually meant. This situation changed with the foundation of the

International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) in 2003 (See >Box 44.1).

Box 44.1. The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC)

The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), a private, independent, not-for-profit Founda-

tion based in Geneva, Switzerland, was founded in 2003. In the late 1990s, challenges of global

technological change such as genetic engineering resulted in increased public concern about risk

assessment and management strategies in the EU. During the annual gathering ‘‘10th Forum

Engelberg’’ in Switzerland, scientists, government leaders, and heads of industry decided to create

an independent, international body to bridge the increasing gaps between science, technological

development, decision-makers, and the public.

Since its formal foundation in 2003, it has organized many expert workshops on risk-related

issues ranging from critical infrastructures, natural hazards, to nanotechnology and other emerg-

ing risks. The IRGC’s work took off with the White Paper No.1 ‘‘Risk Governance – Towards an

integrative approach’’ (Renn 2005). This white paper, written under chairmanship of Ortwin Renn,

is the first scholarly effort to develop risk governance conceptually. This paper aims to create ‘‘an

integrated analytic framework for risk governance which provides guidance for the development

of comprehensive assessment and management strategies to cope with risks, in particular at the

global level. The framework integrates ‘‘scientific, economic, social and cultural aspects and

includes the effective engagement of stakeholders’’ (IRGC (International Risk Governance Council)

2005, p. 11). The framework offered two innovations to risk research by including the societal

context in the assessment and management of risk, and by categorizing risks based on the

knowledge about it, distinguishing between ‘‘simple,’’ ‘‘complex,’’ ‘‘uncertain,’’ and ‘‘ambiguous’’

risks (> Fig. 44.1).

This framework displays the five key elements which reflect the way in which risk can be dealt

with that fully accounts for the societal context of both the risk and the decision that is reached

(IRGC 2005).

Categorisingthe

knowledgeabout the risk

Characterisationand Evaluation

Communication AppraisalManagement

Pre-Assessment

UnderstandingDeciding

. Fig. 44.1

The IRGC risk governance framework. (Source: http://www.irgc.org/-The-IRGC-risk-governance-

framework,82-.html, with kind permission from the International Risk Governance Council)


Through a network between academia, NGOs, regulators, and industry, it is the IRGC’s aim to

jointly achieve coordinated and coherent policy making, regulation, research agendas, and

communication with regard to the governance of risks.

The White Paper was also published as a lead chapter in the books The Tolerability of Risk

management (Bouder et al. 2007) and Global Risk Governance: Concept and Practice Using the IRGC

Framework (Renn and Walker 2008); see also a similar chapter in Bischof (2008), in which next to

the framework itself critical reviews and case studies have been included. Subsequently, some

agencies and national regulatory bodies have partially adopted the framework and designed

manuals on how to use it for their specific purpose (see, e.g., Dreyer and Renn 2009 for EFSA and

the Handbook for Risk Assessment and Policy Advice of the Dutch Food and Consumer Product

Safety Authority (Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit (VWA) 2010).

The Typology of Risk

For the typology of risk, we adopt the approach of van Asselt and Renn (2011) and Renn et al.

(2011). This typology is a further development of Renn’s original typology as set out in Klinke

and Renn (2002) and the IRGC White Paper on Risk Governance (2005). Central to risk

governance is the recognition that there are various types of risks. Since the Knightian

definition (see section >Risk of this chapter), risks have been treated in terms of probability

and effects, dose and response, and agent and consequences. Risk governance involves the

http://www.irgc.org/-The-IRGC-risk-governance-framework,82-.html

http://www.irgc.org/-The-IRGC-risk-governance-framework,82-.html


recognition that uncertainty and risk cannot as easily be distinguished as is assumed in the

positivistic risk paradigm. Some risks are simple, namely, calculable and relatively easy to

manage. In those cases, past experience and the associated availability of statistical data enable

to estimate probability and to derive a measure of effect. Existing risk assessment tools and risk

management approaches suffice. Examples involve car accidents and regularly recurring

natural events, such as seasonal flooding.

However, many risks cannot be classified as ‘‘simple.’’ They are not confined to national

borders or a single sector, and do not fit the linear, mono-causal model of risk. Instead, the

analysis must focus on interdependencies and ripple and spill-over effects that initiate impact

cascades between otherwise unrelated risk clusters (Hellstroem 2001; van Asselt and Renn

2011). A well-known example is BSE which had effects not only on the farming industry but

also on the industry of animal feed, the economy as a whole, and politics (Vos 2000; de Bandt

and Hartmann 2000; OECD 2003; Renn and Keil 2009; see >Box 44.2 in this chapter). The

transmission effects were globally diffused to all areas of the world, including those that were

Box 44.2. The Impact of the BSE Crisis in Risk Research

The BSE crisis has provided a turning point in the way actors – industry, regulators, scientists, and

many others – have started to deal with risks and uncertainties. Prior to the BSE crisis, the EU

managed risks in, e.g., food safety regulation on a rather ad hoc basis (Vos 2000). The BSE case

demonstrated the need for a more structural regulation in policy fields in which risks play a role,

such as food safety, environment health and safety, and chemical policy. BSE was first identified in

Britain in the mid-1980s, and is thought to be caused by the remnants of slaughtered animals that

have ended up in the high-protein diets of cattle in the beginning of the 1980s. By eating this,

cows could develop a fatal neurodegenerative disease, commonly known as ‘‘Mad Cow Disease.’’

Although it has not been scientifically verified, it is thought that by either eating infected beef or

by inhaling the bone meal fertilizer, people risk infection and could develop a variant of the

disease, Creutzfeld Jacob, which is a fatal neurological disorder.

The initial response to this uncertain risk by regulators – seeking certainty about the param-

eters of the crisis – illustrated the need for a new way of approaching risk-related issues. Although

research was ongoing, regulators attempted to obtain plausibility proofs, i.e., they increasingly

resorted to science for more certainty and conclusive evidence. They hoped that this would sooth

an anxious public andwould allow for a quick fix to a persistent problem full of uncertainty that was

providing a threat to the economy since beef sales plummeted. In 1990, in an ultimate attempt to

reassure the public, restore trade in beef, and establish regulatory credibility, the British Minister

of Agriculture, well aware of the uncertainty of the risk, fed his 4-year-old daughter a hamburger

on British national television, implying its absolute safety. Several years thereafter, scientists

discovered a possible link between mad cow disease and the human Creutzfeld Jacob variant.

The aftermath of the BSE crisis led to serious rethinking of risk regulation in academia and

beyond and was an incentive for many to develop and advocate a paradigm shift toward a more

inclusive way of dealing with risks. It became a ‘‘textbook example’’ to show that the way in which

certain risks – such as BSE – were assessed and managed were no longer adequate or acceptable.

Moreover, it also led to reforms and/or the birth of major risk regulating institutions in several

European countries (e.g., the UK) and the EU (with the formation of a new ‘‘European Food Safety

Authority,’’ EFSA) (Oosterveer 2002; Renn 2008; van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005; Vos 2000).


not immediately affected by the crisis. Such risks are complex (multi-causal) and surrounded

by uncertainty and/or ambiguity (Renn et al. 2011; van Asselt and Renn 2011). It is difficult to

identify, let alone quantify, multi-causal, usually nonlinear, links between a multitude of

potential causal agents and specific effects. Complexity can be caused by interactive effects

among agents (synergisms or antagonisms), long delay periods and the associated latency

lacunae (this notion has been introduced to the risk literature by Harremoes et al. 2001 –

latency lacuna refers to the fact that technologies are improved during the period in which

health and/or environmental impacts are studied; when such monitoring and impact studies

identify risks, the question is whether those findings still hold for the newer generation of the

technology), interindividual variation, etc. Due to complexity, it is impossible to achieve

complete deterministic knowledge of cause–effect relationships.

Risk refers to the possibility of damage, whether in health, environmental, economic, or

other terms. As long as the risk has not manifested itself in damages, the threat is potential and

is evaluated by one ormore actors as negative. Due to the fact that these situations often involve

structural changes and or new hazards, they are highly uncertain. Uncertainty is not simply the

absence of knowledge (compare van Asselt 2000 and Levidow et al. 2005). However, addressing

uncertainty is a challenging, far from straightforward, job. Numerous scholars agree that there

cannot be a single approach in addressing uncertainty that will satisfy in all circumstances and

contexts (Bailey et al. 1996; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Harremoes, et al. 2001; Health Council

of the Netherlands 2008; Klinke and Renn 2002; Morgan and Henrion 1990; O’Riordan and

McMichael 2002; Pollack 2003; Ravetz (1996 [1971]); van Asselt and Petersen 2003; van Asselt

and Renn 2011; van Asselt and Rotmans 2002; van der Sluijs 1997; Walker et al. 2003; WRR

(Scientific Council for Government Policy) 2010).

In addition to complexity and uncertainty, risk governance includes a third component:

ambiguity (Klinke and Renn 2002; Renn and Roco 2006; van Asselt and Renn 2011). Ambiguity

refers to the existence of multiple values. Ambiguity results from divergent and contested

perspectives on the justification, severity, or wider meanings associated with a perceived threat

(compare Stirling 2003). As a consequence, views differ on the ways to assess and appraise the

risks, and more in particular on the relevance, meaning, and implications of available risk

information and on which management actions should be considered. This means that there

are different legitimate viewpoints from which to evaluate whether there are or could be

adverse effects and whether these risks are tolerable or even acceptable. Risks are acceptable

in case they are considered low or nonexisting, so additional regulatory efforts are considered

unnecessary. Activities are tolerable if they are considered as worth pursuing for the benefit that

they carry (Bouder et al. 2007). In cases of tolerable risks, additional regulatory efforts for risk

reduction or coping are welcomed. Actors, however, respond to risks according to their own

risk constructs and images, yielding several meaningful and legitimate interpretations of risk

assessment outcomes (Keeney 2004). As a consequence, whether risks are acceptable, tolerable,

or not can be subject of considerable debate and intense controversy. Ambiguity is used to refer

to such social situations around risk issues. Examples involve controversies pertaining to

passive smoking (although the health risks of active smoking are uncontroversial).

Many of the non-simple risks discussed pertain to future risks, namely, potential hazards

that may or may not result in damage in the long run. Take the example of nanotechnology: the

risk assessment for this new technological development depends on theoretical, nonempirical

insights and ideas about causal relationships between exposure(s) and effect(s) on human

health and environment. Furthermore, it depends on the decisions that humans make about


the use, application, exposure barriers, and safety culture with respect to these technologies.

Finally, the context, such as the level of trust in the regulators, major accident(s) elsewhere, and

coincidences between exposure to nanoparticles and detrimental effects is of influence.

Another illustration is the case of wireless communication technology, a popular and

ubiquitous technology with a very high penetration rate that nevertheless ignites public

concern, especially at a local level where the technology is implemented with thousands of

base stations (see, e.g., Burgess 2004; Soneryd 2007; Stilgoe 2007). Governments attempt to act

responsibly, but are confronted with little, inherently uncertain evidence that this technology

poses a threat to human health. While the majority of experts emphasize that to date no

consistent evidence has demonstrated cancer risks, uncertainties remain about long-term effects

and effects on children as well as other health effects (van Asselt et al. 2009). A growing literature

has illustrated the difficulty in dealing with such risks, since the nature of the risk is the

outcome of a complex interplay of science, technology, and society (e.g., Jasanoff 2005).

Van Asselt and Renn (2011) and Renn et al. (2011) argue that it is possible, in theory, to

distinguish between uncertain, complex, and ambiguous risks. However, uncertainty often

results from complexity (van Asselt 2000). An illustrative example is the case of the introduc-

tion of genetically modified species in the environment. It is generally accepted that the risks to

the environment and/or human beings are highly uncertain. Krayer von Kraus (2005) analyzed

how experts view such risks. From his analysis detailing the varying ideas on which variables

matter and which mechanisms should be included in the causal scheme, it is also clear that

GMOs constitute an example of complex risks. Furthermore, taking into account that the risks

are evaluated differently by different experts, as has been convincingly demonstrated by

Jasanoff (2005), it is clearly also an example of ambiguous risks. So risks associated with

genetic modification, and agro-biotechnology in particular, are best characterized as risks that

are uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. The same is true for such risks such as nuclear energy

or climate change.

Uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity point to different reasons why many risks defy

simple concepts of causation (van Asselt and Renn 2011). Each of the three characteristics of

risks contributes to a better understanding of the situation in which risks emerge and manifest

themselves. Risk governance thus highlights the importance of uncertain, complex, and/or

ambiguous risks. In its 2008 scientific report ‘‘Uncertain Safety,’’ theWRR (the Dutch Scientific

Council for Government) calls for a paradigm shift with regard to the governance approach to

risks. The WRR (WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy) 2010) as well as the Health

Council in the Netherlands (Health Council of the Netherlands 2006, 2008), for instance, have

made an effort to translate the ideas that pertain to risk governance, among which is the

acceptance of uncertainty, to practice. These scientific advisory bodies play a key role in

advising the Dutch government about societal relevant issues. They furthermore aim to form

an intersection in international policy (http://www.wrr.nl/english/, accessed April 5, 2011).

They argue that the classical risk paradigm and its policy based on ‘‘simple’’ risks are outdated,

but should not disappear. Rather, a paradigm shift to risk governance should take place,

focusing policy on uncertain, complex, and ambiguous risks. Simple risks, which inhibit little

to no uncertainty (WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy) 2010), the so-called certain

uncertainties (van Asselt 2000), should have the status of the special cases, rather than the

dominant position that they have in current policy on riskmanagement and assessment practices.

Furthermore, it is a consistent finding in the body of literature discussed in section >The

Origins of Risk Governance that very often, uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks are

http://www.wrr.nl/english/


treated, assessed, and managed as if they were simple (Renn et al. 2011; van Asselt and Renn

2011). The assessment and management routines in place do not do justice to the nature

of such risks. The consequences of this maltreatment range from social amplification or

irresponsible attenuation of the risk to sustained controversy, deadlocks, legitimacy

problems, unintelligible decision-making, trade conflicts, border conflicts, expensive rebound

measures, and lock-ins. The main message from risk governance is that it is urgently needed

to develop better conceptual and operational approaches to understand and characterize

non-simple risks.

Risk Governance

Risk governance or the new risk approach, as it is called by theWRR, has gradually been created,

developed, and discussed in scientific literature and has slowly entered the organizational level

as well (WRR (Scientific Council for Government Policy) 2010). However, regulatory and

managerial understanding, let alone practical application and implementation of this

approach, still need development. Complex, uncertain, and ambiguous risks require an

organizational setting which fosters an interdisciplinary perspective, flexibility, and diversity,

which is at odds with current managerial practices (WRR (Scientific Council for Government

Policy) 2010; Health Council of the Netherlands 2008; van Asselt and Renn 2011).

What is needed to treat uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks adequately? Van Asselt

and Renn (2011) argue that first of all, it is important to accept scientific uncertainty and

controversy and public debate as the state of affairs. In many cases the governing of risks will

involve precaution in the sense of a cautious and flexible strategy that enables learning from

restricted errors, new knowledge and visible effects, so that adaption, reversal, or adjustment of

regulatory measures is possible (See also De Vries et al. 2011; van Dijk et al. 2011). Precaution

also entails the responsibility for early warning and monitoring in order to facilitate systematic

searching for new hazards by institutions of government, business, or civil society (Charnley

and Elliott 2002). Risk governance is not just concerned with minimizing risks, but also with

stimulating resilience (or decreasing vulnerability) in order to be able to withstand or even

tolerate surprises (Collingridge 1996).

Risk Governance Principles

Risk governance endorses highly contextualized practices of dealing with risks; it is not a model

in the strict sense of the word. The idea of risk governance aims to serve a paradigm shift that

helps risk professionals to familiarize themselves with a broader concept of risk. Van Asselt and

Renn (2011) and Renn et al. (2011) proposed to synthesize the various ideas and proposals in

a set of principles, which can inform about how to deal with uncertain, complex, and/or

ambiguous risks in various contexts:

● Communication and inclusion

● Integration

● Reflection

The set of principles are discussed in more detail below.


The Communication and Inclusion Principle

In the context of risk governance, van Asselt and Renn (2011) argue that communication is

crucial. Effective mutual communication takes center stage in the challenges risk governance

aims to address and should be approached accordingly. In case of sidestepping communica-

tion, successful risk governance is irretrievably harmed. As we discussed in section >The

Origins of Risk Governance, initially, risk communication has been approached in terms of

educating and persuading the public (Fischhoff 1995). However, this ‘‘deficit model’’ has been

questioned by research on risk controversies (see, e.g., Horlick-Jones 1998; Irwin and Wynne

1996) that shows that the public is often falsely dismissed as a collection of laypersons incapable

of understanding and interpreting science. Risk governance builds on the acknowledgment

that there are various, conflicting risk perspectives.

Van Asselt and Renn (2011) refer to communication as meaningful interactions in which

knowledge, experiences, interpretations, concerns, and perspectives are exchanged (compare

Lofstedt 2005). The role of communication within risk governance is threefold. To begin with,

communication entails the process of sharing knowledge and information on the various risk

perspectives. Secondly, it may lead to the inclusion of various actors in the decision-making

process which will lead to a sense of ownership. Communication might under certain condi-

tions simultaneously increase the level of trust among all actors involved (Lofstedt 2005) which

is an important, if not necessary, component in the acceptance of particular risk management

arrangements.

However, communication in the context of risk governance is not simple. It is not just

a matter of bringing people together. Social learning is required in order to find ways to discuss

risk perspectives. Preparing the structure of the process is key. It is also required to figure out

which type of communication with whom is important in which phase. Constructive com-

munication does not imply that all actors remain in a constant dialogue with each other. It also

does not imply that this question of ‘‘who is important in which phase’’ can be easily answered.

Rather, communication requirements may differ depending on the context, such as political

culture, the dominant social values and the trust relationships between actors. Hence, enabling

communication is insufficient. The interaction level of the actors involved needs to tie into the

challenges that accompany uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. By keeping a constant eye

on ‘‘who is important inwhich phase,’’ it will become visible throughout the process which type

of communication with whom is constructive and contributes to the responsible governance of

uncertain risks. This remains a trial and error process in which various actors learn.

Inclusion has deep implications. Contrary to the current state of affairs in which risk topics

are usually identified by experts, risk perspectives of other actors may act as the driving agents

for identifying risk topics. Inclusion does not just mean that various actors are included, but

that they play a key role in framing (or pre-assessing) the risk (IRGC (International Risk

Governance Council) 2005; Renn 2008; see also Roca et al. 2008). Inclusion should be open and

adaptive at the same time (Stirling 2004). Inclusion is defended for several reasons (compare

Renn et al. 2011; Roca et al. 2008; van Asselt and Renn 2011). First, inclusion is needed to

explore various sources of information and knowledge and to identify various risk perspectives.

Second, it is argued from a democratic perspective that actors affected by the risks and/or the

ways in which the risks are governed have a right to participate in deciding about those risks.

Thus, inclusion is not just a means, but an end in itself. Third, it is argued that the more actors

are involved in weighing the essentially heterogeneous pros and cons, the more socially robust


the outcome. People engaged in the participatory process tend to be more satisfied about the

process itself than about its outcomes. Inclusion is thus supposed to support the coproduction

of risk knowledge, the coordination of risk evaluation, and the design of risk management.

However, including various actors can be a challenge. The challenge is to organize produc-

tive and meaningful communication with, and inclusion of, a range of actors, who have

complementary roles and diverging interests. The available empirical analyses suggest that

the attempt to include different stakeholders can help to de-escalate conflicts and to legitimize

the final decision that will always disappoint some actors in society (Beierle and Cayford 2002;

US-National Research Council of the National Academies 2008). Inclusion does not, however,

necessarily reduce conflict or lead to more widely accepted decisions (Kinney and Leschine

2002). Participation procedures themselves can become a source of conflict (Wiedemann and

Femers 1993). Not every relevant actor might be interested in participating. Some actors might

try to impose their framing on the process from the very beginning (van Asselt and Vos 2006).

It is important to accept and address conflict, even though in many cases conflicts cannot be

settled nor should that be the aim.

The Integration Principle

Integration refers to the need to collect and synthesize all relevant knowledge and experience

from various disciplines and various sources, including uncertainty information and articula-

tions of risk perspectives. Scientific expertise should therefore not be regarded as a panacea to

provide clear-cut solutions to non-simple risk problems. Risk governance still seeks scientific

knowledge, but in order to look beyond the terms of likelihood and effects when it concerns

uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks. The integration principle emphasizes that also

values and issues such as reversibility, persistence, ubiquity, tolerability, equity, catastrophic

potential, controllability, and voluntariness should be integrated in risk assessment and

evaluation. Furthermore, risk governance is not just about risks and usually not about

a single risk. Risk governance requires risk(s)–benefit(s) evaluations and risk–risk trade-offs.

The integration principle reflects the importance of such multidimensional evaluations.

Although it is quite impossible to ever fully understand uncertain, complex, and/or ambig-

uous risks, improvements can be made to understand them better. One way of doing this is, on

the one hand, by transcending disciplinary (academic) boundaries, and on the other hand, by

including more practical and tacit knowledge, in order to reflect a large variety in social and

cultural values, preferences, and worldviews. Such an extended perspective will enable a set of

consistent and coherent scenarios of future decision opportunities on which the relevant actors

can make informed choices (see for an example of such regulation scenarios Fox et al. 2011).

Integration also refers to the process itself. Risk governance advances a holistic approach to

framing, appraising, characterizing, evaluating, and managing risks (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby

2006). This implies that a strict separation between risk assessment and risk management is

counterproductive and in need of critical reexamination (Jasanoff 1993). Risk governance is

not a linear, sequential three-stage process of risk assessment, management, and communica-

tion, but it is dynamic and it requires interlinked and iterative processes. Although it may still be

useful to distinguish assessment (examining the risks and benefits) from management (identi-

fying regulatory options), it is important to realize that they can and should not be viewed as

unconnected activities to be carried out in different realms. In other words, the separation of


risk assessment and risk management does not imply a complete ‘‘divorce’’ (Williams and

Thompson 2004, p. 1622). Jasanoff (2005) as well as van Asselt and Vos (2008) have argued

that boundary work is an effective way to make problems appear to be simple. Defining risk

assessment and management as separate realms enables analysts to ignore uncertainty, com-

plexity, and ambiguity. The integration principle calls attention to the need to consider the

interconnections, both content-wise and in terms of process, between the various risk-related

activities. Shedding light on these interconnections may also enable the actors involved to gain

a better overview of the risks and uncertainties involved, which may lead to better practices.

The Reflection Principle

Unfortunately, risk governance cannot be routinized. Differentiation is not an exception, but

rather the rule. Reflection is a necessary component since it enables actors and institutions to

maintain a critical outlook on what they are doing (compare Beck et al. 1994; Schon 1983) in

order to continue to treat the risks as uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous instead of simple,

which each require different practices (van Asselt and Vos 2006, 2008; Wynne 2002a). What is

needed is a collective reflection about balancing the possibilities for overprotection and

underprotection. Van Dijk et al. (2011) refer to this balancing act as ‘‘prudent precaution.’’ If

too much protection is sought, innovations may be prevented or stalled; if too little protection

is provided, society may experience unmanageable unpleasant surprises. The classic question

‘‘How safe is safe enough?’’ is replaced by the question ‘‘Howmuch uncertainty is the collective

willing to accept in exchange for some benefit(s)’’? So the focus shifts from risk to uncertainty

(compare De Vries et al. 2011). The communication and inclusion principle hold that various

actors take part in this reflective discourse and discuss how decisions could and should bemade

in the face of irresolvable uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The reflection principle

emphasizes that there are important difficult issues (uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity)

which are in need of repeated consideration of all actors throughout the process. Every

situation requires differentiation and flexibility and becomes a balancing act. Otherwise, the

process risks to (re)introduce the familiar frames and routines developed for simple risks.

Hence we have to be alert.

A crucial component of such reflexivity is to remain critical about inclusion and integra-

tion. One should not aim for a situation in which there is full trust – even though this might

occasionally be achieved – since it often implies an approach aimed at risk acceptance rather

than an approach aimed at critical reflection from public skepticism. Moreover it is important

to find and maintain a pragmatic balance, whereby each risk is assessed on its own character-

istics within a certain context, thereby taking into account its associated social dynamics (Walls

et al. 2005). Risk governance thus may contribute to a ‘‘repolitization’’ of risk questions that

have been ‘‘depoliticized,’’ i.e., risk issues that have only been treated technocratically. In other

words, depolitization is not the strategy behind risk governance (compare van Asselt and Vos

2006 who explicitly call attention to the political deficit in current ways of dealing with

uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks). Risk governance thus fundamentally differs

from the traditional, positivistic approach that aims at depolitization by means of technocra-

tization and strict boundaries between realms and activities. Reflexivity requiresmore scholarly

consideration as well, since the contemporary scholarly debate seems to focus mainly on the

communication and inclusion principles.


In sum, risk governance should not be considered as a panacea. It rather aims to facilitate

a broader understanding of issues pertaining to contemporary risks. Risk governance aims to

integrate insights that can be gained from decades of research on risk. The most recent

development is to attempt to synthesize the insights gained into a set of principles. This set

of principles has to prove to be both robust and applicable to practice.

Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter, in order to contribute to risk theory, we have explored and analyzed the origins

and contours of risk governance. To that end, we reflected on important scientific develop-

ments in different strands of literature that have all contributed to the current understanding

and thus explicitly or implicitly to the idea of risk governance in risk theory. These contribu-

tions are very multidisciplinary, ranging from psychology to law to science and technology

studies (STS). We also discussed risk governance as part of the broader governance turn in

policy sciences. Following the state-of-the-art review by van Asselt and Renn (2011), we

emphasized that it is central to risk governance that it is recognized that uncertainty and risk

cannot as easily be distinguished as is assumed in this positivistic risk paradigm. Many risks

which require societal choices and decisions can be adequately characterized as complex,

uncertain, and/or ambiguous risks. Risk governance pleas that uncertain, complex, and/or

ambiguous risks are recognized and it aims to provide a basis for (more) adequate treatment.

It is a consistent finding in the risk literature, that too often these risks are treated, assessed, and

managed as if they were simple. The persistent societal controversies pertaining to genetic

engineering, nuclear energy, and chemical risks suggest an urgent need to develop alternative

approaches to deal with uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks. We have discussed risk

governance as an attempt to provide a basis for such alternatives. We discussed the proposal to

see risk governance as a set of principles that can inform thinking on non-simple risks practices:

the communication and inclusion principle, the integration principle, and the reflection

principle. These principles aim to synthesize the most important aspects to be organized in

order to be able to govern risks responsibly. The multitude of references to ‘‘risk governance’’

has unduly given it the status of a ‘‘buzzword.’’ However, we believe that it should be understood

as a plea for a paradigmatic and practical shift in dealing with modern risks. But it will not be an

easy passage. We think that taking stock might help to facilitate a shift in risk practices.

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